Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (cBRSKI)

6.1. DTLS Connection

A DTLS connection is established between the Pledge and the Registrar, similar to the TLS connection described in Section 5.1 of [RFC8995]. This may occur via a Join Proxy as described in Section 6.2. Regardless of the Join Proxy presence or particular mechanism used, the DTLS connection should operate identically. The cBRSKI and EST-coaps requests and responses for onboarding are carried over this DTLS connection.¶

6.2. cBRSKI Join Proxy

[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy] specifies the details for a stateful and stateless constrained Join Proxy which is equivalent to the Proxy defined in [RFC8995], Section 4. See also Section 10 for more details on discovery of a Join Proxy by a Pledge, and discovery of a Registrar by a Join Proxy.¶

6.3. Request URIs, Resource Discovery and Content Formats

cBRSKI operates using CoAP over DTLS, with request URIs using the coaps scheme. The Pledge operates in CoAP client role. To keep the protocol messages small the EST-coaps and cBRSKI request URIs are shorter than the respective EST and BRSKI URIs.¶

During the BRSKI onboarding on an IPv6 network these request URIs have the following form:¶

  coaps://[<link-local-ipv6>]:<port>/.well-known/brski/<short-name>
  coaps://[<link-local-ipv6>]:<port>/.well-known/est/<short-name>

where <link-local-ipv6> is the discovered link-local IPv6 address of a Join Proxy, and <port> is the discovered port of the Join Proxy that is used to offer the BRSKI proxy functionality.¶

<short-name> is the short resource name for the cBRSKI and EST-coaps resources. For EST-coaps, Section 5.1 of [RFC9148] defines the CoAP <short-name> resource names. For cBRSKI, this document defines the short resource names based on the [RFC8995] long HTTP resource names. See Table 1 for a summary of these resource names.¶

Section 11 details how the Pledge discovers a Join Proxy link-local address and port in different deployment scenarios.¶

The request URI formats defined above enable the Pledge to perform onboarding/enrollment without requiring to perform any discovery of the available onboarding options, voucher formats, BRSKI/EST resources, enrollment protocols, and so on. This is helpful for a majority of constrained Pledges that would support only a single set of options. However, for Pledges that do support multiple options, sending CoAP discovery queries to the Registrar is supported as defined in Section 14.¶

Because a Pledge only has indirect access to the Registrar via a single port on the Join Proxy, the Registrar MUST host all BRSKI/EST-coaps resources on the same (UDP) server IP address and port. This is the address and port where a Join Proxy would relay DTLS records from the Pledge to.¶

Although the request URI templates include IP address, scheme and port, in practice the CoAP request sent over the secure DTLS connection only encodes the request URI. For example, a Pledge that skips resource discovery operations just sends the initial CoAP voucher request as follows:¶

  REQ: POST /.well-known/brski/rv
    Content-Format: 836
    Payload       : (COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request, PVR)

Note that only Content-Format 836 ("application/voucher+cose") is defined in this document for the payload sent to the voucher request resource (/rv). Content-Format 836 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource and it MAY support additional formats. The Pledge MAY also indicate in the request the desired format of the (voucher) response, using the Accept Option. An example of using this option in the request is as follows:¶

  REQ: POST /.well-known/brski/rv
    Content-Format: 836
    Accept        : 836
    Payload       : (COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request, PVR)

If the Accept Option is omitted in the request, the response format follows from the request payload format (which is 836).¶

Note that this specification allows for voucher+cose format requests and vouchers to be transmitted over HTTPS, as well as for voucher-cms+json and other formats yet to be defined over CoAP. The burden for this flexibility is placed upon the Registrar. A Pledge on constrained hardware is expected to support a single format only.¶

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least format 836) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to support all formats that the Pledge supports.¶

6.4. CoAP Responses

[RFC8995], Section 5 defines a number of HTTP response codes that the Registrar is to return when certain conditions occur.¶

The 401, 403, 404, 406 and 415 response codes map directly to CoAP codes 4.01, 4.03, 4.04, 4.06 and 4.15.¶

The 202 Retry process which occurs in the voucher request, is to be handled in the same way as the Section 5.7 of [RFC9148] process for Delayed Responses.¶

6.5. Extensions to EST-coaps

This section defines extensions to EST-coaps for Pledges (during initial onboarding), EST-coaps clients (after initial onboarding) and Registrars (that implement an EST-coaps server). Note that a device that is already onboarded is not called "Pledge" in this section: it now acts in the role of an EST-coaps client.¶

[ <domain sub-CA cert (2)> , <domain CA cert (1)> ]

[ 287, h'3082' ... 'd713', 287, h'3082' ... 'a034' ]

6.6. Registrar Extensions

The Content-Format 60 ("application/cbor") MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and /es resources.¶

Content-Format 836 ("application/voucher+cose") MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource for CoAP POST requests, both as request payload and as response payload.¶

Content-Format 287 ("application/pkix-cert") MUST be supported by the Registrar as a response payload for the /sen and /sren resources.¶

When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crts) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value 287 ("application/pkix-cert") it MUST return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual CA authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. An exception to this rule is when the domain has been configured to operate with multiple CA trust anchors only: then the Registrar returns a 4.06 Not Acceptable error to signal to the client that it needs to request another Content Format that supports retrieval of multiple CA certificates.¶

7.1. Protocol and Formats

Section 5.4 of [RFC8995] describes a connection between the Registrar and the MASA as being a normal TLS connection using HTTPS. This document does not change that. The Registrar MUST use the format "application/voucher+cose" in its voucher request to MASA, when the Pledge uses this format in its request to the Registrar.¶

The MASA only needs to support formats for which it has constructed Pledges that use that format.¶

The Registrar MUST use the same format for the RVR as the Pledge used for its PVR. The Registrar indicates the voucher format it wants to receive from MASA using the HTTP Accept header. This format MUST be the same as the format of the PVR, so that the Pledge can parse it.¶

At the moment of writing the creation of coaps based MASAs is deemed unrealistic. The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection can be the subject of another document. Some consideration was made to specify CoAP support for consistency, but:¶

• the Registrar is not expected to be so constrained that it cannot support HTTPS client connections.¶

• the technology and experience to build Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience doing the same for CoAP is much less common.¶

• a Registrar is likely to provide onboarding services to both constrained and non-constrained devices. Such a Registrar would need to speak HTTPS anyway.¶

• a manufacturer is likely to offer both constrained and non-constrained devices, so there may in practice be no situation in which the MASA could be CoAP-only. Additionally, as the MASA is intended to be a function that can easily be oursourced to a third-party service provider, reducing the complexity would also seem to reduce the cost of that function.¶

• security-related considerations: see Section 15.6.¶

7.2. Registrar Voucher Request

If the PVR contains a proximity assertion, the Registrar MUST propagate this assertion into the RVR by including the "assertion" field with the value "proximity". This conforms to the example in Section 3.3 of [RFC8995] of carrying the assertion forward.¶

7.3. MASA and the Server Name Indicator (SNI)

A TLS/HTTPS connection is established between the Registrar and MASA.¶

Section 5.4 of [RFC8995] explains this process, and there are no externally visible changes. A MASA that supports the unconstrained voucher formats should be able to support constrained voucher formats equally well.¶

There is no requirement that a single MASA be used for both constrained and unconstrained voucher requests: the choice of MASA is determined by the id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016 extension contained in the IDevID.¶

The Registrar MUST do DNS-ID checks ([RFC9525]) on the contents of the certificate provided by the MASA.¶

In constrast to the Pledge/Registrar situation, the Registrar always knows the name of the MASA, and MUST always include an [RFC6066] Server Name Indicator. The SNI is optional in TLS1.2, but common. The SNI it considered mandatory with TLS1.3.¶

The presence of the SNI is needed by the MASA, in order for the MASA's server to host multiple tenants (for different customers).¶

7.4. Registrar Client Certificate Requirement

The Registrar SHOULD use a TLS Client Certificate to authenticate to the MASA per Section 5.4.1 of [RFC8995]. If the certificate that the Registrar uses is marked as a id-kp-cmcRA certificate, via Extended Key Usage, then it MUST also have the id-kp-clientAuth EKU attribute set.¶

In summary for typical Registrar use, where a single Registrar certificate is used, then the certificate MUST have EKU of: id-kp-cmcRA, id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-clientAuth.¶

8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding

Section 5.5 of [RFC8995] describes BRSKI policies for selection of the owner identity. It indicates some of the flexibility that is possible for the Registrar, and recommends the Registrar to include only certificates in the voucher request (CMS) signing structure that participate in the certificate chain that is to be pinned.¶

The MASA is expected to evaluate the certificates included by the Registrar in its voucher request, forming them into a chain with the Registrar's (signing) identity on one end. Then, it pins a certificate selected from the chain. For instance, for a domain with a two-level certification authority (see Figure 1), where the voucher request has been signed by "Registrar", its signing structure includes two additional CA certificates. The arrows in the figure indicate the issuing of a certificate, i.e. author of (1) issued (2) and author of (2) issued (3).¶

 .------------------.
 |  domain CA (1)   |
 |  trust anchor    |
 '------------------'
           |
           v
    .------------.
    | domain (2) |
    | Sub-CA     |
    '------------'
           |
           |
           v
  .----------------.
  |   domain       |
  | Registrar (3)  |
  | EE certificate |
  '----------------'

When the Registrar is using a COSE-signed constrained voucher request towards MASA, instead of a regular CMS-signed voucher request, the COSE_Sign1 object contains a protected and an unprotected header. The Registrar MUST place all the certificates needed to validate the signature chain from the Registrar on the RVR in an "x5bag" attribute in the unprotected header as defined in [RFC9360].¶

The "x5bag" attribute is very important as it provides the required signals from the Registrar to control what identity is pinned in the resulting voucher. This is explained in the next section.¶

8.2. MASA Pinning Policy

The MASA, having assembled and verified the chain in the signing structure of the voucher request needs to select a certificate to pin. (For the case that only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate is included, only this certificate can be selected and this section does not apply.) The BRSKI policy for pinning by the MASA as described in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC8995] leaves much flexibility to the manufacturer.¶

The present document adds the following rules to the MASA pinning policy to reduce the network load on the constrained network side:¶

1. for a voucher containing a nonce, it SHOULD select the most specific (lowest-level) CA certificate in the chain.¶

2. for a nonceless voucher, it SHOULD select the least-specific (highest-level) CA certificate in the chain that is allowed under the MASA's policy for this specific domain.¶

The rationale for 1. is that in case of a voucher with nonce, the voucher is valid only in scope of the present DTLS connection between Pledge and Registrar anyway, so there is no benefit to pin a higher-level CA. By pinning the most specific CA the constrained Pledge can validate its DTLS connection using less crypto operations. The rationale for pinning a CA instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate directly is based on the following benefit on constrained networks: the pinned certificate in the voucher can in common cases be re-used as a Domain CA trust anchor during the EST enrollment and during the operational phase that follows after EST enrollment, as explained in Section 6.5.1.¶

The rationale for 2. follows from the flexible BRSKI trust model for, and purpose of, nonceless vouchers (Sections 5.5.* and 7.4.1 of [RFC8995]).¶

Refering to Figure 1 of a domain with a two-level certification authority, the most specific CA ("Sub-CA") is the identity that is pinned by MASA in a nonced voucher. A Registrar that wished to have only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate pinned would omit the "domain CA" and "Sub-CA" certificates from the voucher request.¶

In case of a nonceless voucher, depending on the trust level, the MASA pins the "Registrar" certificate (low trust in customer), or the "Sub-CA" certificate (in case of medium trust, implying that any Registrar of that sub-domain is acceptable), or even the "domain CA" certificate (in case of high trust in the customer, and possibly a pre-agreed need of the customer to obtain flexible long-lived vouchers).¶

8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys

Specifically for the most-constrained use cases, the pinning of the raw public key (RPK) of the Registrar is also supported in the constrained voucher, instead of a PKIX certificate. This is used by the RPK variant of cBRSKI described in Section 13, but it can also be used in the default cBRSKI flow as a means to reduce voucher size.¶

For both cases, if an RPK is pinned, it MUST be the RPK of the Registrar.¶

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support the RPK variant only, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the RPK of the Registrar in either the "pinned-domain-pubk" or "pinned-domain-pubk-sha256" field of the voucher data. This is described in more detail in [RFC8366bis] and Section 13.¶

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher normally pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain as specified in Section 8.2. However, if the Pledge is known by MASA to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar in the voucher (and not the CA), then MASA SHOULD pin the RPK (RPK3 in Figure 2) of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate to save space in the voucher.¶

                                          .-------------.
 .------------.                           | private     |
 | pub-CA (1) |                           | root-CA (1) |
 '------------'                           '-------------'
        |                                        |
        v             .-------------.            v
 .------------.       | private     |     .------------.
 | sub-CA (2) |       | root-CA (1) |     | sub-CA (2) |
 '------------'       '-------------'     '------------'
        |                    |                   |
        v                    v                   v
.--------------.     .--------------.     .--------------.
| Registrar(3) |     | Registrar(3) |     | Registrar(3) |
|    RPK3      |     |    RPK3      |     |    RPK3      |
'--------------'     '--------------'     '--------------'

8.4. Considerations for use of IDevID-Issuer

[RFC8366bis] and [RFC8995] define the idevid-issuer attribute for voucher and voucher-request (respectively), but they summarily explain when to use it.¶

The use of idevid-issuer is provided so that the serial-number to which the issued voucher pertains can be relative to the entity that issued the devices' IDevID. In most cases there is a one to one relationship between the trust anchor that signs vouchers (and is trusted by the pledge), and the Certification Authority that signs the IDevID. In that case, the serial-number in the voucher data must refer to the same device as the serial-number that is in the IDevID certificate.¶

However, there situations where the one to one relationship may be broken. This occurs whenever a manufacturer has a common MASA, but different products (on different assembly lines) are produced with identical serial numbers. A system of serial numbers which is just a simple counter is a good example of this. A system of serial numbers where there is some prefix relating the product type does not fit into this, even if the lower digits are a counter.¶

It is not possible for the Pledge or the Registrar to know which situation applies. The question to be answered is whether or not to include the idevid-issuer in the PVR and the RVR. A second question arises as to what the format of the idevid-issuer contents are.¶

Analysis of the situation shows that the pledge never needs to include the idevid-issuer in it's PVR, because the pledge's IDevID certificate is available to the Registrar, and the Authority Key Identifier is contained within that IDevID certificate. The pledge therefore has no need to repeat this.¶

For the RVR, the Registrar has to examine the pledge's IDevID certificate to discover the serial number for the Registrar's Voucher Request (RVR). This is clear in Section 5.5 of [RFC8995]. That section also clarifies that the idevid-issuer is to be included in the RVR.¶

Concerning the Authority Key Identifier, [RFC8366bis] specifies that the entire object i.e. the extnValue OCTET STRING is to be included: comprising the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, SEQUENCE, Choice as well as the OCTET STRING that is the keyIdentifier.¶

9.1. Example Artifacts

{
 2501: {          / SID=2501, ietf-voucher-request:voucher|voucher /
   1: 2,                      / SID=2502, assertion 2 = "proximity"/
   7: h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',    / SID=2508, nonce                    /
  12: h'30593013' ... '9A54', / SID=2513, proximity-registrar-pubk /
  13: "JADA123456789"         / SID=2514, serial-number            /
 }
}

{
 "ietf-request-voucher:voucher": {
    "assertion":     2,
    "created-on":    "2022-12-05T19:19:19.536Z",
    "nonce":         h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',
    "idevid-issuer": h'04183016' ... '1736C3E0',
    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",
    "prior-signed-voucher-request": h'A11909' ... '373839'
 }
}

{
 2451: {               / SID = 2451, ietf-voucher:voucher|voucher /
   1: 2,                      / SID = 2452, assertion "proximity" /
   2: "2022-12-05T19:19:23Z", / SID = 2453, created-on            /
   3: false,       / SID = 2454, domain-cert-revocation-checks    /
   7: h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',    / SID = 2508, nonce                 /
   8: h'308201' ... '8CFF',   / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert    /
  11: "JADA123456789"         / SID = 2462, serial-number         /
 }
}

{
 2451: {               / SID = 2451, ietf-voucher:voucher|voucher /
   1: 0,                      / SID = 2452, assertion "verified"  /
   2: "2022-12-06T10:15:32Z", / SID = 2453, created-on            /
   3: false,          / SID = 2454, domain-cert-revocation-checks /
   4: "2022-12-13T10:15:32Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on            /
   8: h'308201F8' ... 'FF',   / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert    /
  11: "JADA123456789"         / SID = 2462, serial-number         /
 }
}

9.2. Signing voucher and voucher request artifacts with COSE

The COSE_Sign1 structure is discussed in Section 4.2 of [RFC9052]. The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body.¶

Support for ECDSA with SHA2-256 using curve secp256r1 (aka prime256k1) is RECOMMENDED. Most current low power hardware has support for acceleration of this algorithm. Future hardware designs could omit this in favour of a newer algorithms. This is the ES256 keytype from Table 1 of [RFC9053]. Support for curve secp256k1 is OPTIONAL.¶

Support for EdDSA using Curve 25519 is RECOMMENDED in new designs if hardware support is available. This is keytype EDDSA (-8) from Table 2 of [RFC9053]. A "crv" parameter is necessary to specify the Curve, which from Table 18. The 'kty' field MUST be present, and it MUST be 'OKP'. (Table 17)¶

A transition towards EdDSA is occurring in the industry. Some hardware can accelerate only some algorithms with specific curves, other hardware can accelerate any curve, and still other kinds of hardware provide a tool kit for acceleration of any eliptic curve algorithm.¶

In general, the Pledge is expected to support only a single algorithm, while the Registrar, usually not constrained, is expected to support a wide variety of algorithms: both legacy ones and up-and-coming ones via regular software updates.¶

An example of the supported COSE_Sign1 object structure containing a Pledge Voucher Request (PVR) is shown in Figure 3.¶

18(                   / tag for COSE_Sign1                       /
 [
   h'A10126',         / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7}  /
                      /            which means { "alg": ES256 }  /
   {},                / unprotected COSE header parameters       /
   h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
   h'4567' ... '1234' / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature   /
 ]
)

The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers/encoding for the "alg" field in Figure 3. The "alg" field restricts the key usage for verification of this COSE object to a particular cryptographic algorithm.¶

18(                    / tag for COSE_Sign1                      /
 [
   h'A10126',          / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7} /
                       /            which means { "alg": ES256 } /
   {
     32: [h'308202' ... '20AE', h'308201' ... '8CFF']  / x5bag   /
   },
   h'A178' ... '7FED', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
   h'E1B7' ... '2925'  / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature  /
 ]
)

18(                    / tag for COSE_Sign1                      /
 [
   h'A10126',          / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7} /
                       /            which means { "alg": ES256 } /
   {
      4: h'59AB3E'     / COSE "kid" header parameter             /
   },
   h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
   h'5678' ... '7890'  / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature  /
 ]
)

18(                    / tag for COSE_Sign1                     /
 [
   h'A10126',          / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7}/
                       /            which means { "alg": ES256 }/
   {},                 / unprotected COSE header parameters     /
   h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher data (binary CBOR)             /
   h'2A2C' ... '7FBF'  / voucher binary Sign1 signature by MASA /
 ]
)

10.1. Discovery Operations by a Pledge

The Pledge must discover the address/port and optionally the protocol with which to communicate. The present document only defines coaps (CoAP over DTLS) as the default protocol for cBRSKI, therefore protocol discovery is out of scope.¶

For the discovery method, this section only defines unsecured CoAP discovery per Section 7 of [RFC7252] as the default method. This uses CoRE Link Format [RFC6690] payloads.¶

Section 11 briefly mentions other methods that apply to specific deployment types or technologies. Details about these deployment-specific methods, or yet other methods, new payload formats, or more elaborate CoAP-based methods, may be defined in future documents such as [I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery]. The more elaborate methods for example may include discovering only Join Proxies that support a particular desired onboarding protocol, voucher format, or cBRSKI variant.¶

Note that identifying the format of the voucher request and the voucher is currently not a required part of the Pledge's discovery operation. It is assumed that all Registrars support all relevant voucher(-request) formats, while the Pledge only supports a single format. A Pledge that makes a voucher request to a Registrar that does not support that format will receive a CoAP 4.06 Not Acceptable status code and the onboarding attempt will fail.¶

Using CoAP discovery, a Pledge can discover a Join Proxy by sending a link-local multicast discovery message to the All CoAP Nodes address FF02::FD. Zero, one, or multiple Constrained Join Proxies may respond. The handling of multiple responses and absence of responses cases follow the guidelines of Section 4 of [RFC8995]. The discovery message is a CoAP GET request on the URI path "/.well-known/core" using a URI query "rt=brski.jp". This resource type (rt) is defined in Section 8.3 of [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy].¶

  REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp

  RES: 2.05 Content
  <coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]:8485>;rt=brski.jp

  REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp

  RES: 2.05 Content
  <coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]>;rt=brski.jp

  REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski*

  RES: 2.05 Content
  <coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]:8485>;rt=brski.jp

  RES: 2.05 Content
  <coaps://[fe80::d359:3813:f382:3b23]:63245>;rt="brski.jp"

10.2. Discovery Operations by a Join Proxy

A Join Proxy needs to discover a Registrar, either at the moment it needs to relay data (of a Pledge) towards the Registrar, or prior to that moment. For example, it may start Registrar discovery as soon as it is requested to be enabled in a Join Proxy role. It may periodically redo this discovery, or periodically or on-demand check that the Registrar is still available in the network at the discovered IP address.¶

Further details on CoAP discovery of the Registrar by a Join Proxy are provided in Section 5.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy].¶

11.1. 6TiSCH Deployments

In 6TiSCH networks, the Constrained Join Proxy (CoJP) mechanism is used as described in [RFC9031]. Such networks are expected to use [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc] for key management. This is the subject of future work. The Enhanced Beacon has been extended in [RFC9032] to allow for discovery of a 6TiSCH-compliant Join Proxy.¶

11.2. IP networks using GRASP

In IP networks that support GRASP [RFC8990], a Pledge can discover a Join Proxy by listening for GRASP messages. GRASP supports mesh networks, and can also be used over unencrypted Wi-Fi.¶

Details of GRASP discovery of Constrained Join Proxies are out of scope of this document and may be defined in future work.¶

11.3. IP networks using mDNS

[RFC8995] defines a mechanism for the Pledge to discover a Join Proxy by sending mDNS [RFC6762] queries. This mechanism can be used on any IP network which does not have another recommended mechanism. It can be used over unencrypted Wi-Fi. This mechanism does support link-local Join Proxy discovery in mesh networks. However, it does not support Registrar discovery by Join Proxies in mesh networks, because the Registrar is typically not reachable by link-local communication in that case. For this, another mechanism is needed, which is out of scope of this document and may be defined in future work.¶

A Pledge uses an mDNS PTR query for the name "_brski-proxy._udp.local." to discover link-local Constrained Join Proxies. The label "_udp" here indicates a query for cBRSKI Constrained Join Proxies, as opposed to "_tcp" defined in [RFC8995] which is for discovering BRSKI Join Proxies.¶

11.4. Thread networks using Mesh Link Establishment (MLE)

Thread [Thread] is a wireless mesh network protocol based on 6LoWPAN [RFC6282] and other IETF protocols. In Thread, a new device discovers potential Thread networks and Thread routers to join by using the Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) [I-D.ietf-6lo-mesh-link-establishment] protocol. MLE uses the UDP port number 19788. The new device sends discovery requests on different IEEE 802.15.4 radio channels, to which routers (if any present) respond with a discovery response containing information about their respective network. Once a suitable router is selected the new device initiates a DTLS transport-layer secured connection to the network's commissioning application, over a link-local single radio hop to the selected Thread router. This link is not yet secured at the radio/MAC link layer: link-layer security will be set up once the new device is approved by the commissioning application to join the Thread network, and it gets provisioned with network access credentials.¶

The Thread router acts here as a Join Proxy. The MLE discovery response message contains UDP port information to signal the new device which port to use for its DTLS connection to the Join Proxy function. The link-local IPv6 source address of the MLE response message indicates the address of the Join Proxy.¶

12.1. Voucher Format and Encoding

The design considerations for vouchers from Section 8 of [RFC8366bis] apply. Specifically for CBOR encoding of voucher data, one key difference with JSON encoding is that the names of the leaves in the YANG definition do not affect the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID ([I-D.ietf-core-sid]) translation process assigns integers to the names.¶

To obtain the lowest code size and RAM use on the Pledge, it is recommended that a Pledge is designed to only process/generate these SID integers and not the lengthy strings. The MASA in that case is required to generate the voucher data for that Pledge using only SID integers. Yet, this MASA implementation MUST still support both SID integers and strings, to be able to process the field names in the RVR.¶

Any POST request to the Registrar with resource /vs or /es returns a 2.04 Changed response with empty payload. The client should be aware that the server may use a piggybacked CoAP response (ACK, 2.04) but may also respond with a separate CoAP response, i.e. first an (ACK, 0.0) that is an acknowledgement of the request reception followed by a (CON, 2.04) response in a separate CoAP message. See [RFC7252] for details.¶

12.2. Use of cBRSKI with HTTPS

This specification contains two extensions to [RFC8995]: a constrained voucher format (COSE), and a constrained transfer protocol (CoAP).¶

On constrained networks with constrained devices, it make senses to use both together. However, this document does not mandate that this be the only way.¶

A given constrained device design and software may be re-used for multiple device models, such as a model having only an IEEE 802.15.4 radio, or a model having only an IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) radio, or a model having both these radios. A manufacturer of such device models may wish to have code only for the use of the constrained voucher format (COSE), and use it on all supported radios including the IEEE 802.11 radio. For this radio, the software stack to support HTTP/TLS may be already integrated into the radio module hence it is attractive for the manufacturer to reuse this. This type of approach is supported by this document. In the case that HTTPS is used, the regular long [RFC8995] resource names are used, together with the new "application/voucher+cose" media type described in this document. For status telemetry requests, the Pledge may use either one or both of the formats defined in Section 6.3.1. A Registrar MUST support both formats.¶

Other combinations are possible, but they are not enumerated here. New work such as [I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher] provides new formats that may be useable over a number of different transports. In general, sending larger payloads over constrained networks makes less sense, while sending smaller payloads over unconstrained networks is perfectly acceptable.¶

The Pledge will in most cases support a single voucher format, which it uses without negotiation i.e. without discovery of formats supported. The Registrar, being unconstrained, is expected to support all voucher formats. There will be cases where a Registrar does not support a new format that a new Pledge uses, and this is an unfortunate situation that will result in lack of interoperation.¶

The responsability for supporting new formats is on the Registrar.¶

13.1. Introduction and Scope

This section introduces a cBRSKI variant to further reduce the data volume and complexity of the cBRSKI onboarding. The use of a raw public key (RPK) in the pinning process can significantly reduce the number of bytes sent over the wire and the number of round trips, and reduce the code footprint in a Pledge. But it comes with a few significant operational limitations.¶

One simplification that comes with RPK use is that a Pledge can avoid doing PKIX certificate operations, such as certificate chain validation.¶

13.2. The Registrar Trust Anchor

When the Pledge first connects to the Registrar, the connection to the Registrar is provisional, as explained in Section 5.6.2 of [RFC8995]. The Registrar normally provides its public key in a TLSServerCertificate, and the Pledge uses that to validate that integrity of the (D)TLS connection, but it does not validate the identity of the provided certificate.¶

As the TLSServerCertificate object is never verified directly by the Pledge, sending it can be considered superfluous. So instead of using a (TLSServer)Certificate of type X509 (see section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446]), a RawPublicKey object (as defined by [RFC7250]) is used.¶

A Registrar operating in a mixed environment can determine whether to send a Certificate or a Raw Public Key to the Pledge: this is signaled by the Pledge. In the case it needs an RPK, it includes the server_certificate_type of RawPublicKey. This is shown in section 5 of [RFC7250].¶

The Pledge MUST send a client_certificate_type of X509 (not an RPK), so that the Registrar can properly identify the Pledge and distill the MASA URI information from its IDevID certificate.¶

13.3. The Pledge Voucher Request

The Pledge puts the Registrar's public key into the proximity-registrar-pubk field of the Pledge Voucher Request (PVR). (The proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 can alternatively be used for efficiency, if the 32-bytes of a SHA256 hash turns out to be smaller than a typical ECDSA key.)¶

As the format of this pubk field is identical to the TLS RawPublicKey data object, no manipulation at all is needed to insert this field into the PVR. This approach reduces the size of the PVR significantly.¶

13.4. The Voucher Response

A returned voucher will have a pinned-domain-pubk field with the identical key as was found in the proximity-registrar-pubk field above, as well as being identical to the Registrar's RPK in the currently active DTLS connection. (Or alternatively the MASA may include the "pinned-domain-pubk-sha256" field if it knows the Pledge supports this field.)¶

Validation of this key by the Pledge is what takes the DTLS connection out of the provisional state; see Section 5.6.2 of [RFC8995] for more details.¶

The received voucher needs to be validated first by the Pledge. The Pledge needs to have a public key to validate the signature from the MASA on the voucher.¶

The MASA's public key counterpart of the (private) MASA signing key MUST be already installed in the Pledge at manufacturing time. Otherwise, the Pledge cannot validate the voucher's signature.¶

13.5. The Enrollment Phase

A Pledge that does not support PKIX operations cannot use EST to enroll; it has to use another method for enrollment without certificates and the Registrar has to support this method also. For example, an enrollment process that records an RPK owned by the Pledge as a legitimate entity that is part of the domain.¶

It is possible that the Pledge will not enroll after obtaining a valid voucher, but instead will do only a network join operation (see for example [RFC9031]). How the Pledge discovers this method and details of such enrollment methods are out of scope of this document.¶

14.1. Pledge Discovery Query for All BRSKI Resources

A Pledge that wishes to discover the available BRSKI onboarding options/formats can do a discovery operation using CoAP discovery per Section 7 of [RFC7252] and Section 4 of [RFC6690]. It first sends a CoAP discovery query to the Registrar over the secured DTLS connection. The Registrar then responds with a CoRE Link Format payload containing the requested resources, if any.¶

For example, if the Registrar supports a short BRSKI URL (/b) instead of just the longer "/.well-known" resources, and supports only the voucher format "application/voucher+cose" (836), and status reporting in both CBOR and JSON formats, a CoAP resource discovery request and response may look as follows:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </b>;rt=brski,
  </b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=836,
  </b/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",
  </b/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"

The Registrar is under no obligation to provide shorter URLs, and MAY respond to this query with only the "/.well-known/brski/<short-name>" resources for the short names as defined in Table 1. This case is shown in the below interaction:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </.well-known/brski>;rt=brski,
  </.well-known/brski/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=836,
  </.well-known/brski/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",
  </.well-known/brski/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"

However, for efficiency reasons it would be better if the Registrar would return shorter URLs instead.¶

When responding to a discovery request for BRSKI resources, the Registrar MAY return the full resource paths for all <short-name> resources and the content types which are supported by these resources (using ct attributes) as shown in the above examples. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for a particular resource on the Registrar and the discovering Pledge also supports multiple.¶

Registrars that have implemented shorter URLs MUST process a request on the corresponding "/.well-known/brski/<short-name>" URL identically. In particular, a Pledge MAY use the longer (well-known) and shorter URLs in any combination.¶

14.2. Pledge Discovery Query for the Root BRSKI Resource

In case the client queries for only rt=brski type resources, the Registrar responds with only the root path for the BRSKI resources (rt=brski, resource /b in earlier examples) and no others. (So, a query for rt=brski, without the wildcard character.) This is shown in the below example. The Pledge in this case requests only the BRSKI root resource of type rt=brski to check if BRSKI is supported by the Registrar and if short names are supported or not. In this case, the Pledge is not interested to check what voucher request formats, or status telemetry formats -- other than the mandatory default formats -- are supported. The compact response then shows that the Registrar indeed supports a short-name BRSKI resource at /b:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </b>;rt=brski

The Pledge can now start using any of the BRSKI resources /b/<short-name>. In above example, the well-known resource present under /.well-known/brski is not returned because this is assumed to be well-known to the Pledge and would not require discovery anyway.¶

As a follow-up example, the Pledge can now start the onboarding by sending its PVR:¶

  REQ: POST /b/rv
  Content-Format: 836
  Accept: 836
  Payload: (binary COSE-signed PVR)

14.3. Usage of ct Attribute

The return of multiple content-types in the "ct" attribute by the Registrar allows the Pledge to choose the most appropriate one for a particular operation, and allows extension with new voucher formats. Note that only Content-Format 836 ("application/voucher+cose") is defined in this document for the voucher request resource (/rv), both as request payload and as response payload.¶

Content-Format 836 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource. If the "ct" attribute is not indicated for the /rv resource in the CoRE link format description, this implies that at least format 836 is supported and maybe more.¶

Note that this specification allows for voucher+cose format requests and vouchers to be transmitted over HTTPS, as well as for voucher-cms+json and other formats yet to be defined over CoAP. The burden for this flexibility is placed upon the Registrar. A Pledge on constrained hardware is expected to support a single format only.¶

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least format 836) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to support all formats that the Pledge supports.¶

In the below example, a Pledge queries specifically for the brski.rv resource type to learn what voucher formats are supported:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.rv

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct="836 65123 65124"

The Registrar returns 3 supported voucher formats: 836, 65123, and 65124. The first is the mandatory "application/voucher+cose". The other two are numbers from the Experimental Use number range of the CoAP Content-Formats sub-registry, which are used as mere examples. The Pledge can now make a selection between the supported formats.¶

Note that if the Registrar only supports the default Content-Formats for each BRSKI resource as specified by this document, it may also omit the ct attributes in the discovery query response. For example as in the following interaction:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </b>;rt=brski,
  </b/rv>;rt=brski.rv,
  </b/vs>;rt=brski.vs,
  </b/es>;rt=brski.es

14.4. EST-coaps Resource Discovery

The Pledge can also use CoAP discovery to identify enrollment options, for example enrollment using EST-coaps or other methods. The below example shows a Pledge that wants to identify EST-coaps enrollment options by sending a discovery query:¶

  REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*

  RES: 2.05 Content
  Content-Format: 40
  Payload:
  </e/crts>;rt=ace.est.crts;ct="62 281 287",
  </e/sen>;rt=ace.est.sen;ct="281 287",
  </e/sren>;rt=ace.est.sren;ct="281 287",
  </e/att>;rt=ace.est.att,
  </e/skg>;rt=ace.est.skg,
  </e/skc>;rt=ace.est.skc

The response indicates that EST-coaps enrollment (/sen) and re-enrollment (/sren) is supported, with a choice of two Content-Formats for the return payload: either a PKCS#7 container with a single LDevID certificate ("application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only", content-format 281) or just a single LDevID certificate ("application/pkix-cert", content-format 287).¶

For the EST cacerts resources (/crts) there are three Content-Formats supported: a multipart-core container (62) per Section 6.5.5, a PKCS#7 container with all CA certificates (287), or a single (most relevant) CA certificate.¶

The Pledge can now send a CoAP request to one or more of the discovered resources, with the Accept Option to indicate which return payload format the Pledge wants to receive.¶

15.1. Duplicate serial-numbers

In the absense of correct use of idevid-issuer by the Registrar as detailed in Section 8.4, it would be possible for a malicious Registrar to use an unauthorized voucher for a device. This would apply only to the case where a Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) is trusted by different products from the same manufacturer, and the manufacturer has duplicated serial numbers as a result of a merge, acquisition or mis-management.¶

For example, imagine the same manufacturer makes light bulbs as well as gas centrifuges, and said manufacturer does not uniquely allocate product serial numbers. This attack only works for nonceless vouchers. The attacker has obtained a light bulb which happens to have the same serial-number as a gas centrofuge which it wishes to obtain access. The attacker performs a normal BRSKI onboarding for the light bulb, but then uses the resulting voucher to onboard the gas centrofuge. The attack requires that the gas centrofuge be returned to a state where it is willing to perform a new onboarding operation.¶

This attack is prevented by the mechanism of having the Registrar include the idevid-issuer in the RVR, and the MASA including it in the resulting voucher. The idevid-issuer is not included by default: a MASA needs to be aware if there are parts of the organization which duplicates serial numbers, and if so, include it.¶

15.2. IDevID security in Pledge

The security of this protocol depends upon the Pledge identifying itself to the Registrar using it's manufacturer installed certificate: the IDevID certificate. Associated with this certificate is the IDevID private key, known only to the Pledge. Disclosure of this private key to an attacker would permit the attacker to impersonate the Pledge towards the Registrar, probably gaining access credentials to that Registrar's network.¶

If the IDevID private key disclosure is known to the manufacturer, there is little recourse other than recall of the relevant part numbers. The process for communicating this recall would be within the BRSKI-MASA protocol. Neither this specification nor [RFC8995] provides for consultation of a Certification Revocation List (CRL) or Open Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) by a Registrar when evaluating an IDevID certificate. However, the BRSKI-MASA protocol submits the IDevID from the Registrar to the manufacturer's MASA and a manufacturer would have an opportunity to decline to issue a voucher for a device which they believe has become compromised.¶

It may be difficult for a manufacturer to determine when an IDevID private key has been disclosed. Two situations present themselves: in the first situation a compromised private key might be reused in a counterfeit device, which is sold to another customer. This would present itself as an onboarding of the same device in two different networks. The manufacturer may become suspicious seeing two voucher requests for the same device from different Registrars. Such activity could be indistinguishable from a device which has been resold from one operator to another, or re-deployed by an operator from one location to another.¶

In the second situation, an attacker having compromised the IDevID private key of a device might then install malware into the same device and attempt to return it to service. The device, now blank, would go through a second onboarding process with the original Registrar. Such a Registrar could notice that the device has been "factory reset" and alert the operator to this situation. One remedy against the presence of malware is through the use of Remote Attestation such as described in [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]. Future work will need to specify a background-check Attestation flow as part of the voucher-request/voucher-response process. Attestation may still require access to a private key (e.g. IDevID private key) in order to sign Evidence, so a primary goal should be to keep any private key safe within the Pledge.¶

In larger, more expensive, systems there is budget (power, space, and bill of materials) to include more specific defenses for a private key. For instance, this includes putting the IDevID private key in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for access to the key. On smaller IoT devices, the cost and power budget for an extra part is often prohibitive.¶

It is becoming more and more common for CPUs to have an internal set of one-time fuses that can be programmed (often they are "burnt" by a laser) at the factory. This section of memory is only accessible in some priviledged CPU state. The use of this kind of CPU is appropriate as it provides significant resistance against key disclosure even when the device can be disassembled by an attacker.¶

In a number of industry verticals, there is increasing concern about counterfeit parts. These may be look-alike parts created in a different factory, or parts which are created in the same factory during an illegal night-shift, but which are not subject to the appropriate level of quality control. The use of a manufacturer-signed IDevID certificate provides for discovery of the pedigree of each part, and this often justifies the cost of the security measures associated with storing the private key.¶

15.3. Security of CoAP and UDP protocols

Section 7.1 explains that no CoAPS version of the BRSKI-MASA protocol is proposed. The connection from the Registrar to the MASA continues to be HTTPS as in [RFC8995]. This has been done to simplify the MASA deployment for the manufacturer, because no new protocol needs to be enabled on the server.¶

The use of UDP protocols across the open Internet is sometimes fraught with security challenges. Denial-of-service attacks against UDP based protocols are trivial as there is no three-way handshake as done for TCP. The three-way handshake of TCP guarantees that the node sending the connection request is reachable using the origin IP address. While DTLS contains an option to do a stateless challenge -- a process actually stronger than that done by TCP -- it is not yet common for this mechanism to be available in hardware at multigigabit speeds. It is for this reason that this document defines using HTTPS for the Registrar to MASA connection.¶

15.4. Registrar Certificate may be self-signed

The provisional (D)TLS connection formed by the Pledge with the Registrar does not authenticate the Registrar's identity. This Registrar's identity is validated by the [RFC8366bis] voucher that is issued by the MASA, signed with an anchor that was built-in to the Pledge.¶

The Registrar may therefore use any certificate, including a self-signed one. The only restrictions on the certificate is that it MUST have EKU bits set as detailed in Section 6.1.5 and Section 7.4.¶

15.5. Use of RPK alternatives to proximity-registrar-cert

In [RFC8366bis], Part voucher-request-artifact two compact alternative fields for proximity-registrar-cert are defined that include an RPK: proximity-registrar-pubk and proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256. The Pledge can use these fields in its PVR to identify the Registrar based on its public key only. Since the full certificate of the proximate Registrar is not included, use of these fields by a Pledge implies that a Registrar could insert another certificate with the same public key identity into the RVR. For example, an older or a newer version of its certificate. The MASA will not be able to detect such act by the Registrar. But since any 'other' certificate the Registrar could insert in this way still encodes its identity the additional risk of using the RPK alternatives is neglible.¶

When a Registrar sees a PVR that uses one of proximity-registrar-pubk or proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 fields, this implies the Registrar must include the certificate identified by these fields into its RVR. Otherwise, the MASA is unable to verify proximity. This requirement is already implied by the "MUST" requirement in Section 8.1.¶

15.6. MASA support of CoAPS

The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection is not in scope of the current document. The following security considerations have led to this choice of scope:¶

• the technology and experience to build secure Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience in doing the same for CoAP is much less common.¶

• in many enterprise networks, outgoing UDP connections are often treated as suspicious, which could effectively block CoAP connections for some firewall configurations.¶

• reducing the complexity of MASA (i.e. less protocols supported) would also reduce its potential attack surface, which is relevant since the MASA is 24/7 exposed on the Internet and accepting (untrusted) incoming connections.¶

16.1. Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values", within the "CoRE Parameters" IANA registry are specified below.¶

Reference: [This RFC]¶

16.2. Media Types Registry

This section registers the media type "application/voucher+cose" in the IANA "Media Types" registry. This media type is used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher or voucher request signed with a COSE_Sign1 structure [RFC9052].¶

Type name:  application
Subtype name:  voucher+cose
Required parameters:  N/A
Optional parameters:  N/A
Encoding considerations:  binary (CBOR)
Security considerations:  Security Considerations of [This RFC].
Interoperability considerations:  The format is designed to be
  broadly interoperable.
Published specification:  [This RFC]
Applications that use this media type:  ANIMA, 6TiSCH, and other
  zero-touch onboarding systems
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
  Magic number(s):  N/A
  File extension(s):  .vch
  Macintosh file type code(s):  N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:  IETF
  ANIMA Working Group (anima@ietf.org) or IETF Operations and
  Management Area Working Group (opsawg@ietf.org)
Intended usage:  COMMON
Restrictions on usage:  N/A
Author:  ANIMA WG
Change controller:  IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only):  NO

16.3. CoAP Content-Format Registry

IANA has allocated ID 836 from the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats".¶

Media type                     Encoding   ID   Reference
-----------------------------  --------- ----  ----------
application/voucher+cose       -          836  [This RFC]

IANA Note (to be removed by RFC editor): the TEMPORARY registration of 836 is made under the old name of "application/voucher-cose+cbor".¶

16.4. Update to BRSKI Parameters Registry

This section updates the BRSKI Well-Known URIs sub-registry of the IANA Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) Parameters Registry by adding a new column "Short URI". The contents of this field MUST be specified for any newly registered URI as follows:¶

Short URI: A short name for the "URI" resource that can be used by a cBRSKI ([This RFC]) Pledge in a CoAP request to the Registrar. In case the "URI" resource is only used between Registrar and MASA, the value "--" is registered denoting that a short name is not applicable.¶

The initial contents of the sub-registry including the new column are as follows:¶

16.5. Structured Syntax Suffixes Registry

This section registers the "+cose" suffix in the IANA Structured Syntax Suffixes Registry based on the [RFC6838] procedure.¶

Name:       CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) object
+suffix:    +cose
References: the "application/cose" media type [RFC9052]
Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)
Interoperability considerations:
  the "application/cose" media type has an optional parameter
  "cose-type". Any new media type that uses the +cose suffix
  and allows use of this parameter MUST specify this
  explicitly, per Section 4.3 of [RFC6838]. If the parameter
  "cose-type" is allowed, its usage MUST be identical to the
  usage defined for the "application/cose" media type in
  Section 2 of [RFC9052].
  A COSE processor handling a media type "foo+cose" and which
  does not know the specific type "foo" SHOULD use the
  cose-type tag, if present, or cose-type parameter, if
  present, to determine the specific COSE object type during
  processing. If the specific type cannot be determined,
  it MUST assume only the generic COSE object structure and
  it MUST NOT perform security-critical operations using the
  COSE object.
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Security considerations: see [RFC9052]
Contact:
  IETF COSE Working Group (cose@ietf.org) or IESG
  (iesg@ietf.org)
Author/Change controller:
  IETF ANIMA Working Group (anima@ietf.org).
  IESG has change control over this registration.

A.1. OpensSSL

From openssl's apps/verify.c :¶

<CODE BEGINS>
X509 *x = NULL;
int i = 0, ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int num_untrusted;

x = load_cert(file, "certificate file");
if (x == NULL)
    goto end;

csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (csc == NULL) {
    BIO_printf(bio_err, "error %s: X.509 store context"
               "allocation failed\n",
               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
    goto end;
}

X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
    X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
               "error %s: X.509 store context"
               "initialization failed\n",
               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
    goto end;
}
if (tchain != NULL)
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
if (crls != NULL)
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);

i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);

<CODE ENDS>

A.2. mbedTLS

<CODE BEGINS>
mbedtls_x509_crt cert;
mbedtls_x509_crt caCert;
uint32_t         certVerifyResultFlags;
// ...
int result = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(&cert, &caCert, NULL, NULL,
                             &certVerifyResultFlags, NULL, NULL);

<CODE ENDS>

B.1. enrollstatus

A coaps enrollstatus message from Pledge to Registrar can be as follows:¶

  REQ: POST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/b/es
  Content-Format: 60
  Payload: <binary CBOR encoding of an enrollstatus map>

The corresponding CoAP header fields for this request are shown below.¶

  Ver = 1
  T = 0 (CON)
  TKL = 1
  Code = 0x02 (0.02 is POST method)
  Message ID = 0xab0f
  Token = 0x4d
  Options
   Option  (Uri-Path)
     Option Delta = 0xb   (option nr = 11)
     Option Length = 0x1
     Option Value = "b"
   Option  (Uri-Path)
     Option Delta = 0x0   (option nr = 11)
     Option Length = 0x2
     Option Value = "es"
   Option  (Content-Format)
     Option Delta = 0x1   (option nr = 12)
     Option Length = 0x1
     Option Value = 60    (application/cbor)
  Payload Marker = 0xFF
  Payload = A26776657273696F6E0166737461747573F5 (18 bytes binary)

The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol (UDP) destination address and port respectively.¶

The above binary CBOR enrollstatus payload looks as follows in CBOR diagnostic notation, for the case of enrollment success:¶

  {
    "version": 1,
    "status": true
   }

Alternatively the payload could look as follows in case of enrollment failure, using the reason field to describe the failure:¶

  Payload = A36776657273696F6E0166737461747573F466726561736F6E782A3C
            496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C652065
            72726F72206D6573736167653E    (69 bytes binary)

  {
    "version": 1,
    "status": false,
    "reason": "<Informative human readable error message>"
  }

To indicate successful reception of the enrollmentstatus telemetry report, a response from the Registrar may then be:¶

  2.04 Changed

Which in case of a piggybacked response has the following CoAP header fields:¶

  Ver=1
  T=2 (ACK)
  TKL=1
  Code = 0x44 (2.04 Changed)
  Message ID = 0xab0f
  Token = 0x4d

B.2. voucher_status

A coaps voucher_status message from Pledge to Registrar can be as follows:¶

  REQ: POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]/.well-known/brski/vs
  Content-Format: 60 (application/cbor)
  Payload =
    A46776657273696F6E0166737461747573F466726561736F6E7828496E66
    6F726D61746976652068756D616E2D7265616461626C65206572726F7220
    6D6573736167656E726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874A100764164646974
    696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E

The request payload above is binary CBOR but represented here in hexadecimal for readability. Below is the equivalent CBOR diagnostic format.¶

  {
    "version": 1,
    "status": false,
    "reason": "Informative human-readable error message",
    "reason-context": { 0: "Additional information" }
  }

A success response without payload will then be sent by the Registrar back to the Pledge to indicate reception of the telemetry report:¶

  2.04 Changed

C.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA Keys

This section documents the public and private keys used for all examples in this appendix. These keys are not used in any production system, and must only be used for testing purposes.¶

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIMv+C4dbzeyrEH20qkpFlWIH2FFACGZv9kW7rNWtSlYtoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAESH6OUiYFRhfIgWl4GG8jHoj8a+8rf6t5s1mZ/4SePlKom39GQ34p
VYryJ9aHmboLLfz69bzICQFKbkoQ5oaiew==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    cb:fe:0b:87:5b:cd:ec:ab:10:7d:b4:aa:4a:45:95:
    62:07:d8:51:40:08:66:6f:f6:45:bb:ac:d5:ad:4a:
    56:2d
pub:
    04:48:7e:8e:52:26:05:46:17:c8:81:69:78:18:6f:
    23:1e:88:fc:6b:ef:2b:7f:ab:79:b3:59:99:ff:84:
    9e:3e:52:a8:9b:7f:46:43:7e:29:55:8a:f2:27:d6:
    87:99:ba:0b:2d:fc:fa:f5:bc:c8:09:01:4a:6e:4a:
    10:e6:86:a2:7b
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256

-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgYJ/MP0dWA9BkYd4W
s6oRY62hDddaEmrAVm5dtAXE/UGhRANCAAQgMIVb6EaRCz7LFcr4Vy0+tWW9xlSh
Xvr27euqi54WCMXJEMk6IIaPyFBNNw8bJvqXWfZ5g7t4hj7amsvqUST2
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    60:9f:cc:3f:47:56:03:d0:64:61:de:16:b3:aa:11:
    63:ad:a1:0d:d7:5a:12:6a:c0:56:6e:5d:b4:05:c4:
    fd:41
pub:
    04:20:30:85:5b:e8:46:91:0b:3e:cb:15:ca:f8:57:
    2d:3e:b5:65:bd:c6:54:a1:5e:fa:f6:ed:eb:aa:8b:
    9e:16:08:c5:c9:10:c9:3a:20:86:8f:c8:50:4d:37:
    0f:1b:26:fa:97:59:f6:79:83:bb:78:86:3e:da:9a:
    cb:ea:51:24:f6
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256

-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgrbJ1oU+HIJ2SWYAk
DkBTL+YNPxQG+gwsMsZB94N8mZ2hRANCAASS9NVlWJdztwNY81yPlH2UODYWhlYA
ZfsqnEPSFZKnq8mq8gF78ZVbYi6q2FEg8kkORY/rpIU/X7SQsRuD+wMW
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----

Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
    ad:b2:75:a1:4f:87:20:9d:92:59:80:24:0e:40:53:
    2f:e6:0d:3f:14:06:fa:0c:2c:32:c6:41:f7:83:7c:
    99:9d
pub:
    04:92:f4:d5:65:58:97:73:b7:03:58:f3:5c:8f:94:
    7d:94:38:36:16:86:56:00:65:fb:2a:9c:43:d2:15:
    92:a7:ab:c9:aa:f2:01:7b:f1:95:5b:62:2e:aa:d8:
    51:20:f2:49:0e:45:8f:eb:a4:85:3f:5f:b4:90:b1:
    1b:83:fb:03:16
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256

C.2. Pledge, Registrar, Domain CA and MASA Certificates

All keys and PKIX certificates used for the examples have been generated with OpenSSL - see Appendix D for more details on certificate generation. Below the certificates are listed that accompany the keys shown above. Each certificate description is followed by the hexadecimal representation of the X.509 ASN.1 DER encoded certificate. This representation can be for example decoded using an online ASN.1 decoder.¶

Certificate:
Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number: 32429 (0x7ead)
 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
 Issuer: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,
         C = NL
 Validity
   Not Before: Dec  9 12:50:47 2022 GMT
   Not After : Dec 31 12:50:47 9999 GMT
 Subject: CN = Stok IoT sensor Y-42, serialNumber = JADA123456789
 Subject Public Key Info:
   Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
     Public-Key: (256 bit)
     pub:
       04:48:7e:8e:52:26:05:46:17:c8:81:69:78:18:6f:
       23:1e:88:fc:6b:ef:2b:7f:ab:79:b3:59:99:ff:84:
       9e:3e:52:a8:9b:7f:46:43:7e:29:55:8a:f2:27:d6:
       87:99:ba:0b:2d:fc:fa:f5:bc:c8:09:01:4a:6e:4a:
       10:e6:86:a2:7b
     ASN1 OID: prime256v1
     NIST CURVE: P-256
 X509v3 extensions:
   X509v3 Key Usage: critical
     Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,
             Data Encipherment
   X509v3 Basic Constraints:
     CA:FALSE
   X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
     CB:8D:98:CA:74:C5:1B:58:DD:E7:AC:EF:86:9A:94:43:A8:D6:66:A6
   1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.32:
      hl=2 l=  12 prim: IA5STRING     :masa.stok.nl

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
 30:45:02:20:4d:89:90:7e:03:fb:52:56:42:0c:3f:c1:b1:f1:
 47:b5:b3:93:65:45:2e:be:50:db:67:85:8f:23:89:a2:3f:9e:
 02:21:00:95:33:69:d1:c6:db:f0:f1:f6:52:24:59:d3:0a:95:
 4e:b2:f4:96:a1:31:3c:7b:d9:2f:28:b3:29:71:bb:60:df

308201CE30820174A00302010202027EAD300A06082A8648CE3D040302304B31
15301306035504030C0C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C31133011060355040A0C
0A76616E64657273746F6B3110300E06035504070C0748656C6D6F6E64310B30
09060355040613024E4C3020170D3232313230393132353034375A180F393939
39313233313132353034375A3037311D301B06035504030C1453746F6B20496F
542073656E736F7220592D3432311630140603550405130D4A41444131323334
35363738393059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004
487E8E5226054617C8816978186F231E88FC6BEF2B7FAB79B35999FF849E3E52
A89B7F46437E29558AF227D68799BA0B2DFCFAF5BCC809014A6E4A10E686A27B
A35A3058300E0603551D0F0101FF0404030204F030090603551D130402300030
1F0603551D23041830168014CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6
301A06082B06010505070120040E160C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C300A0608
2A8648CE3D040302034800304502204D89907E03FB5256420C3FC1B1F147B5B3
9365452EBE50DB67858F2389A23F9E022100953369D1C6DBF0F1F6522459D30A
954EB2F496A1313C7BD92F28B32971BB60DF

Certificate:
Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number:
   c3:f6:21:49:b2:e3:0e:3e
 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
 Issuer: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",
         L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US
 Validity
   Not Before: Dec  9 12:50:47 2022 GMT
   Not After : Dec  8 12:50:47 2025 GMT
 Subject: CN = Custom-ER Registrar, OU = Office dept, O = "Custom-ER,
         Inc.", L = Ottowa, ST = ON, C = CA
 Subject Public Key Info:
   Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
     Public-Key: (256 bit)
     pub:
       04:20:30:85:5b:e8:46:91:0b:3e:cb:15:ca:f8:57:
       2d:3e:b5:65:bd:c6:54:a1:5e:fa:f6:ed:eb:aa:8b:
       9e:16:08:c5:c9:10:c9:3a:20:86:8f:c8:50:4d:37:
       0f:1b:26:fa:97:59:f6:79:83:bb:78:86:3e:da:9a:
       cb:ea:51:24:f6
     ASN1 OID: prime256v1
     NIST CURVE: P-256
 X509v3 extensions:
   X509v3 Key Usage: critical
     Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,
             Data Encipherment
   X509v3 Basic Constraints:
     CA:FALSE
   X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
     C9:08:0B:38:7D:8D:D8:5B:3A:59:E7:EC:10:0B:86:63:93:A9:CA:4C
   X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
     92:EA:76:40:40:4A:8F:AB:4F:27:0B:F3:BC:37:9D:86:CD:72:80:F8
   X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical
     CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server Authentication,
             TLS Web Client Authentication
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
 30:45:02:21:00:d8:4a:7c:69:2f:f9:58:6e:82:22:87:18:f6:
 3b:c3:05:f0:ae:b8:ae:ec:42:78:82:38:79:81:2a:5d:15:61:
 64:02:20:08:f2:3c:13:69:13:b0:2c:e2:63:09:d5:99:4f:eb:
 75:70:af:af:ed:98:cd:f1:12:11:c0:37:f7:18:4d:c1:9d

3082026D30820213A003020102020900C3F62149B2E30E3E300A06082A8648CE
3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F6261
6C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F43757374
6F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B
300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323132
30393132353034375A170D3235313230383132353034375A3079311C301A0603
5504030C13437573746F6D2D4552205265676973747261723114301206035504
0B0C0B4F6666696365206465707431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D
45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070C064F74746F7761310B3009060355
04080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413059301306072A8648CE3D0201
06082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565
BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759
F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818A308187300E0603551D0F0101FF0404
030204F030090603551D1304023000301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387D8D
D85B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA764040
4A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B
0601050507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A
8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D84A7C692FF9586E82228718F63BC305F0
AEB8AEEC4278823879812A5D156164022008F23C136913B02CE26309D5994FEB
7570AFAFED98CDF11211C037F7184DC19D

Certificate:
Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number: 3092288576548618702 (0x2aea0413a42dc1ce)
 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
 Issuer: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",
         L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US
 Validity
   Not Before: Dec  9 12:50:47 2022 GMT
   Not After : Dec  6 12:50:47 2032 GMT
 Subject: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",
         L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US
 Subject Public Key Info:
   Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
     Public-Key: (256 bit)
     pub:
       04:97:b1:ed:96:91:64:93:09:85:bb:b8:ac:9a:2a:
       f9:45:5c:df:ee:a4:b1:1d:e2:e7:9d:06:8b:fa:80:
       39:26:b4:00:52:51:b3:4f:1c:08:15:a4:cb:e0:3f:
       bd:1b:bc:b6:35:f6:43:1a:22:de:78:65:3b:87:b9:
       95:37:ec:e1:6c
     ASN1 OID: prime256v1
     NIST CURVE: P-256
 X509v3 extensions:
   X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
     email:help@custom-er.example.com
   X509v3 Key Usage: critical
     Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
   X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
     CA:TRUE
   X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
     92:EA:76:40:40:4A:8F:AB:4F:27:0B:F3:BC:37:9D:86:CD:72:80:F8
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
 30:44:02:20:66:15:df:c3:70:11:f6:73:78:d8:fd:1c:2a:3f:
 bd:d1:3f:51:f6:b6:6f:2d:7c:e2:7a:13:18:21:bb:70:f0:c0:
 02:20:69:86:d8:d2:28:b2:92:6e:23:9e:19:0b:8f:18:25:c9:
 c1:4c:67:95:ff:a0:b3:24:bd:4d:ac:2e:cb:68:d7:13

30820242308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D
0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C
204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F
6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B30
0906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D3232313230
393132353034375A170D3332313230363132353034375A3072311C301A060355
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B
0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111
300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B
30090603550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03
01070342000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D06
8BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87
B99537ECE16CA369306730250603551D11041E301C811A68656C704063757374
6F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF0404030201
86300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF301D0603551D0E0416041492EA76
40404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D040302034700
304402206615DFC37011F67378D8FD1C2A3FBDD13F51F6B66F2D7CE27A131821
BB70F0C002206986D8D228B2926E239E190B8F1825C9C14C6795FFA0B324BD4D
AC2ECB68D713

Certificate:
Data:
 Version: 3 (0x2)
 Serial Number:
   e3:9c:da:17:e1:38:6a:0a
 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
 Issuer: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,
         C = NL
 Validity
   Not Before: Dec  9 12:50:47 2022 GMT
   Not After : Dec  6 12:50:47 2032 GMT
 Subject: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,
         C = NL
 Subject Public Key Info:
   Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
     Public-Key: (256 bit)
     pub:
       04:92:f4:d5:65:58:97:73:b7:03:58:f3:5c:8f:94:
       7d:94:38:36:16:86:56:00:65:fb:2a:9c:43:d2:15:
       92:a7:ab:c9:aa:f2:01:7b:f1:95:5b:62:2e:aa:d8:
       51:20:f2:49:0e:45:8f:eb:a4:85:3f:5f:b4:90:b1:
       1b:83:fb:03:16
     ASN1 OID: prime256v1
     NIST CURVE: P-256
 X509v3 extensions:
   X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
     email:info@masa.stok.nl
   X509v3 Key Usage: critical
     Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
   X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
     CA:TRUE, pathlen:3
   X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
     CB:8D:98:CA:74:C5:1B:58:DD:E7:AC:EF:86:9A:94:43:A8:D6:66:A6
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
 30:46:02:21:00:94:3f:a5:26:51:68:16:38:5b:78:9a:d8:c3:
 af:8e:49:28:22:60:56:26:43:4a:14:98:3e:e1:e4:81:ad:ca:
 1b:02:21:00:ba:4d:aa:fd:fa:68:42:74:03:2b:a8:41:6b:e2:
 90:0c:9e:7b:b8:c0:9c:f7:0e:3f:b4:36:8a:b3:9c:3e:31:0e

308201F130820196A003020102020900E39CDA17E1386A0A300A06082A8648CE
3D040302304B3115301306035504030C0C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C311330
11060355040A0C0A76616E64657273746F6B3110300E06035504070C0748656C
6D6F6E64310B3009060355040613024E4C301E170D3232313230393132353034
375A170D3332313230363132353034375A304B3115301306035504030C0C6D61
73612E73746F6B2E6E6C31133011060355040A0C0A76616E64657273746F6B31
10300E06035504070C0748656C6D6F6E64310B3009060355040613024E4C3059
301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000492F4D565589773
B70358F35C8F947D9438361686560065FB2A9C43D21592A7ABC9AAF2017BF195
5B622EAAD85120F2490E458FEBA4853F5FB490B11B83FB0316A3633061301C06
03551D11041530138111696E666F406D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C300E060355
1D0F0101FF04040302018630120603551D130101FF040830060101FF02010330
1D0603551D0E04160414CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6300A
06082A8648CE3D0403020349003046022100943FA526516816385B789AD8C3AF
8E492822605626434A14983EE1E481ADCA1B022100BA4DAAFDFA684274032BA8
416BE2900C9E7BB8C09CF70E3FB4368AB39C3E310E

C.3. COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request (PVR)

In this example, the voucher request (PVR) has been signed by the Pledge using the IDevID private key of Appendix C.1.1, and has been sent to the link-local constrained Join Proxy (JP) over CoAPS to the JP's join port. The join port happens to use the default CoAPS UDP port 5684.¶

  REQ: POST coaps://[JP-link-local-address]/b/rv
  Content-Format: 836
  Payload: <signed_pvr>

When the Join Proxy receives the DTLS handshake messages from the Pledge, it will relay these messages to the Registrar. The payload signed_voucher_request is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added) below:¶

D28443A10126A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B305930
1306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B
3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868F
C8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A4144413132
33343536373839584068987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BF
CE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC
1B817C7861A6104B3D

The representiation of signed_pvr in CBOR diagnostic format (with lf added) is:¶

18([h'A10126', {}, h'A11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B3059301
306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB1
5CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370
F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A41444131323334353637383
9', h'68987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B2
2F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D']
)

The COSE payload is the PVR voucher data, encoded as a CBOR byte string. The diagnostic representation of it is shown below:¶

{2501: {1: 2, 7: h'23BFBBC9C2BCF213', 12: h'3059301306072A8648CE3D02
0106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BD
C654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983
BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6', 13: "JADA123456789"}}

The Pledge uses the "proximity" (key '1', SID 2502, enum value 2) assertion together with an included proximity-registrar-pubk field (key '12', SID 2513) to inform MASA about its proximity to the specific Registrar.¶

C.4. COSE-signed Registrar Voucher Request (RVR)

In this example the Registrar's voucher request has been signed by the JRC (Registrar) using the private key from Appendix C.1.2. Contained within this voucher request is the voucher request PVR that was made by the Pledge to JRC. Note that the RVR uses the HTTPS protocol (not CoAP) and corresponding long URI path names as defined in [RFC8995]. The Content-Type and Accept headers indicate the constrained voucher format that is defined in the present document. Because the Pledge used this format in the PVR, the JRC must also use this format in the RVR.¶

  REQ: POST https://masa.stok.nl/.well-known/brski/requestvoucher
  Content-Type: application/voucher+cose
  Accept: application/voucher+cose
  Body: <signed_rvr>

The payload signed_rvr is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):¶

D28443A10126A11820825902843082028030820225A003020102020900C3F621
49B2E30E3E300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C134375
73746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118
3016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504
070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504
0613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D3235313230353131
333735395A30818D3131302F06035504030C28437573746F6D2D455220436F6D
6D65726369616C204275696C64696E6773205265676973747261723113301106
0355040B0C0A4F6666696365206F707331183016060355040A0C0F437573746F
6D2D45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070C064F74746F7761310B300906
035504080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413059301306072A8648CE3D
020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3E
B565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA
9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818730818430090603551D13040230
00300B0603551D0F0404030204F0301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387D8DD8
5B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA7640404A
8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B06
01050507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A86
48CE3D040302034900304602210091A2033692EB81503D53505FFC8DA326B1EE
7DEA96F29174F0B3341A07812201022100FF7339288108B712F418530A18025A
895408CC45E0BB678B46FBAB37DDB4D36B59024730820243308201E9A0030201
0202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A060355
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B
0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111
300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B
3009060355040613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D3332
313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D45
5220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118301606035504
0A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E
204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504061302555330
59301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164
930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C
0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F
0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C70
40637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF
040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D
86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A
7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE440619
2BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843590124A119
09C5A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432303A30343A31352E3735345A
05581A041830168014CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6074823
BFBBC9C2BCF2130958C9D28443A10126A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9
C2BCF2130C585B3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342
00042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E
1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA51
24F60D6D4A414441313233343536373839584068987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2
D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E2
5D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D0D6D4A41444131323334353637
38395840B1DD40B10787437588AEAC9036899191C16CCDBECA31C197855CCB6B
BA142D709FE329CBC3F76297D6063ACB6759EAB98E96EA4C4AA2135AA48A247B
AC1D6A3F

The representation of signed_rvr in CBOR diagnostic format (with lf added) is:¶

18([h'A10126', {32: [h'3082028030820225A003020102020900C3F62149B2E30
E3E300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D4
55220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0
C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7
365310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323
13230363131333735395A170D3235313230353131333735395A30818D3131302F060
35504030C28437573746F6D2D455220436F6D6D65726369616C204275696C64696E6
7732052656769737472617231133011060355040B0C0A4F6666696365206F7073311
83016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070
C064F74746F7761310B300906035504080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413
059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910
B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC85
04D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818730818430090603551
D1304023000300B0603551D0F0404030204F0301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387
D8DD85B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA7640404
A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B06010
50507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A8648CE3D0
40302034900304602210091A2033692EB81503D53505FFC8DA326B1EE7DEA96F2917
4F0B3341A07812201022100FF7339288108B712F418530A18025A895408CC45E0BB6
78B46FBAB37DDB4D36B', h'30820243308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1
CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D45
5220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C
0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F73
65310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D323231
3230363131333735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A060355
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02
495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F0603
5504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504
06130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1
ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B3
4F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F
0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C704063
7573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF04040302
0186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F830
0A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED9
33AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6
807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843']}, h'A11909C5A601020278183230323
22D31322D30365432303A30343A31352E3735345A05581A041830168014CB8D98CA7
4C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130958C9D28443A1012
6A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B3059301306072A8648CE3
D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB56
5BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67
983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A414441313233343536373839584068987DE8B
007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E
777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D0D6D4A41444131323
3343536373839', h'B1DD40B10787437588AEAC9036899191C16CCDBECA31C19785
5CCB6BBA142D709FE329CBC3F76297D6063ACB6759EAB98E96EA4C4AA2135AA48A24
7BAC1D6A3F'])

C.5. COSE-signed Voucher from MASA

The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned to the Registrar:¶

  RES: 200 OK
  Content-Type: application/voucher+cose
  Body: <signed_voucher>

The Registrar then returns the voucher to the Pledge:¶

  RES: 2.04 Changed
  Content-Format: 836
  Body: <signed_voucher>

It is signed by the MASA's private key (see Appendix C.1.3) and can be verified by the Pledge using the MASA's public key that it stores.¶

Below is the binary signed_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with lf added):¶

D28443A10126A0590288A1190993A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432
303A32333A33302E3730385A03F4074857EED786AD4049070859024730820243
308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D04030230
72311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C20434131
0B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D4552
2C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B3009060355
04080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D323231323036313133
3735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13
437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C024954
31183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F0603
5504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B30090603
550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342
000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA8039
26B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537EC
E16CA3693067300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E
301C811A68656C7040637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E
0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8F
AB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D04030203480030450221
00D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FA
DF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1
E5E8430B6D4A4144413132333435363738395840DF31B21A6AD3F5AC7F4C8B02
6F551BD28FBCE62330D3E262AC170F6BFEDDBA5F2E8FBAA2CAACFED9E8614EAC
5BF2450DADC53AC29DFA30E8787A1400B2E7C832

The representiation of signed_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format (with lf added) is:¶

18([h'A10126', {}, h'A1190993A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432303
A32333A33302E3730385A03F4074857EED786AD4049070859024730820243308201E
9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A0
6035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040
B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300
F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060
355040613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D333231323033313
1333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616
C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2
D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035
504080C024341310B30090603550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D0201060
82A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11
DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE786
53B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF302506035
51D11041E301C811A68656C7040637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6
D300E0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8
FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D
6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202
CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E8430B6D4
A414441313233343536373839', h'DF31B21A6AD3F5AC7F4C8B026F551BD28FBCE6
2330D3E262AC170F6BFEDDBA5F2E8FBAA2CAACFED9E8614EAC5BF2450DADC53AC29D
FA30E8787A1400B2E7C832'])

In the above, the third element in the array is the voucher data encoded as a CBOR byte string. When decoded, it can be represented by the following CBOR diagnostic notation:¶

{2451: {1: 2, 2: "2022-12-06T20:23:30.708Z", 3: false, 7: h'57EED786
AD404907', 8: h'30820243308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06
082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C
6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573
746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B30
0906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323132303631
31333735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13
437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118
3016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C
0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B30090603550406130255
533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164
930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815
A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F0603551D
130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C7040637573746F
6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D
0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A
8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E98
1F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD
8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843', 11: "JADA123456789"}}

The largest element in the voucher is identified by key 8, which decodes to SID 2459 (pinned-domain-cert). It contains the complete PKIX (DER-encoded X.509v3) certificate of the Registrar's domain CA. This certificate is shown in Appendix C.2.3.¶

E.1. Minimal Pledge

The Minimal Pledge profile (Min) aims to reduce code size and hardware cost to a minimum. This comes with some severe functional restrictions, in particular:¶

• No support for EST re-enrollment: whenever this would be needed, a factory reset followed by a new onboarding process is required.¶

• No support for change of Registrar: for this case, a factory reset followed by a new onboarding process is required.¶

This profile would be appropriate for single-use devices which must be replaced rather than re-deployed. That might include medical devices, but also sensors used during construction, such as concrete temperature sensors.¶

E.2. Typical Pledge

The Typical Pledge profile (Typ) aims to support a typical cBRSKI feature set including EST re-enrollment support and Registrar changes.¶

E.3. Full-featured Pledge

The Full-featured Pledge profile (Full) illustrates a Pledge category that supports multiple onboarding methods, hardware real-time clock, BRSKI/EST resource discovery, and CSR Attributes request/response. It also supports most of the optional features defined in this specification.¶

E.4. Comparison Chart of Pledge Classes

The below table specifies the functions implemented in the three example Pledge classes Min (Appendix E.1), Typ (Appendix E.2) and Full (Appendix E.3).¶

Notes: (*) means only possible via a factory-reset followed by a new cBRSKI onboarding procedure.¶