Internet Draft                                           Paul Hoffman
draft-hoffman-ipsec-aes-prf-00.txt                     VPN Consortium
June 16, 2003
Expires in six months

                  The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm for IKE

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all
provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

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Abstract

Some implementations of IPsec may want to use a pseudo-random function
derived from AES. This document describes such an algorithm, called
AES-XCBC-PRF-128.

1. Introduction

[AES-XCBC-MAC] describes a method to use AES (the Advanced Encryption
Standard) as a message authentication code (MAC) whose output is 96 bits
long. While 96 bits is generally considered sufficient for a MAC, it is
too short to be useful as a long-lived pseudo-random  (PRF) in either
IKE version 1 or version 2. Both versions of IKE use the PRF to create
keys in a fashion that is dependent on the length of the output of the
PRF. Using a PRF that has 96 bits of output creates keys that are easier
to attack with brute force than a PRF that uses 128 bits of output.

Fortunately, there is a very simple method to use much of [AES-XCBC-MAC]
as a PRF whose output is 128 bits: omit the step that truncates the
128-bit value to 96 bits.


2. The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm

The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 algorithm is identical to [AES-XCBC-MAC] except
that the truncation step in section 4.3 of [AES-XCBC-MAC]  is *not*
performed. That is, there is no processing after section 4.2 of
[AES-XCBC-MAC]. Of course, the test vectors in section 4.6 can be used,
but only those listed as "AES-XCBC-MAC", not "AES-XCBC-MAC-96".


3. Security considerations

The security considerations are the same as those in [AES-XCBC-MAC].


4. References

4.1 Normative references

[AES-XCBC-MAC] "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ciph-aes-xcbc-mac. This document is currently in the
RFC Editor's queue for publication.


5. Author's address

Paul Hoffman
VPN Consortium
127 Segre Place
Santa Cruz, CA  95060  USA
paul.hoffman@vpnc.org