Network Working Group L. Howard
Internet-Draft PADL
Intended status: Experimental December 13, 2015
Expires: June 15, 2016
AEAD Modes for Kerberos GSS-API
draft-howard-gssapi-aead-00
Abstract
This document updates RFC4121 with support for encryption mechanisms
that can authenticate associated data such as Counter with CBC-MAC
(CCM) and Galois/Counter Mode (GCM). These mechanisms are often more
performant and need not expand the message as much as conventional
modes.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Overview 2
4. Updates to RFC 2743 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. GSS_Wrap_AEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. GSS_Unwrap_AEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Updates to RFC 4121 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Support for Associated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Existing Encryption Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3. Native AEAD Encryption Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3.1. Restriction on Native AEAD Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3.2. Application-provided Cipherstate . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.3.3. Encryption and Checksum Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3.4. DCE RPC Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
This document updates [RFC4121] with support for encryption
mechanisms that support Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD). These mechanisms often have performance advantage over
conventional encryption modes as they can be efficiently parallelized
and do not expand the plaintext when encrypting.
In addition, this document defines new GSS-API functions for
protecting associated data in addition to a plaintext.
2. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Overview
The Kerberos 5 GSS-API mechanism specified in [RFC4121] provides for
the authenticated encryption of plaintext, that is, it provides both
for confidentiality and a way to check the for integrity and
authenticity.
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It can be useful in many applications to provide for the integrity
and authenticity of some additional unencrypted data; this is termed
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). This can be
done by the generic composition of existing encryption and checksum
mechanisms, or using algorithms which specifically provide for AEAD
(see [RFC5116]). The latter class of algorithms, referred to as
native AEAD, may have additional constraints (further described in
[KRB-AEAD]).
4. Updates to RFC 2743
[RFC2743] is updated with variations of GSS_Wrap() and GSS_Unwrap()
that permit the inclusion of associated data to be authenticated
along with a plaintext.
[[CREF1: TBD: do we allow interleaved plaintext and associated data
(which SSPI does and indeed requires for DCE), or do we limit it to a
single octet string each? If the former, we need to define
GSS_Wrap_IOV instead of GSS_Wrap_AEAD (and the Unwrap equivalents).]]
4.1. GSS_Wrap_AEAD
Inputs:
o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
o conf_req_flag BOOLEAN,
o qop_req INTEGER, -- 0 specifies default QOP
o input_assoc_data OCTET STRING, -- associated data
o input_message OCTET STRING -- plaintext
Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o conf_state BOOLEAN,
o output_message OCTET STRING -- caller must release with
GSS_Release_buffer()
Performs the data origin authentication, data integrity and
(optionally) data confidentiality functions of GSS_Wrap(),
additionally integrity protecting the data in input_assoc_data.
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Return values are as for GSS_Wrap(). Note that output_message does
not include the data in input_assoc_data.
4.2. GSS_Unwrap_AEAD
Inputs:
o context_handle CONTEXT HANDLE,
o input_message OCTET STRING, -- plaintext
o input_assoc_data OCTET STRING -- associated data
Outputs:
o conf_state BOOLEAN,
o qop_state INTEGER,
o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER,
o output_message OCTET STRING -- caller must release with
GSS_Release_buffer()
Processes a data element generated (and optionally encrypted) by
GSS_Wrap(), provided as input_message, additionally validating the
data origin and integrity of input_assoc_data. Return values are as
for GSS_Unwrap(). Note that output_message does not include the data
in input_assoc_data.
5. Updates to RFC 4121
5.1. Support for Associated Data
The generation of per-message tokens using the GSS_Wrap_AEAD() and
GSS_Unwrap_AEAD() functions is identical to GSS_Wrap() and
GSS_Unwrap(), except that:
o the encrypt-with-ad and decrypt-with-ad functions are used instead
of the encrypt and decrypt functions (respectively)
o the input_assoc_data parameter is passed as the associated data
o the is-longterm parameter is always false
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5.2. Existing Encryption Types
For existing encryption mechanisms that use a generic composition of
encryption and checksum functions (such as the Simplified Profile in
[RFC3961]), the only operative difference to [RFC4121] is that the
associated data is prepended to the plaintext before invoking the
checksum function. As such, for these encryption types
GSS_Wrap_AEAD() with no associated data has an identical output to
GSS_Wrap().
5.3. Native AEAD Encryption Types
When used with native AEAD encryption types as defined in [KRB-AEAD],
the generation of [RFC4121] per-message tokens is modified as
described below.
5.3.1. Restriction on Native AEAD Usage
Implementations SHALL NOT use native AEAD encryption types where the
deterministic cipherstate length is less than 12 octets (96 bytes).
[[CREF2: TBD: if we want to support CCM with a 32-bit counter, we
could remove the Filler byte and reduce the required cipherstate
length to 11 octets. However, this may make it more difficult to use
TLS-oriented GCM implementations that expose the Fixed-Common and
Fixed-Distinct nonce components independently.]]
Native AEAD encryption types that do not support long-term keys
SHOULD only be negotiated for use in GSS-API using the cryptosystem
negotiation extension defined in [RFC4537].
5.3.2. Application-provided Cipherstate
The cipherstate for each invocation of encrypt-with-ad or decrypt-
with-ad is given as follows. (For consistency with [RFC4121] the
following definition uses 0-based indexing.)
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+----------+---------+----------------------------------------------+
| Octet no | Name | Description |
+----------+---------+----------------------------------------------+
| 0..1 | TOK_ID | Identification field, per RFC4121 Section |
| | | 4.2.6 |
| | | |
| 2 | Flags | Attributes field, per RFC4121 Section 4.2.6 |
| | | |
| 3 | Filler | One octet of the hex value FF |
| | | |
| 4..11 | SND_SEQ | Sequence number field, per RFC4121 Section |
| | | 4.2.6 |
| | | |
| 12.. | | Remaining octets (if any) are set to zero |
+----------+---------+----------------------------------------------+
The output cipherstate from the encrypt-with-ad and decrypt-with-ad
functions is discarded as it is always specified explicitly as
described above.
The use of application-managed cipherstate allows the per-message
token size be reduced by omitting the confounder and encrypted copy
of the token header. There is no limit on the number or size of
messages that can be protected beyond those imposed by the sequence
number size and the underlying cryptosystem.
5.3.3. Encryption and Checksum Operations
This text amends [RFC4121] Section 4.2.4.
In Wrap tokens that provide for confidentiality, the first 16 octets
of the token (the "header", as defined in [RFC4121] Section 4.2.6)
SHALL NOT be appended to the plaintext data before encryption.
Instead, the TOK_ID, Flags and SND_SEQ fields of the token header are
protected by the initialization vector (cipherstate). The EC field
is unprotected, a change from [RFC4121]. The receiver MUST
explicitly validate the EC field. For the native AEAD encryption
types profiled in [KRB-AEAD] Section 5, EC SHALL be zero (except when
GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is in use, see below). This specification does not
support native AEAD encryption types that require the plaintext to be
padded.
In Wrap tokens that do not provide for confidentiality, the first 16
octets of the token SHALL NOT be appended to the to-be-signed
plaintext data. As with Wrap tokens that do provide for
confidentiality, all fields except EC and RRC are protected by the
initialization vector. The receiver MUST validate that EC is the
correct constant value. For the AEAD encryption types defined in
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[KRB-AEAD] Section 5, EC SHALL be sixteen, reflecting the tag length
of 16 octets (128 bits).
Because native AEAD encryption types lack an explicit checksum
operation, MIC tokens are generated similarly to Wrap tokens, using
the encrypt-with-ad function passing the to-be-signed data as the
associated data and using a plaintext length of zero. The key usage
and initialization vector serve to disambiguate MIC from Wrap tokens.
The octet string output by the encrypt-with-ad function contains the
authentication tag, which is placed in the SGN_CKSUM field of the
token.
5.3.4. DCE RPC Interoperability
Existing implementations that support the GSS_C_DCE_STYLE context
flag will, when this flag is in set, set EC for Wrap tokens with
confidentiality to the underlying cipher's block size and use an
effective Right Rotation Count (RRC) of EC + RRC bytes. This
document does not specify otherwise.
When GSS_C_DCE_STYLE is set, receivers MUST verify that the otherwise
unprotected EC field is the underlying cipher's block size for Wrap
tokens with confidentiality. (For Wrap tokens without
confidentiality, the EC field remains the length of the
authentication tag.)
DCE interleaves plaintext and associated data; because native AEAD
algorithms may require associated data to be processed before any
plaintext, any plaintext and associated data must each be coalesced
before encrypting or decrypting. This document does not specify an
API for processing interleaved plaintext and associated data.
6. Security Considerations
The combination of a context-specific session key and the presence of
the the TOK_ID and SND_SEQ fields in the cipherstate guarantees that
the key/IV combination is safe from reuse. The allows native AEAD
modes such as [GCM] and [CCM] to be used securely.
Because the initialization vector has a deterministic (but non-
repeating) construction, it is safe for use with GCM without any
limitation on the number of invocations of the authenticated
encryption function other than that imposed by the requirement that
the cipherstate not repeat. (Section 8.3 of [GCM] imposes an
invocation limit of 2^32 where the cipherstate is randomly generated
or is a length other than 96 bits.)
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The reordering of plaintext and associated data for GSS_C_DCE_STYLE
interoperability may be problematic where the plaintext and
associated data lengths are variable.
7. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the following individuals for their
comments and suggestions: Nicolas Williams and Greg Hudson.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743>.
[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos
Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4121, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4121>.
[RFC4537] Zhu, L., Leach, P., and K. Jaganathan, "Kerberos
Cryptosystem Negotiation Extension", RFC 4537,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4537, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4537>.
[KRB-AEAD]
Howard, L., "AEAD Encryption Types for Kerberos 5", draft-
howard-krb-aead-00 (work in progress), December 2015.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, DOI 10.17487/RFC3961, February
2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3961>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
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[CCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality", May 2004.
[GCM] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", November
2007.
Author's Address
Luke Howard
PADL Software
PO Box 59
Central Park, VIC 3145
Australia
Email: lukeh@padl.com
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