ACE Working Group                                               L. Seitz
Internet-Draft                                                 Combitech
Intended status: Standards Track                       December 17, 2019
Expires: June 19, 2020


      Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained
                           Environments (ACE)
                     draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-07

Abstract

   This specification defines new parameters for the OAuth 2.0 token and
   introspection endpoints when used with the framework for
   authentication and authorization for constrained environments (ACE).
   These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the client
   whishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the AS has selected,
   and the key the RS should use to authenticate to the client.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 19, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Parameters for the Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Client-to-AS Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  The Resource Server Confirmation Claim  . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  AS-to-RS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Confirmation Method Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  CBOR Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.3.  OAuth Parameter Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.4.  OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . . .  10
     9.5.  OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registraton  . . . . . . .  10
     9.6.  OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings
           Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  Overlap with OAuth work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
   (ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new
   parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and
   introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in
   access tokens.  These parameters and claims can also be used in other
   contexts, and may need to be updated to align them with ongoing OAuth
   work.  Therefore, these parameters and claims have been put into a
   dedicated document, to facilitate their use and any potential updates
   in a manner independent of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].








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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are assumed to be familiar with the terminology from
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

   Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth 2.0
   [RFC6749] definition, which is to denote resources such as token and
   introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS.  The CoAP [RFC7252]
   definition, which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol"
   is not used in this specification.

3.  Parameters for the Token Endpoint

3.1.  Client-to-AS Request

   This document defines the following additional parameters for
   requesting an access token from a token endpoint in the ACE framework
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]:

   req_cnf
      OPTIONAL.  This field contains information about the key the
      client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of-
      possession.  It is RECOMMENDED that an AS reject a request
      containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field, since the
      AS is expected to be able to generate better symmetric keys than a
      constrained client.  The AS MUST verify that the client really is
      in possession of the corresponding key.  Values of this parameter
      follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].

   Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf"
   parameter to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession
   key.  The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without
   abbreviations for better readability.











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   Header: POST (Code=0.02)
   Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
   Uri-Path: "token"
   Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
   Payload:
   {
      "req_cnf" : {
         "COSE_Key" : {
            "kty" : "EC",
            "kid" : h'11',
            "crv" : "P-256",
            "x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
            "y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
         }
      }
    }

   Figure 1: Example request for an access token bound to an asymmetric
                                   key.

3.2.  AS-to-Client Response

   This document defines the following additional parameters for an AS
   response to a request to the token endpoint:

   cnf
      REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used.
      MAY be present for asymmetric proof-of-possession keys.  This
      field contains the proof-of-possession key that the AS selected
      for the token.  Values of this parameter follow the syntax of the
      "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].  See Section 5 for
      additional discussion of the usage of this parameter.


   rs_cnf
      OPTIONAL if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used.
      MUST NOT be present otherwise.  This field contains information
      about the public key used by the RS to authenticate.  If this
      parameter is absent, either the RS does not use a public key or
      the AS knows that the RS can authenticate itself to the client
      without additional information.  Values of this parameter follow
      the syntax of the "cnf" claim from section 3.1 of
      [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].  See Section 5 for
      additional discussion of the usage of this parameter.

   Figure 2 shows an AS response containing a token and a "cnf"
   parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key.



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   Header: Created (Code=2.01)
   Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
   Payload:
   {
     "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...
      (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
      CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)',
     "cnf" : {
       "COSE_Key" : {
         "kty" : "Symmetric",
         "kid" : b64'39Gqlw',
         "k" : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxCcQh'
       }
     }
   }

       Figure 2: Example AS response with an access token bound to a
                              symmetric key.

   Figure 3 shows an AS response containing a token bound to a
   previously requested asymmetric proof-of-possession key (not shown)
   and a "rs_cnf" parameter containing the public key of the RS.

   Header: Created (Code=2.01)
   Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
   Payload:
   {
     "access_token" : b64'0INDoQEKoQVNKkXfb7xaWqMTf6 ...
      (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
      CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)',
     "rs_cnf" : {
       "COSE_Key" : {
         "kty" : "EC",
         "kid" : h'12',
         "crv" : "P-256",
         "x" : b64'vO5+qsFi+R5vMw9XcSEeIguLVGyWWJsKxK0P0kx34fE',
         "y" : b64'xkezjFXvu8TmLmUXIPAC1ddbLgwCzRMm5mK8oiK5BBY'
       }
     }
   }

       Figure 3: Example AS response, including the RS's public key.

3.3.  The Resource Server Confirmation Claim

   If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which key it should
   use to authenticate towards the client, this specification defines




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   the "rs_cnf" claim, which MAY be used in the access token, with the
   same syntax and semantics as defined in for the "rs_cnf" parameter.

4.  Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint

4.1.  AS-to-RS Response

   This document defines the following additional parameters for an AS
   response to a request to the introspection endpoint:

   cnf
      OPTIONAL.  This field contains information about the proof-of-
      possession key that binds the client to the access token.  Values
      of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from
      section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].  See
      Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this
      parameter.


   rs_cnf
      OPTIONAL.  If the RS uses asymmetric keys to authenticate towards
      the client (e.g. with a DTLS-RPK handshake) and it has several
      such keys (e.g. for different elliptic curves), the AS can give
      the RS a hint using this parameter, as to which key it should use.
      Values of this parameter follow the syntax of the "cnf" claim from
      section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession].  See
      Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this
      parameter.

   Figure 4 shows an AS response to an introspection request including
   the "cnf" parameter to indicate the proof-of-possession key bound to
   the token and the "rs_cnf" parameter to indicate the key the RS is
   supposed to use to authenticate to the client.


















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   Header: Created Code=2.01)
   Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
   Payload:
   {
     "active" : true,
     "scope" : "read",
     "aud" : "tempSensor4711",
     "cnf" : {
       "COSE_Key" : {
         "kty" : "EC",
         "kid" : h'11',
         "crv" : "P-256",
         "x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
         "y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
       }
     },
     "rs_cnf" : {
       "COSE_Key" : {
         "kty" : "EC",
         "kid" : h'12',
         "crv" : "P-256",
         "x" : b64'vO5+qsFi+R5vMw9XcSEeIguLVGyWWJsKxK0P0kx34fE',
         "y" : b64'xkezjFXvu8TmLmUXIPAC1ddbLgwCzRMm5mK8oiK5BBY'
       }
     }
   }

                 Figure 4: Example introspection response.

5.  Confirmation Method Parameters

   The confirmation method parameters are used as follows:

   o  "req_cnf" in the access token request C -> AS, OPTIONAL to
      indicate the client's raw public key, or the key-identifier of a
      previously established key between C and RS that the client wishes
      to use for proof-of-possession of the access token.

   o  "cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL if using an
      asymmetric key or a key that the client requested via a key
      identifier in the request.  REQUIRED if the client didn't specify
      a "req_cnf" and symmetric keys are used.  Used to indicate the
      symmetric key generated by the AS for proof-of-possession of the
      access token.

   o  "cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, REQUIRED if the
      access token that was subject to introspection is a proof-of-




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      possession token, absent otherwise.  Indicates the proof-of-
      possession key bound to the access token.

   o  "rs_cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL to indicate the
      public key of the RS, if it uses one to authenticate itself to the
      client and the binding between key and RS identity is not
      established through other means.

   o  "rs_cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, OPTIONAL,
      contains the public key that the RS should use for authenticating
      itself to the client (e.g. if the RS has several different public
      keys, and there may be ambiguity as to which key to use).

   Note that the COSE_Key structure in a confirmation claim or parameter
   may contain an "alg" or "key_ops" parameter.  If such parameters are
   present, a client MUST NOT use a key that is incompatible with the
   profile or proof-of-possession algorithm according to those
   parameters.  An RS MUST reject a proof-of-possession using such a
   key.

   If an access token is issued for an audience that includes several
   RS, the "rs_cnf" parameter MUST NOT be used, since the client cannot
   determine for which RS the key applies.  This document recommends to
   specify a different endpoint that the client can use to acquire RS
   authentication keys in such cases.  The specification of such an
   endpoint is out of scope for this document.

6.  CBOR Mappings

   If CBOR is used, the new parameters and claims defined in this
   document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 5, using
   the given integer abbreviation for the map key.

       /----------+----------+-------------------------------------\
       | Name     | CBOR Key | Value Type | Usage                  |
       |----------+----------+-------------------------------------|
       | req_cnf  | TBD (4)  | map        | token request          |
       | cnf      | TBD (8)  | map        | token response         |
       | cnf      | TBD (8)  | map        | introspection response |
       | rs_cnf   | TBD (41) | map        | token response         |
       | rs_cnf   | TBD (41) | map        | introspection response |
       | rs_cnf   | TBD (41) | map        | CWT claim              |
       \----------+----------+------------+------------------------/

          Figure 5: CBOR mappings for new parameters and claims.






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7.  Security Considerations

   This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].  All
   security considerations from that document apply here as well.

8.  Privacy Considerations

   This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].  All
   privacy considerations from that document apply here as well.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  JSON Web Token Claims

   This specification registers the following new claim in the JSON Web
   Token (JWT) registry of JSON Web Token Claims
   [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]:

   o  Claim Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  Claim Description: public key used by RS to authenticate itself to
      the client.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 3.3 of [this document]

9.2.  CBOR Web Token Claims

   This specification registers the following new claim in the "CBOR Web
   Token (CWT) Claims" registry [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims].

   o  Claim Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  Claim Description: public key used by RS to authenticate itself to
      the client.
   o  JWT Claim Name: rs_cnf
   o  Claim Key: TBD (suggested: 41)
   o  Claim Value Type(s): map
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [this document]

9.3.  OAuth Parameter Registration

   This section registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
   Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]:

   o  Name: "req_cnf"
   o  Parameter Usage Location: token request
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 5 of [this document]




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   o  Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  Parameter Usage Location: token response
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 5 of [this document]

   o  Name: "cnf"
   o  Parameter Usage Location: token response
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 5 of [this document]

9.4.  OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration

   This section registers the following parameters in the OAuth Token
   Introspection Response registry [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse].

   o  Name: "cnf"
   o  Description: Key to prove the right to use a PoP token.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]

   o  Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  Description: public key used by RS to authenticate itself to the
      client.
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]

9.5.  OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registraton

   This section registers the following parameter mappings in the "OAuth
   Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry established in section 8.9. of
   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

   o  Name: "req_cnf"
   o  CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 4)
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document]

   o  Name: "cnf"
   o  CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 8)
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document]

   o  Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 41)
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document]





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9.6.  OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registration

   This section registers the following parameter mappings in the "OAuth
   Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings" registry established in
   section 8.11. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

   o  Name: "cnf"
   o  CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 8)
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]

   o  Name: "rs_cnf"
   o  CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 41)
   o  Change Controller: IESG
   o  Reference: Section 4.1 of [this document]

10.  Acknowledgments

   This document is a product of the ACE working group of the IETF.

   Ludwig Seitz worked on this document as part of the CelticNext
   projects CyberWI, and CRITISEC with funding from Vinnova.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession]
              Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
              Web Tokens (CWTs)", draft-ietf-ace-cwt-proof-of-
              possession-11 (work in progress), October 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
              Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
              H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
              Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
              Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-27
              (work in progress), November 2019.

   [IANA.CborWebTokenClaims]
              IANA, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml#claims-
              registry>.

   [IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#claims>.



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   [IANA.OAuthParameters]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-
              parameters.xhtml#parameters>.

   [IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]
              IANA, "OAuth Token Introspection Response",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-
              parameters.xhtml#token-introspection-response>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution]
              Bradley, J., Hunt, P., Jones, M., Tschofenig, H., and M.
              Meszaros, "OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization
              Server to Client Key Distribution", draft-ietf-oauth-pop-
              key-distribution-07 (work in progress), March 2019.

   [RFC7252]  Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.

Appendix A.  Overlap with OAuth work

   This document overlaps with draft work from OAuth on proof-of-
   possesion keys [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution].

   The OAuth draft specifies the use of "req_cnf" and "cnf" for
   requesting proof-of-possession tokens and indicating the key that the
   AS has selected.  It it was initially deemed that the work at OAuth
   had been discontinued and therefore equivalent functionality was
   defined here.  Work in OAuth has since resumed, but it is lagging
   behind the planned milestones of the ACE working group.  We have
   therefore split this work out into a separate document so that it can



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   later be updated or obsoleted to align it with the final result of
   the OAuth work, without affecting [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

Author's Address

   Ludwig Seitz
   Combitech
   Djaeknegatan 31
   Malmoe  211 35
   Sweden

   Email: ludwig.seitz@combitech.se







































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