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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 rfc5883          Standards Track
                                                        IPR declarations
Network Working Group                                           D. Katz
Internet Draft                                         Juniper Networks
Intended status: Proposed Standard                              D. Ward
                                                       Juniper Networks
Expires: July, 2010                                     January 5, 2010

                         BFD for Multihop Paths

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
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Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 1]

Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010


   This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding
   Detection protocol (BFD) over multihop paths, including
   unidirectional links.

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [KEYWORDS].

1. Introduction

   The Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol [BFD] defines a
   method for liveness detection of arbitrary paths between systems.
   The BFD one-hop specification [BFD-1HOP] describes how to use BFD
   across single hops of IPv4 and IPv6.

   BFD can also be useful on arbitrary paths between systems, which may
   span multiple network hops and follow unpredictable paths.
   Furthermore, a pair of systems may have multiple paths between them
   that may overlap.  This document describes methods for using BFD in
   such scenarios.

2. Applicability

   Please note that BFD is intended as a connectivity check/connection
   verification OAM mechanism.  It is applicable for network-based
   services (e.g. router-to-router, subscriber-to-gateway, LSP/circuit
   endpoints and service appliance failure detection).  In these
   scenarios it is required that the operator correctly provision the
   rates at which BFD is transmitted to avoid congestion (e.g link, I/O,
   CPU) and false failure detection.  It is not applicable for
   application-to-application failure detection across the Internet
   because it does not have sufficient capability to do necessary
   congestion detection and avoidance and therefore cannot prevent
   congestion collapse. Host-to-host or application-to-application
   deployment across the Internet will require the encapsulation of BFD
   within a transport that provides "TCP-friendly" [TFRC] behavior.

Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 2]

Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010

3. Issues

   There are three primary issues in the use of BFD for multihop paths.
   The first is security and spoofing; [BFD-1HOP] describes a
   lightweight method of avoiding spoofing by requiring a TTL/hop limit
   of 255 on both transmit and receive, but this obviously does not work
   across multiple hops.  The utilization of BFD authentication
   addresses this issue.

   The second, more subtle issue is that of demultiplexing multiple BFD
   sessions between the same pair of systems to the proper BFD session.
   In particular, the first BFD packet received for a session may carry
   a Your Discriminator value of zero, resulting in ambiguity as to
   which session the packet should be associated.  Once the
   discriminator values have been exchanged, all further packets are
   demultiplexed to the proper BFD session solely by the contents of the
   Your Discriminator field.

   [BFD-1HOP] addresses this by requiring that multiple sessions
   traverse independent physical or logical links--the first packet is
   demultiplexed based on the link over which it was received.  In the
   more general case, this scheme cannot work, as two paths over which
   BFD is running may overlap to an arbitrary degree (including the
   first and/or last hop.)

   Finally, the Echo function MUST NOT be used over multiple hops.
   Intermediate hops would route the packets back to the sender, and
   connectivity through the entire path would not be possible to verify.

4. Demultiplexing Packets

   There are a number of possibilities for addressing the demultiplexing
   issue which may be used, depending on the application.

4.1. Totally Arbitrary Paths

   It may be desired to use BFD for liveness detection over paths for
   which no part of the route is known (or if known, may not be stable.)
   A straightforward approach to this problem is to limit BFD deployment
   to a single session between a source/destination address pair.
   Multiple sessions between the same pair of systems must have at least
   one endpoint address distinct from one another.

   In this scenario, the initial packet is demultiplexed to the
   appropriate BFD session based on the source/destination address pair
   when Your Discriminator is set to zero.

Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 3]

Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010

   This approach is appropriate for general connectivity detection
   between systems over routed paths, and is also useful for OSPF
   Virtual Links [OSPFv2] [OSPFv3].

4.2. Out-of-band Discriminator Signaling

   Another approach to the demultiplexing problem is to signal the
   discriminator values in each direction through an out-of-band
   mechanism prior to establishing the BFD session.  Once learned, the
   discriminators are sent as usual in the BFD Control packets;  no
   packets with Your Discriminator set to zero are ever sent.  This
   method is used by the BFD MPLS specification [BFD-MPLS].

   This approach is advantageous because it allows BFD to be directed by
   other system components that have knowledge of the paths in use, and
   from the perspective of BFD implementation it is very simple.

   The disadvantage is that it requires at least some level of BFD-
   specific knowledge in parts of the system outside of BFD.

4.3. Unidirectional Links

   Unidirectional links are classified as multihop paths because the
   return path (which should exist at some level in order to make the
   link useful) may be arbitrary, and the return paths for BFD sessions
   protecting parallel unidirectional links may overlap or even be
   identical.  (If two unidirectional links, one in each direction, are
   to carry a single BFD session, this can be done using the single-hop

   Either of the two methods outlined earlier may be used in the
   Unidirectional link case, but a more general solution can be done
   strictly within BFD and without addressing limitations.

   The approach is similar to the one-hop specification, since the
   unidirectional link is a single hop.  Let's define the two systems as
   the Unidirectional Sender and the Unidirectional Receiver.  In this
   approach the Unidirectional Sender MUST operate in the Active role
   (as defined in the base BFD specification), and the Unidirectional
   Receiver MUST operate in the Passive role.

   In the Passive role, by definition, the Unidirectional Receiver does
   not transmit any BFD Control packets until it learns the
   discriminator value in use by the other system (upon receipt of the
   first BFD Control packet.)  The Unidirectional Receiver demultiplexes
   the first packet to the proper BFD session based on the physical or

Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 4]

Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010

   logical link over which was received.  This allows the receiver to
   learn the remote discriminator value, which it then echoes back to
   the sender in its own (arbitrarily routed) BFD Control packet, after
   which time all packets are demultiplexed solely by discriminator.

5. Encapsulation

   The encapsulation of BFD Control packets for multihop application in
   IPv4 and IPv6 is identical to that defined in [BFD-1HOP], except that
   the UDP destination port MUST have a value of 4784.  This can aid in
   the demultiplexing and internal routing of incoming BFD packets.

6. Authentication

   By their nature, multihop paths expose BFD to spoofing.  As the
   number of hops increase, the exposure to attack grows.  As such,
   implementations of BFD SHOULD utilize cryptographic authentication
   over multihop paths to help mitigate denial-of-service attacks.

Normative References

   [BFD] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection",
       draft-ietf-bfd-base-10.txt, January, 2010.

   [BFD-1HOP] Katz, D., and Ward, D., "BFD for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single
       Hop)", draft-ietf-bfd-v4v6-1hop-11.txt, January, 2010.

   [KEYWORD] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
       Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

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Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010

Informative References

   [BFD-MPLS] Aggarwal, R., Kompella, K., et al, "BFD for MPLS LSPs",
       draft-ietf-bfd-mpls-07.txt, June, 2008.

   [OSPFv2] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", RFC 2328, April 1998.

   [OSPFv3] Coltun, R., et al, "OSPF for IPv6", RFC 2740, December 1999.

   [TFRC] Floyd, S., et al, "TCP Friendly Rate Control (TFRC): Protocol
       Specification", RFC 5348, September, 2008.

Security Considerations

   As the number of hops increases, BFD becomes further exposed to
   attack.  The use of strong forms of authentication is strongly

   No additional security issues are raised in this document beyond
   those that exist in the referenced BFD documents.

IANA Considerations

   Port 4784 has been assigned by IANA for use with this protocol.

Authors' Addresses

    Dave Katz
    Juniper Networks
    1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
    Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206 USA
    Phone: +1-408-745-2000
    Email: dkatz@juniper.net

    Dave Ward
    Juniper Networks
    1194 N. Mathilda Ave.
    Sunnyvale, California 94089-1206 USA
    Phone: +1-408-745-2000
    Email: dward@juniper.net

Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 6]

Internet Draft           BFD for Multihop Paths            January, 2010

Changes from the previous draft

   An applicability section was added.  All other changes are editorial
   in nature.

This document expires in July, 2010.

Katz, Ward                                                      [Page 7]