Network Working Group G. Huston
Internet-Draft Telstra
Expires: April 25, 2003 M. Rose
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.
October 25, 2002
A Proposal to Improve IETF Productivity
draft-huston-ietf-pact-00
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Abstract
The IETF standards process must exhibit four qualities
(Predictability, Accountability, Competency, and Timeliness), which
we term "the IETF Pact". Growth in the IETF's size and diversity
challenges its ability to make progress in producing useful
specifications. This proposal puts forward procedural changes that
will improve the IETF PACT, without altering the IETF's philosophy or
structure, and without requiring changes to the formal IETF standards
process (cf., RFC 2026 [1]).
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Table of Contents
1. The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. The IETF "PACT" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Working Group Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 The "Utility Focus" model for WGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 The "Short-term" model for WGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. IETF Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1 The "Area Focus" model for the IESG . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1 Bounded Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2 Proportional Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3 Vote Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.4 Status Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 The "Bounded Outcome" model for the IETF . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A. Summary of Proposed Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. The Problem
Growth in the IETF's size and diversity challenge its ability to make
progress in producing useful specifications. For example, Working
Group (WG) efforts often take far too long, and the result of those
efforts is sometimes not very useful to the Internet community.
These difficulties are sometimes exacerbated by IESG procedures that
introduce further delay and ambiguity to the process.
This memo proposes seven procedural changes that will improve the
Predictability, Accountability, Competency and Timeliness of the IETF
("the IETF Pact"), without altering the IETF's philosophy or
structure, and without requiring changes to the formal IETF standards
process (cf., RFC 2026 [1]).
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2. The IETF "PACT"
The IETF standards process must exhibit four qualities:
Predictability: IETF efforts must not waste time and energy.
For example, if the responsible AD has any issue with a Working
Group (WG) document, these should be known to the WG long before
the document is submitted to the IESG. IESG procedures for
documents must be clear and consistent, and the status and
progress of documents through the procedures must be visible to
all. At any point, it must be clear what the next step is for a
document and when that step will be taken.
Accountability: Those holding IETF management positions necessarily
wield considerable power and the IETF community needs to be able
to know who has wielded it and when.
Competency: The process must encourage the production of technically
competent output; otherwise, we are left with a fair, expeditious,
but useless process.
Timeliness: Timeliness relates to relevance and quality and, as such,
the IETF's work is sensitive to real-world needs.
If the IETF process takes too long, the results will be irrelevant
and other, less engineered solutions will emerge. Ultimately
then, the Internet community will be less dependent on the IETF's
work. Finally, longer WG processes often lead to work with less
focus and clarity, and the resulting technical specifications are
often confusing and laden with questionable features. This makes
them more difficult to implement correctly and, again, less likely
to have real-world utility.
We now present a set of proposed changes to the way the IETF manages
its working groups. Each change is presented in two parts:
o a philosophy or rational for a change in the IETF's behavior; and,
o a corresponding rule to be employed by the IESG.
Finally, Appendix A summarizes the proposed rules.
In considering these proposals, please keep in mind that the changes
being presented do not change the way in which areas are managed
according to RFC 2026 [1]; rather these are changes to the IESG
management model, which the standards process purposefully leaves to
the discretion of the IESG.
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3. Working Group Operation
An IETF working group is for engineering, rather than research or
general discussion. Hence a WG must understand what problem it is
solving, who will use the solution and how it will be used, and the
WG must make near-term progress towards that solution.
3.1 The "Utility Focus" model for WGs
An IETF working group charter is characterized as a contract between
the WG and the IETF. As the IETF has grown larger and more diverse,
and as the problems tackled by WGs have grown more ambitious,
charters have sometimes become too vague to provide adequate guidance
about the goals and scope of the WG.
Accordingly, a WG charter must explicitly state:
o what problems are to be solved or what specific benefits are
intended from the work to be done;
o who the intended beneficiaries are (also describing some examples
of the use and effect that will accrue from using the capabilities
provided by the WG's output); and,
o where areas of difficulty are likely to be encountered.
3.2 The "Short-term" model for WGs
If an effort requires more than 1.5 years to produce something that
is ready for IETF last call, then it is not yet ready for the IETF.
The effort must do its pre-standards work elsewhere and then come to
the IETF when a solution is ready to be standardized.
Accordingly, a WG gets no more than 18 months to have their first
Internet-Draft (I-D) approved by the IESG; similarly, a WG gets no
more than 12 months to have each succeeding document approved by the
IESG.
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4. IETF Operation
The IESG must juggle two extremely difficult tasks:
o technical oversight; and,
o process management.
It is essential to retain and support both of these tasks, while also
balancing the need to make timely progress.
After a document is given to the IESG for approval it can be
difficult to ascertain the document's status and how it got there.
The procedures that the IESG uses for voting are not well known, and
the reasoning behind the IESG's votes are not published. Further,
some of the procedures may result in a document being delayed, even
if there is a strong consensus in the IESG for it to go forward. As
a result, WG chairs and document editors often find themselves in
"limbo", where they don't know what to do to move documents through
the IETF system.
Two complimentary changes can remedy the problem:
o a greater emphasis on area focus; and,
o a narrower emphasis on what gets evaluated during IETF last call.
4.1 The "Area Focus" model for the IESG
Each area comprises considerable specialization. Although it is
essential to have coordination and collaboration among the areas, it
is equally important that the WGs in an area be allowed to focus on
their own activities and have their consensus results published.
Our philosophy is that whenever the IESG makes any decisions, all ADs
get a voice, but no one AD gets a veto. In realizing this, several
factors must be balanced.
4.1.1 Bounded Discussion
It is essential that no AD be able to exercise a "pocket veto".
Hence there needs to be a way, within the IESG, to override blockages
by individual ADs.
Accordingly, once a document is submitted to the IESG for approval, a
formal request for further discussion may delay IESG voting on the
document until no later than the next IESG meeting. (In other words,
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there may be at most one request for discussion for the document and
any AD may request it.)
4.1.2 Proportional Voting
Responsible ADs are presumed to be expert in the work under review,
both in terms of the technology and their WGs' history. In order to
facilitate the efficiency of their work, they must have a
disproportionate say in progressing a document.
Accordingly, all IESG votes require a minimum of 55% of those voting
"yes" to pass; further, the votes of the responsible ADs are weighted
to 45% of all votes, with the remaining ADs combining to 55% of all
votes.
The voting proportions give extra weight to the votes of the
Responsible ADs, but permit the remainder of the IESG to override
them.
For example, let's assume that there are 13 ADs voting and that 2 ADs
are responsible for an area:
if the two responsible ADs then passage requires
============================= ================================
both vote yes at least 2 other ADs to vote yes
both vote no all other ADs to vote yes
split (one yes, the other no) at least 7 other ADs to vote yes
For example, if both routing ADs vote "yes", then it takes most of
the other ADs voting "no" to defeat an action in the routing area.
Naturally, the usual checks-and-balances apply, e.g., if an IESG
member disapproves of an IESG action, they (like any other IETF
member) are free to appeal to the IAB.
4.1.3 Vote Explanations
In order to give WGs a constructive path towards resolving AD
concerns, a WG must know precisely what those concerns are.
Requiring publication of IESG rationale for rejecting a document
helps ensure IESG accountability when a rejection occurs.
Accordingly, if an IESG vote rejects a WG document, then the IESG
must publish an explanation prior to the next IESG meeting. If no
report is published in that timeframe, then the document is
automatically approved.
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4.1.4 Status Reporting
WG documents do not materialize out of the ether -- WGs are granted
charters by the IESG, and work under the guidance of an AD when
producing their documents. As such, the IESG's decision process
should presume a timely, favorable outcome for WG output.
Accordingly, the IESG must publish regular reports identifying those
actions they have not yet addressed and explaining why. At a
minimum, the IESG must publish these reports no later than one month
prior to each face-to-face IETF meeting.
4.2 The "Bounded Outcome" model for the IETF
A document is developed as a sequence of design decisions, as a WG
makes progress. Hence the resulting document typically is produced
from a substantial number of group consensus assessments. This
should create a very strong presumption of community approval for the
document.
Any document can be criticized for its choices. An IETF effort is
designed to resolve engineering choices for one issue and then move
to a new issue. It is not reasonable to permit arbitrary criticisms
to be raised late in the process, derailing the incremental effort of
a WG.
It is always reasonable to raise fundamental engineering problems,
but it is essential to distinguish these from matters of engineering
aesthetics. In particular, the IETF Last Call and IESG review
periods are not intended for second-guessing a WG's design choices --
the purpose of an IETF Last Call and IESG review is to focus on the
overall viability of the document.
Accordingly, When evaluating a document, the IESG should heed
comments that identify fundamental engineering problems and should
ignore comments that suggest better ways of solving the same problem.
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5. IANA Considerations
This memo does not create any new issues for the IANA.
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6. Security Considerations
To the extent that the proposed changes produce documents that are
more timely and simpler, those documents, in theory, should contain
fewer security holes.
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References
[1] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP
9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
Authors' Addresses
G. Huston
Telstra
5/490 Northbourne Avenue
Dickson, ACT 2602
AU
EMail: gih@telstra.net
Marshall T. Rose
Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.
POB 255268
Sacramento, CA 95865-5268
US
Phone: +1 916 483 8878
EMail: mrose@dbc.mtview.ca.us
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Appendix A. Summary of Proposed Rules
Rule 1: A WG charter must explicitly state:
* what problems are to be solved or what specific benefits are
intended from the work to be done;
* who the intended beneficiaries are (also describing some
examples of the use and effect that will accrue from using the
capabilities provided by the WG's output); and,
* where areas of difficulty are likely to be encountered.
Rule 2: A WG gets no more than 18 months to have their first I-D
approved by the IESG; similarly, a WG gets no more than 12 months
to have each succeeding document approved by the IESG.
Rule 3: Once a document is submitted to the IESG for approval, a
formal request for further discussion may delay IESG voting on the
document until no later than the next IESG meeting.
Rule 4: All IESG votes require a minimum of 55% of those voting "yes"
to pass; further, the votes of the responsible ADs are weighted to
45% of all votes, with the remaining ADs combining to 55% of all
votes.
Rule 5: If an IESG vote rejects a WG document, then the IESG must
publish an explanation prior to the next IESG meeting. If no
report is published in that timeframe, then the document is
automatically approved.
Rule 6: The IESG must publish regular reports identifying those
actions they have not yet addressed and explaining why. At a
minimum, the IESG must publish these reports no later than one
month prior to each face-to-face IETF meeting.
Rule 7: When evaluating a document, the IESG should heed comments
that identify fundamental engineering problems and should ignore
comments that suggest better ways of solving the same problem.
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