EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-16

Versions: (draft-vanderstok-ace-coap-est)  00 01         Standards Track
          02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14                        
          15 16                                                         
ACE                                                      P. van der Stok
Internet-Draft                                                Consultant
Intended status: Standards Track                           P. Kampanakis
Expires: March 13, 2020                                    Cisco Systems
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                                     SSW
                                                                 S. Raza
                                                               RISE SICS
                                                      September 10, 2019


                    EST over secure CoAP (EST-coaps)
                       draft-ietf-ace-coap-est-13

Abstract

   Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
   provisioning protocol over HTTPS.  Low-resource devices often use the
   lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
   exchanges.  This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
   secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
   existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  DTLS and conformance to RFC7925 profiles  . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Protocol Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Discovery and URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  Mandatory/optional EST Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  Payload formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.4.  Message Bindings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.5.  CoAP response codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.6.  Message fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.7.  Delayed Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.8.  Server-side Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Deployment limitations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.1.  Content-Format Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     9.2.  Resource Type registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.1.  EST server considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     10.2.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations . . . . . . . . . .  27
   11. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   12. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     A.1.  cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     A.2.  enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     A.3.  serverkeygen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     A.4.  csrattrs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   Appendix B.  EST-coaps Block message examples . . . . . . . . . .  39
     B.1.  cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     B.2.  enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   Appendix C.  Message content breakdown  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     C.1.  cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     C.2.  enroll / reenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     C.3.  serverkeygen  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47



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   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49

1.  Change Log

   EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication

   -13

      Updates based on AD's review and discussions

      Examples redone without password

   -12

      Updated section 5 based on Esko's comments and nits identified.

      Nits and some clarifications for Esko's new review from 5/21/2019.

      Nits and some clarifications for Esko's new review from 5/28/2019.

   -11

      Updated Server-side keygen to simplify motivation and added
      paragraphs in Security considerations to point out that random
      numbers are still needed (feedback from Hannes).

   -10

      Addressed WGLC comments

      More consistent request format in the examples.

      Explained root resource difference when there is resource
      discovery

      Clarified when the client is supposed to do discovery

      Fixed nits and minor Option length inaccurracies in the examples.

   -09

      WGLC comments taken into account

      consensus about discovery of content-format

      added additional path for content-format selection

      merged DTLS sections



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   -08

      added application/pkix-cert Content-Format TBD287.

      discovery text clarified

      Removed text on ct negotiation in connection to multipart-core

      removed text that duplicates or contradicts RFC7252 (thanks Klaus)

      Stated that well-known/est is compulsory

      Use of response codes clarified.

      removed bugs: Max-Age and Content-Format Options in Request

      Accept Option explained for est/skg and added in enroll example

      Added second URI /skc for server-side key gen and a simple cert
      (not PKCS#7)

      Persistence of DTLS connection clarified.

      Minor text fixes.

   -07:

      redone examples from scratch with openssl

      Updated authors.

      Added CoAP RST as a MAY for an equivalent to an HTTP 204 message.

      Added serialization example of the /skg CBOR response.

      Added text regarding expired IDevIDs and persistent DTLS
      connection that will start using the Explicit TA Database in the
      new DTLS connection.

      Nits and fixes

      Removed CBOR envelop for binary data

      Replaced TBD8 with 62.

      Added RFC8174 reference and text.





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      Clarified MTI for server-side key generation and Content-Formats.
      Defined the /skg MTI (PKCS#8) and the cases where CMS encryption
      will be used.

      Moved Fragmentation section up because it was referenced in
      sections above it.

   -06:

      clarified discovery section, by specifying that no discovery may
      be needed for /.well-known/est URI.

      added resource type values for IANA

      added list of compulsory to implement and optional functions.

      Fixed issues pointed out by the idnits tool.

      Updated CoAP response codes section with more mappings between EST
      HTTP codes and EST-coaps CoAP codes.

      Minor updates to the MTI EST Functions section.

      Moved Change Log section higher.

   -05:

      repaired again

      TBD8 = 62 removed from C-F registration, to be done in CT draft.

   -04:

      Updated Delayed response section to reflect short and long delay
      options.

   -03:

      Removed observe and simplified long waits

      Repaired Content-Format specification

   -02:

      Added parameter discussion in section 8

      Concluded Content-Format specification using multipart-ct draft




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      examples updated

   -01:

      Editorials done.

      Redefinition of proxy to Registrar in Section 6.  Explained better
      the role of https-coaps Registrar, instead of "proxy"

      Provide "observe" Option examples

      extended block message example.

      inserted new server key generation text in Section 5.8 and
      motivated server key generation.

      Broke down details for DTLS 1.3

      New Media-Type uses CBOR array for multiple Content-Format
      payloads

      provided new Content-Format tables

      new media format for IANA

   -00

      copied from vanderstok-ace-coap-04

2.  Introduction

   "Classical" Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used
   for authenticated/authorized endpoint certificate enrollment (and
   optionally key provisioning) through a Certificate Authority (CA) or
   Registration Authority (RA).  EST transports messages over HTTPS.

   This document defines a new transport for EST based on the
   Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) since some Internet of Things
   (IoT) devices use CoAP instead of HTTP.  Therefore, this
   specification utilizes DTLS [RFC6347] and CoAP [RFC7252] instead of
   TLS [RFC8446] and HTTP [RFC7230].

   EST responses can be relatively large and for this reason this
   specification also uses CoAP Block-Wise Transfer [RFC7959] to offer a
   fragmentation mechanism of EST messages at the CoAP layer.

   This document also profiles the use of EST to only support
   certificate-based client authentication.  HTTP Basic or Digest



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   authentication (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030]) are not
   supported.

3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Many of the concepts in this document are taken from [RFC7030].
   Consequently, much text is directly traceable to [RFC7030].

4.  DTLS and conformance to RFC7925 profiles

   This section describes how EST-coaps conforms to the profiles of low-
   resource devices described in [RFC7925].  EST-coaps can transport
   certificates and private keys.  Certificates are responses to
   (re-)enrollment requests or requests a trusted certificate list.
   Private keys can be transported as responses to a server-side key
   generation request as described in Section 4.4 of [RFC7030] and
   discussed in Section 5.8 of this document.

   EST-coaps depends on a secure transport mechanism that secures the
   exchanged CoAP messages.  DTLS is one such secure protocol.  No other
   changes are necessary regarding the secure transport of EST messages.

   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    EST request/response messages               |
   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    CoAP for message transfer and signaling     |
   +------------------------------------------------+
   |    Secure Transport                            |
   +------------------------------------------------+

                    Figure 1: EST-coaps protocol layers

   In accordance with sections 3.3 and 4.4 of [RFC7925], the mandatory
   cipher suite for DTLS in EST-coaps is
   TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251].  Curve secp256r1 MUST
   be supported [RFC8422]; this curve is equivalent to the NIST P-256
   curve.  Additionally, crypto agility is important, and the
   recommendations in Section 4.4 of [RFC7925] and any updates to it
   concerning Curve25519 and other curves also apply.

   DTLS 1.2 implementations must use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
   Supported Point Formats Extensions in [RFC8422].  Uncompressed point



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   format must also be supported.  DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
   implementations differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do not support
   point format negotiation in favor of a single point format for each
   curve.  Thus, support for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point format
   extensions and negotiation.  In addition, DTLS 1.3 uses the
   "supported_groups" extension in contrast to Supported Elliptic Curves
   used by DTLS 1.2

   CoAP was designed to avoid IP fragmentation.  DTLS is used to secure
   CoAP messages.  However, fragmentation is still possible at the DTLS
   layer during the DTLS handshake when using ECC ciphersuites.  If
   fragmentation is necessary, "DTLS provides a mechanism for
   fragmenting a handshake message over several records, each of which
   can be transmitted separately, thus avoiding IP fragmentation"
   [RFC6347].

   The authentication of the EST-coaps server by the EST-coaps client is
   based on certificate authentication in the DTLS handshake.  The EST-
   coaps client MUST be configured with at least an Implicit TA database
   which will enable the authentication of the server the first time
   before updating its trust anchor (Explicit TA) [RFC7030].

   The authentication of the EST-coaps client MUST be with a client
   certificate in the DTLS handshake.  This can either be

   o  a previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
      certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
      simple re-enrollment of clients.

   o  a previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer IDevID
      [ieee802.1ar] or a certificate issued by some other party).
      IDevID's are expected to have a very long life, as long as the
      device, but under some conditions could expire.  In that case, the
      server MAY want to authenticate a client certificate against its
      trust store although the certificate is expired (Section 10).

   EST-coaps supports the certificate types and Trust Anchors (TA) that
   are specified for EST in Section 3 of [RFC7030].

   As described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5272] proof-of-identity refers to
   a value that can be used to prove that the private key corresponding
   to the certified public key is in the possession of and can be used
   by an end-entity or client.  Additionally, channel-binding
   information can link proof-of-identity with an established connetion.
   Connection-based proof-of-possession is OPTIONAL for EST-coaps
   clients and servers.  When proof-of-possession is desired, a set of
   actions are required regarding the use of tls-unique, described in
   Section 3.5 in [RFC7030].  The tls-unique information consists of the



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   contents of the first "Finished" message in the (D)TLS handshake
   between server and client [RFC5929].  The client adds the "Finished"
   message as a ChallengePassword in the attributes section of the
   PKCS#10 Request [RFC5967] to prove that the client is indeed in
   control of the private key at the time of the (D)TLS session
   establishment.

   In the case of EST-coaps, the same operations can be performed during
   the DTLS handshake.  For DTLS 1.2, in the event of handshake message
   fragmentation, the Hash of the handshake messages used in the MAC
   calculation of the Finished message must be computed as if each
   handshake message had been sent as a single fragment (Section 4.2.6
   of [RFC6347]).  The Finished message is calculated as shown in
   Section 7.4.9 of [RFC5246].  Similarly, for DTLS 1.3, the Finished
   message must be computed as if each handshake message had been sent
   as a single fragment (Section 5.8 of [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]) following
   the algorithm described in 4.4.4 of [RFC8446].

   In a constrained CoAP environment, endpoints can't always afford to
   establish a DTLS connection for every EST transaction.
   Authenticating and negotiating DTLS keys requires resources on low-
   end endpoints and consumes valuable bandwidth.  To alleviate this
   situation, an EST-coaps DTLS connection MAY remain open for
   sequential EST transactions.  For example, an EST csrattrs request
   that is followed by a simpleenroll request can use the same
   authenticated DTLS connection.  However, when a cacerts request is
   included in the set of sequential EST transactions, some additional
   security considerations apply regarding the use of the Implicit and
   Explicit TA database as explained in Section 10.1.

   Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a
   new EST transaction will take place after a significant amount of
   time, the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages
   that are relatively close to each other.  In some cases, like NAT
   rebinding, keeping the state of a connection is not possible when
   devices sleep for extended periods of time.  In such occasions,
   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id] negotiates a connection ID that can
   eliminate the need for new handshake and its additional cost; or DTLS
   1.3 session resumption provides a less costly alternative than re-
   doing a full DTLS handshake.

5.  Protocol Design

   EST-coaps uses CoAP to transfer EST messages, aided by Block-Wise
   Transfer [RFC7959] to avoid IP fragmentation.  The use of Blocks for
   the transfer of larger EST messages is specified in Section 5.6.
   Figure 1 shows the layered EST-coaps architecture.




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   The EST-coaps protocol design follows closely the EST design.  The
   supported message types in EST-coaps are:

   o  CA certificate retrieval needed to receive the complete set of CA
      certificates.

   o  Simple enroll and re-enroll for a CA to sign client identity
      public key.

   o  Certificate Signing Request (CSR) attribute messages that informs
      the client of the fields to include in a CSR.

   o  Server-side key generation messages to provide a client identity
      private key when the client chooses so.

   While [RFC7030] permits a number of the EST functions to be used
   without authentication, this specification requires that the client
   MUST be authenticated for all functions.

5.1.  Discovery and URIs

   EST-coaps is targeted for low-resource networks with small packets.
   Two types of installations are possible (1)rigid ones where the
   address and the supported functions of the EST server(s) are known,
   and (2) flexible one where the EST server and it supported functions
   need to be discovered.

   For both types of installations, saving header space is important and
   short EST-coaps URIs are specified in this document.  These URIs are
   shorter than the ones in [RFC7030].  Two example EST-coaps resource
   path names are:

   coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/<short-est>
   coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/
                                              ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>

   The short-est strings are defined in Table 1.  Arbitrary Labels are
   usually defined and used by EST CAs in order to route client requests
   to the appropriate certificate profile.  Implementers should consider
   using short labels to minimize transmission overhead.

   The EST-coaps server URIs, obtained through discovery of the EST-
   coaps resource(s) as shown below, are of the form:

   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/<short-est>
   coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/
                                              ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>




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   Figure 5 in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
   corresponding paths which are supported by EST.  Table 1 provides the
   mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coaps URI path.

            +------------------+------------------------------+
            | EST              | EST-coaps                    |
            +------------------+------------------------------+
            | /cacerts         | /crts                        |
            | /simpleenroll    | /sen                         |
            | /simplereenroll  | /sren                        |
            | /serverkeygen    | /skg (PKCS#7)                |
            | /serverkeygen    | /skc (application/pkix-cert) |
            | /csrattrs        | /att                         |
            +------------------+------------------------------+

                     Table 1: Short EST-coaps URI path

   The /skg message is the EST /serverkeygen equivalent where the client
   requests a certificate in PKCS#7 format and a private key.  If the
   client prefers a single application/pkix-cert certificate instead of
   PKCS#7, she will make an /skc request.  In both cases a private key
   MUST be returned

   Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.
   The corresponding longer URIs from [RFC7030] MAY be supported.

   In the context of CoAP, the presence and location of (path to) the
   EST resources are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
   known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value
   "ace.est*" [RFC6690].  The example below shows the discovery over
   CoAPS of the presence and location of EST-coaps resources.  Linefeeds
   are included only for readability.

     REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*

     RES: 2.05 Content
   </est/crts>;rt="ace.est.crts";ct="281 TBD287",
   </est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen";ct="281 TBD287",
   </est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren";ct="281 TBD287",
   </est/att>;rt="ace.est.att";ct=285,
   </est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg";ct=62,
   </est/skc>;rt="ace.est.skc";ct=62

   The first three lines, describing ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and
   ace.est.sren, of the discovery response above MUST be returned if the
   server supports resource discovery.  The last three lines are only
   included if the corresponding EST functions are implemented (see
   Table 2).  The Content-Formats in the response allow the client to



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   request one that is supported by the server.  These are the values
   that would be sent in the client request with an Accept option.  This
   approach allows future servers to incorporate currently not specified
   content-formats and resources.

   Discoverable port numbers can be returned in the response payload.
   An example response payload for non-default CoAPS server port 61617
   follows below.  Linefeeds are included only for readability.

     REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*

     RES: 2.05 Content
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/crts>;rt="ace.est.crts";
                 ct="281 TBD287",
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen";
                 ct="281 TBD287",
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren";
                 ct="281 TBD287",
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/att>;rt="ace.est.att";
                 ct=285,
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg";
                 ct=62,
   <coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/skc>;rt="ace.est.skc";
                 ct=62

   The server MUST support the default /.well-known/est root resource.
   The server SHOULD support resource discovery when he supports non-
   default URIs (like /est or /est/ArbitraryLabel) or ports.  The client
   SHOULD use resource discovery when she is unaware of the available
   EST-coaps resources.

   Throughout this document the example root resource of /est is used.

5.2.  Mandatory/optional EST Functions

   This specification contains a set of required-to-implement functions,
   optional functions, and not specified functions.  The latter ones are
   deemed too expensive for low-resource devices in payload and
   calculation times.

   Table 2 specifies the mandatory-to-implement or optional
   implementation of the EST-coaps functions.  Discovery of the
   existence of optional functions is described in Section 5.1.








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              +------------------+--------------------------+
              | EST Functions    | EST-coaps implementation |
              +------------------+--------------------------+
              | /cacerts         | MUST                     |
              | /simpleenroll    | MUST                     |
              | /simplereenroll  | MUST                     |
              | /fullcmc         | Not specified            |
              | /csrattrs        | OPTIONAL                 |
              | /serverkeygen    | OPTIONAL                 |
              +------------------+--------------------------+

                   Table 2: List of EST-coaps functions

5.3.  Payload formats

   EST-coaps is designed for low-resource devices and hence does not
   need to send Base64-encoded data.  Simple binary is more efficient
   (30% smaller payload for DER-encoded ASN.1) and well supported by
   CoAP.  Thus, the payload for a given Media-Type follows the ASN.1
   structure of the Media-Type and is transported in binary format.

   The Content-Format (HTTP Media-Type equivalent) of the CoAP message
   determines which EST message is transported in the CoAP payload.  The
   Media-Types specified in the HTTP Content-Type header (Section 3.2.2
   of [RFC7030]) are specified by the Content-Format Option (12) of
   CoAP.  The combination of URI-Path and Content-Format in EST-coaps
   MUST map to an allowed combination of URI and Media-Type in EST.  The
   required Content-Formats for these requests and response messages are
   defined in Section 9.1.  The CoAP response codes are defined in
   Section 5.5.

   Content-Format TBD287 can be used in place of 281 to carry a single
   certificate instead of a PKCS#7 container in a /crts, /sen, /sren or
   /skg response.  Content-Format 281 MUST be supported by EST-coaps
   servers.  Servers MAY also support Content-Format TBD287.  It is up
   to the client to support only Content-Format 281, TBD287 or both.
   The client will use a COAP Accept Option in the request to express
   the preferred response Content-Format.  If an Accept Option is not
   included in the request, the client is not expressing any preference
   and the server SHOULD choose format 281.

   Content-Format 286 is used in /sen, /sren and /skg requests and 285
   in /att responses.

   A representation with Content-Format identifier 62 contains a
   collection of representations along with their respective Content-
   Format.  The Content-Format identifies the Media-Type application/
   multipart-core specified in [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct].  For



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   example, a collection, containing two representations in response to
   a EST-coaps server-side key generation /skg request, could include a
   private key in PKCS#8 [RFC5958] with Content-Format identifier 284
   (0x011C) and a single certificate in a PKCS#7 container with Content-
   Format identifier 281 (0x0119).  Such a collection would look like
   [284,h'0123456789abcdef', 281,h'fedcba9876543210'] in diagnostic CBOR
   notation.  The serialization of such CBOR content would be


      84                  # array(4)
      19 011C             # unsigned(284)
      48                  # bytes(8)
         0123456789ABCDEF # "\x01#Eg\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF"
      19 0119             # unsigned(281)
      48                  # bytes(8)
         FEDCBA9876543210 # "\xFE\xDC\xBA\x98vT2\x10"

                   Multipart /skg response serialization

   When the client makes an /skc request the certificate returned with
   the private key is a single X.509 certificate (not a PKCS#7
   container) with Content-Format identifier TBD287 (0x011F) instead of
   281.  In cases where the private key is encrypted with CMS (as
   explained in Section 5.8) the Content-Format identifier is 280
   (0x0118) instead of 284.  The content format used in the response is
   summarized in Table 3.

             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+
             | Function | Response part 1 | Response part 2 |
             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+
             | /skg     | 284             | 281             |
             | /skc     | 280             | TBD287          |
             +----------+-----------------+-----------------+

             Table 3: response content formats for skg and skc

   The key and certificate representations are ASN.1 encoded in binary
   format.  An example is shown in Appendix A.3.

5.4.  Message Bindings

   The general EST-coaps message characteristics are:

   o  EST-coaps servers sometimes need to provide delayed responses
      which are preceded by an immediately returned empty ACK or an ACK
      containing response code 5.03 as explained in Section 5.7.  Thus,
      it is RECOMMENDED for implementers to send EST-coaps requests in
      confirmable CON CoAP messages.



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   o  The CoAP Options used are Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port, Content-
      Format, Block1, Block2, and Accept.  These CoAP Options are used
      to communicate the HTTP fields specified in the EST REST messages.
      The Uri-host and Uri-Port Options can be omitted from the COAP
      message sent on the wire.  When omitted, they are logically
      assumed to be the transport protocol destination address and port
      respectively.  Explicit Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are
      typically used when an endpoint hosts multiple virtual servers and
      uses the Options to route the requests accordingly.  Other COAP
      Options should be handled in accordance with [RFC7252].

   o  EST URLs are HTTPS based (https://), in CoAP these are assumed to
      be translated to CoAPS (coaps://)

   Table 1 provides the mapping from the EST URI path to the EST-coaps
   URI path.  Appendix A includes some practical examples of EST
   messages translated to CoAP.

5.5.  CoAP response codes

   Section 5.9 of [RFC7252] and Section 7 of [RFC8075] specify the
   mapping of HTTP response codes to CoAP response codes.  The success
   code in response to an EST-coaps GET request (/crts, /att), is 2.05.
   Similarly, 2.04 is used in successfull response to EST-coaps POST
   requests (/sen, /sren, /skg, /skc).

   EST makes use of HTTP 204 or 404 responses when a resource is not
   available for the client.  In EST-coaps 2.04 is used in response to a
   POST (/sen, /sren, /skg, /skc). 4.04 is used when the resource is not
   available for the client.

   HTTP response code 202 with a Retry-After header in [RFC7030] has no
   equivalent in CoAP.  HTTP 202 with Retry-After is used in EST for
   delayed server responses.  Section 5.7 specifies how EST-coaps
   handles delayed messages with 5.03 responses with a Max-Age Option.

   Additionally, EST's HTTP 400, 401, 403, 404 and 503 status codes have
   their equivalent CoAP 4.00, 4.01, 4.03, 4.04 and 5.03 response codes
   in EST-coaps.  Table 4 summarizes the EST-coaps response codes.












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   +-----------------+-----------------+-------------------------------+
   | operation       | EST-coaps       | Description                   |
   |                 | response code   |                               |
   +-----------------+-----------------+-------------------------------+
   | /crts, /att     | 2.05            | Success. Certs included in    |
   |                 |                 | the response payload.         |
   |                 | 4.xx / 5.xx     | Failure.                      |
   | /sen, /skg,     | 2.04            | Success. Cert included in the |
   | /sren, /skc     |                 | response payload.             |
   |                 | 5.03            | Retry in Max-Age Option time. |
   |                 | 4.xx / 5.xx     | Failure.                      |
   +-----------------+-----------------+-------------------------------+

                     Table 4: EST-coaps response codes

5.6.  Message fragmentation

   DTLS defines fragmentation only for the handshake and not for secure
   data exchange (DTLS records).  [RFC6347] states that to avoid using
   IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram reconstitution,
   invokers of the DTLS record layer should size DTLS records so that
   they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained from the record
   layer.  In addition, invokers residing on a 6LoWPAN over IEEE
   802.15.4 [ieee802.15.4] network are recommended to size CoAP messages
   such that each DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4
   frames.

   That is not always possible in EST-coaps.  Even though ECC
   certificates are small in size, they can vary greatly based on
   signature algorithms, key sizes, and Object Identifier (OID) fields
   used.  For 256-bit curves, common ECDSA cert sizes are 500-1000 bytes
   which could fluctuate further based on the algorithms, OIDs, Subject
   Alternative Names (SAN) and cert fields.  For 384-bit curves, ECDSA
   certificates increase in size and can sometimes reach 1.5KB.
   Additionally, there are times when the EST cacerts response from the
   server can include multiple certificates that amount to large
   payloads.  Section 4.6 of CoAP [RFC7252] describes the possible
   payload sizes: "if nothing is known about the size of the headers,
   good upper bounds are 1152 bytes for the message size and 1024 bytes
   for the payload size".  Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also suggests that
   IPv4 implementations may want to limit themselves to more
   conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes.  Even with ECC,
   EST-coaps messages can still exceed MTU sizes on the Internet or
   6LoWPAN [RFC4919] (Section 2 of [RFC7959]).  EST-coaps needs to be
   able to fragment messages into multiple DTLS datagrams.

   To perform fragmentation in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies the Block1
   Option for fragmentation of the request payload and the Block2 Option



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   for fragmentation of the return payload of a CoAP flow.  As explained
   in Section 1 of [RFC7959], block-wise transfers should be used in
   Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid the exacerbation of lost blocks.
   Both EST-coaps clients and servers MUST support Block2.  EST-coaps
   servers MUST also support Block1.  The EST-coaps client MUST support
   Block1 only if it sends EST-coaps requests with an IP packet size
   that exceeds the Path MTU.

   [RFC7959] also defines Size1 and Size2 Options to provide size
   information about the resource representation in a request and
   response.  EST-client and server MAY support Size1 and Size2 Options.

   Examples of fragmented EST-coaps messages are shown in Appendix B.

5.7.  Delayed Responses

   Server responses can sometimes be delayed.  According to
   Section 5.2.2 of [RFC7252], a slow server can acknowledge the request
   and respond later with the requested resource representation.  In
   particular, a slow server can respond to an EST-coaps enrollment
   request with an empty ACK with code 0.00, before sending the
   certificate to the client after a short delay.  If the certificate
   response is large, the server will need more than one Block2 block to
   transfer it.

   This situation is shown in Figure 2.  The client sends an enrollment
   request that uses N1+1 Block1 blocks.  The server uses an empty 0.00
   ACK to announce the delayed response which is provided later with
   2.04 messages containing N2+1 Block2 Options.  The first 2.04 is a
   confirmable message that is acknowledged by the client.  Onwards,
   having received the first 256 bytes in the first Block2 block, the
   client asks for a block reduction to 128 bytes in a confirmable
   enrollment request and acknowledges the Block2 blocks sent up to that
   point.

   The notation of Figure 2 is explained in Appendix B.1.















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POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)} -->
   <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)} -->
   <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                  .
                  .
                  .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
   <-- (0.00 empty ACK)
                  |
   ... Short delay before the certificate is ready ...
                  |
   <-- (CON) (1:N1/0/256)(2:0/1/256)(2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 1)}
                                   (ACK)                     -->
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)          -->
   <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}
                  .
                  .
                  .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/128)          -->
   <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}

               Figure 2: EST-COAP enrollment with short wait

   If the server is very slow (i.e., minutes) in providing the response
   (i.e., when a manual intervention is needed), he SHOULD respond with
   an ACK containing response code 5.03 (Service unavailable) and a Max-
   Age Option to indicate the time the client SHOULD wait to request the
   content later.  After a delay of Max-Age, the client SHOULD resend
   the identical CSR to the server.  As long as the server responds with
   response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) with a Max-Age Option, the
   client SHOULD keep resending the enrollment request until the server
   responds with the certificate or the client abandons the request for
   other reasons.

   To demonstrate this scenario, Figure 3 shows a client sending an
   enrollment request that uses N1+1 Block1 blocks to send the CSR to
   the server.  The server needs N2+1 Block2 blocks to respond, but also
   needs to take a long delay (minutes) to provide the response.
   Consequently, the server uses a 5.03 ACK response with a Max-Age
   Option.  The client waits for a period of Max-Age as many times as
   she receives the same 5.03 response and retransmits the enrollment
   request until she receives a certificate in a fragmented 2.04
   response.  Note that the client asks again for a decrease in the
   block size when acknowledging the first Block2.






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POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)}  -->
  <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)}  -->
  <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                  .
                  .
                  .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
  <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (5.03 Service Unavailable) (Max-Age)
                  |
                  |
  ... Client tries again after Max-Age with identical payload ...
                  |
                  |
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# 1)}-->
  <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)}  -->
  <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                  .
                  .
                  .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
                  |
   ... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...
                  |
  <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/128) (2.04 Changed){Cert resp (frag# 1)}
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/128)           -->
  <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}
                  .
                  .
                  .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/128)          -->
  <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/128) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}

               Figure 3: EST-COAP enrollment with long wait

5.8.  Server-side Key Generation

   In scenarios where it is desirable that the server generates the
   private key, server-side key generation is available.  Such scenarios
   could be when it is considered more secure to generate at the server
   the long-lived random private key that identifies the client, or when
   the resources spent to generate a random private key at the client
   are considered scarce, or when the security policy requires that the
   certificate public and corresponding private keys are centrally
   generated and controlled.  Of course, that does not eliminate the
   need for proper random numbers in various protocols like (D)TLS
   (Section 10.1).



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   When requesting server-side key generation, the client asks for the
   server or proxy to generate the private key and the certificate which
   are transferred back to the client in the server-side key generation
   response.  In all respects, the server treats the CSR as it would
   treat any enroll or re-enroll CSR; the only distinction here is that
   the server MUST ignore the public key values and signature in the
   CSR.  These are included in the request only to allow re-use of
   existing codebases for generating and parsing such requests.

   The client /skg request is for a certificate in a PKCS#7 container
   and private key in two application/multipart-core elements.
   Respectively, an /skc request is for a single application/pkix-cert
   certificate and a private key.  The private key Content-Format
   requested by the client is indicated in the PKCS#10 CSR request.  If
   the request contains SMIMECapabilities and DecryptKeyIdentifier or
   AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier the client is expecting Content-Format
   280 for the private key.  Then the private key is encrypted
   symmetrically or asymmetrically as per [RFC7030].  The symmetric key
   or the asymmetric keypair establishment method is out of scope of the
   specification.  A /skg or /skc request with a CSR without
   SMIMECapabilities expects an application/multipart-core with an
   unencrypted PKCS#8 private key with Content-Format 284.

   The EST-coaps server-side key generation response is returned with
   Content-Format application/multipart-core
   [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct] containing a CBOR array with four items
   (Section 5.3) .  The two representations (each consisting of two CBOR
   array items) are preceded by its Content-Format ID.  Dependent on the
   contents of the CSR, the private key can be in unprotected PKCS#8
   [RFC5958] format (Content-Format 284) or protected inside of CMS
   SignedData (Content-Format 280).  The SignedData, placed in the
   outermost container, is signed by the party that generated the
   private key, which may be the EST server or the EST CA.  SignedData
   placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing as
   explained in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030].  In summary, the
   symmetrically encrypted key is included in the encryptedKey attribute
   in a KEKRecipientInfo structure.  In the case where the asymmetric
   encryption key is suitable for transport key operations the generated
   private key is encrypted with a symmetric key which is encrypted by
   the client-defined (in the CSR) asymmetric public key and is carried
   in an encryptedKey attribute in a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure.
   Finally, if the asymmetric encryption key is suitable for key
   agreement, the generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric
   key which is encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric
   public key and is carried in an recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.





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   [RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
   private key.  For the context of this specification, clients and
   servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
   support unprotected (PKCS#8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
   Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
   EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
   deployments where end-to-end encryption needs to be provided between
   the client and a server.  Such cases could include architectures
   where an entity between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS
   connection (Registrar in Figure 4).

   Following [RFC7030]: "It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the clients
   request that the returned private key be afforded the additional
   security of the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) EnvelopedData in
   addition to the TLS-provided security to protect against unauthorized
   disclosure."

6.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar

   In real-world deployments, the EST server will not always reside
   within the CoAP boundary.  The EST server can exist outside the
   constrained network in which case it will support TLS/HTTP instead of
   CoAPS.  In such environments EST-coaps is used by the client within
   the CoAP boundary and TLS is used to transport the EST messages
   outside the CoAP boundary.  A Registrar at the edge is required to
   operate between the CoAP environment and the external HTTP network as
   shown in Figure 4.

                                        Constrained Network
   .------.                         .----------------------------.
   |  CA  |                         |.--------------------------.|
   '------'                         ||                          ||
      |                             ||                          ||
   .------.  HTTP   .-----------------.   CoAPS  .-----------.  ||
   | EST  |<------->|EST-coaps-to-HTTPS|<------->| EST Client|  ||
   |Server|over TLS |   Registrar     |          '-----------'  ||
   '------'         '-----------------'                         ||
                                    ||                          ||
                                    |'--------------------------'|
                                    '----------------------------'

       Figure 4: EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar at the CoAP boundary.

   The EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps downstream
   and initiate EST connections over TLS upstream.  The Registrar MUST
   authenticate and optionally authorize the client requests while it
   MUST be authenticated by the EST server or CA.  The trust
   relationship between the Registrar and the EST server SHOULD be pre-



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   established for the Registrar to proxy these connections on behalf of
   various clients.

   When enforcing Proof-of-Possession (PoP) linking, the DTLS tls-unique
   value of the (D)TLS session is used to prove that the private key
   corresponding to the public key is in the possession of the client
   and was used to establish the connection as explained in Section 4.
   The PoP linking information is lost between the EST-coaps client and
   the EST server when a Registrar is present.  The EST server becomes
   aware of the presence of a Registrar from its TLS client certificate
   that includes id-kp-cmcRA [RFC6402] extended key usage extension
   (EKU).  As explained in Section 3.7 of [RFC7030], the "EST server
   SHOULD apply an authorization policy consistent with a Registrar
   client.  For example, it could be configured to accept PoP linking
   information that does not match the current TLS session because the
   authenticated EST client Registrar has verified this information when
   acting as an EST server".

   For some use cases, clients that leverage server-side key generation
   might prefer for the enrolled keys to be generated by the Registrar
   if the CA does not support server-side key generation.  Such a
   Registrar is responsible for generating a new CSR signed by a new key
   which will be returned to the client along with the certificate from
   the CA.  In these cases, the Registrar MUST use random number
   generation with proper entropy.

   Table 1 contains the URI mappings between EST-coaps and EST that the
   Registrar MUST adhere to.  Section 5.5 of this specification and
   Section 7 of [RFC8075] define the mappings between EST-coaps and HTTP
   response codes, that determine how the Registrar MUST translate CoAP
   response codes from/to HTTP status codes.  The mapping from CoAP
   Content-Format to HTTP Media-Type is defined in Section 9.1.
   Additionally, a conversion from CBOR major type 2 to Base64 encoding
   MUST take place at the Registrar.  If CMS end-to-end encryption is
   employed for the private key, the encrypted CMS EnvelopedData blob
   MUST be converted at the Registrar to binary CBOR type 2 downstream
   to the client.

   Due to fragmentation of large messages into blocks, an EST-coaps-to-
   HTTP Registrar MUST reassemble the BLOCKs before translating the
   binary content to Base64, and consecutively relay the message
   upstream.

   The EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar MUST support resource discovery
   according to the rules in Section 5.1.






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7.  Parameters

   This section addresses transmission parameters described in sections
   4.7 and 4.8 of [RFC7252].  EST does not impose any unique values on
   the CoAP parameters in [RFC7252], but the setting of the CoAP
   parameter values may have consequence for the setting of the EST
   parameter values.

   It is recommended, based on experiments, to follow the default CoAP
   configuration parameters ([RFC7252]).  However, depending on the
   implementation scenario, retransmissions and timeouts can also occur
   on other networking layers, governed by other configuration
   parameters.  When a change in a server parameter has been
   effectuated, the parameter values in the communicating endpoints MUST
   be adjusted when necessary.

   Some further comments about some specific parameters, mainly from
   Table 2 in [RFC7252]:

   o  NSTART: A parameter that controls the number of simultaneous
      outstanding interactions that a client maintains to a given
      server.  An EST-coaps client is expected to control at most one
      interaction with a given server, which is the default NSTART value
      defined in [RFC7252].

   o  DEFAULT_LEISURE: This setting is only relevant in multicast
      scenarios, outside the scope of EST-coaps.

   o  PROBING_RATE: A parameter which specifies the rate of re-sending
      non-confirmable messages.  In the rare situations that non-
      confirmable messages are used, the default PROBING_RATE value
      defined in [RFC7252] applies.

   Finally, the Table 3 parameters in [RFC7252] are mainly derived from
   Table 2.  Directly changing parameters on one table would affect
   parameters on the other.

8.  Deployment limitations

   Although EST-coaps paves the way for the utilization of EST by
   constrained devices in constrained networks, some classes of devices
   [RFC7228] will not have enough resources to handle the payloads that
   come with EST-coaps.  The specification of EST-coaps is intended to
   ensure that EST works for networks of constrained devices that choose
   to limit their communications stack to DTLS/CoAP.  It is up to the
   network designer to decide which devices execute the EST protocol and
   which do not.




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9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Content-Format Registry

   Additions to the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats", within the
   "CoRE Parameters" registry [COREparams] are specified in Table 5.
   These have been registered provisionally in the IETF Review or IESG
   Approval range (256-9999).

   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
   | HTTP Media-Type              |    ID | Reference                  |
   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+
   | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   280 | [RFC7030] [I-D.ietf-lamps- |
   | smime-type=server-generated- |       | rfc5751-bis] [ThisRFC]     |
   | key                          |       |                            |
   | application/pkcs7-mime;      |   281 | [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bi |
   | smime-type=certs-only        |       | s] [ThisRFC]               |
   | application/pkcs8            |   284 | [RFC5958] [I-D.ietf-lamps- |
   |                              |       | rfc5751-bis] [ThisRFC]     |
   | application/csrattrs         |   285 | [RFC7030]                  |
   | application/pkcs10           |   286 | [RFC5967] [I-D.ietf-lamps- |
   |                              |       | rfc5751-bis] [ThisRFC]     |
   | application/pkix-cert        | TBD28 | [RFC2585] [ThisRFC]        |
   |                              |     7 |                            |
   +------------------------------+-------+----------------------------+

                     Table 5: New CoAP Content-Formats

   It is suggested that 287 is allocated to TBD287.

9.2.  Resource Type registry

   This memo registers new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attributes in
   the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry
   under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters"
   registry.

   o  rt="ace.est.crts".  This resource depicts the support of EST get
      cacerts.

   o  rt="ace.est.sen".  This resource depicts the support of EST simple
      enroll.

   o  rt="ace.est.sren".  This resource depicts the support of EST
      simple reenroll.

   o  rt="ace.est.att".  This resource depicts the support of EST get
      CSR attributes.



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   o  rt="ace.est.skg".  This resource depicts the support of EST
      server-side key generation with the returned certificate in a
      PKCS#7 container.

   o  rt="ace.est.skc".  This resource depicts the support of EST
      server-side key generation with the returned certificate in
      application/pkix-cert format.

10.  Security Considerations

10.1.  EST server considerations

   The security considerations of Section 6 of [RFC7030] are only
   partially valid for the purposes of this document.  As HTTP Basic
   Authentication is not supported, the considerations expressed for
   using passwords do not apply.  The other portions of the security
   considerations of [RFC7030] continue to apply.

   Modern security protocols require random numbers to be available
   during the protocol run, for example for nonces and ephemeral (EC)
   Diffie-Hellman key generation.  This capability to generate random
   numbers is also needed when the constrained device generates the
   private key (that corresponds to the public key enrolled in the CSR).
   When server-side key generation is used, the constrained device
   depends on the server to generate the private key randomly, but it
   still needs locally generated random numbers for use in security
   protocols, as explained in Section 12 of [RFC7925].  Additionally,
   the transport of keys generated at the server is inherently risky.
   For those deploying server-side key generation, analysis SHOULD be
   done to establish whether server-side key generation increases or
   decreases the probability of digital identity theft.

   It is important to note that sources contributing to the randomness
   pool used to generate random numbers on laptops or desktop PCs are
   not available on many constrained devices, such as mouse movement,
   timing of keystrokes, or air turbulence on the movement of hard drive
   heads, as pointed out in [PsQs].  Other sources have to be used or
   dedicated hardware has to be added.  Selecting hardware for an IoT
   device that is capable of producing high-quality random numbers is
   therefore important [RSAfact].

   It is also RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database used
   for EST server authentication is carefully managed to reduce the
   chance of a third-party CA with poor certification practices
   jeopardizing authentication.  Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor
   database after successfully receiving the Distribution of CA
   certificates response (Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7030]) limits any risk to
   the first DTLS exchange.  Alternatively, in a case where a /sen



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   request immediately follows a /crts, a client MAY choose to keep the
   connection authenticated by the Implicit TA open for efficiency
   reasons (Section 4).  A client that interleaves EST-coaps /crts
   request with other requests in the same DTLS connection SHOULD
   revalidate the server certificate chain against the updated Explicit
   TA from the /crts response before proceeding with the subsequent
   requests.  If the server certificate chain does not authenticate
   against the database, the client SHOULD close the connection without
   completing the rest of the requests.  The updated Explicit TA MUST
   continue to be used in new DTLS connections.

   In cases where the IDevID used to authenticate the client is expired
   the server MAY still authenticate the client because IDevIDs are
   expected to live as long as the device itself (Section 4).  In such
   occasions, checking the certificate revocation status or authorizing
   the client using another method is important for the server to ensure
   that the client is to be trusted.

   In accordance with [RFC7030], TLS cipher suites that include
   "_EXPORT_" and "_DES_" in their names MUST NOT be used.  More
   information about recommendations of TLS and DTLS are included in
   [RFC7525].

   As described in CMC, Section 6.7 of [RFC5272], "For keys that can be
   used as signature keys, signing the certification request with the
   private key serves as a PoP on that key pair".  The inclusion of tls-
   unique in the certificate request links the proof-of-possession to
   the TLS proof-of-identity.  This implies but does not prove that only
   the authenticated client currently has access to the private key.

   What's more, CMC PoP linking uses tls-unique as it is defined in
   [RFC5929].  The 3SHAKE attack [tripleshake] poses a risk by allowing
   a man-in-the-middle to leverage session resumption and renegotiation
   to inject himself between a client and server even when channel
   binding is in use.  In the context of this specification, an attacker
   could invalidate the purpose of the PoP linking ChallengePassword in
   the client request by resuming an EST-coaps connection.  Even though
   the practical risk of such an attack to EST-coaps is not devastating,
   we would rather use a more secure channel binding mechanism.  Such a
   mechanism could include an updated tls-unique value generation like
   the tls-unique-prf defined in [I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb] by using a
   TLS exporter [RFC5705] in TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3's updated exporter
   (Section 7.5 of [RFC8446]) value in place of the tls-unique value in
   the CSR.  Such mechanism has not been standardized yet.  Adopting a
   channel binding value generated from an exporter would break
   backwards compatibility for an RA that proxies through to a classic
   EST server.  Thus, in this specification we still depend on the tls-




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   unique mechanism defined in [RFC5929], especially since a 3SHAKE
   attack does not expose messages exchanged with EST-coaps.

   Regarding the Certificate Signing Request (CSR), an EST-coaps server
   is expected to be able to recover from improper CSR requests.

   Interpreters of ASN.1 structures should be aware of the use of
   invalid ASN.1 length fields and should take appropriate measures to
   guard against buffer overflows, stack overruns in particular, and
   malicious content in general.

10.2.  HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar considerations

   The Registrar proposed in Section 6 must be deployed with care, and
   only when direct client-server connections are not possible.  When
   PoP linking is used the Registrar terminating the DTLS connection
   establishes a new TLS connection with the upstream CA.  Thus, it is
   impossible for PoP linking to be enforced end-to-end for the EST
   transaction.  The EST server could be configured to accept PoP
   linking information that does not match the current TLS session
   because the authenticated EST Registrar is assumed to have verified
   PoP linking downstream to the client.

   The introduction of an EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the client
   can authenticate the Registrar using its implicit or explicit TA
   database.  It also assumes the Registrar has a trust relationship
   with the upstream EST server in order to act on behalf of the
   clients.  When a client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate
   validation, she SHOULD confirm if the server is acting as an RA by
   the presence of the id-kp-cmcRA EKU [RFC6402] in the server
   certificate.

   In a server-side key generation case, if no end-to-end encryption is
   used, the Registrar may be able see the private key as it acts as a
   man-in-the-middle.  Thus, the client puts its trust on the Registrar
   not exposing the private key.

   Clients that leverage server-side key generation without end-to-end
   encryption of the private key (Section 5.8) have no knowledge if the
   Registrar will be generating the private key and enrolling the
   certificates with the CA or if the CA will be responsible for
   generating the key.  In such cases, the existence of a Registrar
   requires the client to put its trust on the registrar when it is
   generating the private key.







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11.  Contributors

   Martin Furuhed contributed to the EST-coaps specification by
   providing feedback based on the Nexus EST over CoAPS server
   implementation that started in 2015.  Sandeep Kumar kick-started this
   specification and was instrumental in drawing attention to the
   importance of the subject.

12.  Acknowledgements

   The authors are very grateful to Klaus Hartke for his detailed
   explanations on the use of Block with DTLS and his support for the
   Content-Format specification.  The authors would like to thank Esko
   Dijk and Michael Verschoor for the valuable discussions that helped
   in shaping the solution.  They would also like to thank Peter
   Panburana for his feedback on technical details of the solution.
   Constructive comments were received from Benjamin Kaduk, Eliot Lear,
   Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, Julien Vermillard, John Manuel, Oliver
   Pfaff, Pete Beal and Carsten Bormann.

   Interop tests were done by Oliver Pfaff, Thomas Werner, Oskar
   Camezind, Bjorn Elmers and Joel Hoglund.

   Robert Moskowitz provided code to create the examples.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct]
              Fossati, T., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Multipart
              Content-Format for CoAP", draft-ietf-core-multipart-ct-04
              (work in progress), August 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis]
              Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
              Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
              Message Specification", draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5751-bis-12
              (work in progress), September 2018.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-32 (work in progress), July
              2019.






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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2585]  Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
              RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC5967]  Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5967, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5967>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6690]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.

   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

   [RFC7925]  Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
              Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.





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   [RFC7959]  Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.

   [RFC8075]  Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
              E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8422]  Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [COREparams]
              "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-
              parameters.xhtml>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and T. Fossati, "Connection
              Identifiers for DTLS 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-
              id-06 (work in progress), July 2019.

   [I-D.josefsson-sasl-tls-cb]
              Josefsson, S., "Channel Bindings for TLS based on the
              PRF", draft-josefsson-sasl-tls-cb-03 (work in progress),
              March 2015.

   [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
              Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
              "Guide for building an ECC pki", draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-
              pki-07 (work in progress), August 2019.





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   [ieee802.15.4]
              "IEEE Standard 802.15.4-2006", 2006.

   [ieee802.1ar]
              "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", December 2009.

   [PsQs]     "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys
              in Network Devices", USENIX Security Symposium 2012 ISBN
              978-931971-95-9, August 2012.

   [RFC4919]  Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
              over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
              Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
              RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.

   [RFC5272]  Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
              (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.

   [RFC5705]  Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
              March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.

   [RFC5929]  Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

   [RFC7228]  Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
              Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC7251]  McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
              CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
              TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.





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   [RFC7299]  Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
              Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RSAfact]  "Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards:
              Coppersmith in the wild", Advances in Cryptology
              -  ASIACRYPT 2013, August 2013.

   [tripleshake]
              "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and Fixing
              Authentication over TLS", IEEE Security and Privacy ISBN
              978-1-4799-4686-0, May 2014.

Appendix A.  EST messages to EST-coaps

   This section shows similar examples to the ones presented in
   Appendix A of [RFC7030].  The payloads in the examples are the hex
   encoded binary, generated with 'xxd -p', of the PKI certificates
   created following [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki].  Hex is used for
   visualization purposes because a binary representation cannot be
   rendered well in text.  The hexadecimal representations would not be
   transported in hex, but in binary.  The payloads are shown
   unencrypted.  In practice the message content would be transferred
   over an encrypted DTLS channel.

   The certificate responses included in the examples contain Content-
   Format 281 (application/pkcs7).  If the client had requested Content-
   Format TBD287 (application/pkix-cert) by querying /est/skc, the
   server would respond with a single DER binary certificate in the
   multipart-core container.

   These examples assume a short resource path of "/est".  Even though
   omitted from the examples for brevity, before making the EST-coaps
   requests, a client would learn about the server supported EST-coaps
   resources with a GET request for /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est* as
   explained in Section 5.1.

   The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in Appendix A.1.
   Creating CoAP headers is assumed to be generally understood.

   The message content breakdown is presented in Appendix C.




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A.1.  cacerts

   In EST-coaps, a cacerts message can be:

   GET example.com:9085/est/crts
   (Accept:  281)

   The corresponding CoAP header fields are shown below.  The use of
   block and DTLS are worked out in Appendix B.

     Ver = 1
     T = 0 (CON)
     Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
     Token = 0x9a (client generated)
     Options
     Option (Uri-Host)
        Option Delta = 0x3  (option# 3)
        Option Length = 0xB
        Option Value = "example.com"
     Option (Uri-Port)
        Option Delta = 0x4  (option# 3+4=7)
        Option Length = 0x2
        Option Value = 9085
      Option (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option# 7+4=11)
        Option Length = 0x3
        Option Value = "est"
      Option (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x0   (option# 11+0=11)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = "crts"
      Option (Accept)
        Option Delta = 0x6   (option# 11+6=17)
        Option Length = 0x2
        Option Value = 281
     Payload = [Empty]

   The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options can be omitted if they coincide
   with the transport protocol destination address and port
   respectively.  Explicit Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are typically
   used when an endpoint hosts multiple virtual servers and uses the
   Options to route the requests accordingly.

   A 2.05 Content response with a cert in EST-coaps will then be

   2.05 Content (Content-Format: 281)
      {payload with certificate in binary format}




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   with CoAP fields


     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a   (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option (Content-Format)
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option# 12)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   3082027a06092a864886f70d010702a082026b308202670201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a082024d30820249308201efa0030201020208
   0b8bb0fe604f6a1e300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b300906035504
   0613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c
   4131143012060355040a0c0b4578616d706c6520496e6331163014060355
   040b0c0d63657274696669636174696f6e3110300e06035504030c07526f
   6f74204341301e170d3139303133313131323730335a170d333930313236
   3131323730335a3067310b3009060355040613025553310b300906035504
   080c024341310b300906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b45
   78616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d636572746966696361
   74696f6e3110300e06035504030c07526f6f742043413059301306072a86
   48ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200040c1b1e82ba8cc72680973f
   97edb8a0c72ab0d405f05d4fe29b997a14ccce89008313d09666b6ce375c
   595fcc8e37f8e4354497011be90e56794bd91ad951ab45a3818430818130
   1d0603551d0e041604141df1208944d77b5f1d9dcb51ee244a523f3ef5de
   301f0603551d230418301680141df1208944d77b5f1d9dcb51ee244a523f
   3ef5de300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff300e0603551d0f0101ff
   040403020106301e0603551d110417301581136365727469667940657861
   6d706c652e636f6d300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502202b891d
   d411d07a6d6f621947635ba4c43165296b3f633726f02e51ecf464bd4002
   2100b4be8a80d08675f041fbc719acf3b39dedc85dc92b3035868cb2daa8
   f05db196a1003100

   The breakdown of the payload is shown in Appendix C.1.

A.2.  enroll / reenroll

   During the (re-)enroll exchange the EST-coaps client uses a CSR
   (Content-Format 286) request in the POST request payload.  The Accept
   option tells the server that the client is expecting Content-Format



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   281 (PKCS#7) in the response.  As shown in Appendix C.2, the CSR
   contains a ChallengePassword which is used for PoP linking
   (Section 4).

   POST [2001:db8::2:321]:61616/est/sen
   (Token: 0x45)
   (Accept: 281)
   (Content-Format: 286)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   3082018b30820131020100305c310b3009060355040613025553310b3009
   06035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114301206035504
   0a0c0b6578616d706c6520496e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f54310f
   300d060355040513065774313233343059301306072a8648ce3d02010608
   2a8648ce3d03010703420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f
   028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75
   f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9a073303406092a864886f70d0109
   0731270c2576437630292a264a4b4a3bc3a2c280c2992f3e3c2e2c3d6b6e
   7634332323403d204e787e60303b06092a864886f70d01090e312e302c30
   2a0603551d1104233021a01f06082b06010505070804a013301106092b06
   010401b43b0a01040401020304300a06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045
   02210092563a546463bd9ecff170d0fd1f2ef0d3d012160e5ee90cffedab
   ec9b9a38920220179f10a3436109051abad17590a09bc87c4dce5453a6fc
   1135a1e84eed754377

   After verification of the CSR by the server, a 2.04 Changed response
   with the issued certificate will be returned to the client.





















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   2.04 Changed
   (Token: 0x45)
   (Content-Format: 281)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   3082026e06092a864886f70d010702a082025f3082025b0201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a08202413082023d308201e2a0030201020208
   7e7661d7b54e4632300a06082a8648ce3d040302305d310b300906035504
   0613025553310b300906035504080c02434131143012060355040a0c0b45
   78616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d636572746966696361
   74696f6e3113301106035504030c0a3830322e3141522043413020170d31
   39303133313131323931365a180f39393939313233313233353935395a30
   5c310b3009060355040613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b30
   0906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b6578616d706c652049
   6e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f54310f300d06035504051306577431
   3233343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004
   c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50c
   ff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b56
   38e59fd9a3818a30818730090603551d1304023000301d0603551d0e0416
   041496600d8716bf7fd0e752d0ac760777ad665d02a0301f0603551d2304
   183016801468d16551f951bfc82a431d0d9f08bc2d205b1160300e060355
   1d0f0101ff0404030205a0302a0603551d1104233021a01f06082b060105
   05070804a013301106092b06010401b43b0a01040401020304300a06082a
   8648ce3d0403020349003046022100c0d81996d2507d693f3c48eaa5ee94
   91bda6db214099d98117c63b361374cd86022100a774989f4c321a5cf25d
   832a4d336a08ad67df20f1506421188a0ade6d349236a1003100

   The breakdown of the request and response is shown in Appendix C.2.

A.3.  serverkeygen

   In a serverkeygen exchange the CoAP POST request looks like
















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   POST 192.0.2.1:8085/est/skg
   (Token: 0xa5)
   (Accept: 62)
   (Content-Format: 286)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   3081d03078020100301631143012060355040a0c0b736b67206578616d70
   6c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004c8
   b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff
   958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638
   e59fd9a000300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502207c553981b1fe
   349249d8a3f50a0346336b7dfaa099cf74e1ec7a37a0a760485902210084
   79295398774b2ff8e7e82abb0c17eaef344a5088fa69fd63ee611850c34b
   0a

   The response would follow [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct] and could look
   like































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   2.04 Changed
   (Token: 0xa5)
   (Content-Format: 62)

   [ The hexadecimal representations below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   84                                   # array(4)
   19 011C                              # unsigned(284)
   58 8A                                # bytes(138)
   308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
   6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
   679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
   494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
   cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9
   19 0119                              # unsigned(281)
   59 01D3                              # bytes(467)
   308201cf06092a864886f70d010702a08201c0308201bc0201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a08201a23082019e30820144a0030201020209
   00b3313e8f3fc9538e300a06082a8648ce3d040302301631143012060355
   040a0c0b736b67206578616d706c65301e170d3139303930343037343430
   335a170d3339303833303037343430335a301631143012060355040a0c0b
   736b67206578616d706c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce
   3d03010703420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f028bc351
   cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75f602f915
   2618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9a37b307930090603551d1304023000302c06
   096086480186f842010d041f161d4f70656e53534c2047656e6572617465
   64204365727469666963617465301d0603551d0e0416041496600d8716bf
   7fd0e752d0ac760777ad665d02a0301f0603551d2304183016801496600d
   8716bf7fd0e752d0ac760777ad665d02a0300a06082a8648ce3d04030203
   48003045022100e95bfa25a08976652246f2d96143da39fce0dc4c9b26b9
   cce1f24164cc2b12b602201351fd8eea65764e3459d324e4345ff5b2a915
   38c04976111796b3698bf6379ca1003100

   The private key in the response above is without CMS EnvelopedData
   and has no additional encryption beyond DTLS (Section 5.8).

   The breakdown of the request and response is shown in Appendix C.3

A.4.  csrattrs

   Below is a csrattrs exchange








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   REQ:
   GET example.com:61616/est/att

   RES:
   2.05 Content
   (Content-Format: 285)

   [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
   in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
   cannot be rendered well in text. ]

   307c06072b06010101011630220603883701311b131950617273652053455
   420617320322e3939392e31206461746106092a864886f70d010907302c06
   0388370231250603883703060388370413195061727365205345542061732
   0322e3939392e32206461746106092b240303020801010b06096086480165
   03040202

   A 2.05 Content response should contain attributes which are relevant
   for the authenticated client.  This example is copied from
   Section A.2 in [RFC7030], where the base64 representation is replaced
   with a hexadecimal representation of the equivalent binary format.
   The EST-coaps server returns attributes that the client can ignore if
   they are unknown to him.

Appendix B.  EST-coaps Block message examples

   Two examples are presented in this section:

   1.  a cacerts exchange shows the use of Block2 and the block headers

   2.  an enroll exchange shows the Block1 and Block2 size negotiation
       for request and response payloads.

   The payloads are shown unencrypted.  In practice the message contents
   would be binary formatted and transferred over an encrypted DTLS
   tunnel.  The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in
   Appendix B.1.  Creating CoAP headers is assumed to be generally
   known.

B.1.  cacerts

   This section provides a detailed example of the messages using DTLS
   and BLOCK option Block2.  The example block length is taken as 64
   which gives an SZX value of 2.

   The following is an example of a cacerts exchange over DTLS.  The
   content length of the cacerts response in appendix A.1 of [RFC7030]
   contains 639 bytes in binary in this example.  The CoAP message adds



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   around 10 bytes in this exmple, the DTLS record around 29 bytes.  To
   avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP Block Option is used and an MTU of
   127 is assumed to stay within one IEEE 802.15.4 packet.  To stay
   below the MTU of 127, the payload is split in 9 packets with a
   payload of 64 bytes each, followed by a last tenth packet of 63
   bytes.  The client sends an IPv6 packet containing a UDP datagram
   with the DTLS record that encapsulates a CoAP request 10 times.  The
   server returns an IPv6 packet containing a UDP datagram with a DTLS
   record that encapsulates the CoAP response.  The CoAP request-
   response exchange with block option is shown below.  Block Option is
   shown in a decomposed way (block-option:NUM/M/size) indicating the
   kind of Block Option (2 in this case) followed by a colon, and then
   the block number (NUM), the more bit (M = 0 in Block2 response means
   it is last block), and block size with exponent (2**(SZX+4))
   separated by slashes.  The Length 64 is used with SZX=2.  The CoAP
   Request is sent confirmable (CON) and the Content-Format of the
   response, even though not shown, is 281 (application/pkcs7-mime;
   smime-type=certs-only).  The transfer of the 10 blocks with partially
   filled block NUM=9 is shown below

      GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:0/0/64)  -->
                    <--   (2:0/1/64) 2.05 Content
      GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:1/0/64)  -->
                    <--   (2:1/1/64) 2.05 Content
                                  |
                                  |
                                  |
      GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:9/0/64) -->
                    <--   (2:9/0/64) 2.05 Content

   The header of the GET request looks like




















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     Ver = 1
     T = 0 (CON)
     Code = 0x01 (0.1 GET)
     Token = 0x9a    (client generated)
     Options
      Option (Uri-Host)
        Option Delta = 0x3  (option# 3)
        Option Length = 0xB
        Option Value = "example.com"
      Option (Uri-Port)
        Option Delta = 0x4   (option# 3+4=7)
        Option Length = 0x2
        Option Value = 9085
      Option (Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x4    (option# 7+4=11)
        Option Length = 0x3
        Option Value = "est"
      Option (Uri-Path)Uri-Path)
        Option Delta = 0x0    (option# 11+0=11)
        Option Length = 0x4
        Option Value = "crts"
      Option (Accept)
        Option Delta = 0x6   (option# 11+6=17)
        Option Length = 0x2
        Option Value = 281
     Payload = [Empty]

   The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options can be omitted if they coincide
   with the transport protocol destination address and port
   respectively.  Explicit Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are typically
   used when an endpoint hosts multiple virtual servers and uses the
   Options to route the requests accordingly.

   For further detailing the CoAP headers, the first two and the last
   blocks are written out below.  The header of the first Block2
   response looks like















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     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option# 12+11=23 Block2)
         Option Length = 0x1
         Option Value = 0x0A (block#=0, M=1, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   3082027b06092a864886f70d010702a082026c308202680201013100300b
   06092a864886f70d010701a082024e3082024a308201f0a0030201020209
   009189bc

   The second Block2:

     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (means ACK)
     Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option 12+11=23 Block2)
         Option Length = 0x1
         Option Value = 0x1A (block#=1, M=1, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   df9c99244b300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b300906035504061302
   5553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114
   30120603




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   The 10th and final Block2:

     Ver = 1
     T = 2 (means ACK)
     Code = 0x45      (2.05 Content)
     Token = 0x9a     (copied from request by server)
     Options
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xC  (option# 12 Content-Format)
         Option Length = 0x2
         Option Value = 281
       Option
         Option Delta = 0xB  (option# 12+11=23 Block2 )
         Option Length = 0x1
         Option Value = 0x92 (block#=9, M=0, SZX=2)

     [ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
     in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
     cannot be rendered well in text. ]

     Payload =
   2ec0b4af52d46f3b7ecc9687ddf267bcec368f7b7f1353272f022047a28a
   e5c7306163b3c3834bab3c103f743070594c089aaa0ac870cd13b902caa1
   003100

B.2.  enroll / reenroll

   In this example, the requested Block2 size of 256 bytes, required by
   the client, is transferred to the server in the very first request
   message.  The block size 256=(2**(SZX+4)) which gives SZX=4.  The
   notation for block numbering is the same as in Appendix B.1.  The
   header fields and the payload are omitted for brevity.



















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POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256) {CSR (frag# 1)} -->

       <-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256) {CSR (frag# 2)} -->
       <-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
                      .
                      .
                      .
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256){CSR(frag# N1+1)}-->
                      |
    ...........Immediate response  .........
                      |
  <-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256)(2:0/1/256)(2.04 Changed){Cert resp (frag# 1)}
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/256)           -->
  <-- (ACK) (2:1/1/256)(2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}
                      .
                      .
                      .
POST [2001:db8::2:321]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/256)          -->
  <-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}


            Figure 5: EST-COAP enrollment with multiple blocks

   N1+1 blocks have been transferred from client to the server and N2+1
   blocks have been transferred from server to client.

Appendix C.  Message content breakdown

   This appendix presents the breakdown of the hexadecimal dumps of the
   binary payloads shown in Appendix A.

C.1.  cacerts

   The breakdown of cacerts response containing one root CA certificate
   is















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   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 831953162763987486 (0xb8bb0fe604f6a1e)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
                     OU=certification, CN=Root CA
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan 31 11:27:03 2019 GMT
               Not After : Jan 26 11:27:03 2039 GMT
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
                        OU=certification, CN=Root CA
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:0c:1b:1e:82:ba:8c:c7:26:80:97:3f:97:ed:b8:
                       a0:c7:2a:b0:d4:05:f0:5d:4f:e2:9b:99:7a:14:cc:
                       ce:89:00:83:13:d0:96:66:b6:ce:37:5c:59:5f:cc:
                       8e:37:f8:e4:35:44:97:01:1b:e9:0e:56:79:4b:d9:
                       1a:d9:51:ab:45
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   1D:F1:20:89:44:D7:7B:5F:1D:9D:CB:51:EE:24:4A:52:3F:3E:F5:DE
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                     keyid:
   1D:F1:20:89:44:D7:7B:5F:1D:9D:CB:51:EE:24:4A:52:3F:3E:F5:DE

               X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
                   CA:TRUE
               X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                   Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   email:certify@example.com
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:20:2b:89:1d:d4:11:d0:7a:6d:6f:62:19:47:63:5b:
            a4:c4:31:65:29:6b:3f:63:37:26:f0:2e:51:ec:f4:64:bd:40:
            02:21:00:b4:be:8a:80:d0:86:75:f0:41:fb:c7:19:ac:f3:b3:
            9d:ed:c8:5d:c9:2b:30:35:86:8c:b2:da:a8:f0:5d:b1:96

C.2.  enroll / reenroll

   The breakdown of the enrollment request is






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   Certificate Request:
       Data:
           Version: 0 (0x0)
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
                       OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
                       9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
                       0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
                       be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
                       56:38:e5:9f:d9
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           Attributes:
               challengePassword:   <256-bit PoP linking value>
           Requested Extensions:
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   othername:<unsupported>
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:92:56:3a:54:64:63:bd:9e:cf:f1:70:d0:fd:
            1f:2e:f0:d3:d0:12:16:0e:5e:e9:0c:ff:ed:ab:ec:9b:9a:38:
            92:02:20:17:9f:10:a3:43:61:09:05:1a:ba:d1:75:90:a0:9b:
            c8:7c:4d:ce:54:53:a6:fc:11:35:a1:e8:4e:ed:75:43:77


   The CSR contains a ChallengePassword which is used for PoP linking
   (Section 4).  The CSR also contains an id-on-hardwareModuleName
   hardware identifier to customize the returned certificate to the
   requesting device (See [RFC7299] and [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]).

   The breakdown of the issued certificate is

















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   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 9112578475118446130 (0x7e7661d7b54e4632)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc,
                         OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT
               Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
           Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
                   OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
                       9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
                       0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
                       be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
                       56:38:e5:9f:d9
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                   CA:FALSE
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                   keyid:
   68:D1:65:51:F9:51:BF:C8:2A:43:1D:0D:9F:08:BC:2D:20:5B:11:60

               X509v3 Key Usage: critical
                   Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
               X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                   othername:<unsupported>
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:46:02:21:00:c0:d8:19:96:d2:50:7d:69:3f:3c:48:ea:a5:
            ee:94:91:bd:a6:db:21:40:99:d9:81:17:c6:3b:36:13:74:cd:
            86:02:21:00:a7:74:98:9f:4c:32:1a:5c:f2:5d:83:2a:4d:33:
            6a:08:ad:67:df:20:f1:50:64:21:18:8a:0a:de:6d:34:92:36

C.3.  serverkeygen

   The following is the breakdown of the server-side key generation
   request.





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   Certificate Request:
       Data:
           Version: 0 (0x0)
           Subject: O=skg example
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
                       9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
                       0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
                       be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
                       56:38:e5:9f:d9
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           Attributes:
               a0:00
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:20:7c:55:39:81:b1:fe:34:92:49:d8:a3:f5:0a:03:
            46:33:6b:7d:fa:a0:99:cf:74:e1:ec:7a:37:a0:a7:60:48:59:
            02:21:00:84:79:29:53:98:77:4b:2f:f8:e7:e8:2a:bb:0c:17:
            ea:ef:34:4a:50:88:fa:69:fd:63:ee:61:18:50:c3:4b:0a

   Following is the breakdown of the private key content of the server-
   side key generation response.

   Private-Key: (256 bit)
   priv:
       61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
       6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
       0c:37
   pub:
       04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
       9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
       0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
       be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
       56:38:e5:9f:d9
   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
   NIST CURVE: P-256

   The following is the breakdown of the certificate in the server-side
   key generation response payload.









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   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number:
               b3:31:3e:8f:3f:c9:53:8e
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: O=skg example
           Validity
               Not Before: Sep  4 07:44:03 2019 GMT
               Not After : Aug 30 07:44:03 2039 GMT
           Subject: O=skg example
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub:
                       04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
                       9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
                       0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
                       be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
                       56:38:e5:9f:d9
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
                   NIST CURVE: P-256
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Basic Constraints:
                   CA:FALSE
               Netscape Comment:
                   OpenSSL Generated Certificate
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
   96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
               X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
                   keyid:
   96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:e9:5b:fa:25:a0:89:76:65:22:46:f2:d9:61:
            43:da:39:fc:e0:dc:4c:9b:26:b9:cc:e1:f2:41:64:cc:2b:12:
            b6:02:20:13:51:fd:8e:ea:65:76:4e:34:59:d3:24:e4:34:5f:
            f5:b2:a9:15:38:c0:49:76:11:17:96:b3:69:8b:f6:37:9c

Authors' Addresses

   Peter van der Stok
   Consultant

   Email: consultancy@vanderstok.org






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   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com


   Michael C. Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works

   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
   URI:   http://www.sandelman.ca/


   Shahid Raza
   RISE SICS
   Isafjordsgatan 22
   Kista, Stockholm  16440
   SE

   Email: shahid@sics.se































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