6MAN                                                           S. Amante
Internet-Draft                                                   Level 3
Obsoletes: 3697 (if approved)                               B. Carpenter
Updates: 2205, 2460 (if approved)                      Univ. of Auckland
Intended status: Standards Track                                S. Jiang
Expires: August 30, 2011                    Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
                                                            J. Rajahalme
                                                  Nokia-Siemens Networks
                                                       February 26, 2011

                     IPv6 Flow Label Specification


   This document specifies the IPv6 Flow Label field and the minimum
   requirements for IPv6 nodes labeling flows, IPv6 nodes forwarding
   labeled packets, and flow state establishment methods.  Even when
   mentioned as examples of possible uses of the flow labeling, more
   detailed requirements for specific use cases are out of scope for
   this document.

   The usage of the Flow Label field enables efficient IPv6 flow
   classification based only on IPv6 main header fields in fixed

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
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   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  IPv6 Flow Label Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Stateless Flow Labeling Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Flow State Establishment Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Essential correction to RFC 2205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.1.  Theft and Denial of Service  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  IPsec and Tunneling Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     6.3.  Security Filtering Interactions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  Change log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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1.  Introduction

   A flow is a sequence of packets sent from a particular source to a
   particular unicast, anycast, or multicast destination that a node
   desires to label as a flow.  A flow could consist of all packets in a
   specific transport connection or a media stream.  However, a flow is
   not necessarily 1:1 mapped to a transport connection.

   Traditionally, flow classifiers have been based on the 5-tuple of the
   source and destination addresses, ports, and the transport protocol
   type.  However, some of these fields may be unavailable due to either
   fragmentation or encryption, or locating them past a chain of IPv6
   extension headers may be inefficient.  Additionally, if classifiers
   depend only on IP layer headers, later introduction of alternative
   transport layer protocols will be easier.

   The usage of the 3-tuple of the Flow Label and the Source and
   Destination Address fields enables efficient IPv6 flow
   classification, where only IPv6 main header fields in fixed positions
   are used.

   The flow label could be used in both stateless and stateful
   scenarios.  A stateless scenario is one where a node that sets the
   flow label value for all packets of a given flow does not need to
   store any information about the flow, and any node that processes the
   flow label in any way also does not need to store any information
   after a packet has been processed.  A stateful scenario is one where
   a node that sets or processes the flow label value needs to store
   information about the flow, including the flow label value.  A
   stateful scenario might also require a signaling mechanism to
   establish flow state in the network.

   The flow label can be used most simply in stateless scenarios.  This
   specification concentrates on the stateless model and how it can be
   used as a default mechanism.  Details of stateful models, signaling,
   specific flow state establishment methods and their related service
   models are out of scope for this specification.  Generic requirements
   enabling co-existence of different models are set forth in Section 4.
   The associated scaling characteristics (such as nodes involved in
   state establishment, amount of state maintained by them, and state
   growth function) will be specific to particular service models.

   The minimum level of IPv6 flow support consists of labeling the
   flows.  A specific goal is to enable and encourage the use of the
   flow label for various forms of stateless load distribution,
   especially across Equal Cost Multi-Path (EMCP) and/or Link
   Aggregation Group (LAG) paths.  ECMP and LAG are methods to bond
   together multiple physical links used to procure the required

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   capacity necessary to carry an offered load greater than the
   bandwidth of an individual physical link.  IPv6 source nodes SHOULD
   be able to label known flows (e.g., TCP connections, application
   streams), even if the node itself does not require any flow-specific
   treatment.  Node requirements for stateless flow labeling are given
   in Section 3.

   This document replaces [RFC3697] and Appendix A of [RFC2460].  A
   rationale for the changes made is documented in
   [I-D.ietf-6man-flow-update].  The present document also includes a
   correction to [RFC2205] concerning the flow label.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  IPv6 Flow Label Specification

   The 20-bit Flow Label field in the IPv6 header [RFC2460] is used by a
   node to label packets of a flow.  A Flow Label of zero is used to
   indicate packets not part of any flow.  Packet classifiers can use
   the triplet of Flow Label, Source Address, and Destination Address
   fields to identify which flow a particular packet belongs to.
   Packets are processed in a flow-specific manner by nodes that are
   able to do so in a stateless manner, or that have been set up with
   flow-specific state.  The nature of the specific treatment and the
   methods for flow state establishment are out of scope for this
   specification.  However, any node that sets flow label values
   according to a stateful scheme MUST ensure that packets conform to
   Section 3 of the present specification if they are sent outside the
   network domain using the stateful scheme.

   As specified below in Section 3, the normal expectation is that flow
   label values are uniformly distributed.  In this specification, it is
   recommended below that a pseudo-random method should be used to
   achieve such a uniform distribution.  Intentionally, there are no
   precise mathematical requirements placed on the distribution or the
   pseudo-random method.

   Once set to a non-zero value, the Flow Label MUST be delivered
   unchanged to the destination node(s).  A forwarding node MUST NOT
   change the flow label value in an arriving packet if it is non-zero.
   However, there are two qualifications to this rule:
   1.  Implementers are advised that forwarding nodes, especially those
       acting as domain border devices, might nevertheless be configured
       to change the flow label value in packets.  This is undetectable,
       unless some future version of IPsec authentication [RFC4302]

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       protects the flow label value.
   2.  To enable stateless load distribution at any point in the
       Internet, a network domain should never export packets
       originating within the domain whose flow label values do not
       conform to Section 3.  However, neither domain border egress
       routers nor intermediate routers/devices (using a flow-label, for
       example, as a part of an input-key for a load-distribution hash)
       can determine by inspection that a value is not part of a uniform
       distribution.  Therefore, if nodes within a domain ignore the
       recommendations of Section 3, and such packets are forwarded
       outside the domain, this might result in undesirable operational
       implications (e.g., congestion, reordering) for not only the
       inappropriately flow-labelled packets, but also well-behaved
       flow-labelled packets, during forwarding at various intermediate
       devices.  Thus, a domain must protect its peers by never
       exporting inappropriately labelled packets originating within the
       domain.  This is why nodes using a stateful scheme must not set
       the flow label to a non-zero and non-uniformly distributed value
       if the packet will leave their domain.  If it is known to a
       border router that flow labels originated within the domain are
       not uniformly distributed, it will need to set outgoing flow
       labels in the same manner as described for forwarding nodes in
       Section 3.

   There is no way to verify whether a flow label has been modified en
   route or whether it belongs to a uniform distribution.  Therefore, no
   Internet-wide mechanism can depend mathematically on immutable and
   uniformly distributed flow labels; they have a "best effort" quality.
   This leads to the following formal rules:
   o  Implementers should be aware that the flow label is an unprotected
      field that could have been accidentally or intentionally changed
      en route.  Implementations MUST take appropriate steps to protect
      themselves from being vulnerable to denial of service and other
      types of attack that could result (see Section 6.1).
   o  Forwarding nodes such as routers and load balancers MUST NOT
      depend only on Flow Label values being uniformly distributed.  In
      any usage such as a hash key for load distribution, the Flow Label
      bits MUST be combined at least with bits from other sources within
      the packet, so as to produce a constant hash value for each flow
      and a suitable distribution of hash values across flows.

   Although uniformly distributed flow label values are recommended
   below, and will always be helpful for load balancing, it is unsafe to
   assume their presence in the general case, and the use case needs to
   work even if the flow label value is zero.

   The use of the Flow Label field does not necessarily signal any
   requirement on packet reordering.  Especially, the zero label does

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   not imply that significant reordering is acceptable.

   An IPv6 node that does not set the flow label to a non-zero value, or
   make use of it in any way, MUST ignore it when receiving or
   forwarding a packet.

3.  Stateless Flow Labeling Requirements

   This section defines the minimum requirements for stateless methods
   of setting the flow label value.

   To enable Flow Label based classification, source nodes SHOULD assign
   each unrelated transport connection and application data stream to a
   new flow.  A typical definition of a flow for this purpose is any set
   of packets carrying the same 5-tuple {dest addr, source addr,
   protocol, dest port, source port}.

   It is desirable that flow label values should be uniformly
   distributed to assist load distribution.  It is therefore RECOMMENDED
   that source hosts support the flow label by setting the flow label
   field for all packets of a given flow to the same uniformly
   distributed pseudo-random value.  Both stateful and stateless methods
   of assigning a pseudo-random value could be used, but it is outside
   the scope of this specification to mandate an algorithm.  In a
   stateless mechanism, the algorithm SHOULD ensure that the resulting
   flow label values are unique with high probability.

   An OPTIONAL algorithm for generating such a pseudo-random value is
   described in [I-D.gont-6man-flowlabel-security].

   [[ NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: The preceding sentence should be deleted, and
   the reference should be changed to Informative, if the cited draft is
   not on the standards track at the time of publication. ]]

   A source node which does not otherwise set the flow label MUST set
   its value to zero.

   A node that forwards a flow whose flow label value in arriving
   packets is zero MAY set the flow label value.  In that case, it is
   RECOMMENDED that the forwarding node sets the flow label field for a
   flow to a uniformly distributed pseudo-random value.
   o  The same considerations apply as to source hosts setting the flow
      label; in particular, the normal case is that a flow is defined by
      the 5-tuple.
   o  This option, if implemented, would presumably be used by first-hop
      or ingress routers.  It might place a considerable per-packet
      processing load on them, even if they adopted a stateless method

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      of flow identification and label assignment.  This is why the
      principal recommendation is that the source host should set the

   The preceding rules taken together allow a given network domain to
   include routers that set flow labels on behalf of hosts that do not
   do so.  They also recommend that flow labels exported to the Internet
   are always either zero or uniformly distributed.

4.  Flow State Establishment Requirements

   This section defines the minimum requirements for stateful methods of
   setting the flow label value.

   The node that sets the flow label MAY also take part in flow state
   establishment methods that result in assigning specific treatments to
   specific flows, possibly including signaling.
   o  In this case, unlike the stateless case, a source node MUST ensure
      that it does not unintentionally reuse Flow Label values it is
      currently using or has recently used when creating new flows.
      Flow Label values previously used with a specific pair of source
      and destination addresses MUST NOT be assigned to new flows with
      the same address pair within 120 seconds of the termination of the
      previous flow.
   o  To avoid accidental Flow Label value reuse, the source node SHOULD
      select new Flow Label values in a well-defined way and use an
      initial value that avoids reuse of recently used Flow Label values
      each time the system restarts.  The initial value SHOULD be
      derived from a previous value stored in non-volatile memory, or in
      the absence of such history, a randomly generated initial value
      using techniques that produce good randomness properties SHOULD be

   To enable stateful flow-specific treatment, flow state needs to be
   established on all or a subset of the IPv6 nodes on the path from the
   source to the destination(s).  The methods for the state
   establishment, as well as the models for flow-specific treatment will
   be defined in separate specifications.

   In stateful mechanisms, nodes keeping dynamic flow state MUST NOT
   assume packets arriving 120 seconds or more after the previous packet
   of a flow still belong to the same flow, unless a flow state
   establishment method in use defines a longer flow state lifetime or
   the flow state has been explicitly refreshed within the lifetime

   To enable co-existence of different methods in IPv6 nodes, the

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   methods MUST meet the following basic requirements:
   o  The method MUST provide the means for flow state clean-up from the
      IPv6 nodes providing the flow-specific treatment.  Signaling based
      methods where the source node is involved are free to specify flow
      state lifetimes longer than the default 120 seconds.
   o  Flow state establishment methods MUST be able to recover from the
      case where the requested flow state cannot be supported.

5.  Essential correction to RFC 2205

   [RFC2460] reduced the size of the flow label field from 24 to 20
   bits.  The references to a 24 bit flow label field on pages 87 and 88
   of [RFC2205] are updated accordingly.

6.  Security Considerations

   This section considers security issues raised by the use of the Flow
   Label, primarily the potential for denial-of-service attacks, and the
   related potential for theft of service by unauthorized traffic
   (Section 6.1).  Section 6.2 addresses the use of the Flow Label in
   the presence of IPsec including its interaction with IPsec tunnel
   mode and other tunneling protocols.  We also note that inspection of
   unencrypted Flow Labels may allow some forms of traffic analysis by
   revealing some structure of the underlying communications.  Even if
   the flow label were encrypted, its presence as a constant value in a
   fixed position might assist traffic analysis and cryptoanalysis.

   The flow label is not protected in any way and can be forged by an
   on-path attacker.  On the other hand, a uniformly distributed pseudo-
   random flow label cannot be readily guessed by an off-path attacker;
   see [I-D.gont-6man-flowlabel-security] for further discussion.

6.1.  Theft and Denial of Service

   Since the mapping of network traffic to flow-specific treatment is
   triggered by the IP addresses and Flow Label value of the IPv6
   header, an adversary may be able to obtain better service by
   modifying the IPv6 header or by injecting packets with false
   addresses and/or labels.  Taken to its limits, such theft-of-service
   becomes a denial-of-service attack when the modified or injected
   traffic depletes the resources available to forward it and other
   traffic streams.  A curiosity is that if a DoS attack were undertaken
   against a given Flow Label (or set of Flow Labels), then traffic
   containing an affected Flow Label might well experience worse-than-
   best-effort network performance.

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   Note that since the treatment of IP headers by nodes is typically
   unverified, there is no guarantee that flow labels sent by a node are
   set according to the recommendations in this document.  Therefore,
   any assumptions made by the network about header fields such as flow
   labels should be limited to the extent that the upstream nodes are
   explicitly trusted.

   Since flows are identified by the 3-tuple of the Flow Label and the
   Source and Destination Address, the risk of theft or denial of
   service introduced by the Flow Label is closely related to the risk
   of theft or denial of service by address spoofing.  An adversary who
   is in a position to forge an address is also likely to be able to
   forge a label, and vice versa.

   There are two issues with different properties: Spoofing of the Flow
   Label only, and spoofing of the whole 3-tuple, including Source and
   Destination Address.

   The former can be done inside a node which is using or transmitting
   the correct source address.  The ability to spoof a Flow Label
   typically implies being in a position to also forge an address, but
   in many cases, spoofing an address may not be interesting to the
   spoofer, especially if the spoofer's goal is theft of service, rather
   than denial of service.

   The latter can be done by a host which is not subject to ingress
   filtering [RFC2827] or by an intermediate router.  Due to its
   properties, such is typically useful only for denial of service.  In
   the absence of ingress filtering, almost any third party could
   instigate such an attack.

   In the presence of ingress filtering, forging a non-zero Flow Label
   on packets that originated with a zero label, or modifying or
   clearing a label, could only occur if an intermediate system such as
   a router was compromised, or through some other form of man-in-the-
   middle attack.  However, the risk is limited to traffic receiving
   better or worse quality of service than intended.  For example, if
   Flow Labels are altered or cleared at random, flow classification
   will no longer happen as intended, and the altered packets will
   receive default treatment.  If a complete 3-tuple is forged, the
   altered packets will be classified into the forged flow and will
   receive the corresponding quality of service; this will create a
   denial of service attack subtly different from one where only the
   addresses are forged.  Because it is limited to a single flow
   definition, e.g., to a limited amount of bandwidth, such an attack
   will be more specific and at a finer granularity than a normal
   address-spoofing attack.

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   Since flows are identified by the complete 3-tuple, ingress filtering
   [RFC2827] will, as noted above, mitigate part of the risk.  If the
   source address of a packet is validated by ingress filtering, there
   can be a degree of trust that the packet has not transited a
   compromised router, to the extent that ISP infrastructure may be
   trusted.  However, this gives no assurance that another form of man-
   in-the-middle attack has not occurred.

   A man-in-the-middle denial of service attack specifically directed at
   flow label handling would involve setting unusual flow labels.  For
   example, an attacker could set all flow labels reaching a given
   router to the same arbitrary non-zero value, or could perform rapid
   cycling of flow label values such that the packets of a given flow
   will each have a different value.  Either of these attacks would
   cause a stateless load distribution algorithm to perform badly and
   would cause a stateful mechanism to behave incorrectly.  For this
   reason, stateless mechanisms should not use the flow label alone to
   control load distribution, and stateful mechanisms should include
   explicit methods to detect and ignore suspect flow label values.

6.2.  IPsec and Tunneling Interactions

   The IPsec protocol, as defined in [RFC4301], [RFC4302], [RFC4303]
   does not include the IPv6 header's Flow Label in any of its
   cryptographic calculations (in the case of tunnel mode, it is the
   outer IPv6 header's Flow Label that is not included).  Hence
   modification of the Flow Label by a network node has no effect on
   IPsec end-to-end security, because it cannot cause any IPsec
   integrity check to fail.  As a consequence, IPsec does not provide
   any defense against an adversary's modification of the Flow Label
   (i.e., a man-in-the-middle attack).

   IPsec tunnel mode provides security for the encapsulated IP header's
   Flow Label.  A tunnel mode IPsec packet contains two IP headers: an
   outer header supplied by the tunnel ingress node and an encapsulated
   inner header supplied by the original source of the packet.  When an
   IPsec tunnel is passing through nodes performing flow classification,
   the intermediate network nodes operate on the Flow Label in the outer
   header.  At the tunnel egress node, IPsec processing includes
   removing the outer header and forwarding the packet (if required)
   using the inner header.  The IPsec protocol requires that the inner
   header's Flow Label not be changed by this decapsulation processing
   to ensure that modifications to label cannot be used to launch theft-
   or denial-of-service attacks across an IPsec tunnel endpoint.  This
   document makes no change to that requirement; indeed it forbids
   changes to the Flow Label.

   When IPsec tunnel egress decapsulation processing includes a

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   sufficiently strong cryptographic integrity check of the encapsulated
   packet (where sufficiency is determined by local security policy),
   the tunnel egress node can safely assume that the Flow Label in the
   inner header has the same value as it had at the tunnel ingress node.

   This analysis and its implications apply to any tunneling protocol
   that performs integrity checks.  Of course, any Flow Label set in an
   encapsulating IPv6 header is subject to the risks described in the
   previous section.

6.3.  Security Filtering Interactions

   The Flow Label does nothing to eliminate the need for packet
   filtering based on headers past the IP header, if such filtering is
   deemed necessary for security reasons on nodes such as firewalls or
   filtering routers.

   However, security devices that clear or rewrite non-zero flow label
   values would be in violation of this specification.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no action by IANA.

8.  Acknowledgements

   Steve Deering and Alex Conta were co-authors of RFC 3697, on which
   this document is based.

   Valuable comments and contributions were made by Fred Baker, Steve
   Blake, Remi Despres, Alan Ford, Fernando Gont, Brian Haberman, Tony
   Hain, Joel Halpern, Qinwen Hu, Chris Morrow, Thomas Narten, Mark
   Smith, Pascal Thubert, Iljitsch van Beijnum, and other participants
   in the 6man working group.

   Contributors to the development of RFC 3697 included Ran Atkinson,
   Steve Blake, Jim Bound, Francis Dupont, Robert Elz, Tony Hain, Robert
   Hancock, Bob Hinden, Christian Huitema, Frank Kastenholz, Thomas
   Narten, Charles Perkins, Pekka Savola, Hesham Soliman, Michael
   Thomas, Margaret Wasserman, and Alex Zinin.

   This document was produced using the xml2rfc tool [RFC2629].

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9.  Change log

   draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-01: update after resolving 11 initial
   issues, 2011-02-26

   draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-00: original version, built from RFC3697
   and draft-ietf-6man-flow-update-01, 2011-01-31

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

              Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the IPv6 Flow Label",
              draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-01 (work in progress),
              November 2010.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2205]  Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S.
              Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
              Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.

10.2.  Informative References

              Amante, S., Carpenter, B., and S. Jiang, "Rationale for
              update to the IPv6 flow label specification",
              draft-ietf-6man-flow-update-02 (work in progress),
              January 2011.

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              June 1999.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3697]  Rajahalme, J., Conta, A., Carpenter, B., and S. Deering,
              "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 3697, March 2004.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

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   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              December 2005.

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, December 2005.

Authors' Addresses

   Shane Amante
   Level 3 Communications, LLC
   1025 Eldorado Blvd
   Broomfield, CO  80021

   Email: shane@level3.net

   Brian Carpenter
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Auckland
   PB 92019
   Auckland,   1142
   New Zealand

   Email: brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com

   Sheng Jiang
   Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
   Huawei Building, No.3 Xinxi Rd.,
   Shang-Di Information Industry Base, Hai-Dian District, Beijing
   P.R. China

   Email: shengjiang@huawei.com

   Jarno Rajahalme
   Nokia-Siemens Networks

   Email: jarno.rajahalme@nsn.com

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