AVT A. Begen
Internet-Draft D. Wing
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: June 23, 2011 T. VanCaenegem
Alcatel-Lucent
December 20, 2010
Port Mapping Between Unicast and Multicast RTP Sessions
draft-ietf-avt-ports-for-ucast-mcast-rtp-10
Abstract
This document presents a port mapping solution that allows RTP
receivers to choose their own ports for an auxiliary unicast session
in RTP applications using both unicast and multicast services. The
solution provides protection against denial-of-service or packet
amplification attacks that could be used to cause one or more RTP
packets to be sent to a victim client.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 23, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Token-Based Port Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Motivating Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Normative Behavior and Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Port Mapping Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Port Mapping Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Token Verification Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3.1. Where to Include Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Token Verification Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Procedures for Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Validating Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. SDP Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1. The portmapping and portmapping-req Attributes . . . . . . 22
7.1.1. ABNF Definition of portmapping . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1.2. ABNF Definition of portmapping-req . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.1.3. Offer/Answer Model Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3. Example and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Address Pooling NATs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.1. Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
9.2. The portmapping and portmapping-req Attributes . . . . . . 28
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10.1. Registration of SDP Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10.2. Registration of RTCP Control Packet Types . . . . . . . . 29
10.3. SMT Values for TOKEN Packet Type Registry . . . . . . . . 30
10.4. RAMS Response Code Space Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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1. Introduction
In (any-source or source-specific) multicast RTP applications,
destination ports, i.e., the ports on which the multicast receivers
receive the RTP and RTCP packets, are defined declaratively. In
other words, the receivers cannot choose their receive ports and the
sender(s) use the pre-defined ports.
In unicast RTP applications, the receiving end needs to choose its
ports for RTP and RTCP since these ports are local resources and only
the receiving end can determine which ports are available to use. In
addition, Network Address Port Translators (NAPT - hereafter simply
called NAT) devices are commonly deployed in networks, thus, static
port assignments cannot be used. The receiving end may convey its
request to the sending end through different ways, one of which is
the Offer/Answer Model [RFC3264] for the Session Description Protocol
(SDP) [RFC4566]. However, the Offer/Answer Model requires offer/
answer exchange(s) between the endpoints, and the resulting delay may
not be desirable in delay-sensitive real-time applications.
Furthermore, the Offer/Answer Model may be burdensome for the
endpoints that are concurrently running a large number of unicast
sessions with other endpoints.
In this specification, we consider an RTP application that uses one
or more unicast and multicast RTP sessions together. While the
declaration and selection of the ports are well defined and work well
for multicast and unicast RTP applications, respectively, the usage
of the ports introduces complications when a receiving end mixes
unicast and multicast RTP sessions within the same RTP application.
An example scenario is where the RTP packets are distributed through
source-specific multicast (SSM) and a receiver sends unicast RTCP
NACK feedback to a local repair server (also functioning as a unicast
RTCP feedback target) [RFC5760] asking for a retransmission of the
packets it is missing, and the local repair server sends the
retransmission packets over a unicast RTP session [RFC4588].
Another scenario is where a receiver wants to rapidly acquire a new
primary multicast RTP session and receives one or more RTP burst
packets over a unicast session before joining the SSM session
[I-D.ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp]. Similar scenarios exist in
applications where some part of the content is distributed through
multicast while the receivers get additional and/or auxiliary content
through one or more unicast connections, as sketched in Figure 1.
In this document, we discuss this problem and introduce a solution
that we refer to as Port Mapping. This solution allows receivers to
choose their desired UDP ports for RTP and RTCP in every unicast
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session when they are running RTP applications using both unicast and
multicast services, and offer/answer exchange is not available. The
solution includes a Token-based protection mechanism against denial-
of-service (DoS) or packet amplification attacks that could be used
to cause one or more RTP packets to be sent to a victim client. This
solution is not applicable in cases where TCP is used as the
transport protocol in the unicast sessions. For such scenarios,
refer to [RFC4145].
-----------
| Unicast |................
| Source |............. :
| (Server) | : :
----------- : :
v v
----------- ---------- -----------
| Multicast |------->| Router |---------->|Client RTP |
| Source | | |..........>|Application|
----------- ---------- -----------
| :
| : -----------
| :..............>|Client RTP |
+---------------->|Application|
-----------
-------> Multicast RTP Flow
.......> Unicast RTP Flow
Figure 1: RTP applications simultaneously using both unicast and
multicast services
In the remainder of this document, we refer to the RTP endpoints that
serve other RTP endpoints over a unicast session as the Servers. The
receiving RTP endpoints are referred to as Clients. This terminology
also reflects the fact that when port mapping is used, the RTP
packets can only flow in one direction (from the server to the
client) in the unicast sessions.
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2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Token-Based Port Mapping
Token-based Port Mapping consists of two steps: (i) Token request
and retrieval, and (ii) unicast session establishment.
Once a Token is retrieved from a particular server, it can be used
for all the unicast sessions the client will be running with this
particular server till the Token expires. By default, Tokens are
server specific. However, the client can use the same Token to
communicate with different servers if these servers are provided with
the same secret key and algorithm used to generate the Token and are
at least loosely clock-synchronized.
The Token is essentially an opaque encapsulation that is based on
client's IP address (as seen by the server). When a Token request is
received, the server creates a Token for this particular client, and
sends it back to the client. The Token becomes invalid if client's
IP address (as seen by the server) changes (note that the client
cannot necessarily detect this in a timely manner) or when the server
expires the Token. In these cases, the client has to request a new
Token.
As the second step, when the client wants to establish a unicast
session, the client includes the Token with its RTCP feedback
message. The server validates the Token, making sure that the IP
address information matches. This is effective against DoS attacks,
e.g., an attacker cannot simply spoof another client's IP address and
start a unicast transmission towards random clients. If the
validation passes, the unicast session gets established. Otherwise,
the server notifies the client that the validation has failed, and in
this case, the unicast session will not be established.
Upon successful validation and once the unicast session is
established, all the RTP and RTCP rules specified in [RFC3550] and
other relevant specifications also apply in this session until it is
terminated. During the unicast session lifetime, certain actions and
messages by the client might need to be authorized by the server by
requiring a valid Token. Therefore, the server will need the client
to also include the Token along with the RTCP messages that are
different from the RTCP message that triggerred the unicast session
establishment. These are explained later in this document.
Below, we first present a motivating scenario for port mapping and
then describe the normative behavior and requirements.
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3.1. Motivating Scenario
Consider an SSM distribution network where a distribution source
multicasts RTP packets to a large number of clients, and one or more
retransmission servers function as feedback targets to collect
unicast RTCP feedback from these clients [RFC5760]. The
retransmission servers also join the multicast session to receive the
multicast packets and cache them for a certain time period. When a
client detects missing packets in the multicast session, it requests
a retransmission from one of the retransmission servers by using an
RTCP NACK message [RFC4585]. The retransmission server pulls the
requested packet(s) out of the cache and retransmits them to the
requesting client [RFC4588].
The RTP and RTCP flows pertaining to the scenario described above are
sketched in Figure 2. Between the client and server, we assume there
exists at least one NAT device [RFC4787] (If there is no NAT devices
between the server and client, the method still works the same
fashion). The multicast and unicast sessions are clearly identified
with their individual RTP and RTCP flows and port numbers.
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-------------- --- ----------
| |-------------------------------| |-->|P1 |
| |-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-| |.->|P2 |
| | | | | |
| Distribution | ---------------- | | | |
| Source | | | | | | |
| |---->|P1 | | | | |
| |.-.->|P2 | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
-------------- | P3|<.=.=.=.| |=.=|*c0 |
| P3|<~~~~~~~| |~~~|*c1 |
MULTICAST RTP | | | | | |
SESSION with | | | N | | |
UNICAST FEEDBACK | | | A | | |
| Retransmission | | T | | Client |
- - - - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - -| - - - -| - |- -| - - - - -|-
| Server | | | | |
| | | | | |
PORT MAPPING | PT|<~~~~~~~| |~~>|*cT |
| | | | | |
- - - - - - - - - - -| - - - - - - - -| - - - -| - |- -| - - - - -|-
| | | | | |
AUXILIARY UNICAST | | | | | |
RTP SESSION | | | | | |
| P3|........| |..>|*c1 |
| P3|=.=.=.=.| |=.>|*c1 |
| P4|<.=.=.=.| |=.=|*c2 |
| | | | | |
---------------- --- ----------
-------> Multicast RTP Flow
.-.-.-.> Multicast RTCP Flow
.=.=.=.> Unicast RTCP Reports
~~~~~~~> Unicast RTCP (Feedback) Messages
.......> Unicast RTP Flow
Figure 2: Example scenario showing an SSM distribution with support
for retransmissions from a server
In Figure 2, we have the following multicast and unicast ports:
o Ports P1 and P2 denote the destination RTP and RTCP ports in the
multicast session, respectively. The clients listen to these
ports to receive the multicast RTP and RTCP packets. Ports P1 and
P2 are defined declaratively.
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o Port P3 denotes the RTCP port on the feedback target running on
the retransmission server to collect any RTCP packet sent by the
clients including feedback messages, and RTCP receiver and
extended reports. This is also the port that the retransmission
server uses to send the RTP packets and RTCP sender reports in the
unicast session. Port P3 is defined declaratively.
o Port P4 denotes the RTCP port on the retransmission server used to
collect the RTCP receiver and extended reports for the unicast
session. Port P4 is defined declaratively.
o Ports *c0, *c1 and *c2 are chosen by the client. *c0 denotes the
port on the client used to send the RTCP reports for the multicast
session. *c1 denotes the port on the client used to send the
unicast RTCP feedback messages in the multicast session and to
receive the RTP packets and RTCP sender reports in the unicast
session. *c2 denotes the port on the client used to send the RTCP
receiver and extended reports in the unicast session. Ports c0,
c1 and c2 could be the same port or different ports. There are
two advantages of using the same port for both c0 and c1:
1. Some NATs only keep bindings active when a packet goes from
the inside to the outside of the NAT (See REQ-6 of Section 4.3
of [RFC4787]). When the gap between the packets sent from the
client to the server is long, this can exceed that timeout.
If c0=c1, the occasional (periodic) RTCP receiver reports sent
from port c0 (for the multicast session's RTCP port P3) will
ensure the NAT does not time out the public port associated
with the incoming unicast traffic to port c1.
2. Having c0=c1 conserves NAT port bindings.
o Ports PT and *cT denote the ports through which the Token request
and retrieval occur at the server and client sides, respectively.
Port PT is declared on a per unicast session basis, although the
same port could be used for two or more unicast sessions sourced
by the server. A Token once requested and retrieved by a client
from port PT remains valid until its expiration time.
We assume that the information declaratively defined is available as
part of the session description information and is provided to the
clients. The Session Description Protocol (SDP) [RFC4566] and other
session description methods can be used for this purpose.
3.2. Normative Behavior and Requirements
In this section, we describe the normative behavior and requirements.
To simplify the presentation, we refer to the port numbers described
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in the example presented in Figure 2. However, the behavior and
requirements described here are not specific to that particular
example, and can be applied to any scenario where analogous ports can
be identified.
First of all, a client compliant with this specification MUST be able
to include a Token with any type of RTCP message (as described below)
when it is needed. That is, clients MUST NOT implement this
specification with only a specific use case in mind.
Second, the solution provided in this specification is not applicable
in cases where there is RTP traffic flowing from the client to the
server in the unicast session. In other words, the direction of RTP
traffic MUST be only from the server to the client in the unicast
session. If the client wants to send RTP traffic back to the server,
the regular session establishment methods such as [RFC3264] need to
be used.
The following steps summarize the Token-based solution:
1. The client ascertains server address and port numbers (P3, P4 and
PT) from the session description. Port P4 MUST be different from
port P3. Port PT MAY be equal to port P3.
2. The client selects its local port numbers (*c0, *c1, *c2 and
*cT). It is strongly RECOMMENDED that the client uses the same
port for c0 and c1. Port cT MAY be equal to ports c0 and c1.
3. If the client does not have a Token (or the existing Token has
expired):
A. The client first sends a Port Mapping Request message
(Section 4.1) to port PT. This message is sent from port *cT
on the client side. The server learns client's IP address
from the received message. The client can send this message
anytime it wants (e.g., during initialization), and does not
normally ever need to re-send this message (See Section 6).
B. The server generates an opaque encapsulation (i.e., the
Token) based on certain information including the client's IP
address.
C. The server sends the Token back to the client using a Port
Mapping Response message (Section 4.2). This message MUST be
sent from port PT to port cT.
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4. The client needs to provide the Token to the server using a Token
Verification Request message (Section 4.3), whenever the client
sends an RTCP feedback message for triggering or controlling a
unicast session (See Section 4.3.1). If the Token is invalid or
missing, the server sends a Token Verification Failure message
(Section 4.4) to the client.
Note that the unicast session is only established after the
server has received a feedback message (along with a valid Token)
from the client for which it needs to react by sending unicast
data. Until a unicast session is established, neither the server
nor the client needs to send RTCP reports for the unicast
session.
5. Normal flows ensue as shown in Figure 2. Note that in the
unicast session, traffic from the server to the client (i.e.,
both the RTP and RTCP packets sent from port P3 to port c1) MUST
be multiplexed on the (same) port c1. If the client uses the
same port for both c0 and c1, the RTCP reports sent for the
multicast session keep the P3->c1(=c0) binding alive. If the
client uses different ports for c0 and c1, the client needs to
periodically send an explicit keep-alive message
[I-D.ietf-avt-app-rtp-keepalive] to keep the P3->c1 binding alive
during the lifetime of the unicast session if the time between
unicast feedback messages (from c1 to P3) is likely to exceed the
NAT's timeout value (For the NAT timeout value requirements, see
[RFC4787]).
A unicast session on a particular receive port c1 can last as long as
the associated multicast session lasts. However, a client cannot
keep using the same receive port c1 for different subsequent unicast
sessions since there could be packet leakage when switching from one
unicast session to another unless each received unicast stream has
its own distinct Synchronization Source (SSRC) identifier to allow
the client to filter out the undesired packets. Unless this is
guaranteed (which is not often easy), a client SHOULD use separate
receive ports for subsequent unicast sessions. After a sufficient
time, a previously used receive port could be used again.
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4. Message Formats
This section defines the formats of the RTCP messages that are
exchanged between a server and a client for the purpose of port
mapping. A new RTCP control packet type is introduced and four port
mapping messages using this control packet are defined:
1. Port Mapping Request
2. Port Mapping Response
3. Token Verification Request
4. Token Verification Failure
Each message has a fixed-length field for version (V), padding (P),
sub-message type (SMT), packet type (PT), length and SSRC of packet
sender. Messages have other fields as defined below. In all
messages defined in this section, the PT field is set to TOKEN.
Individual messages are identified by the SMT field. The length
field indicates the message size in 32-bit words minus one, including
the header and any padding. This definition is in line with the
definition of the length field used in RTCP sender and receiver
reports. In all messages, any Reserved field SHALL be set to zero
and ignored.
Following the rules specified in [RFC3550], all integer fields in the
messages defined below are carried in network-byte order, that is,
most significant byte (octet) first, also known as big-endian.
Unless otherwise stated, numeric constants are in decimal (base 10).
Note that RTCP is not a timely or reliable protocol. The RTCP
packets might get lost or re-ordered in the network. When sending a
new Port Mapping Request message, the scheduling rules that apply to
sending initial RTCP messages [RFC4585] apply. When a client sends a
Port Mapping Request or Token Verification Request message but it
does not receive a response back from the server (either a Port
Mapping Response or Token Verification Failure message), it MAY
resend its request by following the timer rules defined for RTCP
feedback messages in Section 3.5 of [RFC4585] as a good practice.
When sending an RTCP (feedback) message bundled with a Token
Verification Request message, the timer rules of [RFC4585] apply as
usual.
4.1. Port Mapping Request
The Port Mapping Request message is identified by SMT=1. This
message is transmitted by the client to a dedicated server port (and
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possibly a dedicated address) to request a Token. In the Port
Mapping Request message, the packet sender SSRC is set to the
client's SSRC. Here, the SSRC value is not necessarily linked to the
one used by the client in the multicast session. The packet format
has the structure depicted in Figure 3.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V=2|P| SMT=1 | PT=TOKEN | Length=3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Packet Sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random |
| Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Packet format for the Port Mapping Request message
o Random Nonce (64 bits): Field that contains a random value
generated by the client following the procedures of [RFC4086].
This nonce is taken into account by the server when generating a
Token for the client to enable better security for clients that
share the same IP address (Such clients need to produce a random
value guaranteed to be temporally and globally unique). If the
same Port Mapping Request message is transmitted multiple times
for redundancy reasons, the random nonce value MUST remain the
same in these duplicated messages. However, the client MUST
generate a new random nonce for every new Port Mapping Request
message.
4.2. Port Mapping Response
The Port Mapping Response message is identified by SMT=2. This
message is sent by the server and delivers the Token to the client as
a response to the Port Mapping Request message. In the Port Mapping
Response message, the packet sender SSRC is set to the server's SSRC.
The packet format has the structure depicted in Figure 4.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V=2|P| SMT=2 | PT=TOKEN | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Packet Sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Requesting Client |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Associated |
| Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Token Element :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Absolute |
| Expiration Time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Relative Expiration Time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Packet Types Element :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Packet format for the Port Mapping Response message
o SSRC of Requesting Client (32 bits): Field that contains the SSRC
of the client who sent the request.
o Associated Nonce (64 bits): Field that contains the nonce
received in the Port Mapping Request message and used in Token
construction.
o Token Element (Variable size): Element that is used to carry the
Token generated by the server. This element is a 32-bit aligned
Length-Value element. The Length field, which is 8 bits,
indicates the length (in octets) of the Value field that follows
the Length field. This length does not include any padding that
is required for alignment. The Value field carries the Token (or
more accurately, the output of the encoding process on the
server). If the Token element does not fall on a 32-bit boundary,
the last word MUST be padded to the boundary using further bits
set to zero.
o Absolute Expiration Time (64 bits): Field that contains the
absolute expiration time of the Token. The absolute expiration
time is expressed as a Network Time Protocol (NTP) timestamp value
in seconds since year 1900 [RFC5905]. The client does not need to
use this element directly, thus, does not need to synchronize its
clock with the server. However, the client needs to send this
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element back to the server along with the associated nonce in the
Token Verification Request message, thus, needs to keep it
associated with the Token.
o Relative Expiration Time (32 bits): Field that contains the
relative expiration time of the Token. The relative expiration
time is expressed in seconds from the time the Token was
generated. Whenever a server decides to not grant a Token to a
requesting client, the relative expiration time will be set to
zero (and hence, the accompanying Token will be invalid).
The server conveys the relative expiration time in the clear to
the client to allow the client to request a new Token well before
the expiration time.
o Packet Types Element (Variable size): Element that is used to
signal which RTCP packet types require Token-based authentication.
This element is a 32-bit aligned Length-Value element. The Length
field, which is 8 bits, indicates the length (in octets) of the
Value field that follows the Length field. This length does not
include any padding that is required for alignment. The Value
field carries zero or more 8-bit sub-fields each carrying an RTCP
packet type. If the Packet Types element does not fall on a 32-
bit boundary, the last word MUST be padded to the boundary using
further bits set to zero.
A server MAY change its policy on which RTCP packet types would
require Token-based authentication based on observations,
configuration or other policies. However, upon such a change the
server SHALL NOT send a new Port Mapping Response message to the
clients who requested a Token earlier. A client learns about this
change when and if it gets a Token Verification Failure message.
4.3. Token Verification Request
The Token Verification Request message is identified by SMT=3. This
message contains the Token and accompanies any RTCP message that
would trigger a new or control an existing unicast session. For a
list of such messages, see Section 4.3.1.
In the Token Verification Request message, the packet sender SSRC is
set to the client's SSRC. The client MUST NOT send a Token
Verification Request message with a Token that has expired. The
packet format has the structure depicted in Figure 5.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V=2|P| SMT=3 | PT=TOKEN | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Packet Sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Associated |
| Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: Token Element :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Associated Absolute |
| Expiration Time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: Packet format for the Token Verification Request message
o Associated Nonce (64 bits): Field that contains the nonce
associated with the Token above.
o Token Element (Variable size): Token element that was previously
received in the Port Mapping Response message.
o Associated Absolute Expiration Time (64 bits): Field that
contains the absolute expiration time associated with the Token
above.
4.3.1. Where to Include Token
This section provides guidelines about which RTCP packet types would
need to be accompanied by a Token Verification Request message.
However, since a server might determine in real time that other RTCP
messages also need to be authenticated by a Token, a client MUST act
according to the up-to-date list provided to the client in the Port
Mapping Response message (in the Packet Types element). Clients need
to support using Token-based authentication with any necessary RTCP
message (See Section 3.2).
As a general rule, when the Token capability is declared in the
session description, the RTCP messages that trigger transmission of
RTP packets in a port-mapped unicast session are REQUIRED to be
authenticated by using a Token. Such messages include but are not
limited to:
o NACK messages [RFC4585]
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o RAMS-R messages [I-D.ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp]
Additionally, some RTCP messages might directly or indirectly control
an existing unicast session associated with a multicast session.
Unless another authentication method as described in their respective
specifications is used, such RTCP messages might also need to be
authenticated by using a Token. Examples are:
o BYE messages [RFC3550]
o RAMS-T messages [I-D.ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp]
o CCM messages [RFC5104]
Note that even if a packet type is listed to require Token-based
authentication, it does not need to be authenticated when it does not
control the unicast session. For example, if BYE (203) is listed in
the Port Mapping Response message as one of the packet types that
requires authentication, the client does not need to bundle the RTCP
BYE message with a Token when it is sending it for the multicast
session.
The Token Verification Request message might also be bundled with
packets carrying RTCP receiver and/or extended reports. While such
packets do not have a strong security impact, a specific application
might desire to have a more controlled reporting scheme from the
clients. In this case, the server lists the packet types for the
receiver (201) and/or extended reports (207) in the Port Mapping
Response message.
4.4. Token Verification Failure
The Token Verification Failure message is identified by SMT=4. This
message is sent by the server and notifies the client that the Token
was invalid or that the client did not include a Token Verification
Request message in the RTCP packet although it was supposed to. In
the Token Verification Failure message, the packet sender SSRC is set
to the server's SSRC. The packet format has the structure depicted
in Figure 6.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V=2|P| SMT=4 | PT=TOKEN | Length=5 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Packet Sender |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SSRC of Requesting Client |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| PT of Request | Req. FMT| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Associated |
| Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Packet format for the Token Verification Failure message
o SSRC of Requesting Client (32 bits): Field that contains the SSRC
of the client who sent the verification request.
o PT of Request (8 bits): Field that indicates the type of the RTCP
packet that caused this failure message.
o Req. FMT (5 bits): Field that indicates the feedback message type
(FMT) value of the RTCP packet that caused this failure. Together
with the field above, the client can infer which RTCP message it
has previously sent caused this failure message to be sent by the
server. For example, if the client did not include a valid Token
with an RTCP NACK message, the PT of Request field will indicate
205 (RTPFB) and the Req. FMT field will indicate 1 (Generic NACK).
If the RTCP message did not have an associated FMT value (such as
an RTCP BYE message), the Req. FMT field SHALL be set to zero.
o Associated Nonce (64 bits): Field that contains the nonce
received in the Token Verification Request message. If there was
no Token Verification Request message included by the client, this
field is set to 0.
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5. Procedures for Token Construction
The Token encoding is known to the server but opaque to the client.
Implementations MUST encode the following information into the Token
as a minimum, in order to provide adequate security:
o Client's IP address as seen by the server (32/128 bits for IPv4/
IPv6 addresses)
o The nonce generated and inserted in the Port Mapping Request
message by the client (64 bits)
o The absolute expiration time chosen by the server indicated as an
NTP timestamp value in seconds since year 1900 [RFC5905] (64 bits,
to protect against replay attacks)
An example way for constructing Tokens is to perform HMAC-SHA1
[RFC2104] on the concatenated values of the information listed above.
The HMAC key needs to be at least 160 bits long, and generated using
a cryptographically secure random source [RFC4086]. While HMAC-SHA1
is the RECOMMENDED procedure, implementations might adopt different
approaches.
In addition to the information listed above, implementations are
encouraged to encode whatever additional information is deemed
necessary or useful. For example, key rollover is simplified by
encoding a key-id into the Token. As another example, a cluster of
anycast servers could find advantage by encoding a server identifier
into the Token. As another example, while HMAC-SHA1 provides a level
of security that is widely regarded as being more than sufficient for
providing message authentication and it is secure against all known
cryptanalytic attacks that use computational resources that are
currently economically feasible, if HMAC-SHA1 has been compromised, a
replacement HMAC algorithm could be used instead (e.g., HMAC-SHA256).
To protect from offline attacks, the server SHOULD occasionally
choose a new HMAC key. To ease implementation, a key-id can be
assigned to each HMAC key. This can be encoded as simply as one bit
(where the new key is X (e.g., 1) and the old key is the inverted
value of X (e.g., 0)), or if several keys are supported at once could
be encoded into several bits. As the encoding of the Token is
entirely private to the server and opaque to the clients, any
encoding can be used. By encoding the key-id into the Token element,
the server can reject an old key without bothering to do HMAC
validation (saving CPU cycles). The key-id can be encoded into the
Value field of the Token element by simply concatenating the
(plaintext) key-id with the hashed information (i.e., the Token
itself).
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For example, the Value field in the Token element can be computed as:
key-id || hash-alg (client-ip | nonce | abs-expiration)
During Token construction, the expiration time has to be chosen
carefully based on the intended service duration. Tokens that are
valid for an unnecessarily long period of time (e.g., several hours)
might impose security risks. Depending on the application and use
cases, a reasonable value needs to be chosen by the server. Note
that using shorter lifetimes requires the clients to acquire Tokens
more frequently. However, since a client can acquire a new Token
well before it will need to use it, the client will not necessarily
be penalized for the acquisition delay.
Finally, be aware that NTP timestamps will wrap around in year 2036
and implementations might need to handle this eventually. Refer to
Section 6 of [RFC5905] for further details.
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6. Validating Tokens
Upon receipt of an RTCP feedback message along with the Token
Verification Request message that contains a Token, nonce and
absolute expiration time, the server MUST validate the Token.
The server first applies its own procedure for constructing the
Tokens by using client's IP address from the received Token
Verification Request message, and the nonce and absolute expiration
time values reported in the received Token Verification Request
message. The server then compares the resulting output with the
Token sent by the client in the Token Verification Request message.
If they match and the absolute expiration time has not passed yet,
the server declares that the Token is valid.
Note that if the client's IP address changes, the Token will not
validate. Similarly, if the client inserts an incorrect nonce or
absolute expiration time value in the Token Verification Request
message, validation will fail. It is also possible that the server
wants to expire the Token prematurely. In these cases, the server
MUST reply back to the client with a Token Verification Failure
message (that goes from port P3 on the server to port c1 on the
client).
In addition to the Token Verification Failure message, it is
RECOMMENDED that applications define an application-specific error
response to be sent by the server when the server detects that the
Token is invalid. For applications using
[I-D.ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp], this document defines a new
4xx-level response code in the RAMS Response Code Space Registry. A
client that received a Token Verification Failure message can request
a new Token from the server.
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7. SDP Signaling
7.1. The portmapping and portmapping-req Attributes
The 'portmapping' attribute is used declaratively without any
parameters in a multicast block in an SDP description. It provides a
hint information to the SDP recipient that one or more unicast
sessions associated with this multicast session require the use of
Tokens for certain RTCP messages. The 'portmapping-req' attribute is
also used declaratively but in a unicast block. It indicates the
port and optionally the address for obtaining a Token.
In an SDP description, there could be one or more multicast sessions
described, each associated with zero or more unicast sessions. The
recipient of the SDP description infers the association(s) between
the multicast and unicast sessions through the "a=group" line(s).
The presence of the 'portmapping' and 'portmapping-req' attribute
pair indicates that (i) a Token MUST be included in certain feedback
messages sent to the server triggering or controlling a unicast
session (See Section 4.3.1), and (ii) the client MUST receive the
unicast session's RTP and RTCP packets from the server on the port
from which it sent the RTCP message triggering or controlling the
unicast session.
Note: This does not imply that Token Verification Request
messages need to be sent in the unicast session. Token
Verification Request messages accompany RTCP messages that trigger
or control this unicast session, and are sent either in the
multicast session or the unicast session, depending on the RTCP
message (See Section 4.3.1).
7.1.1. ABNF Definition of portmapping
The formal description of the 'portmapping' attribute is defined by
the following ABNF [RFC5234] syntax:
portmapping-attr = "a=portmapping"
This attribute SHALL be used as a media-level attribute in a
multicast block in SDP descriptions.
7.1.2. ABNF Definition of portmapping-req
The formal description of the 'portmapping-req' attribute is defined
by the following ABNF [RFC5234] syntax:
portmapping-req-attr = "a=portmapping-req" [":" port [SP nettype SP
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addrtype SP connection-address]] CRLF
Here, 'port', 'nettype', 'addrtype' and 'connection-address' are
defined as specified in Section 9 of [RFC4566].
The 'portmapping-req' attribute SHALL be used as a media-level
attribute in a unicast block in SDP descriptions.
In the optional address value, only unicast addresses SHOULD be used
unless one wants to use a multicast address after evaluating the
additional security risks such as non-legit servers generating fake
Tokens. If the address is not specified, the (source) address in the
"c" line corresponding to the unicast media stream is implied.
7.1.3. Offer/Answer Model Considerations
When using the attributes defined above in SDP offer/answer exchanges
[RFC3264], the following considerations apply. When an offerer sends
an answerer an offer of an SDP description making use of the Token
approach described in this specification, the 'portmapping' and
'portmapping-req' attributes are included declaratively. There will
not be offer/answer exchanges between the answerer and the actual
server providing the unicast service(s).
When the answerer supports the Token approach, it MUST echo in its
answer back to the offerer the 'portmapping' and 'portmapping-req'
attributes from the offer including the same port number and address
(if any) for the 'portmapping-req' attribute. If the answerer does
not implement this specification, it follows normal SDP parsing of
unknown attributes (they are ignored and are not sent in the answer).
This means that the answerer can still join the multicast session,
but will not be able to use the unicast service(s) that require the
use of Tokens.
7.2. Requirements
The use of SDP for the port mapping solution normatively requires the
support for:
o The SDP grouping framework and flow identification (FID) semantics
[RFC5888]
o The RTP/AVPF profile [RFC4585]
o Multiplexing RTP and RTCP on a single port on both endpoints in
the unicast session [RFC5761]
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7.3. Example and Discussion
The declarative SDP describing the scenario given in Figure 2 is
written as:
v=0
o=ali 1122334455 1122334466 IN IP4 nack.example.com
s=Local Retransmissions
t=0 0
a=group:FID 1 2
a=rtcp-unicast:rsi
m=video 41000 RTP/AVPF 98
i=Multicast Stream
c=IN IP4 233.252.0.2/255
a=source-filter:incl IN IP4 233.252.0.2 198.51.100.1 ; Note 1
a=rtpmap:98 MP2T/90000
a=multicast-rtcp:41500 ; Note 1
a=rtcp:42000 IN IP4 192.0.2.1 ; Note 2
a=rtcp-fb:98 nack ; Note 2
a=portmapping ; Note 3
a=mid:1
m=video 42000 RTP/AVPF 99 ; Note 4
i=Unicast Retransmission Stream
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
a=sendonly
a=rtpmap:99 rtx/90000
a=rtcp-mux ; Note 5
a=rtcp:42500 ; Note 6
a=fmtp:99 apt=98; rtx-time=5000
a=portmapping-req:30000 ; Note 7
a=mid:2
Figure 7: SDP describing an SSM distribution with support for
retransmissions from a local server
In this description, we highlight the following notes:
Note 1: The source stream is multicast from a distribution source
with a source IP address of 198.51.100.1 to the multicast destination
address of 233.252.0.2 and port 41000 (P1). The associated RTCP
packets are multicast in the same group to port 41500 (P2).
Note 2: A retransmission server including feedback target
functionality with an IP address of 192.0.2.1 and port of 42000 (P3)
is specified with the 'rtcp' attribute. The feedback functionality
is enabled for the RTP stream with payload type 98 through the
'rtcp-fb' attribute [RFC4585].
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Note 3: The "a=portmapping" line together with the "a=group" line
hints that a Token needs to be retrieved first before the unicast
session can be established.
Note 4: The port specified in the second "m" line (for the unicast
stream) does not mean anything in this scenario as the client does
not send any RTP traffic back to the server.
Note 5: The server multiplexes RTP and RTCP packets on the same port
(c1 in Figure 2).
Note 6: The server uses port 42500 (P4) for the unicast session.
Note 7: The "a=portmapping-req" line indicates that the Port Mapping
Request message needs to be sent to port 30000 (PT). Since there is
no address indicated in this line, the client needs to send the Token
request to the address specified in the "c" line.
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8. Address Pooling NATs
Large-scale NAT devices have a pool of public IPv4 addresses and map
internal hosts to one of those public IPv4 addresses. As long as an
internal host maintains an active mapping in the NAT, the same IPv4
address is assigned to new connections. However, once all of the
host's mappings have been deleted (e.g., because of timeout), it is
possible that a new connection from that same host will be assigned a
different IPv4 address from the pool. When that occurs, the Token
will be considered invalid by the server, causing an additional round
trip for the client to acquire a fresh Token.
Any traffic from the host which traverses the NAT will prevent this
problem. As the host is sending RTCP receiver reports at least every
5 seconds (Section 6.2 of [RFC3550]) for the multicast session it is
receiving, those RTCP messages will be sufficient to prevent this
problem.
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9. Security Considerations
9.1. Tokens
The Token, which is generated based on a client's IP address and
expiration date, provides protection against off-path denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks. An attacker using a certain IP address cannot
cause one or more RTP packets to be sent to a victim client who has a
different IP address. However, if the attacker acquires a valid
Token for a victim and can spoof the victim's source address, this
approach becomes vulnerable to replay attacks. This is especially
easy if the attacker and victim are behind a large-scale NAT and
share the same IP address.
Multicast is deployed on managed networks - not the Internet. These
managed networks will choose to enable network ingress filtering
[RFC2827] or not. If ingress filtering is enabled on a network, an
attacker cannot spoof a victim's IP address to use a Token to
initiate an attack against a victim. However, if ingress filtering
is not enabled on a network, an attacker could obtain a Token and
spoof the victim's address, causing traffic to flood the victim. On
such a network, the server can reduce the time period for such an
attack by expiring a Token in a short period of time. In the extreme
case, the server can expire the Token in such a short period of time,
such that the client will have to acquire a new Token immediately
before using it in a Token Verification Request message. One should,
however, note that such a behavior might have an adverse effect on
the delay in establishing or controlling a unicast session.
RTCP messages could be subject to on-path or man-in-the-middle
attacks. For example, an attacker can modify a value in one or more
fields in the Port Mapping Response or the Token Verification Request
message that are used in Token construction. This will result in
Token validation failure. Consequently, the client ends up asking
the server to generate a new Token. The resulting delay and extra
processing on the server are undesirable.
Alternatively, the attacker can modify a value in a field that is not
used in Token construction. For example, the attacker can reduce the
value in the Relative Expiration Time field in the Port Mapping
Response message from two hours to two minutes. While the Token will
still validate, this attack will result in more frequent requests to
the server for a new Token. Oppositely, the attacker can increase
the value in the Relative Expiration Time field, and make the client
think the Token will be valid for a longer time. This attack can be
only detected by monitoring the activity on the server. Note that
using the relative expiration time in Token construction does not
necessarily make this attack to be detected more easily since the
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attacker might revert the modified value back to its original value
in the Token Verification Request message. This allows the Token to
still validate on the server. In this case, the attack is still only
detectable by monitoring the server activity.
If there is a risk or concern for on-path or man-in-the-middle
attacks, RTCP messages SHOULD be protected by Secure RTCP (SRTCP)
[RFC3711].
9.2. The portmapping and portmapping-req Attributes
The 'portmapping' attribute does not introduce a significant security
risk. It is used for informative purposes as a hint in a multicast
block in SDP descriptions and without the use of the 'portmapping-
req' attribute in an associated unicast block, its existence does not
mean anything and SHALL be ignored. However, if the 'portmapping-
req' attribute exists in the unicast block but the 'portmapping'
attribute is missing in the associated multicast block (which is
inferred through the "a=group" line), the clients MUST still behave
as if the 'portmapping' attribute existed in the multicast block.
The 'portmapping-req' attribute is not believed to introduce any
significant security risk to multimedia applications. A malevolent
third party could use this attribute to redirect the Port Mapping
Request messages by altering the port number or cause the unicast
session establishment to fail by removing it from the SDP
description. But, this requires intercepting and rewriting the
packets carrying the SDP description; and if an interceptor can do
that, many more attacks are possible, including a wholesale change of
the addresses and port numbers at which the media will be sent.
In order to avoid attacks of this sort, the SDP description needs to
be integrity protected and provided with source authentication. This
can, for example, be achieved on an end-to-end basis using S/MIME
[RFC5652] when SDP is used in a signaling packet using MIME types
(application/sdp). Alternatively, HTTPS [RFC2818] or the
authentication method in the Session Announcement Protocol (SAP)
[RFC2974] could be used as well.
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10. IANA Considerations
The following contact information shall be used for all registrations
in this document:
Ali Begen
abegen@cisco.com
Note to the RFC Editor: In the following, please replace "XXXX" with
the number of this document prior to publication as an RFC.
10.1. Registration of SDP Attributes
This document registers two new attribute names in SDP.
SDP Attribute ("att-field"):
Attribute name: portmapping
Long form: Hint for the use of port mapping
Type of name: att-field
Type of attribute: Media level
Subject to charset: No
Purpose: See this document
Reference: [RFCXXXX]
Values: See this document
SDP Attribute ("att-field"):
Attribute name: portmapping-req
Long form: Port and address for requesting Token
Type of name: att-field
Type of attribute: Media level
Subject to charset: No
Purpose: See this document
Reference: [RFCXXXX]
Values: See this document
10.2. Registration of RTCP Control Packet Types
In accordance with Section 15 of [RFC3550], this specification adds
the following value to the RTCP Control Packet types sub-registry of
the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) Parameters registry:
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Value Abbrev. Name Reference
-------- --------- --------------------------------------- ---------
TBD TOKEN Port Mapping [RFCXXXX]
Note to the IANA: Please assign the next available value, which is
currently 210.
10.3. SMT Values for TOKEN Packet Type Registry
This document creates a new sub-registry for the sub-message type
(SMT) values to be used with the TOKEN packet type. The registry is
called the SMT Values for TOKEN Packet Type Registry. This registry
is to be managed by the IANA according to the IETF Review policy of
[RFC5226].
The length of the SMT field is five bits, allowing 32 values. The
registry is initialized with the following entries:
Value Name Reference
----- -------------------------------------------------- -------------
0 Reserved [RFCXXXX]
1 Port Mapping Request [RFCXXXX]
2 Port Mapping Response [RFCXXXX]
3 Token Verification Request [RFCXXXX]
4 Token Verification Failure [RFCXXXX]
5-30 Unassigned IETF Review
31 Reserved [RFCXXXX]
The SMT values 0 and 31 are reserved for future use.
10.4. RAMS Response Code Space Registry
This document adds the following entry to the RAMS Response Code
Space Registry.
Code Description Reference
----- -------------------------------------------------- -------------
405 Invalid Token [RFCXXXX]
This response code is used when the Token included by the RTP_Rx in
the RAMS-R message is invalid.
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11. Acknowledgments
The approach presented in this document came out after discussions
with various individuals in the AVT and MMUSIC WGs, and the breakout
session held in the Anaheim meeting. We thank each of these
individuals, in particular to Magnus Westerlund and Colin Perkins.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC4585] Ott, J., Wenger, S., Sato, N., Burmeister, C., and J. Rey,
"Extended RTP Profile for Real-time Transport Control
Protocol (RTCP)-Based Feedback (RTP/AVPF)", RFC 4585,
July 2006.
[RFC5760] Ott, J., Chesterfield, J., and E. Schooler, "RTP Control
Protocol (RTCP) Extensions for Single-Source Multicast
Sessions with Unicast Feedback", RFC 5760, February 2010.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC5888] Camarillo, G. and H. Schulzrinne, "The Session Description
Protocol (SDP) Grouping Framework", RFC 5888, June 2010.
[RFC5761] Perkins, C. and M. Westerlund, "Multiplexing RTP Data and
Control Packets on a Single Port", RFC 5761, April 2010.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
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12.2. Informative References
[RFC3264] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264,
June 2002.
[RFC4145] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in
the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145,
September 2005.
[I-D.ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp]
Steeg, B., Begen, A., Caenegem, T., and Z. Vax, "Unicast-
Based Rapid Acquisition of Multicast RTP Sessions",
draft-ietf-avt-rapid-acquisition-for-rtp-17 (work in
progress), November 2010.
[RFC4787] Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address Translation
(NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP", BCP 127,
RFC 4787, January 2007.
[RFC4588] Rey, J., Leon, D., Miyazaki, A., Varsa, V., and R.
Hakenberg, "RTP Retransmission Payload Format", RFC 4588,
July 2006.
[I-D.ietf-avt-app-rtp-keepalive]
Marjou, X. and A. Sollaud, "Application Mechanism for
keeping alive the Network Address Translator (NAT)
mappings associated to RTP flows.",
draft-ietf-avt-app-rtp-keepalive-09 (work in progress),
September 2010.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5104] Wenger, S., Chandra, U., Westerlund, M., and B. Burman,
"Codec Control Messages in the RTP Audio-Visual Profile
with Feedback (AVPF)", RFC 5104, February 2008.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, September 2009.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
Begen, et al. Expires June 23, 2011 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Port Mapping December 2010
[RFC2974] Handley, M., Perkins, C., and E. Whelan, "Session
Announcement Protocol", RFC 2974, October 2000.
Begen, et al. Expires June 23, 2011 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Port Mapping December 2010
Authors' Addresses
Ali Begen
Cisco
181 Bay Street
Toronto, ON M5J 2T3
Canada
Email: abegen@cisco.com
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: dwing@cisco.com
Tom VanCaenegem
Alcatel-Lucent
Copernicuslaan 50
Antwerpen, 2018
Belgium
Email: Tom.Van_Caenegem@alcatel-lucent.com
Begen, et al. Expires June 23, 2011 [Page 35]
