Benchmarking Working Group M. Bustos
Internet-Draft IXIA
Expires: January 30, 2005 T. Van Herck
Cisco Systems
M. Kaeo
Double Shot Security
August 2004
Terminology for Benchmarking IPSec Devices
draft-ietf-bmwg-ipsec-term-04
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This purpose of this document is to define terminology specific to
measuring the performance of IPsec devices. It builds upon the
tenets set forth in [RFC1242], [RFC2544], [RFC2285] and other IETF
Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) documents used for
benchmarking routers and switches. This document seeks to extend
these efforts specific to the IPsec paradigm. The BMWG produces two
major classes of documents: Benchmarking Terminology documents and
Benchmarking Methodology documents. The Terminology documents
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present the benchmarks and other related terms. The Methodology
documents define the procedures required to collect the benchmarks
cited in the corresponding Terminology documents.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. IPsec Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 IPsec Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Definition Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Key Words to Reflect Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Existing Benchmark Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1 IPsec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2 ISAKMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3 IKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3.1 IKEv1 Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3.2 IKE Phase 1 Main Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3.3 IKE Phase 1 Aggressive Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3.4 IKEv2 Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3.5 IKE Phase 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3.6 Phase 2 Quick Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.4 Security Association (SA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5 Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.6 IPsec Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.6.1 Initiator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.6.2 Responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6.3 IPsec Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.6.4 IPsec Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.7 Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.7.1 IKE Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.7.2 IPsec Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.7.3 Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.7.4 Configured Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.7.5 Established Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.7.6 Active Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.8 Iterated Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.8.1 Nested Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.8.2 Transport Adjacency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.9 Transform protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.9.1 Authentication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.9.2 Encryption Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.10 IPSec Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.10.1 Authentication Header (AH) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7.10.2 Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) . . . . . . . . 28
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7.11 NAT Traversal (NAT-T) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.12 IP Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7.13 Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Framesizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1 Layer3 clear framesize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.2 Layer3 encrypted framesize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.3 Layer2 clear framesize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.4 Layer2 encrypted framesize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9. Performance Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.1 Tunnels Per Second (TPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.2 Tunnel Rekeys Per Seconds (TRPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9.3 Tunnel Attempts Per Second (TAPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10. Test Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1 Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1.1 Tunnel Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1.2 IPsec Encryption Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.1.3 IPsec Decryption Throughput . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10.2 Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.2.1 Tunnel Latency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10.2.2 IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency . . . . . . . . . . 40
10.2.3 IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency . . . . . . . . . . 41
10.2.4 Time To First Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
10.3 Frame Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10.3.1 IPSec Tunnel Frame Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10.3.2 IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss . . . . . . . . . 43
10.3.3 IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss . . . . . . . . . 43
10.3.4 Phase 2 Rekey Frame Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10.4 Back-to-back Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.4.1 Tunnel Back-to-back Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.4.2 Encryption Back-to-back Frames . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10.4.3 Decryption Back-to-back Frames . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10.5 Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.5.1 Tunnel Setup Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.5.2 Phase 1 Setup Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
10.5.3 Phase 2 Setup Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
10.6 Tunnel Rekey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.6.1 Phase 1 Rekey Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.6.2 Phase 2 Rekey Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.7 Tunnel Failover Time (TFT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10.8 IKE DOS Resilience Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 56
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1. Introduction
Despite the need to secure communications over a public medium there
is no standard method of performance measurement nor a standard in
the terminology used to develop such hardware and software solutions.
This results in varied implementations which challenge
interoperability and direct performance comparisons. Standardized
IPsec terminology and performance test methodologies will enable
users to determine if the IPsec device they select will withstand
loads of secured traffic that meet their requirements.
To appropriately define the parameters and scope of this document,
this section will give a brief overview of the IPsec standard:
2. IPsec Fundamentals
IPsec is a framework of open standards that provides data
confidentiality, data integrity, and data authenticity between
participating peers. IPsec provides these security services at the
IP layer. IPsec uses IKE to handle negotiation of protocols and
algorithms based on local policy, and to generate the encryption and
authentication keys to be used. IPsec can be used to protect one or
more data flows between a pair of hosts, between a pair of security
gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. The IPsec
protocol suite set of standards is documented in RFC's [RFC2401]
through [RFC2412] and [RFC2451]. The reader is assumed to be
familiar with these documents. Some Internet Drafts supersede these
RFC's and will be taken into consideration.
IPsec itself defines the following:
Authentication Header (AH): A security protocol, defined in
[RFC2402], which provides data authentication and optional
anti-replay services. AH ensures the integrity and data origin
authentication of the IP datagram as well as the invariant fields in
the outer IP header.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): A security protocol, defined in
[RFC2406], which provides confidentiality, data origin
authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service and
limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services provided
depends on options selected at the time of Security Association (SA)
establishment and on the location of the implementation in a network
topology. ESP authenticates only headers and data after the IP
header.
Internet Key Exchange (IKE): A hybrid protocol which implements
Oakley [RFC2412] and SKEME [SKEME] key exchanges inside the ISAKMP
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framework. While IKE can be used with other protocols, its initial
implementation is with the IPsec protocol. IKE provides
authentication of the IPsec peers, negotiates IPsec security
associations, and establishes IPsec keys.
The AH and ESP protocols each support two modes of operation:
transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode, two hosts provide
protection primarily for upper-layer protocols. The cryptographic
endpoints (where the encryption and decryption take place) are the
source and destination of the data packet. In IPv4, a transport mode
security protocol header appears immediately after the IP header and
before any higher-layer protocols (such as TCP or UDP).
In the case of AH in transport mode, all upper-layer information is
protected, and all fields in the IPv4 header excluding the fields
typically are modified in transit. The fields of the IPv4 header
that are not included are, therefore, set to 0 before applying the
authentication algorithm. These fields are as follows:
* TOS
* TTL
* Header Checksum
* Offset
* Flags
In the case of ESP in transport mode, security services are provide
only for the higher-layer protocols, not for the IP header.
A tunnel is a vehicle for encapsulating packets inside a protocol
that is understood at the entry and exit points of a given network.
These entry and exit points are defined as tunnel interfaces.
Both the AH and ESP protocols can be used in tunnel mode for data
packet endpoints as well as by intermediate security gateways. In
tunnel mode, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies the IPsec
processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that specifies the
ultimate destination for the packet. The source address in the outer
IP header is the initiating cryptographic endpoint; the source
address in the inner header is the true source address of the packet.
The security protocol header appears after the outer IP header and
before the inner IP header.
If AH is employed in tunnel mode, portions of the outer IP header are
given protection (those same fields as for transport mode, described
earlier in this section), as well as all of the tunneled IP packet
(that is, all of the inner IP header is protected as are the
higher-layer protocols). If ESP is employed, the protection is
afforded only to the tunneled packet, not to the outer header.
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2.1 IPsec Operation
2.1.1 Security Associations
The concept of a Security Association (SA) is fundamental to IPsec.
An SA is a relationship between two or more entities that describes
how the entities will use security services to communicate. The SA
includes: an encryption algorithm, an authentication algorithm and a
shared session key.
Because an SA is unidirectional, two SAs (one in each direction) are
required to secure typical, bidirectional communication between two
entities. The security services associated with an SA can be used
for AH or ESP, but not for both. If both AH and ESP protection is
applied to a traffic stream, two (or more) SAs are created for each
direction to protect the traffic stream.
The SA is uniquely identified by the security parameter index (SPI)
[RFC2406]. When a system sends a packet that requires IPsec
protection, it looks up the SA in its database and applies the
specified processing and security protocol (AH/ESP), inserting the
SPI from the SA into the IPsec header. When the IPsec peer receives
the packet, it looks up the SA in its database by destination
address, protocol, and SPI and then processes the packet as required.
2.1.2 Key Management
IPsec uses cryptographic keys for authentication, integrity and
encryption services. Both manual provisioning and automatic
distribution of keys is supported. IKE is specified as the
public-key-based approach for automatic key management.
IKE authenticates each peer involved in IPsec, negotiates the
security policy, and handles the exchange of session keys. IKE is a
hybrid protocol, combining parts of the following protocols to
negotiate and derive keying material for SAs in a secure and
authenticated manner:
1. ISAKMP [RFC2408] (Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol), which provides a framework for
authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP
is designed to be key exchange independent; it is designed to
support many different key exchanges.
2. Oakley [RFC2412], which describes a series of key exchanges,
called modes, and details the services provided by each (for
example, perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection,
and authentication).
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3. [SKEME] (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which
describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides
anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment.
IKE creates an authenticated, secure tunnel between two entities and
then negotiates the security association for IPsec. This is
performed in two phases.
In Phase 1, the two unidirectional SA's establish a secure,
authenticated channel with which to communicate. Phase 1 has two
distinct modes; Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Main Mode for Phase 1
provides identity protection. When identity protection is not
needed, Aggressive Mode can be used. The completion of Phase 1 is
called an IKE SA.
The following attributes are used by IKE and are negotiated as part
of the IKE SA:
o Encryption algorithm.
o Hash algorithm.
o Authentication method (digital signature, public-key encryption or
pre-shared key).
o Diffie-Hellman group information.
After the attributes are negotiated, both parties must be
authenticated to each other. IKE supports multiple authentication
methods. The following mechanisms are generally implemented:
o Pre-shared keys: The same key is pre-installed on each host. IKE
peers authenticate each other by computing and sending a keyed
hash of data that includes the pre-shared key. If the receiving
peer can independently create the same hash using its preshared
key, it knows that both parties must share the same secret, and
thus the other party is authenticated.
o Public key cryptography: Each party generates a pseudo-random
number (a nonce) and encrypts it and its ID using the other
party's public key. The ability for each party to compute a keyed
hash containing the other peer's nonce and ID, decrypted with the
local private key, authenticates the parties to each other. This
method does not provide nonrepudiation; either side of the
exchange could plausibly deny that it took part in the exchange.
o Digital signature: Each device digitally signs a set of data and
sends it to the other party. This method is similar to the
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public-key cryptography approach except that it provides
nonrepudiation.
Note that both digital signature and public-key cryptography require
the use of digital certificates to validate the public/private key
mapping. IKE allows the certificate to be accessed independently or
by having the two devices explicitly exchange certificates as part of
IKE. Both parties must have a shared session key to encrypt the IKE
tunnel. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to agree on a common
session key.
In Phase 2 of IKE, SA's are negotiated for ESP and/or AH. These SA's
will be called IPsec SAs. These IPsec SA's use a different shared
key than that used for the IKE_SA. The IPsec SA shared key can be
derived by using Diffie-Hellman again or by refreshing the shared key
derived from the original Diffie-Hellman exchange that generated the
IKE_SA by hashing it with nonces. Once the shared key is derived and
additional communication parameters are negotiated, the IPsec SA's
are established and traffic can be exchanged using the negotiated
parameters. Note that for IKEv2, the term CHILD-SA is used for what
we call an IPsec SA.
3. Document Scope
The primary focus of this document is to establish useful performance
testing terminology for IPsec devices that support IKEv1. We want to
constrain the terminology specified in this document to meet the
requirements of the Methodology for Benchmarking IPSec Devices
documented test methodologies. The testing will be constrained to
devices acting as IPsec gateways and will pertain to both IPsec
tunnel and transport mode.
Any testing involving interoperability and/or conformance issues,
L2TP [RFC2661], GRE [RFC2784], MPLS VPN's [RFC2547], multicast, and
anything that does not specifically relate to the establishment and
tearing down of IPsec tunnels is specifically out of scope. It is
assumed that all relevant networking parameters that facilitate in
the running of these tests are pre-configured (this includes at a
minimum ARP caches and routing tables). This document will encompass
updates to AH, ESP and NAT Traversal. Since NAT traversal has been
included in the document, NAT is not included in this document.
4. Definition Format
The definition format utilized by this document is described in
[RFC1242], Section 2.
Term to be defined.
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Definition:
The specific definition for the term.
Discussion:
A brief discussion of the term, its application, or other
information that would build understanding.
Issues:
List of issues or conditions that affect this term. This field
can present items the may impact the term's related methodology or
otherwise restrict its measurement procedures.
[Measurement units:]
Units used to record measurements of this term. This field is
mandatory where applicable. This field is optional in this
document.
[See Also:]
List of other terms that are relevant to the discussion of this
term. This field is optional in this document.
5. Key Words to Reflect Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. RFC 2119
defines the use of these key words to help make the intent of
standards track documents as clear as possible. While this document
uses these keywords, this document is not a standards track document.
6. Existing Benchmark Definitions
It is recommended that readers consult [RFC1242], [RFC2544] and
[RFC2285] before making use of this document. These and other IETF
Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) router and switch
documents contain several existing terms relevant to benchmarking the
performance of IPsec devices. The conceptual framework established
in these earlier RFCs will be evident in this document.
This document also draws on existing terminology defined in other
BMWG documents. Examples include, but are not limited to:
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Throughput [RFC 1242, section 3.17]
Latency [RFC 1242, section 3.8]
Frame Loss Rate [RFC 1242, section 3.6]
Forwarding Rates [RFC 2285, section 3.6]
Loads [RFC 2285, section 3.5]
Note: "DUT/SUT" refers to a metric that may be applicable to a DUT
(Device Under Test) or an SUT (System Under Test).
7. Definitions
7.1 IPsec
Definition:
IPsec or IP Security protocol suite which comprises a set of
standards used to provide security services at the IP layer.
Discussion:
IPsec is a framework of protocols that offer authentication,
authenticity and encryption services to the IP and/or upper layer
protocols. The major components of the protocol suite are IKE,
used for key exchanges, and IPsec protocols such as AH and ESP,
which use the exchanged keys to protect payload traffic.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Device, IKE, ISAKMP, ESP, AH
7.2 ISAKMP
Definition:
The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol,
which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but
does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange
independent; it is designed to support many different key
exchanges. ISAKMP is defined in [RFC2407].
Discussion:
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Though ISAKMP is only a framework for the IPsec standard key
management protocol, it is often misused and interchanged with the
term 'IKE', which is an implementation of ISAKMP.
Issues:
When implementations refer to the term 'ISAKMP SA', it refers to
an IKE Phase 1 SA.
See Also:
IKE, Security Association
7.3 IKE
Definition:
A hybrid key management protocol that allows secure negotiation of
IPsec SA paramters.
Discussion:
A hybrid protocol, defined in [RFC2409], from the following 3
protocols:
* ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol), which provides a framework for authentication and
key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to
be key exchange independent; it is designed to support many
different key exchanges.
* Oakley, which describes a series of key exchanges, called
modes, and details the services provided by each (for example,
perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and
authentication). [RFC2412]
* [SKEME] (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which
describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides
anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment.
Note that IKE is an optional protocol within the IPsec framework.
Tunnels may also be manually configured i.e. the administrator
will provide keys that will be associated with the Phase 2 SA's as
long as the IPsec Tunnel is configured. This method is the most
basic mechanism to establish an IPsec tunnel between two IPsec
devices but it also decreases the level of protection since the
keys are not changing as they normally would during an IKE phase 2
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rekey.
Issues:
During the first IPsec deployment experiences, ambiguities were
found in the IKEv1 specification, which lead to interoperability
problems. To resolve these issues, IKEv1 is being updated by
IKEv2.
See Also:
ISAKMP, IPsec, Security Association
7.3.1 IKEv1 Phase 1
Definition:
The shared policy and key(s) used by negotiating peers to set up a
secure authenticated "control channel" for further IKE
communications.
Discussion:
Note that IKE is an optional protocol within the IPsec framework
and keys can also be manually configured.
Issues:
In other documents often referenced as ISAKMP SA or IKE SA.
See Also:
IKE, ISAKMP
7.3.2 IKE Phase 1 Main Mode
Definition:
Main Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Identity Protect
Exchange, defined in [RFC2409]. Upon successful completion it
results in the establishment of an IKE Phase 1 SA.
Discussion:
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IKE Main Mode use 3 distinct message pairs, for a total of 6
messages. The first two messages negotiate policy; the next two
represent Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data (e.g.
nonces); and the last two messages authenticate the Diffie-Hellman
Exchange. The authentication method negotiated as part of the
initial IKE Phase 1 influence the composition of the payloads but
not their purpose.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Aggressive Mode
7.3.3 IKE Phase 1 Aggressive Mode
Definition:
Aggressive Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Aggressive
Exchange, defined in [RFC2409]. Upon successful completion it
results in the establishment of an IKE Phase 1 SA.
Discussion:
IKE Aggressive Mode uses 3 messages. The first two messages
negotiate policy, exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and
ancillary data necessary for the exchange, and identities. In
addition the second message authenticates the Responder. The
third message authenticates the Initiator and provides proof of
participation in the exchange.
Issues:
For IKEv1 the standard specifies that all implementations use both
main and agressive mode, however, it is common to use only main
mode.
See Also:
ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Main Mode
7.3.4 IKEv2 Phase 1
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Definition:
IKEv2 calls the IKEv1 Phase 1 the IKEv2 Initial Exchange.
Discussion:
IKEv2 uses 2 exchanges (i.e. four messages) to complete its
initial exchange. The first pair of messages (IKE_SA_INIT)
negotiate cryptographic algorithms, exchange nonces and do a
Diffie-Hellman exchange. The second pair of messages (IKE_AUTH)
authenticate the previous messages, exchange identities and
certificates, and establish the first CHILD_SA. Parts of the
IKE_AUTH messages are encrypted and integrity protected with keys
established through the IKE_SA_INIT exchange.
Issues:
In some scenarios, only a single CHILD_SA is needed between IPsec
endpoints and therefore there would be no additional exchanges.
However, subsequent exchanges (i.e. the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange)
are often used for re-keying purposes.
See Also:
ISAKMP, IKE, IKEv1 Phase 1, Phase 1 Main Mode
7.3.5 IKE Phase 2
Definition:
ISAKMP phase which upon successful completion establishes the
shared keys used by the negotiating peers to set up a secure "data
channel" for IPsec.
Discussion:
The main purpose of Phase 2 is to produce the key for the IPsec
tunnel. Phase 2 is also used to regenerate the key being used for
IPsec (called "rekeying"), as well as for exchanging informational
messages.
IKEv2 calls the IKEv1 phase 2 the IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange.
These messages are used to create additional CHILD_SAs between
IPsec endpoints or to re-key existing CHILD-SAs.
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Issues:
In other documents also referenced as IPsec SA.
See Also:
IKE Phase 1, ISAKMP, IKE
7.3.6 Phase 2 Quick Mode
Definition:
Quick Mode is an instanciation of IKE Phase 2. After successful
completion it will result in one or typically two or more IPsec
SA's
Discussion:
Quick Mode is used to negotiate the SA's and keys that will be
used to protect the user data, i.e. the IPsec SA. Three
different messages are exchanged, which are protected by the
security parameters negotiated by the IKE phase 1 exchange. An
additional Diffie-Hellman exchange may be performed if PFS
(Perfect Forward Secrecy) is enabled.
The IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange consists of a single request/
response pair. These messages are cryptographically protected
using the cryptographic algorithms and keys negotiated in the
IKE_SA_INIT messages.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 2
7.4 Security Association (SA)
Definition:
A simplex (unidirectional) logical connection that links a traffic
flow to a set of security parameters. All traffic traversing an
SA is provided the same security processing and will be subjected
to a common set of encryption and/or authentication algorithms.
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In IPsec, an SA is an Internet layer abstraction implemented
through the use of AH or ESP as defined in [RFC2401].
Discussion:
A set of policy and key(s) used to protect information. It is a
negotiation agreement between two IPsec devices, specifically the
Initiator and Responder.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Initiator, Responder
7.5 Selectors
Definition:
A mechanism used for the classification of traffic flows that
require encryption and/or authentication services.
Discussion:
The selectors are a set of fields that will be extracted from the
network and transport layer headers that provide the ability to
classify the traffic flow and associate it with an SA.
After classification, a decision can be made if the traffic needs
to be encrypted/decrypted and how this should be done depending on
the SA linked to the traffic flow. Simply put, selectors classify
IP packets that require IPsec processing and those packets that
must be passed along without any intervention of the IPsec
framework.
Selectors are flexible objects that can match on ranges of source
and destination addresses and ranges of source and destination
ports.
Issues:
Both sides must agree exactly on both the networks being
protected, and they both must agree on how to describe the
networks (range, subnet, addresses). This is a common point of
non-interoperability.
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7.6 IPsec Device
Definition:
Any implementation that has the ability to process data flows
according to the IPsec protocol suite specifications.
Discussion:
Implementations can be grouped by 'external' properties (e.g.
software vs. hardware implementations) but more important is the
subtle differences that implementations may have with relation to
the IPsec Protocol Suite. Not all implementations will cover all
RFC's that encompass the IPsec Protocol Suite, but the majority
will support a large subset of features described in the suite,
nor will all implementations utilize all of the cryptographic
functions listed in the RFC's.
In that context, any implementation, that supports basic IP layer
security services as described in the IPsec protocol suite shall
be called an IPsec Device.
Issues:
Due to the fragmented nature of the IPsec Protocol Suite RFC's, it
is possible that IPsec implementations will not be able to
interoperate. Therefore it is important to know which features
and options are implemented in the IPsec Device.
See Also:
IPsec
7.6.1 Initiator
Definition:
An IPsec devices which starts the negotiation of IKE Phase 1 and
Phase 2 tunnels.
Discussion:
When a traffic flow is offered at an IPsec device and it is
determined that the flow must be protected, but there is no IPsec
tunnel to send the traffic through, it is the responsibility of
the IPsec device to start a negotiation process that will
instantiate the IPsec tunnel. This process will establish an IKE
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Phase 1 SA and one, or more likely, a pair IKE phase 2 SA's,
eventually resulting in secured data transport. The device that
takes the action to start this negotiation process will be called
an Initiator.
Issues:
IPsec devices/implementations can be both an initiator as well as
a responder. The distinction is useful from a test perspective.
See Also:
Responder, IKE, IPsec
7.6.2 Responder
Definition:
An IPsec devices which replies to incoming IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2
tunnel requests and process these messages in order to establish a
tunnel.
Discussion:
When an initiator attempts to establish SA's with another IPsec
device, this peer will need to evaluate the proposals made by the
initiator and either accept or deny them. In the former case, the
traffic flow will be decrypted according to the negotiated
parameters. Such a device will be called a Responder.
Issues:
IPsec devices/implementations can usually be both an initiator as
well as a responder. The distinction is useful from a test
perspective.
See Also:
Initiator, IKE
7.6.3 IPsec Client
Definition:
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IPsec Devices that will only act as an Initiator.
Discussion:
In some situations it is not needed or prefered to have an IPsec
device respond to an inbound tunnel request. In the case of e.g.
road warriors or home office scenarios the only property needed
from the IPsec device is the ability to securely connect to a
remote private network. The IPsec Client will set up one or more
Tunnels to an IPsec Server on the network that needs to be
accessed and to provide the required security services. An IPsec
client will silently drop and ignore any inbound tunnel requests.
IPsec clients are generally used to connect remote users in a
secure fashion over the Internet to a private network.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec device, IPsec Server, Initiator, Responder
7.6.4 IPsec Server
Definition:
IPSec Devices that can both act as an Initiator as well as a
Responder.
Discussion:
IPSec Servers are mostly positioned at private network edges and
provide several functions :
Responds to tunnel setup request from IPSec Clients.
Responds to tunnel setup request from other IPsec devices
(Initiators).
Initiate tunnels to other IPsec servers inside or outside the
private network.
Issues:
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IPsec Servers are also sometimes referred to as 'VPN
Concentrators'.
See Also:
IPsec Device, IPsec Client, Initiator, Responder
7.7 Tunnels
The term "tunnel" is often used in a variety of contexts. To avoid
any discrepancies, in this document, the following distinctions have
been defined :
7.7.1 IKE Tunnel
Definition:
A single Phase 1 IKE SA.
Discussion:
An IKE Tunnel between IPsec devices facilitates a mechanism for
secure negotiation of Phase 1 properties and Phase 2 SA's needed
for protected data transport. The initiator may choose which mode
to start the negotiation of the IKE Tunnel in. This can be either
main mode or aggressive mode.
Issues:
Also referred to as an ISAKMP SA or IKE SA or Phase 1 Tunnel.
See Also:
Tunnel, IPsec Tunnel, Security Association, IKE, IKE Phase 1
7.7.2 IPsec Tunnel
Definition:
One or more Phase 2 SA's that are negotiated in conjuntion with an
IKE Tunnel.
Discussion:
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In the case of simplex communication, a single phase 2 SA.
In the more likely case where bidirectional communication is
needed it is a pair (2) Phase 2 SA's. The two SA's are used to
secure inbound and outbound traffic.
Not in all situations is it required to have an existing IKE
Tunnel in order to negotiate IPsec Tunnel properties and
parameters. Manually keyed tunnels allow the set up of IPsec
Tunnels without the need of the IKE protocol.
Issues:
Also referred to as a Phase 2 Tunnel or a Phase 2 SA (may be
multiple).
See Also:
Tunnel, IKE Tunnel, Security Association, IKE, IKE Phase 2
7.7.3 Tunnel
Definition:
The combination of an IKE Tunnel and an IPsec Tunnel
Discussion:
In the majority of the cases IPsec is used to protect
bidirectional traffic flows. Unless stated otherwise a 'Tunnel'
will be defined as a single Phase 1 SA and two Phase 2 SA's that
are associated with the Phase 1 SA.
Issues:
If other than a single Phase 2 SA, for each direction, have been
negotiated through a single IKE Tunnel, then this specific ratio
MUST be mentioned and the term 'Tunnel' MUST NOT be used in this
context."
See Also:
IKE Tunnel, IPsec Tunnel
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7.7.4 Configured Tunnel
Definition:
A tunnel that is present in the IPSec device's configuration but
does not have any entries in the SADBi.e. SA's.
Discussion:
Several steps are required before a Tunnel can be used to actually
transport traffic. The very first step is to configure the tunnel
in the IPsec device. In that way packet classification can make a
decision if it is required to start negotiating SA's. At this
time there are no SA's associated with the Tunnel and no traffic
is going through the IPsec device that matches the Selectors,
which would instantiate the Tunnel.
A Configured Tunnel is also a tunnel that has relinquished all
it's SA's and is not transmitting data anymore. To be more
specific, when an Established or an Active Tunnel is terminated
due to either an administrative action or an IKE event that teared
down the tunnel, the tunnel will be back in a configured state.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Tunnel, Established Tunnel, Active Tunnel
7.7.5 Established Tunnel
Definition:
A Tunnel that has completed Phase 1 and Phase 2 SA negotiations
but is otherwise idle.
Discussion:
A second step needed to ensure that a Tunnel can transport data is
to complete the Phase 1 and Phase 2 negotiations. After the
packet classification process has asserted that a packet requires
security services, the negotation is started to obtain both Phase
1 and Phase 2 SA's. After this is completed the tunnel is called
'Established'. Note that at this time there is still no traffic
flowing through the Tunnel. Just enough packet(s) have been sent
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to the IPsec device that matched the selectors and triggered the
Tunnel setup. This may also be acomplished by an administrative
command to connect the Tunnel, in which case the Tunnel is not
triggered by any positive packet classification.
Issues:
In the case of manually keyed tunnels, there is no distinction
between a Configured Tunnel or an Established Tunnel since there
is no negotiation required with these type of Tunnels and the
Tunnel is Established at time of Configuration since all keying
information is known at that point.
See Also:
Tunnel, Configured Tunnel, Active Tunnel
7.7.6 Active Tunnel
Definition:
A tunnel that has completed Phase 1 and Phase 2 SA negotiations
and is forwarding data.
Discussion:
When a Tunnel is Established and it is transporting traffic, the
tunnel is called 'Active'.
Issues:
The distinction between an Active Tunnel and Configured/
Established Tunnel is made in the context of manual keyed Tunnels.
In this case it would be possible to have an Established tunnel on
an IPsec device which has no counterpart on it's corresponding
peer. This will lead to encrypted traffic flows which will be
discarded on the receiving peer. Only if both peers have an
Established Tunnel that shows evidence of traffic transport, it
may be called an Active Tunnel.
See Also:
Tunnel, Configured Tunnel, Established Tunnel
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7.8 Iterated Tunnels
Iterated Tunnels are a bundle of transport and/or tunnel mode SA's.
The bundles are divided into two major groups :
7.8.1 Nested Tunnels
Definition:
An SA bundle consisting of two or more 'tunnel mode' SA's.
Discussion:
The process of nesting tunnels can theoretically be repeated
multiple times (for example, tunnels can be many levels deep), but
for all practical purposes, most implementations limit the level
of nesting. Nested tunnels can use a mix of AH and ESP
encapsulated traffic.
[GW1] --- [GW2] ---- [IP CLOUD] ---- [GW3] --- [GW4]
| | | |
| | | |
| +----{SA1 (ESP tunnel)}----+ |
| |
+--------------{SA2 (AH tunnel)}---------------+
In the IP Cloud a packet would have a format like this :
[IP{2,3}][ESP][IP{1,4}][AH][IP][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]
Nested tunnels can be deployed to provide additional security on
already secured traffic. A typical example of this would be that
the inner gateways (GW2 and GW3) are securing traffic between two
branch offices and the outer gateways (GW1 & GW4) add an
additional layer of security between departments within those
branch offices.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Transport Adjacency, IPsec Tunnel
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7.8.2 Transport Adjacency
Definition:
An SA bundle consisting of two or more transport mode SA's.
Discussion:
Transport adjacency is a form of tunnel nesting. In this case two
or more transport mode IPsec tunnels are set side by side to
enhance applied security properties.
Transport adjacency can be used with a mix of AH and ESP tunnels
although some combinations are not preferred. If AH and ESP are
mixed, the ESP tunnel should always encapsulate the AH tunnel.
The reverse combination is a valid combination but doesn't make
cryptographical sense.
[GW1] --- [GW2] ---- [IP CLOUD] ---- [GW3] --- [GW4]
| | | |
| | | |
| +------{SA1 (ESP transport)}--------+ |
| |
+-------------{SA2 (AH transport)}--------------+
In the IP Cloud a packet would have a format like this :
[IP][ESP][AH][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]
Issues:
This is rarely used.
See Also:
Nested Tunnels, IPsec Tunnel
7.9 Transform protocols
Definition:
Encryption and authentication algorithms that provide
cryptograhical services to the IPsec Protocols.
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Discussion:
Some algorithms run significantly slower than others. For
example, TripleDES encryption is one third as fast as DES
encryption.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Authentication protocols, Encryption protocols
7.9.1 Authentication Protocols
Definition:
Algorithms which provide data integrity and data source
authentication.
Discussion:
Authentication protocols provide no confidentiality. Commonly
used authentication algorithms/protocols are:
* MD5-HMAC
* SHA-HMAC
* AES-HMAC
Issues:
SHA-HMAC is thought to be more secure than MD5-HMAC and is often
used. AES-HMAC is still fairly new and not in common use yet.
See Also:
Transform protocols, Encryption protocols
7.9.2 Encryption Protocols
Definition:
Algorithms which provide data confidentiality.
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Discussion:
Encryption protocols provide no authentication. Commonly used
encryption algorithms/protocols are:
* NULL encryption
* DES-CBC
* 3DES-CBC
* AES-CBC
Issues:
Null option is a valid encryption mechanism although it reverts to
use of IPsec back to message authenticity but only for upper layer
protocols, and is commonly used.
DES has been officially deprecated by NIST, though it is still
mandated RFC and is still commonly implemented and used due to
it's speed advantage over 3DES.
See Also:
Transform protocols, Authentication protocols
7.10 IPSec Protocols
Definition:
A suite of protocols which provide a framework of open standards
that provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and data
authenticity between participating peers at the IP layer. The
IPsec protocol suite set of standards is documented in [RFC2401]
through [RFC2412] and [RFC2451].
Discussion:
The IPsec Protocol suite is modular and forward compatible. The
protocols that comprise the IPsec protocol suite can be replaced
with new versions of those protocols as the older versions become
obsolete. For example, IKEv2 will soon replace IKEv1.
Issues:
N/A
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See Also:
AH, ESP
7.10.1 Authentication Header (AH)
Definition:
Provides authentication and data integrity (including replay
protection) security services [RFC2402].
Discussion:
The AH protocol supports both modes of operation; tunnel mode and
transport mode. If AH is employed in tunnel mode, portions of the
outer IP header are given protection, as well as all of the
tunneled IP packet (that is, all of the inner IP header is
protected as are the higher-layer protocols). In the case of AH
in transport mode, all upper-layer information is protected, and
all fields in the IPv4 header excluding the fields typically are
modified in transit.
Original IPv4 packet :
[IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD]
In transport mode :
[IP ORIG][AH][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD]
In tunnel mode :
[IP NEW][AH][IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD]
Issues:
AH is rarely used/implemented.
See Also:
Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Encapsulated Security
Payload
7.10.2 Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
Definition:
Provides three essential components needed for secure data
exchange: authentication, integrity (including replay protection)
and confidentiality as defined in [RFC2406].
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Discussion:
The ESP protocol supports both modes of operation i.e. tunnel
mode and transport mode. If ESP is employed in tunnel mode, the
protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not to the
outer header. In the case of ESP in transport mode, security
services are provided only for the higher-layer protocols, not for
the IP header.
Original IPv4 packet :
[IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD]
In transport mode :
[IP ORIG][ESP][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]
In tunnel mode :
[IP NEW][ESP][IP ORIG][L4 HDR][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Authentication Header
7.11 NAT Traversal (NAT-T)
Definition:
The capability to support IPsec functionality in the presence of
NAT devices.
Discussion:
NAT-Traversal requires some modifications to IKE as defined in
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike]. Specifically, in phase 1, it requires
detecting if the other end supports NAT-Traversal, and detecting
if there are one or more NAT instances along the path from host to
host. In IKE Quick Mode, there is a need to negotiate the use of
UDP encapsulated IPsec packets.
NAT-T also describes how to transmit the original source and
destination addresses to the corresponding IPsec Device. The
original source and destination addresses are used in transport
mode to incrementally update the TCP/IP checksums so that they
will match after the NAT transform (The NAT cannot do this,
because the TCP/IP checksum is inside the UDP encapsulated IPsec
packet).
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Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IKE
7.12 IP Compression
Definition:
A mechanism as defined in [RFC2393] that reduces the size of the
payload that needs to be encrypted.
Discussion:
IP payload compression is a protocol to reduce the size of IP
datagrams. This protocol will increase the overall communication
performance between a pair of communicating hosts/gateways
("nodes") by compressing the datagrams, provided the nodes have
sufficient computation power, through either CPU capacity or a
compression coprocessor, and the communication is over slow or
congested links.
IP payload compression is especially useful when encryption is
applied to IP datagrams. Encrypting the IP datagram causes the
data to be random in nature, rendering compression at lower
protocol layers (e.g., PPP Compression Control Protocol [RFC1962])
ineffective. If both compression and encryption are required,
compression must be applied before encryption.
Issues:
N/A
7.13 Security Context
Definition:
A security context is a collection of security parameters that
describe the characteristics of the path that a tunnel will take,
all of the tunnel parameters and the effects it has on the
underlying protected traffic. Security Context encompasses
protocol suite and security policy(ies).
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Discussion:
In order to fairly compare multiple IPsec devices it is imperative
that an accurate overview is given of all security parameters that
were used to establish tunnels and to secure the traffic between
protected networks. Security Context is not a metric; it is
included to accurately reflect the test environment variables when
reporting the methodology results. To avoid listing too much
information when reporting metrics, we have divided the security
context into an IKE context and an IPsec context.
When merely discussing the behavior of traffic flows through IPsec
devices, an IPsec context MUST be provided. In other cases the
scope of a discussion or report may focus on a more broad set of
behavioral characteristics of the IPsec device, the both and IPsec
and an IKE context MUST be provided.
The IPsec context MUST consist of the following elements:
* Number of IPsec tunnels
* IPsec tunnels per IKE tunnel (IKE/IPsec tunnel ratio)
* IPsec protocol
* IPsec mode (tunnel or transport)
* Authentication protocol used by IPsec
* Encryption protocol used by IPsec (if applicable)
* IPsec SA lifetime (traffic and time based)
The IPsec Context MAY also list:
* Selectors
* Fragmentation handling
The IKE Context MUST consist of the following elements:
* Number of IKE tunnels.
* Authentication protocol used by IKE
* Encryption protocol used by IKE
* Key exchange mechanism (pre-shared key, certificate authority,
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etc ...)
* Key size (if applicable)
* Diffie-Hellman group
* IKE SA lifetime (time based)
* Keepalive or DPD values as defined in [I-D.ietf-ipsec-dpd]
* IP Compression [RFC2393]
* PFS Diffie-Hellman group
The IKE context MAY also list:
* Phase 1 mode (main or aggressive)
* Available bandwidth and latency to Certificate Authority server
(if applicable)
Issues:
A Security Context will be an important element in describing the
environment where protected traffic is traveling through.
See Also:
IPsec Protocols, Transform Protocols, IKE Phase 1, IKE phase 2,
Selectors, IPsec Tunnel
8. Framesizes
8.1 Layer3 clear framesize
Definition:
The total size of the unencrypted L3 PDU.
Discussion:
In relation to IPsec this is the size of the IP header and its
payload. It SHALL NOT include any encapsulations that MAY be
applied before the PDU is processed for encryption.
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For example: 46 bytes PDU = 20 bytes IP header + 26 bytes payload.
Measurement Units:
Bytes
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Layer3 Encrypted Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2
Encrypted Framesize.
8.2 Layer3 encrypted framesize
Definition:
The total size of the encrypted L3 PDU.
Discussion:
The size of the IP packet and itÆs payload after encapsulations
MAY be applied and the PDU is being processed by the transform.
For example, after a tunnel mode ESP 3DES/SHA1 transform has been
applied an unencrypted or clear layer3 framesize of 46 bytes
Becomes 96 bytes:
20 bytes outer IP header (tunnel mode)
4 bytes SPI (ESP header)
4 bytes Sequence (ESP Header)
8 bytes IV (IOS ESP-3DES)
46 bytes payload
0 bytes pad (ESP-3DES 64 bit)
1 byte Pad length (ESP Trailer)
1 byte Next Header (ESP Trailer)
12 bytes ESP-HMAC SHA1 96 digest
Measurement Units:
Bytes
Issues:
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N/A
See Also:
Layer3 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Encrypted
Framesize.
8.3 Layer2 clear framesize
Definition:
The total size of the unencrypted L2 PDU.
Discussion:
This is the Layer 3 clear framesize plus all the layer2 overhead.
In the case of Ethernet this would be 18 bytes.
For example, a 46 byte Layer3 clear framesize packet would become
64 Bytes after Ethernet Layer2 overhead is added:
6 bytes destination mac address
6 bytes source mac address
2 bytes length/type field
46 bytes layer3 (IP) payload
4 bytes FCS
Measurement Units:
Bytes
Issues:
If it is not mentioned explicitly what kind of framesize is used,
the layer2 clear framesize will be the default.
See Also:
Layer3 clear framesize, Layer2 encrypted framesize, Layer2
encrypted framesize.
8.4 Layer2 encrypted framesize
Definition:
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The total size of the encrypted L2 PDU.
Discussion:
This is the Layer 3 encrypted framesize plus all the layer2
overhead. In the case of Ethernet this would be 18 bytes.
For example, a 96 byte Layer3 encrypted framesize packet would
become 114 bytes after Ethernet Layer2 overhead is added:
6 bytes destination mac address
6 bytes source mac address
2 bytes length/type field
96 bytes layer3 (IPsec) payload
4 bytes FCS
Measurement Units:
Bytes
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Layer3 Clear Framesize, Layer3 Encrypted Framesize, Layer2 Clear
Framesize
9. Performance Metrics
9.1 Tunnels Per Second (TPS)
Definition:
The measurement unit for the Tunnel Setup Rate tests. The rate
that Tunnels are established per second.
Discussion:
According to [RFC2401] two tunnels cannot be established between
the same gateways with the same selectors. This is to prevent
overlapping tunnels. If overlapping tunnels are attempted, the
error will take longer than if the tunnel setup was successful.
For this reason, a unique pair of selector sets are required for
TPS testing.
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Issues:
A unique pair of selector sets are required for TPS testing.
See Also:
Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior, Tunnel Setup Rate, IKE Setup Rate,
IPsec Setup Rate
9.2 Tunnel Rekeys Per Seconds (TRPS)
Definition:
A metric that quantifies the number of IKE or IPsec Tunnel rekey's
per seconds a DUT can correctly process.
Discussion:
This metric will be will be primary used with Tunnel Rekey
behavior tests.
TRPS will provide a metric used to see system behavior under
stressful conditions where large volumes of tunnels are being
rekeyed at the same time or in a short timespan.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Tunnel Rekey; Phase 1 Rekey Rate, Phase 2 Rekey Rate
9.3 Tunnel Attempts Per Second (TAPS)
Definition:
A metric that quantifies the number of successful and unsuccessful
tunnel (both Phase 1 or Phase 2) establishment requests per
second.
Discussion:
This metric can be used to measure IKE DOS Resilience behavior
test.
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TAPS provides an important metric to validate the stability of a
platform, if stressed with valid (large number of IPsec tunnel
establishments per seconds or TPS) or invalid (IKE DOS attacks of
any style) tunnel establishment requests.
Issues:
If the TAPS increases, the TPS usually decreases, due to burdening
of the DUT with the DOS attack traffic.
10. Test Definitions
10.1 Throughput
10.1.1 Tunnel Throughput
Definition:
The maximum rate through an IPsec tunnel at which none of the
offered frames are dropped by the device under test.
Discussion:
The IPsec Tunnel Throughput is almost identically defined as
Throughput in [RFC1242], section 3.17. The only difference is
that the throughput is measured with a traffic flow getting
encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec device. IPsec Tunnel
Throughput is an end-to-end measurement.
The metric can be represented in two variantions depending on
where measurement is taken in the SUT. One can look at throughput
from a cleartext point of view i.e. find the maximum rate where
clearpackets no longer get dropped. This resulting rate can be
recalculated with an encrypted framesize to represent the
encryption throughput rate. The latter is the preferred method of
representation.
Measurement Units:
Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps
Issues:
N/A
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See Also:
IPsec Encryption Throughput, IPsec Decryption Throughput
10.1.2 IPsec Encryption Throughput
Definition:
The maximum encryption rate through an IPsec tunnel at which none
of the offered cleartext frames are dropped by the device under
test.
Discussion:
Since encryption throughput is not necessarily equal to the
decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be
measured independently. The independent forwarding rates have to
measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can
originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in
[RFC1242], measurements should be taken with an assortment of
frame sizes.
Measurement Units:
Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Throughput, IPsec Decryption Throughput
10.1.3 IPsec Decryption Throughput
Definition:
The maximum decryption rate through an IPsec tunnel at which none
of the offered encrypted frames are dropped by the device under
test.
Discussion:
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Since encryption throughput is not necessarily equal to the
decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be
measured independently.
The independent forwarding rates have to be measured with the help
of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate
IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in [RFC1242], measurements
should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes.
Measurement Units:
Packets per seconds (pps), Mbps
Issues:
Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future
methodology document.
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Throughput, IPsec Encryption Throughput
10.2 Latency
10.2.1 Tunnel Latency
Definition:
Time required to propagate a cleartext frame from the input
interface of an initiator, through an IPsec Tunnel, to the output
interface of the responder.
Discussion:
The Tunnel Latency is the time interval starting when the end of
the first bit of the cleartext frame reaches the input interface
of the initiator and ending when the start of the first bit of the
same cleartext frame is detected on the output interface of the
responder. The frame has passed through an IPsec Tunnel between
an initiator and a responder and has been through an encryption
and decryption cycle.
Measurement Units:
Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.
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Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency, IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency
10.2.2 IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency
Definition:
The IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency is the time interval starting
when the end of the first bit of the cleartext frame reaches the
input interface, through an IPsec tunnel, and ending when the
start of the first bit of the encrypted output frame is seen on
the output interface.
Discussion:
IPsec Tunnel Encryption latency is the latency introduced when
encrypting traffic through an IPsec tunnel.
Like encryption/decryption throughput, it is not always the case
that encryption latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore
a distinction between the two has to be made in order to get a
more accurate view of where the latency is the most pronounced.
The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be
measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can
originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in
[RFC1242], measurements should be taken with an assortment of
frame sizes.
Measurement Units:
Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Latency, IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency
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10.2.3 IPsec Tunnel Decryption Latency
Definition:
The IPsec Tunnel decryption Latency is the time interval starting
when the end of the first bit of the encrypted frame reaches the
input interface, through an IPsec tunnel, and ending when the
start of the first bit of the decrypted output frame is seen on
the output interface.
Discussion:
IPsec Tunnel decryption latency is the latency introduced when
decrypting traffic through an IPsec tunnel. Like encryption/
decryption throughput, it is not always the case that encryption
latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore a distinction
between the two has to be made in order to get a more accurate
view of where the latency is the most pronounced.
The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be
measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can
originate and terminate IPsec and IKE tunnels. As defined in
[RFC1242], measurements should be taken with an assortment of
frame sizes.
Measurement Units:
Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Latency, IPsec Tunnel Encryption Latency
10.2.4 Time To First Packet
Definition:
The Time To First Packet (TTFP) is the time required process an
cleartext packet when no tunnel is present.
Discussion:
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The TTFP addresses the issue of responsiveness of an IPsec device
by looking how long it take to transmit a packet over a not yet
established tunnel path. The TTFP MUST include the time to set up
the tunnel, triggered by the traffic flow (both phase 1 and phase
2 setup times are included) and the time it takes to encrypt and
decrypt the packet on a corresponding peer.
It must be noted that it is highly unlikely that the first packet
of the traffic flow will be the packet that will be used to
measure the TTFP. There MAY be several protocol layers in the
stack before the tunnel is formed and the traffic is forwarded,
hence several packets COULD be lost during negotiation, for
example, ARP and/or IKE.
Measurement Units:
Time units with enough precision to reflect a TTFP measurement.
Issues:
N/A
10.3 Frame Loss
10.3.1 IPSec Tunnel Frame Loss
Definition:
Percentage of cleartext frames that should have been forwarded
through a Tunnel under steady state (constant) load but were
dropped before encryption or after decryption.
Discussion:
The IPsec Tunnel Frame Loss is almost identically defined as Frame
Loss Rate in [RFC1242], section 3.6. The only difference is that
the IPsec Tunnel Frame Loss Rate is measured with a traffic flow
getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec device. IPsec Tunnel
Frame Loss Rate is an end-to-end measurement.
Measurement Units:
Percent (%)
Issues:
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N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss, IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame
Loss
10.3.2 IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss
Definition:
Percentage of cleartext frames that should have been encrypted
through an IPsec tunnel under steady state (constant) load but
were dropped.
Discussion:
DUT's will always have an inherent forwarding limitation. This
will be more pronounced when IPsec is employed on the DUT. The
moment that a Tunnel is established and traffic is offered at a
given rate that will flow through that tunnel, there is a
possibility that the offered traffic rate at the tunnel is too
high to be transported through the IPsec tunnel and not all
cleartext packets will get encrypted. In that case, some
percentage of the cleartext traffic will be dropped. This drop
percentage is called the IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss.
Measurement Units:
Percent (%)
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Frame Loss, IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss
10.3.3 IPsec Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss
Definition:
Percentage of encrypted frames that should have been decrypted
through an IPsec tunnel under steady state (constant) load but
were dropped.
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Discussion:
A DUT will also have an inherent forwarding limitation when
decrypting packets. When established tunnel encrypted traffic is
offered at a costant load, there might be a possibility that the
IPsec Device that needs to decrypt the traffic will not be able to
perfom this action on all of the packets due to limitations of the
decryption performance. The percentage of encrypted frames that
would get dropped under these conditions is called the IPsec
Tunnel Decryption Frame Loss.
Measurement Units:
Percent (%)
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
IPsec Tunnel Frame Loss, IPsec Tunnel Encryption Frame Loss
10.3.4 Phase 2 Rekey Frame Loss
Definition:
Number of frames dropped as a result of an inefficient Phase 2
rekey.
Discussion:
Normal operation of an IPSec device would require that a rekey
does not create temporary Frame Loss of a traffic stream that is
protected by the Phase 2 SA's. Nevertheless there can be
situations where Frame Loss occurs during the rekey process.
This metric should be ideally zero but this may not be the case on
IPsec devices where IPsec funtionality is not a core feature.
Measurement Units:
Number of N-octet frames
Issues:
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N/A
See Also:
Phase 2 Rekey Rate
10.4 Back-to-back Frames
10.4.1 Tunnel Back-to-back Frames
Definition:
A burst of cleartext frames, offered at a constant load that can
be sent through an IPsec tunnel without losing a single cleartext
frame after decryption.
Discussion:
The Tunnel Back-to-back Frames is almost identically defined as
Back-to-back in [RFC1242], section 3.1. The only difference is
that the Tunnel Back-to-back Frames is measured with a traffic
flow getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec device. Tunnel
Back-to-back Frames is an end-to-end measurement.
Measurement Units:
Number of N-octet frames in burst.
Issues:
Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future
methodology document.
See Also:
Encryption Back-to-back frames, Decryption Back-to-back frames
10.4.2 Encryption Back-to-back Frames
Definition:
A burst of cleartext frames, offered at a constant load that can
be sent through an IPsec tunnel without losing a single encrypted
frame.
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Discussion:
Encryption back-to-back frames is the measure of the maximum burst
size that a device can handle for encrypting traffic that it
receives as plaintext. Since it is not necessarily the case that
the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for encryption is equal to
the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for decryption, both of
these capabilities must be measured independently. The encryption
back-to-back frame measurement has to be measured with the help of
an IPsec aware test device that can decrypt the traffic to
determine the validity of the encrypted frames.
Measurement Units:
Number of N-octet frames in burst.
Issues:
Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future
methodology document.
See Also:
Tunnel Back-to-back frames, Decryption Back-to-back frames
10.4.3 Decryption Back-to-back Frames
Definition:
The number of encrypted frames, offered at a constant load, that
can be sent through an IPsec tunnel without losing a single
cleartext frame.
Discussion:
Decryption back-to-back frames is the measure of the maximum burst
size that a device can handle for decrypting traffic that it
receives as encrypted traffic. Since it is not necessarily the
case that the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for decryption
is equal to the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for
encryption, both of these capabilities must be measured
independently. The decryption back-to-back frame measurement has
to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that
can determine the validity of the decrypted frames.
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Measurement Units:
Number of N-octet frames in burst.
Issues:
Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future
methodology document.
See Also:
Tunnel Back-to-back frames, Encryption back-to-back frames
10.5 Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior
10.5.1 Tunnel Setup Rate
Definition:
The maximum number of tunnels (1 IKE SA + 2 IPsec SAs) per second
that an IPsec device can successfully establish.
Discussion:
The tunnel setup rate SHOULD be measured at varying number of
tunnels on the DUT. Several factors may influence Tunnel Setup
Rate, such as: TAPS rate, Background cleartext traffic load on the
secure interface, Already established tunnels, Authentication
method such as pre-shared keys, RSA-encryption, RSA-signature, DSS
Key sizes used (when using RSA/DSS).
Measurement Units:
Tunnels Per Second (TPS)
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Phase 1 Setup Rate, Phase 2 Setup Rate, Tunnel Rekey
10.5.2 Phase 1 Setup Rate
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Definition:
The maximum number of IKE tunnels (1 IKE Phase 1 SA) per second
that an IPsec device can be observed to successfully establish.
Discussion:
The Phase 1 Setup Rate is a portion of the Tunnel Setup Rate. In
the process of establishing a Tunnel, it is interesting to know
what the limiting factor of the IKE Finite State Machine is i.e.
is it limited by the Phase 1 processing delays or rather by the
Phase 2 processing delays.
Measurement Units:
Tunnels Per Second (TPS)
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Tunnel Setup Rate, Phase 2 Setup Rate, Tunnel Rekey
10.5.3 Phase 2 Setup Rate
Definition:
The maximum number of IPsec tunnels (2 IKE Phase 2 SA's) per
second that a IPsec device can be observed to successfully
establish.
Discussion:
The Phase 2 Setup Rate is a portion of the Tunnel Setup Rate. For
identical reasons why it is required to quantify the Phase 1 Setup
Rate, it is a good practice to know the processing delays involved
in setting up a Phase 2 SA for each direction of the protected
traffic flow.
Note that once you have the Tunnel Setup Rate and either the Phase
1 or the Phase 2 Setup Rate data, you can extrapolate the
unmeasured metric, although it is RECOMMENDED to measure all three
metrics.
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Measurement Units:
Tunnels Per Second (TPS)
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Tunnel Setup Rate, Phase 1 Setup Rate, Tunnel Rekey
10.6 Tunnel Rekey
10.6.1 Phase 1 Rekey Rate
Definition:
The number of Phase 1 SA's that can be succesfully re-establish
per second.
Discussion:
Although the Phase 1 Rekey Rate has less impact on the forwarding
behavior of traffic that requires security services then the Phase
2 Rekey Rate, it can pose a large burden on the CPU or network
processor of the IPsec Device. Due to the highly computational
nature of a Phase 1 exchange, it may impact the stability of
Active Tunnels in the network when the IPsec Device fails to
properly rekey an IKE Tunnel.
Measurement Units:
Rekey's per second
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Phase 2 Rekey Rate
10.6.2 Phase 2 Rekey Rate
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Definition:
The number of Phase 2 SA's that can be succesfully re-negotiated
per-second.
Discussion:
Although many implementations will usually derive new keying
material before the old keys expire, there may still be a period
of time where frames get dropped before the phase 2 tunnels are
successfully re-established. There may also be some packetloss
introduced when the handover of traffic is done from the expired
SA to the newly negotiated SA. To measure the phase 2 rekey rate,
the measurement will require an IPsec aware test device to act as
a responder when negotiating the new phase 2 keying material.
The test methodology report must specify if PFS is enabled in
reported security context.
Measurement Units:
Rekey's per second
Issues:
N/A
See Also:
Phase 1 Rekey Rate
10.7 Tunnel Failover Time (TFT)
Definition:
Time required to recover all tunnels on a stanby IPsec device,
after a catastrophic failure occurs on the active IPsec device.
Discussion:
Recovery time required to re-establish all tunnels and reroute all
traffic on a standby node or other failsafe system after a failure
has occurred. Failure can include but are not limited to a
catastrophic IPsec Device failure, a encryption engine failure,
link outage. The recovery time is delta between the point of
failure and the time the first packet is seen on the last restored
tunnel on the backup device.
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Measurement Units:
Time units with enough precision to reflect Tunnel Failover Time.
Issues:
N/A
10.8 IKE DOS Resilience Rate
Definition:
The IKE Denial Of Service (DOS) Resilience Rate provides a rate of
invalid or mismatching IKE tunnels setup attempts at which it is
no longer possible to set up a valid IKE tunnel.
Discussion:
The IKE DOS Resilience Rate will provide a metric to how robust
and hardened an IPsec device is against malicious attempts to set
up a tunnel.
IKE DOS attacks can pose themselves in various forms and do not
necessarily have to have a malicious background. It is sufficient
to make a typographical error in a shared secret in an IPsec
aggregation device to be susceptible to a large number of IKE
attempts that need to be turned down. Due to the intense
computational nature of an IKE exchange every single IKE tunnel
attempt that has to be denied will take a non-negligible time an a
CPU in the IPsec device.
Depending on how many of these messages have to be processed, a
system might end up in a state that it is only doing key exchanges
and burdening the CPU for any other processes that might be
running in the IPsec device. At this point it will be no longer
possible to process a valid IKE tunnel setup request and thus IKE
DOS is in effect.
Measurement Units:
Tunnel Attempts Per Seconds (TAPS)
Issues:
N/A
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11. Security Considerations
As this document is solely for the purpose of providing test
benchmarking terminology and describes neither a protocol nor a
protocol's implementation; there are no security considerations
associated with this document.
12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individual for
their help and participation of the compilation and editing of this
document: Debby Stopp, Ixia.
13. Contributors
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individual for
their significant help, guidance, and contributions to this document:
Paul Hoffman, VPNC, Sunil Kalidindi, Ixia, Brian Talbert, MCI.
14. References
14.1 Normative References
[RFC1242] Bradner, S., "Benchmarking terminology for network
interconnection devices", RFC 1242, July 1991.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2285] Mandeville, R., "Benchmarking Terminology for LAN
Switching Devices", RFC 2285, February 1998.
[RFC2393] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R. and M. Thomas, "IP
Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", RFC 2393, December
1998.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2402] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC
2402, November 1998.
[RFC2403] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2403, November 1998.
[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
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[RFC2405] Madson, C. and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm With Explicit IV", RFC 2405, November 1998.
[RFC2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[RFC2407] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schneider, M. and M. Schertler, "Internet
Security Association and Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.
[RFC2411] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N. and R. Glenn, "IP Security
Document Roadmap", RFC 2411, November 1998.
[RFC2412] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC
2412, November 1998.
[RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
[RFC2544] Bradner, S. and J. McQuaid, "Benchmarking Methodology for
Network Interconnect Devices", RFC 2544, March 1999.
[RFC2547] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS VPNs", RFC 2547, March
1999.
[RFC2661] Townsley, W., Valencia, A., Rubens, A., Pall, G., Zorn, G.
and B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"", RFC
2661, August 1999.
[RFC2784] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D. and P. Traina,
"Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784, March
2000.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-ikev2]
Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-14 (work in progress), June 2004.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-dpd]
Huang, G., Beaulieu, S. and D. Rochefort, "A Traffic-Based
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Method of Detecting Dead IKE Peers",
draft-ietf-ipsec-dpd-04 (work in progress), October 2003.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike]
Kivinen, T., "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE",
draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-08 (work in progress), February
2004.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps]
Huttunen, A., "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec Packets",
draft-ietf-ipsec-udp-encaps-09 (work in progress), May
2004.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts]
Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-NAT Compatibility
Requirements", draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-reqts-06 (work in
progress), October 2003.
[I-D.ietf-ipsec-properties]
Krywaniuk, A., "Security Properties of the IPsec Protocol
Suite", draft-ietf-ipsec-properties-02 (work in progress),
July 2002.
[FIPS.186-1.1998]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 186-1, December 1998,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fips1861.pdf>.
14.2 Informative References
[Designing Network Security]
Kaeo, M., "Designing Network Security", ISBN: 1578700434,
Published: May 07, 1999; Copyright: 1999, 1999.
[SKEME] Krawczyk, H., "SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange
Mechanism for Internet", from IEEE Proceedings of the
1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems
Security, URI http://www.research.ibm.com/security/
skeme.ps, 1996.
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Authors' Addresses
Michele Bustos
IXIA
26601 W. Agoura Rd.
Calabasas, CA 91302
US
Phone: +1 (818)444-3244
EMail: mbustos@ixiacom.com
Tim Van Herck
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
US
Phone: +1 (408)527-2461
EMail: herckt@cisco.com
Merike Kaeo
Double Shot Security
520 Washington Blvd #363
Marina Del Rey, CA 90292
US
Phone: +1 (310)866-0165
EMail: kaeo@merike.com
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Bustos, et al. Expires January 30, 2005 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft Terminology for Benchmarking IPSec Devices August 2004
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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Acknowledgment
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