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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06                                          
INTERNET-DRAFT                                        Mike Swift
draft-ietf-cat-kerberos-set-passwd-00.txt             Microsoft
expires March, 2000                                   Jonathan Trostle
                                                      Cisco Systems
                                                      John Brezak
                                                      Microsoft

         Extending Change Password for Setting Kerberos Passwords

0. Status Of This Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-
   Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Comments and suggestions on this document are encouraged.  Comments
   on this document should be sent to the CAT working group discussion
   list:
                       ietf-cat-wg@stanford.edu

   This document expires in March, 2000.

1. Abstract

   The Kerberos [1] change password protocol [2], does not allow for
   an administrator to set a password for a new user. This functionality
   is useful in some environments, and this proposal extends [2] to
   allow password setting. The changes are: adding new fields to the
   request message to indicate the principal which is having its
   password set, not requiring the initial flag in the service ticket,
   using a new protocol version number, and adding three new result
   codes.

2. The Protocol

   The service must accept requests on UDP port 464 and TCP port 464 as
   well. The protocol consists of a single request message followed by
   a single reply message.  For UDP transport, each message must be fully
   contained in a single UDP packet.

   For TCP transport, there is a 4 octet header in network byte order
   precedes the message and specifies the length of the message. This
   requirement is consistent with the TCP transport header in 1510bis.

Request Message

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |         message length        |    protocol version number    |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          AP_REQ length        |         AP-REQ data           /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                        KRB-PRIV message                       /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   All 16 bit fields are in big-endian order.

   message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message
   including this field.

   protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0xff80 (big-endian
   integer).

   AP-REQ length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero,
   then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV
   message.

   AP-REQ data: (see [1]) The AP-REQ message must be for the service
   principal kadmin/changepw@REALM, where REALM is the REALM of the user
   who wishes to change/set his password.  The ticket in the AP-REQ must
   must include a subkey in the Authenticator.

   KRB-PRIV message (see [1]) This KRB-PRIV message must be generated
   using the subkey from the authenticator in the AP-REQ data. The
   initial flag of the service ticket is ignored by the server unless
   policy dictates otherwise, in which case the request will be rejected
   with result code 0x0007 if the initial flag is not set and is required
   for this particular request. The user-data component of the message
   consists of the following ASN.1 structure encoded as an OCTET STRING:

   ChangePasswdData ::=  SEQUENCE {
                       newpasswd[0]   OCTET STRING,
                       targname[2]    PrincipalName OPTIONAL,
                       targrealm[3]   Realm OPTIONAL
                       }

   The server must verify the AP-REQ message, check whether the client
   principal in the ticket is authorized to set/change the password
   (either for that principal, or for the principal in the targname
   field if present), and decrypt the new password. The server also
   checks whether the initial flag is required for this request,
   replying with status 0x0007 if it is not set and should be. An
   authorization failure is cause to respond with status 0x0005. For
   forward compatibility, the server should be prepared to ignore fields
   after targrealm in the structure that it does not understand.

   The newpasswd field contains the cleartext password, and the server
   should apply any local policy checks including password policy checks.
   The server then generates the appropriate keytypes from the password
   and stores them in the KDC database. If all goes well, status 0x0000
   is returned to the client in the reply message (see below).

Reply Message

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |         message length        |    protocol version number    |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          AP_REP length        |         AP-REP data           /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      /                KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message                  /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   All 16 bit fields are in big-endian order.

   message length field: contains the number of bytes in the message
   including this field.

   protocol version number: contains the hex constant 0x0001 (big-endian
   integer). (The reply message has the same format as in [2]).

   AP-REP length: length of AP-REP data, in bytes. If the length is zero,
   then the last field contains a KRB-ERROR message instead of a KRB-PRIV
   message.

   AP-REP data: the AP-REP is the response to the AP-REQ in the request
   packet.

   KRB-PRIV or KRB-ERROR message: - from [2]: if the AP-REP length is
   zero, then this field contains a KRB-ERROR message.  Otherwise, it
   contains a KRB-PRIV message. This KRB-PRIV message must be generated
   using the subkey in the authenticator in the AP-REQ data.

   The server will respond with a KRB-PRIV message unless it cannot
   decode the client AP-REQ or KRB-PRIV message, in which case it will
   respond with a KRB-ERROR message.

   The user-data component of the KRB-PRIV message, or e-data component
   of the KRB-ERROR message, must consist of the following data.

       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          result code          |        result string          /
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

      result code (16 bits) (result codes 0-4 are from [2]):
         The result code must have one of the following values (big-
         endian integer):
         KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS      0 request succeeds (This value is not
                                     allowed in a KRB-ERROR message)

         KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED    1 request fails due to being malformed
         KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR    2 request fails due to "hard" error in
                                     processing the request (for example,
                                     there is a resource or other problem
                                     causing the request to fail)
         KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR    3 request fails due to an error in
                                     authentication processing
         KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR    4 request fails due to a "soft" error
                                     in processing the request
         KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED 5 requestor not authorized
         KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION  6 protocol version unsupported
         KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED 7 initial flag required
         0xFFFF if the request fails for some other reason.
         Although only a few non-zero result codes are specified here,
         the client should accept any non-zero result code as indicating
         failure.
      result string - from [2]:
         This field should contain information which the server thinks
         might be useful to the user, such as feedback about policy
         failures.  The string must be encoded in UTF-8.  It may be
         omitted if the server does not wish to include it.  If it is
         present, the client should display the string to the user.
         This field is analogous to the string which follows the numeric
         code in SMTP, FTP, and similar protocols.

3. Bibliography

   [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication
   Service (V5). Request for Comments 1510.

   [2] M. Horowitz. Kerberos Change Password Protocol.
   ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/
   draft-ietf-cat-kerb-chg-password-02.txt

4. Expiration Date

This draft expires on March 31, 2000.

5. Authors' Addresses

   Jonathan Trostle
   Cisco Systems
   170 W. Tasman Dr.
   San Jose, CA 95134

   Email: jtrostle@cisco.com, jtrostle@world.std.com

   Mike Swift
   1 Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052
   mikesw@microsoft.com

   John Brezak
   1 Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052
   jbrezak@microsoft.com