Kerberos Working Group G. Hudson, Ed.
Internet-Draft MIT Kerberos Consortium
Expires: November 12, 2011 May 11, 2011
Camellia Encryption for Kerberos 5
draft-hudson-krbwg-camellia-cts-02
Abstract
This document specifies two encryption types and two corresponding
checksum types for the Kerberos cryptosystem suite. The new types
use the Camellia block cipher in CBC-mode with ciphertext stealing
and the CMAC algorithm for integrity protection.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the BSD License.
1. Introduction
The Camellia block cipher, described in [RFC3713], has a 128-bit
block size and a 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit key size, similar to
AES. This document specifies Kerberos encryption and checksum types
for Camellia using 128-bit or 256-bit keys. The new types conform to
the framework specified in [RFC3961], but do not use the simplified
profile.
Like the simplified profile, the new types use key derivation to
produce keys for encryption, integrity protection, and checksum
operations. Instead of the [RFC3961] section 5.1 key derivation
function, the new types use a key derivation function from the family
specified in [SP800-108].
The new types use the CMAC algorithm for integrity protection and
checksum operations. As a consequence, they do not rely on a hash
algorithm except when generating keys from strings.
Like the AES encryption types [RFC3962], the new encryption types use
CBC mode with ciphertext stealing to avoid the need for padding.
They also use the same PBKDF2 algorithm for key generation from
strings, with a modification to the salt string to ensure that
different keys are generated for Camellia and AES encryption types.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Protocol Key Representation
The Camellia key space is dense, so we use random octet strings
directly as keys. The first bit of the Camellia bit string is the
high bit of the first byte of the random octet string.
3. Key Generation from Strings
We use a variation on the key generation algorithm specified in
[RFC3962] section 4.
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First, to ensure that different long-term keys are used with Camellia
and AES, we prepend the enctype name to the salt string, separated by
a null byte. The enctype name is "camellia128-cts-cmac" or
"camellia256-cts-cmac" (without the quotes).
Second, the final key derivation step uses the algorithm described in
Section 4 instead of the key derivation algorithm used by the
simplified profile.
Third, if no string-to-key parameters are specified, the default
number of iterations is raised to 32768.
saltp = enctype-name | 0x00 | salt
tkey = random2key(PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1(passphrase, saltp,
iter_count, keylength))
key = KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(tkey, "kerberos")
4. Key Derivation
We use a key derivation function from the family specified in
[SP800-108] section 5.2, "KDF in Feedback Mode". The PRF parameter
of the key derivation function is CMAC with Camellia-128 or Camellia-
256 as the underlying block cipher; this PRF has an output size of
128 bits. A block counter is used with a length of 4 bytes,
represented in big-endian order. The length of the output key in
bits (denoted as k) is also represented as a four-byte string in big-
endian order. The label input to the KDF is the usage constant
supplied to the key derivation function, and the context is unused.
n = ceiling(k / 128)
K0 = zeros
Ki = CMAC(key, K(i-1) | i | constant | 0x00 | k)
DR(key, constant) = k-truncate(K1 | K2 | ... | Kn)
KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(key, constant) = random-to-key(DR(key, constant))
The constants used for key derivation are the same as those used in
the simplified profile.
5. CMAC Checksum Algorithm
For integrity protection and checksums, we use the CMAC function
defined in [SP800-38B], with Camellia-128 or Camellia-256 as the
underlying block cipher.
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6. Kerberos Algorithm Protocol Parameters
The following parameters apply to the encryption types camellia128-
cts-cmac, which uses a 128-bit protocol key, and camellia256-cts-
cmac, which uses a 256-bit protocol key.
Protocol key format: as defined in Section 2.
Specific key structure: three protocol format keys: { Kc, Ke, Ki }.
Required checksum mechanism: as defined in Section 7.
Key generation seed length: the key size (128 or 256 bits).
String-to-key function: as defined in Section 3.
Default string-to-key parameters: 00 00 80 00.
Random-to-key function: identity function.
Key-derivation function: as indicated below, with usage represented
as four octets in big-endian order.
Kc = KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(base-key, usage | 0x99)
Ke = KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(base-key, usage | 0xAA)
Ki = KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(base-key, usage | 0x55)
Cipher state: a 128-bit CBC initialization vector.
Initial cipher state: all bits zero.
Encryption function: as follows, where E() is Camellia encryption in
CBC-CTS mode, with the next-to-last block used as the CBC-style ivec,
or the last block if there is only one.
conf = Random string of 128 bits
(C, newstate) = E(Ke, conf | plaintext, oldstate)
M = CMAC(Ki, conf | plaintext)
ciphertext = C | M
Decryption function: as follows, where D() is Camellia decryption in
CBC-CTS mode, with the ivec treated as in E().
(C, M) = ciphertext
(P, newIV) = D(Ke, C, oldstate)
if (M != CMAC(Ki, P)) report error
newstate = newIV
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Pseudo-random function: as follows.
Kp = KDF-FEEDBACK-CMAC(protocol-key, "prf")
PRF = CMAC(Kp, octet-string)
7. Checksum Parameters
The following parameters apply to the checksum types cmac-camellia128
and cmac-camellia256, which are the associated checksum for
camellia128-cts-cmac and camellia256-cts-cmac respectively.
Associated cryptosystem: Camellia-128 or Camellia-256 as appropriate
for the checksum type.
get_mic: CMAC(Kc, message).
verify_mic: get_mic and compare.
8. Assigned Numbers
Encryption types
+----------------------+-------------+----------+
| Type name | etype value | key size |
+----------------------+-------------+----------+
| camellia128-cts-cmac | TBD | 128 |
| camellia256-cts-cmac | TBD | 256 |
+----------------------+-------------+----------+
Checksum types
+------------------+---------------+--------+
| Type name | sumtype value | length |
+------------------+---------------+--------+
| cmac-camellia128 | TBD | 128 |
| cmac-camellia256 | TBD | 128 |
+------------------+---------------+--------+
9. Security Considerations
[CRYPTOENG] chapter 4 discusses weaknesses of the CBC cipher mode.
An attacker who can observe enough messages generated with the same
key to encounter a collision in ciphertext blocks could recover the
XOR of the plaintexts of the previous blocks. Observing such a
collision becomes likely as the number of blocks observed approaches
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2^64. This consideration applies to all previously standardized
Kerberos encryption types and all uses of CBC encryption with 128-bit
block ciphers in other protocols. Kerberos deployments can mitigate
this concern by rolling over keys often enough to make observing 2^64
messages unlikely.
Because the new checksum types are deterministic, an attacker could
pre-compute checksums for a known plain-text message in 2^64 randomly
chosen protocol keys. The attacker could then observe checksums
legitimately computed in different keys until a collision with one of
the pre-computed keys is observed; this becomes likely after the
number of observed checksums approaches 2^64. Observing such a
collision allows the attacker to recover the protocol key. This
consideration applies to most previously standardized Kerberos
checksum types and most uses of 128-bit checksums in other protocols.
Kerberos deployments should not migrate to the Camellia encryption
types simply because they are newer, but should use them only if
business needs require the use of Camellia, or if a serious flaw is
discovered in AES which does not apply to Camellia.
The security considerations described in [RFC3962] section 8
regarding the string-to-key algorithm also apply to the Camellia
encryption types.
At the time of writing this document, there are no known weak keys
for Camellia, and no security problem has been found on Camellia (see
[NESSIE], [CRYPTREC], and [LNCS5867]).
10. IANA Considerations
Assign two Kerberos Encryption Type Numbers for camellia128-cts-cmac
and camellia256-cts-cmac.
Assign two Kerberos Checksum Type Numbers for cmac-camellia128 and
camellia256.
11. Test Vectors
Sample results for string-to-key conversion:
Iteration count = 1
Pass phrase = "password"
Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn"
128-bit Camellia key:
57 D0 29 72 98 FF D9 D3 5D E5 A4 7F B4 BD E2 4B
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256-bit Camellia key:
B9 D6 82 8B 20 56 B7 BE 65 6D 88 A1 23 B1 FA C6
82 14 AC 2B 72 7E CF 5F 69 AF E0 C4 DF 2A 6D 2C
Iteration count = 2
Pass phrase = "password"
Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn"
128-bit Camellia key:
73 F1 B5 3A A0 F3 10 F9 3B 1D E8 CC AA 0C B1 52
256-bit Camellia key:
83 FC 58 66 E5 F8 F4 C6 F3 86 63 C6 5C 87 54 9F
34 2B C4 7E D3 94 DC 9D 3C D4 D1 63 AD E3 75 E3
Iteration count = 1200
Pass phrase = "password"
Salt = "ATHENA.MIT.EDUraeburn"
128-bit Camellia key:
8E 57 11 45 45 28 55 57 5F D9 16 E7 B0 44 87 AA
256-bit Camellia key:
77 F4 21 A6 F2 5E 13 83 95 E8 37 E5 D8 5D 38 5B
4C 1B FD 77 2E 11 2C D9 20 8C E7 2A 53 0B 15 E6
Iteration count = 5
Pass phrase = "password"
Salt=0x1234567878563412
128-bit Camellia key:
00 49 8F D9 16 BF C1 C2 B1 03 1C 17 08 01 B3 81
256-bit Camellia key:
11 08 3A 00 BD FE 6A 41 B2 F1 97 16 D6 20 2F 0A
FA 94 28 9A FE 8B 27 A0 49 BD 28 B1 D7 6C 38 9A
Iteration count = 1200
Pass phrase = (64 characters)
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
Salt="pass phrase equals block size"
128-bit Camellia key:
8B F6 C3 EF 70 9B 98 1D BB 58 5D 08 68 43 BE 05
256-bit Camellia key:
11 9F E2 A1 CB 0B 1B E0 10 B9 06 7A 73 DB 63 ED
46 65 B4 E5 3A 98 D1 78 03 5D CF E8 43 A6 B9 B0
Iteration count = 1200
Pass phrase = (65 characters)
"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"
Salt = "pass phrase exceeds block size"
128-bit Camellia key:
57 52 AC 8D 6A D1 CC FE 84 30 B3 12 87 1C 2F 74
256-bit Camellia key:
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61 4D 5D FC 0B A6 D3 90 B4 12 B8 9A E4 D5 B0 88
B6 12 B3 16 51 09 94 67 9D DB 43 83 C7 12 6D DF
Iteration count = 50
Pass phrase = g-clef (0xf09d849e)
Salt = "EXAMPLE.COMpianist"
128-bit Camellia key:
CC 75 C7 FD 26 0F 1C 16 58 01 1F CC 0D 56 06 16
256-bit Camellia key:
16 3B 76 8C 6D B1 48 B4 EE C7 16 3D F5 AE D7 0E
20 6B 68 CE C0 78 BC 06 9E D6 8A 7E D3 6B 1E CC
Sample results for key derivation:
128-bit Camellia key:
57 D0 29 72 98 FF D9 D3 5D E5 A4 7F B4 BD E2 4B
Kc value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x0000000299):
D1 55 77 5A 20 9D 05 F0 2B 38 D4 2A 38 9E 5A 56
Ke value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x00000002AA):
64 DF 83 F8 5A 53 2F 17 57 7D 8C 37 03 57 96 AB
Ki value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x0000000255):
3E 4F BD F3 0F B8 25 9C 42 5C B6 C9 6F 1F 46 35
256-bit Camellia key:
B9 D6 82 8B 20 56 B7 BE 65 6D 88 A1 23 B1 FA C6
82 14 AC 2B 72 7E CF 5F 69 AF E0 C4 DF 2A 6D 2C
Kc value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x0000000299):
E4 67 F9 A9 55 2B C7 D3 15 5A 62 20 AF 9C 19 22
0E EE D4 FF 78 B0 D1 E6 A1 54 49 91 46 1A 9E 50
Ke value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x00000002AA):
41 2A EF C3 62 A7 28 5F C3 96 6C 6A 51 81 E7 60
5A E6 75 23 5B 6D 54 9F BF C9 AB 66 30 A4 C6 04
Ki value for key usage 2 (constant = 0x0000000255):
FA 62 4F A0 E5 23 99 3F A3 88 AE FD C6 7E 67 EB
CD 8C 08 E8 A0 24 6B 1D 73 B0 D1 DD 9F C5 82 B0
Sample encryptions (all using the default cipher state):
Plaintext: (empty)
128-bit Camellia key:
1D C4 6A 8D 76 3F 4F 93 74 2B CB A3 38 75 76 C3
Random confounder:
B6 98 22 A1 9A 6B 09 C0 EB C8 55 7D 1F 1B 6C 0A
Ciphertext:
C4 66 F1 87 10 69 92 1E DB 7C 6F DE 24 4A 52 DB
0B A1 0E DC 19 7B DB 80 06 65 8C A3 CC CE 6E B8
Plaintext: 1
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Random confounder:
6F 2F C3 C2 A1 66 FD 88 98 96 7A 83 DE 95 96 D9
128-bit Camellia key:
50 27 BC 23 1D 0F 3A 9D 23 33 3F 1C A6 FD BE 7C
Ciphertext:
84 2D 21 FD 95 03 11 C0 DD 46 4A 3F 4B E8 D6 DA
88 A5 6D 55 9C 9B 47 D3 F9 A8 50 67 AF 66 15 59
B8
Plaintext: 9 bytesss
Random confounder:
A5 B4 A7 1E 07 7A EE F9 3C 87 63 C1 8F DB 1F 10
128-bit Camellia key:
A1 BB 61 E8 05 F9 BA 6D DE 8F DB DD C0 5C DE A0
Ciphertext:
61 9F F0 72 E3 62 86 FF 0A 28 DE B3 A3 52 EC 0D
0E DF 5C 51 60 D6 63 C9 01 75 8C CF 9D 1E D3 3D
71 DB 8F 23 AA BF 83 48 A0
Plaintext: 13 bytes byte
Random confounder:
19 FE E4 0D 81 0C 52 4B 5B 22 F0 18 74 C6 93 DA
128-bit Camellia key:
2C A2 7A 5F AF 55 32 24 45 06 43 4E 1C EF 66 76
Ciphertext:
B8 EC A3 16 7A E6 31 55 12 E5 9F 98 A7 C5 00 20
5E 5F 63 FF 3B B3 89 AF 1C 41 A2 1D 64 0D 86 15
C9 ED 3F BE B0 5A B6 AC B6 76 89 B5 EA
Plaintext: 30 bytes bytes bytes bytes byt
Random confounder:
CA 7A 7A B4 BE 19 2D AB D6 03 50 6D B1 9C 39 E2
128-bit Camellia key:
78 24 F8 C1 6F 83 FF 35 4C 6B F7 51 5B 97 3F 43
Ciphertext:
A2 6A 39 05 A4 FF D5 81 6B 7B 1E 27 38 0D 08 09
0C 8E C1 F3 04 49 6E 1A BD CD 2B DC D1 DF FC 66
09 89 E1 17 A7 13 DD BB 57 A4 14 6C 15 87 CB A4
35 66 65 59 1D 22 40 28 2F 58 42 B1 05 A5
Plaintext: (empty)
Random confounder:
3C BB D2 B4 59 17 94 10 67 F9 65 99 BB 98 92 6C
256-bit Camellia key:
B6 1C 86 CC 4E 5D 27 57 54 5A D4 23 39 9F B7 03
1E CA B9 13 CB B9 00 BD 7A 3C 6D D8 BF 92 01 5B
Ciphertext:
03 88 6D 03 31 0B 47 A6 D8 F0 6D 7B 94 D1 DD 83
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7E CC E3 15 EF 65 2A FF 62 08 59 D9 4A 25 92 66
Plaintext: 1
Random confounder:
DE F4 87 FC EB E6 DE 63 46 D4 DA 45 21 BB A2 D2
256-bit Camellia key:
1B 97 FE 0A 19 0E 20 21 EB 30 75 3E 1B 6E 1E 77
B0 75 4B 1D 68 46 10 35 58 64 10 49 63 46 38 33
Ciphertext:
2C 9C 15 70 13 3C 99 BF 6A 34 BC 1B 02 12 00 2F
D1 94 33 87 49 DB 41 35 49 7A 34 7C FC D9 D1 8A
12
Plaintext: 9 bytesss
Random confounder:
AD 4F F9 04 D3 4E 55 53 84 B1 41 00 FC 46 5F 88
256-bit Camellia key:
32 16 4C 5B 43 4D 1D 15 38 E4 CF D9 BE 80 40 FE
8C 4A C7 AC C4 B9 3D 33 14 D2 13 36 68 14 7A 05
Ciphertext:
9C 6D E7 5F 81 2D E7 ED 0D 28 B2 96 35 57 A1 15
64 09 98 27 5B 0A F5 15 27 09 91 3F F5 2A 2A 9C
8E 63 B8 72 F9 2E 64 C8 39
Plaintext: 13 bytes byte
Random confounder:
CF 9B CA 6D F1 14 4E 0C 0A F9 B8 F3 4C 90 D5 14
256-bit Camellia key:
B0 38 B1 32 CD 8E 06 61 22 67 FA B7 17 00 66 D8
8A EC CB A0 B7 44 BF C6 0D C8 9B CA 18 2D 07 15
Ciphertext:
EE EC 85 A9 81 3C DC 53 67 72 AB 9B 42 DE FC 57
06 F7 26 E9 75 DD E0 5A 87 EB 54 06 EA 32 4C A1
85 C9 98 6B 42 AA BE 79 4B 84 82 1B EE
Plaintext: 30 bytes bytes bytes bytes byt
Random confounder:
64 4D EF 38 DA 35 00 72 75 87 8D 21 68 55 E2 28
256-bit Camellia key:
CC FC D3 49 BF 4C 66 77 E8 6E 4B 02 B8 EA B9 24
A5 46 AC 73 1C F9 BF 69 89 B9 96 E7 D6 BF BB A7
Ciphertext:
0E 44 68 09 85 85 5F 2D 1F 18 12 52 9C A8 3B FD
8E 34 9D E6 FD 9A DA 0B AA A0 48 D6 8E 26 5F EB
F3 4A D1 25 5A 34 49 99 AD 37 14 68 87 A6 C6 84
57 31 AC 7F 46 37 6A 05 04 CD 06 57 14 74
Sample checksums:
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Plaintext: abcdefghijk
Checksum type: cmac-camellia128
128-bit Camellia key:
1D C4 6A 8D 76 3F 4F 93 74 2B CB A3 38 75 76 C3
Key usage: 7
Checksum:
11 78 E6 C5 C4 7A 8C 1A E0 C4 B9 C7 D4 EB 7B 6B
Plaintext: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Checksum type: cmac-camellia128
128-bit Camellia key:
50 27 BC 23 1D 0F 3A 9D 23 33 3F 1C A6 FD BE 7C
Key usage: 8
Checksum:
D1 B3 4F 70 04 A7 31 F2 3A 0C 00 BF 6C 3F 75 3A
Plaintext: 123456789
Checksum type: cmac-camellia256
256-bit Camellia key:
B6 1C 86 CC 4E 5D 27 57 54 5A D4 23 39 9F B7 03
1E CA B9 13 CB B9 00 BD 7A 3C 6D D8 BF 92 01 5B
Key usage: 9
Checksum:
87 A1 2C FD 2B 96 21 48 10 F0 1C 82 6E 77 44 B1
Plaintext: !@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()
Checksum type: cmac-camellia256
256-bit Camellia key:
32 16 4C 5B 43 4D 1D 15 38 E4 CF D9 BE 80 40 FE
8C 4A C7 AC C4 B9 3D 33 14 D2 13 36 68 14 7A 05
Key usage: 10
Checksum:
3F A0 B4 23 55 E5 2B 18 91 87 29 4A A2 52 AB 64
12. References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3713] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of
the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.
[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for
Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005.
[RFC3962] Raeburn, K., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Encryption for Kerberos 5", RFC 3962, February 2005.
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[SP800-38B]
Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", NIST Special
Publication 800-38B, October 2009.
[SP800-108]
Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108,
October 2009.
[CRYPTOENG]
Schneier, B., "Cryptography Engineering", March 2010.
[CRYPTREC]
Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA),
"Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees",
<http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.
[LNCS5867]
Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results
on Impossible Different Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round
Camellia-128", LNCS 5867, November 2009,
<http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.
[NESSIE] The NESSIE Project, "New European Schemes for Signatures,
Integrity, and Encryption",
<http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/>.
Appendix A. Document History (REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION)
0: Renamed to include krbwg in title. Clarified specification of
cipher state. Added security considerations text and references
about the Camellia cipher.
1: Minor edit.
Appendix B. Notes to RFC Editor
Change the "TBD" entries in Section 8 to the values assigned by IANA.
Remove the above document history section.
Remove this section.
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Author's Address
Greg Hudson (editor)
MIT Kerberos Consortium
Email: ghudson@mit.edu
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