Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft D. Hancock
Intended status: Standards Track Comcast
Expires: April 25, 2019 M. Barnes
iconectiv
J. Peterson
Neustar Inc.
October 22, 2018
TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token
draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-01
Abstract
This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and
authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to
support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined
by STI certificates.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 8
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general
method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to
control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the
Certification Authority.
This document addresses the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] which
identifies the need for Internet credentials that can attest
authority for the originator of VoIP calls in order to detect
impersonation, which is currently an enabler for common attacks
associated with illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting.
These credentials are used to sign PASSporTs [RFC8225], which can be
carried in using protocols such as SIP [RFC8224]. Currently, the
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only defined credentials for this purpose are the certificates
specified in [RFC8226].
[RFC8226] describes certificate extensions suitable for associating
telephone numbers and service provider codes with certificates.
Specifically, the TN Authorization List defined in [RFC8226]
Section 9, defines the ability to associate a STI certificate with a
specific set of Service Provider Codes (SPCs), Telephone Numbers
(TNs), or Telephone Number ranges (TN ranges). Typically, these
identifiers have been assigned to a Communications Service Provider
(CSP) that is authorized to use a set of telephone numbers or
telephone number ranges in association with a Service Provider Code
as defined in [RFC8226]. The SPC is a unique code or string managed
by a national regulatory body that has the authority over those code-
to-CSP associations.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList
In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an
ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certification
Authority. The new-order request contains an identifier field that
specifies the identifier objects the order corresponds to. This
draft defines a new type of identifier object called TNAuthList. A
TNAuthList identifier contains the identity information to be
populated in the TN Authorization List of the new certificate. For
the TNAuthList identifier, the new-order request MUST include a type
set to the string "TNAuthList". The value of the TNAuthList
identifier MUST be set to the details of the TNAuthList requested.
The format of the string that represents the TNAuthList MUST be
constructed as a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the TN Authorization
List certificate extension ASN.1 object. The TN Authorization List
certificate extension ASN.1 syntax is defined in [RFC8226] section 9.
An example of an ACME order object "identifiers" field containing a
TNAuthList certificate would look as follows,
"identifiers": [{"type":"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}]
where the "value" object string represents the arbitrary length
base64 encoded string.
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A full new-order request would look as follows,
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],
"notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z"
}),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
}
On receiving a valid new-order request, the CA creates an
authorization object containing the challenge that the ACME client
must satisfy to demonstrate authority for the identifiers specified
by the new order (in this case, the TNAuthList identifier). The CA
adds the authorization object URL to the "authorizations" field of
the order object, and returns the order object to the ACME client in
the body of a 201 (Created) response.
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw
Location: https://example.com/acme/order/1234
{
"status": "pending",
"expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",
"notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z",
"identifiers":[{"type:"TNAuthList",
"value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],
"authorizations": [
"https://example.com/acme/authz/1234"
],
"finalize": "https://example.com/acme/order/1234/finalize"
}
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4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization
On receiving the new-order response, the ACME client queries the
referenced authorization object to obtain the challenges for the
identifier contained in the new-order request as shown in the
following example request and response.
POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": " https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/authz/1234",
}),
"payload": "",
"signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"
}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"
{
"status": "pending",
"expires": "2018-03-03T14:09:00Z",
"identifier": {
"type:"TNAuthList",
"value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="
},
"challenges": [
{
"type": "tkauth-01",
"tkauth-type": "ATC",
"token-authority": "https://authority.example.org/authz",
"url": "https://boulder.example.com/authz/asdf/0"
"token": "IlirfxKKXAsHtmzK29Pj8A"
}
]
}
When processing a certificate order containing an identifier of type
"TNAuthList", a CA MUST use the Authority Token challenge mechanism
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defined in [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] to verify that the
requesting ACME client has authenticated and authorized control over
the requested resources represented by the "TNAuthList" value.
The challenge "token-authority" parameter is optional and only used
in cases where the VoIP telephone network requires the CA to identify
the Token Authority. This is currently not the case for the SHAKEN
[ATIS-1000080] certificate framework governance, but may be used by
other frameworks. If a "token-authority" parameter is present, then
the ACME client MAY use the "token-authority" value to identify the
URL representing the Token Authority that will provide the TNAuthList
Authority Token response to the challenge. If the "token-authority"
parameter is not present, then the ACME client MUST identify the
Token Authority based on locally configured information or local
policies.
The ACME client MUST respond to the challenge by posting the
TNAuthList Authority Token to the challenge URL identified in the
returned ACME authorization object, an example of which follows.
POST /acme/authz/asdf/0 HTTP/1.1
Host: boulder.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",
"url": "https://boulder.example.com/acme/authz/asdf/0"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"ATC": "DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE"
}),
"signature": "9cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjz...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYQ"
}
The specifics of the construction of the TNAuthList specific "ATC"
token is defined in the next section.
5. TNAuthList Authority Token
The Telephone Number Authority List Authority Token (TNAuthList
Authority Token) is an extension of the ACME Authority Token defined
in [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token].
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The TNAuthList Authority Token Protected header MUST comply with the
Authority Token Protected header as defined in
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token].
The TNAuthList Authority Token Payload MUST include the mandatory
claims and MAY include the optional claims defined for the Authority
Token detailed in the next subsections.
5.1. "iss" claim
The "iss" claim is an optional claim. It can be used as a URL
identifying the Token Authority that issued the TNAuthList Authority
Token beyond the "x5u" Header claim that identifies the location of
the certificate of the Token Authority used to validate the
TNAuthList Authority Token.
5.2. "exp" claim
The "exp" claim contains the DateTime value of the ending date and
time that the TNAuthList Authority Token expires.
5.3. "jti" claim
The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList
Authority Token transaction.
5.4. "atc" claim
The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this
document. It contains an array of three elements; a string set to
"TNAuthList", the TNAuthList identifier "value" string, and a
fingerprint.
The "fingerprint" value is a fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949] of
the ACME account credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is
a secure one-way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form
of the public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create
the account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of
the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this
specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value is
represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated
by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash function.
An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows,
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{ "typ":"JWT",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert
}
{
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"exp":1300819380,
"jti":"id6098364921",
"atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:
9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"]
}
Similar to the definition for the TNAuthList identifier "value"
string, the identifier value in the "atc" claim must contain the
base64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate extension
ASN.1 object.
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority
The specifics of how the token is acquired from the authority is out
of the scope of this document
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities
When the Token Authority creates the TnAuthList Authority Token, it
is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the
information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents
the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized
to represent.
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token
Upon receiving a response to the challenge, the ACME server MUST
perform the following steps to determine the validity of the
response.
o Verify that the token contained in the Payload "ATC" field is an
TNAuthList Authority Token.
o Verify the TNAuthList Authority Token signature using the public
key of the certificate referenced by the token's "x5u" parameter.
o Verify that "atc" claim contains an identifier type of
"TNAuthList",
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o Verify that the "atc" claim contains the equivalent base64 encoded
TNAuthList certificate extension string value as the Identifier
specified in the original challenge.
o Verify that the remaining claims are valid (e.g., verify that
token has not expired)
o Verify that the "atc" claim "fingerprint" is valid
If all steps in the token validation process pass, then the CA MUST
set the challenge object "status" to "valid". If any step of the
validation process fails, the "status" in the challenge object MUST
be set to "invalid".
7. Usage Considerations
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values
There are many scenarios and reasons to have various combinations of
SPCs, TNs, and TN Ranges. [RFC8226] has provided a somewhat
unbounded set of combinations. It's possible that a complex non-
contiguous set of telephone numbers are being managed by a CSP. Best
practice may be simply to split a set of non-contiguous numbers under
management into multiple STI certificates to represent the various
contiguous parts of the greater non-contiguous set of TNs,
particularly if length of the set of values in identifier object
grows to be too large.
8. Security Considerations
TBD
9. IANA Considerations
This document requests the addition of a new identifier object type
that can be present in the identifier field of the ACME authorization
object defined in [I-D.ietf-acme-acme].
+------------+-----------+
| Label | Reference |
+------------+-----------+
| TNAuthList | RFCThis |
+------------+-----------+
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10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable
contributions to this document.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-16 (work in progress),
October 2018.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]
Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme-
authority-token-00 (work in progress), July 2018.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
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11.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017.
[ATIS-1000080]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) Governance
Model and Certificate Management
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000080.pdf>", July 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt
Comcast
One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
David Hancock
Comcast
Email: davidhancock.ietf@gmail.com
Mary Barnes
iconectiv
Email: mary.ietf.barnes@gmail.com
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Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
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