Network Working Group M. Jethanandani
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track A. Mishra
Expires: November 26, 2018 SES Networks
A. Saxena
Ciena Corporation
M. Bhatia
Nokia
May 25, 2018
Optimizing BFD Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-optimizing-authentication-05
Abstract
This document describes an optimization to BFD Authentication as
described in Section 6.7 of BFD RFC5880.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2018.
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Authentication Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. NULL Auth TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
Authenticating every BFD [RFC5880] packet with a Simple Password, or
with a MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] , or Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms is computationally intensive process,
making it difficult if not impossible to authenticate every packet -
particularly at faster rates. Also, the recent escalating series of
attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise
concerns about their remaining useful lifetime as outlined in Updated
Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5
Algorithm [RFC6151] and Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and
SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC6194]. If replaced by stronger
algorithms, the computational overhead, will make the task of
authenticating every packet even more difficult to achieve.
This document proposes that only BFD frames that signal a state
change in BFD be authenticated. Rest of the frames can be
transmitted and received without authentication enabled. Most frames
that are transmitted and received have no state change associated
with them. Limiting authentication to frames that affect a BFD
session state allows more sessions to be supported for
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authentication. Moreover, most BFD frames that signal a state change
are generally transmitted at a slower interval of 1s leaving enough
time to compute the hash.
Section 2 talks about the changes to authentication mode as described
in BFD [RFC5880].
2. Authentication Mode
The cryptographic authentication mechanisms specified in BFD
[RFC5880] describes enabling and disabling of authentication as a one
time operation. As a security precaution, it mentions that
authentication state be allowed to change at most once. Once
enabled, every packet must have Authentication Bit set and the
associated Authentication TLV appended. In addition, it states that
an implementation SHOULD NOT allow the authentication state to be
changed based on the receipt of a BFD Control packet.
This document proposes that the authentication mode be modified to be
enabled on demand. Instead of authenticating every packet, BFD peers
decide which frames need to be authenticated, and authenticate only
those frames. For example, the two ends can decide that BFD frames
that indicate a state change should be authenticated and enable
authentication on those frames only. If the two ends have not
previously negotiated which frames they will transmit or receive with
authentication enabled, then the BFD session will fail to come up,
because at least one end will expect every frame to be authenticated.
The state changes for which authentication is being suggested
include:
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Read : On state change from <column> to <row>
Auth : Authenticate frame
NULL : No Authentication. Use NULL AUTH TLV.
n/a : Invalid state transition.
Select : Most frames NULL AUTH. Selective (periodic)
frames authenticated.
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| | DOWN | INIT | UP | POLL | DEMAND |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| DOWN | NULL | Auth | Auth | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| INIT | Auth | NULL | Auth | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| UP | Auth | n/a | Select | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| POLL | Auth | n/a | Auth | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
| DEMAND | Auth | Auth | Auth | Auth | Auth |
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+
Optimized Authentication Map
All frames already carry the sequence number. The NULL AUTH frames
MUST contain the TLV specified in Section 3. This enables a
monotonically increasing sequence number to be carried in each frame,
and prevents man-in-the-middle from capturing and replaying the same
frame again. Since all frames still carry a sequence number, the
logic for sequence number maintenance remains unchanged from
[RFC5880]. If at a later time, a different scheme is adopted for
changing sequence number, this method can use the updated scheme
without any impact.
Most frames transmitted on a BFD session are BFD CC UP frames.
Authenticating a small subset of these frames (one per configured
period) significantly reduces the computational demand for the system
while maintaining security of the session across the configured
authentication periods. The configuration of the periodic
authentication interval for BFD CC UP frames is an open issue.
3. NULL Auth TLV
This section describes a new Authentication TLV as:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Auth Type | Auth Len | Auth Key ID | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
NULL Auth TLV
where:
Auth Type: The Authentication Type, which in this case is 0 (NULL
Auth TL)
Auth Len: The length of the NULL Auth TLV, in bytes i.e. 8 bytes
Auth Key ID: The authentication key ID in use for this packet. Must
be set to zero.
Reserved: The authentication key ID in use for this packet. This
allows multiple keys to be active simultaneously.
Sequence Number: The sequence number for this packet. Implementation
may use sequence numbers as defined in [RFC5880], or secure sequence
numbers as defined in [I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers].
The NULL Auth TLV must be used for all frames that are not
authenticated. This protects against replay-attacks by allowing the
session to maintain an incrementing sequence number for all frames
(authenticated and un-authenticated).
In the future, if a new scheme is adopted for changing the sequence
number, this method can adopt the new scheme without any impact.
4. IANA Considerations
This document requests an update to the registry titled "BFD
Authentication Types". IANA is requested to update the Value of 0
which is currently named as Reserved to NULL (see Section 3).
Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
RFC.
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5. Security Considerations
The approach described in this document enhances the ability to
authentication a BFD session by taking away the onerous requirement
that every frame be authenticated. By authenticating frames that
affect the state of the session, the security of the BFD session is
maintained. As such this document does not change the security
considerations for BFD.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-bfd-secure-sequence-numbers]
Jethanandani, M., Agarwal, S., Mishra, A., Saxena, A., and
A. DeKok, "Secure BFD Sequence Numbers", draft-ietf-bfd-
secure-sequence-numbers-01 (work in progress), November
2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.
[RFC5880] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
(BFD)", RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>.
[RFC6151] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
RFC 6151, DOI 10.17487/RFC6151, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6151>.
[RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.
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[SHA-1-attack1]
Wang, X., Yin, Y., and H. Yu, "Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1", 2005.
[SHA-1-attack2]
Wang, X., Yao, A., and F. Yao, "New Collision Search for
SHA-1", 2005.
Authors' Addresses
Mahesh Jethanandani
USA
Email: mjethanandani@gmail.com
Ashesh Mishra
SES Networks
Email: mishra.ashesh@gmail.com
Ankur Saxena
Ciena Corporation
3939 N 1st Street
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: ankurpsaxena@gmail.com
Manav Bhatia
Nokia
Bangalore
India
Email: manav.bhatia@nokia.com
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