Internet-Draft R. Housley
Intended status: Standards Track Vigil Security
Expires: 27 September 2017 27 March 2017
Use of the SHA3 One-way Hash Functions in the
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
<draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00.txt>
Abstract
This document describes the conventions for using the four one-way
hash functions in the SHA3 family with the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS).
Status of This Memo
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1. Introduction
The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS] is used to digitally
sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
This specification describes the use of the four one-way hash
functions in the SHA3 family (SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and
SHA3-512) [SHA3] with the CMS. In addition, this specification
describes the use of these four one-way hash functions with the
RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [PKCS1] and the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the CMS
signed-data content type.
1.1. ASN.1
CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[ASN1-E].
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [KEYWORDS].
2. Message Digest Algorithms
One-way hash functions are also referred to as message digest
algorithms. This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and
SHA3-512 [SHA3].
Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData
digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the
DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData
digestAlgorithm field.
Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the
Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values
are input to signature algorithms.
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 produce output values with
224, 256, 384, and 512 bits, respectively. The object identifiers
for these four one-way hash functions are as follows:
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 7 }
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id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 8 }
id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 9 }
id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 10 }
When using the id-sha3-224, id-sha3-s256, id-sha3-384, or id-sha3-512
algorithm identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL
but absent.
3. Signature Algorithms
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support the four SHA3 one-way hash functions
with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [PKCS1] and
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the
CMS signed-data content type.
Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData. Also, signature algorithm
identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of
countersignature attributes.
Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of
SignedData. Also, signature values are located in the SignerInfo
signature field of countersignature attributes.
3.1. RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA3
The RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is defined in [PKCS1]. When RSASSA PKCS#1
v1.5 is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash
functions, the object identifiers are:
sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224 ::= { sigAlgs 13 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256 ::= { sigAlgs 14 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384 ::= { sigAlgs 15 }
id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512 ::= { sigAlgs 16 }
The algorithm identifier for RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 subject public keys
in certificates is specified in [PKIXALG], and it is repeated here
for convenience:
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rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }
When the rsaEncryption, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224, id-
rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256, id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384,
and id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512 algorithm identifier is used,
AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST contain NULL.
When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used, the RSA public
key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent, MUST be
encoded using the RSAPublicKey type as specified in [PKIXALG]. The
output of this encoding is carried in the certificate subject public
key. The definition of RSAPublicKey is repeated here for
convenience:
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
When signing, the RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm generates a
single value, and that value is used directly as the signature value.
3.2. ECDSA with SHA3
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[DSS]. When ECDSA is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-
way hash functions, the object identifiers are:
sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 ::= { sigAlgs 9 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 ::= { sigAlgs 10 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 ::= { sigAlgs 11 }
id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 ::= { sigAlgs 12 }
When using the id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224, id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256, id-
ecdsa-with-sha3-384, and id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 algorithm
identifiers, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but
absent.
The conventions for ECDSA public keys is as specified in [PKIXECC].
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
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When signing, the ECDSA algorithm generates two values. These values
are commonly referred to as r and s. To easily transfer these two
values as one signature, they MUST be ASN.1 encoded using the ECDSA-
Sig-Value defined in [PKIXALG] and repeated here for convenience:
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
r INTEGER,
s INTEGER }
4. Message Authentication Codes
This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
implementations that support the HMAC with SHA3 message
authentication code (MAC).
MAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData
macAlgorithm field.
MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field.
When HMAC is used in conjunction with one of the SHA3 one-way hash
functions, the object identifiers are:
hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 13 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 14 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 15 }
id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 16 }
When the id-hmacWithSHA3-224, id-hmacWithSHA3-256, id-
hmacWithSHA3-384, and id-hmacWithSHA3-512 algorithm identifier is
used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.
5. Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade.
When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
content could originate from any one of the parties.
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Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
relies on a random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random
number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic such values can
result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier
to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching
the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force
searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random
numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers important guidance in
this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186-4 [DSS] provides some PRNG
techniques.
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic
algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to
regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.
6. Normative References
[ASN1-B] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
Recommendation X.680, 2015.
[ASN1-E] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
[CMS] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard,
version 4", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013.
[HMAC] Krawczyk, H., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
Authentication", RFC 2104. February 1997.
[KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[PKCS1] Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"
RFC 8017, November 2016.
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[PKIXALG] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.
[PKIXECC] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
August 2015.
7. Informative References
[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
Appendix. ASN.1 Module
TBD
Author Address
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
USA
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
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