ACE Working Group S. Gerdes
Internet-Draft O. Bergmann
Intended status: Standards Track C. Bormann
Expires: March 10, 2019 Universitaet Bremen TZI
G. Selander
Ericsson
L. Seitz
RISE SICS
September 06, 2018
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)
draft-ietf-ace-dtls-authorize-04
Abstract
This specification defines a profile for delegating client
authentication and authorization in a constrained environment by
establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel
between resource-constrained nodes. The protocol relies on DTLS for
communication security between entities in a constrained network
using either raw public keys or pre-shared keys. A resource-
constrained node can use this protocol to delegate management of
authorization information to a trusted host with less severe
limitations regarding processing power and memory.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 10, 2019.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Resource Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Dynamic Update of Authorization Information . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Token Expiration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. RawPublicKey Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. PreSharedKey Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Updating Authorization Information . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
This specification defines a profile of the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. In this profile, a client and a resource
server use CoAP [RFC7252] over DTLS [RFC6347] to communicate. The
client uses an access token, bound to a key (the proof-of-possession
key) to authorize its access to protected resources hosted by the
resource server. DTLS provides communication security, proof of
possession, and server authentication. Optionally the client and the
resource server may also use CoAP over DTLS to communicate with the
authorization server. This specification supports the DTLS handshake
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
with Raw Public Keys (RPK) [RFC7250] and the DTLS handshake with Pre-
Shared Keys (PSK) [RFC4279].
The DTLS RPK handshake [RFC7250] requires client authentication to
provide proof-of-possession for the key tied to the access token.
Here the access token needs to be transferred to the resource server
before the handshake is initiated, as described in section 5.8.1 of
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [1].
The DTLS PSK handshake [RFC4279] provides the proof-of-possession for
the key tied to the access token. Furthermore the psk_identity
parameter in the DTLS PSK handshake is used to transfer the access
token from the client to the resource server.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
2. Protocol Overview
The CoAP-DTLS profile for ACE specifies the transfer of
authentication and, if necessary, authorization information between
the client C and the resource server RS during setup of a DTLS
session for CoAP messaging. It also specifies how a Client can use
CoAP over DTLS to retrieve an Access Token from the authorization
server AS for a protected resource hosted on the resource server RS.
This profile requires a Client (C) to retrieve an Access Token for
the resource(s) it wants to access on a Resource Server (RS) as
specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Figure 1 shows the typical
message flow in this scenario (messages in square brackets are
optional):
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
C RS AS
| [-- Resource Request --->] | |
| | |
| [<----- AS Information --] | |
| | |
| --- Token Request ----------------------------> |
| | |
| <---------------------------- Access Token ----- |
| + RS Information |
Figure 1: Retrieving an Access Token
To determine the AS in charge of a resource hosted at the RS, the
client C MAY send an initial Unauthorized Resource Request message to
the RS. The RS then denies the request and sends the address of its
AS back to the client C as specified in section 5.1.2 of draft-ietf-
ace-oauth-authz [2].
Once the client C knows the authorization server's address, it can
send an Access Token request to the token endpoint at the AS as
specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. As the Access Token request
as well as the response may contain confidential data, the
communication between the client and the authorization server MUST be
confidentiality-protected and ensure authenticity. How the mutual
authentication between the client and the authorization server is
achieved is out of scope for this document; the client may have been
configured with a public key of the authorization server and have
been registered at the AS via the OAuth client registration mechanism
as outlined in section 5.3 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [3].
If C wants to use the CoAP RawPublicKey mode as described in
Section 9 of RFC 7252 [4] it MUST provide a key or key identifier
within a "cnf" object in the token request. If the authorization
server AS decides that the request is to be authorized it generates
an access token response for the client C containing a "profile"
parameter with the value "coap_dtls" to indicate that this profile
MUST be used for communication between the client C and the resource
server.
For RPK mode, the authorization server also adds a "rs_cnf" parameter
containing information about the public that is used by the resource
server (see Section 3).
For PSK mode, the authorization server adds a "cnf" parameter
containing information about the shared secret that C can use to
setup a DTLS session with the resource server (see Section 4).
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
The Access Token returned by the authorization server then can be
used by the client to establish a new DTLS session with the resource
server. When the client intends to use asymmetric cryptography in
the DTLS handshake with the resource server, the client MUST upload
the Access Token to the authz-info resource on the resource server
before starting the DTLS handshake, as described in section 5.8.1 of
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [5]. If only symmetric cryptography is
used between the client and the resource server, the Access Token MAY
instead be transferred in the DTLS ClientKeyExchange message (see
Section 4.1).
Figure 2 depicts the common protocol flow for the DTLS profile after
the client C has retrieved the Access Token from the authorization
server AS.
C RS AS
| [--- Access Token ------>] | |
| | |
| <== DTLS channel setup ==> | |
| | |
| == Authorized Request ===> | |
| | |
| <=== Protected Resource == | |
Figure 2: Protocol overview
The following sections specify how CoAP is used to interchange
access-related data between the resource server and the authorization
server so that the authorization server can provide the client and
the resource server with sufficient information to establish a secure
channel, and convey authorization information specific for this
communication relationship to the resource server.
Depending on the desired CoAP security mode, the Client-to-AS
request, AS-to-Client response and DTLS session establishment carry
slightly different information. Section 3 addresses the use of raw
public keys while Section 4 defines how pre-shared keys are used in
this profile.
2.1. Resource Access
Once a DTLS channel has been established as described in Section 3
and Section 4, respectively, the client is authorized to access
resources covered by the Access Token it has uploaded to the authz-
info resource hosted by the resource server.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
On the resource server side, successful establishment of the DTLS
channel binds the client to the access token, functioning as a proof-
of-possession associated key. Any request that the resource server
receives on this channel MUST be checked against these authorization
rules that are associated with the identity of the client. Incoming
CoAP requests that are not authorized with respect to any Access
Token that is associated with the client MUST be rejected by the
resource server with 4.01 response as described in Section 5.1.1 of
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [6].
Note: The identity of the client is determined by the authentication
process
during the DTLS handshake. In the asymmetric case, the public key
will define the client's identity, while in the PSK case, the
client's identity is defined by the shared secret generated by the
authorization server for this communication.
The resource server SHOULD treat an incoming CoAP request as
authorized if the following holds:
1. The message was received on a secure channel that has been
established using the procedure defined in this document.
2. The authorization information tied to the sending peer is valid.
3. The request is destined for the resource server.
4. The resource URI specified in the request is covered by the
authorization information.
5. The request method is an authorized action on the resource with
respect to the authorization information.
Incoming CoAP requests received on a secure DTLS channel MUST be
rejected according to [Section 5.1.1 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.1
1. with response code 4.03 (Forbidden) when the resource URI
specified in the request is not covered by the authorization
information, and
2. with response code 4.05 (Method Not Allowed) when the resource
URI specified in the request covered by the authorization
information but not the requested action.
The client cannot always know a priori if an Authorized Resource
Request will succeed. If the client repeatedly gets error responses
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
containing AS Information (cf. Section 5.1.1 of draft-ietf-ace-
oauth-authz [7] as response to its requests, it SHOULD request a new
Access Token from the authorization server in order to continue
communication with the resource server.
2.2. Dynamic Update of Authorization Information
The client can update the authorization information stored at the
resource server at any time without changing an established DTLS
session. To do so, the Client requests from the authorization server
a new Access Token for the intended action on the respective resource
and uploads this Access Token to the authz-info resource on the
resource server.
Figure 3 depicts the message flow where the client C requests a new
Access Token after a security association between the client and the
resource server RS has been established using this protocol. The
token request MUST specify the key identifier of the existing DTLS
channel between the client and the resource server in the "kid"
parameter of the Client-to-AS request. The authorization server MUST
verify that the specified "kid" denotes a valid verifier for a proof-
of-possession ticket that has previously been issued to the
requesting client. Otherwise, the Client-to-AS request MUST be
declined with a the error code "unsupported_pop_key" as defined in
Section 5.6.3 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [8].
When the authorization server issues a new access token to update
existing authorization information it MUST include the specified
"kid" parameter in this access token. A resource server MUST
associate the updated authorization information with any existing
DTLS session that is identified by this key identifier.
Note: By associating the access tokens with the identifier of an
existing DTLS session, the authorization information can be
updated without changing the cryptographic keys for the DTLS
communication between the client and the resource server, i.e. an
existing session can be used with updated permissions.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
C RS AS
| <===== DTLS channel =====> | |
| + Access Token | |
| | |
| --- Token Request ----------------------------> |
| | |
| <---------------------------- New Access Token - |
| + RS Information |
| | |
| --- Update /authz-info --> | |
| New Access Token | |
| | |
| == Authorized Request ===> | |
| | |
| <=== Protected Resource == | |
Figure 3: Overview of Dynamic Update Operation
2.3. Token Expiration
DTLS sessions that have been established in accordance with this
profile are always tied to a specific set of access tokens. As these
tokens may become invalid at any time (either because the token has
expired or the responsible authorization server has revoked the
token), the session may become useless at some point. A resource
server therefore may decide to terminate existing DTLS sessions after
the last valid access token for this session has been deleted.
As specified in section 5.8.3 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz [9], the
resource server MUST notify the client with an error response with
code 4.01 (Unauthorized) for any long running request before
terminating the session.
The resource server MAY also keep the session alive for some time and
respond to incoming requests with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message
including AS Information to signal that the client needs to upload a
new access token before it can continue using this DTLS session. The
AS Information is created as specified in section 5.1.2 of draft-
ietf-ace-oauth-authz [10]. The resource server SHOULD add a "kid"
parameter to the AS Information denoting the identifier of the key
that it uses internally for this DTLS session. The client then
includes this "kid" parameter in a Client-to-AS request used to
retrieve a new access token to be used with this DTLS session. In
case the key identifier is already known by the client (e.g. because
it was included in the RS Information in an AS-to-Client response),
the "kid" parameter MAY be elided from the AS Information.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
Table 1 updates Figure 2 in section 5.1.2 of draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz [11] with the new "kid" parameter in accordance with [RFC8152].
+----------------+----------+-----------------+
| Parameter name | CBOR Key | Major Type |
+----------------+----------+-----------------+
| kid | 4 | 2 (byte string) |
+----------------+----------+-----------------+
Table 1: Updated AS Information parameters
3. RawPublicKey Mode
To retrieve an access token for the resource that the client wants to
access, the client requests an Access Token from the authorization
server. The client MUST add a "cnf" object carrying either its raw
public key or a unique identifier for a public key that it has
previously made known to the authorization server. To prove that the
client is in possession of this key, it MUST use the same public key
as in certificate message that is used to establish the DTLS session
with the authorization server.
An example Access Token request from the client to the resource
server is depicted in Figure 4.
POST coaps://as.example.com/token
Content-Format: application/cbor
{
grant_type: client_credentials,
aud: "tempSensor4711",
cnf: {
COSE_Key: {
kty: EC2,
crv: P-256,
x: h'TODOX',
y: h'TODOY'
}
}
}
Figure 4: Access Token Request Example for RPK Mode
The example shows an Access Token request for the resource identified
by the audience string "tempSensor4711" on the authorization server
using a raw public key.
When the authorization server authorizes a request, it will return an
Access Token and a "cnf" object in the AS-to-Client response. Before
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
the client initiates the DTLS handshake with the resource server, it
MUST send a "POST" request containing the new Access Token to the
authz-info resource hosted by the resource server. If this operation
yields a positive response, the client SHOULD proceed to establish a
new DTLS channel with the resource server. To use raw public key
mode, the client MUST pass the same public key that was used for
constructing the Access Token with the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure
in the DTLS handshake as specified in [RFC7250].
An implementation that supports the RPK mode of this profile MUST at
least support the ciphersuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
[RFC7251] with the ed25519 curve (cf. [RFC8032], [RFC8422]).
Note: According to [RFC7252], CoAP implementations MUST support the
ciphersuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251] and the
NIST P-256 curve. As discussed in [RFC7748], new ECC curves have
been defined recently that are considered superior to the so-
called NIST curves. The curve that is mandatory to implement in
this specification is said to be efficient and less dangerous
regarding implementation errors than the secp256r1 curve mandated
in [RFC7252].
The Access Token is constructed by the authorization server such that
the resource server can associate the Access Token with the Client's
public key. If CBOR web tokens [RFC8392] are used as recommended in
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the authorization server MUST include a
"COSE_Key" object in the "cnf" claim of the Access Token. This
"COSE_Key" object MAY contain a reference to a key for the client
that is already known by the resource server (e.g., from previous
communication). If the authorization server has no certain knowledge
that the Client's key is already known to the resource server, the
Client's public key MUST be included in the Access Token's "cnf"
parameter.
4. PreSharedKey Mode
To retrieve an access token for the resource that the client wants to
access, the client MAY include a "cnf" object carrying an identifier
for a symmetric key in its Access Token request to the authorization
server. This identifier can be used by the authorization server to
determine the shared secret to construct the proof-of-possession
token and therefore MUST specify a symmetric key that was previously
generated by the authorization server as a shared secret for the
communication between the client and the resource server.
Depending on the requested token type and algorithm in the Access
Token request, the authorization server adds RS Information to the
response that provides the client with sufficient information to
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
setup a DTLS channel with the resource server. For symmetric proof-
of-possession keys (c.f. [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), the client
must ensure that the Access Token request is sent over a secure
channel that guarantees authentication, message integrity and
confidentiality.
When the authorization server authorizes the client it returns an AS-
to-Client response with the profile parameter set to "coap_dtls" and
a "cnf" parameter carrying a "COSE_Key" object that contains the
symmetric key to be used between the client and the resource server
as illustrated in Figure 5.
2.01 Created
Content-Format: application/cbor
Location-Path: /token/asdjbaskd
{
access_token: h'd08343a10...
(remainder of CWT omitted for brevity)
token_type: pop,
alg: HS256,
expires_in: 86400,
profile: coap_dtls,
cnf: {
COSE_Key: {
kty: symmetric,
k: h'73657373696f6e6b6579'
}
}
}
Figure 5: Example Access Token response
In this example, the authorization server returns a 2.01 response
containing a new Access Token. The information is transferred as a
CBOR data structure as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
A response that declines any operation on the requested resource is
constructed according to Section 5.2 of RFC 6749 [12], (cf.
Section 5.7.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]).
4.00 Bad Request
Content-Format: application/cbor
{
error: invalid_request
}
Figure 6: Example Access Token response with reject
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
4.1. DTLS Channel Setup Between C and RS
When a client receives an Access Token from an authorization server,
it checks if the payload contains an "access_token" parameter and a
"cnf" parameter. With this information the client can initiate
establishment of a new DTLS channel with a resource server. To use
DTLS with pre-shared keys, the client follows the PSK key exchange
algorithm specified in Section 2 of [RFC4279] using the key conveyed
in the "cnf" parameter of the AS response as PSK when constructing
the premaster secret.
In PreSharedKey mode, the knowledge of the shared secret by the
client and the resource server is used for mutual authentication
between both peers. Therefore, the resource server must be able to
determine the shared secret from the Access Token. Following the
general ACE authorization framework, the client can upload the Access
Token to the resource server's authz-info resource before starting
the DTLS handshake. Alternatively, the client MAY provide the most
recent Access Token in the "psk_identity" field of the
ClientKeyExchange message. To do so, the client MUST treat the
contents of the "access_token" field from the AS-to-Client response
as opaque data and not perform any re-coding.
Note: As stated in section 4.2 of [RFC7925], the PSK identity should
be treated as binary data in the Internet of Things space and not
assumed to have a human-readable form of any sort.
If a resource server receives a ClientKeyExchange message that
contains a "psk_identity" with a length greater zero, it uses the
contents as index for its key store (i.e., treat the contents as key
identifier). The resource server MUST check if it has one or more
Access Tokens that are associated with the specified key. If no
valid Access Token is available for this key, the DTLS session setup
is terminated with an "illegal_parameter" DTLS alert message.
If no key with a matching identifier is found the resource server the
resource server MAY process the decoded contents of the
"psk_identity" field as access token that is stored with the
authorization information endpoint before continuing the DTLS
handshake. If the decoded contents of the "psk_identity" do not
yield a valid access token for the requesting client, the DTLS
session setup is terminated with an "illegal_parameter" DTLS alert
message.
Note1: As a resource server cannot provide a client with a meaningful
PSK identity hint in
response to the client's ClientHello message, the resource server
SHOULD NOT send a ServerKeyExchange message.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
Note2: According to [RFC7252], CoAP implementations MUST support the
ciphersuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655]. A client is
therefore expected to offer at least this ciphersuite to the
resource server.
This specification assumes that the Access Token is a PoP token as
described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] unless specifically stated
otherwise. Therefore, the Access Token is bound to a symmetric PoP
key that is used as shared secret between the client and the resource
server.
While the client can retrieve the shared secret from the contents of
the "cnf" parameter in the AS-to-Client response, the resource server
uses the information contained in the "cnf" claim of the Access Token
to determine the actual secret when no explicit "kid" was provided in
the "psk_identity" field. Usually, this is done by including a
"COSE_Key" object carrying either a key that has been encrypted with
a shared secret between the authorization server and the resource
server, or a key identifier that can be used by the resource server
to lookup the shared secret.
Instead of the "COSE_Key" object, the authorization server MAY
include a "COSE_Encrypt" structure to enable the resource server to
calculate the shared key from the Access Token. The "COSE_Encrypt"
structure MUST use the _Direct Key with KDF_ method as described in
Section 12.1.2 of RFC 8152 [13]. The authorization server MUST
include a Context information structure carrying a PartyU "nonce"
parameter carrying the nonce that has been used by the authorization
server to construct the shared key.
This specification mandates that at least the key derivation
algorithm "HKDF SHA-256" as defined in [RFC8152] MUST be supported.
This key derivation function is the default when no "alg" field is
included in the "COSE_Encrypt" structure for the resource server.
4.2. Updating Authorization Information
Usually, the authorization information that the resource server keeps
for a client is updated by uploading a new Access Token as described
in Section 2.2.
The Client MAY also perform a new DTLS handshake according to
Section 4.1 that replaces the existing DTLS session. After
successful completion of the DTLS handshake the resource server
updates the existing authorization information for the client
according to the new Access Token.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
5. Security Considerations
This document specifies a profile for the Authentication and
Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. As it follows this framework's general
approach, the general security and privacy considerations from
section 6 and section 7 also apply to this profile.
Constrained devices that use DTLS [RFC6347] are inherently vulnerable
to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as the handshake protocol requires
creation of internal state within the device. This is specifically
of concern where an adversary is able to intercept the initial cookie
exchange and interject forged messages with a valid cookie to
continue with the handshake.
[I-D.tiloca-tls-dos-handshake] specifies a TLS extension to prevent
this type of attack which is applicable especially for constrained
environments where the authorization server can act as trust anchor.
6. Privacy Considerations
An unprotected response to an unauthorized request may disclose
information about the resource server and/or its existing
relationship with the client. It is advisable to include as little
information as possible in an unencrypted response. When a DTLS
session between the client and the resource server already exists,
more detailed information may be included with an error response to
provide the client with sufficient information to react on that
particular error.
Note that some information might still leak after DTLS session is
established, due to observable message sizes, the source, and the
destination addresses.
7. IANA Considerations
The following registrations are done for the ACE OAuth Profile
Registry following the procedure specified in
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[RFC-XXXX]"
with the RFC number of this specification and delete this paragraph.
Profile name: coap_dtls
Profile Description: Profile for delegating client authentication and
authorization in a constrained environment by establishing a Datagram
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel between resource-constrained
nodes.
Profile ID: 1
Change Controller: IESG
Reference: [RFC-XXXX]
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-13
(work in progress), July 2018.
[I-D.tiloca-tls-dos-handshake]
Tiloca, M., Seitz, L., Hoeve, M., and O. Bergmann,
"Extension for protecting (D)TLS handshakes against Denial
of Service", draft-tiloca-tls-dos-handshake-02 (work in
progress), March 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
8.3. URIs
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.8.1
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.2
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.3
[4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252#section-9
[5] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.8.1
[6] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.1
[7] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.1
[8] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.6.3
[9] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.8.3
[10] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.2
[11] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-
13#section-5.1.2
[12] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
[13] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8152#section-12.1.2
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft CoAP-DTLS September 2018
Authors' Addresses
Stefanie Gerdes
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63906
Email: gerdes@tzi.org
Olaf Bergmann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63904
Email: bergmann@tzi.org
Carsten Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63921
Email: cabo@tzi.org
Goeran Selander
Ericsson
Faroegatan 6
Kista 164 80
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
Ludwig Seitz
RISE SICS
Scheelevaegen 17
Lund 223 70
Sweden
Email: ludwig.seitz@ri.se
Gerdes, et al. Expires March 10, 2019 [Page 18]