INTERNET-DRAFT Clifford Neuman
John Kohl
Theodore Ts'o
November 24, 2000
Expires May 24, 2001
The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07.txt.
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The distribution of this memo is unlimited. It is filed as
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07.txt, and expires May 24, 2001.
Please send comments to: ietf-krb-wg@anl.gov
ABSTRACT
This document provides an overview and specification of Version 5 of the
Kerberos protocol, and updates RFC1510 to clarify aspects of the protocol
and its intended use that require more detailed or clearer explanation than
was provided in RFC1510. This document is intended to provide a detailed
description of the protocol, suitable for implementation, together with
descriptions of the appropriate use of protocol messages and fields within
those messages.
This document is not intended to describe Kerberos to the end user, system
administrator, or application developer. Higher level papers describing
Version 5 of the Kerberos system [NT94] and documenting version 4 [SNS88],
are available elsewhere.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
OVERVIEW
This INTERNET-DRAFT describes the concepts and model upon which the Kerberos
network authentication system is based. It also specifies Version 5 of the
Kerberos protocol.
The motivations, goals, assumptions, and rationale behind most design
decisions are treated cursorily; they are more fully described in a paper
available in IEEE communications [NT94] and earlier in the Kerberos portion
of the Athena Technical Plan [MNSS87]. The protocols have been a proposed
standard and are being considered for advancement for draft standard through
the IETF standard process. Comments are encouraged on the presentation, but
only minor refinements to the protocol as implemented or extensions that fit
within current protocol framework will be considered at this time.
Requests for addition to an electronic mailing list for discussion of
Kerberos, kerberos@MIT.EDU, may be addressed to kerberos-request@MIT.EDU.
This mailing list is gatewayed onto the Usenet as the group
comp.protocols.kerberos. Requests for further information, including
documents and code availability, may be sent to info-kerberos@MIT.EDU.
BACKGROUND
The Kerberos model is based in part on Needham and Schroeder's trusted
third-party authentication protocol [NS78] and on modifications suggested by
Denning and Sacco [DS81]. The original design and implementation of Kerberos
Versions 1 through 4 was the work of two former Project Athena staff
members, Steve Miller of Digital Equipment Corporation and Clifford Neuman
(now at the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern
California), along with Jerome Saltzer, Technical Director of Project
Athena, and Jeffrey Schiller, MIT Campus Network Manager. Many other members
of Project Athena have also contributed to the work on Kerberos.
Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol (described in this document) has evolved
from Version 4 based on new requirements and desires for features not
available in Version 4. The design of Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol was
led by Clifford Neuman and John Kohl with much input from the community. The
development of the MIT reference implementation was led at MIT by John Kohl
and Theodore T'so, with help and contributed code from many others. Since
RFC1510 was issued, extensions and revisions to the protocol have been
proposed by many individuals. Some of these proposals are reflected in this
document. Where such changes involved significant effort, the document cites
the contribution of the proposer.
Reference implementations of both version 4 and version 5 of Kerberos are
publicly available and commercial implementations have been developed and
are widely used. Details on the differences between Kerberos Versions 4 and
5 can be found in [KNT92].
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
1. Introduction
Kerberos provides a means of verifying the identities of principals, (e.g. a
workstation user or a network server) on an open (unprotected) network. This
is accomplished without relying on assertions by the host operating system,
without basing trust on host addresses, without requiring physical security
of all the hosts on the network, and under the assumption that packets
traveling along the network can be read, modified, and inserted at
will[1.1]. Kerberos performs authentication under these conditions as a
trusted third-party authentication service by using conventional (shared
secret key [1.2]) cryptography. Kerberos extensions described in [PKINIT
reference as RFC] provide for the use of public key cryptography during
certain phases of the authentication protocol. These extensions allow
authentication of users registered with public key certification
authorities, and provide certain benefits of public key cryptography in
situations where they are needed.
The basic Kerberos authentication process proceeds as follows: A client
sends a request to the authentication server (AS) requesting 'credentials'
for a given server. The AS responds with these credentials, encrypted in the
client's key. The credentials consist of 1) a 'ticket' for the server and 2)
a temporary encryption key (often called a "session key"). The client
transmits the ticket (which contains the client's identity and a copy of the
session key, all encrypted in the server's key) to the server. The session
key (now shared by the client and server) is used to authenticate the
client, and may optionally be used to authenticate the server. It may also
be used to encrypt further communication between the two parties or to
exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further
communication.
Implementation of the basic protocol consists of one or more authentication
servers running on physically secure hosts. The authentication servers
maintain a database of principals (i.e., users and servers) and their secret
keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol.
In order to add authentication to its transactions, a typical network
application adds one or two calls to the Kerberos library directly or
through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface,
GSSAPI, described in separate document [ref to GSSAPI RFC]. These calls
result in the transmission of the necessary messages to achieve
authentication.
The Kerberos protocol consists of several sub-protocols (or exchanges).
There are two basic methods by which a client can ask a Kerberos server for
credentials. In the first approach, the client sends a cleartext request for
a ticket for the desired server to the AS. The reply is sent encrypted in
the client's secret key. Usually this request is for a ticket-granting
ticket (TGT) which can later be used with the ticket-granting server (TGS).
In the second method, the client sends a request to the TGS. The client uses
the TGT to authenticate itself to the TGS in the same manner as if it were
contacting any other application server that requires Kerberos
authentication. The reply is encrypted in the session key from the TGT.
Though the protocol specification describes the AS and the TGS as separate
servers, they are implemented in practice as different protocol entry points
within a single Kerberos server.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Once obtained, credentials may be used to verify the identity of the
principals in a transaction, to ensure the integrity of messages exchanged
between them, or to preserve privacy of the messages. The application is
free to choose whatever protection may be necessary.
To verify the identities of the principals in a transaction, the client
transmits the ticket to the application server. Since the ticket is sent "in
the clear" (parts of it are encrypted, but this encryption doesn't thwart
replay) and might be intercepted and reused by an attacker, additional
information is sent to prove that the message originated with the principal
to whom the ticket was issued. This information (called the authenticator)
is encrypted in the session key, and includes a timestamp. The timestamp
proves that the message was recently generated and is not a replay.
Encrypting the authenticator in the session key proves that it was generated
by a party possessing the session key. Since no one except the requesting
principal and the server know the session key (it is never sent over the
network in the clear) this guarantees the identity of the client.
The integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can also be
guaranteed using the session key (passed in the ticket and contained in the
credentials). This approach provides detection of both replay attacks and
message stream modification attacks. It is accomplished by generating and
transmitting a collision-proof checksum (elsewhere called a hash or digest
function) of the client's message, keyed with the session key. Privacy and
integrity of the messages exchanged between principals can be secured by
encrypting the data to be passed using the session key contained in the
ticket or the sub-session key found in the authenticator.
The authentication exchanges mentioned above require read-only access to the
Kerberos database. Sometimes, however, the entries in the database must be
modified, such as when adding new principals or changing a principal's key.
This is done using a protocol between a client and a third Kerberos server,
the Kerberos Administration Server (KADM). There is also a protocol for
maintaining multiple copies of the Kerberos database. Neither of these
protocols are described in this document.
1.1. Cross-realm operation
The Kerberos protocol is designed to operate across organizational
boundaries. A client in one organization can be authenticated to a server in
another. Each organization wishing to run a Kerberos server establishes its
own 'realm'. The name of the realm in which a client is registered is part
of the client's name, and can be used by the end-service to decide whether
to honor a request.
By establishing 'inter-realm' keys, the administrators of two realms can
allow a client authenticated in the local realm to prove its identity to
servers in other realms[1.3]. The exchange of inter-realm keys (a separate
key may be used for each direction) registers the ticket-granting service of
each realm as a principal in the other realm. A client is then able to
obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the remote realm's ticket-granting
service from its local realm. When that ticket-granting ticket is used, the
remote ticket-granting service uses the inter-realm key (which usually
differs from its own normal TGS key) to decrypt the ticket-granting ticket,
and is thus certain that it was issued by the client's own TGS. Tickets
issued by the remote ticket-granting service will indicate to the
end-service that the client was authenticated from another realm.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A realm is said to communicate with another realm if the two realms share an
inter-realm key, or if the local realm shares an inter-realm key with an
intermediate realm that communicates with the remote realm. An
authentication path is the sequence of intermediate realms that are
transited in communicating from one realm to another.
Realms are typically organized hierarchically. Each realm shares a key with
its parent and a different key with each child. If an inter-realm key is not
directly shared by two realms, the hierarchical organization allows an
authentication path to be easily constructed. If a hierarchical organization
is not used, it may be necessary to consult a database in order to construct
an authentication path between realms.
Although realms are typically hierarchical, intermediate realms may be
bypassed to achieve cross-realm authentication through alternate
authentication paths (these might be established to make communication
between two realms more efficient). It is important for the end-service to
know which realms were transited when deciding how much faith to place in
the authentication process. To facilitate this decision, a field in each
ticket contains the names of the realms that were involved in authenticating
the client.
The application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or rejecting
authentication and should check the transited field. The application server
may choose to rely on the KDC for the application server's realm to check
the transited field. The application server's KDC will set the
TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in this case. The KDC's for intermediate
realms may also check the transited field as they issue
ticket-granting-tickets for other realms, but they are encouraged not to do
so. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited field by
setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but not
required to honor this flag.
1.2. Choosing a principal with which to communicate
The Kerberos protocol provides the means for verifying (subject to the
assumptions in 1.4) that the entity with which one communicates is the same
entity that was registered with the KDC using the claimed identity
(principal name). It is still necessary to determine whether that identity
corresponds to the entity with which one intends to communicate.
When appropriate data has been exchanged in advance, this determination may
be performed syntactically by the application based on the application
protocol specification, information provided by the user, and configuration
files. For example, the server principal name (including realm) for a telnet
server might be derived from the user specified host name (from the telnet
command line), the "host/" prefix specified in the application protocol
specification, and a mapping to a Kerberos realm derived syntactically from
the domain part of the specified hostname and information from the local
Kerberos realms database.
One can also rely on trusted third parties to make this determination, but
only when the data obtained from the third party is suitably integrity
protected wile resident on the third party server and when transmitted.
Thus, for example, one should not rely on an unprotected domain name system
record to map a host alias to the primary name of a server, accepting the
primary name as the party one intends to contact since an attacker can
modify the mapping and impersonate the party with which one intended to
communicate.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
If a Kerberos server supports name canonicalization, it may be relied upon
as a third party to aid in this determination. When utilizing the name
canonicalization function provided by the Kerberos server, a client, having
already located the instance of a service it wishes to contact, makes a
request to the KDC using the server's name information as specified by the
user. The Kerberos server will attempt to locate a service principal in its
database that corresponds to the requested name and return a ticket for the
appropriate server principal to the client. If the KDC determines that the
correct server principal is registered in another realm, the KDC will
provide a referral to the Kerberos realm that is known to contain the
requested service principal. The name canonicalization function supports
identity mapping only, and it may not be used as a general name service to
locate service instances. There is no guarantee that the returned server
principal name (identity) will embed the name of the host on which the
server resides.
1.3. Authorization
As an authentication service, Kerberos provides a means of verifying the
identity of principals on a network. Authentication is usually useful
primarily as a first step in the process of authorization, determining
whether a client may use a service, which objects the client is allowed to
access, and the type of access allowed for each. Kerberos does not, by
itself, provide authorization. Possession of a client ticket for a service
provides only for authentication of the client to that service, and in the
absence of a separate authorization procedure, it should not be considered
by an application as authorizing the use of that service.
Such separate authorization methods may be implemented as application
specific access control functions and may utilize files on the application
server, or on separately issued authorization credentials such as those
based on proxies [Neu93], or on other authorization services. Separately
authenticated authorization credentials may be embedded in a tickets
authorization data when encapsulated by the kdc-issued authorization data
element.
Applications should not accept the mere issuance of a service ticket by the
Kerberos server (even by a modified Kerberos server) as granting authority
to use the service, since such applications may become vulnerable to the
bypass of this authorization check in an environment if they interoperate
with other KDCs or where other options for application authentication (e.g.
the PKTAPP proposal) are provided.
1.4. Environmental assumptions
Kerberos imposes a few assumptions on the environment in which it can
properly function:
* 'Denial of service' attacks are not solved with Kerberos. There are
places in the protocols where an intruder can prevent an application
from participating in the proper authentication steps. Detection and
solution of such attacks (some of which can appear to be not-uncommon
'normal' failure modes for the system) is usually best left to the
human administrators and users.
* Principals must keep their secret keys secret. If an intruder somehow
steals a principal's key, it will be able to masquerade as that
principal or impersonate any server to the legitimate principal.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
* 'Password guessing' attacks are not solved by Kerberos. If a user
chooses a poor password, it is possible for an attacker to successfully
mount an offline dictionary attack by repeatedly attempting to decrypt,
with successive entries from a dictionary, messages obtained which are
encrypted under a key derived from the user's password.
* Each host on the network must have a clock which is 'loosely
synchronized' to the time of the other hosts; this synchronization is
used to reduce the bookkeeping needs of application servers when they
do replay detection. The degree of "looseness" can be configured on a
per-server basis, but is typically on the order of 5 minutes. If the
clocks are synchronized over the network, the clock synchronization
protocol must itself be secured from network attackers.
* Principal identifiers are not recycled on a short-term basis. A typical
mode of access control will use access control lists (ACLs) to grant
permissions to particular principals. If a stale ACL entry remains for
a deleted principal and the principal identifier is reused, the new
principal will inherit rights specified in the stale ACL entry. By not
re-using principal identifiers, the danger of inadvertent access is
removed.
1.5. Glossary of terms
Below is a list of terms used throughout this document.
Authentication
Verifying the claimed identity of a principal.
Authentication header
A record containing a Ticket and an Authenticator to be presented to a
server as part of the authentication process.
Authentication path
A sequence of intermediate realms transited in the authentication
process when communicating from one realm to another.
Authenticator
A record containing information that can be shown to have been recently
generated using the session key known only by the client and server.
Authorization
The process of determining whether a client may use a service, which
objects the client is allowed to access, and the type of access allowed
for each.
Capability
A token that grants the bearer permission to access an object or
service. In Kerberos, this might be a ticket whose use is restricted by
the contents of the authorization data field, but which lists no
network addresses, together with the session key necessary to use the
ticket.
Ciphertext
The output of an encryption function. Encryption transforms plaintext
into ciphertext.
Client
A process that makes use of a network service on behalf of a user. Note
that in some cases a Server may itself be a client of some other server
(e.g. a print server may be a client of a file server).
Credentials
A ticket plus the secret session key necessary to successfully use that
ticket in an authentication exchange.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
KDC
Key Distribution Center, a network service that supplies tickets and
temporary session keys; or an instance of that service or the host on
which it runs. The KDC services both initial ticket and ticket-granting
ticket requests. The initial ticket portion is sometimes referred to as
the Authentication Server (or service). The ticket-granting ticket
portion is sometimes referred to as the ticket-granting server (or
service).
Kerberos
Aside from the 3-headed dog guarding Hades, the name given to Project
Athena's authentication service, the protocol used by that service, or
the code used to implement the authentication service.
Plaintext
The input to an encryption function or the output of a decryption
function. Decryption transforms ciphertext into plaintext.
Principal
A named client or server entity that participates in a network
communication, with one name that is considered canonical.
Principal identifier
The canonical name used to uniquely identify each different principal.
Seal
To encipher a record containing several fields in such a way that the
fields cannot be individually replaced without either knowledge of the
encryption key or leaving evidence of tampering.
Secret key
An encryption key shared by a principal and the KDC, distributed
outside the bounds of the system, with a long lifetime. In the case of
a human user's principal, the secret key may be derived from a
password.
Server
A particular Principal which provides a resource to network clients.
The server is sometimes referred to as the Application Server.
Service
A resource provided to network clients; often provided by more than one
server (for example, remote file service).
Session key
A temporary encryption key used between two principals, with a lifetime
limited to the duration of a single login "session".
Sub-session key
A temporary encryption key used between two principals, selected and
exchanged by the principals using the session key, and with a lifetime
limited to the duration of a single association.
Ticket
A record that helps a client authenticate itself to a server; it
contains the client's identity, a session key, a timestamp, and other
information, all sealed using the server's secret key. It only serves
to authenticate a client when presented along with a fresh
Authenticator.
2. Ticket flag uses and requests
Each Kerberos ticket contains a set of flags which are used to indicate
attributes of that ticket. Most flags may be requested by a client when the
ticket is obtained; some are automatically turned on and off by a Kerberos
server as required. The following sections explain what the various flags
mean, and gives examples of reasons to use such a flag.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
2.1. Initial, pre-authenticated, and hardware authenticated tickets
The INITIAL flag indicates that a ticket was issued using the AS protocol
and not issued based on a ticket-granting ticket. Application servers that
want to require the demonstrated knowledge of a client's secret key (e.g. a
password-changing program) can insist that this flag be set in any tickets
they accept, and thus be assured that the client's key was recently
presented to the application client.
The PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags provide additional information about
the initial authentication, regardless of whether the current ticket was
issued directly (in which case INITIAL will also be set) or issued on the
basis of a ticket-granting ticket (in which case the INITIAL flag is clear,
but the PRE-AUTHENT and HW-AUTHENT flags are carried forward from the
ticket-granting ticket).
2.2. Invalid tickets
The INVALID flag indicates that a ticket is invalid. Application servers
must reject tickets which have this flag set. A postdated ticket will
usually be issued in this form. Invalid tickets must be validated by the KDC
before use, by presenting them to the KDC in a TGS request with the VALIDATE
option specified. The KDC will only validate tickets after their starttime
has passed. The validation is required so that postdated tickets which have
been stolen before their starttime can be rendered permanently invalid
(through a hot-list mechanism) (see section 3.3.3.1).
2.3. Renewable tickets
Applications may desire to hold tickets which can be valid for long periods
of time. However, this can expose their credentials to potential theft for
equally long periods, and those stolen credentials would be valid until the
expiration time of the ticket(s). Simply using short-lived tickets and
obtaining new ones periodically would require the client to have long-term
access to its secret key, an even greater risk. Renewable tickets can be
used to mitigate the consequences of theft. Renewable tickets have two
"expiration times": the first is when the current instance of the ticket
expires, and the second is the latest permissible value for an individual
expiration time. An application client must periodically (i.e. before it
expires) present a renewable ticket to the KDC, with the RENEW option set in
the KDC request. The KDC will issue a new ticket with a new session key and
a later expiration time. All other fields of the ticket are left unmodified
by the renewal process. When the latest permissible expiration time arrives,
the ticket expires permanently. At each renewal, the KDC may consult a
hot-list to determine if the ticket had been reported stolen since its last
renewal; it will refuse to renew such stolen tickets, and thus the usable
lifetime of stolen tickets is reduced.
The RENEWABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service (discussed below in section 3.3). It can usually be
ignored by application servers. However, some particularly careful
application servers may wish to disallow renewable tickets.
If a renewable ticket is not renewed by its expiration time, the KDC will
not renew the ticket. The RENEWABLE flag is reset by default, but a client
may request it be set by setting the RENEWABLE option in the KRB_AS_REQ
message. If it is set, then the renew-till field in the ticket contains the
time after which the ticket may not be renewed.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
2.4. Postdated tickets
Applications may occasionally need to obtain tickets for use much later,
e.g. a batch submission system would need tickets to be valid at the time
the batch job is serviced. However, it is dangerous to hold valid tickets in
a batch queue, since they will be on-line longer and more prone to theft.
Postdated tickets provide a way to obtain these tickets from the KDC at job
submission time, but to leave them "dormant" until they are activated and
validated by a further request of the KDC. If a ticket theft were reported
in the interim, the KDC would refuse to validate the ticket, and the thief
would be foiled.
The MAY-POSTDATE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. This flag
must be set in a ticket-granting ticket in order to issue a postdated ticket
based on the presented ticket. It is reset by default; it may be requested
by a client by setting the ALLOW-POSTDATE option in the KRB_AS_REQ message.
This flag does not allow a client to obtain a postdated ticket-granting
ticket; postdated ticket-granting tickets can only by obtained by requesting
the postdating in the KRB_AS_REQ message. The life (endtime-starttime) of a
postdated ticket will be the remaining life of the ticket-granting ticket at
the time of the request, unless the RENEWABLE option is also set, in which
case it can be the full life (endtime-starttime) of the ticket-granting
ticket. The KDC may limit how far in the future a ticket may be postdated.
The POSTDATED flag indicates that a ticket has been postdated. The
application server can check the authtime field in the ticket to see when
the original authentication occurred. Some services may choose to reject
postdated tickets, or they may only accept them within a certain period
after the original authentication. When the KDC issues a POSTDATED ticket,
it will also be marked as INVALID, so that the application client must
present the ticket to the KDC to be validated before use.
2.5. Proxiable and proxy tickets
At times it may be necessary for a principal to allow a service to perform
an operation on its behalf. The service must be able to take on the identity
of the client, but only for a particular purpose. A principal can allow a
service to take on the principal's identity for a particular purpose by
granting it a proxy.
The process of granting a proxy using the proxy and proxiable flags is used
to provide credentials for use with specific services. Though conceptually
also a proxy, user's wishing to delegate their identity for ANY purpose must
use the ticket forwarding mechanism described in the next section to forward
a ticket granting ticket.
The PROXIABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. When set,
this flag tells the ticket-granting server that it is OK to issue a new
ticket (but not a ticket-granting ticket) with a different network address
based on this ticket. This flag is set if requested by the client on initial
authentication. By default, the client will request that it be set when
requesting a ticket granting ticket, and reset when requesting any other
ticket.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
This flag allows a client to pass a proxy to a server to perform a remote
request on its behalf, e.g. a print service client can give the print server
a proxy to access the client's files on a particular file server in order to
satisfy a print request.
In order to complicate the use of stolen credentials, Kerberos tickets are
usually valid from only those network addresses specifically included in the
ticket[2.1]. When granting a proxy, the client must specify the new network
address from which the proxy is to be used, or indicate that the proxy is to
be issued for use from any address.
The PROXY flag is set in a ticket by the TGS when it issues a proxy ticket.
Application servers may check this flag and at their option they may require
additional authentication from the agent presenting the proxy in order to
provide an audit trail.
2.6. Forwardable tickets
Authentication forwarding is an instance of a proxy where the service
granted is complete use of the client's identity. An example where it might
be used is when a user logs in to a remote system and wants authentication
to work from that system as if the login were local.
The FORWARDABLE flag in a ticket is normally only interpreted by the
ticket-granting service. It can be ignored by application servers. The
FORWARDABLE flag has an interpretation similar to that of the PROXIABLE
flag, except ticket-granting tickets may also be issued with different
network addresses. This flag is reset by default, but users may request that
it be set by setting the FORWARDABLE option in the AS request when they
request their initial ticket-granting ticket.
This flag allows for authentication forwarding without requiring the user to
enter a password again. If the flag is not set, then authentication
forwarding is not permitted, but the same result can still be achieved if
the user engages in the AS exchange specifying the requested network
addresses and supplies a password.
The FORWARDED flag is set by the TGS when a client presents a ticket with
the FORWARDABLE flag set and requests a forwarded ticket by specifying the
FORWARDED KDC option and supplying a set of addresses for the new ticket. It
is also set in all tickets issued based on tickets with the FORWARDED flag
set. Application servers may choose to process FORWARDED tickets differently
than non-FORWARDED tickets.
2.7 Transited Policy Checking
While the application server is ultimately responsible for accepting or
rejecting authentication and should check the transited field, a KDC may
apply a realm specific policy for validating the transited field and
accepting credentials for cross-realm authentication. When the KDC applies
such checks and accepts such cross-realm authentication it will set the
TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag in the service tickets it issues based on the
cross-realm TGT. A client may request that the KDC's not check the transited
field by setting the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK flag. KDC's are encouraged but
not required to honor this flag.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
2.8 Anonymous Tickets
When policy allows, a KDC may issue anonymous tickets for the purpose of
enabling encrypted communication between a client and server without
identifying the client to the server. Such anonymous tickets are issued with
a generic principal name configured on the KDC (e.g. "anonymous@") and will
have the ANONYMOUS flag set. A server accepting such a ticket may assume
that subsequent requests using the same ticket and session key originate
from the same user. Requests with the same username but different tickets
are likely to originate from different users. Users request anonymous ticket
by setting the REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option in an AS or TGS request.
2.9. Other KDC options
There are three additional options which may be set in a client's request of
the KDC.
2.9.1 Name canonicalization [JBrezak]
The NAME-CANONICALIZATION option allows the KDC to replace the name of the
client or server requested by the client with the canonical form of the
principal's name, if known, or to refer the client to a KDC for the realm
with which the requested principal is registered.
Where name cannonicalization is supported a client who can identify a
principal but does not know the full principal name can request that the
Kerberos server attempt to lookup the name in its database and use the
canonical name of the requested principal or return a referral to a realm
that has the requested principal in its namespace. Use of name
canonicalization supports the case where a principal has multiple common
names (names typed by a user[2.2]), all of which are known to the KDC, but
only one Kerberos identity (the canonical name is the Kerberos principal
name). Name canonicalization is intended solely to provide a secure mapping
from the name known by a user to its principal identifier. It is not
intended for use as a general purpose nameserver or to identify instances of
a service.
The CANONICALIZE flag in a ticket request is used to indicate to the
Kerberos server that the client will accept an alternative name to the
principal in the request or a referral to another realm. When name
cannonicalization is supported in a realm, all instances of the AS and TGS
for the realm must be able to interpret requests with this flag. In realms
where name cannonicalization is not supported, this flag may be ignored. By
using this flag, the client can avoid extensive configuration needed to map
specific host names to a particular realm.
2.9.2 Renewable-OK
The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates that the client will accept a renewable
ticket if a ticket with the requested life cannot otherwise be provided. If
a ticket with the requested life cannot be provided, then the KDC may issue
a renewable ticket with a renew-till equal to the the requested endtime. The
value of the renew-till field may still be adjusted by site-determined
limits or limits imposed by the individual principal or server.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
2.9.3 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY
The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option supports user-to-user authentication. It allows
the KDC to issue a service ticket encrypted using the session key from a
ticket granting ticket issued to another user. This is needed to support
peer-to-peer authentication since the long term key of the user does not
remain on the workstation after initial login. The ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is
honored only by the ticket-granting service. It indicates that the ticket to
be issued for the end server is to be encrypted in the session key from the
additional second ticket-granting ticket provided with the request. See
section 3.3.3 for specific details.
3. Message Exchanges
The following sections describe the interactions between network clients and
servers and the messages involved in those exchanges.
3.1. The Authentication Service Exchange
Summary
Message direction Message type Section
1. Client to Kerberos KRB_AS_REQ 5.4.1
2. Kerberos to client KRB_AS_REP or 5.4.2
KRB_ERROR 5.9.1
The Authentication Service (AS) Exchange between the client and the Kerberos
Authentication Server is initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain
authentication credentials for a given server but currently holds no
credentials. In its basic form, the client's secret key is used for
encryption and decryption. This exchange is typically used at the initiation
of a login session to obtain credentials for a Ticket-Granting Server which
will subsequently be used to obtain credentials for other servers (see
section 3.3) without requiring further use of the client's secret key. This
exchange is also used to request credentials for services which must not be
mediated through the Ticket-Granting Service, but rather require a
principal's secret key, such as the password-changing service[3.1]. This
exchange does not by itself provide any assurance of the the identity of the
user[3.2].
The exchange consists of two messages: KRB_AS_REQ from the client to
Kerberos, and KRB_AS_REP or KRB_ERROR in reply. The formats for these
messages are described in sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2, and 5.9.1.
In the request, the client sends (in cleartext) its own identity and the
identity of the server for which it is requesting credentials. The response,
KRB_AS_REP, contains a ticket for the client to present to the server, and a
session key that will be shared by the client and the server. The session
key and additional information are encrypted in the client's secret key. The
KRB_AS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect replays,
and to associate it with the message to which it replies.
Without pre-authentication, the authentication server does not know whether
the client is actually the principal named in the request. It simply sends a
reply without knowing or caring whether they are the same. This is
acceptable because nobody but the principal whose identity was given in the
request will be able to use the reply. Its critical information is encrypted
in that principal's key. The initial request supports an optional field that
can be used to pass additional information that might be needed for the
initial exchange. This field may be used for pre-authentication as described
in section 3.1.1.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Various errors can occur; these are indicated by an error response
(KRB_ERROR) instead of the KRB_AS_REP response. The error message is not
encrypted. The KRB_ERROR message contains information which can be used to
associate it with the message to which it replies. If suitable
preauthentication has occurred, an optional checksum may be included in the
KRB_ERROR message to prevent fabrication or modification of the KRB_ERROR
message. When a checksum is not present, the lack of integrity protection
precludes the ability to detect replays, fabrications, or modifications of
the message, and the client must not depend on information in the KRB_ERROR
message for security critical operations.
3.1.1. Generation of KRB_AS_REQ message
The client may specify a number of options in the initial request. Among
these options are whether pre-authentication is to be performed; whether the
requested ticket is to be renewable, proxiable, or forwardable; whether it
should be postdated or allow postdating of derivative tickets; whether the
client requests name-canonicalization or an anonymous ticket; and whether a
renewable ticket will be accepted in lieu of a non-renewable ticket if the
requested ticket expiration date cannot be satisfied by a non-renewable
ticket (due to configuration constraints; see section 4). See section A.1
for pseudocode.
The client prepares the KRB_AS_REQ message and sends it to the KDC.
3.1.2. Receipt of KRB_AS_REQ message
If all goes well, processing the KRB_AS_REQ message will result in the
creation of a ticket for the client to present to the server. The format for
the ticket is described in section 5.3.1. The contents of the ticket are
determined as follows.
3.1.3. Generation of KRB_AS_REP message
The authentication server looks up the client and server principals named in
the KRB_AS_REQ in its database, extracting their respective keys. If the
requested client principal named in the request is not known because it
doesn't exist in the KDC's principal database and if an acceptable canonical
name of the client is not known, then an error message with a
KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN is returned.
If the request had the CANONICALIZE option set and if the AS finds the
canonical name for the client and it is in another realm, then an error
message with a KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM error code and the cname and crealm in
the error message will contain the true client principal name and realm. In
this case, since no key is shared with the client, the response from the KDC
is not integrity protected and the referral can only be considered a hint;
the validity of the referral is validated upon successful completion of
initial authentication with the correct AS using the appropriate user key.
If required, the server pre-authenticates the request, and if the
pre-authentication check fails, an error message with the code
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned. If pre-authentication is required, but
was not present in the request, an error message with the code
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED is returned and the PA-ETYPE-INFO pre-authentication
field will be included in the KRB-ERROR message. If the server cannot
accommodate an encryption type requested by the client, an error message
with code KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP is returned. Otherwise the KDC generates a
'random' session key[3.3].
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
When responding to an AS request, if there are multiple encryption keys
registered for a client in the Kerberos database (or if the key registered
supports multiple encryption types; e.g. DES3-CBC-SHA1 and
DES3-CBC-SHA1-KD), then the etype field from the AS request is used by the
KDC to select the encryption method to be used to protect the encrypted part
of the KRB_AS_REP message which is sent to the client. If there is more than
one supported strong encryption type in the etype list, the first valid
etype for which an encryption key is available is used. The encryption
method used to protect the encrypted part of the KRB_TGS_REP message is the
keytype of the session key found in the ticket granting ticket presented in
the KRB_TGS_REQ.
If the user's key was generated using an alternate string to key function
than that used by the selected encryption type, information needed by the
string to key function will be returned to the client in the padata field of
the KRB_AS_REP message using the PA-PW-SALT, PA-AFS3-SALT, or similar
pre-authentication typed values. This does not affect the encryption
performed by the KDC since the key stored in the principal database already
has the string to key transformation applied.
When the etype field is present in a KDC request, whether an AS or TGS
request, the KDC will attempt to assign the type of the random session key
from the list of methods in the etype field. The KDC will select the
appropriate type using the list of methods provided together with
information from the Kerberos database indicating acceptable encryption
methods for the application server. The KDC will not issue tickets with a
weak session key encryption type.
If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is
within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE
option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to
the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the
future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not
been specified then the error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise
the requested start time is checked against the policy of the local realm
(the administrator might decide to prohibit certain types or ranges of
postdated tickets), and if acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as
requested and the INVALID flag is set in the new ticket. The postdated
ticket must be validated before use by presenting it to the KDC after the
start time has been reached.
The expiration time of the ticket will be set to the earlier of the
requested endtime and a time determined by local policy, possibly determined
using realm or principal specific factors. For example, the expiration time
may be set to the minimum of the following:
* The expiration time (endtime) requested in the KRB_AS_REQ message.
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated
with the client principal from the authentication server's database
(see section 4).
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum allowable lifetime associated
with the server principal.
* The ticket's start time plus the maximum lifetime set by the policy of
the local realm.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
If the requested expiration time minus the start time (as determined above)
is less than a site-determined minimum lifetime, an error message with code
KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID is returned. If the requested expiration time for the
ticket exceeds what was determined as above, and if the 'RENEWABLE-OK'
option was requested, then the 'RENEWABLE' flag is set in the new ticket,
and the renew-till value is set as if the 'RENEWABLE' option were requested
(the field and option names are described fully in section 5.4.1).
If the RENEWABLE option has been requested or if the RENEWABLE-OK option has
been set and a renewable ticket is to be issued, then the renew-till field
is set to the minimum of:
* Its requested value.
* The start time of the ticket plus the minimum of the two maximum
renewable lifetimes associated with the principals' database entries.
* The start time of the ticket plus the maximum renewable lifetime set by
the policy of the local realm.
The flags field of the new ticket will have the following options set if
they have been requested and if the policy of the local realm allows:
FORWARDABLE, MAY-POSTDATE, POSTDATED, PROXIABLE, RENEWABLE, ANONYMOUS. If
the new ticket is post-dated (the start time is in the future), its INVALID
flag will also be set.
If all of the above succeed, the server will encrypt ciphertext part of the
ticket using the encryption key extracted from the server principal's record
in the Kerberos database using the encryption type associated with the
server principal's key (this choice is NOT affected by the etype field in
the request). It then formats a KRB_AS_REP message (see section 5.4.2),
copying the addresses in the request into the caddr of the response, placing
any required pre-authentication data into the padata of the response, and
encrypts the ciphertext part in the client's key using an acceptable
encryption method requested in the etype field of the request, and sends the
message to the client. See section A.2 for pseudocode.
3.1.4. Generation of KRB_ERROR message
Several errors can occur, and the Authentication Server responds by
returning an error message, KRB_ERROR, to the client, with the error-code,
e-text, and optional e-cksum fields set to appropriate values. The error
message contents and details are described in Section 5.9.1.
3.1.5. Receipt of KRB_AS_REP message
If the reply message type is KRB_AS_REP, then the client verifies that the
cname and crealm fields in the cleartext portion of the reply match what it
requested. If any padata fields are present, they may be used to derive the
proper secret key to decrypt the message. The client decrypts the encrypted
part of the response using its secret key, verifies that the nonce in the
encrypted part matches the nonce it supplied in its request (to detect
replays). It also verifies that the sname and srealm in the response match
those in the request (or are otherwise expected values), and that the host
address field is also correct. It then stores the ticket, session key, start
and expiration times, and other information for later use. The
key-expiration field from the encrypted part of the response may be checked
to notify the user of impending key expiration (the client program could
then suggest remedial action, such as a password change). See section A.3
for pseudocode.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Proper decryption of the KRB_AS_REP message is not sufficient for the host
to verify the identity of the user; the user and an attacker could cooperate
to generate a KRB_AS_REP format message which decrypts properly but is not
from the proper KDC. If the host wishes to verify the identity of the user,
it must require the user to present application credentials which can be
verified using a securely-stored secret key for the host. If those
credentials can be verified, then the identity of the user can be assured.
3.1.6. Receipt of KRB_ERROR message
If the reply message type is KRB_ERROR, then the client interprets it as an
error and performs whatever application-specific tasks are necessary to
recover. If the client set the CANONICALIZE option and a KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM
error was returned, the AS request should be retried to the realm and client
principal name specified in the error message crealm and cname field
respectively.
3.2. The Client/Server Authentication Exchange
Summary
Message direction Message type Section
Client to Application server KRB_AP_REQ 5.5.1
[optional] Application server to client KRB_AP_REP or 5.5.2
KRB_ERROR 5.9.1
The client/server authentication (CS) exchange is used by network
applications to authenticate the client to the server and vice versa. The
client must have already acquired credentials for the server using the AS or
TGS exchange.
3.2.1. The KRB_AP_REQ message
The KRB_AP_REQ contains authentication information which should be part of
the first message in an authenticated transaction. It contains a ticket, an
authenticator, and some additional bookkeeping information (see section
5.5.1 for the exact format). The ticket by itself is insufficient to
authenticate a client, since tickets are passed across the network in
cleartext[3.4], so the authenticator is used to prevent invalid replay of
tickets by proving to the server that the client knows the session key of
the ticket and thus is entitled to use the ticket. The KRB_AP_REQ message is
referred to elsewhere as the 'authentication header.'
3.2.2. Generation of a KRB_AP_REQ message
When a client wishes to initiate authentication to a server, it obtains
(either through a credentials cache, the AS exchange, or the TGS exchange) a
ticket and session key for the desired service. The client may re-use any
tickets it holds until they expire. To use a ticket the client constructs a
new Authenticator from the the system time, its name, and optionally an
application specific checksum, an initial sequence number to be used in
KRB_SAFE or KRB_PRIV messages, and/or a session subkey to be used in
negotiations for a session key unique to this particular session.
Authenticators may not be re-used and will be rejected if replayed to a
server[3.5]. If a sequence number is to be included, it should be randomly
chosen so that even after many messages have been exchanged it is not likely
to collide with other sequence numbers in use.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
The client may indicate a requirement of mutual authentication or the use of
a session-key based ticket by setting the appropriate flag(s) in the
ap-options field of the message.
The Authenticator is encrypted in the session key and combined with the
ticket to form the KRB_AP_REQ message which is then sent to the end server
along with any additional application-specific information. See section A.9
for pseudocode.
3.2.3. Receipt of KRB_AP_REQ message
Authentication is based on the server's current time of day (clocks must be
loosely synchronized), the authenticator, and the ticket. Several errors are
possible. If an error occurs, the server is expected to reply to the client
with a KRB_ERROR message. This message may be encapsulated in the
application protocol if its 'raw' form is not acceptable to the protocol.
The format of error messages is described in section 5.9.1.
The algorithm for verifying authentication information is as follows. If the
message type is not KRB_AP_REQ, the server returns the KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE
error. If the key version indicated by the Ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is not
one the server can use (e.g., it indicates an old key, and the server no
longer possesses a copy of the old key), the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error is
returned. If the USE-SESSION-KEY flag is set in the ap-options field, it
indicates to the server that the ticket is encrypted in the session key from
the server's ticket-granting ticket rather than its secret key [3.6].
Since it is possible for the server to be registered in multiple realms,
with different keys in each, the srealm field in the unencrypted portion of
the ticket in the KRB_AP_REQ is used to specify which secret key the server
should use to decrypt that ticket. The KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY error code is
returned if the server doesn't have the proper key to decipher the ticket.
The ticket is decrypted using the version of the server's key specified by
the ticket. If the decryption routines detect a modification of the ticket
(each encryption system must provide safeguards to detect modified
ciphertext; see section 6), the KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned
(chances are good that different keys were used to encrypt and decrypt).
The authenticator is decrypted using the session key extracted from the
decrypted ticket. If decryption shows it to have been modified, the
KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. The name and realm of the client
from the ticket are compared against the same fields in the authenticator.
If they don't match, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH error is returned (they might
not match, for example, if the wrong session key was used to encrypt the
authenticator). The addresses in the ticket (if any) are then searched for
an address matching the operating-system reported address of the client. If
no match is found or the server insists on ticket addresses but none are
present in the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error is returned. If the
local (server) time and the client time in the authenticator differ by more
than the allowable clock skew (e.g., 5 minutes), the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error
is returned.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Unless the application server provides its own suitable means to protect
against replay (for example, a challenge-response sequence initiated by the
server after authentication, or use of a server-generated encryption
subkey), the server must utilize a replay cache to remember any
authenticator presented within the allowable clock skew. Careful analysis of
the application protocol and implementation is recommended before
eliminating this cache. The replay cache will store the server name, along
with the client name, time and microsecond fields from the recently-seen
authenticators and if a matching tuple is found, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error
is returned [3.7]. If a server loses track of authenticators presented
within the allowable clock skew, it must reject all requests until the clock
skew interval has passed, providing assurance that any lost or re-played
authenticators will fall outside the allowable clock skew and can no longer
be successfully replayed[3.8].
If a sequence number is provided in the authenticator, the server saves it
for later use in processing KRB_SAFE and/or KRB_PRIV messages. If a subkey
is present, the server either saves it for later use or uses it to help
generate its own choice for a subkey to be returned in a KRB_AP_REP message.
If multiple servers (for example, different services on one machine, or a
single service implemented on multiple machines) share a service principal
(a practice we do not recommend in general, but acknowledge will be used in
some cases), they should also share this replay cache, or the application
protocol should be designed so as to eliminate the need for it. Note that
this applies to all of the services, if any of the application protocols
does not have replay protection built in; an authenticator used with such a
service could later be replayed to a different service with the same service
principal but no replay protection, if the former doesn't record the
authenticator information in the common replay cache.
The server computes the age of the ticket: local (server) time minus the
start time inside the Ticket. If the start time is later than the current
time by more than the allowable clock skew or if the INVALID flag is set in
the ticket, the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV error is returned. Otherwise, if the
current time is later than end time by more than the allowable clock skew,
the KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED error is returned.
If all these checks succeed without an error, the server is assured that the
client possesses the credentials of the principal named in the ticket and
thus, the client has been authenticated to the server. See section A.10 for
pseudocode.
Passing these checks provides only authentication of the named principal; it
does not imply authorization to use the named service. Applications must
make a separate authorization decisions based upon the authenticated name of
the user, the requested operation, local access control information such as
that contained in a .k5login or .k5users file, and possibly a separate
distributed authorization service.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
3.2.4. Generation of a KRB_AP_REP message
Typically, a client's request will include both the authentication
information and its initial request in the same message, and the server need
not explicitly reply to the KRB_AP_REQ. However, if mutual authentication
(not only authenticating the client to the server, but also the server to
the client) is being performed, the KRB_AP_REQ message will have
MUTUAL-REQUIRED set in its ap-options field, and a KRB_AP_REP message is
required in response. As with the error message, this message may be
encapsulated in the application protocol if its "raw" form is not acceptable
to the application's protocol. The timestamp and microsecond field used in
the reply must be the client's timestamp and microsecond field (as provided
in the authenticator)[3.9]. If a sequence number is to be included, it
should be randomly chosen as described above for the authenticator. A subkey
may be included if the server desires to negotiate a different subkey. The
KRB_AP_REP message is encrypted in the session key extracted from the
ticket. See section A.11 for pseudocode.
3.2.5. Receipt of KRB_AP_REP message
If a KRB_AP_REP message is returned, the client uses the session key from
the credentials obtained for the server[3.10] to decrypt the message, and
verifies that the timestamp and microsecond fields match those in the
Authenticator it sent to the server. If they match, then the client is
assured that the server is genuine. The sequence number and subkey (if
present) are retained for later use. See section A.12 for pseudocode.
3.2.6. Using the encryption key
After the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP exchange has occurred, the client and server
share an encryption key which can be used by the application. In some cases,
the use of this session key will be implicit in the protocol; in others the
method of use must be chosen from several alternatives. The 'true session
key' to be used for KRB_PRIV, KRB_SAFE, or other application-specific uses
may be chosen by the application based on the session key from the ticket
and subkeys in the KRB_AP_REP message and the authenticator[3.11]. To
mitigate the effect of failures in random number generation on the client it
is strongly encouraged that any key derived by an application for subsequent
use include the full key entropy derived from the KDC generated session key
carried in the ticket. We leave the protocol negotiations of how to use the
key (e.g. selecting an encryption or checksum type) to the application
programmer; the Kerberos protocol does not constrain the implementation
options, but an example of how this might be done follows.
One way that an application may choose to negotiate a key to be used for
subsequent integrity and privacy protection is for the client to propose a
key in the subkey field of the authenticator. The server can then choose a
key using the proposed key from the client as input, returning the new
subkey in the subkey field of the application reply. This key could then be
used for subsequent communication.
To make this example more concrete, if the communication patterns of an
application dictates the use of encryption modes of operation incompatible
with the encryption system used for the authenticator, then a key compatible
with the required encryption system may be generated by either the client,
the server, or collaboratively by both and exchanged using the subkey field.
This generation might involve the use of a random number as a pre-key,
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
initially generated by either party, which could then be encrypted using the
session key from the ticket, and the result exchanged and used for
subsequent encryption. By encrypting the pre-key with the session key from
the ticket, randomness from the KDC generated key is assured of being
present in the negotiated key. Application developers must be careful
however, to use a means of introducing this entropy that does not allow an
attacker to learn the session key from the ticket if it learns the key
generated and used for subsequent communication. The reader should note that
this is only an example, and that an analysis of the particular cryptosystem
to be used, must be made before deciding how to generate values for the
subkey fields, and the key to be used for subsequent communication.
With both the one-way and mutual authentication exchanges, the peers should
take care not to send sensitive information to each other without proper
assurances. In particular, applications that require privacy or integrity
should use the KRB_AP_REP response from the server to client to assure both
client and server of their peer's identity. If an application protocol
requires privacy of its messages, it can use the KRB_PRIV message (section
3.5). The KRB_SAFE message (section 3.4) can be used to assure integrity.
3.3. The Ticket-Granting Service (TGS) Exchange
Summary
Message direction Message type Section
1. Client to Kerberos KRB_TGS_REQ 5.4.1
2. Kerberos to client KRB_TGS_REP or 5.4.2
KRB_ERROR 5.9.1
The TGS exchange between a client and the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server is
initiated by a client when it wishes to obtain authentication credentials
for a given server (which might be registered in a remote realm), when it
wishes to renew or validate an existing ticket, or when it wishes to obtain
a proxy ticket. In the first case, the client must already have acquired a
ticket for the Ticket-Granting Service using the AS exchange (the
ticket-granting ticket is usually obtained when a client initially
authenticates to the system, such as when a user logs in). The message
format for the TGS exchange is almost identical to that for the AS exchange.
The primary difference is that encryption and decryption in the TGS exchange
does not take place under the client's key. Instead, the session key from
the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or sub-session key from an
Authenticator is used. As is the case for all application servers, expired
tickets are not accepted by the TGS, so once a renewable or ticket-granting
ticket expires, the client must use a separate exchange to obtain valid
tickets.
The TGS exchange consists of two messages: A request (KRB_TGS_REQ) from the
client to the Kerberos Ticket-Granting Server, and a reply (KRB_TGS_REP or
KRB_ERROR). The KRB_TGS_REQ message includes information authenticating the
client plus a request for credentials. The authentication information
consists of the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) which includes the
client's previously obtained ticket-granting, renewable, or invalid ticket.
In the ticket-granting ticket and proxy cases, the request may include one
or more of: a list of network addresses, a collection of typed authorization
data to be sealed in the ticket for authorization use by the application
server, or additional tickets (the use of which are described later). The
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TGS reply (KRB_TGS_REP) contains the requested credentials, encrypted in the
session key from the ticket-granting ticket or renewable ticket, or if
present, in the sub-session key from the Authenticator (part of the
authentication header). The KRB_ERROR message contains an error code and
text explaining what went wrong. The KRB_ERROR message is not encrypted. The
KRB_TGS_REP message contains information which can be used to detect
replays, and to associate it with the message to which it replies. The
KRB_ERROR message also contains information which can be used to associate
it with the message to which it replies, but except when an optional
checksum is included in the KRB_ERROR message, it is not possible to detect
replays or fabrications of such messages.
3.3.1. Generation of KRB_TGS_REQ message
Before sending a request to the ticket-granting service, the client must
determine in which realm the application server is believed to be
registered[3.12]. If the client knows the service principal name and realm
and it does not already possess a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate
realm, then one must be obtained. This is first attempted by requesting a
ticket-granting ticket for the destination realm from a Kerberos server for
which the client possesses a ticket-granting ticket (using the KRB_TGS_REQ
message recursively). The Kerberos server may return a TGT for the desired
realm in which case one can proceed. Alternatively, the Kerberos server may
return a TGT for a realm which is 'closer' to the desired realm (further
along the standard hierarchical path between the client's realm and the
requested realm server's realm).
If the client does not know the realm of the service or the true service
principal name, then the CANONICALIZE option must be used in the request.
This will cause the TGS to locate the service principal based on the target
service name in the ticket and return the service principal name in the
response. This function allows the KDC to inform the user of the registered
Kerberos principal name and registered KDC for a server that may have more
than one host name or whose registered realm can not be determined from the
name of the host, but it is not to be used to locate the application server.
If the server name determined by a TGS supporting name canonicalization is
with a remote KDC, then the response will include the principal name
determined by the KDC, and will include a TGT for the remote realm or a
realm 'closer' to the realm with which the server principal is registered.
In this case, the canonicalization request must be repeated with a Kerberos
server in the realm specified in the returned TGT. If neither are returned,
then the request may be retried with a Kerberos server for a realm higher in
the hierarchy. This request will itself require a ticket-granting ticket for
the higher realm which must be obtained by recursively applying these
directions.
Once the client obtains a ticket-granting ticket for the appropriate realm,
it determines which Kerberos servers serve that realm, and contacts one. The
list might be obtained through a configuration file or network service or it
may be generated from the name of the realm; as long as the secret keys
exchanged by realms are kept secret, only denial of service results from
using a false Kerberos server.
As in the AS exchange, the client may specify a number of options in the
KRB_TGS_REQ message. The client prepares the KRB_TGS_REQ message, providing
an authentication header as an element of the padata field, and including
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the same fields as used in the KRB_AS_REQ message along with several
optional fields: the enc-authorization-data field for application server use
and additional tickets required by some options.
In preparing the authentication header, the client can select a sub-session
key under which the response from the Kerberos server will be
encrypted[3.13]. If the sub-session key is not specified, the session key
from the ticket-granting ticket will be used. If the enc-authorization-data
is present, it must be encrypted in the sub-session key, if present, from
the authenticator portion of the authentication header, or if not present,
using the session key from the ticket-granting ticket.
Once prepared, the message is sent to a Kerberos server for the destination
realm. See section A.5 for pseudocode.
3.3.2. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REQ message
The KRB_TGS_REQ message is processed in a manner similar to the KRB_AS_REQ
message, but there are many additional checks to be performed. First, the
Kerberos server must determine which server the accompanying ticket is for
and it must select the appropriate key to decrypt it. For a normal
KRB_TGS_REQ message, it will be for the ticket granting service, and the
TGS's key will be used. If the TGT was issued by another realm, then the
appropriate inter-realm key must be used. If the accompanying ticket is not
a ticket granting ticket for the current realm, but is for an application
server in the current realm, the RENEW, VALIDATE, or PROXY options are
specified in the request, and the server for which a ticket is requested is
the server named in the accompanying ticket, then the KDC will decrypt the
ticket in the authentication header using the key of the server for which it
was issued. If no ticket can be found in the padata field, the
KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP error is returned.
Once the accompanying ticket has been decrypted, the user-supplied checksum
in the Authenticator must be verified against the contents of the request,
and the message rejected if the checksums do not match (with an error code
of KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED) or if the checksum is not keyed or not
collision-proof (with an error code of KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM). If the
checksum type is not supported, the KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP error is
returned. If the authorization-data are present, they are decrypted using
the sub-session key from the Authenticator.
If any of the decryptions indicate failed integrity checks, the
KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is returned. If the CANONICALIZE option is
set in the KRB_TGS_REQ, then the requested service name might not be the
true principal name or the service might not be in the TGS realm and the
correct name must be determined.
3.3.3. Generation of KRB_TGS_REP message
The KRB_TGS_REP message shares its format with the KRB_AS_REP (KRB_KDC_REP),
but with its type field set to KRB_TGS_REP. The detailed specification is in
section 5.4.2.
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The response will include a ticket for the requested server or for a ticket
granting server of an intermediate KDC to be contacted to obtain the
requested ticket. The Kerberos database is queried to retrieve the record
for the appropriate server (including the key with which the ticket will be
encrypted). If the request is for a ticket granting ticket for a remote
realm, and if no key is shared with the requested realm, then the Kerberos
server will select the realm 'closest' to the requested realm with which it
does share a key, and use that realm instead. If the CANONICALIZE option is
set, the TGS may return a ticket containing the server name of the true
service principal. If the requested server cannot be found in the TGS
database, then a TGT for another trusted realm may be returned instead of a
ticket for the service. This TGT is a referral mechanism to cause the client
to retry the request to the realm of the TGT. These are the only cases where
the response for the KDC will be for a different server than that requested
by the client.
By default, the address field, the client's name and realm, the list of
transited realms, the time of initial authentication, the expiration time,
and the authorization data of the newly-issued ticket will be copied from
the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or renewable ticket. If the transited field
needs to be updated, but the transited type is not supported, the
KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP error is returned.
If the request specifies an endtime, then the endtime of the new ticket is
set to the minimum of (a) that request, (b) the endtime from the TGT, and
(c) the starttime of the TGT plus the minimum of the maximum life for the
application server and the maximum life for the local realm (the maximum
life for the requesting principal was already applied when the TGT was
issued). If the new ticket is to be a renewal, then the endtime above is
replaced by the minimum of (a) the value of the renew_till field of the
ticket and (b) the starttime for the new ticket plus the life
(endtime-starttime) of the old ticket.
If the FORWARDED option has been requested, then the resulting ticket will
contain the addresses specified by the client. This option will only be
honored if the FORWARDABLE flag is set in the TGT. The PROXY option is
similar; the resulting ticket will contain the addresses specified by the
client. It will be honored only if the PROXIABLE flag in the TGT is set. The
PROXY option will not be honored on requests for additional ticket-granting
tickets.
If the requested start time is absent, indicates a time in the past, or is
within the window of acceptable clock skew for the KDC and the POSTDATE
option has not been specified, then the start time of the ticket is set to
the authentication server's current time. If it indicates a time in the
future beyond the acceptable clock skew, but the POSTDATED option has not
been specified or the MAY-POSTDATE flag is not set in the TGT, then the
error KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE is returned. Otherwise, if the ticket-granting
ticket has the MAY-POSTDATE flag set, then the resulting ticket will be
postdated and the requested starttime is checked against the policy of the
local realm. If acceptable, the ticket's start time is set as requested, and
the INVALID flag is set. The postdated ticket must be validated before use
by presenting it to the KDC after the starttime has been reached. However,
in no case may the starttime, endtime, or renew-till time of a newly-issued
postdated ticket extend beyond the renew-till time of the ticket-granting
ticket.
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If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket
has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket
using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and
verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. If the name of the requested
server is missing from the request, the name of the client in the additional
ticket will be used. Otherwise the name of the requested server will be
compared to the name of the client in the additional ticket and if
different, the request will be rejected. If the request succeeds, the
session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new
ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the
new ticket will be used.
If the name of the server in the ticket that is presented to the KDC as part
of the authentication header is not that of the ticket-granting server
itself, the server is registered in the realm of the KDC, and the RENEW
option is requested, then the KDC will verify that the RENEWABLE flag is set
in the ticket, that the INVALID flag is not set in the ticket, and that the
renew_till time is still in the future. If the VALIDATE option is requested,
the KDC will check that the starttime has passed and the INVALID flag is
set. If the PROXY option is requested, then the KDC will check that the
PROXIABLE flag is set in the ticket. If the tests succeed, and the ticket
passes the hotlist check described in the next section, the KDC will issue
the appropriate new ticket.
The ciphertext part of the response in the KRB_TGS_REP message is encrypted
in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, if present, or the session
key key from the ticket-granting ticket. It is not encrypted using the
client's secret key. Furthermore, the client's key's expiration date and the
key version number fields are left out since these values are stored along
with the client's database record, and that record is not needed to satisfy
a request based on a ticket-granting ticket. See section A.6 for pseudocode.
3.3.3.1. Checking for revoked tickets
Whenever a request is made to the ticket-granting server, the presented
ticket(s) is(are) checked against a hot-list of tickets which have been
canceled. This hot-list might be implemented by storing a range of issue
timestamps for 'suspect tickets'; if a presented ticket had an authtime in
that range, it would be rejected. In this way, a stolen ticket-granting
ticket or renewable ticket cannot be used to gain additional tickets
(renewals or otherwise) once the theft has been reported to the KDC for the
realm in which the server resides. Any normal ticket obtained before it was
reported stolen will still be valid (because they require no interaction
with the KDC), but only until their normal expiration time. If TGT's have
been issued for cross-realm authentication, use of the cross-realm TGT will
not be affected unless the hot-list is propagated to the KDC's for the
realms for which such cross-realm tickets were issued.
3.3.3.2. Encoding the transited field
If the identity of the server in the TGT that is presented to the KDC as
part of the authentication header is that of the ticket-granting service,
but the TGT was issued from another realm, the KDC will look up the
inter-realm key shared with that realm and use that key to decrypt the
ticket. If the ticket is valid, then the KDC will honor the request, subject
to the constraints outlined above in the section describing the AS exchange.
The realm part of the client's identity will be taken from the
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
ticket-granting ticket. The name of the realm that issued the
ticket-granting ticket will be added to the transited field of the ticket to
be issued. This is accomplished by reading the transited field from the
ticket-granting ticket (which is treated as an unordered set of realm
names), adding the new realm to the set, then constructing and writing out
its encoded (shorthand) form (this may involve a rearrangement of the
existing encoding).
Note that the ticket-granting service does not add the name of its own
realm. Instead, its responsibility is to add the name of the previous realm.
This prevents a malicious Kerberos server from intentionally leaving out its
own name (it could, however, omit other realms' names).
The names of neither the local realm nor the principal's realm are to be
included in the transited field. They appear elsewhere in the ticket and
both are known to have taken part in authenticating the principal. Since the
endpoints are not included, both local and single-hop inter-realm
authentication result in a transited field that is empty.
Because the name of each realm transited is added to this field, it might
potentially be very long. To decrease the length of this field, its contents
are encoded. The initially supported encoding is optimized for the normal
case of inter-realm communication: a hierarchical arrangement of realms
using either domain or X.500 style realm names. This encoding (called
DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS) is now described.
Realm names in the transited field are separated by a ",". The ",", "\",
trailing "."s, and leading spaces (" ") are special characters, and if they
are part of a realm name, they must be quoted in the transited field by
preceding them with a "\".
A realm name ending with a "." is interpreted as being prepended to the
previous realm. For example, we can encode traversal of EDU, MIT.EDU,
ATHENA.MIT.EDU, WASHINGTON.EDU, and CS.WASHINGTON.EDU as:
"EDU,MIT.,ATHENA.,WASHINGTON.EDU,CS.".
Note that if ATHENA.MIT.EDU, or CS.WASHINGTON.EDU were end-points, that they
would not be included in this field, and we would have:
"EDU,MIT.,WASHINGTON.EDU"
A realm name beginning with a "/" is interpreted as being appended to the
previous realm[18]. If it is to stand by itself, then it should be preceded
by a space (" "). For example, we can encode traversal of /COM/HP/APOLLO,
/COM/HP, /COM, and /COM/DEC as:
"/COM,/HP,/APOLLO, /COM/DEC".
Like the example above, if /COM/HP/APOLLO and /COM/DEC are endpoints, they
they would not be included in this field, and we would have:
"/COM,/HP"
A null subfield preceding or following a "," indicates that all realms
between the previous realm and the next realm have been traversed[19]. Thus,
"," means that all realms along the path between the client and the server
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
have been traversed. ",EDU, /COM," means that that all realms from the
client's realm up to EDU (in a domain style hierarchy) have been traversed,
and that everything from /COM down to the server's realm in an X.500 style
has also been traversed. This could occur if the EDU realm in one hierarchy
shares an inter-realm key directly with the /COM realm in another hierarchy.
3.3.4. Receipt of KRB_TGS_REP message
When the KRB_TGS_REP is received by the client, it is processed in the same
manner as the KRB_AS_REP processing described above. The primary difference
is that the ciphertext part of the response must be decrypted using the
session key from the ticket-granting ticket rather than the client's secret
key. The server name returned in the reply is the true principal name of the
service. See section A.7 for pseudocode.
3.4. The KRB_SAFE Exchange
The KRB_SAFE message may be used by clients requiring the ability to detect
modifications of messages they exchange. It achieves this by including a
keyed collision-proof checksum of the user data and some control
information. The checksum is keyed with an encryption key (usually the last
key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has
occurred).
3.4.1. Generation of a KRB_SAFE message
When an application wishes to send a KRB_SAFE message, it collects its data
and the appropriate control information and computes a checksum over them.
The checksum algorithm should be a keyed one-way hash function (such as the
RSA- MD5-DES checksum algorithm specified in section 6.4.5, or the DES MAC),
generated using the sub-session key if present, or the session key.
Different algorithms may be selected by changing the checksum type in the
message. Unkeyed or non-collision-proof checksums are not suitable for this
use.
The control information for the KRB_SAFE message includes both a timestamp
and a sequence number. The designer of an application using the KRB_SAFE
message must choose at least one of the two mechanisms. This choice should
be based on the needs of the application protocol.
Sequence numbers are useful when all messages sent will be received by one's
peer. Connection state is presently required to maintain the session key, so
maintaining the next sequence number should not present an additional
problem.
If the application protocol is expected to tolerate lost messages without
them being resent, the use of the timestamp is the appropriate replay
detection mechanism. Using timestamps is also the appropriate mechanism for
multi-cast protocols where all of one's peers share a common sub-session
key, but some messages will be sent to a subset of one's peers.
After computing the checksum, the client then transmits the information and
checksum to the recipient in the message format specified in section 5.6.1.
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3.4.2. Receipt of KRB_SAFE message
When an application receives a KRB_SAFE message, it verifies it as follows.
If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application.
The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type
fields match the current version and KRB_SAFE, respectively. A mismatch
generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The
application verifies that the checksum used is a collision-proof keyed
checksum, and if it is not, a KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM error is generated. If
the sender's address was included in the control information, the recipient
verifies that the operating system's report of the sender's address matches
the sender's address in the message, and (if a recipient address is
specified or the recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's
addresses appears as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match
for either case generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and
usec and/or the sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec
are expected and not present, or they are present but not current, the
KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated. If the server name, along with the
client name, time and microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any
recently-seen (sent or received[20] ) such tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT
error is generated. If an incorrect sequence number is included, or a
sequence number is expected but not present, the KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error
is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or a sequence number is
present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated. Finally, the checksum is
computed over the data and control information, and if it doesn't match the
received checksum, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated.
If all the checks succeed, the application is assured that the message was
generated by its peer and was not modified in transit.
3.5. The KRB_PRIV Exchange
The KRB_PRIV message may be used by clients requiring confidentiality and
the ability to detect modifications of exchanged messages. It achieves this
by encrypting the messages and adding control information.
3.5.1. Generation of a KRB_PRIV message
When an application wishes to send a KRB_PRIV message, it collects its data
and the appropriate control information (specified in section 5.7.1) and
encrypts them under an encryption key (usually the last key negotiated via
subkeys, or the session key if no negotiation has occurred). As part of the
control information, the client must choose to use either a timestamp or a
sequence number (or both); see the discussion in section 3.4.1 for
guidelines on which to use. After the user data and control information are
encrypted, the client transmits the ciphertext and some 'envelope'
information to the recipient.
3.5.2. Receipt of KRB_PRIV message
When an application receives a KRB_PRIV message, it verifies it as follows.
If any error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application.
The message is first checked by verifying that the protocol version and type
fields match the current version and KRB_PRIV, respectively. A mismatch
generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
application then decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant
plaintext. If decryption shows the data to have been modified, a
KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is generated. If the sender's address was
included in the control information, the recipient verifies that the
operating system's report of the sender's address matches the sender's
address in the message, and (if a recipient address is specified or the
recipient requires an address) that one of the recipient's addresses appears
as the recipient's address in the message. A failed match for either case
generates a KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. Then the timestamp and usec and/or the
sequence number fields are checked. If timestamp and usec are expected and
not present, or they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error
is generated. If the server name, along with the client name, time and
microsecond fields from the Authenticator match any recently-seen such
tuples, the KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT error is generated. If an incorrect sequence
number is included, or a sequence number is expected but not present, the
KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER error is generated. If neither a time-stamp and usec or
a sequence number is present, a KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED error is generated.
If all the checks succeed, the application can assume the message was
generated by its peer, and was securely transmitted (without intruders able
to see the unencrypted contents).
3.6. The KRB_CRED Exchange
The KRB_CRED message may be used by clients requiring the ability to send
Kerberos credentials from one host to another. It achieves this by sending
the tickets together with encrypted data containing the session keys and
other information associated with the tickets.
3.6.1. Generation of a KRB_CRED message
When an application wishes to send a KRB_CRED message it first (using the
KRB_TGS exchange) obtains credentials to be sent to the remote host. It then
constructs a KRB_CRED message using the ticket or tickets so obtained,
placing the session key needed to use each ticket in the key field of the
corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence of the encrypted part of the the KRB_CRED
message.
Other information associated with each ticket and obtained during the
KRB_TGS exchange is also placed in the corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence in
the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message. The current time and, if
specifically required by the application the nonce, s-address, and r-address
fields, are placed in the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED message which is
then encrypted under an encryption key previously exchanged in the KRB_AP
exchange (usually the last key negotiated via subkeys, or the session key if
no negotiation has occurred).
3.6.2. Receipt of KRB_CRED message
When an application receives a KRB_CRED message, it verifies it. If any
error occurs, an error code is reported for use by the application. The
message is verified by checking that the protocol version and type fields
match the current version and KRB_CRED, respectively. A mismatch generates a
KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION or KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE error. The application then
decrypts the ciphertext and processes the resultant plaintext. If decryption
shows the data to have been modified, a KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY error is
generated.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
If present or required, the recipient verifies that the operating system's
report of the sender's address matches the sender's address in the message,
and that one of the recipient's addresses appears as the recipient's address
in the message. A failed match for either case generates a
KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR error. The timestamp and usec fields (and the nonce field
if required) are checked next. If the timestamp and usec are not present, or
they are present but not current, the KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW error is generated.
If all the checks succeed, the application stores each of the new tickets in
its ticket cache together with the session key and other information in the
corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the encrypted part of the KRB_CRED
message.
4. The Kerberos Database
The Kerberos server must have access to a database containing the principal
identifiers and secret keys of any principals to be authenticated[4.1] using
such secret keys. The keying material in the database must be protected so
that they are only accessible to the Kerberos server and administrative
functions specifically authorized to access such material. Specific
implementations may handle the storage of keying material separate from the
Kerberos database (e.g. in hardware) or by encrypting the keying material
before placing it in the Kerberos database. Some implementations might
provide a means for using long term secret keys, but not for retrieving them
from the Kerberos database.
4.1. Database contents
A database entry will typically contain the following fields, though in some
instances a KDC may obtain these values through other means:
Field Value
name Principal's identifier
key Principal's secret key
p_kvno Principal's key version
max_life Maximum lifetime for Tickets
max_renewable_life Maximum total lifetime for renewable Tickets
The name field is an encoding of the principal's identifier. The key field
contains an encryption key. This key is the principal's secret key. (The key
can be encrypted before storage under a Kerberos "master key" to protect it
in case the database is compromised but the master key is not. In that case,
an extra field must be added to indicate the master key version used, see
below.) The p_kvno field is the key version number of the principal's secret
key. The max_life field contains the maximum allowable lifetime (endtime -
starttime) for any Ticket issued for this principal. The max_renewable_life
field contains the maximum allowable total lifetime for any renewable Ticket
issued for this principal. (See section 3.1 for a description of how these
lifetimes are used in determining the lifetime of a given Ticket.)
A server may provide KDC service to several realms, as long as the database
representation provides a mechanism to distinguish between principal records
with identifiers which differ only in the realm name.
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When an application server's key changes, if the change is routine (i.e. not
the result of disclosure of the old key), the old key should be retained by
the server until all tickets that had been issued using that key have
expired. Because of this, it is possible for several keys to be active for a
single principal. Ciphertext encrypted in a principal's key is always tagged
with the version of the key that was used for encryption, to help the
recipient find the proper key for decryption.
When more than one key is active for a particular principal, the principal
will have more than one record in the Kerberos database. The keys and key
version numbers will differ between the records (the rest of the fields may
or may not be the same). Whenever Kerberos issues a ticket, or responds to a
request for initial authentication, the most recent key (known by the
Kerberos server) will be used for encryption. This is the key with the
highest key version number.
4.2. Additional fields
Project Athena's KDC implementation uses additional fields in its database:
Field Value
K_kvno Kerberos' key version
expiration Expiration date for entry
attributes Bit field of attributes
mod_date Timestamp of last modification
mod_name Modifying principal's identifier
The K_kvno field indicates the key version of the Kerberos master key under
which the principal's secret key is encrypted.
After an entry's expiration date has passed, the KDC will return an error to
any client attempting to gain tickets as or for the principal. (A database
may want to maintain two expiration dates: one for the principal, and one
for the principal's current key. This allows password aging to work
independently of the principal's expiration date. However, due to the
limited space in the responses, the KDC combines the key expiration and
principal expiration date into a single value called 'key_exp', which is
used as a hint to the user to take administrative action.)
The attributes field is a bitfield used to govern the operations involving
the principal. This field might be useful in conjunction with user
registration procedures, for site-specific policy implementations (Project
Athena currently uses it for their user registration process controlled by
the system-wide database service, Moira [LGDSR87]), to identify whether a
principal can play the role of a client or server or both, to note whether a
server is appropriately trusted to receive credentials delegated by a
client, or to identify the 'string to key' conversion algorithm used for a
principal's key[4.2]. Other bits are used to indicate that certain ticket
options should not be allowed in tickets encrypted under a principal's key
(one bit each): Disallow issuing postdated tickets, disallow issuing
forwardable tickets, disallow issuing tickets based on TGT authentication,
disallow issuing renewable tickets, disallow issuing proxiable tickets, and
disallow issuing tickets for which the principal is the server.
The mod_date field contains the time of last modification of the entry, and
the mod_name field contains the name of the principal which last modified
the entry.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
4.3. Frequently Changing Fields
Some KDC implementations may wish to maintain the last time that a request
was made by a particular principal. Information that might be maintained
includes the time of the last request, the time of the last request for a
ticket-granting ticket, the time of the last use of a ticket-granting
ticket, or other times. This information can then be returned to the user in
the last-req field (see section 5.2).
Other frequently changing information that can be maintained is the latest
expiration time for any tickets that have been issued using each key. This
field would be used to indicate how long old keys must remain valid to allow
the continued use of outstanding tickets.
4.4. Site Constants
The KDC implementation should have the following configurable constants or
options, to allow an administrator to make and enforce policy decisions:
* The minimum supported lifetime (used to determine whether the
KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID error should be returned). This constant should
reflect reasonable expectations of round-trip time to the KDC,
encryption/decryption time, and processing time by the client and
target server, and it should allow for a minimum 'useful' lifetime.
* The maximum allowable total (renewable) lifetime of a ticket
(renew_till - starttime).
* The maximum allowable lifetime of a ticket (endtime - starttime).
* Whether to allow the issue of tickets with empty address fields
(including the ability to specify that such tickets may only be issued
if the request specifies some authorization_data).
* Whether proxiable, forwardable, renewable or post-datable tickets are
to be issued.
5. Message Specifications
This section (5) still has revisions that are pending based on comments by
Tom Yu. Please see http://www.isi.edu/people/bcn/krb-revisions for the
latest versions. There will be additional updates prior to the San Diego
IETF meeting.
The following sections describe the exact contents and encoding of protocol
messages and objects. The ASN.1 base definitions are presented in the first
subsection. The remaining subsections specify the protocol objects (tickets
and authenticators) and messages. Specification of encryption and checksum
techniques, and the fields related to them, appear in section 6.
Optional field in ASN.1 sequences
For optional integer value and date fields in ASN.1 sequences where a
default value has been specified, certain default values will not be allowed
in the encoding because these values will always be represented through
defaulting by the absence of the optional field. For example, one will not
send a microsecond zero value because one must make sure that there is only
one way to encode this value.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Additional fields in ASN.1 sequences
Implementations receiving Kerberos messages with additional fields present
in ASN.1 sequences should carry those fields through, unmodified, when the
message is forwarded. Implementations should not drop such fields if the
sequence is re-encoded.
5.1. ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Representation
All uses of ASN.1 in Kerberos shall use the Distinguished Encoding
Representation of the data elements as described in the X.509 specification,
section 8.7 [X509-88].
5.2. ASN.1 Base Definitions
The following ASN.1 base definitions are used in the rest of this section.
Note that since the underscore character (_) is not permitted in ASN.1
names, the hyphen (-) is used in its place for the purposes of ASN.1 names.
Realm ::= GeneralString
PrincipalName ::= SEQUENCE {
name-type[0] INTEGER,
name-string[1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralString
}
Kerberos realms are encoded as GeneralStrings. Realms shall not contain a
character with the code 0 (the ASCII NUL). Most realms will usually consist
of several components separated by periods (.), in the style of Internet
Domain Names, or separated by slashes (/) in the style of X.500 names.
Acceptable forms for realm names are specified in section 7. A PrincipalName
is a typed sequence of components consisting of the following sub-fields:
name-type
This field specifies the type of name that follows. Pre-defined values
for this field are specified in section 7.2. The name-type should be
treated as a hint. Ignoring the name type, no two names can be the same
(i.e. at least one of the components, or the realm, must be different).
This constraint may be eliminated in the future.
name-string
This field encodes a sequence of components that form a name, each
component encoded as a GeneralString. Taken together, a PrincipalName
and a Realm form a principal identifier. Most PrincipalNames will have
only a few components (typically one or two).
KerberosTime ::= GeneralizedTime
-- Specifying UTC time zone (Z)
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The timestamps used in Kerberos are encoded as GeneralizedTimes. An encoding
shall specify the UTC time zone (Z) and shall not include any fractional
portions of the seconds. It further shall not include any separators.
Example: The only valid format for UTC time 6 minutes, 27 seconds after 9 pm
on 6 November 1985 is 19851106210627Z.
HostAddress ::= SEQUENCE {
addr-type[0] INTEGER,
address[1] OCTET STRING
}
HostAddresses ::= SEQUENCE OF HostAddress
The host address encodings consists of two fields:
addr-type
This field specifies the type of address that follows. Pre-defined
values for this field are specified in section 8.1.
address
This field encodes a single address of type addr-type.
The two forms differ slightly. HostAddress contains exactly one address;
HostAddresses contains a sequence of possibly many addresses.
AuthorizationData ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
ad-type[0] INTEGER,
ad-data[1] OCTET STRING
}
ad-data
This field contains authorization data to be interpreted according to
the value of the corresponding ad-type field.
ad-type
This field specifies the format for the ad-data subfield. All negative
values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for
registered use.
Each sequence of type and data is referred to as an authorization element.
Elements may be application specific, however, there is a common set of
recursive elements that should be understood by all implementations. These
elements contain other elements embedded within them, and the interpretation
of the encapsulating element determines which of the embedded elements must
be interpreted, and which may be ignored. Definitions for these common
elements may be found in Appendix B.
TicketExtensions ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
te-type[0] INTEGER,
te-data[1] OCTET STRING
}
te-data
This field contains opaque data that must be carried with the ticket to
support extensions to the Kerberos protocol including but not limited
to some forms of inter-realm key exchange and plaintext authorization
data. See appendix C for some common uses of this field.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
te-type
This field specifies the format for the te-data subfield. All negative
values are reserved for local use. Non-negative values are reserved for
registered use.
APOptions ::= BIT STRING
-- reserved(0),
-- use-session-key(1),
-- mutual-required(2)
TicketFlags ::= BIT STRING
-- reserved(0),
-- forwardable(1),
-- forwarded(2),
-- proxiable(3),
-- proxy(4),
-- may-postdate(5),
-- postdated(6),
-- invalid(7),
-- renewable(8),
-- initial(9),
-- pre-authent(10),
-- hw-authent(11),
-- transited-policy-checked(12),
-- ok-as-delegate(13)
KDCOptions ::= BIT STRING io
-- reserved(0),
-- forwardable(1),
-- forwarded(2),
-- proxiable(3),
-- proxy(4),
-- allow-postdate(5),
-- postdated(6),
-- unused7(7),
-- renewable(8),
-- unused9(9),
-- unused10(10),
-- unused11(11),
-- unused12(12),
-- unused13(13),
-- requestanonymous(14),
-- canonicalize(15),
-- disable-transited-check(26),
-- renewable-ok(27),
-- enc-tkt-in-skey(28),
-- renew(30),
-- validate(31)
ASN.1 Bit strings have a length and a value. When used in Kerberos for the
APOptions, TicketFlags, and KDCOptions, the length of the bit string on
generated values should be the smallest number of bits needed to include the
highest order bit that is set (1), but in no case less than 32 bits. The
ASN.1 representation of the bit strings uses unnamed bits, with the meaning
of the individual bits defined by the comments in the specification above.
Implementations should accept values of bit strings of any length and treat
the value of flags corresponding to bits beyond the end of the bit string as
if the bit were reset (0). Comparison of bit strings of different length
should treat the smaller string as if it were padded with zeros beyond the
high order bits to the length of the longer string[23].
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
LastReq ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
lr-type[0] INTEGER,
lr-value[1] KerberosTime
}
lr-type
This field indicates how the following lr-value field is to be
interpreted. Negative values indicate that the information pertains
only to the responding server. Non-negative values pertain to all
servers for the realm. If the lr-type field is zero (0), then no
information is conveyed by the lr-value subfield. If the absolute value
of the lr-type field is one (1), then the lr-value subfield is the time
of last initial request for a TGT. If it is two (2), then the lr-value
subfield is the time of last initial request. If it is three (3), then
the lr-value subfield is the time of issue for the newest
ticket-granting ticket used. If it is four (4), then the lr-value
subfield is the time of the last renewal. If it is five (5), then the
lr-value subfield is the time of last request (of any type). If it is
(6), then the lr-value subfield is the time when the password will
expire.
lr-value
This field contains the time of the last request. the time must be
interpreted according to the contents of the accompanying lr-type
subfield.
See section 6 for the definitions of Checksum, ChecksumType, EncryptedData,
EncryptionKey, EncryptionType, and KeyType.
5.3. Tickets and Authenticators
This section describes the format and encryption parameters for tickets and
authenticators. When a ticket or authenticator is included in a protocol
message it is treated as an opaque object.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
5.3.1. Tickets
A ticket is a record that helps a client authenticate to a service. A Ticket
contains the following information:
Ticket ::= [APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
tkt-vno[0] INTEGER,
realm[1] Realm,
sname[2] PrincipalName,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData, -- EncTicketPart
extensions[4] TicketExtensions OPTIONAL
}
-- Encrypted part of ticket
EncTicketPart ::= [APPLICATION 3] SEQUENCE {
flags[0] TicketFlags,
key[1] EncryptionKey,
crealm[2] Realm,
cname[3] PrincipalName,
transited[4] TransitedEncoding,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
caddr[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[10] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
-- encoded Transited field
TransitedEncoding ::= SEQUENCE {
tr-type[0] INTEGER, -- must be registered
contents[1] OCTET STRING
}
The encoding of EncTicketPart is encrypted in the key shared by Kerberos and
the end server (the server's secret key). See section 6 for the format of
the ciphertext.
tkt-vno
This field specifies the version number for the ticket format. This
document describes version number 5.
realm
This field specifies the realm that issued a ticket. It also serves to
identify the realm part of the server's principal identifier. Since a
Kerberos server can only issue tickets for servers within its realm,
the two will always be identical.
sname
This field specifies all components of the name part of the server's
identity, including those parts that identify a specific instance of a
service.
enc-part
This field holds the encrypted encoding of the EncTicketPart sequence.
extensions
This optional field contains a sequence of extensions that may be used
to carry information that must be carried with the ticket to support
several extensions, including but not limited to plaintext
authorization data, tokens for exchanging inter-realm keys, and other
information that must be associated with a ticket for use by the
application server. See Appendix C for definitions of common
extensions.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Note that some older versions of Kerberos did not support this field.
Because this is an optional field it will not break older clients, but
older clients might strip this field from the ticket before sending it
to the application server. This limits the usefulness of this ticket
field to environments where the ticket will not be parsed and
reconstructed by these older Kerberos clients.
If it is known that the client will strip this field from the ticket,
as an interim measure the KDC may append this field to the end of the
enc-part of the ticket and append a trailer indicating the length of
the appended extensions field.
flags
This field indicates which of various options were used or requested
when the ticket was issued. It is a bit-field, where the selected
options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected
options and reserved fields being reset (0). Bit 0 is the most
significant bit. The encoding of the bits is specified in section 5.2.
The flags are described in more detail above in section 2. The meanings
of the flags are:
Bits Name Description
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
The FORWARDABLE flag is normally only
interpreted by the TGS, and can be
ignored by end servers. When set, this
1 FORWARDABLE flag tells the ticket-granting server
that it is OK to issue a new
ticket-granting ticket with a
different network address based on the
presented ticket.
When set, this flag indicates that the
ticket has either been forwarded or
2 FORWARDED was issued based on authentication
involving a forwarded ticket-granting
ticket.
The PROXIABLE flag is normally only
interpreted by the TGS, and can be
ignored by end servers. The PROXIABLE
flag has an interpretation identical
3 PROXIABLE to that of the FORWARDABLE flag,
except that the PROXIABLE flag tells
the ticket-granting server that only
non-ticket-granting tickets may be
issued with different network
addresses.
4 PROXY When set, this flag indicates that a
ticket is a proxy.
The MAY-POSTDATE flag is normally only
interpreted by the TGS, and can be
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
5 MAY-POSTDATE ignored by end servers. This flag
tells the ticket-granting server that
a post-dated ticket may be issued
based on this ticket-granting ticket.
This flag indicates that this ticket
has been postdated. The end-service
6 POSTDATED can check the authtime field to see
when the original authentication
occurred.
This flag indicates that a ticket is
invalid, and it must be validated by
7 INVALID the KDC before use. Application
servers must reject tickets which have
this flag set.
The RENEWABLE flag is normally only
interpreted by the TGS, and can
usually be ignored by end servers
8 RENEWABLE (some particularly careful servers may
wish to disallow renewable tickets). A
renewable ticket can be used to obtain
a replacement ticket that expires at a
later date.
This flag indicates that this ticket
9 INITIAL was issued using the AS protocol, and
not issued based on a ticket-granting
ticket.
This flag indicates that during
initial authentication, the client was
authenticated by the KDC before a
10 PRE-AUTHENT ticket was issued. The strength of the
preauthentication method is not
indicated, but is acceptable to the
KDC.
This flag indicates that the protocol
employed for initial authentication
required the use of hardware expected
11 HW-AUTHENT to be possessed solely by the named
client. The hardware authentication
method is selected by the KDC and the
strength of the method is not
indicated.
This flag indicates that the KDC for
the realm has checked the transited
field against a realm defined policy
for trusted certifiers. If this flag
is reset (0), then the application
server must check the transited field
itself, and if unable to do so it must
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
12 TRANSITED- reject the authentication. If the flag
POLICY-CHECKED
is set (1) then the application server
may skip its own validation of the
transited field, relying on the
validation performed by the KDC. At
its option the application server may
still apply its own validation based
on a separate policy for acceptance.
This flag indicates that the server
(not the client) specified in the
ticket has been determined by policy
of the realm to be a suitable
recipient of delegation. A client can
use the presence of this flag to help
it make a decision whether to delegate
credentials (either grant a proxy or a
13 OK-AS-DELEGATE forwarded ticket granting ticket) to
this server. The client is free to
ignore the value of this flag. When
setting this flag, an administrator
should consider the Security and
placement of the server on which the
service will run, as well as whether
the service requires the use of
delegated credentials.
This flag indicates that the principal
named in the ticket is a generic
principal for the realm and does not
identify the individual using the
ticket. The purpose of the ticket is
only to securely distribute a session
14 ANONYMOUS key, and not to identify the user.
Subsequent requests using the same
ticket and session may be considered
as originating from the same user, but
requests with the same username but a
different ticket are likely to
originate from different users.
15-31 RESERVED Reserved for future use.
key
This field exists in the ticket and the KDC response and is used to
pass the session key from Kerberos to the application server and the
client. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2.
crealm
This field contains the name of the realm in which the client is
registered and in which initial authentication took place.
cname
This field contains the name part of the client's principal identifier.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
transited
This field lists the names of the Kerberos realms that took part in
authenticating the user to whom this ticket was issued. It does not
specify the order in which the realms were transited. See section
3.3.3.2 for details on how this field encodes the traversed realms.
When the names of CA's are to be embedded in the transited field (as
specified for some extensions to the protocol), the X.500 names of the
CA's should be mapped into items in the transited field using the
mapping defined by RFC2253.
authtime
This field indicates the time of initial authentication for the named
principal. It is the time of issue for the original ticket on which
this ticket is based. It is included in the ticket to provide
additional information to the end service, and to provide the necessary
information for implementation of a `hot list' service at the KDC. An
end service that is particularly paranoid could refuse to accept
tickets for which the initial authentication occurred "too far" in the
past. This field is also returned as part of the response from the KDC.
When returned as part of the response to initial authentication
(KRB_AS_REP), this is the current time on the Kerberos server[24].
starttime
This field in the ticket specifies the time after which the ticket is
valid. Together with endtime, this field specifies the life of the
ticket. If it is absent from the ticket, its value should be treated as
that of the authtime field.
endtime
This field contains the time after which the ticket will not be honored
(its expiration time). Note that individual services may place their
own limits on the life of a ticket and may reject tickets which have
not yet expired. As such, this is really an upper bound on the
expiration time for the ticket.
renew-till
This field is only present in tickets that have the RENEWABLE flag set
in the flags field. It indicates the maximum endtime that may be
included in a renewal. It can be thought of as the absolute expiration
time for the ticket, including all renewals.
caddr
This field in a ticket contains zero (if omitted) or more (if present)
host addresses. These are the addresses from which the ticket can be
used. If there are no addresses, the ticket can be used from any
location. The decision by the KDC to issue or by the end server to
accept zero-address tickets is a policy decision and is left to the
Kerberos and end-service administrators; they may refuse to issue or
accept such tickets. The suggested and default policy, however, is that
such tickets will only be issued or accepted when additional
information that can be used to restrict the use of the ticket is
included in the authorization_data field. Such a ticket is a
capability.
Network addresses are included in the ticket to make it harder for an
attacker to use stolen credentials. Because the session key is not sent
over the network in cleartext, credentials can't be stolen simply by
listening to the network; an attacker has to gain access to the session
key (perhaps through operating system security breaches or a careless
user's unattended session) to make use of stolen tickets.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
It is important to note that the network address from which a
connection is received cannot be reliably determined. Even if it could
be, an attacker who has compromised the client's workstation could use
the credentials from there. Including the network addresses only makes
it more difficult, not impossible, for an attacker to walk off with
stolen credentials and then use them from a "safe" location.
authorization-data
The authorization-data field is used to pass authorization data from
the principal on whose behalf a ticket was issued to the application
service. If no authorization data is included, this field will be left
out. Experience has shown that the name of this field is confusing, and
that a better name for this field would be restrictions. Unfortunately,
it is not possible to change the name of this field at this time.
This field contains restrictions on any authority obtained on the basis
of authentication using the ticket. It is possible for any principal in
posession of credentials to add entries to the authorization data field
since these entries further restrict what can be done with the ticket.
Such additions can be made by specifying the additional entries when a
new ticket is obtained during the TGS exchange, or they may be added
during chained delegation using the authorization data field of the
authenticator.
Because entries may be added to this field by the holder of
credentials, except when an entry is separately authenticated by
encapsulation in the kdc-issued element, it is not allowable for the
presence of an entry in the authorization data field of a ticket to
amplify the privileges one would obtain from using a ticket.
The data in this field may be specific to the end service; the field
will contain the names of service specific objects, and the rights to
those objects. The format for this field is described in section 5.2.
Although Kerberos is not concerned with the format of the contents of
the sub-fields, it does carry type information (ad-type).
By using the authorization_data field, a principal is able to issue a
proxy that is valid for a specific purpose. For example, a client
wishing to print a file can obtain a file server proxy to be passed to
the print server. By specifying the name of the file in the
authorization_data field, the file server knows that the print server
can only use the client's rights when accessing the particular file to
be printed.
A separate service providing authorization or certifying group
membership may be built using the authorization-data field. In this
case, the entity granting authorization (not the authorized entity),
may obtain a ticket in its own name (e.g. the ticket is issued in the
name of a privilege server), and this entity adds restrictions on its
own authority and delegates the restricted authority through a proxy to
the client. The client would then present this authorization credential
to the application server separately from the authentication exchange.
Alternatively, such authorization credentials may be embedded in the
ticket authenticating the authorized entity, when the authorization is
separately authenticated using the kdc-issued authorization data
element (see B.4).
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Similarly, if one specifies the authorization-data field of a proxy and
leaves the host addresses blank, the resulting ticket and session key
can be treated as a capability. See [Neu93] for some suggested uses of
this field.
The authorization-data field is optional and does not have to be
included in a ticket.
5.3.2. Authenticators
An authenticator is a record sent with a ticket to a server to certify the
client's knowledge of the encryption key in the ticket, to help the server
detect replays, and to help choose a "true session key" to use with the
particular session. The encoding is encrypted in the ticket's session key
shared by the client and the server:
-- Unencrypted authenticator
Authenticator ::= [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE {
authenticator-vno[0] INTEGER,
crealm[1] Realm,
cname[2] PrincipalName,
cksum[3] Checksum OPTIONAL,
cusec[4] INTEGER,
ctime[5] KerberosTime,
subkey[6] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[7] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
authorization-data[8] AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
}
authenticator-vno
This field specifies the version number for the format of the
authenticator. This document specifies version 5.
crealm and cname
These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section
5.3.1.
cksum
This field contains a checksum of the the application data that
accompanies the KRB_AP_REQ.
cusec
This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp. Its
value (before encryption) ranges from 0 to 999999. It often appears
along with ctime. The two fields are used together to specify a
reasonably accurate timestamp.
ctime
This field contains the current time on the client's host.
subkey
This field contains the client's choice for an encryption key which is
to be used to protect this specific application session. Unless an
application specifies otherwise, if this field is left out the session
key from the ticket will be used.
seq-number
This optional field includes the initial sequence number to be used by
the KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages when sequence numbers are used to
detect replays (It may also be used by application specific messages).
When included in the authenticator this field specifies the initial
sequence number for messages from the client to the server. When
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
included in the AP-REP message, the initial sequence number is that for
messages from the server to the client. When used in KRB_PRIV or
KRB_SAFE messages, it is incremented by one after each message is sent.
Sequence numbers fall in the range of 0 through 2^32 - 1 and wrap to
zero following the value 2^32 - 1.
For sequence numbers to adequately support the detection of replays
they should be non-repeating, even across connection boundaries. The
initial sequence number should be random and uniformly distributed
across the full space of possible sequence numbers, so that it cannot
be guessed by an attacker and so that it and the successive sequence
numbers do not repeat other sequences.
authorization-data
This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1. It
is optional and will only appear when additional restrictions are to be
placed on the use of a ticket, beyond those carried in the ticket
itself.
5.4. Specifications for the AS and TGS exchanges
This section specifies the format of the messages used in the exchange
between the client and the Kerberos server. The format of possible error
messages appears in section 5.9.1.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
5.4.1. KRB_KDC_REQ definition
The KRB_KDC_REQ message has no type of its own. Instead, its type is one of
KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ depending on whether the request is for an initial
ticket or an additional ticket. In either case, the message is sent from the
client to the Authentication Server to request credentials for a service.
The message fields are:
AS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 10] KDC-REQ
TGS-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 12] KDC-REQ
KDC-REQ ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[1] INTEGER,
msg-type[2] INTEGER,
padata[3] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL,
req-body[4] KDC-REQ-BODY
}
PA-DATA ::= SEQUENCE {
padata-type[1] INTEGER,
padata-value[2] OCTET STRING,
-- might be encoded AP-REQ
}
KDC-REQ-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
kdc-options[0] KDCOptions,
cname[1] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
-- Used only in AS-REQ
realm[2] Realm, -- Server's realm
-- Also client's in AS-REQ
sname[3] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
from[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
till[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
rtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
nonce[7] INTEGER,
etype[8] SEQUENCE OF INTEGER,
-- EncryptionType,
-- in preference order
addresses[9] HostAddresses OPTIONAL,
enc-authorization-data[10] EncryptedData OPTIONAL,
-- Encrypted AuthorizationData
-- encoding
additional-tickets[11] SEQUENCE OF Ticket OPTIONAL
}
The fields in this message are:
pvno
This field is included in each message, and specifies the protocol
version number. This document specifies protocol version 5.
msg-type
This field indicates the type of a protocol message. It will almost
always be the same as the application identifier associated with a
message. It is included to make the identifier more readily accessible
to the application. For the KDC-REQ message, this type will be
KRB_AS_REQ or KRB_TGS_REQ.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
padata
The padata (pre-authentication data) field contains a sequence of
authentication information which may be needed before credentials can
be issued or decrypted. In the case of requests for additional tickets
(KRB_TGS_REQ), this field will include an element with padata-type of
PA-TGS-REQ and data of an authentication header (ticket-granting ticket
and authenticator). The checksum in the authenticator (which must be
collision-proof) is to be computed over the KDC-REQ-BODY encoding. In
most requests for initial authentication (KRB_AS_REQ) and most replies
(KDC-REP), the padata field will be left out.
This field may also contain information needed by certain extensions to
the Kerberos protocol. For example, it might be used to initially
verify the identity of a client before any response is returned. When
this field is used to authenticate or pre-authenticate a request, it
should contain a keyed checksum over the KDC-REQ-BODY to bind the
pre-authentication data to rest of the request. The KDC, as a matter of
policy, may decide whether to honor a KDC-REQ which includes any
pre-authentication data that does not contain the checksum field.
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP defines a pre-authentication data type that is used
for authenticating a client by way of an encrypted timestamp. This is
accomplished with a padata field with padata-type equal to
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP and padata-value defined as follows (query: the
checksum is new in this definition. If the optional field will break
things we can keep the old PA-ENC-TS-ENC, and define a new alternate
form that includes the checksum). :
padata-type ::= PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP
padata-value ::= EncryptedData -- PA-ENC-TS-ENC
PA-ENC-TS-ENC ::= SEQUENCE {
patimestamp[0] KerberosTime, -- client's time
pausec[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
pachecksum[2] checksum OPTIONAL
-- keyed checksum of KDC-REQ-BODY
}
with patimestamp containing the client's time and pausec containing the
microseconds which may be omitted if a client will not generate more
than one request per second. The ciphertext (padata-value) consists of
the PA-ENC-TS-ENC sequence, encrypted using the client's secret key.
It may also be used by the client to specify the version of a key that
is being used for accompanying preauthentication, and/or which should
be used to encrypt the reply from the KDC.
padata-type ::= PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO
padata-value ::= Integer
}
The KDC should only accept and abide by the value of the
use-specified-kvno preauthentication data field when the specified key
is still valid and until use of a new key is confirmed. This situation
is likely to occur primarily during the period during which an updated
key is propagating to other KDC's in a realm.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
The padata field can also contain information needed to help the KDC or
the client select the key needed for generating or decrypting the
response. This form of the padata is useful for supporting the use of
certain token cards with Kerberos. The details of such extensions are
specified in separate documents. See [Pat92] for additional uses of
this field.
padata-type
The padata-type element of the padata field indicates the way that the
padata-value element is to be interpreted. Negative values of
padata-type are reserved for unregistered use; non-negative values are
used for a registered interpretation of the element type.
req-body
This field is a placeholder delimiting the extent of the remaining
fields. If a checksum is to be calculated over the request, it is
calculated over an encoding of the KDC-REQ-BODY sequence which is
enclosed within the req-body field.
kdc-options
This field appears in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ requests to the
KDC and indicates the flags that the client wants set on the tickets as
well as other information that is to modify the behavior of the KDC.
Where appropriate, the name of an option may be the same as the flag
that is set by that option. Although in most case, the bit in the
options field will be the same as that in the flags field, this is not
guaranteed, so it is not acceptable to simply copy the options field to
the flags field. There are various checks that must be made before
honoring an option anyway.
The kdc_options field is a bit-field, where the selected options are
indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected options and
reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits is specified
in section 5.2. The options are described in more detail above in
section 2. The meanings of the options are:
Bits Name Description
0 RESERVED Reserved for future expansion of
this field.
The FORWARDABLE option indicates
that the ticket to be issued is to
have its forwardable flag set. It
1 FORWARDABLE may only be set on the initial
request, or in a subsequent request
if the ticket-granting ticket on
which it is based is also
forwardable.
The FORWARDED option is only
specified in a request to the
ticket-granting server and will only
be honored if the ticket-granting
ticket in the request has its
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
2 FORWARDED FORWARDABLE bit set. This option
indicates that this is a request for
forwarding. The address(es) of the
host from which the resulting ticket
is to be valid are included in the
addresses field of the request.
The PROXIABLE option indicates that
the ticket to be issued is to have
its proxiable flag set. It may only
3 PROXIABLE be set on the initial request, or in
a subsequent request if the
ticket-granting ticket on which it
is based is also proxiable.
The PROXY option indicates that this
is a request for a proxy. This
option will only be honored if the
ticket-granting ticket in the
4 PROXY request has its PROXIABLE bit set.
The address(es) of the host from
which the resulting ticket is to be
valid are included in the addresses
field of the request.
The ALLOW-POSTDATE option indicates
that the ticket to be issued is to
have its MAY-POSTDATE flag set. It
5 ALLOW-POSTDATE may only be set on the initial
request, or in a subsequent request
if the ticket-granting ticket on
which it is based also has its
MAY-POSTDATE flag set.
The POSTDATED option indicates that
this is a request for a postdated
ticket. This option will only be
honored if the ticket-granting
ticket on which it is based has its
6 POSTDATED MAY-POSTDATE flag set. The resulting
ticket will also have its INVALID
flag set, and that flag may be reset
by a subsequent request to the KDC
after the starttime in the ticket
has been reached.
7 UNUSED This option is presently unused.
The RENEWABLE option indicates that
the ticket to be issued is to have
its RENEWABLE flag set. It may only
be set on the initial request, or
when the ticket-granting ticket on
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
8 RENEWABLE which the request is based is also
renewable. If this option is
requested, then the rtime field in
the request contains the desired
absolute expiration time for the
ticket.
9 RESERVED Reserved for PK-Cross
10-13 UNUSED These options are presently unused.
The REQUEST-ANONYMOUS option
indicates that the ticket to be
issued is not to identify the user
to which it was issued. Instead, the
principal identifier is to be
generic, as specified by the policy
of the realm (e.g. usually
14 REQUEST-ANONYMOUS anonymous@realm). The purpose of the
ticket is only to securely
distribute a session key, and not to
identify the user. The ANONYMOUS
flag on the ticket to be returned
should be set. If the local realms
policy does not permit anonymous
credentials, the request is to be
rejected.
The CANONICALIZE option indicates
that the client will accept the
return of a true server name instead
of the name specified in the
request. In addition the client will
be able to process any TGT referrals
that will direct the client to
15 CANONICALIZE another realm to locate the
requested server. If a KDC does not
support name- canonicalization, the
option is ignored and the
appropriate
KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN or
KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN error is
returned. [JBrezak]
16-25 RESERVED Reserved for future use.
By default the KDC will check the
transited field of a
ticket-granting-ticket against the
policy of the local realm before it
will issue derivative tickets based
on the ticket granting ticket. If
this flag is set in the request,
checking of the transited field is
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
26 DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK disabled. Tickets issued without the
performance of this check will be
noted by the reset (0) value of the
TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED flag,
indicating to the application server
that the tranisted field must be
checked locally. KDC's are
encouraged but not required to honor
the DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK option.
The RENEWABLE-OK option indicates
that a renewable ticket will be
acceptable if a ticket with the
requested life cannot otherwise be
provided. If a ticket with the
requested life cannot be provided,
27 RENEWABLE-OK then a renewable ticket may be
issued with a renew-till equal to
the the requested endtime. The value
of the renew-till field may still be
limited by local limits, or limits
selected by the individual principal
or server.
This option is used only by the
ticket-granting service. The
ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option indicates
28 ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY that the ticket for the end server
is to be encrypted in the session
key from the additional
ticket-granting ticket provided.
29 RESERVED Reserved for future use.
This option is used only by the
ticket-granting service. The RENEW
option indicates that the present
request is for a renewal. The ticket
provided is encrypted in the secret
key for the server on which it is
30 RENEW valid. This option will only be
honored if the ticket to be renewed
has its RENEWABLE flag set and if
the time in its renew-till field has
not passed. The ticket to be renewed
is passed in the padata field as
part of the authentication header.
This option is used only by the
ticket-granting service. The
VALIDATE option indicates that the
request is to validate a postdated
ticket. It will only be honored if
the ticket presented is postdated,
presently has its INVALID flag set,
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
31 VALIDATE and would be otherwise usable at
this time. A ticket cannot be
validated before its starttime. The
ticket presented for validation is
encrypted in the key of the server
for which it is valid and is passed
in the padata field as part of the
authentication header.
cname and sname
These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section
5.3.1. sname may only be absent when the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is
specified. If absent, the name of the server is taken from the name of
the client in the ticket passed as additional-tickets.
enc-authorization-data
The enc-authorization-data, if present (and it can only be present in
the TGS_REQ form), is an encoding of the desired authorization-data
encrypted under the sub-session key if present in the Authenticator, or
alternatively from the session key in the ticket-granting ticket, both
from the padata field in the KRB_AP_REQ.
realm
This field specifies the realm part of the server's principal
identifier. In the AS exchange, this is also the realm part of the
client's principal identifier. If the CANONICALIZE option is set, the
realm is used as a hint to the KDC for its database lookup.
from
This field is included in the KRB_AS_REQ and KRB_TGS_REQ ticket
requests when the requested ticket is to be postdated. It specifies the
desired start time for the requested ticket. If this field is omitted
then the KDC should use the current time instead.
till
This field contains the expiration date requested by the client in a
ticket request. It is optional and if omitted the requested ticket is
to have the maximum endtime permitted according to KDC policy for the
parties to the authentication exchange as limited by expiration date of
the ticket granting ticket or other preauthentication credentials.
rtime
This field is the requested renew-till time sent from a client to the
KDC in a ticket request. It is optional.
nonce
This field is part of the KDC request and response. It it intended to
hold a random number generated by the client. If the same number is
included in the encrypted response from the KDC, it provides evidence
that the response is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker.
Nonces must never be re-used. Ideally, it should be generated randomly,
but if the correct time is known, it may suffice[25].
etype
This field specifies the desired encryption algorithm to be used in the
response.
addresses
This field is included in the initial request for tickets, and
optionally included in requests for additional tickets from the
ticket-granting server. It specifies the addresses from which the
requested ticket is to be valid. Normally it includes the addresses for
the client's host. If a proxy is requested, this field will contain
other addresses. The contents of this field are usually copied by the
KDC into the caddr field of the resulting ticket.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
additional-tickets
Additional tickets may be optionally included in a request to the
ticket-granting server. If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been
specified, then the session key from the additional ticket will be used
in place of the server's key to encrypt the new ticket. When he
ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option is used for user-to-user authentication, this
addional ticket may be a TGT issued by the local realm or an
inter-realm TGT issued for the current KDC's realm by a remote KDC. If
more than one option which requires additional tickets has been
specified, then the additional tickets are used in the order specified
by the ordering of the options bits (see kdc-options, above).
The application code will be either ten (10) or twelve (12) depending on
whether the request is for an initial ticket (AS-REQ) or for an additional
ticket (TGS-REQ).
The optional fields (addresses, authorization-data and additional-tickets)
are only included if necessary to perform the operation specified in the
kdc-options field.
It should be noted that in KRB_TGS_REQ, the protocol version number appears
twice and two different message types appear: the KRB_TGS_REQ message
contains these fields as does the authentication header (KRB_AP_REQ) that is
passed in the padata field.
5.4.2. KRB_KDC_REP definition
The KRB_KDC_REP message format is used for the reply from the KDC for either
an initial (AS) request or a subsequent (TGS) request. There is no message
type for KRB_KDC_REP. Instead, the type will be either KRB_AS_REP or
KRB_TGS_REP. The key used to encrypt the ciphertext part of the reply
depends on the message type. For KRB_AS_REP, the ciphertext is encrypted in
the client's secret key, and the client's key version number is included in
the key version number for the encrypted data. For KRB_TGS_REP, the
ciphertext is encrypted in the sub-session key from the Authenticator, or if
absent, the session key from the ticket-granting ticket used in the request.
In that case, no version number will be present in the EncryptedData
sequence.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
The KRB_KDC_REP message contains the following fields:
AS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 11] KDC-REP
TGS-REP ::= [APPLICATION 13] KDC-REP
KDC-REP ::= SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
padata[2] SEQUENCE OF PA-DATA OPTIONAL,
crealm[3] Realm,
cname[4] PrincipalName,
ticket[5] Ticket,
enc-part[6] EncryptedData
-- EncASREpPart or EncTGSReoOart
}
EncASRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 25[27]] EncKDCRepPart
EncTGSRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 26] EncKDCRepPart
EncKDCRepPart ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
last-req[1] LastReq,
nonce[2] INTEGER,
key-expiration[3] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
flags[4] TicketFlags,
authtime[5] KerberosTime,
starttime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[7] KerberosTime,
renew-till[8] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[9] Realm,
sname[10] PrincipalName,
caddr[11] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
}
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is either
KRB_AS_REP or KRB_TGS_REP.
padata
This field is described in detail in section 5.4.1. One possible use
for this field is to encode an alternate "mix-in" string to be used
with a string-to-key algorithm (such as is described in section 6.3.2).
This ability is useful to ease transitions if a realm name needs to
change (e.g. when a company is acquired); in such a case all existing
password-derived entries in the KDC database would be flagged as
needing a special mix-in string until the next password change.
crealm, cname, srealm and sname
These fields are the same as those described for the ticket in section
5.3.1.
ticket
The newly-issued ticket, from section 5.3.1.
enc-part
This field is a place holder for the ciphertext and related information
that forms the encrypted part of a message. The description of the
encrypted part of the message follows each appearance of this field.
The encrypted part is encoded as described in section 6.1.
key
This field is the same as described for the ticket in section 5.3.1.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
last-req
This field is returned by the KDC and specifies the time(s) of the last
request by a principal. Depending on what information is available,
this might be the last time that a request for a ticket-granting ticket
was made, or the last time that a request based on a ticket-granting
ticket was successful. It also might cover all servers for a realm, or
just the particular server. Some implementations may display this
information to the user to aid in discovering unauthorized use of one's
identity. It is similar in spirit to the last login time displayed when
logging into timesharing systems.
nonce
This field is described above in section 5.4.1.
key-expiration
The key-expiration field is part of the response from the KDC and
specifies the time that the client's secret key is due to expire. The
expiration might be the result of password aging or an account
expiration. This field will usually be left out of the TGS reply since
the response to the TGS request is encrypted in a session key and no
client information need be retrieved from the KDC database. It is up to
the application client (usually the login program) to take appropriate
action (such as notifying the user) if the expiration time is imminent.
flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till and caddr
These fields are duplicates of those found in the encrypted portion of
the attached ticket (see section 5.3.1), provided so the client may
verify they match the intended request and to assist in proper ticket
caching. If the message is of type KRB_TGS_REP, the caddr field will
only be filled in if the request was for a proxy or forwarded ticket,
or if the user is substituting a subset of the addresses from the
ticket granting ticket. If the client-requested addresses are not
present or not used, then the addresses contained in the ticket will be
the same as those included in the ticket-granting ticket.
5.5. Client/Server (CS) message specifications
This section specifies the format of the messages used for the
authentication of the client to the application server.
5.5.1. KRB_AP_REQ definition
The KRB_AP_REQ message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the
message type KRB_AP_REQ, an options field to indicate any options in use,
and the ticket and authenticator themselves. The KRB_AP_REQ message is often
referred to as the 'authentication header'.
AP-REQ ::= [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
ap-options[2] APOptions,
ticket[3] Ticket,
authenticator[4] EncryptedData
-- Authenticator from 5.3.2
}
APOptions ::= BIT STRING {
reserved(0),
use-session-key(1),
mutual-required(2)
}
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_AP_REQ.
ap-options
This field appears in the application request (KRB_AP_REQ) and affects
the way the request is processed. It is a bit-field, where the selected
options are indicated by the bit being set (1), and the unselected
options and reserved fields being reset (0). The encoding of the bits
is specified in section 5.2. The meanings of the options are:
Bit(s) Name Description
0 RESERVED
Reserved for future expansion of this
field.
1 USE-SESSION-KEY
The USE-SESSION-KEY option indicates
that the ticket the client is presenting
to a server is encrypted in the session
key from the server's ticket-granting
ticket. When this option is not speci-
fied, the ticket is encrypted in the
server's secret key.
2 MUTUAL-REQUIRED
The MUTUAL-REQUIRED option tells the
server that the client requires mutual
authentication, and that it must respond
with a KRB_AP_REP message.
3-31 RESERVED
Reserved for future use.
ticket
This field is a ticket authenticating the client to the server.
authenticator
This contains the authenticator, which includes the client's choice of
a subkey. Its encoding is described in section 5.3.2.
5.5.2. KRB_AP_REP definition
The KRB_AP_REP message contains the Kerberos protocol version number, the
message type, and an encrypted time- stamp. The message is sent in in
response to an application request (KRB_AP_REQ) where the mutual
authentication option has been selected in the ap-options field.
AP-REP ::= [APPLICATION 15] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
enc-part[2] EncryptedData
-- EncAPRepPart
}
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
EncAPRepPart ::= [APPLICATION 27[29]] SEQUENCE {
ctime[0] KerberosTime,
cusec[1] INTEGER,
subkey[2] EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
The encoded EncAPRepPart is encrypted in the shared session key of the
ticket. The optional subkey field can be used in an application-arranged
negotiation to choose a per association session key.
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_AP_REP.
enc-part
This field is described above in section 5.4.2.
ctime
This field contains the current time on the client's host.
cusec
This field contains the microsecond part of the client's timestamp.
subkey
This field contains an encryption key which is to be used to protect
this specific application session. See section 3.2.6 for specifics on
how this field is used to negotiate a key. Unless an application
specifies otherwise, if this field is left out, the sub-session key
from the authenticator, or if also left out, the session key from the
ticket will be used.
seq-number
This field is described above in section 5.3.2.
5.5.3. Error message reply
If an error occurs while processing the application request, the KRB_ERROR
message will be sent in response. See section 5.9.1 for the format of the
error message. The cname and crealm fields may be left out if the server
cannot determine their appropriate values from the corresponding KRB_AP_REQ
message. If the authenticator was decipherable, the ctime and cusec fields
will contain the values from it.
5.6. KRB_SAFE message specification
This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either
side (client or server) of an application to send a tamper-proof message to
its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been exchanged (for
example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages).
5.6.1. KRB_SAFE definition
The KRB_SAFE message contains user data along with a collision-proof
checksum keyed with the last encryption key negotiated via subkeys, or the
session key if no negotiation has occurred. The message fields are:
KRB-SAFE ::= [APPLICATION 20] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
safe-body[2] KRB-SAFE-BODY,
cksum[3] Checksum
}
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
KRB-SAFE-BODY ::= SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_SAFE.
safe-body
This field is a placeholder for the body of the KRB-SAFE message.
cksum
This field contains the checksum of the application data. Checksum
details are described in section 6.4. The checksum is computed over the
encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence. First, the cksum is zeroed and the
checksum is computed over the encoding of the KRB-SAFE sequence, then
the checksum is set to the result of that computation, and finally the
KRB-SAFE sequence is encoded again.
user-data
This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages and contain
the application specific data that is being passed from the sender to
the recipient.
timestamp
This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV messages. Its contents
are the current time as known by the sender of the message. By checking
the timestamp, the recipient of the message is able to make sure that
it was recently generated, and is not a replay.
usec
This field is part of the KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV headers. It contains
the microsecond part of the timestamp.
seq-number
This field is described above in section 5.3.2.
s-address
This field specifies the address in use by the sender of the message.
It may be omitted if not required by the application protocol. The
application designer considering omission of this field is warned, that
the inclusion of this address prevents some kinds of replay attacks
(e.g., reflection attacks) and that it is only acceptable to omit this
address if there is sufficient information in the integrity protected
part of the application message for the recipient to unambiguously
determine if it was the intended recipient.
r-address
This field specifies the address in use by the recipient of the
message. It may be omitted for some uses (such as broadcast protocols),
but the recipient may arbitrarily reject such messages. This field
along with s-address can be used to help detect messages which have
been incorrectly or maliciously delivered to the wrong recipient.
5.7. KRB_PRIV message specification
This section specifies the format of a message that can be used by either
side (client or server) of an application to securely and privately send a
message to its peer. It presumes that a session key has previously been
exchanged (for example, by using the KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages).
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
5.7.1. KRB_PRIV definition
The KRB_PRIV message contains user data encrypted in the Session Key. The
message fields are:
KRB-PRIV ::= [APPLICATION 21] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData
-- EncKrbPrivPart
}
EncKrbPrivPart ::= [APPLICATION 28[31]] SEQUENCE {
user-data[0] OCTET STRING,
timestamp[1] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[2] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
seq-number[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL, -- sender's addr
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL -- recip's addr
}
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_PRIV.
enc-part
This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbPrivPart sequence encrypted
under the session key[32]. This encrypted encoding is used for the
enc-part field of the KRB-PRIV message. See section 6 for the format of
the ciphertext.
user-data, timestamp, usec, s-address and r-address
These fields are described above in section 5.6.1.
seq-number
This field is described above in section 5.3.2.
5.8. KRB_CRED message specification
This section specifies the format of a message that can be used to send
Kerberos credentials from one principal to another. It is presented here to
encourage a common mechanism to be used by applications when forwarding
tickets or providing proxies to subordinate servers. It presumes that a
session key has already been exchanged perhaps by using the
KRB_AP_REQ/KRB_AP_REP messages.
5.8.1. KRB_CRED definition
The KRB_CRED message contains a sequence of tickets to be sent and
information needed to use the tickets, including the session key from each.
The information needed to use the tickets is encrypted under an encryption
key previously exchanged or transferred alongside the KRB_CRED message. The
message fields are:
KRB-CRED ::= [APPLICATION 22] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER, -- KRB_CRED
tickets[2] SEQUENCE OF Ticket,
enc-part[3] EncryptedData -- EncKrbCredPart
}
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EncKrbCredPart ::= [APPLICATION 29] SEQUENCE {
ticket-info[0] SEQUENCE OF KrbCredInfo,
nonce[1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
timestamp[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
usec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
s-address[4] HostAddress OPTIONAL,
r-address[5] HostAddress OPTIONAL
}
KrbCredInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
key[0] EncryptionKey,
prealm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
pname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
flags[3] TicketFlags OPTIONAL,
authtime[4] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
starttime[5] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
endtime[6] KerberosTime OPTIONAL
renew-till[7] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
srealm[8] Realm OPTIONAL,
sname[9] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
caddr[10] HostAddresses OPTIONAL
}
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_CRED.
tickets
These are the tickets obtained from the KDC specifically for use by the
intended recipient. Successive tickets are paired with the
corresponding KrbCredInfo sequence from the enc-part of the KRB-CRED
message.
enc-part
This field holds an encoding of the EncKrbCredPart sequence encrypted
under the session key shared between the sender and the intended
recipient. This encrypted encoding is used for the enc-part field of
the KRB-CRED message. See section 6 for the format of the ciphertext.
nonce
If practical, an application may require the inclusion of a nonce
generated by the recipient of the message. If the same value is
included as the nonce in the message, it provides evidence that the
message is fresh and has not been replayed by an attacker. A nonce must
never be re-used; it should be generated randomly by the recipient of
the message and provided to the sender of the message in an application
specific manner.
timestamp and usec
These fields specify the time that the KRB-CRED message was generated.
The time is used to provide assurance that the message is fresh.
s-address and r-address
These fields are described above in section 5.6.1. They are used
optionally to provide additional assurance of the integrity of the
KRB-CRED message.
key
This field exists in the corresponding ticket passed by the KRB-CRED
message and is used to pass the session key from the sender to the
intended recipient. The field's encoding is described in section 6.2.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
The following fields are optional. If present, they can be associated with
the credentials in the remote ticket file. If left out, then it is assumed
that the recipient of the credentials already knows their value.
prealm and pname
The name and realm of the delegated principal identity.
flags, authtime, starttime, endtime, renew-till, srealm, sname, and caddr
These fields contain the values of the corresponding fields from the
ticket found in the ticket field. Descriptions of the fields are
identical to the descriptions in the KDC-REP message.
5.9. Error message specification
This section specifies the format for the KRB_ERROR message. The fields
included in the message are intended to return as much information as
possible about an error. It is not expected that all the information
required by the fields will be available for all types of errors. If the
appropriate information is not available when the message is composed, the
corresponding field will be left out of the message.
Note that since the KRB_ERROR message is only optionally integrity
protected, it is quite possible for an intruder to synthesize or modify such
a message. In particular, this means that unless appropriate integrity
protection mechanisms have been applied to the KRB_ERROR message, the client
should not use any fields in this message for security-critical purposes,
such as setting a system clock or generating a fresh authenticator. The
message can be useful, however, for advising a user on the reason for some
failure.
5.9.1. KRB_ERROR definition
The KRB_ERROR message consists of the following fields:
KRB-ERROR ::= [APPLICATION 30] SEQUENCE {
pvno[0] INTEGER,
msg-type[1] INTEGER,
ctime[2] KerberosTime OPTIONAL,
cusec[3] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
stime[4] KerberosTime,
susec[5] INTEGER,
error-code[6] INTEGER,
crealm[7] Realm OPTIONAL,
cname[8] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
realm[9] Realm, -- Correct realm
sname[10] PrincipalName, -- Correct name
e-text[11] GeneralString OPTIONAL,
e-data[12] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
e-cksum[13] Checksum OPTIONAL,
}
pvno and msg-type
These fields are described above in section 5.4.1. msg-type is
KRB_ERROR.
ctime
This field is described above in section 5.4.1.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
cusec
This field is described above in section 5.5.2.
stime
This field contains the current time on the server. It is of type
KerberosTime.
susec
This field contains the microsecond part of the server's timestamp. Its
value ranges from 0 to 999999. It appears along with stime. The two
fields are used in conjunction to specify a reasonably accurate
timestamp.
error-code
This field contains the error code returned by Kerberos or the server
when a request fails. To interpret the value of this field see the list
of error codes in section 8. Implementations are encouraged to provide
for national language support in the display of error messages.
crealm, cname, srealm and sname
These fields are described above in section 5.3.1.
e-text
This field contains additional text to help explain the error code
associated with the failed request (for example, it might include a
principal name which was unknown).
e-data
This field contains additional data about the error for use by the
application to help it recover from or handle the error. If present,
this field will contain the encoding of a sequence of TypedData
(TYPED-DATA below), unless the errorcode is KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED,
in which case it will contain the encoding of a sequence of of padata
fields (METHOD-DATA below), each corresponding to an acceptable
pre-authentication method and optionally containing data for the
method:
TYPED-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of TypedData
METHOD-DATA ::= SEQUENCE of PA-DATA
TypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
data-type[0] INTEGER,
data-value[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
Note that the padata-type field in the PA-DATA structure and the
data-type field in the TypedData structure share a common range of
allocated values which are coordinated to avoid conflicts. One Kerberos
error message, KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED, embeds elements of type
PA-DATA, while all other error messages embed TypedData.
While preauthentication methods of type PA-DATA should be encapsulated
within a TypedData element of type TD-PADATA, for compatibility with
old clients, the KDC should include PA-DATA types below 22 directly as
method-data. All new implementations interpreting the METHOD-DATA field
for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED message must accept a type of
TD-PADATA, extract the typed data field and interpret the use any
elements encapsulated in the TD-PADATA elements as if they were present
in the METHOD-DATA sequence.
Unless otherwise specified, unrecognized TypedData elements within the
KRB-ERROR message MAY be ignored by implementations that do not support
them. Note that all TypedData MAY be bound to the KRB-ERROR message via
the checksum field.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
An application may use the TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR typed data type for
data carried in a Kerberos error message that is specific to the
application. TD-APP-SPECIFIC must set the data-type value of TypedData
to TD-APP-SPECIFIC and the data-value field to
AppSpecificTypedData as follows:
AppSpecificTypedData ::= SEQUENCE {
oid[0] OPTIONAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
-- identifies the application
data-value[1] OCTET STRING
-- application
-- specific data
}
The TD-REQ-NONCE TypedData MAY be used to bind a KRB-ERROR to a
KDC-REQ. The data-value is an INTEGER that is equivalent to the
nonce in a KDC-REQ.
The TD-REQ-SEQ TypedData MAY be used for binding a KRB-ERROR to
the sequence number from an authenticator. The data-value is an
INTEGER, and it is identical to sequence number sent in the
authenticator.
The data-value for TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL is the Kerberos-defined
PrincipalName. The data-value for TD-KRB-REALM is the
Kerberos-defined Realm. These TypedData types MAY be used to
indicate principal and realm name when appropriate.
e-cksum
This field contains an optional checksum for the KRB-ERROR message. The
checksum is calculated over the Kerberos ASN.1 encoding of the
KRB-ERROR message with the checksum absent. The checksum is then added
to the KRB-ERROR structure and the message is re-encoded. The Checksum
should be calculated using the session key from the ticket granting
ticket or service ticket, where available. If the error is in response
to a TGS or AP request, the checksum should be calculated using the the
session key from the client's ticket. If the error is in response to an
AS request, then the checksum should be calulated using the client's
secret key ONLY if there has been suitable preauthentication to prove
knowledge of the secret key by the client[33]. If a checksum can not be
computed because the key to be used is not available, no checksum will
be included.
6. Encryption and Checksum Specifications
This section is undergoing major revision to include rijndael support based
on the Internet Draft by Ken Raeburn
(draft-raeburn-krb-rijndael-krb-00.txt). The discussions of 3DES are also
undergoing revision. Please see http://www.isi.edu/people/bcn/krb-revisions
for the latest versions of this section when it becomes available.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
7. Naming Constraints
7.1. Realm Names
Although realm names are encoded as GeneralStrings and although a realm can
technically select any name it chooses, interoperability across realm
boundaries requires agreement on how realm names are to be assigned, and
what information they imply.
To enforce these conventions, each realm must conform to the conventions
itself, and it must require that any realms with which inter-realm keys are
shared also conform to the conventions and require the same from its
neighbors.
Kerberos realm names are case sensitive. Realm names that differ only in the
case of the characters are not equivalent. There are presently four styles
of realm names: domain, X500, other, and reserved. Examples of each style
follow:
domain: ATHENA.MIT.EDU (example)
X500: C=US/O=OSF (example)
other: NAMETYPE:rest/of.name=without-restrictions (example)
reserved: reserved, but will not conflict with above
Domain names must look like domain names: they consist of components
separated by periods (.) and they contain neither colons (:) nor slashes
(/). Though domain names themselves are case insensitive, in order for
realms to match, the case must match as well. When establishing a new realm
name based on an internet domain name it is recommended by convention that
the characters be converted to upper case.
X.500 names contain an equal (=) and cannot contain a colon (:) before the
equal. The realm names for X.500 names will be string representations of the
names with components separated by slashes. Leading and trailing slashes
will not be included. Note that the slash separator is consistent with
Kerberos implementations based on RFC1510, but it is different from the
separator recommended in RFC2253.
Names that fall into the other category must begin with a prefix that
contains no equal (=) or period (.) and the prefix must be followed by a
colon (:) and the rest of the name. All prefixes must be assigned before
they may be used. Presently none are assigned.
The reserved category includes strings which do not fall into the first
three categories. All names in this category are reserved. It is unlikely
that names will be assigned to this category unless there is a very strong
argument for not using the 'other' category.
These rules guarantee that there will be no conflicts between the various
name styles. The following additional constraints apply to the assignment of
realm names in the domain and X.500 categories: the name of a realm for the
domain or X.500 formats must either be used by the organization owning (to
whom it was assigned) an Internet domain name or X.500 name, or in the case
that no such names are registered, authority to use a realm name may be
derived from the authority of the parent realm. For example, if there is no
domain name for E40.MIT.EDU, then the administrator of the MIT.EDU realm can
authorize the creation of a realm with that name.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
This is acceptable because the organization to which the parent is assigned
is presumably the organization authorized to assign names to its children in
the X.500 and domain name systems as well. If the parent assigns a realm
name without also registering it in the domain name or X.500 hierarchy, it
is the parent's responsibility to make sure that there will not in the
future exist a name identical to the realm name of the child unless it is
assigned to the same entity as the realm name.
7.2. Principal Names
As was the case for realm names, conventions are needed to ensure that all
agree on what information is implied by a principal name. The name-type
field that is part of the principal name indicates the kind of information
implied by the name. The name-type should be treated as a hint. Ignoring the
name type, no two names can be the same (i.e. at least one of the
components, or the realm, must be different). The following name types are
defined:
name-type value meaning
NT-UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known
NT-PRINCIPAL 1 General principal name (e.g. username, or DCE principal)
NT-SRV-INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
NT-SRV-HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands)
NT-SRV-XHST 4 Service with slash-separated host name components
NT-UID 5 Unique ID
NT-X500-PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 1779]
NT-SMTP-NAME 7 Name in form of SMTP email name (e.g. user@foo.com)
When a name implies no information other than its uniqueness at a particular
time the name type PRINCIPAL should be used. The principal name type should
be used for users, and it might also be used for a unique server. If the
name is a unique machine generated ID that is guaranteed never to be
reassigned then the name type of UID should be used (note that it is
generally a bad idea to reassign names of any type since stale entries might
remain in access control lists).
If the first component of a name identifies a service and the remaining
components identify an instance of the service in a server specified manner,
then the name type of SRV-INST should be used. An example of this name type
is the Kerberos ticket-granting service whose name has a first component of
krbtgt and a second component identifying the realm for which the ticket is
valid.
If instance is a single component following the service name and the
instance identifies the host on which the server is running, then the name
type SRV-HST should be used. This type is typically used for Internet
services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands. If the separate
components of the host name appear as successive components following the
name of the service, then the name type SRV-XHST should be used. This type
might be used to identify servers on hosts with X.500 names where the slash
(/) might otherwise be ambiguous.
A name type of NT-X500-PRINCIPAL should be used when a name from an X.509
certificate is translated into a Kerberos name. The encoding of the X.509
name as a Kerberos principal shall conform to the encoding rules specified
in RFC 2253.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A name type of SMTP allows a name to be of a form that resembles a SMTP
email name. This name, including an "@" and a domain name, is used as the
one component of the principal name. This name type can be used in
conjunction with name-canonicalization to allow a free-form of email address
to be specified as a client name and allow the KDC to determine the Kerberos
principal name for the requested name. [JBrezak, Raeburn]
A name type of UNKNOWN should be used when the form of the name is not
known. When comparing names, a name of type UNKNOWN will match principals
authenticated with names of any type. A principal authenticated with a name
of type UNKNOWN, however, will only match other names of type UNKNOWN.
Names of any type with an initial component of 'krbtgt' are reserved for the
Kerberos ticket granting service. See section 8.2.3 for the form of such
names.
7.2.1. Name of server principals
The principal identifier for a server on a host will generally be composed
of two parts: (1) the realm of the KDC with which the server is registered,
and (2) a two-component name of type NT-SRV-HST if the host name is an
Internet domain name or a multi-component name of type NT-SRV-XHST if the
name of the host is of a form such as X.500 that allows slash (/)
separators. The first component of the two- or multi-component name will
identify the service and the latter components will identify the host. Where
the name of the host is not case sensitive (for example, with Internet
domain names) the name of the host must be lower case. If specified by the
application protocol for services such as telnet and the Berkeley R commands
which run with system privileges, the first component may be the string
'host' instead of a service specific identifier. When a host has an official
name and one or more aliases and the official name can be reliably
determined, the official name of the host should be used when constructing
the name of the server principal.
8. Constants and other defined values
8.1. Host address types
All negative values for the host address type are reserved for local use.
All non-negative values are reserved for officially assigned type fields and
interpretations.
The values of the types for the following addresses are chosen to match the
defined address family constants in the Berkeley Standard Distributions of
Unix. They can be found in with symbolic names AF_xxx (where xxx is an
abbreviation of the address family name).
Internet (IPv4) Addresses
Internet (IPv4) addresses are 32-bit (4-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB
order. The IPv4 loopback address should not appear in a Kerberos packet. The
type of IPv4 addresses is two (2).
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Internet (IPv6) Addresses [Westerlund]
IPv6 addresses are 128-bit (16-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The
type of IPv6 addresses is twenty-four (24). [RFC1883] [RFC1884]. The
following addresses (see [RFC1884]) MUST not appear in any Kerberos packet:
* the Unspecified Address
* the Loopback Address
* Link-Local addresses
IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses MUST be represented as addresses of type 2.
CHAOSnet addresses
CHAOSnet addresses are 16-bit (2-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order.
The type of CHAOSnet addresses is five (5).
ISO addresses
ISO addresses are variable-length. The type of ISO addresses is seven (7).
Xerox Network Services (XNS) addresses
XNS addresses are 48-bit (6-octet) quantities, encoded in MSB order. The
type of XNS addresses is six (6).
AppleTalk Datagram Delivery Protocol (DDP) addresses
AppleTalk DDP addresses consist of an 8-bit node number and a 16-bit network
number. The first octet of the address is the node number; the remaining two
octets encode the network number in MSB order. The type of AppleTalk DDP
addresses is sixteen (16).
DECnet Phase IV addresses
DECnet Phase IV addresses are 16-bit addresses, encoded in LSB order. The
type of DECnet Phase IV addresses is twelve (12).
Netbios addresses
Netbios addresses are 16-octet addresses typically composed of 1 to 15
characters, trailing blank (ascii char 20) filled, with a 16th octet of 0x0.
The type of Netbios addresses is 20 (0x14).
8.2. KDC messages
8.2.1. UDP/IP transport
When contacting a Kerberos server (KDC) for a KRB_KDC_REQ request using UDP
IP transport, the client shall send a UDP datagram containing only an
encoding of the request to port 88 (decimal) at the KDC's IP address; the
KDC will respond with a reply datagram containing only an encoding of the
reply message (either a KRB_ERROR or a KRB_KDC_REP) to the sending port at
the sender's IP address. Kerberos servers supporting IP transport must
accept UDP requests on port 88 (decimal). The response to a request made
through UDP/IP transport must also use UDP/IP transport.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
8.2.2. TCP/IP transport [Westerlund,Danielsson]
Kerberos servers (KDC's) should accept TCP requests on port 88 (decimal) and
clients should support the sending of TCP requests on port 88 (decimal).
When the KRB_KDC_REQ message is sent to the KDC over a TCP stream, a new
connection will be established for each authentication exchange (request and
response). The KRB_KDC_REP or KRB_ERROR message will be returned to the
client on the same TCP stream that was established for the request. The
response to a request made through TCP/IP transport must also use TCP/IP
transport. Implementors should note that some extensions to the Kerberos
protocol will not work if any implementation not supporting the TCP
transport is involved (client or KDC). Implementors are strongly urged to
support the TCP transport on both the client and server and are advised that
the current notation of "should" support will likely change in the future to
must support. The KDC may close the TCP stream after sending a response, but
may leave the stream open if it expects a followup - in which case it may
close the stream at any time if resource constraints or other factors make
it desirable to do so. Care must be taken in managing TCP/IP connections
with the KDC to prevent denial of service attacks based on the number of
TCP/IP connections with the KDC that remain open. If multiple exchanges with
the KDC are needed for certain forms of preauthentication, multiple TCP
connections may be required. A client may close the stream after receiving
response, and should close the stream if it does not expect to send followup
messages. The client must be prepared to have the stream closed by the KDC
at anytime, in which case it must simply connect again when it is ready to
send subsequent messages.
The first four octets of the TCP stream used to transmit the request request
will encode in network byte order the length of the request (KRB_KDC_REQ),
and the length will be followed by the request itself. The response will
similarly be preceded by a 4 octet encoding in network byte order of the
length of the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR message and will be followed by
the KRB_KDC_REP or the KRB_ERROR response. If the sign bit is set on the
integer represented by the first 4 octets, then the next 4 octets will be
read, extending the length of the field by another 4 octets (less the sign
bit of the additional four octets which is reserved for future expansion and
which at present must be zero).
8.2.3. OSI transport
During authentication of an OSI client to an OSI server, the mutual
authentication of an OSI server to an OSI client, the transfer of
credentials from an OSI client to an OSI server, or during exchange of
private or integrity checked messages, Kerberos protocol messages may be
treated as opaque objects and the type of the authentication mechanism will
be:
OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso (1), org(3), dod(6),internet(1), security(5),kerberosv5(2)}
Depending on the situation, the opaque object will be an authentication
header (KRB_AP_REQ), an authentication reply (KRB_AP_REP), a safe message
(KRB_SAFE), a private message (KRB_PRIV), or a credentials message
(KRB_CRED). The opaque data contains an application code as specified in the
ASN.1 description for each message. The application code may be used by
Kerberos to determine the message type.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
8.2.3. Name of the TGS
The principal identifier of the ticket-granting service shall be composed of
three parts: (1) the realm of the KDC issuing the TGS ticket (2) a two-part
name of type NT-SRV-INST, with the first part "krbtgt" and the second part
the name of the realm which will accept the ticket-granting ticket. For
example, a ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be
used to get tickets from the ATHENA.MIT.EDU KDC has a principal identifier
of "ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "ATHENA.MIT.EDU") (name). A
ticket-granting ticket issued by the ATHENA.MIT.EDU realm to be used to get
tickets from the MIT.EDU realm has a principal identifier of
"ATHENA.MIT.EDU" (realm), ("krbtgt", "MIT.EDU") (name).
8.3. Protocol constants and associated values
The following tables list constants used in the protocol and define their
meanings. Ranges are specified in the "specification" section that limit the
values of constants for which values are defined here. This allows
implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will be
received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside the
range specified in the "specification" section may reject the request, but
they must recover cleanly.
Encryption type etype value block size minimum pad size confounder size
NULL 0 1 0 0
des-cbc-crc 1 8 4 8
des-cbc-md4 2 8 0 8
des-cbc-md5 3 8 0 8
[reserved] 4
des3-cbc-md5 5 8 0 8
[reserved] 6
des3-cbc-sha1 7 8 0 8
dsaWithSHA1-CmsOID 9 (pkinit)
md5WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 10 (pkinit)
sha1WithRSAEncryption-CmsOID 11 (pkinit)
rc2CBC-EnvOID 12 (pkinit)
rsaEncryption-EnvOID 13 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v1.5)
rsaES-OAEP-ENV-OID 14 (pkinit from PKCS#1 v2.0)
des-ede3-cbc-Env-OID 15 (pkinit)
des3-cbc-sha1-kd 16 (Tom Yu)
rc4-hmac 23 (swift)
rc4-hmac-exp 24 (swift)
subkey-keynaterial 65 (opaque mhur)
[reserved] 0x8003
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Checksum type sumtype value checksum size
CRC32 1 4
rsa-md4 2 16
rsa-md4-des 3 24
des-mac 4 16
des-mac-k 5 8
rsa-md4-des-k 6 16 (drop rsa ?)
rsa-md5 7 16 (drop rsa ?)
rsa-md5-des 8 24 (drop rsa ?)
rsa-md5-des3 9 24 (drop rsa ?)
hmac-sha1-des3-kd 12 20
hmac-sha1-des3 13 20
sha1 (unkeyed) 14 20
padata and data types padata-type value comment
PA-TGS-REQ 1
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP 2
PA-PW-SALT 3
[reserved] 4
PA-ENC-UNIX-TIME 5 (depricated)
PA-SANDIA-SECUREID 6
PA-SESAME 7
PA-OSF-DCE 8
PA-CYBERSAFE-SECUREID 9
PA-AFS3-SALT 10
PA-ETYPE-INFO 11
PA-SAM-CHALLENGE 12 (sam/otp)
PA-SAM-RESPONSE 13 (sam/otp)
PA-PK-AS-REQ 14 (pkinit)
PA-PK-AS-REP 15 (pkinit)
PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO 20
PA-SAM-REDIRECT 21 (sam/otp)
PA-GET-FROM-TYPED-DATA 22 (embedded in typed data)
TD-PADATA 22 (embeds padata)
PA-SAM-ETYPE-INFO 23 (sam/otp)
TD-PKINIT-CMS-CERTIFICATES 101 CertificateSet from CMS
TD-KRB-PRINCIPAL 102 PrincipalName (see Sec.5.9.1)
TD-KRB-REALM 103 Realm (see Sec.5.9.1)
TD-TRUSTED-CERTIFIERS 104 from PKINIT
TD-CERTIFICATE-INDEX 105 from PKINIT
TD-APP-DEFINED-ERROR 106 application specific (see Sec.5.9.1)
TD-REQ-NONCE 107 INTEGER (see Sec.5.9.1)
TD-REQ-SEQ 108 INTEGER (see Sec.5.9.1)
authorization data type ad-type value
AD-IF-RELEVANT 1
AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER 2
AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS 3
AD-KDC-ISSUED 4
AD-OR 5
AD-MANDATORY-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 6
AD-IN-TICKET-EXTENSIONS 7
reserved values 8-63
OSF-DCE 64
SESAME 65
AD-OSF-DCE-PKI-CERTID 66 (hemsath@us.ibm.com)
AD-WIN200-PAC 128 (jbrezak@exchange.microsoft.com)
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Ticket Extension Types
TE-TYPE-NULL 0 Null ticket extension
TE-TYPE-EXTERNAL-ADATA 1 Integrity protected authorization data
[reserved] 2 TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-KDC (I have reservations)
TE-TYPE-PKCROSS-CLIENT 3 PKCROSS cross realm key ticket
TE-TYPE-CYBERSAFE-EXT 4 Assigned to CyberSafe Corp
[reserved] 5 TE-TYPE-DEST-HOST (I have reservations)
alternate authentication type method-type value
reserved values 0-63
ATT-CHALLENGE-RESPONSE 64
transited encoding type tr-type value
DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS 1
reserved values all others
Label Value Meaning or MIT code
pvno 5 current Kerberos protocol version number
message types
KRB_AS_REQ 10 Request for initial authentication
KRB_AS_REP 11 Response to KRB_AS_REQ request
KRB_TGS_REQ 12 Request for authentication based on TGT
KRB_TGS_REP 13 Response to KRB_TGS_REQ request
KRB_AP_REQ 14 application request to server
KRB_AP_REP 15 Response to KRB_AP_REQ_MUTUAL
KRB_SAFE 20 Safe (checksummed) application message
KRB_PRIV 21 Private (encrypted) application message
KRB_CRED 22 Private (encrypted) message to forward credentials
KRB_ERROR 30 Error response
name types
KRB_NT_UNKNOWN 0 Name type not known
KRB_NT_PRINCIPAL 1 Just the name of the principal as in DCE, or for users
KRB_NT_SRV_INST 2 Service and other unique instance (krbtgt)
KRB_NT_SRV_HST 3 Service with host name as instance (telnet, rcommands)
KRB_NT_SRV_XHST 4 Service with host as remaining components
KRB_NT_UID 5 Unique ID
KRB_NT_X500_PRINCIPAL 6 Encoded X.509 Distingished name [RFC 2253]
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
error codes
KDC_ERR_NONE 0 No error
KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP 1 Client's entry in database has expired
KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP 2 Server's entry in database has expired
KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO 3 Requested protocol version number not supported
KDC_ERR_C_OLD_MAST_KVNO 4 Client's key encrypted in old master key
KDC_ERR_S_OLD_MAST_KVNO 5 Server's key encrypted in old master key
KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 6 Client not found in Kerberos database
KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN 7 Server not found in Kerberos database
KDC_ERR_PRINCIPAL_NOT_UNIQUE 8 Multiple principal entries in database
KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY 9 The client or server has a null key
KDC_ERR_CANNOT_POSTDATE 10 Ticket not eligible for postdating
KDC_ERR_NEVER_VALID 11 Requested start time is later than end time
KDC_ERR_POLICY 12 KDC policy rejects request
KDC_ERR_BADOPTION 13 KDC cannot accommodate requested option
KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP 14 KDC has no support for encryption type
KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP 15 KDC has no support for checksum type
KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP 16 KDC has no support for padata type
KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP 17 KDC has no support for transited type
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED 18 Clients credentials have been revoked
KDC_ERR_SERVICE_REVOKED 19 Credentials for server have been revoked
KDC_ERR_TGT_REVOKED 20 TGT has been revoked
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET 21 Client not yet valid - try again later
KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET 22 Server not yet valid - try again later
KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED 23 Password has expired - change password to reset
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED 24 Pre-authentication information was invalid
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED 25 Additional pre-authenticationrequired [40]
KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH 26 Requested server and ticket don't match
KDC_ERR_MUST_USE_USER2USER 27 Server principal valid for user2user only
KDC_ERR_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED 28 KDC Policy rejects transited path
KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE 29 A service is not available
KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY 31 Integrity check on decrypted field failed
KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED 32 Ticket expired
KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV 33 Ticket not yet valid
KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT 34 Request is a replay
KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US 35 The ticket isn't for us
KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH 36 Ticket and authenticator don't match
KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW 37 Clock skew too great
KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR 38 Incorrect net address
KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION 39 Protocol version mismatch
KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE 40 Invalid msg type
KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED 41 Message stream modified
KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER 42 Message out of order
KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER 44 Specified version of key is not available
KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY 45 Service key not available
KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL 46 Mutual authentication failed
KRB_AP_ERR_BADDIRECTION 47 Incorrect message direction
KRB_AP_ERR_METHOD 48 Alternative authentication method required
KRB_AP_ERR_BADSEQ 49 Incorrect sequence number in message
KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM 50 Inappropriate type of checksum in message
KRB_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCEPTED 51 Policy rejects transited path
KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG 52 Response too big for UDP, retry with TCP
KRB_ERR_GENERIC 60 Generic error (description in e-text)
KRB_ERR_FIELD_TOOLONG 61 Field is too long for this implementation
KDC_ERROR_CLIENT_NOT_TRUSTED 62 (pkinit)
KDC_ERROR_KDC_NOT_TRUSTED 63 (pkinit)
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
KDC_ERROR_INVALID_SIG 64 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_KEY_TOO_WEAK 65 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_CERTIFICATE_MISMATCH 66 (pkinit)
KRB_AP_ERR_NO_TGT 67 (user-to-user)
KDC_ERR_WRONG_REALM 68 (user-to-user)
KRB_AP_ERR_USER_TO_USER_REQUIRED 69 (user-to-user)
KDC_ERR_CANT_VERIFY_CERTIFICATE 70 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_INVALID_CERTIFICATE 71 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE 72 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN 73 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 74 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH 75 (pkinit)
KDC_ERR_KDC_NAME_MISMATCH 76 (pkinit)
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
9. Interoperability requirements
Version 5 of the Kerberos protocol supports a myriad of options. Among these
are multiple encryption and checksum types, alternative encoding schemes for
the transited field, optional mechanisms for pre-authentication, the
handling of tickets with no addresses, options for mutual authentication,
user to user authentication, support for proxies, forwarding, postdating,
and renewing tickets, the format of realm names, and the handling of
authorization data.
In order to ensure the interoperability of realms, it is necessary to define
a minimal configuration which must be supported by all implementations. This
minimal configuration is subject to change as technology does. For example,
if at some later date it is discovered that one of the required encryption
or checksum algorithms is not secure, it will be replaced.
9.1. Specification 2
This section defines the second specification of these options.
Implementations which are configured in this way can be said to support
Kerberos Version 5 Specification 2 (5.1). Specification 1 (deprecated) may
be found in RFC1510.
Transport
TCP/IP and UDP/IP transport must be supported by KDCs claiming conformance
to specification 2. Kerberos clients claiming conformance to specification 2
must support UDP/IP transport for messages with the KDC and should support
TCP/IP transport.
Encryption and checksum methods
The following encryption and checksum mechanisms must be supported.
Implementations may support other mechanisms as well, but the additional
mechanisms may only be used when communicating with principals known to also
support them: This list is to be determined.
Encryption: DES-CBC-MD5, DES3-CBC-SHA1-KD, RIJNDAEL(decide identifier)
Checksums: CRC-32, DES-MAC, DES-MAC-K, DES-MD5, HMAC-SHA1-DES3-KD
Realm Names
All implementations must understand hierarchical realms in both the Internet
Domain and the X.500 style. When a ticket granting ticket for an unknown
realm is requested, the KDC must be able to determine the names of the
intermediate realms between the KDCs realm and the requested realm.
Transited field encoding
DOMAIN-X500-COMPRESS (described in section 3.3.3.2) must be supported.
Alternative encodings may be supported, but they may be used only when that
encoding is supported by ALL intermediate realms.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Pre-authentication methods
The TGS-REQ method must be supported. The TGS-REQ method is not used on the
initial request. The PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method must be supported by clients
but whether it is enabled by default may be determined on a realm by realm
basis. If not used in the initial request and the error
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED is returned specifying PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP as an
acceptable method, the client should retry the initial request using the
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP preauthentication method. Servers need not support the
PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP method, but if not supported the server should ignore the
presence of PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP pre-authentication in a request.
Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication (via the KRB_AP_REP message) must be supported.
Ticket addresses and flags
All KDC's must pass through tickets that carry no addresses (i.e. if a TGT
contains no addresses, the KDC will return derivative tickets), but each
realm may set its own policy for issuing such tickets, and each application
server will set its own policy with respect to accepting them.
Proxies and forwarded tickets must be supported. Individual realms and
application servers can set their own policy on when such tickets will be
accepted.
All implementations must recognize renewable and postdated tickets, but need
not actually implement them. If these options are not supported, the
starttime and endtime in the ticket shall specify a ticket's entire useful
life. When a postdated ticket is decoded by a server, all implementations
shall make the presence of the postdated flag visible to the calling server.
User-to-user authentication
Support for user to user authentication (via the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY KDC option)
must be provided by implementations, but individual realms may decide as a
matter of policy to reject such requests on a per-principal or realm-wide
basis.
Authorization data
Implementations must pass all authorization data subfields from
ticket-granting tickets to any derivative tickets unless directed to
suppress a subfield as part of the definition of that registered subfield
type (it is never incorrect to pass on a subfield, and no registered
subfield types presently specify suppression at the KDC).
Implementations must make the contents of any authorization data subfields
available to the server when a ticket is used. Implementations are not
required to allow clients to specify the contents of the authorization data
fields.
Constant ranges
All protocol constants are constrained to 32 bit (signed) values unless
further constrained by the protocol definition. This limit is provided to
allow implementations to make assumptions about the maximum values that will
be received for these constants. Implementation receiving values outside
this range may reject the request, but they must recover cleanly.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
9.2. Recommended KDC values
Following is a list of recommended values for a KDC implementation, based on
the list of suggested configuration constants (see section 4.4).
minimum lifetime 5 minutes
maximum renewable lifetime 1 week
maximum ticket lifetime 1 day
empty addresses only when suitable restrictions appear
in authorization data
proxiable, etc. Allowed.
10. REFERENCES
[NT94] B. Clifford Neuman and Theodore Y. Ts'o, "An Authenti-
cation Service for Computer Networks," IEEE Communica-
tions Magazine, Vol. 32(9), pp. 33-38 (September 1994).
[MNSS87] S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, J. I. Schiller, and J. H.
Saltzer, Section E.2.1: Kerberos Authentication and
Authorization System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge,
Massachusetts (December 21, 1987).
[SNS88] J. G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller, "Ker-
beros: An Authentication Service for Open Network Sys-
tems," pp. 191-202 in Usenix Conference Proceedings,
Dallas, Texas (February, 1988).
[NS78] Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder, "Using
Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Com-
puters," Communications of the ACM, Vol. 21(12),
pp. 993-999 (December, 1978).
[DS81] Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco, "Time-
stamps in Key Distribution Protocols," Communications
of the ACM, Vol. 24(8), pp. 533-536 (August 1981).
[KNT92] John T. Kohl, B. Clifford Neuman, and Theodore Y. Ts'o,
"The Evolution of the Kerberos Authentication Service,"
in an IEEE Computer Society Text soon to be published
(June 1992).
[Neu93] B. Clifford Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and
Accounting for Distributed Systems," in Proceedings of
the 13th International Conference on Distributed Com-
puting Systems, Pittsburgh, PA (May, 1993).
[DS90] Don Davis and Ralph Swick, "Workstation Services and
Kerberos Authentication at Project Athena," Technical
Memorandum TM-424, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science
(February 1990).
[LGDSR87] P. J. Levine, M. R. Gretzinger, J. M. Diaz, W. E. Som-
merfeld, and K. Raeburn, Section E.1: Service Manage-
ment System, M.I.T. Project Athena, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts (1987).
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
[X509-88] CCITT, Recommendation X.509: The Directory Authentica-
tion Framework, December 1988.
[Pat92]. J. Pato, Using Pre-Authentication to Avoid Password
Guessing Attacks, Open Software Foundation DCE Request
for Comments 26 (December 1992).
[DES77] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, "Data Encryption Standard," Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 46, Washington, DC
(1977).
[DESM80] National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, "DES Modes of Operation," Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 81, Springfield, VA
(December 1980).
[SG92] Stuart G. Stubblebine and Virgil D. Gligor, "On Message
Integrity in Cryptographic Protocols," in Proceedings
of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and
Privacy, Oakland, California (May 1992).
[IS3309] International Organization for Standardization, "ISO
Information Processing Systems - Data Communication -
High-Level Data Link Control Procedure - Frame Struc-
ture," IS 3309 (October 1984). 3rd Edition.
[MD4-92] R. Rivest, "The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC
1320, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April
1992).
[MD5-92] R. Rivest, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm," RFC
1321, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science (April
1992).
[KBC96] H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication," Working Draft
draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-md5-01.txt, (August 1996).
[Horowitz96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Authentication,
Integrity, and Privacy", draft-horowitz-key-derivation-02.txt,
August 1998.
[HorowitzB96] Horowitz, M., "Key Derivation for Kerberos V5", draft-
horowitz-kerb-key-derivation-01.txt, September 1998.
[Krawczyk96] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, and M., Canetti, R., "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", =
draft-ietf-ipsec-hmac-
md5-01.txt, August, 1996.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A. Pseudo-code for protocol processing
This appendix provides pseudo-code describing how the messages are to be
constructed and interpreted by clients and servers.
A.1. KRB_AS_REQ generation
request.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* pvno =3D 5 */
request.msg-type :=3D message type; /* type =3D KRB_AS_REQ */
if(pa_enc_timestamp_required) then
request.padata.padata-type =3D PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP;
get system_time;
padata-body.patimestamp,pausec =3D system_time;
encrypt padata-body into request.padata.padata-value
using client.key; /* derived from password */
endif
body.kdc-options :=3D users's preferences;
body.cname :=3D user's name;
body.realm :=3D user's realm;
body.sname :=3D service's name; /* usually "krbtgt", =
"localrealm" */
if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then
body.from :=3D requested starting time;
else
omit body.from;
endif
body.till :=3D requested end time;
if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then
body.rtime :=3D requested final renewal time;
endif
body.nonce :=3D random_nonce();
body.etype :=3D requested etypes;
if (user supplied addresses) then
body.addresses :=3D user's addresses;
else
omit body.addresses;
endif
omit body.enc-authorization-data;
request.req-body :=3D body;
kerberos :=3D lookup(name of local kerberos server (or =
servers));
send(packet,kerberos);
wait(for response);
if (timed_out) then
retry or use alternate server;
endif
A.2. KRB_AS_REQ verification and KRB_AS_REP generation
decode message into req;
client :=3D lookup(req.cname,req.realm);
server :=3D lookup(req.sname,req.realm);
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
get system_time;
kdc_time :=3D system_time.seconds;
if (!client) then
/* no client in Database */
error_out(KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
endif
if (!server) then
/* no server in Database */
error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
endif
if(client.pa_enc_timestamp_required and
pa_enc_timestamp not present) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP));
endif
if(pa_enc_timestamp present) then
decrypt req.padata-value into decrypted_enc_timestamp
using client.key;
using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey;
if (decrypt_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
if(decrypted_enc_timestamp is not within allowable skew) =
then
error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED);
endif
if(decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec is replay)
error_out(KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED);
endif
add decrypted_enc_timestamp and usec to replay cache;
endif
use_etype :=3D first supported etype in req.etypes;
if (no support for req.etypes) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP);
endif
new_tkt.vno :=3D ticket version; /* =3D 5 */
new_tkt.sname :=3D req.sname;
new_tkt.srealm :=3D req.srealm;
reset all flags in new_tkt.flags;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then
set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then
set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then
set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) or
(req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) or
(req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) or
(req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) or
(req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set)) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
new_tkt.session :=3D random_session_key();
new_tkt.cname :=3D req.cname;
new_tkt.crealm :=3D req.crealm;
new_tkt.transited :=3D empty_transited_field();
new_tkt.authtime :=3D kdc_time;
if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then
if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED;
set new_tkt.flags.INVALID;
new_tkt.starttime :=3D req.from;
else
omit new_tkt.starttime; /* treated as authtime when omitted =
*/
endif
if (req.till =3D 0) then
till :=3D infinity;
else
till :=3D req.till;
endif
new_tkt.endtime :=3D min(till,
new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life,
new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life,
new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm);
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and
(new_tkt.endtime < req.till)) then
/* we set the RENEWABLE option for later processing */
set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE;
req.rtime :=3D req.till;
endif
if (req.rtime =3D 0) then
rtime :=3D infinity;
else
rtime :=3D req.rtime;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then
set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE;
new_tkt.renew-till :=3D min(rtime,
new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife,
new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife,
new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm);
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
else
omit new_tkt.renew-till; /* only present if RENEWABLE */
endif
if (req.addresses) then
new_tkt.caddr :=3D req.addresses;
else
omit new_tkt.caddr;
endif
new_tkt.authorization_data :=3D empty_authorization_data();
encode to-be-encrypted part of ticket into OCTET STRING;
new_tkt.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING
using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, =
server.p_kvno;
/* Start processing the response */
resp.pvno :=3D 5;
resp.msg-type :=3D KRB_AS_REP;
resp.cname :=3D req.cname;
resp.crealm :=3D req.realm;
resp.ticket :=3D new_tkt;
resp.key :=3D new_tkt.session;
resp.last-req :=3D fetch_last_request_info(client);
resp.nonce :=3D req.nonce;
resp.key-expiration :=3D client.expiration;
resp.flags :=3D new_tkt.flags;
resp.authtime :=3D new_tkt.authtime;
resp.starttime :=3D new_tkt.starttime;
resp.endtime :=3D new_tkt.endtime;
if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then
resp.renew-till :=3D new_tkt.renew-till;
endif
resp.realm :=3D new_tkt.realm;
resp.sname :=3D new_tkt.sname;
resp.caddr :=3D new_tkt.caddr;
encode body of reply into OCTET STRING;
resp.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING
using use_etype, client.key, client.p_kvno;
send(resp);
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A.3. KRB_AS_REP verification
decode response into resp;
if (resp.msg-type =3D KRB_ERROR) then
if(error =3D KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED(PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP)) =
then
set pa_enc_timestamp_required;
goto KRB_AS_REQ;
endif
process_error(resp);
return;
endif
/* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key */
/* from the response immediately */
key =3D get_decryption_key(resp.enc-part.kvno, =
resp.enc-part.etype,
resp.padata);
unencrypted part of resp :=3D decode of decrypt of resp.enc-part
using resp.enc-part.etype and key;
zero(key);
if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then
destroy resp.key;
return error;
endif
if near(resp.princ_exp) then
print(warning message);
endif
save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags);
A.4. KRB_AS_REP and KRB_TGS_REP common checks
if (decryption_error() or
(req.cname !=3D resp.cname) or
(req.realm !=3D resp.crealm) or
(req.sname !=3D resp.sname) or
(req.realm !=3D resp.realm) or
(req.nonce !=3D resp.nonce) or
(req.addresses !=3D resp.caddr)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
/* make sure no flags are set that shouldn't be, and that all =
that */
/* should be are set =
*/
if (!check_flags_for_compatability(req.kdc-options,resp.flags)) =
then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if ((req.from =3D 0) and
(resp.starttime is not within allowable skew)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
endif
if ((req.from !=3D 0) and (req.from !=3D resp.starttime)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
if ((req.till !=3D 0) and (resp.endtime > req.till)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and
(req.rtime !=3D 0) and (resp.renew-till > req.rtime)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and
(resp.flags.RENEWABLE) and
(req.till !=3D 0) and
(resp.renew-till > req.till)) then
destroy resp.key;
return KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
endif
A.5. KRB_TGS_REQ generation
/* Note that make_application_request might have to recursivly =
*/
/* call this routine to get the appropriate ticket-granting =
ticket */
request.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* pvno =3D 5 */
request.msg-type :=3D message type; /* type =3D KRB_TGS_REQ */
body.kdc-options :=3D users's preferences;
/* If the TGT is not for the realm of the end-server */
/* then the sname will be for a TGT for the end-realm */
/* and the realm of the requested ticket (body.realm) */
/* will be that of the TGS to which the TGT we are */
/* sending applies */
body.sname :=3D service's name;
body.realm :=3D service's realm;
if (body.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then
body.from :=3D requested starting time;
else
omit body.from;
endif
body.till :=3D requested end time;
if (body.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) then
body.rtime :=3D requested final renewal time;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
body.nonce :=3D random_nonce();
body.etype :=3D requested etypes;
if (user supplied addresses) then
body.addresses :=3D user's addresses;
else
omit body.addresses;
endif
body.enc-authorization-data :=3D user-supplied data;
if (body.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY) then
body.additional-tickets_ticket :=3D second TGT;
endif
request.req-body :=3D body;
check :=3D generate_checksum (req.body,checksumtype);
request.padata[0].padata-type :=3D PA-TGS-REQ;
request.padata[0].padata-value :=3D create a KRB_AP_REQ using
the TGT and checksum
/* add in any other padata as required/supplied */
kerberos :=3D lookup(name of local kerberose server (or =
servers));
send(packet,kerberos);
wait(for response);
if (timed_out) then
retry or use alternate server;
endif
A.6. KRB_TGS_REQ verification and KRB_TGS_REP generation
/* note that reading the application request requires first
determining the server for which a ticket was issued, and =
choosing the
correct key for decryption. The name of the server appears in =
the
plaintext part of the ticket. */
if (no KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP);
endif
verify KRB_AP_REQ in req.padata;
/* Note that the realm in which the Kerberos server is operating =
is
determined by the instance from the ticket-granting ticket. The =
realm
in the ticket-granting ticket is the realm under which the =
ticket
granting ticket was issued. It is possible for a single =
Kerberos
server to support more than one realm. */
auth_hdr :=3D KRB_AP_REQ;
tgt :=3D auth_hdr.ticket;
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if (tgt.sname is not a TGT for local realm and is not req.sname) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOT_US);
realm :=3D realm_tgt_is_for(tgt);
decode remainder of request;
if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is missing) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM);
endif
if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum type is not supported) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_SUMTYPE_NOSUPP);
endif
if (auth_hdr.authenticator.cksum is not both collision-proof and =
keyed) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM);
endif
set computed_checksum :=3D checksum(req);
if (computed_checksum !=3D auth_hdr.authenticatory.cksum) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED);
endif
server :=3D lookup(req.sname,realm);
if (!server) then
if (is_foreign_tgt_name(req.sname)) then
server :=3D best_intermediate_tgs(req.sname);
else
/* no server in Database */
error_out(KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN);
endif
endif
session :=3D generate_random_session_key();
use_etype :=3D first supported etype in req.etypes;
if (no support for req.etypes) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP);
endif
new_tkt.vno :=3D ticket version; /* =3D 5 */
new_tkt.sname :=3D req.sname;
new_tkt.srealm :=3D realm;
reset all flags in new_tkt.flags;
/* It should be noted that local policy may affect the */
/* processing of any of these flags. For example, some */
/* realms may refuse to issue renewable tickets */
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
new_tkt.caddr :=3D tgt.caddr;
resp.caddr :=3D NULL; /* We only include this if they change */
if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDABLE is set) then
if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDABLE;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.FORWARDED is set) then
if (tgt.flags.FORWARDABLE is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED;
new_tkt.caddr :=3D req.addresses;
resp.caddr :=3D req.addresses;
endif
if (tgt.flags.FORWARDED is set) then
set new_tkt.flags.FORWARDED;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.PROXIABLE is set) then
if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset)
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.PROXIABLE;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.PROXY is set) then
if (tgt.flags.PROXIABLE is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.PROXY;
new_tkt.caddr :=3D req.addresses;
resp.caddr :=3D req.addresses;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.ALLOW-POSTDATE is set) then
if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset)
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.POSTDATED is set) then
if (tgt.flags.MAY-POSTDATE is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
set new_tkt.flags.POSTDATED;
set new_tkt.flags.INVALID;
if (against_postdate_policy(req.from)) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
endif
new_tkt.starttime :=3D req.from;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if (req.kdc-options.VALIDATE is set) then
if (tgt.flags.INVALID is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
endif
if (tgt.starttime > kdc_time) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NYV);
endif
if (check_hot_list(tgt)) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
endif
tkt :=3D tgt;
reset new_tkt.flags.INVALID;
endif
if (req.kdc-options.(any flag except ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY, RENEW,
and those already processed) is set) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
new_tkt.authtime :=3D tgt.authtime;
if (req.kdc-options.RENEW is set) then
/* Note that if the endtime has already passed, the ticket =
would */
/* have been rejected in the initial authentication stage, so =
*/
/* there is no need to check again here =
*/
if (tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is reset) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_BADOPTION);
endif
if (tgt.renew-till < kdc_time) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED);
endif
tkt :=3D tgt;
new_tkt.starttime :=3D kdc_time;
old_life :=3D tgt.endttime - tgt.starttime;
new_tkt.endtime :=3D min(tgt.renew-till,
new_tkt.starttime + old_life);
else
new_tkt.starttime :=3D kdc_time;
if (req.till =3D 0) then
till :=3D infinity;
else
till :=3D req.till;
endif
new_tkt.endtime :=3D min(till,
=
new_tkt.starttime+client.max_life,
=
new_tkt.starttime+server.max_life,
=
new_tkt.starttime+max_life_for_realm,
tgt.endtime);
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE-OK is set) and
(new_tkt.endtime < req.till) and
(tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set) then
/* we set the RENEWABLE option for later =
processing */
set req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE;
req.rtime :=3D min(req.till, tgt.renew-till);
endif
endif
if (req.rtime =3D 0) then
rtime :=3D infinity;
else
rtime :=3D req.rtime;
endif
if ((req.kdc-options.RENEWABLE is set) and
(tgt.flags.RENEWABLE is set)) then
set new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE;
new_tkt.renew-till :=3D min(rtime,
=
new_tkt.starttime+client.max_rlife,
=
new_tkt.starttime+server.max_rlife,
=
new_tkt.starttime+max_rlife_for_realm,
tgt.renew-till);
else
new_tkt.renew-till :=3D OMIT; /* leave the renew-till =
field out */
endif
if (req.enc-authorization-data is present) then
decrypt req.enc-authorization-data into =
decrypted_authorization_data
using auth_hdr.authenticator.subkey;
if (decrypt_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
endif
new_tkt.authorization_data :=3D =
req.auth_hdr.ticket.authorization_data +
decrypted_authorization_data;
new_tkt.key :=3D session;
new_tkt.crealm :=3D tgt.crealm;
new_tkt.cname :=3D req.auth_hdr.ticket.cname;
if (realm_tgt_is_for(tgt) :=3D tgt.realm) then
/* tgt issued by local realm */
new_tkt.transited :=3D tgt.transited;
else
/* was issued for this realm by some other realm */
if (tgt.transited.tr-type not supported) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP);
endif
new_tkt.transited :=3D compress_transited(tgt.transited =
+ tgt.realm)
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
/* Don't check tranited field if TGT for foreign realm,=20
* or requested not to check */
if (is_not_foreign_tgt_name(new_tkt.server)=20
&& req.kdc-options.DISABLE-TRANSITED-CHECK not set) =
then
/* Check it, so end-server does not have to=20
* but don't fail, end-server may still accept =
it */
if (check_transited_field(new_tkt.transited) =
=3D=3D OK)
set =
new_tkt.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED;
endif
endif
endif
encode encrypted part of new_tkt into OCTET STRING;
if (req.kdc-options.ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY is set) then
if (server not specified) then
server =3D req.second_ticket.client;
endif
if ((req.second_ticket is not a TGT) or
(req.second_ticket.client !=3D server)) then
error_out(KDC_ERR_POLICY);
endif
new_tkt.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING using
using etype_for_key(second-ticket.key), =
second-ticket.key;
else
new_tkt.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING
using etype_for_key(server.key), server.key, =
server.p_kvno;
endif
resp.pvno :=3D 5;
resp.msg-type :=3D KRB_TGS_REP;
resp.crealm :=3D tgt.crealm;
resp.cname :=3D tgt.cname;
resp.ticket :=3D new_tkt;
resp.key :=3D session;
resp.nonce :=3D req.nonce;
resp.last-req :=3D fetch_last_request_info(client);
resp.flags :=3D new_tkt.flags;
resp.authtime :=3D new_tkt.authtime;
resp.starttime :=3D new_tkt.starttime;
resp.endtime :=3D new_tkt.endtime;
omit resp.key-expiration;
resp.sname :=3D new_tkt.sname;
resp.realm :=3D new_tkt.realm;
if (new_tkt.flags.RENEWABLE) then
resp.renew-till :=3D new_tkt.renew-till;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
encode body of reply into OCTET STRING;
if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey)
resp.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype,
req.padata.authenticator.subkey;
else resp.enc-part :=3D encrypt OCTET STRING using use_etype, =
tgt.key;
send(resp);
=09
A.7. KRB_TGS_REP verification
decode response into resp;
if (resp.msg-type =3D KRB_ERROR) then
process_error(resp);
return;
endif
/* On error, discard the response, and zero the session key from
the response immediately */
if (req.padata.authenticator.subkey)
unencrypted part of resp :=3D decode of decrypt of =
resp.enc-part
using resp.enc-part.etype and subkey;
else unencrypted part of resp :=3D decode of decrypt of =
resp.enc-part
using resp.enc-part.etype and tgt's =
session key;
if (common_as_rep_tgs_rep_checks fail) then
destroy resp.key;
return error;
endif
check authorization_data as necessary;
save_for_later(ticket,session,client,server,times,flags);
A.8. Authenticator generation
body.authenticator-vno :=3D authenticator vno; /* =3D 5 */
body.cname, body.crealm :=3D client name;
if (supplying checksum) then
body.cksum :=3D checksum;
endif
get system_time;
body.ctime, body.cusec :=3D system_time;
if (selecting sub-session key) then
select sub-session key;
body.subkey :=3D sub-session key;
endif
if (using sequence numbers) then
select initial sequence number;
body.seq-number :=3D initial sequence;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A.9. KRB_AP_REQ generation
obtain ticket and session_key from cache;
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_AP_REQ */
if (desired(MUTUAL_AUTHENTICATION)) then
set packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED;
else
reset packet.ap-options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED;
endif
if (using session key for ticket) then
set packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY;
else
reset packet.ap-options.USE-SESSION-KEY;
endif
packet.ticket :=3D ticket; /* ticket */
generate authenticator;
encode authenticator into OCTET STRING;
encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.authenticator using =
session_key;
A.10. KRB_AP_REQ verification
receive packet;
if (packet.pvno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.msg-type !=3D KRB_AP_REQ) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
endif
if (packet.ticket.tkt_vno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.ap_options.USE-SESSION-KEY is set) then
retrieve session key from ticket-granting ticket for
packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype};
else
retrieve service key for
=
packet.ticket.{sname,srealm,enc-part.etype,enc-part.skvno};
endif
if (no_key_available) then
if (cannot_find_specified_skvno) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER);
else
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_NOKEY);
endif
endif
decrypt packet.ticket.enc-part into decr_ticket using retrieved =
key;
if (decryption_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
decrypt packet.authenticator into decr_authenticator
using decr_ticket.key;
if (decryption_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
if (decr_authenticator.{cname,crealm} !=3D
decr_ticket.{cname,crealm}) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADMATCH);
endif
if (decr_ticket.caddr is present) then
if (sender_address(packet) is not in decr_ticket.caddr) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
elseif (application requires addresses) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
if (not in_clock_skew(decr_authenticator.ctime,
decr_authenticator.cusec)) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW);
endif
if (repeated(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm})) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
endif
save_identifier(decr_authenticator.{ctime,cusec,cname,crealm});
get system_time;
if ((decr_ticket.starttime-system_time > CLOCK_SKEW) or
(decr_ticket.flags.INVALID is set)) then
/* it hasn't yet become valid */
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_NYV);
endif
if (system_time-decr_ticket.endtime > CLOCK_SKEW) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_EXPIRED);
endif
if (decr_ticket.transited) then
/* caller may ignore the TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED and do
* check anyway */
if (decr_ticket.flags.TRANSITED-POLICY-CHECKED not set) then
if (check_transited_field(decr_ticket.transited) then
error_out(KDC_AP_PATH_NOT_ACCPETED);
endif
endif
endif
/* caller must check decr_ticket.flags for any pertinent details =
*/
return(OK, decr_ticket, packet.ap_options.MUTUAL-REQUIRED);
A.11. KRB_AP_REP generation
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_AP_REP */
body.ctime :=3D packet.ctime;
body.cusec :=3D packet.cusec;
if (selecting sub-session key) then
select sub-session key;
body.subkey :=3D sub-session key;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if (using sequence numbers) then
select initial sequence number;
body.seq-number :=3D initial sequence;
endif
encode body into OCTET STRING;
select encryption type;
encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part;
A.12. KRB_AP_REP verification
receive packet;
if (packet.pvno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.msg-type !=3D KRB_AP_REP) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
endif
cleartext :=3D decrypt(packet.enc-part) using ticket's session =
key;
if (decryption_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
if (cleartext.ctime !=3D authenticator.ctime) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL);
endif
if (cleartext.cusec !=3D authenticator.cusec) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL);
endif
if (cleartext.subkey is present) then
save cleartext.subkey for future use;
endif
if (cleartext.seq-number is present) then
save cleartext.seq-number for future verifications;
endif
return(AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED);
A.13. KRB_SAFE generation
collect user data in buffer;
/* assemble packet: */
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_SAFE */
body.user-data :=3D buffer; /* DATA */
if (using timestamp) then
get system_time;
body.timestamp, body.usec :=3D system_time;
endif
if (using sequence numbers) then
body.seq-number :=3D sequence number;
endif
body.s-address :=3D sender host addresses;
if (only one recipient) then
body.r-address :=3D recipient host address;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
checksum.cksumtype :=3D checksum type;
compute checksum over body;
checksum.checksum :=3D checksum value; /* checksum.checksum */
packet.cksum :=3D checksum;
packet.safe-body :=3D body;
A.14. KRB_SAFE verification
receive packet;
if (packet.pvno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.msg-type !=3D KRB_SAFE) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
endif
if (packet.checksum.cksumtype is not both collision-proof and =
keyed) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM);
endif
if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(packet)) then
set computed_checksum :=3D checksum(packet.body);
if (computed_checksum !=3D packet.checksum) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED);
endif
return (packet, PACKET_IS_GENUINE);
else
return common_checks_error;
endif
A.15. KRB_SAFE and KRB_PRIV common checks
if (packet.s-address !=3D O/S_sender(packet)) then
/* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it =
*/
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
if ((packet.r-address is present) and
(packet.r-address !=3D local_host_address)) then
/* was not sent to proper place */
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
if (((packet.timestamp is present) and
(not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec))) or
(packet.timestamp is not present and timestamp expected)) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW);
endif
if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
endif
if (((packet.seq-number is present) and
((not in_sequence(packet.seq-number)))) or
(packet.seq-number is not present and sequence expected)) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADORDER);
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
if (packet.timestamp not present and packet.seq-number not =
present) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED);
endif
save_identifier(packet.{timestamp,usec,s-address},
sender_principal(packet));
return PACKET_IS_OK;
A.16. KRB_PRIV generation
collect user data in buffer;
/* assemble packet: */
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_PRIV */
packet.enc-part.etype :=3D encryption type;
body.user-data :=3D buffer;
if (using timestamp) then
get system_time;
body.timestamp, body.usec :=3D system_time;
endif
if (using sequence numbers) then
body.seq-number :=3D sequence number;
endif
body.s-address :=3D sender host addresses;
if (only one recipient) then
body.r-address :=3D recipient host address;
endif
encode body into OCTET STRING;
select encryption type;
encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher;
A.17. KRB_PRIV verification
receive packet;
if (packet.pvno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.msg-type !=3D KRB_PRIV) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
endif
cleartext :=3D decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key;
if (decryption_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
if (safe_priv_common_checks_ok(cleartext)) then
return(cleartext.DATA, =
PACKET_IS_GENUINE_AND_UNMODIFIED);
else
return common_checks_error;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A.18. KRB_CRED generation
invoke KRB_TGS; /* obtain tickets to be provided to peer */
/* assemble packet: */
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_CRED */
for (tickets[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do
packet.tickets[n] =3D tickets[n].ticket;
done
packet.enc-part.etype :=3D encryption type;
for (ticket[n] in tickets to be forwarded) do
body.ticket-info[n].key =3D tickets[n].session;
body.ticket-info[n].prealm =3D tickets[n].crealm;
body.ticket-info[n].pname =3D tickets[n].cname;
body.ticket-info[n].flags =3D tickets[n].flags;
body.ticket-info[n].authtime =3D tickets[n].authtime;
body.ticket-info[n].starttime =3D tickets[n].starttime;
body.ticket-info[n].endtime =3D tickets[n].endtime;
body.ticket-info[n].renew-till =3D =
tickets[n].renew-till;
body.ticket-info[n].srealm =3D tickets[n].srealm;
body.ticket-info[n].sname =3D tickets[n].sname;
body.ticket-info[n].caddr =3D tickets[n].caddr;
done
get system_time;
body.timestamp, body.usec :=3D system_time;
if (using nonce) then
body.nonce :=3D nonce;
endif
if (using s-address) then
body.s-address :=3D sender host addresses;
endif
if (limited recipients) then
body.r-address :=3D recipient host address;
endif
encode body into OCTET STRING;
select encryption type;
encrypt OCTET STRING into packet.enc-part.cipher
using negotiated encryption key;
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
A.19. KRB_CRED verification
receive packet;
if (packet.pvno !=3D 5) then
either process using other protocol spec
or error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION);
endif
if (packet.msg-type !=3D KRB_CRED) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE);
endif
cleartext :=3D decrypt(packet.enc-part) using negotiated key;
if (decryption_error()) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY);
endif
if ((packet.r-address is present or required) and
(packet.s-address !=3D O/S_sender(packet)) then
/* O/S report of sender not who claims to have sent it =
*/
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
if ((packet.r-address is present) and
(packet.r-address !=3D local_host_address)) then
/* was not sent to proper place */
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR);
endif
if (not in_clock_skew(packet.timestamp,packet.usec)) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW);
endif
if (repeated(packet.timestamp,packet.usec,packet.s-address)) =
then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT);
endif
if (packet.nonce is required or present) and
(packet.nonce !=3D expected-nonce) then
error_out(KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED);
endif
for (ticket[n] in tickets that were forwarded) do
save_for_later(ticket[n],key[n],principal[n],
server[n],times[n],flags[n]);
return
A.20. KRB_ERROR generation
/* assemble packet: */
packet.pvno :=3D protocol version; /* 5 */
packet.msg-type :=3D message type; /* KRB_ERROR */
get system_time;
packet.stime, packet.susec :=3D system_time;
packet.realm, packet.sname :=3D server name;
if (client time available) then
packet.ctime, packet.cusec :=3D client_time;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
packet.error-code :=3D error code;
if (client name available) then
packet.cname, packet.crealm :=3D client name;
endif
if (error text available) then
packet.e-text :=3D error text;
endif
if (error data available) then
packet.e-data :=3D error data;
endif
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
B. Definition of common authorization data elements
This appendix contains the definitions of common authorization data
elements. These common authorization data elements are recursivly defined,
meaning the ad-data for these types will itself contain a sequence of
authorization data whose interpretation is affected by the encapsulating
element. Depending on the meaning of the encapsulating element, the
encapsulated elements may be ignored, might be interpreted as issued
directly by the KDC, or they might be stored in a separate plaintext part of
the ticket. The types of the encapsulating elements are specified as part of
the Kerberos specification because the behavior based on these values should
be understood across implementations whereas other elements need only be
understood by the applications which they affect.
In the definitions that follow, the value of the ad-type for the element
will be specified in the subsection number, and the value of the ad-data
will be as shown in the ASN.1 structure that follows the subsection heading.
B.1. If relevant
AD-IF-RELEVANT AuthorizationData
AD elements encapsulated within the if-relevant element are intended for
interpretation only by application servers that understand the particular
ad-type of the embedded element. Application servers that do not understand
the type of an element embedded within the if-relevant element may ignore
the uninterpretable element. This element promotes interoperability across
implementations which may have local extensions for authorization.
B.2. Intended for server
AD-INTENDED-FOR-SERVER SEQUENCE {
intended-server[0] SEQUENCE OF PrincipalName
elements[1] AuthorizationData
}
AD elements encapsulated within the intended-for-server element may be
ignored if the application server is not in the list of principal names of
intended servers. Further, a KDC issuing a ticket for an application server
can remove this element if the application server is not in the list of
intended servers.
Application servers should check for their principal name in the
intended-server field of this element. If their principal name is not found,
this element should be ignored. If found, then the encapsulated elements
should be evaluated in the same manner as if they were present in the top
level authorization data field. Applications and application servers that do
not implement this element should reject tickets that contain authorization
data elements of this type.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
B.3. Intended for application class
AD-INTENDED-FOR-APPLICATION-CLASS SEQUENCE { intended-application-class[0]
SEQUENCE OF GeneralString elements[1] AuthorizationData } AD elements
encapsulated within the intended-for-application-class element may be
ignored if the application server is not in one of the named classes of
application servers. Examples of application server classes include
"FILESYSTEM", and other kinds of servers.=20
This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by
applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this
element.
B.4. KDC Issued
AD-KDCIssued SEQUENCE {
ad-checksum[0] Checksum,
i-realm[1] Realm OPTIONAL,
i-sname[2] PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
elements[3] AuthorizationData.
}
ad-checksum
A checksum over the elements field using a cryptographic checksum
method that is identical to the checksum used to protect the ticket
itself (i.e. using the same hash function and the same encryption
algorithm used to encrypt the ticket) and using a key derived from the
same key used to protect the ticket.
i-realm, i-sname
The name of the issuing principal if different from the KDC itself.
This field would be used when the KDC can verify the authenticity of
elements signed by the issuing principal and it allows this KDC to
notify the application server of the validity of those elements.
elements
A sequence of authorization data elements issued by the KDC.
The KDC-issued ad-data field is intended to provide a means for Kerberos
principal credentials to embed within themselves privilege attributes and
other mechanisms for positive authorization, amplifying the priveleges of
the principal beyond what can be done using a credentials without such an
a-data element.
This can not be provided without this element because the definition of the
authorization-data field allows elements to be added at will by the bearer
of a TGT at the time that they request service tickets and elements may also
be added to a delegated ticket by inclusion in the authenticator.
For KDC-issued elements this is prevented because the elements are signed by
the KDC by including a checksum encrypted using the server's key (the same
key used to encrypt the ticket - or a key derived from that key). Elements
encapsulated with in the KDC-issued element will be ignored by the
application server if this "signature" is not present. Further, elements
encapsulated within this element from a ticket granting ticket may be
interpreted by the KDC, and used as a basis according to policy for
including new signed elements within derivative tickets, but they will not
be copied to a derivative ticket directly. If they are copied directly to a
derivative ticket by a KDC that is not aware of this element, the signature
will not be correct for the application ticket elements, and the field will
be ignored by the application server.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
This element and the elements it encapulates may be safely ignored by
applications, application servers, and KDCs that do not implement this
element.
B.5. And-Or
AD-AND-OR SEQUENCE {
condition-count[0] INTEGER,
elements[1] AuthorizationData
}=20
When restrictive AD elements encapsulated within the and-or element are
encountered, only the number specified in condition-count of the
encapsulated conditions must be met in order to satisfy this element. This
element may be used to implement an "or" operation by setting the
condition-count field to 1, and it may specify an "and" operation by setting
the condition count to the number of embedded elements. Application servers
that do not implement this element must reject tickets that contain
authorization data elements of this type.
B.6. Mandatory ticket extensions
AD-Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions SEQUENCE {
te-type[0] INTEGER,
te-checksum[0] Checksum
}=20
An authorization data element of type mandatory-ticket-extensions specifies
the type and a collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used
to protect the integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum will be
calculated over an individual extension field of the type indicated. If
there are more than one extension, multiple Mandatory-Ticket-Extensions
authorization data elements may be present, each with a checksum for a
different extension field. This restriction indicates that the ticket should
not be accepted if a ticket extension is not present in the ticket for which
the type and checksum do not match that checksum specified in the
authorization data element. Note that although the type is redundant for the
purposes of the comparison, it makes the comparison easier when multiple
extensions are present. Application servers that do not implement this
element must reject tickets that contain authorization data elements of this
type.
B.7. Authorization Data in ticket extensions
AD-IN-Ticket-Extensions Checksum
An authorization data element of type in-ticket-extensions specifies a
collision-proof checksum using the same hash algorithm used to protect the
integrity of the ticket itself. This checksum is calculated over a separate
external AuthorizationData field carried in the ticket extensions.
Application servers that do not implement this element must reject tickets
that contain authorization data elements of this type. Application servers
that do implement this element will search the ticket extensions for
authorization data fields, calculate the specified checksum over each
authorization data field and look for one matching the checksum in this
in-ticket-extensions element. If not found, then the ticket must be
rejected. If found, the corresponding authorization data elements will be
interpreted in the same manner as if they were contained in the top level
authorization data field.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Note that if multiple external authorization data fields are present in a
ticket, each will have a corresponding element of type in-ticket-extensions
in the top level authorization data field, and the external entries will be
linked to the corresponding element by their checksums.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
C. Definition of common ticket extensions
This appendix contains the definitions of common ticket extensions. Support
for these extensions is optional. However, certain extensions have
associated authorization data elements that may require rejection of a
ticket containing an extension by application servers that do not implement
the particular extension. Other extensions have been defined beyond those
described in this specification. Such extensions are described elswhere and
for some of those extensions the reserved number may be found in the list of
constants.
It is known that older versions of Kerberos did not support this field, and
that some clients will strip this field from a ticket when they parse and
then reassemble a ticket as it is passed to the application servers. The
presence of the extension will not break such clients, but any functionaly
dependent on the extensions will not work when such tickets are handled by
old clients. In such situations, some implementation may use alternate
methods to transmit the information in the extensions field.
C.1. Null ticket extension
TE-NullExtension OctetString -- The empty Octet String
The te-data field in the null ticket extension is an octet string of lenght
zero. This extension may be included in a ticket granting ticket so that the
KDC can determine on presentation of the ticket granting ticket whether the
client software will strip the extensions field. =20
C.2. External Authorization Data
TE-ExternalAuthorizationData AuthorizationData
The te-data field in the external authorization data ticket extension is
field of type AuthorizationData containing one or more authorization data
elements. If present, a corresponding authorization data element will be
present in the primary authorization data for the ticket and that element
will contain a checksum of the external authorization data ticket extension.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
D. Significant changes since RFC 1510
Commentary
Section 1: The preamble and introduction does not define the protocol,
mention is made in the introduction regarding the ability to rely on the KDC
to check the transited field, and on the inclusion of a flag in a ticket
indicating that this check has occurred. This is a new capability not
present in RFC1510. Pre-existing implementation may ignore or not set this
flag without negative security implications.
The definition of the secret key says that in the case of a user the key may
be derived from a password. In 1510, it said that the key was derived from
the password. This change was made to accommodate situations where the user
key might be stored on a smart-card, or otherwise obtained independent of a
password.
The introduction also mentions the use of public key for initial
authentication in Kerberos by reference. RFC1510 did not include such a
reference.
Section 1.2 was added to explain that while Kerberos provides authentication
of a named principal, it is still the responsibility of the application to
ensure that the authenticated name is the entity with which the application
wishes to communicate. Because section 1.2 is completely new, I am
particularly interested in suggestions to improve the wording of this
section. Sections 1.2-4 were renumbered.
Section 2: No changes were made to existing options and flags specified in
RFC1510, though some of the sections in the specification were renumbered,
and text was revised to make the description and intent of existing options
clearer, especially with respect to the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option (now section
2.9.3) which is used for user-to-user authentication. New options and ticket
flags added since RFC1510 include transited policy checking (section 2.7),
anonymous tickets (section 2.8) and name canonicalization (section 2.9.1).
Section 3: Added mention of the optional checksum field in the KRB-ERROR
message. Added mention of name canonicalization and anonymous tickets in
exposition on KDC options. Mention of the name canonicalization case is
included in the description of the KDC reply (3.1.3). A warning regarding
generation of session keys for application use was added, urging the
inclusion of key entropy from the KDC generated session key in the ticket.
An example regarding use of the subsession key was added to section 3.2.6.
Descriptions of the pa-etype-info, and pa-pw-salt preauthentication data
items were added.
Changes to section 4: Added language about who has access to the keys in the
Kerberos database. Also made it clear that KDC's may obtain the information
from some database field through other means - for example, one form of
pkinit may extract some of these fields from a certificate.
Regarding the discussion on the list regarding the use of tamper resistant
hardware to store keys, I was not able to determine specific suggested
changes to the text in the RFC regarding this. Much of this discussion
centers around particular implementations. I did however loosen the wording
about the database so as not to preclude keys that can not be extracted in
the clear from such hardware.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
Section 5: A statement regarding the carrying of unrecognized additional
fields in ASN.1 encoding through in tickets was added (still waiting on some
better text regarding this).
Ticket flags and KDC options were added to support the new functions
described elsewhere in this document. The encoding of the options flags are
now described to be no less than 32 bits, and the smallest number of bits
beyond 32 needed to encode any set bits. It also describes the encoding of
the bitstring as using "unnamed" bits.
An optional ticket extensions field was added to support the carrying of
auxiliary data that allows the passing of auxiliary that is to accompany a
ticket to the verifier.
(I would like to drop the part about optionally appending it of the opaque
part of the ciphertext. We are still waiting on some text regarding how to
assure backward compatibility).
(Still pending, Tom Yu's request to change the application codes on KDC
message to indicate which minor rev of the protocol - I think this might
break things, but am not sure).
Definition of the PA-USE-SPECIFIED-KVNO preauthentication data field was
added.
The optional e-cksum field was added to the KRB-ERROR message and the e-data
filed was generalized for use in other than the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
error. The TypedData structure was defined. Type tags for TypedData are
defined in the same sequence as the PA-DATA type space to avoid confusion
with the use of the PA-DATA namespace previously used for the e-data field
for the KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED error.
Section 7: Words were added describing the convention that domain based
realm names for newly created realms should be specified as upper case. This
recommendation does not make lower case realm names illegal. Words were
added highlighting that the slash separated components in the X500 style of
realm names is consistent with existing RFC1510 based implementations, but
that it conflicts with the general recommendation of X.500 name
representation specified in RFC2253.
There were suggestions on the list regarding extensions to or new name
types. These require discussion at the IETF meeting. My own feeling at this
point is that in the absence of a strong consensus for for adding new types
at this time, I would rather not add new name types in the current draft,
but leave things open for additions later.
Section 8: Since RFC1510, the definition of the TCP transport for Kerberos
messages was added.
Section 9: Requirements for supporting DES3-CBC-SHA1-KD encryption and
HMAC-SHA1-DES3-KD checksums were added.
I would like to make support for Rijndael mandatory and for us to have a
SINGLE standard for use of Rijndale in these revisions.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Section 8: Regarding the suggestion of weakening the requirement for use of
port 88 for cases where the port can be looked up elsewhere - I did not
incorporate this suggestion because cross realm authentication requires the
ability to contact the appropriate KDC, and unless ALL implementations of
Kerberos include support for finding such alternate port numbers, use of
such KDC's would be non-interoperable.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[TM] Project Athena, Athena, and Kerberos are trademarks of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). No commercial use of these
trademarks may be made without prior written permission of MIT.
[1.1] Note, however, that many applications use Kerberos' functions only
upon the initiation of a stream-based network connection. Unless an
application subsequently provides integrity protection for the data stream,
the identity verification applies only to the initiation of the connection,
and does not guarantee that subsequent messages on the connection originate
from the same principal.
[1.2] Secret and private are often used interchangeably in the literature.
In our usage, it takes two (or more) to share a secret, thus a shared DES
key is a secret key. Something is only private when no one but its owner
knows it. Thus, in public key cryptosystems, one has a public and a private
key.
[1.3] Of course, with appropriate permission the client could arrange
registration of a separately-named prin- cipal in a remote realm, and engage
in normal exchanges with that realm's services. However, for even small
numbers of clients this becomes cumbersome, and more automatic methods as
described here are necessary.
[2.1] Though it is permissible to request or issue tick- ets with no network
addresses specified.
[2.2] It is important that the KDC be sent the name as typed by the user,
and not only the canonical form of the name. If the domain name system was
used to find the canonical name on the client side, the mapping is
vulnerable. [3.1] The password-changing request must not be honored unless
the requester can provide the old password (the user's current secret key).
Otherwise, it would be possible for someone to walk up to an unattended
session and change another user's password.
[3.2] To authenticate a user logging on to a local system, the credentials
obtained in the AS exchange may first be used in a TGS exchange to obtain
credentials for a local server. Those credentials must then be verified by a
local server through successful completion of the Client/Server exchange.
[3.3] "Random" means that, among other things, it should be impossible to
guess the next session key based on knowledge of past session keys. This can
only be achieved in a pseudo-random number generator if it is based on
cryptographic principles. It is more desirable to use a truly random number
generator, such as one based on measurements of random physical phenomena.
[3.4] Tickets contain both an encrypted and unencrypted portion, so
cleartext here refers to the entire unit, which can be copied from one
message and replayed in another without any cryptographic skill.
[3.5] Note that this can make applications based on unreliable transports
difficult to code correctly. If the transport might deliver duplicated
messages, either a new authenticator must be generated for each retry, or
the application server must match requests and replies and replay the first
reply in response to a detected duplicate.
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07 Expires 24 May 2001
[3.6] This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication [8],
which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys
in situations where such secret keys could be easily compromised.
[3.7]Note also that the rejection here is restricted to authenticators from
the same principal to the same server. Other client principals communicating
with the same server principal should not be have their authenticators
rejected if the time and microsecond fields happen to match some other
client's authenticator.
[3.8] If this is not done, an attacker could subvert the authentication by
recording the ticket and authenticator sent over the network to a server and
replaying them following an event that caused the server to lose track of
recently seen authenticators.
[3.9] In the Kerberos version 4 protocol, the timestamp in the reply was the
client's timestamp plus one. This is not necessary in version 5 because
version 5 messages are formatted in such a way that it is not possible to
create the reply by judicious message surgery (even in encrypted form)
without knowledge of the appropriate encryption keys.
[3.10] Note that for encrypting the KRB_AP_REP message, the sub-session key
is not used, even if present in the Authenticator.
[3.11] Implementations of the protocol may wish to provide routines to
choose subkeys based on session keys and random numbers and to generate a
negotiated key to be returned in the KRB_AP_REP message.
[3.12]This can be accomplished in several ways. It might be known beforehand
(since the realm is part of the principal identifier), it might be stored in
a nameserver, or it might be obtained from a configuration file. If the
realm to be used is obtained from a nameserver, there is a danger of being
spoofed if the nameservice providing the realm name is not authenticated.
This might result in the use of a realm which has been compromised, and
would result in an attacker's ability to compromise the authentication of
the application server to the client.
[3.13] If the client selects a sub-session key, care must be taken to ensure
the randomness of the selected sub-session key. One approach would be to
generate a random number and XOR it with the session key from the
ticket-granting ticket.
[4.1] The implementation of the Kerberos server need not combine the
database and the server on the same machine; it is feasible to store the
principal database in, say, a network name service, as long as the entries
stored therein are protected from disclosure to and modification by
unauthorized parties. However, we recommend against such strategies, as they
can make system management and threat analysis quite complex.
[4.2] See the discussion of the padata field in section 5.4.2 for details on
why this can be useful.
Datatracker
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-revisions-07
Internet-Draft
