AFT Working Group Marc VanHeyningen
draft-ietf-aft-socks-pro-v5-03 Aventail Corp.
Expires in six months 22 June 1998
SOCKS Protocol Version 5
Status of this Memo
This document is a submission to the IETF Authenticated Firewall
Traversal (AFT) Working Group. Comments are solicited and should be
addressed to the working group mailing list (aft@socks.nec.com) or to
the editor.
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
and its working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet Drafts.
Internet-Drafts draft documents are valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check
the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts
Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net
(Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au
(Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu
(US West Coast).
Distribution of this memo is unlimited
Acknowledgments
This memo describes a protocol that is an evolution of the previous
version of the protocol, version 4[SOCKS]. This new protocol stems
from active discussions and prototype implementations. The key
contributors are:
o Marcus Leech: Bell-Northern Research
o David Koblas: Independent Consultant
o Ying-Da Lee: NEC Systems Laboratory
o LaMont Jones: Hewlett-Packard Company
o Ron Kuris: Unify Corporation
o Matt Ganis: International Business Machines
o David Blob: NEC USA
o Wei Lu: NEC USA.
o William Perry: Aventail
o Dave Chouinard: Intel
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 1]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
1. Introduction
The use of network firewalls, systems that effectively isolate an
organizations internal network structure from an exterior network,
such as the INTERNET is becoming increasingly popular. These
firewall systems typically act as application-layer gateways between
networks, usually offering controlled TELNET, FTP, and SMTP access.
With the emergence of more sophisticated application layer protocols
designed to facilitate global information discovery, there exists a
need to provide a general framework for these protocols to
transparently and securely traverse a firewall.
There exists, also, a need for strong authentication of such
traversal in as fine-grained a manner as is practical. This
requirement stems from the realization that client-server
relationships emerge between the networks of various organizations,
and that such relationships need to be controlled and often strongly
authenticated.
The protocol described here is designed to provide a framework for
client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to
conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall.
The protocol is conceptually a "shim-layer" between the application
layer and the transport layer, and as such does not provide network-
layer gateway services, such as forwarding of ICMP messages.
2. Existing practice
There currently exists a protocol, SOCKS Version 4, that provides for
unsecured firewall traversal for TCP-based client-server
applications, including TELNET, FTP and the popular information-
discovery protocols such as HTTP, WAIS and GOPHER.
This new protocol extends the SOCKS Version 4 model to include UDP,
and extends the framework to include provisions for generalized
strong authentication schemes, and extends the addressing scheme to
encompass domain-name and V6 IP addresses.
The implementation of the SOCKS protocol typically involves the
recompilation or relinking of TCP-based client applications to use
the appropriate encapsulation routines in the SOCKS library.
Note:
Unless otherwise noted, the decimal numbers appearing in packet-
format diagrams represent the length of the corresponding field, in
octets. Where a given octet must take on a specific value, the
syntax X'hh' is used to denote the value of the single octet in that
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 2]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
field. When the word 'Variable' is used, it indicates that the
corresponding field has a variable length defined either by an
associated (one or two octet) length field, or by a data type field.
3. Procedure for TCP-based clients
When a TCP-based client wishes to establish a connection to an object
that is reachable only via a firewall (such determination is left up
to the implementation), it must open a TCP connection to the
appropriate SOCKS port on the SOCKS server system. The SOCKS service
is conventionally located on TCP port 1080. If the connection
request succeeds, the client enters a negotiation for the
authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen
method, then sends a relay request. The SOCKS server evaluates the
request, and either establishes the appropriate connection or denies
it.
The client connects to the server, and sends a version
identifier/method selection message:
+----+----------+----------+
|VER | NMETHODS | METHODS |
+----+----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 to 255 |
+----+----------+----------+
The VER field is set to X'05' for this version of the protocol. The
NMETHODS field contains the number of method identifier octets that
appear in the METHODS field.
The server selects from one of the methods given in METHODS, and
sends a METHOD selection message:
+----+--------+
|VER | METHOD |
+----+--------+
| 1 | 1 |
+----+--------+
If the selected METHOD is X'FF', none of the methods listed by the
client are acceptable, and the client MUST close the connection.
The values currently defined for METHOD are:
o X'00' NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED
o X'01' GSSAPI
o X'02' USERNAME/PASSWORD
o X'03' CHAP
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 3]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
o X'04' to X'7F' IANA ASSIGNED
o X'80' to X'FE' RESERVED FOR PRIVATE METHODS
o X'FF' NO ACCEPTABLE METHODS
The client and server then enter a method-specific sub-negotiation.
Descriptions of the method-dependent sub-negotiations appear in
separate memos.
Developers of new METHOD support for this protocol should contact
IANA for a METHOD number. The ASSIGNED NUMBERS document should be
referred to for a current list of METHOD numbers and their
corresponding protocols.
Compliant implementations MUST support NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED and
CHAP, SHOULD support USERNAME/PASSWORD and MAY support GSSAPI
authentication methods.
As with other TCP application data, out of band data is normally
proxied to the SOCKS server as out of band data; note that
implementations may be limited to handling a single byte of such data
at a time. Authentication methods which define some content
encapsulation SHOULD define a method-specific mechanism for proxying
out of band data.
4. Requests
Once the method-dependent subnegotiation has completed, the client
sends the request details. If the negotiated method includes
encapsulation for purposes of integrity checking and/or
confidentiality, these requests MUST be encapsulated in the method-
dependent encapsulation.
The SOCKS request is formed as follows:
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
|VER | CMD | FLAG | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable | 2 |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
Where:
o VER protocol version: X'05'
o CMD
o CONNECT X'01'
o BIND X'02'
o UDP ASSOCIATE X'03'
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 4]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
o X'04' to X'7F' IANA ASSIGNED
o X'80' to X'FF' RESERVED FOR PRIVATE METHODS
o FLAG command dependent flag (defaults to X'00')
o ATYP address type of following address
o IP V4 address: X'01'
o DOMAINNAME: X'03'
o IP V6 address: X'04'
o DST.ADDR desired destination address
o DST.PORT desired destination port in network octet
order
The SOCKS server will typically evaluate the request based on
source and destination addresses, and return one or more reply
messages, as appropriate for the request type.
5. Addressing
In an address field (DST.ADDR, BND.ADDR), the ATYP field specifies
the type of address contained within the field:
o X'01'
The address is a version-4 IP address, with a length of 4 octets.
o X'03'
The address field contains a fully-qualified domain name. The first
octet of the address field contains the number of octets of name that
follow, there is no terminating NUL octet.
o X'04'
The address is a version-6 IP address, with a length of 16 octets.
6. Replies
The SOCKS request information is sent by the client as soon as it has
established a connection to the SOCKS server, and completed the
authentication negotiations. The server evaluates the request, and
returns a reply formed as follows:
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
|VER | REP | FLAG | ATYP | BND.ADDR | BND.PORT |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable | 2 |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+----------+
Where:
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 5]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
o VER protocol version: X'05'
o REP Reply field:
o X'00' succeeded
o X'01' general SOCKS server failure
o X'02' connection not allowed by ruleset
o X'03' Network unreachable
o X'04' Host unreachable
o X'05' Connection refused
o X'06' TTL expired
o X'07' Command not supported
o X'08' Address type not supported
o X'09' Invalid address
o X'0A' to X'FF' unassigned
o FLAG command dependent flag
o ATYP address type of following address
o IP V4 address: X'01'
o DOMAINNAME: X'03'
o IP V6 address: X'04'
o BND.ADDR server bound address
o BND.PORT server bound port in network octet order
If the chosen method includes encapsulation for purposes of
authentication, integrity and/or confidentiality, the replies are
encapsulated in the method-dependent encapsulation.
Reply Processing
When a reply indicates a failure (REP value other than X'00',) the
SOCKS server MUST terminate the TCP connection shortly after sending
the reply. This must be no more than 10 seconds after detecting the
condition that caused a failure.
If the reply code indicates a success, the client may now start
passing data. If the selected authentication method supports
encapsulation for the purposes of integrity, authentication and/or
confidentiality, the data are encapsulated using the method-dependent
encapsulation. Similarly, when data arrives at the SOCKS server for
the client, the server MUST encapsulate the data as appropriate for
the authentication method in use.
7. TCP Procedure
CONNECT
In the reply to a CONNECT, BND.PORT contains the port number that the
server assigned to connect to the target host, and BND.ADDR contains
the associated IP address. The supplied BND.ADDR is often different
from the IP address that the client uses to reach the SOCKS server,
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 6]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
since such servers are often multi-homed. It is expected that the
SOCKS server will use DST.ADDR and DST.PORT, and the client-side
source address and port in evaluating the CONNECT request.
BIND
The BIND request is used in protocols which require the client to
accept connections from the server. FTP is a well-known example,
which uses the primary client-to-server connection for commands and
status reports, but may use a server-to-client connection for
transferring data on demand (e.g. LS, GET, PUT).
It is expected that the client side of an application protocol will
use the BIND request only to establish secondary connections after a
primary connection is established using CONNECT. DST.ADDR must be
the address of the primary connection's destination. DST.PORT should
be the requested port (or 0 for a random, unused port). It is
expected that a SOCKS server will use DST.ADDR and DST.PORT in
evaluating the BIND request.
Two replies are sent from the SOCKS server to the client during a
BIND operation. The first is sent after the server creates and binds
a new socket. The BND.PORT field contains the port number that the
SOCKS server assigned to listen for an incoming connection. The
BND.ADDR field contains the associated IP address. The client will
typically use these pieces of information to notify (via the primary
or control connection) the application server of the rendezvous
address. The second reply occurs only after the anticipated incoming
connection succeeds or fails.
In the second reply, the BND.PORT and BND.ADDR fields contain the
address and port number of the connecting host.
8. UDP procedure
UDP ASSOCIATE requests
The UDP ASSOCIATE request is used to establish an association within
the UDP relay process to handle UDP datagrams. The DST.ADDR and
DST.PORT fields contain the address and port that the client expects
to use to send UDP datagrams on for the association. The server MAY
use this information to limit access to the association. If the
client is not in possesion of the information at the time of the UDP
ASSOCIATE, the client MUST use address type X'01' with a port number
and address of all zeros.
A UDP association terminates when the TCP connection that the UDP
ASSOCIATE request arrived on terminates.
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 7]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
Flag bits in the request and reply are defined as follows:
INTERFACE REQUEST X'01'
USECLIENTSPORT X'04'
If the USECLIENTSPORT bit is set in the flag field of the request, the
server SHOULD interact with the application server using the same port
the client used in the request, and set the USECLIENTSPORT bit in the
flag field of the reply to acknowledge having done so. If no port
number was specified in the UDP ASSOCIATE request, this flag is
meaningless and MUST not be used.
If the INTERFACE REQUEST bit is set in the flag field of the request,
the server may indicate its support for this extension by setting this
bit in the reply. If both client and server support this feature, the
client SHOULD send INTERFACE DATA subcommands, described below, during
the UDP association.
In the reply to a UDP ASSOCIATE request, the BND.PORT and BND.ADDR
fields indicate the port number/address where the client MUST send UDP
request messages to be relayed.
UDP Control Channel
A UDP association terminates when the TCP connection that the UDP
ASSOCIATE request arrived on terminates. If the flag negotiation
indicated mutual support for it, the client SHOULD send INTERFACE DATA
subcommands to learn the external address information for the UDP
assocaiation with respect to a particular destination. The server, in
turn, MAY use this information to limit access to the association to
those destination addresses for which it has received INTERFACE DATA
queries; multiple INTERFACE DATA commands are permitted, and have a
cumulative effect.
Such requests are formatted as follows:
+----+-----+------+------+----------+------+
|RSV | SUB | FLAG | ATYP | ADDR | PORT |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+------+
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Variable | 2 |
+----+-----+------+------+----------+------+
The fields in the CONTROL CHANNEL packet are:
o RSV Reserved X'00'
o SUB Subcommand
o INTERFACE DATA: X'01'
o FLAG A subcommand dependent flag (normally X'00')
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 8]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
o ATYP address type of following addresses:
o IP V4 address: X'01'
o DOMAINNAME: X'03'
o IP V6 address: X'04'
o ADDR destination address information
o PORT destination port information
Replies to INTERFACE DATA commands are structured the same way as
ordinary SOCKS replies, as per section 6.
UDP packet structure
A UDP-based client MUST send its datagrams to the UDP relay server at
the UDP port indicated by BND.PORT in the reply to the UDP ASSOCIATE
request. If the selected authentication method provides
encapsulation for the purposes of authenticity, integrity, and/or
confidentiality, the datagram MUST be encapsulated using the
appropriate encapsulation. Each UDP datagram carries a UDP request
header with it:
+------+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
| FLAG | FRAG | ATYP | DST.ADDR | DST.PORT | DATA |
+------+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
| 2 | 1 | 1 | Variable | 2 | Variable |
+------+------+------+----------+----------+----------+
The fields in the UDP request header are:
o FLAG Reserved X'0000'
o FRAG Current fragment number
o ATYP address type of following addresses:
o IP V4 address: X'01'
o DOMAINNAME: X'03'
o IP V6 address: X'04'
o DST.ADDR desired destination address
o DST.PORT desired destination port
o DATA user data
FRAG is currently unused, and reserved for future work to deal with
fragmentation; it must be set to X'00'.
When a UDP relay server decides to relay a UDP datagram, it does so
silently, without any notification to the requesting client.
Similarly, it will drop datagrams it cannot or will not relay. When
a UDP relay server receives a reply datagram from a remote host, it
MUST encapsulate that datagram using the above UDP request header,
and any authentication-method-dependent encapsulation.
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 9]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
The UDP relay server MUST acquire from the SOCKS server the expected
IP address of the client that will send datagrams to the BND.PORT
given in the reply to UDP ASSOCIATE. It MUST drop any datagrams
arriving from any source IP address other than the one recorded for
the particular association.
The programming interface for a SOCKS-aware UDP MUST report an
available buffer space for UDP datagrams that is smaller than the
actual space provided by the operating system:
o if ATYP is X'01' - 10+method_dependent octets smaller
o if ATYP is X'03' - 262+method_dependent octets smaller
o if ATYP is X'04' - 20+method_dependent octets smaller
9. Security Considerations
This document describes a protocol for the application-layer
traversal of IP network firewalls. The security of such traversal is
highly dependent on the particular authentication and encapsulation
methods provided in a particular implementation, and selected during
negotiation between SOCKS client and SOCKS server.
Careful consideration should be given by the administrator to the
selection of authentication methods.
10. References
[CHAP] VanHeyningen, M., "Challenge-Handshake Authentication
Protocol for SOCKS V5," work in progress.
[RFC 1928] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R. Koblas, D., &
Jones, L., "SOCKS Protocol V5," April 1996.
[RFC 1929] Leech, M., "Username/Password Authentication for SOCKS V5,"
March 1996.
[RFC 1961] McMahon, P., "GSS-API Authentication Method for SOCKS
Version 5," June 1996.
[SOCKS] Koblas, D., "SOCKS", Proceedings: 1992 Usenix Security
Symposium.
Author's Address
Marc VanHeyningen
Aventail Corporation
808 Howell Streeet; Suite 200
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 10]
INTERNET-DRAFT SOCKS Protocol Version 5 22 June 1998
Seattle, WA 98101
Phone: +1 (206) 215-1111
Email: marcvh@aventail.com
VanHeyningen Expires January 1999 [Page 11]
