CORE C. Bormann
Internet-Draft Universitaet Bremen TZI
Updates: 7641 (if approved) S. Lemay
Intended status: Standards Track Zebra Technologies
Expires: August 18, 2017 H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
K. Hartke
Universitaet Bremen TZI
B. Silverajan
Tampere University of Technology
B. Raymor, Ed.
Microsoft
February 14, 2017
CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets
draft-ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls-06
Abstract
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), although inspired by
HTTP, was designed to use UDP instead of TCP. The message layer of
the CoAP over UDP protocol includes support for reliable delivery,
simple congestion control, and flow control.
Some environments benefit from the availability of CoAP carried over
reliable transports such as TCP or TLS. This document outlines the
changes required to use CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets
transports. It also formally updates [RFC7641] for use with these
transports.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. CoAP over TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Messaging Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Message Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4. Connection Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. CoAP over WebSockets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Opening Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Message Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3. Message Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4. Connection Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. Signaling Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Signaling Option Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Capabilities and Settings Messages (CSM) . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Ping and Pong Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.5. Release Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.6. Abort Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.7. Signaling examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Block-wise Transfer and Reliable Transports . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Example: GET with BERT Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Example: PUT with BERT Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6. CoAP over Reliable Transport URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.1. coap+tcp URI scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2. coaps+tcp URI scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.3. coap+ws URI scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.4. coaps+ws URI scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.5. Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.6. Decomposing URIs into Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.7. Composing URIs from Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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7. Securing CoAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.1. TLS binding for CoAP over TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7.2. TLS usage for CoAP over WebSockets . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.1. Signaling Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.1. Signaling Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.2. CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . 31
9.3. Service Name and Port Number Registration . . . . . . . . 32
9.4. Secure Service Name and Port Number Registration . . . . 33
9.5. URI Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9.6. Well-Known URI Suffix Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9.7. ALPN Protocol Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9.8. WebSocket Subprotocol Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix A. Updates to RFC7641 Observing Resources in the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) . . . . . . 40
A.1. Notifications and Reordering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.2. Transmission and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.3. Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.4. Cancellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix B. CoAP over WebSocket Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.1. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.2. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.3. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.4. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] was designed
for Internet of Things (IoT) deployments, assuming that UDP [RFC0768]
or DTLS [RFC6347] over UDP can be used unimpeded. UDP is a good
choice for transferring small amounts of data across networks that
follow the IP architecture.
Some CoAP deployments need to integrate well with existing enterprise
infrastructures, where UDP-based protocols may not be well-received
or may even be blocked by firewalls. Middleboxes that are unaware of
CoAP usage for IoT can make the use of UDP brittle, resulting in lost
or malformed packets.
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Emerging standards such as Lightweight Machine to Machine [LWM2M]
currently use CoAP over UDP as a transport and require support for
CoAP over TCP to address the issues above and to protect investments
in existing CoAP implementations and deployments. Although HTTP/2
could also potentially address these requirements, there would be
additional costs and delays introduced by such a transition.
Currently, there are also fewer HTTP/2 implementations available for
constrained devices in comparison to CoAP.
To address these requirements, this document defines how to transport
CoAP over TCP, CoAP over TLS, and CoAP over WebSockets. Figure 1
illustrates the layering:
+--------------------------------+
| Application |
+--------------------------------+
+--------------------------------+
| Requests/Responses/Signaling | CoAP (RFC 7252) / This Document
|--------------------------------|
| Message Framing | This Document
+--------------------------------+
| Reliable Transport |
+--------------------------------+
Figure 1: Layering of CoAP over Reliable Transports
Where NATs are present, CoAP over TCP can help with their traversal.
NATs often calculate expiration timers based on the transport layer
protocol being used by application protocols. Many NATs maintain
TCP-based NAT bindings for longer periods based on the assumption
that a transport layer protocol, such as TCP, offers additional
information about the session life cycle. UDP, on the other hand,
does not provide such information to a NAT and timeouts tend to be
much shorter [HomeGateway].
Some environments may also benefit from the ability of TCP to
exchange larger payloads, such as firmware images, without
application layer segmentation and to utilize the more sophisticated
congestion control capabilities provided by many TCP implementations.
Note that there is ongoing work to add more elaborate congestion
control to CoAP (see [I-D.ietf-core-cocoa]).
CoAP may be integrated into a Web environment where the front-end
uses CoAP over UDP from IoT devices to a cloud infrastructure and
then CoAP over TCP between the back-end services. A TCP-to-UDP
gateway can be used at the cloud boundary to communicate with the
UDP-based IoT device.
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To allow IoT devices to better communicate in these demanding
environments, CoAP needs to support different transport protocols,
namely TCP [RFC0793], in some situations secured by TLS [RFC5246].
In addition, some corporate networks only allow Internet access via a
HTTP proxy. In this case, the best transport for CoAP might be the
WebSocket Protocol [RFC6455]. The WebSocket protocol provides two-
way communication between a WebSocket client and a WebSocket server
after upgrading an HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230] connection and may be available
in an environment that blocks CoAP over UDP. Another scenario for
CoAP over WebSockets is a CoAP application running inside a web
browser without access to connectivity other than HTTP and
WebSockets.
This document specifies how to access resources using CoAP requests
and responses over the TCP/TLS and WebSocket protocols. This allows
connectivity-limited applications to obtain end-to-end CoAP
connectivity either by communicating CoAP directly with a CoAP server
accessible over a TCP/TLS or WebSocket connection or via a CoAP
intermediary that proxies CoAP requests and responses between
different transports, such as between WebSockets and UDP.
Appendix A updates Observing Resources in the Constrained Application
Protocol [RFC7641] for use with CoAP over reliable transports.
[RFC7641] is an extension to the CoAP core protocol that enables CoAP
clients to "observe" a resource on a CoAP server. (The CoAP client
retrieves a representation of a resource and registers to be notified
by the CoAP server when the representation is updated.)
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
This document assumes that readers are familiar with the terms and
concepts that are used in [RFC6455], [RFC7252], [RFC7641], and
[RFC7959].
The term "reliable transport" is used only to refer to transport
protocols such as TCP which provide reliable and ordered delivery of
a byte-stream.
BERT Option:
A Block1 or Block2 option that includes an SZX value of 7.
BERT Block:
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The payload of a CoAP message that is affected by a BERT Option in
descriptive usage (Section 2.1 of [RFC7959]).
Connection Initiator:
The peer that opens a reliable byte stream connection, i.e., the
TCP active opener, TLS client, or WebSocket client.
Connection Acceptor:
The peer that accepts the reliable byte stream connection opened
by the other peer, i.e., the TCP passive opener, TLS server, or
WebSocket server.
For simplicity, a Payload Marker (0xFF) is shown in all examples for
message formats:
...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Payload Marker indicates the start of the optional payload and is
absent for zero-length payloads (see section 3 of [RFC7252]).
2. CoAP over TCP
The request/response interaction model of CoAP over TCP is the same
as CoAP over UDP. The primary differences are in the message layer.
The message layer of CoAP over UDP supports optional reliability by
defining four Types of messages: Confirmable, Non-confirmable,
Acknowledgement, and Reset. In addition, messages include a Message
ID to relate Acknowledgments to Confirmable messages and to detect
duplicate messages.
2.1. Messaging Model
Conceptually, CoAP over TCP replaces most of the message layer of
CoAP over UDP with a framing mechanism on top of the byte-stream
provided by TCP/TLS, conveying the length information for each
message that on datagram transports is provided by the UDP/DTLS
datagram layer.
TCP ensures reliable message transmission, so the message layer of
CoAP over TCP is not required to support acknowledgements or to
detect duplicate messages. As a result, both the Type and Message ID
fields are no longer required and are removed from the CoAP over TCP
message format.
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Figure 2 illustrates the difference between CoAP over UDP and CoAP
over reliable transport. The removed Type and Message ID fields are
indicated by dashes.
CoAP Client CoAP Server CoAP Client CoAP Server
| | | |
| CON [0xbc90] | | (-------) [------] |
| GET /temperature | | GET /temperature |
| (Token 0x71) | | (Token 0x71) |
+------------------->| +------------------->|
| | | |
| ACK [0xbc90] | | (-------) [------] |
| 2.05 Content | | 2.05 Content |
| (Token 0x71) | | (Token 0x71) |
| "22.5 C" | | "22.5 C" |
|<-------------------+ |<-------------------+
| | | |
CoAP over UDP CoAP over reliable
transport
Figure 2: Comparison between CoAP over unreliable and reliable
transport
2.2. Message Format
The CoAP message format defined in [RFC7252], as shown in Figure 3,
relies on the datagram transport (UDP, or DTLS over UDP) for keeping
the individual messages separate and for providing length
information.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ver| T | TKL | Code | Message ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token (if any, TKL bytes) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: RFC 7252 defined CoAP Message Format
The CoAP over TCP message format is very similar to the format
specified for CoAP over UDP. The differences are as follows:
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o Since the underlying TCP connection provides retransmissions and
deduplication, there is no need for the reliability mechanisms
provided by CoAP over UDP. The Type (T) and Message ID fields in
the CoAP message header are elided.
o The Version (Vers) field is elided as well. In contrast to the
message format of CoAP over UDP, the message format for CoAP over
TCP does not include a version number. CoAP is defined in
[RFC7252] with a version number of 1. At this time, there is no
known reason to support version numbers different from 1. If
version negotiation needs to be addressed in the future, then
Capabilities and Settings Messages (CSM see Section 4.3) have been
specifically designed to enable such a potential feature.
o In a stream oriented transport protocol such as TCP, a form of
message delimitation is needed. For this purpose, CoAP over TCP
introduces a length field with variable size. Figure 4 shows the
adjusted CoAP message format with a modified structure for the
fixed header (first 4 bytes of the CoAP over UDP header), which
includes the length information of variable size, shown here as an
8-bit length.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Len=13 | TKL |Extended Length| Code | TKL bytes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: CoAP frame with 8-bit Extended Length field
Length (Len): 4-bit unsigned integer. A value between 0 and 12
directly indicates the length of the message in bytes starting
with the first bit of the Options field. Three values are
reserved for special constructs:
13: An 8-bit unsigned integer (Extended Length) follows the
initial byte and indicates the length of options/payload minus
13.
14: A 16-bit unsigned integer (Extended Length) in network byte
order follows the initial byte and indicates the length of
options/payload minus 269.
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15: A 32-bit unsigned integer (Extended Length) in network byte
order follows the initial byte and indicates the length of
options/payload minus 65805.
The encoding of the Length field is modeled on CoAP Options (see
section 3.1 of [RFC7252]).
The following figures show the message format for the 0-bit, 16-bit,
and the 32-bit variable length cases.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Len | TKL | Code | Token (if any, TKL bytes) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5: CoAP message format without an Extended Length field
For example: A CoAP message just containing a 2.03 code with the
token 7f and no options or payload would be encoded as shown in
Figure 6.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x01 | 0x43 | 0x7f |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Len = 0 ------> 0x01
TKL = 1 ___/
Code = 2.03 --> 0x43
Token = 0x7f
Figure 6: CoAP message with no options or payload
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Len=14 | TKL | Extended Length (16 bits) | Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Token (if any, TKL bytes) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: CoAP message format with 16-bit Extended Length field
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Len=15 | TKL | Extended Length (32 bits)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Code | Token (if any, TKL bytes) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: CoAP message format with 32-bit Extended Length field
The semantics of the other CoAP header fields are left unchanged.
2.3. Message Transmission
Once a connection is established, both endpoints MUST send a
Capabilities and Settings message (CSM see Section 4.3) as their
first message on the connection. This message establishes the
initial settings and capabilities for the endpoint such as maximum
message size or support for block-wise transfers. The absence of
options in the CSM indicates that base values are assumed.
To avoid a deadlock, the Connection Initiator MUST NOT wait for the
Connection Acceptor to send its initial CSM message before sending
its own initial CSM message. Conversely, the Connection Acceptor MAY
wait for the Connection Initiator to send its initial CSM message
before sending its own initial CSM message.
To avoid unnecessary latency, a Connection Initiator MAY send
additional messages without waiting to receive the Connection
Acceptor's CSM; however, it is important to note that the Connection
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Acceptor's CSM might advertise capabilities that impact how the
initiator is expected to communicate with the acceptor. For example,
the acceptor CSM could advertise a Max-Message-Size option (see
Section 4.3.1) that is smaller than the base value (1152).
Endpoints MUST treat a missing or invalid CSM as a connection error
and abort the connection (see Section 4.6).
CoAP requests and responses are exchanged asynchronously over the
TCP/TLS connection. A CoAP client can send multiple requests without
waiting for a response and the CoAP server can return responses in
any order. Responses MUST be returned over the same connection as
the originating request. Concurrent requests are differentiated by
their Token, which is scoped locally to the connection.
The connection is bi-directional, so requests can be sent both by the
entity that established the connection and the remote host.
Retransmission and deduplication of messages is provided by the TCP/
TLS protocol.
2.4. Connection Health
Empty messages (Code 0.00) can always be sent and MUST be ignored by
the recipient. This provides a basic keep-alive function that can
refresh NAT bindings.
If a CoAP client does not receive any response for some time after
sending a CoAP request (or, similarly, when a client observes a
resource and it does not receive any notification for some time), it
can send a CoAP Ping Signaling message (Section 4.4) to test the
connection and verify that the CoAP server is responsive.
3. CoAP over WebSockets
CoAP over WebSockets is intentionally similar to CoAP over TCP;
therefore, this section only specifies the differences between the
transports.
CoAP over WebSockets can be used in a number of configurations. The
most basic configuration is a CoAP client retrieving or updating a
CoAP resource located on a CoAP server that exposes a WebSocket
endpoint (Figure 9). The CoAP client acts as the WebSocket client,
establishes a WebSocket connection, and sends a CoAP request, to
which the CoAP server returns a CoAP response. The WebSocket
connection can be used for any number of requests.
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___________ ___________
| | | |
| _|___ requests ___|_ |
| CoAP / \ \ -------------> / / \ CoAP |
| Client \__/__/ <------------- \__\__/ Server |
| | responses | |
|___________| |___________|
WebSocket =============> WebSocket
Client Connection Server
Figure 9: CoAP Client (WebSocket client) accesses CoAP Server
(WebSocket server)
The challenge with this configuration is how to identify a resource
in the namespace of the CoAP server. When the WebSocket protocol is
used by a dedicated client directly (i.e., not from a web page
through a web browser), the client can connect to any WebSocket
endpoint. Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 define new URI schemes that
enable the client to identify both a WebSocket endpoint and the path
and query of the CoAP resource within that endpoint. When the
WebSocket protocol is used from a web page, the choices are more
limited [RFC6454], but the challenge persists.
Another possible configuration is to set up a CoAP forward proxy at
the WebSocket endpoint. Depending on what transports are available
to the proxy, it could forward the request to a CoAP server with a
CoAP UDP endpoint (Figure 10), an SMS endpoint (a.k.a. mobile phone),
or even another WebSocket endpoint. The CoAP client specifies the
resource to be updated or retrieved in the Proxy-Uri Option.
___________ ___________ ___________
| | | | | |
| _|___ ___|_ _|___ ___|_ |
| CoAP / \ \ ---> / / \ CoAP / \ \ ---> / / \ CoAP |
| Client \__/__/ <--- \__\__/ Proxy \__/__/ <--- \__\__/ Server |
| | | | | |
|___________| |___________| |___________|
WebSocket ===> WebSocket UDP UDP
Client Server Client Server
Figure 10: CoAP Client (WebSocket client) accesses CoAP Server (UDP
server) via a CoAP proxy (WebSocket server/UDP client)
A third possible configuration is a CoAP server running inside a web
browser (Figure 11). The web browser initially connects to a
WebSocket endpoint and is then reachable through the WebSocket
server. When no connection exists, the CoAP server is unreachable.
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Because the WebSocket server is the only way to reach the CoAP
server, the CoAP proxy should be a Reverse Proxy.
___________ ___________ ___________
| | | | | |
| _|___ ___|_ _|___ ___|_ |
| CoAP / \ \ ---> / / \ CoAP / / \ ---> / \ \ CoAP |
| Client \__/__/ <--- \__\__/ Proxy \__\__/ <--- \__/__/ Server |
| | | | | |
|___________| |___________| |___________|
UDP UDP WebSocket <=== WebSocket
Client Server Server Client
Figure 11: CoAP Client (UDP client) accesses CoAP Server (WebSocket
client) via a CoAP proxy (UDP server/WebSocket server)
Further configurations are possible, including those where a
WebSocket connection is established through an HTTP proxy.
3.1. Opening Handshake
Before CoAP requests and responses are exchanged, a WebSocket
connection is established as defined in Section 4 of [RFC6455].
Figure 12 shows an example.
The WebSocket client MUST include the subprotocol name "coap" in the
list of protocols, which indicates support for the protocol defined
in this document. Any later, incompatible versions of CoAP or CoAP
over WebSockets will use a different subprotocol name.
The WebSocket client includes the hostname of the WebSocket server in
the Host header field of its handshake as per [RFC6455]. The Host
header field also indicates the default value of the Uri-Host Option
in requests from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server.
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GET /.well-known/coap HTTP/1.1
Host: example.org
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: coap
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: coap
Figure 12: Example of an Opening Handshake
3.2. Message Format
Once a WebSocket connection is established, CoAP requests and
responses can be exchanged as WebSocket messages. Since CoAP uses a
binary message format, the messages are transmitted in binary data
frames as specified in Sections 5 and 6 of [RFC6455].
The message format shown in Figure 13 is the same as the CoAP over
TCP message format (see Section 2.2) with one change. The Length
(Len) field MUST be set to zero because the WebSockets frame contains
the length.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Len=0 | TKL | Code | Token (TKL bytes) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 13: CoAP Message Format over WebSockets
As with CoAP over TCP, the message format for CoAP over WebSockets
eliminates the Version field defined in CoAP over UDP. If CoAP
version negotiation is required in the future, CoAP over WebSockets
can address the requirement by the definition of a new subprotocol
identifier that is negotiated during the opening handshake.
Requests and response messages can be fragmented as specified in
Section 5.4 of [RFC6455], though typically they are sent unfragmented
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as they tend to be small and fully buffered before transmission. The
WebSocket protocol does not provide means for multiplexing. If it is
not desirable for a large message to monopolize the connection,
requests and responses can be transferred in a block-wise fashion as
defined in [RFC7959].
3.3. Message Transmission
As with CoAP over TCP, both endpoints MUST send a Capabilities and
Settings message (CSM see Section 4.3) as their first message on the
WebSocket connection.
CoAP requests and responses are exchanged asynchronously over the
WebSocket connection. A CoAP client can send multiple requests
without waiting for a response and the CoAP server can return
responses in any order. Responses MUST be returned over the same
connection as the originating request. Concurrent requests are
differentiated by their Token, which is scoped locally to the
connection.
The connection is bi-directional, so requests can be sent both by the
entity that established the connection and the remote host.
As with CoAP over TCP, retransmission and deduplication of messages
is provided by the WebSocket protocol. CoAP over WebSockets
therefore does not make a distinction between Confirmable or Non-
Confirmable messages, and does not provide Acknowledgement or Reset
messages.
3.4. Connection Health
As with CoAP over TCP, a CoAP client can test the health of the CoAP
over WebSocket connection by sending a CoAP Ping Signaling message
(Section 4.4). WebSocket Ping and unsolicited Pong frames
(Section 5.5 of [RFC6455]) SHOULD NOT be used to ensure that
redundant maintenance traffic is not transmitted.
4. Signaling
Signaling messages are introduced to allow peers to:
o Related characteristics such as maximum message size for the
connection
o Shut down the connection in an orderly fashion
o Provide diagnostic information when terminating a connection in
response to a serious error condition
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Signaling is a third basic kind of message in CoAP, after requests
and responses. Signaling messages share a common structure with the
existing CoAP messages. There is a code, a token, options, and an
optional payload.
(See Section 3 of [RFC7252] for the overall structure, as adapted to
the specific transport.)
4.1. Signaling Codes
A code in the 7.00-7.31 range indicates a Signaling message. Values
in this range are assigned by the "CoAP Signaling Codes" sub-registry
(see Section 9.1).
For each message, there is a sender and a peer receiving the message.
Payloads in Signaling messages are diagnostic payloads as defined in
Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]), unless otherwise defined by a Signaling
message option.
4.2. Signaling Option Numbers
Option numbers for Signaling messages are specific to the message
code. They do not share the number space with CoAP options for
request/response messages or with Signaling messages using other
codes.
Option numbers are assigned by the "CoAP Signaling Option Numbers"
sub-registry (see Section 9.2).
Signaling options are elective or critical as defined in
Section 5.4.1 of [RFC7252]. If a Signaling option is critical and
not understood by the receiver, it MUST abort the connection (see
Section 4.6). If the option is understood but cannot be processed,
the option documents the behavior.
4.3. Capabilities and Settings Messages (CSM)
Capabilities and Settings messages (CSM) are used for two purposes:
o Each capability option advertises one capability of the sender to
the recipient.
o Setting options indicate a setting that will be applied by the
sender.
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One CSM MUST be sent by both endpoints at the start of the
connection. Further CSM MAY be sent at any other time by either
endpoint over the lifetime of the connection.
Both capability and setting options are cumulative. A CSM does not
invalidate a previously sent capability indication or setting even if
it is not repeated. A capability message without any option is a no-
operation (and can be used as such). An option that is sent might
override a previous value for the same option. The option defines
how to handle this case if needed.
Base values are listed below for CSM Options. These are the values
for the capability and setting before any Capabilities and Settings
messages send a modified value.
These are not default values for the option as defined in
Section 5.4.4 in [RFC7252]. A default value would mean that an empty
Capabilities and Settings message would result in the option being
set to its default value.
Capabilities and Settings messages are indicated by the 7.01 code
(CSM).
4.3.1. Max-Message-Size Capability Option
The sender can use the elective Max-Message-Size Option to indicate
the maximum message size in bytes that it can receive.
+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
| 2 | | | CSM | Max-Message-Size | uint | 0-4 | 1152 |
+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
As per Section 4.6 of [RFC7252], the base value (and the value used
when this option is not implemented) is 1152.
The active value of the Max-Message-Size Option is replaced each time
the option is sent with a modified value. Its starting value is its
base value.
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4.3.2. Block-wise Transfer Capability Option
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| 4 | | | CSM | Block-wise | empty | 0 | (none) |
| | | | | Transfer | | | |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
A sender can use the elective Block-wise Transfer Option to indicate
that it supports the block-wise transfer protocol [RFC7959].
If the option is not given, the peer has no information about whether
block-wise transfers are supported by the sender or not. An
implementation that supports block-wise transfers SHOULD indicate the
Block-wise Transfer Option. If a Max-Message-Size Option is
indicated with a value that is greater than 1152 (in the same or a
different CSM message), the Block-wise Transfer Option also indicates
support for BERT (see Section 5). Subsequently, if the Max-Message-
Size Option is indicated with a value equal or less than 1152, BERT
support is no longer indicated.
4.4. Ping and Pong Messages
In CoAP over reliable transports, Empty messages (Code 0.00) can
always be sent and MUST be ignored by the recipient. This provides a
basic keep-alive function. In contrast, Ping and Pong messages are a
bidirectional exchange.
Upon receipt of a Ping message, the receiver MUST return a Pong
message with an identical token in response. Unless there is an
option with delaying semantics such as the Custody Option, it SHOULD
respond as soon as practical. As with all Signaling messages, the
recipient of a Ping or Pong message MUST ignore elective options it
does not understand.
Ping and Pong messages are indicated by the 7.02 code (Ping) and the
7.03 code (Pong).
4.4.1. Custody Option
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+---+---+---+----------+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+----------+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| 2 | | | Ping, | Custody | empty | 0 | (none) |
| | | | Pong | | | | |
+---+---+---+----------+----------------+--------+--------+---------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
When responding to a Ping message, the receiver can include an
elective Custody Option in the Pong message. This option indicates
that the application has processed all the request/response messages
received prior to the Ping message on the current connection. (Note
that there is no definition of specific application semantics for
"processed", but there is an expectation that the receiver of a Pong
Message with a Custody Option should be able to free buffers based on
this indication.)
A sender can also include an elective Custody Option in a Ping
message to explicitly request the inclusion of an elective Custody
Option in the corresponding Pong message. The receiver SHOULD delay
its Pong message until it finishes processing all the request/
response messages received prior to the Ping message on the current
connection.
4.5. Release Messages
A Release message indicates that the sender does not want to continue
maintaining the connection and opts for an orderly shutdown. The
details are in the options. A diagnostic payload (see Section 5.5.2
of [RFC7252]) MAY be included. A peer will normally respond to a
Release message by closing the TCP/TLS connection. Messages may be
in flight when the sender decides to send a Release message. The
general expectation is that these will still be processed.
Release messages are indicated by the 7.04 code (Release).
Release messages can indicate one or more reasons using elective
options. The following options are defined:
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+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
| 2 | | x | Release | Alternative- | string | 1-255 | (none) |
| | | | | Address | | | |
+---+---+---+---------+------------------+--------+--------+--------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
The elective Alternative-Address Option requests the peer to instead
open a connection of the same scheme as the present connection to the
alternative transport address given. Its value is in the form
"authority" as defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC3986].
The Alternative-Address Option is a repeatable option as defined in
Section 5.4.5 of [RFC7252].
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| 4 | | | Release | Hold-Off | uint | 0-3 | (none) |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
The elective Hold-Off Option indicates that the server is requesting
that the peer not reconnect to it for the number of seconds given in
the value.
4.6. Abort Messages
An Abort message indicates that the sender is unable to continue
maintaining the connection and cannot even wait for an orderly
release. The sender shuts down the connection immediately after the
abort (and may or may not wait for a Release or Abort message or
connection shutdown in the inverse direction). A diagnostic payload
(see Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]) SHOULD be included in the Abort
message. Messages may be in flight when the sender decides to send
an Abort message. The general expectation is that these will NOT be
processed.
Abort messages are indicated by the 7.05 code (Abort).
Abort messages can indicate one or more reasons using elective
options. The following option is defined:
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+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| # | C | R | Applies | Name | Format | Length | Base |
| | | | to | | | | Value |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| 2 | | | Abort | Bad-CSM-Option | uint | 0-2 | (none) |
+---+---+---+---------+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
C=Critical, R=Repeatable
The elective Bad-CSM-Option Option indicates that the sender is
unable to process the CSM option identified by its option number,
e.g. when it is critical and the option number is unknown by the
sender, or when there is parameter problem with the value of an
elective option. More detailed information SHOULD be included as a
diagnostic payload.
One reason for an sender to generate an Abort message is a general
syntax error in the byte-stream received. No specific option has
been defined for this, as the details of that syntax error are best
left to a diagnostic payload.
4.7. Signaling examples
An encoded example of a Ping message with a non-empty token is shown
in Figure 14.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x01 | 0xe2 | 0x42 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Len = 0 -------> 0x01
TKL = 1 ___/
Code = 7.02 Ping --> 0xe2
Token = 0x42
Figure 14: Ping Message Example
An encoded example of the corresponding Pong message is shown in
Figure 15.
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0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x01 | 0xe3 | 0x42 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Len = 0 -------> 0x01
TKL = 1 ___/
Code = 7.03 Pong --> 0xe3
Token = 0x42
Figure 15: Pong Message Example
5. Block-wise Transfer and Reliable Transports
The message size restrictions defined in Section 4.6 of CoAP
[RFC7252] to avoid IP fragmentation are not necessary when CoAP is
used over a reliable transport. While this suggests that the Block-
wise transfer protocol [RFC7959] is also no longer needed, it remains
applicable for a number of cases:
o large messages, such as firmware downloads, may cause undesired
head-of-line blocking when a single TCP connection is used
o a UDP-to-TCP gateway may simply not have the context to convert a
message with a Block Option into the equivalent exchange without
any use of a Block Option (it would need to convert the entire
blockwise exchange from start to end into a single exchange)
The 'Block-wise Extension for Reliable Transport (BERT)' extends the
Block protocol to enable the use of larger messages over a reliable
transport.
The use of this new extension is signaled by sending Block1 or Block2
Options with SZX == 7 (a "BERT option"). SZX == 7 is a reserved
value in [RFC7959].
In control usage, a BERT option is interpreted in the same way as the
equivalent Option with SZX == 6, except that it also indicates the
capability to process BERT blocks. As with the basic Block protocol,
the recipient of a CoAP request with a BERT option in control usage
is allowed to respond with a different SZX value, e.g. to send a non-
BERT block instead.
In descriptive usage, a BERT Option is interpreted in the same way as
the equivalent Option with SZX == 6, except that the payload is
allowed to contain a multiple of 1024 bytes (non-final BERT block) or
more than 1024 bytes (final BERT block).
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The recipient of a non-final BERT block (M=1) conceptually partitions
the payload into a sequence of 1024-byte blocks and acts exactly as
if it had received this sequence in conjunction with block numbers
starting at, and sequentially increasing from, the block number given
in the Block Option. In other words, the entire BERT block is
positioned at the byte position that results from multiplying the
block number with 1024. The position of further blocks to be
transferred is indicated by incrementing the block number by the
number of elements in this sequence (i.e., the size of the payload
divided by 1024 bytes).
As with SZX == 6, the recipient of a final BERT block (M=0) simply
appends the payload at the byte position that is indicated by the
block number multiplied with 1024.
The following examples illustrate BERT options. A value of SZX == 7
is labeled as "BERT" or as "BERT(nnn)" to indicate a payload of size
nnn.
In all these examples, a Block Option is decomposed to indicate the
kind of Block Option (1 or 2) followed by a colon, the block number
(NUM), more bit (M), and block size exponent (2**(SZX+4)) separated
by slashes. E.g., a Block2 Option value of 33 would be shown as
2:2/0/32), or a Block1 Option value of 59 would be shown as
1:3/1/128.
5.1. Example: GET with BERT Blocks
Figure 16 shows a GET request with a response that is split into
three BERT blocks. The first response contains 3072 bytes of
payload; the second, 5120; and the third, 4711. Note how the block
number increments to move the position inside the response body
forward.
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CoAP Client CoAP Server
| |
| GET, /status ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.05 Content, 2:0/1/BERT(3072) |
| |
| GET, /status, 2:3/0/BERT ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.05 Content, 2:3/1/BERT(5120) |
| |
| GET, /status, 2:8/0/BERT ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.05 Content, 2:8/0/BERT(4711) |
Figure 16: GET with BERT blocks
5.2. Example: PUT with BERT Blocks
Figure 17 demonstrates a PUT exchange with BERT blocks.
CoAP Client CoAP Server
| |
| PUT, /options, 1:0/1/BERT(8192) ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.31 Continue, 1:0/1/BERT |
| |
| PUT, /options, 1:8/1/BERT(16384) ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.31 Continue, 1:8/1/BERT |
| |
| PUT, /options, 1:24/0/BERT(5683) ------> |
| |
| <------ 2.04 Changed, 1:24/0/BERT |
| |
Figure 17: PUT with BERT blocks
6. CoAP over Reliable Transport URIs
CoAP over UDP [RFC7252] defines the "coap" and "coaps" URI schemes.
This document introduces four additional URI schemes for identifying
CoAP resources and providing a means of locating the resource:
o the "coap+tcp" URI scheme for CoAP over TCP
o the "coaps+tcp" URI scheme for CoAP over TCP secured by TLS
o the "coap+ws" URI scheme for CoAP over WebSockets
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o the "coaps+ws" URI scheme for CoAP over WebSockets secured by TLS
Resources made available via these schemes have no shared identity
even if their resource identifiers indicate the same authority (the
same host listening to the same TCP port). They are distinct
namespaces and are considered to be distinct origin servers.
The syntax for the URI schemes in this section are specified using
Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) [RFC5234]. The definitions of
"host", "port", "path-abempty", and "query" are adopted from
[RFC3986].
Section 8 (Multicast CoAP) in [RFC7252] is not applicable to these
schemes.
6.1. coap+tcp URI scheme
The "coap+tcp" URI scheme identifies CoAP resources that are intended
to be accessible using CoAP over TCP.
coap+tcp-URI =
"coap+tcp:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path-abempty [ "?" query ]
The syntax defined in Section 6.1 of [RFC7252] applies to this URI
scheme with the following changes:
o The port subcomponent indicates the TCP port at which the CoAP
server is located. (If it is empty or not given, then the default
port 5683 is assumed, as with UDP.)
Encoding considerations: The scheme encoding conforms to the
encoding rules established for URIs in [RFC3986].
Interoperability considerations: None.
Security considerations: See Section 11.1 of [RFC7252].
6.2. coaps+tcp URI scheme
The "coaps+tcp" URI scheme identifies CoAP resources that are
intended to be accessible using CoAP over TCP secured with TLS.
coaps+tcp-URI =
"coaps+tcp:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path-abempty [ "?" query ]
The syntax defined in Section 6.2 of [RFC7252] applies to this URI
scheme, with the following changes:
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o The port subcomponent indicates the TCP port at which the TLS
server for the CoAP server is located. If it is empty or not
given, then the default port 443 is assumed (this is different
from the default port for "coaps", i.e., CoAP over DTLS over UDP).
o If a TLS server does not support the Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension (ALPN) [RFC7301] or wishes to accommodate
TLS clients that do not support ALPN, it MAY offer a coaps+tcp
endpoint on TCP port 5684. This endpoint MAY also be ALPN
enabled. A TLS server MAY offer coaps+tcp endpoints on ports
other than TCP port 5684, which MUST be ALPN enabled.
o For TCP ports other than port 5684, the TLS client MUST use the
ALPN extension to advertise the "coap" protocol identifier (see
Section 9.7) in the list of protocols in its ClientHello. If the
TCP server selects and returns the "coap" protocol identifier
using the ALPN extension in its ServerHello, then the connection
succeeds. If the TLS server either does not negotiate the ALPN
extension or returns a no_application_protocol alert, the TLS
client MUST close the connection.
o For TCP port 5684, a TLS client MAY use the ALPN extension to
advertise the "coap" protocol identifier in the list of protocols
in its ClientHello. If the TLS server selects and returns the
"coap" protocol identifier using the ALPN extension in its
ServerHello, then the connection succeeds. If the TLS server
returns a no_application_protocol alert, then the TLS client MUST
close the connection. If the TLS server does not negotiate the
ALPN extension, then coaps+tcp is implicitly selected.
o For TCP port 5684, if the TLS client does not use the ALPN
extension to negotiate the protocol, then coaps+tcp is implicitly
selected.
Encoding considerations: The scheme encoding conforms to the
encoding rules established for URIs in [RFC3986].
Interoperability considerations: None.
Security considerations: See Section 11.1 of [RFC7252].
6.3. coap+ws URI scheme
The "coap+ws" URI scheme identifies CoAP resources that are intended
to be accessible using CoAP over WebSockets.
coap-ws-URI =
"coap+ws:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path-abempty [ "?" query ]
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The port component is OPTIONAL. The default is port 80.
The WebSocket endpoint is identified by a "ws" URI that is composed
of the authority part of the "coap+ws" URI and the well-known path
"/.well-known/coap" [RFC5785]. The path and query parts of a
"coap+ws" URI identify a resource within the specified endpoint which
can be operated on by the methods defined by CoAP:
coap+ws://example.org/sensors/temperature?u=Cel
\______ ______/\___________ ___________/
\/ \/
Uri-Path: "sensors"
ws://example.org/.well-known/coap Uri-Path: "temperature"
Uri-Query: "u=Cel"
Figure 18: The "coap+ws" URI Scheme
Encoding considerations: The scheme encoding conforms to the
encoding rules established for URIs in [RFC3986].
Interoperability considerations: None.
Security considerations: See Section 11.1 of [RFC7252].
6.4. coaps+ws URI scheme
The "coaps+ws" URI scheme identifies CoAP resources that are intended
to be accessible using CoAP over WebSockets secured by TLS.
coaps-ws-URI =
"coaps+ws:" "//" host [ ":" port ] path-abempty [ "?" query ]
The port component is OPTIONAL. The default is port 443.
The WebSocket endpoint is identified by a "wss" URI that is composed
of the authority part of the "coaps+ws" URI and the well-known path
"/.well-known/coap" [RFC5785]. The path and query parts of a
"coaps+ws" URI identify a resource within the specified endpoint
which can be operated on by the methods defined by CoAP.
coaps+ws://example.org/sensors/temperature?u=Cel
\______ ______/\___________ ___________/
\/ \/
Uri-Path: "sensors"
wss://example.org/.well-known/coap Uri-Path: "temperature"
Uri-Query: "u=Cel"
Figure 19: The "coaps+ws" URI Scheme
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Encoding considerations: The scheme encoding conforms to the
encoding rules established for URIs in [RFC3986].
Interoperability considerations: None.
Security considerations: See Section 11.1 of [RFC7252].
6.5. Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options
CoAP over reliable transports maintains the property from
Section 5.10.1 of [RFC7252]:
The default values for the Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are
sufficient for requests to most servers.
Unless otherwise noted, the default value of the Uri-Host Option is
the IP literal representing the destination IP address of the request
message. The default value of the Uri-Port Option is the destination
TCP port.
For CoAP over TLS, these default values are the same unless Server
Name Indication (SNI) [RFC6066] is negotiated. In this case, the
default value of the Uri-Host Option in requests from the TLS client
to the TLS server is the SNI host.
For CoAP over WebSockets, the default value of the Uri-Host Option in
requests from the WebSocket client to the WebSocket server is
indicated by the Host header field from the WebSocket handshake.
6.6. Decomposing URIs into Options
The steps are the same as specified in Section 6.4 of [RFC7252] with
the following changes:
3. If |url| does not have a <scheme> component whose value, when
converted to ASCII lowercase, is "coap" or "coaps", then fail
this algorithm.
If |url| does not have a <scheme> component whose value, when
converted to ASCII lowercase, is "coap+tcp", "coaps+tcp", "coap+ws",
or "coaps+ws" then fail this algorithm.
7. If |port| does not equal the request's destination UDP port,
include a Uri-Port Option and let that option's value be |port|.
If |port| does not equal the request's destination TCP port, include
a Uri-Port Option and let that option's value be |port|.
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6.7. Composing URIs from Options
The steps are the same as specified in Section 6.5 of [RFC7252] with
the following changes:
1. If the request is secured using DTLS, let |url| be the string
"coaps://". Otherwise, let |url| be the string "coap://".
For CoAP over TCP, if the request is secured using TLS, let |url| be
the string "coaps+tcp://". Otherwise, let |url| be the string
"coap+tcp://". For CoAP over WebSockets, if the request is secured
using TLS, let |url| be the string "coaps+ws://". Otherwise,
let |url| be the string "coap+ws://".
4. If the request includes a Uri-Port Option, let |port| be that
option's value. Otherwise, let |port| be the request's
destination UDP port.
If the request includes a Uri-Port Option, let |port| be that
option's value. Otherwise, let |port| be the request's destination
TCP port.
7. Securing CoAP
Security Challenges for the Internet of Things [SecurityChallenges]
recommends:
... it is essential that IoT protocol suites specify a mandatory
to implement but optional to use security solution. This will
ensure security is available in all implementations, but
configurable to use when not necessary (e.g., in closed
environment). ... even if those features stretch the capabilities
of such devices.
A security solution MUST be implemented to protect CoAP over reliable
transports and MUST be enabled by default. This document defines the
TLS binding, but alternative solutions at different layers in the
protocol stack MAY be used to protect CoAP over reliable transports
when appropriate. Note that there is ongoing work to support a data
object-based security model for CoAP that is independent of transport
(see [I-D.ietf-core-object-security]).
7.1. TLS binding for CoAP over TCP
The TLS usage guidance in [RFC7925] applies.
During the provisioning phase, a CoAP device is provided with the
security information that it needs, including keying materials,
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access control lists, and authorization servers. At the end of the
provisioning phase, the device will be in one of four security modes:
NoSec: TLS is disabled.
PreSharedKey: TLS is enabled. The guidance in Section 4.2 of
[RFC7925] applies.
RawPublicKey: TLS is enabled. The guidance in Section 4.3 of
[RFC7925] applies.
Certificate: TLS is enabled. The guidance in Section 4.4 of
[RFC7925] applies.
The "NoSec" mode is mandatory-to-implement. The system simply sends
the packets over normal TCP which is indicated by the "coap+tcp"
scheme and the TCP CoAP default port. The system is secured only by
keeping attackers from being able to send or receive packets from the
network with the CoAP nodes.
"PreSharedKey", "RawPublicKey", or "Certificate" is mandatory-to-
implement for the TLS binding depending on the credential type used
with the device. These security modes are achieved using TLS and are
indicated by the "coaps+tcp" scheme and TLS-secured CoAP default
port.
7.2. TLS usage for CoAP over WebSockets
A CoAP client requesting a resource identified by a "coaps+ws" URI
negotiates a secure WebSocket connection to a WebSocket server
endpoint with a "wss" URI. This is described in Section 6.4.
The client MUST perform a TLS handshake after opening the connection
to the server. The guidance in Section 4.1 of [RFC6455] applies.
When a CoAP server exposes resources identified by a "coaps+ws" URI,
the guidance in Section 4.4 of [RFC7925] applies towards mandatory-
to-implement TLS functionality for certificates. For the server-side
requirements in accepting incoming connections over a HTTPS (HTTP-
over-TLS) port, the guidance in Section 4.2 of [RFC6455] applies.
8. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC7252] apply. For CoAP over
WebSockets and CoAP over TLS-secured WebSockets, the security
considerations of [RFC6455] also apply.
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8.1. Signaling Messages
o The guidance given by an Alternative-Address Option cannot be
followed blindly. In particular, a peer MUST NOT assume that a
successful connection to the Alternative-Address inherits all the
security properties of the current connection.
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. Signaling Codes
IANA is requested to create a third sub-registry for values of the
Code field in the CoAP header (Section 12.1 of [RFC7252]). The name
of this sub-registry is "CoAP Signaling Codes".
Each entry in the sub-registry must include the Signaling Code in the
range 7.00-7.31, its name, and a reference to its documentation.
Initial entries in this sub-registry are as follows:
+------+---------+-----------+
| Code | Name | Reference |
+------+---------+-----------+
| 7.01 | CSM | [RFCthis] |
| | | |
| 7.02 | Ping | [RFCthis] |
| | | |
| 7.03 | Pong | [RFCthis] |
| | | |
| 7.04 | Release | [RFCthis] |
| | | |
| 7.05 | Abort | [RFCthis] |
+------+---------+-----------+
Table 1: CoAP Signal Codes
All other Signaling Codes are Unassigned.
The IANA policy for future additions to this sub-registry is "IETF
Review or IESG Approval" as described in [RFC5226].
9.2. CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry
IANA is requested to create a sub-registry for Options Numbers used
in CoAP signaling options within the "CoRE Parameters" registry. The
name of this sub-registry is "CoAP Signaling Option Numbers".
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Each entry in the sub-registry must include one or more of the codes
in the Signaling Codes subregistry (Section 9.1), the option number,
the name of the option, and a reference to the option's
documentation.
Initial entries in this sub-registry are as follows:
+------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
| Applies to | Number | Name | Reference |
+------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
| 7.01 | 2 | Max-Message-Size | [RFCthis] |
| | | | |
| 7.01 | 4 | Block-wise-Transfer | [RFCthis] |
| | | | |
| 7.02, 7.03 | 2 | Custody | [RFCthis] |
| | | | |
| 7.04 | 2 | Alternative-Address | [RFCthis] |
| | | | |
| 7.04 | 4 | Hold-Off | [RFCthis] |
| | | | |
| 7.05 | 2 | Bad-CSM-Option | [RFCthis] |
+------------+--------+---------------------+-----------+
Table 2: CoAP Signal Option Codes
The IANA policy for future additions to this sub-registry is based on
number ranges for the option numbers, analogous to the policy defined
in Section 12.2 of [RFC7252].
The documentation for a Signaling Option Number should specify the
semantics of an option with that number, including the following
properties:
o Whether the option is critical or elective, as determined by the
Option Number.
o Whether the option is repeatable.
o The format and length of the option's value.
o The base value for the option, if any.
9.3. Service Name and Port Number Registration
IANA is requested to assign the port number 5683 and the service name
"coap+tcp", in accordance with [RFC6335].
Service Name.
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coap+tcp
Transport Protocol.
tcp
Assignee.
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact.
IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description.
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
Reference.
[RFCthis]
Port Number.
5683
9.4. Secure Service Name and Port Number Registration
IANA is requested to assign the port number 5684 and the service name
"coaps+tcp", in accordance with [RFC6335]. The port number is
requested to address the exceptional case of TLS implementations that
do not support the "Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension"
[RFC7301].
Service Name.
coaps+tcp
Transport Protocol.
tcp
Assignee.
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact.
IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description.
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
Reference.
[RFC7301], [RFCthis]
Port Number.
5684
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9.5. URI Scheme Registration
URI schemes are registered within the "Uniform Resource Identifier
(URI) Schemes" registry maintained at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes/uri-schemes.xhtml .
9.5.1. coap+tcp
IANA is requested to register the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
scheme "coap+tcp". This registration request complies with
[RFC7595].
Scheme name:
coap+tcp
Status:
Permanent
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
The scheme is used by CoAP endpoints to access CoAP resources
using TCP.
Contact:
IETF chair <chair@ietf.org>
Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Reference:
Section 6.1 in [RFCthis]
9.5.2. coaps+tcp
IANA is requested to register the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
scheme "coaps+tcp". This registration request complies with
[RFC7595].
Scheme name:
coaps+tcp
Status:
Permanent
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
The scheme is used by CoAP endpoints to access CoAP resources
using TLS.
Contact:
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IETF chair <chair@ietf.org>
Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Reference:
Section 6.2 in [RFCthis]
9.5.3. coap+ws
IANA is requested to register the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
scheme "coap+ws". This registration request complies with [RFC7595].
Scheme name:
coap+ws
Status:
Permanent
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
The scheme is used by CoAP endpoints to access CoAP resources
using the WebSocket protocol.
Contact:
IETF chair <chair@ietf.org>
Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Reference:
Section 6.3 in [RFCthis]
9.5.4. coaps+ws
IANA is requested to register the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
scheme "coaps+ws". This registration request complies with
[RFC7595].
Scheme name:
coaps+ws
Status:
Permanent
Applications/protocols that use this scheme name:
The scheme is used by CoAP endpoints to access CoAP resources
using the WebSocket protocol secured with TLS.
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Contact:
IETF chair <chair@ietf.org>
Change controller:
IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
References:
Section 6.4 in [RFCthis]
9.6. Well-Known URI Suffix Registration
IANA is requested to register the 'coap' well-known URI in the "Well-
Known URIs" registry. This registration request complies with
[RFC5785]:
URI Suffix.
coap
Change controller.
IETF
Specification document(s).
[RFCthis]
Related information.
None.
9.7. ALPN Protocol Identifier
IANA is requested to assign the following value in the registry
"Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs" created
by [RFC7301]. The "coap" string identifies CoAP when used over TLS.
Protocol.
CoAP
Identification Sequence.
0x63 0x6f 0x61 0x70 ("coap")
Reference.
[RFCthis]
9.8. WebSocket Subprotocol Registration
IANA is requested to register the WebSocket CoAP subprotocol under
the "WebSocket Subprotocol Name Registry":
Subprotocol Identifier.
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coap
Subprotocol Common Name.
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
Subprotocol Definition.
[RFCthis]
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
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[RFC6455] Fette, I. and A. Melnikov, "The WebSocket Protocol",
RFC 6455, DOI 10.17487/RFC6455, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6455>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
[RFC7595] Thaler, D., Ed., Hansen, T., and T. Hardie, "Guidelines
and Registration Procedures for URI Schemes", BCP 35,
RFC 7595, DOI 10.17487/RFC7595, June 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7595>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
10.2. Informative References
[HomeGateway]
Eggert, L., "An experimental study of home gateway
characteristics", Proceedings of the 10th annual
conference on Internet measurement , 2010.
[I-D.ietf-core-cocoa]
Bormann, C., Betzler, A., Gomez, C., and I. Demirkol,
"CoAP Simple Congestion Control/Advanced", draft-ietf-
core-cocoa-00 (work in progress), October 2016.
[I-D.ietf-core-object-security]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)", draft-ietf-core-
object-security-01 (work in progress), December 2016.
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[LWM2M] Open Mobile Alliance, "Lightweight Machine to Machine
Technical Specification Version 1.0", February 2017,
<http://www.openmobilealliance.org/release/LightweightM2M/
V1_0-20170208-A/
OMA-TS-LightweightM2M-V1_0-20170208-A.pdf>.
[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[SecurityChallenges]
Polk, T. and S. Turner, "Security Challenges for the
Internet of Things", Interconnecting Smart Objects with
the Internet / IAB Workshop , February 2011,
<http://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/
Turner.pdf>.
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Appendix A. Updates to RFC7641 Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)
In this appendix, "client" and "server" refer to the CoAP client and
CoAP server.
A.1. Notifications and Reordering
When using the Observe Option with CoAP over UDP, notifications from
the server set the option value to an increasing sequence number for
reordering detection on the client since messages can arrive in a
different order than they were sent. This sequence number is not
required for CoAP over reliable transports since the TCP protocol
ensures reliable and ordered delivery of messages. The value of the
Observe Option in 2.xx notifications MAY be empty on transmission and
MUST be ignored on reception.
A.2. Transmission and Acknowledgements
For CoAP over UDP, server notifications to the client can be
confirmable or non-confirmable. A confirmable message requires the
client to either respond with an acknowledgement message or a reset
message. An acknowledgement message indicates that the client is
alive and wishes to receive further notifications. A reset message
indicates that the client does not recognize the token which causes
the server to remove the associated entry from the list of observers.
Since TCP eliminates the need for the message layer to support
reliability, CoAP over reliable transports does not support
confirmable or non-confirmable message types. All notifications are
delivered reliably to the client with positive acknowledgement of
receipt occurring at the TCP level. If the client does not recognize
the token in a notification, it MAY immediately abort the connection
(see Section 4.6).
A.3. Freshness
For CoAP over UDP, if a client does not receive a notification for
some time, it MAY send a new GET request with the same token as the
original request to re-register its interest in a resource and verify
that the server is still responsive. For CoAP over reliable
transports, it is more efficient to check the health of the
connection (and all its active observations) by sending a CoAP Ping
Signaling message (Section 4.4) rather than individual requests to
confirm active observations.
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A.4. Cancellation
For CoAP over UDP, a client that is no longer interested in receiving
notifications can "forget" the observation and respond to the next
notification from the server with a reset message to cancel the
observation.
For CoAP over reliable transports, a client MUST explicitly
deregister by issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to
the token of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe
Option with the value set to 1 (deregister).
If the client observes one or more resources over a reliable
transport, then the CoAP server (or intermediary in the role of the
CoAP server) MUST remove all entries associated with the client
endpoint from the lists of observers when the connection is either
closed or times out.
Appendix B. CoAP over WebSocket Examples
This section gives examples for the first two configurations
discussed in Section 3.
An example of the process followed by a CoAP client to retrieve the
representation of a resource identified by a "coap+ws" URI might be
as follows. Figure 20 below illustrates the WebSocket and CoAP
messages exchanged in detail.
1. The CoAP client obtains the URI <coap+ws://example.org/sensors/
temperature?u=Cel>, for example, from a resource representation
that it retrieved previously.
2. It establishes a WebSocket connection to the endpoint URI
composed of the authority "example.org" and the well-known path
"/.well-known/coap", <ws://example.org/.well-known/coap>.
3. It sends a single-frame, masked, binary message containing a CoAP
request. The request indicates the target resource with the Uri-
Path ("sensors", "temperature") and Uri-Query ("u=Cel") options.
4. It waits for the server to return a response.
5. The CoAP client uses the connection for further requests, or the
connection is closed.
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CoAP CoAP
Client Server
(WebSocket (WebSocket
Client) Server)
| |
| |
+=========>| GET /.well-known/coap HTTP/1.1
| | Host: example.org
| | Upgrade: websocket
| | Connection: Upgrade
| | Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
| | Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: coap
| | Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
| |
|<=========+ HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
| | Upgrade: websocket
| | Connection: Upgrade
| | Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=
| | Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: coap
| |
| |
+--------->| Binary frame (opcode=%x2, FIN=1, MASK=1)
| | +-------------------------+
| | | GET |
| | | Token: 0x53 |
| | | Uri-Path: "sensors" |
| | | Uri-Path: "temperature" |
| | | Uri-Query: "u=Cel" |
| | +-------------------------+
| |
|<---------+ Binary frame (opcode=%x2, FIN=1, MASK=0)
| | +-------------------------+
| | | 2.05 Content |
| | | Token: 0x53 |
| | | Payload: "22.3 Cel" |
| | +-------------------------+
: :
: :
| |
+--------->| Close frame (opcode=%x8, FIN=1, MASK=1)
| |
|<---------+ Close frame (opcode=%x8, FIN=1, MASK=0)
| |
Figure 20: A CoAP client retrieves the representation of a resource
identified by a "coap+ws" URI
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Figure 21 shows how a CoAP client uses a CoAP forward proxy with a
WebSocket endpoint to retrieve the representation of the resource
"coap://[2001:DB8::1]/". The use of the forward proxy and the
address of the WebSocket endpoint are determined by the client from
local configuration rules. The request URI is specified in the
Proxy-Uri Option. Since the request URI uses the "coap" URI scheme,
the proxy fulfills the request by issuing a Confirmable GET request
over UDP to the CoAP server and returning the response over the
WebSocket connection to the client.
CoAP CoAP CoAP
Client Proxy Server
(WebSocket (WebSocket (UDP
Client) Server) Endpoint)
| | |
+--------->| | Binary frame (opcode=%x2, FIN=1, MASK=1)
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | | | GET |
| | | | Token: 0x7d |
| | | | Proxy-Uri: "coap://[2001:DB8::1]/" |
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | |
| +--------->| CoAP message (Ver=1, T=Con, MID=0x8f54)
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | | | GET |
| | | | Token: 0x0a15 |
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | |
| |<---------+ CoAP message (Ver=1, T=Ack, MID=0x8f54)
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | | | 2.05 Content |
| | | | Token: 0x0a15 |
| | | | Payload: "ready" |
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | |
|<---------+ | Binary frame (opcode=%x2, FIN=1, MASK=0)
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | | | 2.05 Content |
| | | | Token: 0x7d |
| | | | Payload: "ready" |
| | | +------------------------------------+
| | |
Figure 21: A CoAP client retrieves the representation of a resource
identified by a "coap" URI via a WebSockets-enabled CoAP proxy
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Appendix C. Change Log
The RFC Editor is requested to remove this section at publication.
C.1. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-02
Merged draft-savolainen-core-coap-websockets-07 Merged draft-bormann-
core-block-bert-01 Merged draft-bormann-core-coap-sig-02
C.2. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-03
Editorial updates
Added mandatory exchange of Capabilities and Settings messages after
connecting
Added support for coaps+tcp port 5684 and more details on
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
Added guidance on CoAP Signaling Ping-Pong versus WebSocket Ping-Pong
Updated references and requirements for TLS security considerations
C.3. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-04
Updated references
Added Appendix: Updates to RFC7641 Observing Resources in the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
Updated Capability and Settings Message (CSM) exchange in the Opening
Handshake to allow initiator to send messages before receiving
acceptor CSM
C.4. Since draft-core-coap-tcp-tls-05
Addressed feedback from Working Group Last Call
Added Securing CoAP section and informative reference to OSCOAP
Removed the Server-Name and Bad-Server-Name Options
Clarified the Capability and Settings Message (CSM) exchange
Updated Pong response requirements
Added Connection Initiator and Connection Acceptor terminology where
appropriate
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Updated LWM2M 1.0 informative reference
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Stephen Berard, Geoffrey Cristallo, Olivier
Delaby, Christian Groves, Nadir Javed, Michael Koster, Matthias
Kovatsch, Achim Kraus, David Navarro, Szymon Sasin, Goran Selander,
Zach Shelby, Andrew Summers, Julien Vermillard, and Gengyu Wei for
their feedback.
Contributors
Matthias Kovatsch
Siemens AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich D-81739
Phone: +49-173-5288856
EMail: matthias.kovatsch@siemens.com
Teemu Savolainen
Nokia Technologies
Hatanpaan valtatie 30
Tampere FI-33100
Finland
Email: teemu.savolainen@nokia.com
Valik Solorzano Barboza
Zebra Technologies
820 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 700
Chicago 60607
United States of America
Phone: +1-847-634-6700
Email: vsolorzanobarboza@zebra.com
Authors' Addresses
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Carsten Bormann
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63921
Email: cabo@tzi.org
Simon Lemay
Zebra Technologies
820 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 700
Chicago 60607
United States of America
Phone: +1-847-634-6700
Email: slemay@zebra.com
Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge CB1 9NJ
Great Britain
Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Klaus Hartke
Universitaet Bremen TZI
Postfach 330440
Bremen D-28359
Germany
Phone: +49-421-218-63905
Email: hartke@tzi.org
Bilhanan Silverajan
Tampere University of Technology
Korkeakoulunkatu 10
Tampere FI-33720
Finland
Email: bilhanan.silverajan@tut.fi
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Brian Raymor (editor)
Microsoft
One Microsoft Way
Redmond 98052
United States of America
Email: brian.raymor@microsoft.com
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