Network Working Group P. Eronen, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nokia
Expires: October 4, 2004 T. Hiller
Lucent Technologies
G. Zorn
Cisco Systems
April 5, 2004
Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application
draft-ietf-aaa-eap-05.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) provides a standard
mechanism for support of various authentication methods. This
document defines the Command-Codes and AVPs necessary to carry EAP
packets between a Network Access Server (NAS) and a back-end
authentication server.
Conventions used in this document
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Extensible Authentication Protocol Support in Diameter . . . . 4
2.1 Advertising application support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Sessions and NASREQ interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1 Scenario 1: Direct connection . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2 Scenario 2: Direct connection with redirects . . . . . 9
2.3.3 Scenario 3: Direct EAP, authorization via agents . . . 10
2.3.4 Scenario 4: Proxy agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Invalid packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7 Accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.8 Usage guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.8.1 User-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.8.2 Conflicting AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8.3 Displayable messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8.4 Role reversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.8.5 Alternative Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Command-Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.1 Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Attribute-Value Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1 New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.1 EAP-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.2 EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.3 EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1.4 Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. AVP Occurrence Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1 EAP Command AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2 Accounting AVP Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. RADIUS/Diameter interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.1 RADIUS Request forwarded as Diameter Request . . . . . . . 22
6.2 Diameter Request forwarded as RADIUS Request . . . . . . . 23
6.3 Accounting Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8.2 AVP editing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8.3 Negotiation attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.4 Session key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.5 Privacy issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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8.6 Note about EAP and impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
10.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 36
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1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [EAP], is an
authentication framework which supports multiple authentication
mechanisms. EAP may be used on dedicated links as well as switched
circuits, and wired as well as wireless links.
To date, EAP has been implemented with hosts and routers that connect
via switched circuits or dial-up lines using PPP [RFC1661], IEEE 802
wired switches [IEEE-802.1X], and IEEE 802.11 wireless access points
[IEEE-802.11i]. EAP has also been adopted for IPsec remote access in
IKEv2 [IKEv2].
This document specifies the Diameter EAP application that carries EAP
packets between a Network Access Server (NAS) working as an EAP
Authenticator and a back-end authentication server. The Diameter EAP
application is based on NASREQ and is intended for similar
environments as NASREQ.
In Diameter EAP application, authentication occurs between the EAP
client and its home Diameter server. This end-to-end authentication
reduces the possibility for fraudulent authentication, such as replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks. End-to-end authentication also
provides a possibility for mutual authentication, which is not
possible with PAP and CHAP in a roaming PPP environment.
The Diameter EAP application relies heavily on [NASREQ], and in
earlier drafts was part of the Diameter NASREQ application. It can
also be used in conjunction with NASREQ, selecting the application
based on the used authentication mechanism (EAP or PAP/CHAP). The
Diameter EAP application defines new Command-Codes and new AVPs, and
can work together with RADIUS EAP support [RFC3579].
2. Extensible Authentication Protocol Support in Diameter
2.1 Advertising application support
Diameter nodes conforming to this specification MAY advertise support
by including the value of TBD in the Auth-Application-Id AVP of the
Capabilities-Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer
command [BASE].
If the NAS receives a response with the Result-Code set to
DIAMETER_APPLICATION_UNSUPPORTED [BASE], it is an indication that the
Diameter server in the home realm does not support EAP. If possible,
the access device MAY attempt to negotiate another authentication
protocol, such as PAP or CHAP. An access device SHOULD be cautious
when determining whether a less secure authentication protocol will
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be used, since this could be a result of a bidding down attack (see
Section 8.3).
2.2 Protocol Overview
The EAP conversation between the authenticating peer and the access
device begins with the initiation of EAP within a link layer, such as
PPP [RFC1661] or IEEE 802.11i [IEEE-802.11i]. Once EAP has been
initiated, the access device will typically send to the Diameter
server a Diameter-EAP-Request message with an empty EAP-Payload AVP,
signifying an EAP-Start.
If the Diameter home server is willing to do EAP authentication, it
responds with a Diameter-EAP-Answer message containing an EAP-Payload
AVP that includes an encapsulated EAP packet. The Result-Code AVP in
the message will be set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH, signifying that
a subsequent request is expected. The EAP payload is forwarded by
the access device to the EAP client. This is illustrated in the
diagram below.
User NAS Server
| | |
| (initiate EAP) | |
|<------------------------------>| |
| | Diameter-EAP-Request |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Start) |
| |------------------------------->|
| | |
| | Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Request #1) |
| |<-------------------------------|
| EAP Request #1 | |
|<-------------------------------| |
: : :
: ...continues... :
The initial Diameter-EAP-Answer in a multi-round exchange normally
includes an EAP-Request/Identity, requesting the EAP client to
identify itself. Upon receipt of the EAP client's EAP-Response, the
access device will then issue a second Diameter-EAP-Request message,
with the client's EAP payload encapsulated within the EAP-Payload
AVP.
A preferred approach is for the access device to issue the
EAP-Request/Identity message to the EAP client, and forward the
EAP-Response/Identity packet, encapsulated within the EAP-Payload
AVP, as a Diameter-EAP-Request to the Diameter server (see the
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diagram below). This alternative reduces the number of Diameter
message round trips. When the EAP-Request/Identity message is issued
by the access device, it SHOULD interpret the EAP-Response/Identity
packet returned by the authenticating peer, and copy its value to a
User-Name AVP in Diameter-EAP-Request. This is useful in roaming
environments, since the Destination-Realm is needed for routing
purposes. Note that this alternative cannot be universally employed,
as there are circumstances where a user's identity is not needed
(such as when authorization occurs based on a calling or called phone
number).
User NAS Server
| | |
| (initiate EAP) | |
|<------------------------------>| |
| | |
| EAP Request(Identity) | |
|<-------------------------------| |
| | |
| EAP Response(Identity) | |
|------------------------------->| |
| | Diameter-EAP-Request |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Response) |
| |------------------------------->|
: : :
: ...continues... :
The conversation continues until the Diameter server sends a
Diameter-EAP-Answer with a Result-Code AVP indicating success or
failure, and an optional EAP-Payload. The Result-Code AVP is used by
the access device to determine whether service is to be provided to
the EAP client. The access device MUST NOT rely on the contents of
the optional EAP-Payload to determine whether service is to be
provided.
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: ...continued... :
: : :
| EAP Response #N | |
|------------------------------->| |
| | Diameter-EAP-Request |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Response #N) |
| |------------------------------->|
| | |
| | Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| | Result-Code=DIAMETER_SUCCESS |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Success) |
| | [EAP-Master-Session-Key] |
| | (authorization AVPs) |
| |<-------------------------------|
| | |
| EAP Success | |
|<-------------------------------| |
If authorization was requested, a Diameter-EAP-Answer with
Result-Code set to DIAMETER_SUCCESS SHOULD also include the
appropriate authorization AVPs required for the service requested
(see Section 5 and [NASREQ]). In some cases, the home server may not
be able to provide all necessary authorization AVPs; in this case, a
separate authorization step MAY be used as described in Section
2.3.3. Diameter-EAP-Answer messages whose Result-Code AVP is set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH MAY include authorization AVPs.
A Diameter-EAP-Answer with successful Result-Code MAY also include an
EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP that contains keying material for
protecting the communication between the user and the NAS. Exactly
how this keying material is used depends on the link layer in
question, and is beyond the scope of this document.
A home Diameter server MAY request EAP re-authentication by issuing
the Re-Auth-Request [BASE] message to the Diameter client.
Should an EAP authentication session be interrupted due to a home
server failure, the session MAY be directed to an alternate server,
but the authentication session will have to be restarted from the
beginning.
2.3 Sessions and NASREQ interaction
The previous section introduced the basic protocol between the NAS
and the home server. Since the Diameter-EAP-Answer message may
include a Master Session Key (MSK) for protecting the communication
between the user and the NAS, care must be taken to ensure that this
key does not fall into wrong hands.
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Basic Diameter security mechanisms (IPsec and TLS) protect Diameter
messages hop-by-hop. Since there are currently no end-to-end
(NAS-to-home server) security mechanisms defined for Diameter, this
section describes some possible scenarios how the messages could be
transported protected using these hop-by-hop mechanisms.
The list of scenarios is not intended to be exhaustive, and it is
possible to combine them. For instance, the first proxy agent after
the NAS could use redirects as in scenario 2 to bypass any additional
proxy agents.
2.3.1 Scenario 1: Direct connection
The simplest case is when the NAS contacts the home server directly.
All the authorization AVPs are delivered by the home server, as is
EAP keying material.
NAS home server
| |
| Diameter-EAP-Request |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Start) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Request) |
|<----------------------------------------------------------------|
| |
: ...more EAP Request/Response pairs... :
| |
| Diameter-EAP-Request |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Response) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_SUCCESS |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Success) |
| EAP-Master-Session-Key |
| (authorization AVPs) |
|<----------------------------------------------------------------|
This scenario is the most likely to be used in small networks, or in
cases where Diameter agents are not needed to provide routing or
additional authorization AVPs.
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2.3.2 Scenario 2: Direct connection with redirects
In this scenario the NAS uses a redirect agent to locate the home
server, and the rest of the session proceeds as before.
NAS Local redirect agent Home server
| | |
| Diameter-EAP-Request | |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Start) | |
|------------------------------->| |
| | |
| Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Redirect-Host=homeserver.example.com |
| Redirect-Host-Usage=REALM_AND_APPLICATION |
|<-------------------------------| |
| : |
| Diameter-EAP-Request : |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Start) : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| : |
: ...rest of the session continues as in first case... :
: : :
The advantage of this scenario is that knowledge of realms and home
servers is centralized to a redirect agent, and it is not necessary
to modify the NAS configuration when, e.g., a new roaming agreement
is done.
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2.3.3 Scenario 3: Direct EAP, authorization via agents
In this scenario the EAP authentication is done directly with the
home server (with Auth-Request-Type set to AUTHENTICATE_ONLY), and
the authorization AVPs are retrieved from the local proxy agents.
This scenario is intended for environments where the home server
cannot provide all the necessary authorization AVPs to the NAS.
NAS Local proxy agent Home server
| : |
| Diameter-EAP-Request : |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHENTICATE_ONLY |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Start) : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| : |
| : Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH |
| : EAP-Payload(EAP Request) |
|<----------------------------------------------------------------|
| : |
: ...more EAP Request/Response pairs... :
| : |
| Diameter-EAP-Request : |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Response) : |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| : |
| : Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| : Result-Code=DIAMETER_SUCCESS |
| : EAP-Payload(EAP Success) |
| : EAP-Master-Session-Key |
| : (authorization AVPs) |
|<----------------------------------------------------------------|
| | |
| AA-Request | |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHORIZE_ONLY |
| (some AVPs from first session) | |
|------------------------------->| |
| | |
| AA-Answer | |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_SUCCESS | |
| (authorization AVPs) | |
|<-------------------------------| |
The NASREQ application is used here for authorization because the
realm-specific routing table supports routing based on application,
but not on Diameter commands.
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2.3.4 Scenario 4: Proxy agents
Same as scenario 1, but through proxies. Note that in this case the
proxies can see the EAP session keys, so this is not suitable for
environments where proxies cannot be trusted for this.
NAS Local proxy/relay agent Home server
| | |
| Diameter-EAP-Request | |
| Auth-Request-Type=AUTHORIZE_AUTHENTICATE |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Start) | |
|------------------------------->|------------------------------->|
| | |
| | Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| Result-Code=DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Request) |
|<-------------------------------|<-------------------------------|
| : |
: ...more EAP Request/Response pairs... :
| : |
| Diameter-EAP-Request | |
| EAP-Payload(EAP Response) | |
|------------------------------->|------------------------------->|
| | |
| | Diameter-EAP-Answer |
| | Result-Code=DIAMETER_SUCCESS |
| | EAP-Payload(EAP Success) |
| | EAP-Master-Session-Key |
| | (authorization AVPs) |
|<-------------------------------|<-------------------------------|
2.4 Invalid packets
While acting as a pass-through, the NAS MUST validate the EAP header
fields (Code, Identifier, Length) prior to forwarding an EAP packet
to or from the Diameter server. On receiving an EAP packet from the
peer, the NAS checks the Code (2) and Length fields, and matches the
Identifier value against the current Identifier, supplied by the
Diameter server in the most recently validated EAP Request. On
receiving an EAP packet from the Diameter server (encapsulated within
a Diameter-EAP-Answer), the NAS checks the Code (1) and Length
fields, then updates the current Identifier value. Pending EAP
Responses that do not match the current Identifier value are silently
discarded by the NAS.
Since EAP method fields (Type, Type-Data) are typically not validated
by a NAS operating as a pass-through, despite these checks it is
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possible for a NAS to forward an invalid EAP packet to or from the
Diameter server.
A Diameter server receiving an EAP-Payload AVP it does not understand
SHOULD make the determination of whether the error is fatal or
non-fatal based on the EAP Type. A Diameter server determining that
a fatal error has occurred MUST send an a Diameter-EAP-Answer with a
failure Result-Code and an EAP-Payload AVP encapsulating an EAP
Failure packet. A Diameter server determining that a non-fatal error
has occurred MUST send a Diameter-EAP-Answer with
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH Result-Code, but no EAP-Payload AVP. To
simplify RADIUS translation, this message MUST also include an
EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP encapsulating the previous EAP Request sent
by the server.
When receiving a Diameter-EAP-Answer without an EAP-Payload AVP (and
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH Result-Code), the NAS SHOULD discard the
EAP-Response packet most recently transmitted to the Diameter server
and check whether additional EAP Response packets have been received
matching the current Identifier value. If so, a new EAP Response
packet, if available, MUST be sent to the Diameter server within an
Diameter-EAP-Request. If no EAP Response packet is available, then
the previous EAP Request is resent to the peer, and the
retransmission timer is reset.
In order to provide protection against Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks, it is advisable for the NAS to allocate a finite buffer for
EAP packets received from the peer, and to discard packets according
to an appropriate policy once that buffer has been exceeded. Also,
the Diameter server is advised to permit only a modest number of
invalid EAP packets within a single session, prior to terminating the
session with DIAMETER_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED Result-Code. By default
a value of 5 invalid EAP packets is recommended.
2.5 Retransmission
As noted in [EAP], if an EAP packet is lost in transit between the
authenticating peer and the NAS (or vice versa), the NAS will
retransmit.
It may be necessary to adjust retransmission strategies and
authentication timeouts in certain cases. For example, when a token
card is used, additional time may be required to allow the user to
find the card and enter the token. Since the NAS will typically not
have knowledge of the required parameters, these need to be provided
by the Diameter server.
If a Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP [BASE] is present in an
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Diameter-EAP-Answer message that also contains an EAP-Payload AVP,
that value is used to set the EAP retransmission timer for that EAP
Request, and that Request alone.
2.6 Fragmentation
Using the EAP-Payload AVP, it is possible for the Diameter server to
encapsulate an EAP packet that is larger than the MTU on the link
between the NAS and the peer. Since it is not possible for the
Diameter server to use MTU discovery to ascertain the link MTU, a
Framed-MTU AVP may be included in a Diameter-EAP-Request message so
as to provide the Diameter server with this information.
A Diameter server having received a Framed-MTU AVP in a
Diameter-EAP-Request message MUST NOT send any subsequent packet in
this EAP conversation containing EAP-Payload AVP whose length exceeds
the length specified by the Framed-MTU value, taking the link type
(specified by the NAS-Port-Type AVP) into account. For example, as
noted in [RFC3580] Section 3.10, for a NAS-Port-Type value of IEEE
802.11, the RADIUS server may send an EAP packet as large as
Framed-MTU minus four (4) octets, taking into account the additional
overhead for the IEEE 802.1X Version (1), Type (1) and Body Length
(2) fields.
2.7 Accounting
When a user is authenticated using EAP, the NAS MAY include an
Accounting-Auth-Method AVP [NASREQ] with value 5 (EAP) in
Accounting-Request messages. This document specifies one additional
AVP for accounting messages: one or more Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method
AVPs (see Section 4.1.4) MAY be included in Accounting-Request
messages to indicate the EAP method(s) used to authenticate the user.
If the NAS has authenticated the user with a locally implemented EAP
method, it knows the method used and SHOULD include it in an
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP.
If the authentication was done using Diameter-EAP-Request/Answer
messages, the Diameter server SHOULD include one more more
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVPs in Diameter-EAP-Answer packets with a
successful result code. In this case, the NAS SHOULD include these
AVPs in Accounting-Request messages.
2.8 Usage guidelines
2.8.1 User-Name AVP
Unless the access device interprets the EAP-Response/Identity packet
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returned by the authenticating peer, it will not have access to the
user's identity. Furthermore, some EAP methods support identity
protection where the user's real identity is not included in
EAP-Response/Identity. Therefore, the Diameter Server SHOULD return
the user's identity by inserting a User-Name AVP to
Diameter-EAP-Answer messages that have a Result-Code of
DIAMETER_SUCCESS. A separate billing identifier or pseudonym MAY be
used for privacy reasons (see Section 8.5). If the user's identity is
not available to the NAS, the Session-Id AVP MAY be used for
accounting and billing; however operationally this could be very
difficult to manage.
2.8.2 Conflicting AVPs
A Diameter-EAP-Answer message containing an EAP-Payload of type
EAP-Success or EAP-Failure MUST NOT have the Result-Code AVP set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH.
Some lower layers assume that the authorization decision is made by
the EAP server, and thus the peer considers EAP Success as an
indication that access was granted. In this case, the Result-Code
SHOULD match the contained EAP packet: a successful Result-Code for
EAP-Success, and a failure Result-Code for EAP-Failure. If the
encapsulated EAP packet does not match the result implied by the
Result-Code AVP, the combination is likely to cause confusion,
because the NAS and peer will arrive at different conclusions as to
the outcome of the authentication. For example, if the NAS receives a
failure Result-Code with an encapsulated EAP Success, it will not
grant access to the peer. However, on receiving the EAP Success, the
peer will be lead to believe that access was granted.
This situation can be difficult to avoid when Diameter proxy agents
make authorization decisions (that is, proxies can change the
Result-Code AVP sent by the home server), or when Diameter is used
for communicating with a backend authentication server (see Section
2.8.5). Since the responsibility for avoiding conflicts lies with the
Diameter server, the NAS MUST NOT "manufacture" EAP result packets in
order to correct contradictory messages that it receives. This
behavior, originally mandated within [IEEE-802.1X], will be
deprecated in the future.
2.8.3 Displayable messages
The Reply-Message AVP [NASREQ] contains text which may be displayed
to the user. Note that the NAS does not necessarily have any
facility for actually sending these messages to the user. In any
case, the NAS MUST NOT manufacture any EAP packets (such as
EAP-Request/Notification) from Reply-Message AVPs.
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2.8.4 Role reversal
Some environments where EAP is used, such as PPP, support
peer-to-peer operation. That is, both parties act as authenticators
and authenticatees at the same time, in two simultaneous and
independent EAP conversations.
This specification is intended for communication between EAP
(passthrough) authenticator and backend authentication server. A
Diameter client MUST NOT send a Diameter-EAP-Request encapsulating an
EAP Request packet, and a Diameter server receiving such packet MUST
respond with a failure Result-Code..
2.8.5 Alternative Uses
Currently the conversation between the backend authentication server
and the Diameter server is proprietary because of lack of
standardization. In order to increase standardization and provide
interoperability between Diameter vendors and backend security
vendors, it is recommended that Diameter-encapsulated EAP be used for
this conversation.
This has the advantage of allowing the Diameter server to support EAP
without the need for authentication-specific code within the Diameter
server. Authentication-specific code can then reside on a back-end
authentication server instead.
In the case where Diameter-encapsulated EAP is used in a conversation
between a Diameter server and a backend authentication server, the
latter will typically return an Diameter-EAP-Answer/EAP-Payload/
EAP-Success message without inclusion of the expected authorization
AVPs required in a successful response. This means that the Diameter
server MUST add these attributes prior to sending an
Diameter-EAP-Answer/EAP-Payload/EAP-Success message to the access
device.
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3. Command-Codes
This section defines new Command-Code values that MUST be supported
by all Diameter implementations conforming to this specification.
The following Command Codes are defined in this section:
Command-Name Abbrev. Code Reference
--------------------------------------------------------
Diameter-EAP-Request DER 268 3.1
Diameter-EAP-Answer DEA 268 3.2
3.1 Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) Command
The Diameter-EAP-Request (DER) command, indicated by the Command-Code
field set to 268 and the 'R' bit set in the Command Flags field, is
sent by a Diameter client to a Diameter server and conveys an
EAP-Response from the EAP client. The Diameter-EAP-Request MUST
contain one EAP-Payload AVP, which contains the actual EAP payload.
An EAP-Payload AVP with no data MAY be sent to the Diameter server to
initiate an EAP authentication session.
The DER message MAY be the result of a multi-round authentication
exchange, which occurs when the DEA is received with the Result-Code
AVP set to DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH [BASE]. A subsequent DER
message MUST include any State AVPs [NASREQ] that were present in the
DEA. For re-authentication, it is recommended that the Identity
request be skipped in order to reduce the number of authentication
round trips. This is only possible when the user's identity is
already known by the home Diameter server.
Message format
<Diameter-EAP-Request> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, REQ, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
{ Destination-Realm }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
[ NAS-Port ]
[ NAS-Port-Id ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
[ Destination-Host ]
[ NAS-Identifier ]
[ NAS-IP-Address ]
[ NAS-IPv6-Address ]
[ NAS-Port-Type ]
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[ Port-Limit ]
[ User-Name ]
{ EAP-Payload }
[ Service-Type ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ State ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ Callback-Number ]
[ Called-Station-Id ]
[ Calling-Station-Id ]
* [ Class ]
[ Originating-Line-Info ]
[ Connect-Info ]
* [ Framed-Compression ]
[ Framed-Interface-Id ]
[ Framed-IP-Address ]
* [ Framed-IPv6-Prefix ]
[ Framed-IP-Netmask ]
[ Framed-MTU ]
[ Framed-Protocol ]
* [ Tunneling ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ Route-Record ]
* [ AVP ]
3.2 Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) Command
The Diameter-EAP-Answer (DEA) message, indicated by the Command-Code
field set to 268 and the 'R' bit cleared in the Command Flags field,
is sent by the Diameter server to the client for one of the following
reasons:
1. The message is part of a multi-round authentication exchange, and
the server is expecting a subsequent Diameter-EAP-Request. This
is indicated by setting the Result-Code to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH, and MAY include zero or more State
AVPs.
2. The EAP client has been successfully authenticated and
authorized, in which case the message MUST include the
Result-Code AVP indicating success, and SHOULD include an
EAP-Payload of type EAP-Success. This event MUST cause the
access device to provide service to the EAP client.
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3. The EAP client has not been successfully authenticated and/or
authorized, and the Result-Code AVP is set to indicate failure.
This message SHOULD include an EAP-Payload, but this AVP is not
used to determine whether service is to be provided.
If the message from the Diameter client included a request for
authorization, a successful response MUST include the authorization
AVPs that are relevant to the service being provided.
Message format
<Diameter-EAP-Answer> ::= < Diameter Header: 268, PXY >
< Session-Id >
{ Auth-Application-Id }
{ Auth-Request-Type }
{ Result-Code }
{ Origin-Host }
{ Origin-Realm }
[ User-Name ]
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ EAP-Reissued-Payload ]
[ EAP-Master-Session-Key ]
[ Multi-Round-Time-Out ]
[ Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method ]
[ Service-Type ]
* [ Class ]
* [ Configuration-Token ]
[ Acct-Interim-Interval ]
[ Error-Message ]
[ Error-Reporting-Host ]
[ Idle-Timeout ]
[ Authorization-Lifetime ]
[ Auth-Grace-Period ]
[ Auth-Session-State ]
[ Re-Auth-Request-Type ]
[ Session-Timeout ]
[ State ]
* [ Reply-Message ]
[ Origin-State-Id ]
* [ Filter-Id ]
[ Port-Limit ]
[ Callback-Id ]
[ Callback-Number ]
[ Framed-Appletalk-Link ]
* [ Framed-Appletalk-Network ]
[ Framed-Appletalk-Zone ]
* [ Framed-Compression ]
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[ Framed-Interface-Id ]
[ Framed-IP-Address ]
* [ Framed-IPv6-Prefix ]
[ Framed-IPv6-Pool ]
* [ Framed-IPv6-Route ]
[ Framed-IP-Netmask ]
* [ Framed-Route ]
[ Framed-Pool ]
[ Framed-IPX-Network ]
[ Framed-MTU ]
[ Framed-Protocol ]
[ Framed-Routing ]
* [ NAS-Filter-Rule ]
* [ Tunneling ]
* [ Redirect-Host ]
[ Redirect-Host-Usage ]
[ Redirect-Max-Cache-Time ]
* [ Proxy-Info ]
* [ AVP ]
4. Attribute-Value Pairs
This section both defines new AVPs, unique to the EAP Diameter
application and describes the usage of AVPs defined elsewhere if that
usage in the EAP application is noteworthy.
4.1 New AVPs
4.1.1 EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type OctetString and is used
to encapsulate the actual EAP packet that is being exchanged between
the EAP client and the home Diameter server.
4.1.2 EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP
The EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type OctetString.
The use of this AVP is described in Section 2.4.
4.1.3 EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP
The EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type OctetString.
It contains keying material for protecting the communications between
the user and the NAS. Exactly how this keying material is used
depends on the link layer in question, and is beyond the scope of
this document.
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4.1.4 Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP
The Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type
Unsigned64. In case of expanded types [EAP, Section 5.7], the least
significant 32 bits contain the Vendor-Type field, and the next 24
bits contain the Vendor-Id field.
The use of this AVP is described in Section 2.7.
5. AVP Occurrence Tables
The following tables use these symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the
message
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message
Note that AVPs that can only be present within a Grouped AVP are not
represented in these tables.
5.1 EAP Command AVP Table
The following table lists the AVPs that may be present in the DER and
DEA Commands, defined in this document; however, the AVPs listed are
defined both here and in [NASREQ].
+---------------+
| Command-Code |
|-------+-------+
Attribute Name | DER | DEA |
------------------------------------|-------+-------|
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method | 0 | 0+ |
Acct-Interim-Interval [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Auth-Application-Id [BASE] | 1 | 1 |
Auth-Grace-Period [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Auth-Request-Type [BASE] | 1 | 1 |
Auth-Session-State [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Authorization-Lifetime [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Callback-Id [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Callback-Number [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Called-Station-Id [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
Calling-Station-Id [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
Class [BASE] | 0+ | 0+ |
Configuration-Token [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Connect-Info [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
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Destination-Host [BASE] | 0-1 | 0 |
Destination-Realm [BASE] | 1 | 0 |
EAP-Master-Session-Key | 0 | 0-1 |
EAP-Payload | 1 | 0-1 |
EAP-Reissued-Payload | 0 | 0-1 |
Error-Message [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Error-Reporting-Host [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Failed-AVP [BASE] | 0+ | 0+ |
Filter-Id [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-Appletalk-Link [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Appletalk-Network [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-Appletalk-Zone [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Compression [NASREQ] | 0+ | 0+ |
Framed-Interface-Id [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IP-Address [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IP-Netmask [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-IPv6-Prefix [NASREQ] | 0+ | 0+ |
Framed-IPv6-Pool [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-IPv6-Route [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-IPX-Network [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-MTU [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Pool [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Framed-Protocol [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Framed-Route [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Framed-Routing [NASREQ] | 0 | 0-1 |
Idle-Timeout [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Multi-Round-Time-Out [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
NAS-Filter-Rule [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
NAS-Identifier [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-IP-Address [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-IPv6-Address [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-Port [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-Port-Id [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
NAS-Port-Type [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
Originating-Line-Info [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0 |
Origin-Host [BASE] | 1 | 1 |
Origin-Realm [BASE] | 1 | 1 |
Origin-State-Id [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Port-Limit [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Proxy-Info [BASE] | 0+ | 0+ |
Re-Auth-Request-Type [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Redirect-Host [BASE] | 0 | 0+ |
Redirect-Host-Usage [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Redirect-Max-Cache-Time [BASE] | 0 | 0-1 |
Reply-Message [NASREQ] | 0 | 0+ |
Result-Code [BASE] | 0 | 1 |
Route-Record [BASE] | 0+ | 0+ |
Service-Type [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
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Session-Id [BASE] | 1 | 1 |
Session-Timeout [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
State [NASREQ] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
Tunneling [NASREQ] | 0+ | 0+ |
User-Name [BASE] | 0-1 | 0-1 |
5.2 Accounting AVP Table
The table in this section is used to represent which AVPs defined in
this document are to be present in the Accounting messages, defined
in [BASE].
+-----------+
| Command |
| Code |
|-----+-----+
Attribute Name | ACR | ACA |
---------------------------------------|-----+-----+
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method | 0+ | 0 |
6. RADIUS/Diameter interactions
Section 9 of [NASREQ] describes basic guidelines that translation
agents may follow when translating between RADIUS and Diameter
protocols. This section gives additional guidelines for the Diameter
EAP application. Note that this document does not restrict
implementations from creating additional methods, as long as the
translation function doesn't violate the RADIUS or the Diameter
protocols.
6.1 RADIUS Request forwarded as Diameter Request
RADIUS Access-Request to Diameter-EAP-Request:
o RADIUS EAP-Message attribute(s) are translated to a Diameter
EAP-Payload AVP. If multiple RADIUS EAP-Message attributes are
present, they are concatenated and translated to a single Diameter
EAP-Payload AVP.
o An empty RADIUS EAP-Message attribute (with length 2) signifies
EAP-Start, and it is translated to an empty EAP-Payload AVP.
Diameter-EAP-Answer to RADIUS Access-Accept/Reject/Challenge:
o Diameter EAP-Payload AVP is translated to RADIUS EAP-Message
attribute(s). If necessary, the value is split into multiple
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RADIUS EAP-Message attributes.
o Diameter EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP is translated to a message that
contains RADIUS EAP-Message attribute(s), and a RADIUS Error-Cause
attribute [RFC3576] with value 202 (decimal), "Invalid EAP Packet
(Ignored)" [RFC3579].
o As described in [NASREQ], if the Result-Code AVP set to
DIAMETER_MULTI_ROUND_AUTH and the Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP is
present, it is translated to the RADIUS Session-Timeout attribute.
o Diameter EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP can be translated to the
vendor-specific RADIUS MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and MS-MPPE-Send-Key
attributes [RFC2548]. The first up to 32 octets of the key is
stored into MS-MPPE-Recv-Key, and the next up to 32 octets (if
present) are stored into MS-MPPE-Send-Key. The encryption of this
attribute is described in [RFC2548].
o Diameter Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVPs, if present, are
discarded.
6.2 Diameter Request forwarded as RADIUS Request
Diameter-EAP-Request to RADIUS Access-Request:
o The Diameter EAP-Payload AVP is translated to RADIUS EAP-Message
attribute(s).
o An empty Diameter EAP-Payload AVP signifies EAP-Start, and it is
translated to an empty RADIUS EAP-Message attribute.
o The type (or expanded type) field from the EAP-Payload AVP can be
saved either in a local state table, or encoded in a RADIUS
Proxy-State attribute. This information is needed to construct an
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP for the answer message (see below).
RADIUS Access-Accept/Reject/Challenge to Diameter-EAP-Answer:
o If the RADIUS Access-Challenge message does not contain an
Error-Cause attribute [RFC3576] with value 202 (decimal), "Invalid
EAP Packet (Ignored)" [RFC3579], any RADIUS EAP-Message attributes
are translated to a Diameter EAP-Payload AVP, concatenating them
if multiple attributes are present.
o If the Error-Cause attribute with value 202 is present, any RADIUS
EAP-Message attributes are translated to a Diameter
EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP, concatenating them if multiple
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attributes are present.
o As described in [NASREQ], if the Session-Timeout attribute is
present in a RADIUS Access-Challenge message, it is translated to
the Diameter Multi-Round-Time-Out AVP.
o If the vendor-specific RADIUS MS-MPPE-Recv-Key and/or
MS-MPPE-Send-Key attributes [RFC2548] are present, they can be
translated to a Diameter EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP. The
attributes have to be decrypted before conversion, and the Salt,
Key-Length and Padding sub-fields are discarded. The Key
sub-fields are concatenated (MS-MPPE-Recv-Key first,
MS-MPPE-Send-Key next), and the concatenated value is stored into
a Diameter EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP.
o If the Diameter-EAP-Answer will have a successful result code, the
saved state (see above) can be used to construct an
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP.
6.3 Accounting Requests
In Accounting-Requests, the vendor-specific RADIUS MS-Acct-EAP-Type
attribute [RFC2548] can be translated to a Diameter
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP, and vice versa.
When translating from Diameter to RADIUS, note that the
MS-Acct-EAP-Type attribute does not support expanded EAP types. Type
values greater than 255 should be translated to type 254.
7. IANA Considerations
This document does not create any new namespaces to be maintained by
IANA, but it requires new values in namespaces that have been defined
in the Diameter Base protocol [BASE].
o IANA has assigned a Command Code value of TBD-BY-IANA (suggested
value: 268) for the Diameter-EAP-Request/Diameter-EAP-Answer
command (in the Command Code namespace defined in [BASE]).
o IANA has assigned the following AVP Code values for the new AVPs
defined in this document (in the AVP Code namespace defined in
[BASE]).
AVP name Code
-----------------------------------
EAP-Payload TBD
EAP-Reissued-Payload TBD
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EAP-Master-Session-Key TBD
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method TBD
o IANA has assigned an Application Identifier value of TBD-BY-IANA
for this specification (in the Application Identifier namespace
defined in [BASE]).
8. Security Considerations
8.1 Overview
Diameter peer-to-peer connections can be protected with IPsec or TLS.
These mechanisms are believed to provide sufficient protection under
the normal Internet threat model--that is, assuming the authorized
nodes engaging in the protocol have not been compromised, but the
attacker has complete control over the communication channels between
them. This includes eavesdropping, message modification, insertion,
man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. The details and related
security considerations are discussed in [BASE].
In addition to authentication provided by IPsec or TLS, authorization
is also required. Authorization here means the act of determining if
a Diameter message received from an authenticated Diameter peer
should be accepted (and not authorization of users requesting network
access from a NAS). In other words, when a Diameter server receives
a Diameter-EAP-Request, it has to decide if the client is authorized
to act as a NAS for the specific user, service type, and so on.
Correspondingly, when a NAS contacts a server to send a
Diameter-EAP-Request, it has to determine whether the server is
authorized to act as home server for the realm in question.
Authorization can involve local Access Control Lists (ACLs),
information contained in certificates, or some other means. See
[BASE] for more discussion and related security considerations. Note
that authorization issues are particularly relevant when Diameter
redirects are used. While redirection reduces the number of nodes
which have access to the contents of Diameter messages, a compromised
Diameter agent may not supply the right home server's address. If the
Diameter client is unable to tell whether this particular server is
authorized to act as the home server for this particular user, the
security of the communications rests on the redirect agent, even if
redirects are used.
The hop-by-hop security mechanisms (IPsec and TLS) combined with
proper authorization provide good protection against "outside"
attackers (denial-of-service is, of course, possible). The remaining
part of this section deals with attacks by nodes that have been
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properly authorized (to function as a NAS, Diameter agent, or
Diameter server) but abuse their authorization or have been
compromised. In general, it is not possible to completely protect
against attacks by compromised nodes, but this section offers some
advice that can be used to limit the extent of the damage.
Attacks involving eavesdropping or modification of EAP messages are
beyond the scope of these document. See [EAP] for discussion of these
security considerations (including method negotiation, dictionary
attacks, and privacy issues). While these attacks can be carried out
by an attacker between the client and the NAS, compromised NASes and
Diameter agents are naturally also in a good position to modify and
eavesdrop the EAP messages.
Similarly, attacks involving whatever link layer protocol is used
between the client and the NAS, such as PPP or IEEE 802.11, are
beyond the scope of this document.
8.2 AVP editing
Diameter agents can modify, insert, and delete AVPs. Diameter agents
are usually meant to modify AVPs, and the protocol in general cannot
distinguish well-intentioned and malicious modifications (see
[RFC2607] for more discussion). Similarly, a compromised NAS or
server can naturally include different set of AVPs than expected.
The question is thus "what can an attacker who compromises an
authorized NAS, agent, or server do using Diameter EAP messages?"
Some of the consequences are rather obvious--for instance, a Diameter
agent can give access to unauthorized users by changing the
Result-Code to DIAMETER_SUCCESS. Other consequences are less obvious,
and are discussed below (authentication method negotiation attacks
are discussed in the next section).
By including suitable AVPs in an AA-Answer/Diameter-EAP-Answer
messages an attacker (depending on implementation and configuration
details) may be able to:
o Give unauthorized users access, or deny access to authorized users
(Result-Code).
o Give attacker a login session to a host otherwise protected by
firewalls, or redirect an authorized user's login session to a
host controlled by the attacker (Login-Host).
o Route an authorized user's traffic through a host controlled by
the attacker (various tunneling AVPs).
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o Redirect an authorized user's DNS requests to a malicious DNS
server (various vendor-specific AVPs).
o Modify routing tables at the NAS and thus redirect packets
destined for someone else (Framed-Route, Framed-Routing).
o Remove packet filters and other restrictions for user (Filter,
Callback, various vendor-specific AVPs).
o Cause the NAS to call some number, possibly expensive toll number
controlled by the attacker (callback AVPs)
o Execute Command Line Interface (CLI) commands on the NAS (various
vendor-specific attributes).
By modifying an AA-Request/Diameter-EAP-Request, an attacker may be
able to:
o Change NAS-Identifier/NAS-Port/Origin-Host (or something) so that
a valid user appears to be accessing the network from a different
NAS than in reality.
o Modify Calling-Station-ID (either to hide the true value, gain
access, or frame someone else).
o Modify password change messages (some vendor-specific attributes)
o Modify usage information in accounting messages.
o Modify contents of Class and State AVPs.
Some of these attacks can be prevented if the NAS or server can be
configured not to accept some particular AVPs, or accepting them only
from some nodes.
8.3 Negotiation attacks
This section deals with attacks where the NAS, any Diameter agents,
or Diameter server attempts to cause the authenticating user to
choose some authentication method other than EAP, such as PAP or CHAP
(negotiation attacks within EAP are discussed in [EAP], Section 7.8).
The vulnerability can be mitigated via implementation of
per-connection policy on the part of the authenticating peer, and
per-user policy on the part of the Diameter server. For the
authenticating peer, authentication policy should be set on a
per-connection basis.
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With per-connection policy, an authenticating peer will only attempt
to negotiate EAP for a session in which EAP support is expected. As
a result, there is a presumption that an authenticating peer
selecting EAP requires that level of security. If it cannot be
provided, it is likely that there is some kind of misconfiguration,
or even that the authenticating peer is contacting the wrong server.
In this case, the authenticating peer simply disconnects.
Similarly, with a per-user policy, the home server will not accept
authentication methods other than EAP for users for which EAP support
is expected.
For a NAS, it may not be possible to determine whether a peer is
required to authenticate with EAP until the peer's identity is known.
For example, for shared-uses NASes it is possible for one reseller to
implement EAP while another does not. Alternatively, some peer might
be authenticated locally by the NAS while other peers are
authenticated via Diameter. In such cases, if any peers of the NAS
MUST do EAP, then the NAS MUST attempt to negotiate EAP for every
session. This avoids forcing a peer to support more than one
authentication type, which could weaken security.
8.4 Session key distribution
Since there are currently no end-to-end (NAS-to-home server) security
mechanisms specified for Diameter, any agents that process
Diameter-EAP-Answer messages can see the contents of the
EAP-Session-Key AVP. For this reason, this specification strongly
recommends avoiding Diameter agents when they cannot be trusted to
keep the keys secret.
In environments where agents are present, several factors should be
considered when deciding whether the agents that are authorized (and
considered "trustworthy enough") to grant access to users and specify
various authorization and tunneling AVPs are also "trustworthy
enough" to handle the session keys. These factors include (but are
not limited to) the type of access provided (e.g., public Internet or
corporate internet), security level of the agents, and the
possibilities for attacking user's traffic after it has been
decrypted by the NAS.
Note that the keys communicated in Diameter messages are usually
short-term session keys (or short-term master keys that are used to
derive session keys). To actually cause any damage, those session
keys must end with some malicious party; that party must be able to
eavesdrop, modify, or insert traffic between the user and the NAS
during the lifetime of those keys (e.g., in 802.11i the attacker must
also eavesdrop the "four-way handshake"); and that eavesdropping or
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modification must cause some damage.
8.5 Privacy issues
Diameter messages can contain AVPs that can be used to identify the
user (e.g., User-Name) and approximate location of the user (e.g.
Origin-Host for WLAN access points, Calling-Station-Id for fixed
phone lines). Thus, any Diameter nodes that process the messages may
be able to determine the geographic location of users.
Note that in many cases, the user identity is also sent in clear
inside EAP-Payload AVPs, and it may be possible to eavesdrop this
between the user and the NAS.
This can mitigated somewhat by using EAP methods that provide
identity protection (see [EAP], Section 7.3), and using Session-Id or
pseudonyms for accounting.
8.6 Note about EAP and impersonation
If the EAP method used does not provide mutual authentication,
obviously anyone can impersonate as the network to the user. Even
when EAP mutual authentication is used, it occurs between the user
and the Diameter home server. See [EAPKey] for an extensive
discussion about the details and their implications.
However, one issue is worth pointing out here. As described in
[EAPKey], the current EAP architecture does not allow the home server
to restrict what service parameters or identities (such as SSID or
BSSID in 802.11 wireless LANs) are advertised by the NAS to the
client. That is, a compromised NAS can change its BSSID or SSID, thus
appearing to offer a different service than intended. Even if these
parameters are included in Diameter-EAP-Request messages, the NAS can
tell different values to the client.
Thus, the possession of the session keys by the NAS proves that the
user is talking to *some* authorized NAS, but a compromised NAS can
lie about its exact identity. See [EAPKey] for discussion how
individual EAP methods can provide authentication of NAS service
parameters and identities.
Note that the usefulness of such authentication may be rather limited
in many environments. For instance, in wireless LANs the user does
not usually securely know the identity (such as BSSID) of the "right"
access point--it is simply picked from a beacon message that has the
correct SSID and good signal strength (something that is easy to
spoof). Thus, simply authenticating the identity may not allow the
user to distinguish the "right" access point from all other ones.
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9. Acknowledgements
This Diameter application relies heavily on earlier work on Diameter
NASREQ application [NASREQ] and RADIUS EAP support [RFC3579]. Much
of the material in this specification has been copied from these
documents.
The authors would also like to acknowledge the following people for
their contributions to this document: Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko,
Julien Bournelle, Pat Calhoun, Henry Haverinen, John Loughney,
Yoshihiro Ohba, and Joseph Salowey.
10. References
10.1 Normative References
[BASE] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G. and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[EAP] Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Aboba, B., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-09 (work in progress), February
2004.
[NASREQ] Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D. and D. Mitton, "Diameter
Network Access Server Application",
draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-14 (work in progress),
February 2004.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2 Informative References
[Archie] Walker, J. and R. Housley, "The EAP Archie Protocol",
draft-jwalker-eap-archie-01 (work in progress), June 2003.
[EAPKey] Aboba, B., Simon, D., Arkko, J. and H. Levkowetz, "EAP Key
Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-01 (work in
progress), October 2003.
[IEEE-802.1X]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local
and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access
Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X, September 2001.
[IEEE-802.11i]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
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Standard for Information technology - Telecommunications
and information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access
Control (MAC) Security Enhancements", IEEE Draft P802.11i/
D9.0 (work in progress), March 2004.
[IKEv2] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-13 (work in progress),
March 2004.
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51,
RFC 1661, July 1994.
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999.
[RFC2607] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.
[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576,
July 2003.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.
Authors' Addresses
Pasi Eronen (editor)
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 Nokia Group
Finland
EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com
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Tom Hiller
Lucent Technologies
1960 Lucent Lane
Naperville, IL 60566
USA
Phone: +1 630 979 7673
EMail: tom.hiller@lucent.com
Glen Zorn
Cisco Systems
500 108th Avenue N.E., Suite 500
Bellevue, WA 98004
USA
Phone: +1 425 344 8113
EMail: gwz@cisco.com
Appendix A. Changelog
(This section will not appear in the final version submitted to RFC
editor.)
Changes from -04 to -05.a:
o Clarified User-Name handling in Section 2.8.1 (issue 455).
o Clarified text about conflicting AVPs in Section 2.8.2 (issue
461).
o Added missing AVPs to ABNF and occurrence tables (issues 450 and
458).
o Typos and editorial changes about NASREQ use (issue 450).
o Changed EAPKey reference to informative.
o Updated references: NASREQ to -14, IKEv2 to -13, RFC2284bis to -09
(renamed to EAP), IEEE-802.11i to D9.0.
o Updated I-D boilerplate.
Version -04.a published as -04.
Changes from -03 to -04.a:
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o Removed DIAMETER_LIMITED_SUCCESS case from scenario 3 in Section
2.3.3. The remaining example is better in line with Diameter base
document.
o Use DIAMETER_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED Result-Code when too many
invalid EAP packets are received (Section 2.4).
o Mention that MS-MPPE-Recv/Send-Key attributes are encrypted.
o Several editorial comments from Glen Zorn (WG mailing list
2004-01-11 and 2004-01-14).
o Updated security considerations based on comments from Jari Arkko
(issue 437, WG mailing list 2003-11-04).
o Updated references: RFC2284bis, EAPKey, IEEE-802.11i, IKEv2.
Version -03.a published as -03.
Changes from -02 to -03.a:
o Updated security considerations section.
o Removed the EAP-MTU attribute (use Framed-MTU instead).
o Clarified text about invalid packets and EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP.
o Added reference to Accounting-Auth-Method AVP to Section 2.7.
o Updated ABNFs and AVP occurrence tables to match NASREQ-13.
o Updated the IANA considerations to reflect the new AAA parameters
registry. Changed EAP-Payload and Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP
codes to "TBD" since they collided with NASREQ codes (issue 429).
o Updated references: DynAuth to RFC3576, RFC2869bis to RFC3579,
RADIUS1X to RFC3580, BASE TO RFC3588, NASREQ to -13, IKEv2 to -11,
2284bis to -06.
Version -02.e published as -02.
Changes from -02.d to -02.e:
o Added a section on accounting, and changed how the
Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method is determined.
o Updates to "authorization" and "impersonating as the network"
security considerations.
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Changes from -02.c to -02.d:
o Some clarifications to Introduction section.
o Lots of clarifications and added diagrams in protocol overview
section. Moved non-EAP-supporting servers, User-Name AVP
guidelines, and conflicting messages to separate sections.
o Added a new section about sessions and NASREQ interaction.
o Wrote a note about Reply-Message AVP, and added it back to ABNFs
and occurance tables.
o Added EAP-Reissued-Payload AVP for signalling invalid packets, and
RADIUS translation for this.
o Added EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP for keys, and suggestions for
RADIUS translation.
o Attempted to clarify Framed-MTU RADIUS translation.
o Added a first attempt of security considerations section.
o Updated acknowledgements (please notify me if someone's missing).
Changes from -02.b to -02.c:
o Rephrased abstract and introduction sections.
o A couple of minor changes in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
o Added text about advertising application support and role
reversal.
o Changed type of Accounting-EAP-Auth-Method AVP from Enumerated to
Unsigned64, and explained how it is determined.
o Removed references to EAP-Master-Session-Key AVP added in -02.b.
o Added Diameter-RADIUS translation of accounting AVPs.
o Added IANA Considerations section.
o References section: Updated RFC2284bis, added IEEE-802.11i and
IKEv2, deleted RFC1510 ad RFC1938.
Changes from -02.a to -02.b:
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o Added some text to Introduction section.
o Stole text from 2869bis about invalid packets, retransmissions,
and fragmentation.
o In section 2.1, changed one "MAY" to "could" since it was not used
to describe a requirement.
o Updated ABNF's and AVP occurance tables to match the current
NASREQ-11 document.
o Added EAP-MTU and EAP-Master-Session-Key AVPs.
o Removed description of Configuration-Token, Nas-Port, Nas-Port-Id,
and State AVPs (the text didn't add anything to their description
in NASREQ).
o Added a first attempt of a section describing Diameter-RADIUS
translation.
o Added references RFC2284bis, RFC2548, RFC2869bis, RADIUS1X, and
DynAuth.
Changes from -01 to -02.a:
o New editor.
o Added Changelog appendix.
o Converted source to XML format. This will result in many small
formatting changes in the ASCII version.
o Updated BASE and NASREQ references to current versions.
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