Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                 T. Hardie
Expires: May 6, 2021                                              Google
                                                        November 2, 2020

   Report from the IAB workshop on Design Expectations vs. Deployment
                    Reality in Protocol Development


   The Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
   Development Workshop was convened by the Internet Architecture Board
   (IAB) in June 2019.  This report summarizes its significant points of
   discussion and identifies topics that may warrant further

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Workshop Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Position Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Past experiences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Principles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Centralised deployment models . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Future  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Summary of discussions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.1.  Potential architecture actions and outputs  . . . . .  13
       5.2.2.  Potential other actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.3.  Other publications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Feedback  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Particant List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   The Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
   Development Workshop was convened by the Internet Architecture Board
   (IAB) in June 2019.  This report summarizes its significant points of
   discussion and identifies topics that may warrant further

   The background for the workshop was that during the development and
   early elaboration phase for a number of protocols, there was a
   presumption of specific deployment models.  Actual deployments have,
   however, often run contrary to these early expectations when
   economies of scale, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack
   resilience, market consolidation, or other factors have come into
   play.  These factors can result in the deployed reality being highly

   This is a serious issue for the Internet, as concentrated,
   centralized deployment models present risks to user choice, privacy,
   and future protocol evolution.

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   On occasion, the differences to expectations were almost immediate,
   but they also occur after a significant time has passed from the
   protocol's initial development.

   Examples include:

   Email standards, which presumed many providers running in a largely
   uncoordinated fashion, but which has seen both significant market
   consolidation and a need for coordination to defend against spam and
   other attacks.  The coordination and centralized defense mechanisms
   scale better for large entities, which has fueled additional

   The DNS, which presumed deep hierarchies but has often been deployed
   in large, flat zones, leading to the nameservers for those zones
   becoming critical infrastructure.  Future developments in DNS may see
   concentration through the use of globally available common resolver
   services, which evolve rapidly and can offer better security.
   Paradoxically, concentration of these queries into few services
   creates new security and privacy concerns.

   The Web, which is built on a fundamentally decentralized design, but
   which is now often delivered with the aid of Content Delivery
   Networks.  Their services provide scaling, distribution, and Denial
   of Service prevention in ways that new entrants and smaller systems
   operators would find difficult to replicate.  While truly small
   services and truly large ones may operate using only their own
   infrastructure, many others are left with the only practical choice
   being the use of a globally available commercial service.

   Similar developments may happen with future technologies and
   services.  For instance, the growing use of Machine Learning
   technology presents challenges for distributing effective
   implementation of a service throughout a pool of many different

   In [RFC5218] the IAB tackled what made for a successful protocol.  In
   [RFC8170], the IAB described how to handle protocol transitions.
   This purpose of the workshop was to explore cases where the initial
   system design assumptions turned out to be wrong, looking for
   patterns in what caused those assumptions to fail (e.g.,
   concentration due to DDoS resilience) and in how those failures
   impact the security, privacy, and manageability of the resulting

   While the eventual goals might include proposing common remediations
   for specific cases of confounded protocol expectations.

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   The workshop call for papers invited the submission of position
   papers which would:

   o  Describe specific cases where systems assumptions during protocol
      development were confounded by later deployment conditions.

   o  Survey a set of cases to identify common factors in these
      confounded expectations.

   o  Explore remediations which foster user privacy, security and
      provider diversity in the face of these changes.

   A total of 21 position papers were received, listed in Section 3.  On
   site or remote were 30 participants, listed in Appendix A.

2.  Workshop Agenda

   After opening and discussion of goals for the workshop, the
   discussion focused on five main topics:

   o  Past experiences.  What have we learned?

   o  Principles.  What forces apply to deployment?  What principles to
      take into account in design?

   o  Centralised deployment models.  The good and the bad of
      centralisation.  Can centralisation be avoided?  How?

   o  Security.  Are we addressing the right threats?  What should we
      prepare ourselves for?

   o  Future.  What can we do?  Should we get better at predicting, or
      should we do different things?

3.  Position Papers

   The following position papers were submitted to the workshop (in
   alphabetical order):

   o  Jari Arkko.  "Changes in the Internet Threat Model" [Arkko2019]

   o  Vittorio Bertola.  "How the Internet Was Won and Where It Got Us"

   o  Carsten Bormann.  "WiFi authentication: Some deployment
      observations from eduroam" [Bormann2019]

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   o  Stephane Bortzmeyer.  "Encouraging better deployments"

   o  Brian Carpenter and Bing Liu. "Limited Domains and Internet
      Protocols" [Carpenter2019]

   o  Alissa Cooper.  "Don't Forget the Access Network" [Cooper2019]

   o  Stephen Farrell.  "We're gonna need a bigger threat model"

   o  Phillip Hallam-Baker.  "The Devil is in the Deployment"

   o  Ted Hardie.  "Instant Messaging and Presence: A Cautionary Tale"

   o  Paul Hoffman.  "Realities in DNSSEC Depployment" [Hoffman2019]

   o  Christian Huitema.  "Concentration is a business model"

   o  Geoff Huston.  "The Border Gateway Protocol, 25 years on"

   o  Dirk Kutscher.  "Great Expectations: Protocol Design and
      Socioeconomic Realities" [Kutscher2019]

   o  Julien Maisonneuve.  "DNS, side effects and concentration"

   o  John Mattsson.  "Privacy, Jurisdiction, and the Health of the
      Internet" [Mattsson2019]

   o  Moritz Muller.  "Rolling Forward: An Outlook on Future Root
      Rollovers" [Muller2019]

   o  Joerg Ott. "Protocol Design Assumptions and PEPs" [Ott2019]

   o  Lucas Pardue.  "Some challenges with IP multicast deployment"

   o  Jim Reid.  "Where/Why has DNS gone wrong?"  [Reid2019]

   o  Mohit Sethi and Tuomas Aura.  "IoT Security and the role of
      Manufacturers: A Story of Unrealistic Design Expectations"

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   o  Andrew Sullivan.  "Three kinds of concentration in open protocols"

   These papers are available from the IAB website [CFP] [POS].

4.  Discussions

4.1.  Past experiences

   The workshop investigated deployment cases from certificate
   authorities for web connections (WebPKI) to DNS Security (DNSSEC),
   from Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to Network Address Translators
   (NATs), from Domain Name System (DNS) resolvers to Content Data
   Networks (CDNs), and from Internet of Things (IoT) systems to instant
   messaging and social media applications.

   In many cases there was either a surprise in how technology was
   deployed, lack of sufficient adoption, or the business models
   associated with chosen technologies were not in favor of broader

   In general, the protocol designers cannot affect market forces but
   must work within them.  But there are often competing technical
   approaches or features that are tailored for a particular deployment
   pattern.  In some cases it is possible to choose whether to support,
   for instance, a clear need for an established business, a feature
   designed to support collaboration among smaller players, or some kind
   of disruption through a more speculative new feature or technology.

   Lessons learned include:

   o  Feedback from those who deploy often comes too late.

   o  Building blocks get re-purposed in unexpected ways

   o  User communities come in too late.

   o  The web is getting more centralised, and counteracting this trend
      is difficult.  It is not necessarily clear what technical path
      leads to distributed markets and de-centralized architectures, for

   o  There are also many forces that make it easier to pursue
      centralised models than other ones.  For instance, deployment is
      often easier in a centralised model.  And various business and
      regulatory processes work best within a small, well-defined set of
      entities that can interact with each other.  This can lead to, for
      instance, regulators preferring a situation with a small number of

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      entities that they can talk to, rather than a diverse set of

   o  It is important but hard to determine how useful new protocols

   o  It is difficult for the IETF community to interact with others,
      e.g., specific business sectors that need new technology (such as
      aviation or healthcare) or regulators.

4.2.  Principles

   Several underlying principles can be observed in the example cases
   that were discussed.  Deployment failures tend to be associated with
   cases where interdependencies make progress difficult and there's no
   major advantage for early deployment.  Despite persistent problems in
   the currently used technology, it becomes difficult for the ecosystem
   to switch to better technology.  For instance, there are a number of
   areas where the Internet routing protocol, BGP [RFC4271], is lacking,
   but there has been only limited success in deploying significant
   improvements, for instance in the area of security.

   Another principle appears to be first mover advantage.  Several
   equally interesting technologies have fared in very different ways,
   depending whether there was an earlier system that provided most of
   the benefits of the new system.  Again, despite potential problems in
   an already deployed technology, it becomes difficult to deploy
   improvements due to lack of immediate incentives and due to the
   competing and already deployed alternative that is proceeding forward
   in the ecosystem.  For instance, WebPKI is very widely deployed and
   used, but DNSSEC ([RFC4033]) is not.  Is this because the earlier
   commercial adoption of WebPKI, the more complex interdependencies
   between systems that wished to deploy DNSSEC, or some other reason?

   The definition of success in [RFC5218] appears to a part of the
   problem.  The only way to control deployments up front is to prevent
   wild success, but wild successes are actually what we want.  And it
   seems very difficult to predict these successes.

   The workshop also discussed the extent to which protocol work even
   should be controlled by the IETF, or the IESG.  It seems unproductive
   to attempt to constrain deployment models, as one can only offer
   possibilities but not force anyone to use a particular possibility.

   The workshop also discussed different types of deployment patterns on
   the Internet:

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   o  Delivering functionality over Internet as a web service.  The
      Internet is an open and standardised system, but the service on
      top may be closed, essentially running two components of the same
      service provider's software against each other over the browser
      and Internet infrastructure.  Several large application systems
      have grown in the Internet in this manner, encompassing large
      amounts of functionality and a large fraction of Internet users.
      This makes it easier for web applications to grow by themselves
      without cross-fertilisation or interoperability.

   o  Delivering concentrated network services that offer the standard
      capabilities of the Internet.  Examples in this category include
      the provisioning of some mail services, DNS resolution, and so on.

   The second case is more interesting for an Internet architecture
   discussion.  There can, however, be different underlying situations
   even in that case.  The service may be simply a concentrated way to
   provide a commodity service.  The market should find a natural
   equilibrium for such situations.  This may be fine, particularly,
   where the service does not provide any new underlying advantage to
   whoever is providing it (in the form of user data that can be
   commercialized, for instance, or as training data for an important
   machine learning service).

   Secondly, the service may be an extension beyond standard protocols,
   leading to some questions about how well standards and user
   expectations match.  But those questions could be addressed by better
   or newer standards.  But the third situation is more troubling: the
   service are provided in this concentrated manner due to business
   patterns that make it easier for particular entities to deploy such

   The group also discussed monocultures, and their negative effect on
   the Internet and its stability and resistance to various problems and

   Regulation may affect the Internet businesses as well.  Regulation
   can exist in multiple forms, based on economic rationale (e.g.,
   competition law) or other factors.  For instance, user privacy is a
   common regulatory topic.

4.3.  Centralised deployment models

   Many of the participants have struggled with these trends and their
   effect on desirable characteristics of Internet systems, such as
   distributed, end-to-end architecture or privacy.  Yet, there are many
   business and technical drivers causing the Internet architecture to
   become further and further centralised.

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   Some observations that were made:

   o  When standardising new technology, the parties involved in the
      effort may think they agree on what the goals are, but often in
      reality are surprised in the end.  For instance, with DNS-over-
      HTTPS (DoH, [RFC8484]) there were very different aspirations, some
      around improvements in confidentiality of the queries, some around
      operational and latency improvements to DNS operations, and some
      about shifting business and deployment models.  The full picture
      was not clear before the work was completed.

   o  In DNS, DDoS is practical reality, and only a handful of providers
      can handle the traffic load in these attacks.

   The hopeful side of this issue is that there are some potential

   o  DDoS defenses do not have to come through large entities, as
      layered defenses and federation also helps similarly.

   o  Surveillance state data capture can be fought with data object
      encryption, and not storing all of the data in one place.

   o  Web tracking can be combatted by browsers choosing to avoid the
      techniques sensitive to tracking.  Competition in the browser
      market may help drive some of these changes.

   o  Open interfaces help guard against the bundling of services in one
      large entity; as long as there are open, well-defined interface to
      specific functions these functions can also be performed by other

   o  Commercial surveillance does not seem to be curbed by current
      means.  But there are still possibilities, such as stronger
      regulation, data minimisation, or browsers acting on behalf of
      users.  There are hopeful signs that at least some browsers are
      becoming more aggressive in this regard.  But more is needed.

   One comment made in the workshop that the Internet community needs to
   curb the architectural trend of centralization.  Another comment was
   that discussing this in the abstract is not as useful as more
   concrete, practical actions.  For instance, one might imagine
   different DoH deployments with widely different implications for
   privacy or tolerance of failures.  Getting to the specifics of how a
   particular service can be made better is important.

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4.4.  Security

   This part of the discussed focused on whether in the current state of
   the Internet we actually need a new threat model.

   Many of the communications security concerns have been addressed in
   the past few years, with increasing encryption.  However, issues with
   trusting endpoints on the other side of the communication have not
   been addressed, and are becoming more urgent with the advent or
   centralised service architectures.

   Further effort may be needed to minimise centralisation, as having
   only few places to tap increases the likelihood of surveillance.

   There may be a need to update [RFC3552] and [RFC7258].

   The participants in the workshop agreed that a new threat model is
   needed, and that non-communications-security issues need to be

   Other security discussions were focused on IOT systems, algorithm
   agility issues, experiences from difficult security upgrades such as
   the DNSSEC key rollover, and routing security.

   The participants cautioned against relying too much on device
   manufacturers for security, and being clear on security models and
   assumptions.  Security is often poorly understood, and the
   assumptions about who the system defends against and not are not

4.5.  Future

   The workshop turned into a discussion of what actions we can take:

   o  Documenting our experiences?

   o  Providing advice (to IETF or to others)

   o  Waiting for the catastrophe that will make people agree to
      changes?  The participants of course did not wish for this.

   o  Work at the IETF?

   o  Technical solutions/choices?

   The best way for the IETF to do things is through standards;
   convincing people through other requests is difficult.  The IETF
   needs to:

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   o  Pick pieces that it is responsible for.

   o  Be reactive for the rest, be available as an expert in other
      discussions, provide Internet technology clue where needed, etc.

   One key question is what other parties need to be involved in any
   discussions.  Platform developers (mobile platforms, cloud systems,
   etc.) is one such group.  Specific technology or business groups
   (such as email provider or certificate authority forums) are another.

   The workshop also discussed specific technology issues, for instance
   around IOT systems.  One observation in those systems is that there
   is no single model for applications, they vary.  There are a lot of
   different constraints in different systems and different control
   points.  What is needed perhaps most today is user control and
   transparency (for instance, via Manufacturer Usage Descriptions
   (MUDs, [RFC8520])).  Another issue is management, particularly for
   devices that could be operational for decades.  Given the diversity
   of IOT systems, it may also make more sense to build support systems
   for the broader solutions that specific solutions or specific

   There are also many security issues.  While some of them are trivial
   (such as default passwords), one should also look forward and be
   prepared to have solutions for, say, trust management for long time
   scales, or be able to provide data minimization to cut down on
   potential for leakages.  And the difficulty of establishing peer-to-
   peer security strengthens the need for a central point, which may
   also be harmful from a long-term privacy perspective.

5.  Conclusions

5.1.  Summary of discussions

   The workshop met in sunny Finnish countryside and made the non-
   surprising observation that technologies sometimes get deployed in
   surprising ways.  But the consequences of deployment choices can have
   an impact on security, privacy, centralised vs. distributed models,
   competition, surveillance.  As the IETF community cares deeply about
   these aspects, it is worthwhile to spend time in analysis of these

   The prime factor driving deployments is perceived needs; expecting
   people to recognise obvious virtues and therefore deploy is not
   likely to work.

   And the ecosystem is complex, including for instance many parties:
   different business roles, users, regulators, and so on, and

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   perceptions of needs and ability to act depends highly on what party
   one talks to.

   While the workshop discussed actions and advice, there is a critical
   question of who these are targeted towards.  There is need to
   construct a map of what parties need to perform what actions.

   The workshop also made some technical observations.  One issue is
   that the workshop identified a set of hard issues that affect
   deployment and for which have no good solutions.  These issues
   include, for instance, dealing with distributed denial-of-service
   attacks or how to handle spam.  Similarly, lack of good solutions for
   micropayments is one factor behind a lot of the Internet economy
   being based on advertisements.

   One recent trend is that technology is moving up the stack, e.g., in
   the areas of services, transport protocol functionality, security,
   naming, and so on.  This impacts how easy or hard changes are, and
   who is able to perform them.

   It was also noted that interoperability continues to be important,
   and we need to explore what new interfaces need standardisation --
   this will enable different deployment models & competition.  Prime
   factor driving deployments is actual needs; we cannot force anything
   to others but can provide solutions for those that need them.  Needs
   and actions may fall on different parties.

   The workshop also considered the balancing of user non-involvement
   and transparency and choice, relevant threats such as communicating
   with malicious endpoints, the role and willingness of browsers in
   increasing the ability to defending the users' privacy, and concerns
   around centralised control or data storage points

   The workshop also discussed specific issues around routing, denial-
   of-service attacks, IOT systems, role of device manufacturers, the
   DNS, and regulatory reactions and their possible consequences.

5.2.  Actions

   The prime conclusion from the workshop was that the topic is not
   completed in the workshop.  Much more work is needed.  The best way
   for the IETF to make an impact is through standards.  The IETF should
   focus on the parts that it is responsible for, and be available as an
   expert on other discussions.

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5.2.1.  Potential architecture actions and outputs

   The documents/outputs and actions described in the following were
   deemed relevant by the participants.

   o  Develop and document a modern threat model.

   o  Continue discussion of consolidation/centralisation issues.

   o  Document architectural principles, e.g., (re-)application of the
      end-to-end principle.

   The first receiver of these thoughts is the IETF and protocol
   community, but combined with some evangelising & validation

5.2.2.  Potential other actions

   o  Pursue specific IETF topics, e.g., work on taking into account
      reputation systems in IETF work, working to ensuring certificate
      scoping can be appropriately limited, building end-to-end
      encryption tools for applications, etc.

   o  General deployment experiences/advice, and documenting deployment
      assumptions possibly already in WG charters

   o  A report, and a short summary article will be produced from the

5.3.  Other publications

   The workshop results have also been reported at [ISPColumn] by Geoff

5.4.  Feedback

   Feedback regarding the workshop is appreciated, and can be sent to
   the program committee, the IAB, or the architecture-discuss list.

6.  Informative References

              Arkko, J., "Changes in the Internet Threat Model",
              Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June

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              Bertola, V., "How the Internet Was Won and Where It Got
              Us", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop ,
              June 2019.

              Bormann, C., "WiFi authentication: Some deployment
              observations from eduroam", Position paper submitted for
              the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Bortzmeyer, S., "Encouraging better deployments", Position
              paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
              Protocols", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

   [CFP]      IAB, ., "Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in
              Protocol Development Workshop 2019",
              April 2019.

              Cooper, A., "Don't Forget the Access Network", Position
              paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Farrell, S., "We're gonna need a bigger threat model",
              Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June

              Hallam-Baker, P., "The Devil is in the Deployment",
              Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June

              Hardie, T., "Instant Messaging and Presence: A Cautionary
              Tale", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

              Hoffman, P., "Realities in DNSSEC Depployment", Position
              paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

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              Huitema, C., "Concentration is a business model", Position
              paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Huston, G., "The Border Gateway Protocol, 25 years on",
              Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June

              Huston, G., "Network Protocols and their Use",
     , June

              Kutscher, D., "Great Expectations: Protocol Design and
              Socioeconomic Realities", Position paper submitted for the
              IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Maisonneuve, J., "DNS, side effects and concentration",
              Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June

              Mattsson, J., "Privacy, Jurisdiction, and the Health of
              the Internet", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

              Muller, M., "Rolling Forward: An Outlook on Future Root
              Rollovers", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

   [Ott2019]  Ott, J., "Protocol Design Assumptions and PEPs", Position
              paper submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

              Pardue, L., "Some challenges with IP multicast
              deployment", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

   [POS]      IAB, ., "Position Papers: DEDR Workshop",
              position-papers/ , June 2019.

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              Reid, J., "Where/Why has DNS gone wrong?", Position paper
              submitted for the IAB DEDR workshop , June 2019.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,

   [RFC5218]  Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful
              Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008,

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <>.

   [RFC8170]  Thaler, D., Ed., "Planning for Protocol Adoption and
              Subsequent Transitions", RFC 8170, DOI 10.17487/RFC8170,
              May 2017, <>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,

   [RFC8520]  Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
              Description Specification", RFC 8520,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,

              Sethi, M. and T. Aura, "IoT Security and the role of
              Manufacturers: A Story of Unrealistic Design
              Expectations", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

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              Sullivan, A., "Three kinds of concentration in open
              protocols", Position paper submitted for the IAB DEDR
              workshop , June 2019.

Appendix A.  Particant List

   The following is a list of participants on site and over a remote

   o  Arkko, Jari

   o  Aura, Tuomas

   o  Bertola, Vittorio

   o  Bormann, Carsten

   o  Bortzmeyer, Stephane

   o  Cooper, Alissa

   o  Farrell, Stephen

   o  Flinck, Hannu

   o  Gahnberg, Carl

   o  Hallam-Baker, Phillip

   o  Hardie, Ted

   o  Hoffman, Paul

   o  Huitema, Christian (remote)

   o  Huston, Geoff

   o  Komaitis, Konstantinos

   o  Kuhlewind, Mirja

   o  Kutscher, Dirk

   o  Li, Zhenbin

   o  Maisonneuve, Julien

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   o  Mattson, John

   o  Muller, Moritz

   o  Ott, Joerg

   o  Pardue, Lucas

   o  Reid, Jim

   o  Rieckers, Jan-Frederik

   o  Sethi, Mohit

   o  Shore, Melinda (remote)

   o  Soininen, Jonne

   o  Sullivan, Andrew

   o  Trammell, Brian

Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the workshop participants, the
   members of the IAB, and the participants in the architecture
   discussion list for interesting discussions.  The notes from Jim Reid
   were instrumental in writing this report.  The workshop organizers
   would also like to thank Nokia for hosting the workshop in excellent
   facilities in Kirkkonummi, Finland.

Authors' Addresses

   Jari Arkko


   Ted Hardie


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