Internet Architecture Board                                   R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Informational                             K. O'Donoghue
Expires: May 5, 2016                                    Internet Society
                                                        November 2, 2015

Problems with the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the World Wide Web


   This document describes the technical and non-technical problems with
   the current Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for the World Wide
   Web.  Some potential technical improvements are considered, and some
   non-technical approaches to improvements are discussed.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 5, 2016.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Very Brief Description of the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Technical Improvements to the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Weak Cryptographic Algorithms or Short Public Keys  . . .   3
     3.2.  Certificate Status Checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  Short-lived Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.2.  CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.3.  Proprietary Revocation Checks . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.2.4.  OCSP Stapling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Surprising Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.3.1.  Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) . . . . . .   7
       3.3.2.  HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.3.  HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) . . . . . . . .   8
       3.3.4.  DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) . .   9
       3.3.5.  Certificate Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Automation for Server Administrators  . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Policy and Process Improvements to the Web PKI  . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Determination of the Trusted Certificate Authorities  . .  11
     4.2.  Governance Structures for the Web PKI . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Other Considerations for Improving the Web PKI  . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix B.  IAB Members at the Time of Approval  . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   There are many technical and non-technical problems with the current
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) used for the World Wide Web.  This
   document describes these problems, considers some potential technical
   improvements, and discusses some non-technical approaches to

   The Web PKI makes use of certificates as described in RFC 5280
   [RFC5280].  These certificates are primarily used with Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) RFC 5246 [RFC5246].

2.  Very Brief Description of the Web PKI

   Certificates are specified in [RFC5280].  Certificates contain, among
   other things, a subject name and a public key, and they are digitally
   signed by the Certification Authority (CA).  Certificate users

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   require confidence that the private key associated with the certified
   public key is owned by the named subject.  A certificate has a
   limited valid lifetime.

   The architectural model used in the Web PKI includes:

   EE:   End Entity -- the subject of a certificate -- certificates are
         issued to Web Servers, and certificates are also issued to
         clients that need mutual authentication.

   CA:   Certification Authority -- the issuer of a certificate --
         issues certificates for Web Servers and clients.

   RA:   Registration Authority -- an optional system to which a CA
         delegates some management functions such as identity validation
         or physical credential distribution.

   CAs are responsible for indicating the revocation status of the
   certificates that they issue throughout the lifetime of the
   certificate.  Revocation status information may be provided using the
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560], certificate
   revocation lists (CRLs) [RFC5280], or some other mechanism.  In
   general, when revocation status information is provided using CRLs,
   the CA is also the CRL issuer.  However, a CA may delegate the
   responsibility for issuing CRLs to a different entity.

   The enrollment process used by a CA makes sure that the subject name
   in the certificate is appropriate and that the subject actually holds
   the private key.  Proof of possession of the private key is often
   accomplished through a challenge-response protocol.

3.  Technical Improvements to the Web PKI

   Over the years, many technical improvements have been made to the Web
   PKI.  This section discusses sever problems and the technical
   problems that have been made to address them.  This history sets the
   stage for suggestions for additional improvements in other sections
   of this document.

3.1.  Weak Cryptographic Algorithms or Short Public Keys

   Over the years, the digital signature algorithms, one-way hash
   functions, and public key sizes that are considered strong have
   changed.  This is not a surprise.  Cryptographic algorithms age; they
   become weaker with time.  As new cryptanalysis techniques are
   developed and computing capabilities improve, the work factor to
   break a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce.  For this
   reason, the algorithms and key sizes used in the Web PKI need to

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   migrate over time.  A reasonable choice of algorithm or key size
   needs to be evaluated periodically, and a transition may be needed
   before the expected lifetime expires.

   The browser vendors have been trying to manage algorithm and key size
   transitions, but a long-lived trust anchor or intermediate CA
   certificate can have a huge number of subordinate certificates.  So,
   removing a one because it uses a weak cryptographic algorithm or a
   short public key can have a significant impact.

   As a result, some valid trust anchors and certificates contain
   cryptographic algorithms after weakness has been discovered and
   widely known.  Similarly, valid trust anchors and certificates
   contain public keys after computational resources available to
   attackers have rendered them too weak.  We have seen a very
   successful migration away from certificates that use the MD2 or MD5
   one-way hash functions.  However, there are still a great number of
   certificates that use SHA-1 and 1024-bit RSA public keys, and these
   should be replaced.

   Today, the algorithms and key sizes used by a CA to sign certificates
   with a traditional lifespan should offer 112 to 128 bits of security.
   SHA-256 is a widely studied one-way hash function that meets this
   requirement.  RSA with a public key of at least 2048 bits or ECDSA
   with a public key of at least 256 bits are widely studied digital
   signature algorithms that meet this requirement.

3.2.  Certificate Status Checking

   Several years ago, many browsers do not perform certificate status
   checks by default.  That is, browsers did not check whether the
   issuing CA has revoked the certificate unless the user explicitly
   adjusted a setting to enable this feature.  This check can be made by
   fetching the most recent certificate revocation list (CRL) RFC 5280
   [RFC5280], or this check can use the Online Certificate Status
   Protocol (OCSP) RFC 6960 [RFC6960].  The location of the CRL or the
   OCSP responder is usually found in the certificate itself.  Either
   one of these approaches add latency.  The desire to provide a snappy
   user experience is a significant reason that this feature was not
   turned on by default.

   Certificate status checking needs to be used at all times.  Several
   techniques have been tried by CAs and browsers to make certificate
   status checking more efficient.  Many CAs are using of Content
   Delivery Networks (CDNs) by CAs to deliver CRLs and OCSP responses,
   resulting in very high availability and low latency.  Yet, browser
   vendors are still reluctant to perform standard-based status checking
   by default for every session.

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3.2.1.  Short-lived Certificates

   Short-lived certificates are an excellent way to reduce the need for
   certificate status checking.  The shorter the life of the
   certificate, the less time there is for anything to go wrong.  If the
   lifetime is short enough, policy might allow certificate status
   checking can be skipped altogether.  In practice, implementation of
   short-lived certificates requires automation to assist web server
   administrators, which is a topic that is discussed elsewhere in this

3.2.2.  CRL Distribution Points

   The certificate revocation list distribution point (CRLDP)
   certificate extension RFC 5280 [RFC5280] allows a CA to control the
   maximum size of the CRLs that they issue.  This helps in two ways.
   First, the amount of storage needed by the browser to cache CRLs is
   reduced.  Second, and more importantly, the amount of time it takes
   to download a CRL can be scoped, so that the amount of time needed to
   fetch any single CRL is reasonable.

   Few CAs take advantage of the CRLDP certificate extension to limit
   the size of CRLs.  In fact, there are several CAs that publish
   extremely large CRLs.  Browsers never want to suffer the latency
   associated with large CRLs, and some ignore the CRLDP extension when
   it is present.  Browsers tend to avoid the use of CRLs altogether.

3.2.3.  Proprietary Revocation Checks

   Some browser vendors provide a proprietary mechanism for revocation
   checking.  These mechanisms obtain revocation status information once
   per day for the entire Web PKI in a very compact form.  No network
   traffic is generated at the time that a certificate is being
   validated, so there is no latency associated with revocation status
   checking.  The browser vendor infrastructure performs daily checks of
   the Web PKI, and then the results are assembled in a proprietary
   format and made available to the browser.  These checks only cover
   the trust anchor store for that browser vendor, so any trust anchors
   added by the user cannot be checked in this manner.

3.2.4.  OCSP Stapling

   Browsers can avoid transmission of CRLs altogether by using the
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) RFC 6960 [RFC6960] to check
   the validity of web server certificates.  The TLS Certificate Status
   Request extension is defined in Section 8 of RFC 6066 [RFC6066].  In
   addition, RFC 6961 [RFC6961] defines the TLS Multiple Certificate
   Status Request extension, which allows the web server to provide

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   status information about its own certificate and also the status of
   intermediate certificates in the certification path.  By including
   this extension in the TLS handshake, the browser asks the web server
   to provide an OCSP response in addition to its certificate.  This
   approach greatly reduces the number of round trips by the browser to
   check the status of each certificate in the path.  In addition, the
   web server can cache the OCSP response for a period of time, avoiding
   additional latency.  Even in the cases where the web server needs to
   contact the OCSP responder, the web server usually has a higher
   bandwidth connection than the browser to do so.

   The provision of the time-stamped OCSP response in the TLS handshake
   is referred to as "stapling" the OCSP response to the TLS handshake.
   If the browser does not receive a stapled OCSP response, it can
   contact the OCSP responder directly.  In addition, the MUST_STAPLE
   feature [TLSFEATURE] can be used to insist that OCSP stapling be

   When every browser that connects to a high volume website performs
   its own OCSP lookup, the OCSP responder must handle a real-time
   response to every browser.  OCSP stapling can avoid enormous volumes
   of OCSP requests for certificates of popular websites, so stapling
   can significantly reduce the cost of providing an OCSP service.

   OCSP stapling can also improve user privacy, since the web server,
   not the browser, contacts the OCSP responder.  In this way, the OCSP
   responder is not able to determine which browsers are checking the
   validity of certificate for websites.

   Many web site are taking advantage of OCSP sampling.  At the time of
   this writing, browser venders report that about 12% the the
   transactions use OCSP sampling, and the number is on the rise.

3.3.  Surprising Certificates

   All of the CAs in the trust store are equally trusted for the entire
   domain name space, so any CA can issue for any domain name.  In fact,
   there have been certificates issued by CAs that are surprising to the
   legitimate owner of a domain.  The domain name owner is surprised
   because they did not request the certificates.  They are initially
   unaware that a CA has issued a certificate that contains their domain
   name, and once the surprising certificate is discovered, it can be
   very difficult for the legitimate domain name owner to get it
   revoked.  Further, browsers and other relying parties cannot
   distinguish a certificate that the legitimate domain name owner
   requested from an surprising one.

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   Since all of the CAs in the trust store are equally trusted, any CA
   can issue a certificate for any domain name.  There are known cases
   where attackers have thwarted the CA protections and issued
   certificates that were then used to mount attacks against the users
   of that web site [FOXIT].  For this reason, all of the CAs listed in
   the trust store must be very well protected.

   The Baseline Requirements produced by the CA/Browser Forum [CAB2014]
   tell CAs the checks that need to be performed before a certificate is
   issued.  In addition, WebTrust [WEBTRUST] provides the audit
   requirements for CAs, and browser vendors will remove a CA from the
   trust anchor store if successful audit reports are not made

   When a CA issues a certificate to a subordinate CA, the inclusion of
   widely supported certificate extensions can reduce set of privileges
   given to the sub-CA.  This aligns with the traditional security
   practice of least privilege, where only the privileges needed to
   perform the envisioned tasks are provided.  However, many sub-CAs
   have certificates that pass along the full powers of the CA, creating
   additional high-pay-off targets for attackers, and these sub-CAs may
   not be held to the same certificate issuance requirements and audit
   requirement as the parent CA.

   Some major implementations have not fully implemented the mechanisms
   necessary to reduce sub-CA privileges.  For example, RFC 5280
   [RFC5280] includes the specification of name constraints, and the CA/
   Browser Forum guidelines [CAB2014] encourage the use dNSNames in
   permittedSubtrees within the name Constraints extension.  Despite
   this situation, one major browser does not support name constraints,
   and as a result, CAs are reluctant to use them.  Further, global CAs
   are prepared to issue certificates within every top-level domain,
   including ones that are newly-approved.  It is not practical for
   these global CAs to use name constraints in their sub-CA

   As a result of procedural failures or attacks, surprising
   certificates are being issued.  Several mechanisms have been defined
   to avoid the issuance of surprising certificates or prevent browsers
   from accepting them.

3.3.1.  Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA)

   The Certificate Authority Authorization (CAA) [RFC6844] DNS resource
   record allows a domain administrator to specify one or more CA that
   is authorized to issue certificates that include the domain name.
   Then, a trustworthy CA will refuse to issue a certificate for a

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   domain name that has a CAA resource record that does not explicitly
   name the CA.

   To date, only one major CA performs this check, and there is no
   indication that other CAs are planning to add this check in the near

3.3.2.  HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)

   HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) [RFC7469] allows a web server to
   instruct browsers to remember the server's public key fingerprints
   for a period of time.  The fingerprint is a one-way hash of the
   subject public key information in the certificate.  The Public-Key-
   Pins header provides a maximum retention period, fingerprints of the
   web server certificate, and optionally fingerprints for backup
   certificates.  The act of saving of the fingerprints is referred to
   as "pinning".  During pin lifetime, browsers require that the same
   web server present a certificate chain that includes a public key
   that matches one of the retained fingerprints.  This prevents
   impersonation of the website with a surprising certificate.

   A website can choose to pin the CA certificate so that the browser
   will accept only valid certificates for the website domain that are
   issued by that CA.  Alternatively, the website can choose to pin
   their own certificate and at least one backup certificate in case the
   current certificate needs to be replaced due to a compromised server.

   Some browser vendors also pin certificates by hardcoding fingerprints
   of very well known websites.

   When HPKP is used, browsers may be able to detect a man-in-the-
   middle.  Sometimes the man-in-the-middle is an attacker, and other
   times a service provider purposefully terminates the TLS at a
   location other than the web server.  One example became very public
   in February 2012 when Trustwave admitted that it had issued a
   subordinate CA certificate for use by a company to inspect corporate
   network traffic [LC2012].  When HPKP is used, the browser user will
   be notified if the key-pining is violated, unless the violating
   certificate can be validated to a locally installed trust anchor.  In
   this situation, the browser is assuming that the user intended to
   explicitly trust the certificate.

3.3.3.  HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)

   HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797] is a security policy
   mechanism that protects secure websites against downgrade attacks,
   and it greatly simplifies protection against cookie hijacking.  The
   presence of the Strict-Transport-Security header tells browsers that

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   all interactions with this web server should never use HTTP without
   TLS, providing protection against eavesdropping and active network

   When a web server includes the Strict-Transport-Security header, the
   browser is expected to do two things.  First, the browser
   automatically turns any insecure links into secure ones.  For
   instance, "" will be changed to
   "".  Second, if the TLS Handshake
   results in some failure, such as the certificate cannot be validated,
   then an error message is displayed and the user is denied access the
   web application.

3.3.4.  DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)

   The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698]
   allows domain administrators to specify the raw public keys or
   certificates that are used by web servers in their domain.  DANE
   leverages the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4034][RFC4035],
   which provides digital signatures over DNS zones that are validated
   with keys that are bound to the domain name of the signed zone.  The
   keys associated with a domain name can only be signed by a key
   associated with the parent of that domain name.  For example, the
   DNSSEC keys for "" can only be signed by the DNSSEC
   keys for "".  Therefore, a malicious actor can only
   compromise the keys of their own subdomains.  Like the Web PKI,
   DNSSEC relies on public keys used to validate chains of signatures,
   but DNSSEC has a single root domain as opposed to a multiplicity of
   trusted CAs.

   DANE binds raw public keys or certificates to DNS names.  The domain
   administrator is the one that vouches for the binding of the public
   key or the certificate to the domain name by adding the TSLA records
   to the zone and then signing the zone.  In this way, the same
   administrator is responsible for managing the DNS names themselves
   and associated public keys or certificates with those names.  DANE
   restricts the scope of assertions that can be made, forcing them to
   be consistent with the DNS naming hierarchy.

   In addition, DNSSEC reduces opportunities for redirection attacks by
   binding the domain name to the public key or certificate.

   Some Web PKI certificates are being posted in TLSA records, but
   browsers expect to receive the the server certificate in the TLS
   handshake, and there is little incentive to confirm that the received
   certificate matches the one posted in the DNS.  For this reason, work
   has begun on a TLS extension that will allow the DNSSEC-protected

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   information to be provided in the handshake, which will eliminate the
   latency [TLSCHAIN].

3.3.5.  Certificate Transparency

   Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962] offers a mechanism to detect
   mis-issued certificates, and once detected, administrators and CAs
   can take the necessary actions to revoke the mis-issued certificates.

   When requesting a certificate, the administrator can request the CA
   to include an embedded Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT) in the
   certificate to ensure that their legitimate certificate is logged
   with one or more CT log.

   An administrator, or another party acting on behalf of the
   administrator, is able to monitor one or more CT log to which a pre-
   certificate or certificate is submitted, and detect the logging of a
   pre-certificate or certificate that contains their domain name.  When
   such a pre-certificate or certificate is detected, the CA can be
   contacted to to get the mis-issued certificate revoked.

   In the future, a browser may choose to reject certificates that do
   not contain an SCT, and potentially notify the website administrator
   or CA when they encounter such a certificate.  Such reporting will
   help detect mis-issuance of certificates and lead to their

3.4.  Automation for Server Administrators

   There have been several attempts to provide automation for routine
   tasks that are performed by web server administrators, such as
   certificate renewal.  For example, some commercial tools offer
   automated certificate renewal and installation [DCEI][SSLM].  Also,
   at least one proposal was brought to the IETF that allows a web
   server automate obtaining and renewing certificates [PHBOB].  Without
   automation, there are many manual steps involved in getting a
   certificate from a CA, and to date none of these attempts at
   automation have not enjoyed widespread interoperability and adoption.
   There are at least two ways that this impacts web security.  First,
   many web sites do not have a certificate at all.  The cost, time, and
   effort are too great for the system administrator to go through the
   effort, especially if the web site does not offer anything for
   purchase.  Second, once a certificate is obtained, a replacement is
   not obtained until the current one expires.  Automation can reduce
   the amount of time that an administrator needs to dedicate to
   certificate management, and it can make certificate renewal timely
   and automatic.

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   The IETF ACME working group [ACMEWG] is working on protocols that
   will provide system administrators an automated way to enroll and
   renew their certificates.  The expectation is that these
   specifications will lead to widely available and interoperable tools
   for system administrators.  The expectation is that these protocols
   and tools will be supported by all web server environments and CAs,
   which will greatly reduce complexity and cost.

4.  Policy and Process Improvements to the Web PKI

   As with many technologies, the issues and complexities associated
   with Web PKI use and deployment are just as much policy and process
   as technical.  These have evolved over time as well.  This section
   discusses the ways that business models and operational policies and
   processes impact the Web PKI.

4.1.  Determination of the Trusted Certificate Authorities

   A very basic question for users of the Web PKI is "Who do you trust?"
   The system for determining which CAs are added to or removed from the
   trust store in browsers has been perceived by some as opaque and
   confusing.  As mentioned earlier, the CA/Browser Forum has developed
   baseline requirements for the management and issuance of certificates
   [CAB2014] for individual CAs.  However, the process by which an
   individual CA gets added to the trust store for each of the major
   browsers is not straightforward.  The individual browser vendors
   determine what should and should not be trusted by including those
   trusted CAs in their trust store.  They do this by leveraging the
   AICPA/CICA WebTrust Program for Certification Authorities [WEBTRUST].
   This program provides auditing requirements and a trust mark for CAs.
   Failure to pass an audit can result in the CA being removed from the
   trust store.

   Once the browser has shipped, how does a user know which CAs are
   trusted or what has changed recently.  For an informed user,
   information about which CAs have been added to or deleted from the
   browser trust store can be found in the release notes.  Users can
   also examine the policies of the various CAs which would have been
   developed and posted for the WebTrust Program.  However, this may be
   considered a fairly high barrier for the average user.  There are
   also options to make local modifications by educated users, but there
   is little understanding about the implications of these choices.  How
   does an individual, organization, or enterprise really determine if a
   particular CA is trustworthy?  Do the default choices inherited from
   the browser vendors truly represent the organization's trust model?
   What constitutes sufficiently bad behavior by a CA to cause removal
   from the trust store?

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   One form of bad behavior by CAs is the mis-issuance of certificates.
   This mis-issuance can be either an honest mistake by the CA,
   malicious behavior by the CA, or a case where an external party has
   duped the CA into the mis-issuance.  When a CA has delegated
   authority to a sub-CA, and then the sub-CA issued bad certificates
   either unintentionally or maliciously, the CA is able to deny
   responsibility for the actions of the sub-CA.  However, the CA may be
   the only party that can revoke the sub-CA certificate to protect the
   overall Web PKI.

   Another complication with CAs and the trust store maintained by the
   browser vendor is an enterprise managed PKI.  For example, the US
   Department of Defense operates its own PKI.  In this case, the
   enterprise maintains its own PKI for the exclusive use of the
   enterprise itself.  A bridge CA may be used to connect related
   enterprises.  The complication in this approach is that the
   revocation mechanisms don't work with any additions that have been
   made by the enterprise.  See Section 3.2.3 on proprietary revocation

   What constitutes sufficiently bad behavior by a CA to cause removal
   from the trust store?  The guidelines provided by the WebTrust
   program [WEBTRUST] provide a framework, but the implications of
   removing a CA can be significant.  There may be a few very large CAs
   that are critical to significant portions of Internet infrastructure.
   Removing one of these trusted CAs can have a significant impact on a
   large cross section of Internet users.

4.2.  Governance Structures for the Web PKI

   There are a number of organizations that play significant roles in
   the operation of the Web PKI, including the CAB Forum, the WebTrust
   Program, and the browser vendors.  These organizations act on behalf
   of the entire Internet community.  Transparency in these operations
   is vital to basic trust in the Web PKI.  As one example, in the past
   the CAB Forum was perceived as being a closed forum; however, some
   changes were made to the operational procedures to allow more
   visibility if not actual participation in the process [CAB1.2].  How
   do we ensure that these processes continue to evolve in an open,
   inclusive, and transparent manner?  Currently, as the name implies,
   the CAB Forum members represent CAs and browser vendors.  How do we
   ensure that relying parties a voice in this forum?

   Since the Web PKI is widespread, applications beyond the World Wide
   Web are making use of the Web PKI.  For example, the Web PKI is used
   to secure the connections between SMTP servers.  In these
   environments, the browser-centric capabilities are unavailable.  For
   example, see Section 3.2.3 on proprietary revocation checks.  The

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   current governance structure does not provide a way for these other
   applications to participate.  How do we ensure that these other
   applications get a voice in this forum?

5.  Other Considerations for Improving the Web PKI

   Other factors impact the usability and reliability of the Web PKI.
   One factor is time synchronization.  As time synchronization
   infrastructure is made more secure, this infrastrucre will require
   the use of certificates to authenticate time servers.  However,
   certificate infrastructure is reliant on quality time synchronization
   as well, creating a boot strapping issue.

6.  Security Considerations

   Many people find browser error messages related to certificates
   confusing.  Good man-machine interfaces are always difficult, but in
   this situation users are unable to understand the risks that they are
   accepting by clicking "okay".  This aspect of browser usability needs
   to be improved for users to make better security choices.

7.  IANA Considerations


   {{{ RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication. }}}

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,

8.2.  Informative References

   [ACMEWG]   IETF, "Charter for Automated Certificate Management
              Environment (acme) Working Group", June 2015,

   [CAB1.2]   CA/Browser Forum, "Bylaws of the CA/Browser Forum",
              October 2014, <

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   [CAB2014]  CA/Browser Forum, "CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements
              for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted
              Certificates, v.1.2.2", October 2014,

   [DCEI]     DigiCert Inc, "Express Install(TM): Automate SSL
              Certificate Installation and HTTPS Configuration", AUGUST
              2015, <>.

   [FOXIT]    Prins, J., "DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach:
              "Operation Black Tulip"", September 2011,

   [LC2012]   Constantin, L., "Trustwave admits issuing man-in-the-
              middle digital certificate; Mozilla debates punishment",
              February 2012,

   [PHBOB]    Hallam-Baker, P., "OmniBroker Publication Protocol",
              draft-hallambaker-omnipublish-00 (work in progress), May

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,

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   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <>.

   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,

   [RFC6844]  Hallam-Baker, P. and R. Stradling, "DNS Certification
              Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record", RFC 6844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6844, January 2013,

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,

   [RFC6961]  Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013,

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <>.

   [SSLM]     Opsmate, Inc., "SSLMate: Secure your website the easy
              way", August 2015, <>.

              Shore, M., Barnes, R., Huque, S., and W. Toorop, "X.509v3
              TLS Feature Extension", draft-shore-tls-dnssec-chain-
              extension-01 (work in progress), July 2015.

              Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 TLS Feature Extension", draft-
              hallambaker-tlsfeature-10 (work in progress), July 2015.

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              CPA Canada, "WebTrust Program for Certification
              Authorities", August 2015, <

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   This document has been developed within the IAB Privacy and Security
   Program.  The authors greatly appreciate the review and suggestions
   provided by Rick Andrews, Mary Barnes, Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
   Alissa Cooper, Nick Doty, Stephen Farrell, Joe Hall, Ted Hardie,
   Ralph Holz, Christian Huitema, Eliot Lear, Xing Li, Lucy Lynch,
   Gervase Markham, Andrei Robachevsky, Thomas Roessler, Jeremy Rowley,
   Christine Runnegar, Jakob Schlyter, Wendy Seltzer, Brian Trammell,
   and Juan Carlos Zuniga.

Appendix B.  IAB Members at the Time of Approval

   {{{ RFC Editor: Please add the names to the IAB members at the time
   that this document is put into the RFC Editor queue. }}}

Authors' Addresses

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA  20170


   Karen O'Donoghue
   Internet Society
   1775 Wiehle Ave #201
   Reston, VA  20190


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