CoRE Working Group G. Selander
Internet-Draft J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track F. Palombini
Expires: October 1, 2018 Ericsson AB
L. Seitz
RISE SICS
March 30, 2018
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
draft-ietf-core-object-security-12
Abstract
This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object
Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection
between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP.
OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a
range of proxy operations, including translation between different
transport protocols.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 1, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. The OSCORE Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. The Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Security Context Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Establishment of Security Context Parameters . . . . . . 10
3.3. Requirements on the Security Context Parameters . . . . . 12
4. Protected Message Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. CoAP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. CoAP Header Fields and Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. Signaling Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. The COSE Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Kid Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2. Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3. Plaintext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4. Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. OSCORE Header Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.2. Encoding of the OSCORE Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1. Message Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.2. Sequence Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.3. Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.4. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5. Losing Part of the Context State . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.1. Protecting the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.2. Verifying the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.3. Protecting the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.4. Verifying the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
9. Web Linking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10. CoAP-to-CoAP Forwarding Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
11. HTTP Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11.1. The HTTP OSCORE Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
11.2. CoAP-to-HTTP Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11.3. HTTP-to-CoAP Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
11.4. HTTP Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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11.5. Example: HTTP Client and CoAP Server . . . . . . . . . . 41
11.6. Example: CoAP Client and HTTP Server . . . . . . . . . . 43
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12.1. End-to-end Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12.2. Security Context Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
12.3. Master Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
12.4. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
12.5. Client Aliveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
12.6. Cryptographic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
12.7. Message Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
12.8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
13.1. COSE Header Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
13.2. CoAP Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
13.3. CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . 48
13.4. Header Field Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
13.5. Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
13.6. CoAP Content-Formats Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix A. Scenario Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.1. Secure Access to Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.2. Secure Subscribe to Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix B. Deployment Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.1. Master Secret Used Once . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.2. Master Secret Used Multiple Times . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix C. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
C.1. Test Vector 1: Key Derivation with Master Salt . . . . . 59
C.2. Test Vector 2: Key Derivation without Master Salt . . . . 60
C.3. Test Vector 3: OSCORE Request, Client . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.4. Test Vector 4: OSCORE Request, Client . . . . . . . . . . 63
C.5. Test Vector 5: OSCORE Response, Server . . . . . . . . . 64
C.6. Test Vector 6: OSCORE Response with Partial IV, Server . 65
Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . 66
D.1. Supporting Proxy Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
D.2. Protected Message Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
D.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
D.4. Unprotected Message Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix E. CDDL Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web
transfer protocol, designed for constrained nodes and networks
[RFC7228], and may be mapped from HTTP [RFC8075]. CoAP specifies the
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use of proxies for scalability and efficiency and references DTLS
[RFC6347] for security. CoAP-to-CoAP, HTTP-to-CoAP, and CoAP-to-HTTP
proxies require DTLS or TLS [RFC5246] to be terminated at the proxy.
The proxy therefore not only has access to the data required for
performing the intended proxy functionality, but is also able to
eavesdrop on, or manipulate any part of, the message payload and
metadata in transit between the endpoints. The proxy can also
inject, delete, or reorder packets since they are no longer protected
by (D)TLS.
This document defines the Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (OSCORE) security protocol, protecting CoAP and CoAP-
mappable HTTP requests and responses end-to-end across intermediary
nodes such as CoAP forward proxies and cross-protocol translators
including HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075]. In addition to the core
CoAP features defined in [RFC7252], OSCORE supports Observe
[RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959], No-Response [RFC7967], and PATCH and
FETCH [RFC8132]. An analysis of end-to-end security for CoAP
messages through some types of intermediary nodes is performed in
[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. OSCORE essentially protects the
RESTful interactions; the request method, the requested resource, the
message payload, etc. (see Section 4). OSCORE protects neither the
CoAP Messaging Layer nor the CoAP Token which may change between the
endpoints, and those are therefore processed as defined in [RFC7252].
Additionally, since the message formats for CoAP over unreliable
transport [RFC7252] and for CoAP over reliable transport [RFC8323]
differ only in terms of CoAP Messaging Layer, OSCORE can be applied
to both unreliable and reliable transports (see Figure 1).
+-----------------------------------+
| Application |
+-----------------------------------+
+-----------------------------------+ \
| Requests / Responses / Signaling | |
|-----------------------------------| |
| OSCORE | | CoAP
|-----------------------------------| |
| Messaging Layer / Message Framing | |
+-----------------------------------+ /
+-----------------------------------+
| UDP / TCP / ... |
+-----------------------------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Layering of CoAP with OSCORE
OSCORE works in very constrained nodes and networks, thanks to its
small message size and the restricted code and memory requirements in
addition to what is required by CoAP. Examples of the use of OSCORE
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are given in Appendix A. OSCORE does not depend on underlying
layers, and can be used with non-IP transports (e.g.,
[I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie]). OSCORE may also be used in
different ways with HTTP. OSCORE messages may be transported in
HTTP, and OSCORE may also be used to protect CoAP-mappable HTTP
messages, as described below.
OSCORE is designed to protect as much information as possible while
still allowing CoAP proxy operations (Section 10). It works with
legacy CoAP-to-CoAP forward proxies [RFC7252], but an OSCORE-aware
proxy will be more efficient. HTTP-to-CoAP proxies [RFC8075] and
CoAP-to-HTTP proxies can also be used with OSCORE, as specified in
Section 11. OSCORE may be used together with TLS or DTLS over one or
more hops in the end-to-end path, e.g. transported with HTTPS in one
hop and with plain CoAP in another hop. The use of OSCORE does not
affect the URI scheme and OSCORE can therefore be used with any URI
scheme defined for CoAP or HTTP. The application decides the
conditions for which OSCORE is required.
OSCORE uses pre-shared keys which may have been established out-of-
band or with a key establishment protocol (see Section 3.2). The
technical solution builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
(COSE) [RFC8152], providing end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay
protection, and binding of response to request. A compressed version
of COSE is used, as specified in Section 6. The use of OSCORE is
signaled in CoAP with a new option (Section 2), and in HTTP with a
new header field (Section 11.1) and content type (Section 13.5). The
solution transforms a CoAP/HTTP message into an "OSCORE message"
before sending, and vice versa after receiving. The OSCORE message
is a CoAP/HTTP message related to the original message in the
following way: the original CoAP/HTTP message is translated to CoAP
(if not already in CoAP) and protected in a COSE object. The
encrypted message fields of this COSE object are transported in the
CoAP payload/HTTP body of the OSCORE message, and the OSCORE option/
header field is included in the message. A sketch of an exchange of
OSCORE messages, in the case of the original message being CoAP, is
provided in Figure 2.
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Client Server
| OSCORE request - POST example.com: |
| Header, Token, |
| Options: {OSCORE, ...}, |
| Payload: COSE ciphertext |
+--------------------------------------------->|
| |
|<---------------------------------------------+
| OSCORE response - 2.04 (Changed): |
| Header, Token, |
| Options: {OSCORE, ...}, |
| Payload: COSE ciphertext |
| |
Figure 2: Sketch of CoAP with OSCORE
An implementation supporting this specification MAY implement only
the client part, MAY implement only the server part, or MAY implement
only one of the proxy parts.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in CoAP [RFC7252], Observe [RFC7641], Block-wise [RFC7959],
COSE [RFC8152], CBOR [RFC7049], CDDL [I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl] as
summarized in Appendix E, and constrained environments [RFC7228].
The term "hop" is used to denote a particular leg in the end-to-end
path. The concept "hop-by-hop" (as in "hop-by-hop encryption" or
"hop-by-hop fragmentation") opposed to "end-to-end", is used in this
document to indicate that the messages are processed accordingly in
the intermediaries, rather than just forwarded to the next node.
The term "stop processing" is used throughout the document to denote
that the message is not passed up to the CoAP Request/Response layer
(see Figure 1).
The terms Common/Sender/Recipient Context, Master Secret/Salt, Sender
ID/Key, Recipient ID/Key, and Common IV are defined in Section 3.1.
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2. The OSCORE Option
The OSCORE option (see Figure 3, which extends Table 4 of [RFC7252])
indicates that the CoAP message is an OSCORE message and that it
contains a compressed COSE object (see Section 5 and Section 6). The
OSCORE option is critical, safe to forward, part of the cache key,
and not repeatable.
+------+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| No. | C | U | N | R | Name | Format | Length | Default |
+------+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
| TBD1 | x | | | | OSCORE | (*) | 0-255 | (none) |
+------+---+---+---+---+-----------------+--------+--------+---------+
C = Critical, U = Unsafe, N = NoCacheKey, R = Repeatable
(*) See below.
Figure 3: The OSCORE Option
The OSCORE option includes the OSCORE flag bits (Section 6), the
Sender Sequence Number and the Sender ID when present (Section 3).
The detailed format and length is specified in Section 6. If the
OSCORE flag bits are all zero (0x00) the Option value SHALL be empty
(Option Length = 0). An endpoint receiving a CoAP message without
payload, that also contains an OSCORE option SHALL treat it as
malformed and reject it.
A successful response to a request with the OSCORE option SHALL
contain the OSCORE option. Whether error responses contain the
OSCORE option depends on the error type (see Section 8).
For CoAP proxy operations, see Section 10.
3. The Security Context
OSCORE requires that client and server establish a shared security
context used to process the COSE objects. OSCORE uses COSE with an
Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD, [RFC5116])
algorithm for protecting message data between a client and a server.
In this section, we define the security context and how it is derived
in client and server based on a shared secret and a key derivation
function (KDF).
3.1. Security Context Definition
The security context is the set of information elements necessary to
carry out the cryptographic operations in OSCORE. For each endpoint,
the security context is composed of a "Common Context", a "Sender
Context", and a "Recipient Context".
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The endpoints protect messages to send using the Sender Context and
verify messages received using the Recipient Context, both contexts
being derived from the Common Context and other data. Clients and
servers need to be able to retrieve the correct security context to
use.
An endpoint uses its Sender ID (SID) to derive its Sender Context,
and the other endpoint uses the same ID, now called Recipient ID
(RID), to derive its Recipient Context. In communication between two
endpoints, the Sender Context of one endpoint matches the Recipient
Context of the other endpoint, and vice versa. Thus, the two
security contexts identified by the same IDs in the two endpoints are
not the same, but they are partly mirrored. Retrieval and use of the
security context are shown in Figure 4.
.-------------. .-------------.
| Common, | | Common, |
| Sender, | | Recipient, |
| Recipient | | Sender |
'-------------' '-------------'
Client Server
| |
Retrieve context for | OSCORE request: |
target resource | Token = Token1, |
Protect request with | kid = SID, ... |
Sender Context +---------------------->| Retrieve context with
| | RID = kid
| | Verify request with
| | Recipient Context
| OSCORE response: | Protect response with
| Token = Token1, ... | Sender Context
Retrieve context with |<----------------------+
Token = Token1 | |
Verify request with | |
Recipient Context | |
Figure 4: Retrieval and use of the Security Context
The Common Context contains the following parameters:
o AEAD Algorithm. The COSE AEAD algorithm to use for encryption.
o Key Derivation Function. The HMAC based HKDF [RFC5869] used to
derive Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV.
o Master Secret. Variable length, random byte string (see
Section 12.3) containing the keying material used to derive
traffic keys and IVs.
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o Master Salt. Variable length byte string containing the salt used
to derive traffic keys and IVs.
o Common IV. Byte string derived from Master Secret and Master
Salt. Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.
The Sender Context contains the following parameters:
o Sender ID. Byte string used to identify the Sender Context and to
assure unique AEAD nonces. Maximum length is determined by the
AEAD Algorithm.
o Sender Key. Byte string containing the symmetric key to protect
messages to send. Derived from Common Context and Sender ID.
Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.
o Sender Sequence Number. Non-negative integer used by the sender
to protect requests and certain responses, e.g. Observe
notifications. Used as 'Partial IV' [RFC8152] to generate unique
nonces for the AEAD. Maximum value is determined by the AEAD
Algorithm.
The Recipient Context contains the following parameters:
o Recipient ID. Byte string used to identify the Recipient Context
and to assure unique AEAD nonces. Maximum length is determined by
the AEAD Algorithm.
o Recipient Key. Byte string containing the symmetric key to verify
messages received. Derived from Common Context and Recipient ID.
Length is determined by the AEAD Algorithm.
o Replay Window (Server only). The replay window to verify requests
received.
All parameters except Sender Sequence Number and Replay Window are
immutable once the security context is established. An endpoint may
free up memory by not storing the Common IV, Sender Key, and
Recipient Key, deriving them from the Master Key and Master Salt when
needed. Alternatively, an endpoint may free up memory by not storing
the Master Secret and Master Salt after the other parameters have
been derived.
Endpoints MAY operate as both client and server and use the same
security context for those roles. Independent of being client or
server, the endpoint protects messages to send using its Sender
Context, and verifies messages received using its Recipient Context.
The endpoints MUST NOT change the Sender/Recipient ID when changing
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roles. In other words, changing the roles does not change the set of
keys to be used.
3.2. Establishment of Security Context Parameters
The parameters in the security context are derived from a small set
of input parameters. The following input parameters SHALL be pre-
established:
o Master Secret
o Sender ID
o Recipient ID
The following input parameters MAY be pre-established. In case any
of these parameters is not pre-established, the default value
indicated below is used:
o AEAD Algorithm
* Default is AES-CCM-16-64-128 (COSE algorithm encoding: 10)
o Master Salt
* Default is the empty string
o Key Derivation Function (KDF)
* Default is HKDF SHA-256
o Replay Window Type and Size
* Default is DTLS-type replay protection with a window size of 32
[RFC6347]
All input parameters need to be known to and agreed on by both
endpoints, but the replay window may be different in the two
endpoints. The way the input parameters are pre-established, is
application specific. Considerations of security context
establishment are given in Section 12.2 and examples of deploying
OSCORE in Appendix B.
3.2.1. Derivation of Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV
The KDF MUST be one of the HMAC based HKDF [RFC5869] algorithms
defined in COSE. HKDF SHA-256 is mandatory to implement. The
security context parameters Sender Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV
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SHALL be derived from the input parameters using the HKDF, which
consists of the composition of the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps
[RFC5869]:
output parameter = HKDF(salt, IKM, info, L)
where:
o salt is the Master Salt as defined above
o IKM is the Master Secret as defined above
o info is a CBOR array consisting of:
info = [
id : bstr,
alg_aead : int / tstr,
type : tstr,
L : uint
]
where:
o id is the Sender ID or Recipient ID when deriving keys and the
empty string when deriving the Common IV. The encoding is
described in Section 5.
o alg_aead is the AEAD Algorithm, encoded as defined in [RFC8152].
o type is "Key" or "IV". The label is an ASCII string, and does not
include a trailing NUL byte.
o L is the size of the key/IV for the AEAD algorithm used, in bytes.
For example, if the algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 (see Section 10.2 in
[RFC8152]) is used, the integer value for alg_aead is 10, the value
for L is 16 for keys and 13 for the Common IV.
3.2.2. Initial Sequence Numbers and Replay Window
The Sender Sequence Number is initialized to 0. The supported types
of replay protection and replay window length is application specific
and depends on how OSCORE is transported, see Section 7.4. The
default is DTLS-type replay protection with a window size of 32
initiated as described in Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC6347].
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3.3. Requirements on the Security Context Parameters
As collisions may lead to the loss of both confidentiality and
integrity, Sender ID SHALL be unique in the set of all security
contexts using the same Master Secret and Master Salt. To assign
identifiers, a trusted third party (e.g., [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz])
or a protocol that allows the parties to negotiate locally unique
identifiers can be used. The Sender IDs can be very short. The
maximum length of Sender ID in bytes equals the length of AEAD nonce
minus 6. For AES-CCM-16-64-128 the maximum length of Sender ID is 7
bytes.
To simplify retrieval of the right Recipient Context, the Recipient
ID SHOULD be unique in the sets of all Recipient Contexts used by an
endpoint. If an endpoint has the same Recipient ID with different
Recipient Contexts, i.e. the Recipient Contexts are derived from
different keying material, then the endpoint may need to try multiple
times before finding the right security context associated to the
Recipient ID. The Client MAY provide a 'kid context' parameter
(Section 5.1) to help the Server find the right context.
While the triple (Master Secret, Master Salt, Sender ID) MUST be
unique, the same Master Salt MAY be used with several Master Secrets
and the same Master Secret MAY be used with several Master Salts.
4. Protected Message Fields
OSCORE transforms a CoAP message (which may have been generated from
an HTTP message) into an OSCORE message, and vice versa. OSCORE
protects as much of the original message as possible while still
allowing certain proxy operations (see Section 10 and Section 11).
This section defines how OSCORE protects the message fields and
transfers them end-to-end between client and server (in any
direction).
The remainder of this section and later sections focus on the
behavior in terms of CoAP messages. If HTTP is used for a particular
hop in the end-to-end path, then this section applies to the
conceptual CoAP message that is mappable to/from the original HTTP
message as discussed in Section 11. That is, an HTTP message is
conceptually transformed to a CoAP message and then to an OSCORE
message, and similarly in the reverse direction. An actual
implementation might translate directly from HTTP to OSCORE without
the intervening CoAP representation.
Protection of Signaling messages (Section 5 of [RFC8323]) is
specified in Section 4.3. The other parts of this section target
Request/Response messages.
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Message fields of the CoAP message may be protected end-to-end
between CoAP client and CoAP server in different ways:
o Class E: encrypted and integrity protected,
o Class I: integrity protected only, or
o Class U: unprotected.
The sending endpoint SHALL transfer Class E message fields in the
ciphertext of the COSE object in the OSCORE message. The sending
endpoint SHALL include Class I message fields in the Additional
Authenticated Data (AAD) of the AEAD algorithm, allowing the
receiving endpoint to detect if the value has changed in transfer.
Class U message fields SHALL NOT be protected in transfer. Class I
and Class U message field values are transferred in the header or
options part of the OSCORE message, which is visible to proxies.
Message fields not visible to proxies, i.e., transported in the
ciphertext of the COSE object, are called "Inner" (Class E). Message
fields transferred in the header or options part of the OSCORE
message, which is visible to proxies, are called "Outer" (Class I or
U). There are currently no Class I options defined.
An OSCORE message may contain both an Inner and an Outer instance of
a certain CoAP message field. Inner message fields are intended for
the receiving endpoint, whereas Outer message fields are used to
enable proxy operations. Inner and Outer message fields are
processed independently.
4.1. CoAP Options
A summary of how options are protected is shown in Figure 5. Note
that some options may have both Inner and Outer message fields which
are protected accordingly. Certain options require special
processing as is described in Section 4.1.3.
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+------+-----------------+---+---+
| No. | Name | E | U |
+------+-----------------+---+---+
| 1 | If-Match | x | |
| 3 | Uri-Host | | x |
| 4 | ETag | x | |
| 5 | If-None-Match | x | |
| 6 | Observe | | x |
| 7 | Uri-Port | | x |
| 8 | Location-Path | x | |
| TBD1 | OSCORE | | x |
| 11 | Uri-Path | x | |
| 12 | Content-Format | x | |
| 14 | Max-Age | x | x |
| 15 | Uri-Query | x | |
| 17 | Accept | x | |
| 20 | Location-Query | x | |
| 23 | Block2 | x | x |
| 27 | Block1 | x | x |
| 28 | Size2 | x | x |
| 35 | Proxy-Uri | | x |
| 39 | Proxy-Scheme | | x |
| 60 | Size1 | x | x |
| 258 | No-Response | x | x |
+------+-----------------+---+---+
E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
U = Unprotected (Outer)
Figure 5: Protection of CoAP Options
Options that are unknown or for which OSCORE processing is not
defined SHALL be processed as class E (and no special processing).
Specifications of new CoAP options SHOULD define how they are
processed with OSCORE. A new COAP option SHOULD be of class E unless
it requires proxy processing.
4.1.1. Inner Options
Inner option message fields (class E) are used to communicate
directly with the other endpoint.
The sending endpoint SHALL write the Inner option message fields
present in the original CoAP message into the plaintext of the COSE
object (Section 5.3), and then remove the Inner option message fields
from the OSCORE message.
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The processing of Inner option message fields by the receiving
endpoint is specified in Section 8.2 and Section 8.4.
4.1.2. Outer Options
Outer option message fields (Class U or I) are used to support proxy
operations, see Appendix D.1.
The sending endpoint SHALL include the Outer option message field
present in the original message in the options part of the OSCORE
message. All Outer option message fields, including the OSCORE
option, SHALL be encoded as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252],
where the delta is the difference to the previously included instance
of Outer option message field.
The processing of Outer options by the receiving endpoint is
specified in Section 8.2 and Section 8.4.
A procedure for integrity-protection-only of Class I option message
fields is specified in Section 5.4. Proxies MUST NOT change the
order of option's occurrences, for options repeatable and of class I.
Note: There are currently no Class I option message fields defined.
4.1.3. Special Options
Some options require special processing as specified in this section.
4.1.3.1. Max-Age
An Inner Max-Age message field is used to indicate the maximum time a
response may be cached by the client (as defined in [RFC7252]), end-
to-end from the server to the client, taking into account that the
option is not accessible to proxies. The Inner Max-Age SHALL be
processed by OSCORE as a normal Inner option, specified in
Section 4.1.1.
An Outer Max-Age message field is used to avoid unnecessary caching
of OSCORE error responses at OSCORE unaware intermediary nodes. A
server MAY set a Class U Max-Age message field with value zero to
OSCORE error responses, which are described in Section 7.4,
Section 8.2 and Section 8.4. Such message field is then processed
according to Section 4.1.2.
Successful OSCORE responses do not need to include an Outer Max-Age
option since the responses are non-cacheable by construction (see
Section 4.2).
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4.1.3.2. Proxy-Uri
Proxy-Uri, when present, is split by OSCORE into class U options and
class E options, which are processed accordingly. When Proxy-Uri is
used in the original CoAP message, Uri-* are not present [RFC7252].
The sending endpoint SHALL first decompose the Proxy-Uri value of the
original CoAP message into the Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, Uri-Port, Uri-
Path, and Uri-Query options (if present) according to Section 6.4 of
[RFC7252].
Uri-Path and Uri-Query are class E options and SHALL be protected and
processed as Inner options (Section 4.1.1). Uri-Host being an Outer
option SHOULD NOT contain privacy sensitive information.
The Proxy-Uri option of the OSCORE message SHALL be set to the
composition of Proxy-Scheme, Uri-Host, and Uri-Port options (if
present) as specified in Section 6.5 of [RFC7252], and processed as
an Outer option of Class U (Section 4.1.2).
Note that replacing the Proxy-Uri value with the Proxy-Scheme and
Uri-* options works by design for all CoAP URIs (see Section 6 of
[RFC7252]). OSCORE-aware HTTP servers should not use the userinfo
component of the HTTP URI (as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC3986]),
so that this type of replacement is possible in the presence of CoAP-
to-HTTP proxies. In future documents specifying cross-protocol
proxying behavior using different URI structures, it is expected that
the authors will create Uri-* options that allow decomposing the
Proxy-Uri, and specify in which OSCORE class they belong.
An example of how Proxy-Uri is processed is given here. Assume that
the original CoAP message contains:
o Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com/resource?q=1"
During OSCORE processing, Proxy-Uri is split into:
o Proxy-Scheme = "coap"
o Uri-Host = "example.com"
o Uri-Port = "5683"
o Uri-Path = "resource"
o Uri-Query = "q=1"
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Uri-Path and Uri-Query follow the processing defined in
Section 4.1.1, and are thus encrypted and transported in the COSE
object. The remaining options are composed into the Proxy-Uri
included in the options part of the OSCORE message, which has value:
o Proxy-Uri = "coap://example.com"
See Sections 6.1 and 12.6 of [RFC7252] for more information.
4.1.3.3. The Block Options
Block-wise [RFC7959] is an optional feature. An implementation MAY
support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting block-wise
transfers. The Block options (Block1, Block2, Size1, Size2), when
Inner message fields, provide secure message segmentation such that
each segment can be verified. The Block options, when Outer message
fields, enables hop-by-hop fragmentation of the OSCORE message.
Inner and Outer block processing may have different performance
properties depending on the underlying transport. The end-to-end
integrity of the message can be verified both in case of Inner and
Outer Block-wise transfers provided all blocks are received.
4.1.3.3.1. Inner Block Options
The sending CoAP endpoint MAY fragment a CoAP message as defined in
[RFC7959] before the message is processed by OSCORE. In this case
the Block options SHALL be processed by OSCORE as normal Inner
options (Section 4.1.1). The receiving CoAP endpoint SHALL process
the OSCORE message before processing Block-wise as defined in
[RFC7959].
4.1.3.3.2. Outer Block Options
Proxies MAY fragment an OSCORE message using [RFC7959], by
introducing Block option message fields that are Outer
(Section 4.1.2). Note that the Outer Block options are neither
encrypted nor integrity protected. As a consequence, a proxy can
maliciously inject block fragments indefinitely, since the receiving
endpoint needs to receive the last block (see [RFC7959]) to be able
to compose the OSCORE message and verify its integrity. Therefore,
applications supporting OSCORE and [RFC7959] MUST specify a security
policy defining a maximum unfragmented message size
(MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE) considering the maximum size of message which
can be handled by the endpoints. Messages exceeding this size SHOULD
be fragmented by the sending endpoint using Inner Block options
(Section 4.1.3.3.1).
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An endpoint receiving an OSCORE message with an Outer Block option
SHALL first process this option according to [RFC7959], until all
blocks of the OSCORE message have been received, or the cumulated
message size of the blocks exceeds MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE. In the
former case, the processing of the OSCORE message continues as
defined in this document. In the latter case the message SHALL be
discarded.
Because of encryption of Uri-Path and Uri-Query, messages to the same
server may, from the point of view of a proxy, look like they also
target the same resource. A proxy SHOULD mitigate a potential mix-up
of blocks from concurrent requests to the same server, for example
using the Request-Tag processing specified in Section 3.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].
4.1.3.4. Observe
Observe [RFC7641] is an optional feature. An implementation MAY
support [RFC7252] and the OSCORE option without supporting [RFC7641].
The Observe option as used here targets the requirements on
forwarding of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs] (Section 2.2.1).
An Observe intermediary MUST forward the OSCORE option unchanged. In
order for an OSCORE-unaware proxy to support forwarding of Observe
messages [RFC7641], there SHALL be an Outer Observe option, i.e.,
present in the options part of the OSCORE message. With OSCORE,
Observe intermediaries are forwarding messages without being able to
re-send cached notifications to other clients.
In order to support multiple concurrent Observe registrations in the
same endpoint, Observe intermediaries are allowed to deviate from
[RFC7641] and register multiple times to the same (root) resource,
since the actual target resource is encrypted and not visible in the
OSCORE message. The processing of the CoAP Code for Observe messages
is described in Section 4.2.
The Observe option in the CoAP request may be legitimately removed by
a proxy or ignored by the server. In these cases, the server
processes the request as a non-Observe request and produce a non-
Observe response. If the OSCORE client receives a response to an
Observe request without an Outer Observe value, then it verifies the
response as a non-Observe response, as specified in Section 8.4. If
the OSCORE client receives a response to a non-Observe request with
an Outer Observe value, it stops processing the message, as specified
in Section 8.4.
It the server accepts the Observe registration, a Partial IV must be
included in all notifications (both successful and error). To secure
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the order of notifications, the client SHALL maintain a Notification
Number for each Observation it registers. The Notification Number is
a non-negative integer containing the largest Partial IV of the
received notifications for the associated Observe registration (see
Section 7.4). The Notification Number is initialized to the Partial
IV of the first successfully received notification response to the
registration request. In contrast to [RFC7641], the received Partial
IV MUST always be compared with the Notification Number, which thus
MUST NOT be forgotten after 128 seconds. Further details of replay
protection of notifications are specified in Section 7.4. The client
MAY ignore the Observe option value.
Clients can re-register observations to ensure that the observation
is still active and establish freshness again ([RFC7641]
Section 3.3.1). When an OSCORE observation is refreshed, not only
the ETags, but also the partial IV (and thus the payload and OSCORE
option) change. The server uses the new request's Partial IV as the
'request_piv' of new responses.
4.1.3.5. No-Response
No-Response [RFC7967] is an optional feature. Clients using No-
Response MUST set both an Inner (Class E) and an Outer (Class U) No-
Response option, with the same value.
The Inner No-Response option is used to communicate to the server the
client's disinterest in certain classes of responses to a particular
request. The Inner No-Response SHALL be processed by OSCORE as
specified in Section 4.1.1.
The Outer No-Response option is used to support proxy functionality,
specifically to avoid error transmissions from proxies to clients,
and to avoid bandwidth reduction to servers by proxies applying
congestion control when not receiving responses. The Outer No-
Response option is processed according to Section 4.1.2.
Note the effect in step 8 of Section 8.4 when applied to No-Response.
Applications should consider that a proxy may remove the Outer No-
Response option from the request. Applications using No-Response can
specify policies to deal with cases where servers receive an Inner
No-Response option only, which may be the result of the request
having traversed a No-Response unaware proxy, and update the
processing in Section 8.4 accordingly. This avoids unnecessary error
responses to clients and bandwidth reductions to servers, due to No-
Response unaware proxies.
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4.1.3.6. OSCORE
The OSCORE option is only defined to be present in OSCORE messages,
as an indication that OSCORE processing have been performed. The
content in the OSCORE option is neither encrypted nor integrity
protected as a whole but some part of the content of this option is
protected (see Section 5.4). Nested use of OSCORE is not supported:
If OSCORE processing detects an OSCORE option in the original CoAP
message, then processing SHALL be stopped.
4.2. CoAP Header Fields and Payload
A summary of how the CoAP header fields and payload are protected is
shown in Figure 6, including fields specific to CoAP over UDP and
CoAP over TCP (marked accordingly in the table).
+------------------+---+---+
| Field | E | U |
+------------------+---+---+
| Version (UDP) | | x |
| Type (UDP) | | x |
| Length (TCP) | | x |
| Token Length | | x |
| Code | x | |
| Message ID (UDP) | | x |
| Token | | x |
| Payload | x | |
+------------------+---+---+
E = Encrypt and Integrity Protect (Inner)
U = Unprotected (Outer)
Figure 6: Protection of CoAP Header Fields and Payload
Most CoAP Header fields (i.e. the message fields in the fixed 4-byte
header) are required to be read and/or changed by CoAP proxies and
thus cannot in general be protected end-to-end between the endpoints.
As mentioned in Section 1, OSCORE protects the CoAP Request/Response
layer only, and not the Messaging Layer (Section 2 of [RFC7252]), so
fields such as Type and Message ID are not protected with OSCORE.
The CoAP Header field Code is protected by OSCORE. Code SHALL be
encrypted and integrity protected (Class E) to prevent an
intermediary from eavesdropping on or manipulating the Code (e.g.,
changing from GET to DELETE).
The sending endpoint SHALL write the Code of the original CoAP
message into the plaintext of the COSE object (see Section 5.3).
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After that, the sending endpoint writes an Outer Code to the OSCORE
message. The Outer Code SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST) or 0.05 (FETCH)
for requests. For non-Observe requests the client SHALL set the
Outer Code to 0.02 (POST). For responses, the sending endpoint SHALL
respond with Outer Code 2.04 (Changed) to 0.02 (POST) requests, and
with Outer Code 2.05 (Content) to 0.05 (FETCH) requests. Using FETCH
with Observe allows OSCORE to be compliant with the Observe
processing in OSCORE-unaware intermediaries. The choice of POST and
FETCH [RFC8132] allows all OSCORE messages to have payload.
The receiving endpoint SHALL discard the Outer Code in the OSCORE
message and write the Code of the COSE object plaintext (Section 5.3)
into the decrypted CoAP message.
The other currently defined CoAP Header fields are Unprotected (Class
U). The sending endpoint SHALL write all other header fields of the
original message into the header of the OSCORE message. The
receiving endpoint SHALL write the header fields from the received
OSCORE message into the header of the decrypted CoAP message.
The CoAP Payload, if present in the original CoAP message, SHALL be
encrypted and integrity protected and is thus an Inner message field.
The sending endpoint writes the payload of the original CoAP message
into the plaintext (Section 5.3) input to the COSE object. The
receiving endpoint verifies and decrypts the COSE object, and
recreates the payload of the original CoAP message.
4.3. Signaling Messages
Signaling messages (CoAP Code 7.00-7.31) were introduced to exchange
information related to an underlying transport connection in the
specific case of CoAP over reliable transports [RFC8323].
OSCORE MAY be used to protect Signaling if the endpoints for OSCORE
coincide with the endpoints for the signaling message. If OSCORE is
used to protect Signaling then:
o To comply with [RFC8323], an initial empty CSM message SHALL be
sent. The subsequent signaling message SHALL be protected.
o Signaling messages SHALL be protected as CoAP Request messages,
except in the case the Signaling message is a response to a
previous Signaling message, in which case it SHALL be protected as
a CoAP Response message. For example, 7.02 (Ping) is protected as
a CoAP Request and 7.03 (Pong) as a CoAP response.
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o The Outer Code for Signaling messages SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST),
unless it is a response to a previous Signaling message, in which
case it SHALL be set to 2.04 (Changed).
o All Signaling options, except the OSCORE option, SHALL be Inner
(Class E).
NOTE: Option numbers for Signaling messages are specific to the CoAP
Code (see Section 5.2 of [RFC8323]).
If OSCORE is not used to protect Signaling, Signaling messages SHALL
be unaltered by OSCORE.
5. The COSE Object
This section defines how to use COSE [RFC8152] to wrap and protect
data in the original message. OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0
structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
(AEAD) algorithm. The key lengths, IV length, nonce length, and
maximum Sender Sequence Number are algorithm dependent.
The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 10.2 of
[RFC8152] is mandatory to implement. For AES-CCM-16-64-128 the
length of Sender Key and Recipient Key is 128 bits, the length of
nonce and Common IV is 13 bytes. The maximum Sender Sequence Number
is specified in Section 12.
As specified in [RFC5116], plaintext denotes the data that is to be
encrypted and integrity protected, and Additional Authenticated Data
(AAD) denotes the data that is to be integrity protected only.
The COSE Object SHALL be a COSE_Encrypt0 object with fields defined
as follows
o The 'protected' field is empty.
o The 'unprotected' field includes:
* The 'Partial IV' parameter. The value is set to the Sender
Sequence Number. All leading zeroes SHALL be removed when
encoding the Partial IV, except in the case of value 0 which is
encoded to the byte string 0x00. This parameter SHALL be
present in requests. In case of Observe notifications
(Section 4.1.3.4) the Partial IV SHALL be present in responses,
and otherwise the Partial IV will not typically be present in
responses.
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* The 'kid' parameter. The value is set to the Sender ID. This
parameter SHALL be present in requests and will not typically
be present in responses. An example where the Sender ID is
included in a response is the extension of OSCORE to group
communication [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm].
* Optionally, a 'kid context' parameter as defined in
Section 5.1. This parameter MAY be present in requests and
SHALL NOT be present in responses.
o The 'ciphertext' field is computed from the secret key (Sender Key
or Recipient Key), AEAD nonce (see Section 5.2), plaintext (see
Section 5.3), and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) (see
Section 5.4) following Section 5.2 of [RFC8152].
The encryption process is described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8152].
5.1. Kid Context
For certain use cases, e.g. deployments where the same kid is used
with multiple contexts, it is necessary or favorable for the sender
to provide an additional identifier of the security material to use,
in order for the receiver to retrieve or establish the correct key.
The kid context parameter is used to provide such additional input.
The kid context and kid are used to determine the security context,
or to establish the necessary input parameters to derive the security
context (see Section 3.2). The application defines how this is done.
The kid context is implicitly integrity protected, as a manipulation
that leads to the wrong key (or no key) being retrieved results in an
error, as described in Section 8.2.
A summary of the COSE header parameter kid context defined above can
be found in Figure 7.
Some examples of relevant uses of kid context are the following:
o If the client has an identifier in some other namespace which can
be used by the server to retrieve or establish the security
context, then that identifier can be used as kid context. The kid
context may be used as Master Salt (Section 3.1) for additional
entropy of the security contexts (see for example Appendix B.2 or
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]).
o In case of a group communication scenario
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm], if the server belongs to
multiple groups, then a group identifier can be used as kid
context to enable the server to find the right security context.
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+----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+
| name | label | value type | value registry | description |
+----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+
| kid | TBD2 | bstr | | Identifies the |
| context | | | | kid context |
+----------+--------+------------+----------------+-----------------+
Figure 7: Additional common header parameter for the COSE object
5.2. Nonce
The AEAD nonce is constructed in the following way (see Figure 8):
1. left-padding the Partial IV (PIV) in network byte order with
zeroes to exactly 5 bytes,
2. left-padding the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated the
Partial IV (ID_PIV) in network byte order with zeroes to exactly
nonce length minus 6 bytes,
3. concatenating the size of the ID_PIV (a single byte S) with the
padded ID_PIV and the padded PIV,
4. and then XORing with the Common IV.
Note that in this specification only algorithms that use nonces equal
or greater than 7 bytes are supported. The nonce construction with
S, ID_PIV, and PIV together with endpoint unique IDs and encryption
keys makes it easy to verify that the nonces used with a specific key
will be unique, see Appendix D.3.
If the Partial IV is not present in a response, the nonce from the
request is used. For responses that are not notifications (i.e. when
there is a single response to a request), the request and the
response should typically use the same nonce to reduce message
overhead. Both alternatives provide all the required security
properties, see Appendix D.3 and Section 7.4. The only non-Observe
scenario where a Partial IV must be included in a response is when
the server is unable to perform replay protection, see Section 7.5.2.
For processing instructions see Section 8.
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<- nonce length minus 6 B -> <-- 5 bytes -->
+---+-------------------+--------+---------+-----+
| S | padding | ID_PIV | padding | PIV |----+
+---+-------------------+--------+---------+-----+ |
|
<---------------- nonce length ----------------> |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| Common IV |->(XOR)
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|
<---------------- nonce length ----------------> |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| Nonce |<---+
+------------------------------------------------+
Figure 8: AEAD Nonce Formation
5.3. Plaintext
The plaintext is formatted as a CoAP message without Header (see
Figure 9) consisting of:
o the Code of the original CoAP message as defined in Section 3 of
[RFC7252]; and
o all Inner option message fields (see Section 4.1.1) present in the
original CoAP message (see Section 4.1). The options are encoded
as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7252], where the delta is the
difference to the previously included instance of Class E option;
and
o the Payload of original CoAP message, if present, and in that case
prefixed by the one-byte Payload Marker (0xFF).
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Class E options (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(only if there
is payload)
Figure 9: Plaintext
NOTE: The plaintext contains all CoAP data that needs to be encrypted
end-to-end between the endpoints.
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5.4. Additional Authenticated Data
The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array as defined below:
external_aad = [
oscore_version : uint,
algorithms : [ alg_aead : int / tstr ],
request_kid : bstr,
request_piv : bstr,
options : bstr
]
where:
o oscore_version: contains the OSCORE version number.
Implementations of this specification MUST set this field to 1.
Other values are reserved for future versions.
o algorithms: contains (for extensibility) an array of algorithms,
according to this specification only containing alg_aead.
o alg_aead: contains the AEAD Algorithm from the security context
used for the exchange (see Section 3.1).
o request_kid: contains the value of the 'kid' in the COSE object of
the request (see Section 5).
o request_piv: contains the value of the 'Partial IV' in the COSE
object of the request (see Section 5).
o options: contains the Class I options (see Section 4.1.2) present
in the original CoAP message encoded as described in Section 3.1
of [RFC7252], where the delta is the difference to the previously
included instance of class I option.
The oscore_version and algorithms parameters are established out-of-
band and are thus never transported in OSCORE, but the external_aad
allows to verify that they are the same in both endpoints.
NOTE: The format of the external_aad is for simplicity the same for
requests and responses, although some parameters, e.g. request_kid,
need not be integrity protected in the requests.
6. OSCORE Header Compression
The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] combines
very small message sizes with extensibility. The CBOR Object Signing
and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] uses CBOR to create compact encoding
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of signed and encrypted data. COSE is however constructed to support
a large number of different stateless use cases, and is not fully
optimized for use as a stateful security protocol, leading to a
larger than necessary message expansion. In this section, we define
a stateless header compression mechanism, simply removing redundant
information from the COSE objects, which significantly reduces the
per-packet overhead. The result of applying this mechanism to a COSE
object is called the "compressed COSE object".
The COSE_Encrypt0 object used in OSCORE is transported in the OSCORE
option and in the Payload. The Payload contains the Ciphertext and
the headers of the COSE object are compactly encoded as described in
the next section.
6.1. Encoding of the OSCORE Option Value
The value of the OSCORE option SHALL contain the OSCORE flag bits,
the Partial IV parameter, the kid context parameter (length and
value), and the kid parameter as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 <--------- n bytes ------------->
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---------------------------------
|0 0 0|h|k| n | Partial IV (if any) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+---------------------------------
<- 1 byte -> <------ s bytes ----->
+------------+----------------------+------------------+
| s (if any) | kid context (if any) | kid (if any) ... |
+------------+----------------------+------------------+
Figure 10: The OSCORE Option Value
o The first byte of flag bits encodes the following set of flags and
the length of the Partial IV parameter:
* The three least significant bits encode the Partial IV length
n. If n = 0 then the Partial IV is not present in the
compressed COSE object. The values n = 6 and n = 7 are
reserved.
* The fourth least significant bit is the kid flag, k: it is set
to 1 if the kid is present in the compressed COSE object.
* The fifth least significant bit is the kid context flag, h: it
is set to 1 if the compressed COSE object contains a kid
context (see Section 5.1).
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* The sixth to eighth least significant bits are reserved for
future use. These bits SHALL be set to zero when not in use.
According to this specification, if any of these bits are set
to 1 the message is considered to be malformed and
decompression fails as specified in item 3 of Section 8.2.
o The following n bytes encode the value of the Partial IV, if the
Partial IV is present (n > 0).
o The following 1 byte encode the length of the kid context
(Section 5.1) s, if the kid context flag is set (h = 1).
o The following s bytes encode the kid context, if the kid context
flag is set (h = 1).
o The remaining bytes encode the value of the kid, if the kid is
present (k = 1).
Note that the kid MUST be the last field of the OSCORE option value,
even in case reserved bits are used and additional fields are added
to it.
The length of the OSCORE option thus depends on the presence and
length of Partial IV, kid context, kid, as specified in this section,
and on the presence and length of the other parameters, as defined in
the separate documents.
6.2. Encoding of the OSCORE Payload
The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of the
COSE object.
6.3. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects
This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples for
requests and responses. The examples assume the COSE_Encrypt0 object
is set (which means the CoAP message and cryptographic material is
known). Note that the full CoAP unprotected message, as well as the
full security context, is not reported in the examples, but only the
input necessary to the compression mechanism, i.e. the COSE_Encrypt0
object. The output is the compressed COSE object as defined in
Section 6, divided into two parts, since the object is transported in
two CoAP fields: OSCORE option and payload.
1. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
0x25, and Partial IV = 0x05
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Before compression (24 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'25', 6:h'05' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
After compression (17 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09
Option Value: 09 05 25 (3 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
2. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
empty string, and Partial IV = 0x00
Before compression (23 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'', 6:h'00' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
After compression (16 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00001001 = 0x09
Option Value: 09 00 (2 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
3. Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
empty string, Partial IV = 0x05, and kid context = 0x44616c656b
Before compression (30 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'', 6:h'05', 8:h'44616c656b' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
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After compression (22 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00011001 = 0x19
Option Value: 19 05 05 44 61 6c 65 6b (8 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
4. Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and no
Partial IV
Before compression (18 bytes):
[
h'',
{},
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
After compression (14 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00000000 = 0x00
Option Value: (0 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
5. Response with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 and
Partial IV = 0x07
Before compression (21 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 6:h'07' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
After compression (16 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00000001 = 0x01
Option Value: 01 07 (2 bytes)
Payload: ae a0 15 56 67 92 4d ff 8a 24 e4 cb 35 b9 (14 bytes)
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7. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection
7.1. Message Binding
In order to prevent response delay and mismatch attacks
[I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators] from on-path attackers and
compromised intermediaries, OSCORE binds responses to the requests by
including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the AAD of the
response. The server therefore needs to store the kid and Partial IV
of the request until all responses have been sent.
7.2. Sequence Numbers
An AEAD nonce MUST NOT be used more than once per AEAD key. The
uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs is shown in Appendix D.3, and in
particular depends on a correct usage of Partial IVs. If messages
are processed concurrently, the operation of reading and increasing
the Sender Sequence Number MUST be atomic.
The maximum Sender Sequence Number is algorithm dependent (see
Section 12), and SHALL be less than 2^40. If the Sender Sequence
Number exceeds the maximum, the endpoint MUST NOT process any more
messages with the given Sender Context. If necessary, the endpoint
SHOULD acquire a new security context before this happens. The
latter is out of scope of this document.
7.3. Freshness
For requests, OSCORE provides only the guarantee that the request is
not older than the security context. For applications having
stronger demands on request freshness (e.g., control of actuators),
OSCORE needs to be augmented with mechanisms providing freshness, for
example as specified in [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag].
Assuming an honest server, the message binding guarantees that a
response is not older than its request. For responses that are not
notifications (i.e. when there is a single response to a request),
this gives absolute freshness. For notifications, the absolute
freshness gets weaker with time, and it is RECOMMENDED that the
client regularly re-register the observation. Note that the message
binding does not guarantee that misbehaving server created the
response before receiving the request, i.e. it does not verify server
aliveness.
For requests and notifications, OSCORE also provides relative
freshness in the sense that the received Partial IV allows a
recipient to determine the relative order of requests or responses.
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7.4. Replay Protection
In order to protect from replay of requests, the server's Recipient
Context includes a Replay Window. A server SHALL verify that a
Partial IV received in the COSE object has not been received before.
If this verification fails the server SHALL stop processing the
message, and MAY optionally respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error
message. Also, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value
zero. The diagnostic payload MAY contain the "Replay detected"
string. The size and type of the Replay Window depends on the use
case and the protocol with which the OSCORE message is transported.
In case of reliable and ordered transport from endpoint to endpoint,
e.g. TCP, the server MAY just store the last received Partial IV and
require that newly received Partial IVs equals the last received
Partial IV + 1. However, in case of mixed reliable and unreliable
transports and where messages may be lost, such a replay mechanism
may be too restrictive and the default replay window be more suitable
(see Section 3.2.2).
Responses that are not notifications (with or without Partial IV) are
protected against replay as they are bound to the request and the
fact that only a single response is accepted. Note that the Partial
IV is not used for replay protection in this case.
A client receiving a notification SHALL compare the Partial IV of a
received notification with the Notification Number associated to that
Observe registration. A client MUST consider the notification with
the highest Partial IV as the freshest, regardless of the order of
arrival. If the verification of the response succeeds, and the
received Partial IV was greater than the Notification Number then the
client SHALL overwrite the corresponding Notification Number with the
received Partial IV (see step 7 of Section 8.4. The client MUST stop
processing notifications with a Partial IV which has been previously
received. The client MAY process only notifications which have
greater Partial IV than the Notification Number.
If messages are processed concurrently, the Partial IV needs to be
validated a second time after decryption and before updating the
replay protection data. The operation of validating the Partial IV
and updating the replay protection data MUST be atomic.
7.5. Losing Part of the Context State
To prevent reuse of an AEAD nonce with the same key, or from
accepting replayed messages, an endpoint needs to handle the
situation of losing rapidly changing parts of the context, such as
the request Token, Sender Sequence Number, Replay Window, and
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Notification Numbers. These are typically stored in RAM and
therefore lost in the case of an unplanned reboot.
After boot, an endpoint MAY reject to use pre-existing security
contexts, and MAY establish a new security context with each endpoint
it communicates with. However, establishing a fresh security context
may have a non-negligible cost in terms of, e.g., power consumption.
After boot, an endpoint MAY use a partly persistently stored security
context, but then the endpoint MUST NOT reuse a previous Sender
Sequence Number and MUST NOT accept previously accepted messages.
Some ways to achieve this are described in the following sections.
7.5.1. Sequence Number
To prevent reuse of Sender Sequence Numbers, an endpoint MAY perform
the following procedure during normal operations:
o Before using a Sender Sequence Number that is evenly divisible by
K, where K is a positive integer, store the Sender Sequence Number
in persistent memory. After boot, the endpoint initiates the
Sender Sequence Number to the value stored in persistent memory +
K. Storing to persistent memory can be costly. The value K gives
a trade-off between the number of storage operations and efficient
use of Sender Sequence Numbers.
7.5.2. Replay Window
To prevent accepting replay of previously received requests, the
server MAY perform the following procedure after boot:
o For each stored security context, the first time after boot the
server receives an OSCORE request, the server responds with the
Echo option [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag] to get a request with
verifiable freshness. The server MUST use its Partial IV when
generating the AEAD nonce and MUST include the Partial IV in the
response.
If the server using the Echo option can verify a second request as
fresh, then the Partial IV of the second request is set as the lower
limit of the replay window.
7.5.3. Replay Protection of Observe Notifications
To prevent accepting replay of previously received notification
responses, the client MAY perform the following procedure after boot:
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o The client rejects notifications bound to the earlier
registration, removes all Notification Numbers and re-registers
using Observe.
8. Processing
This section describes the OSCORE message processing.
8.1. Protecting the Request
Given a CoAP request, the client SHALL perform the following steps to
create an OSCORE request:
1. Retrieve the Sender Context associated with the target resource.
2. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as
described in Section 5.4 and Section 5.3.
3. Encode the Partial IV (Sender Sequence Number in network byte
order) and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute
the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV as
described in Section 5.2.
4. Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE
Object as specified in Section 6.
5. Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4. The OSCORE
option is added (see Section 4.1.2).
6. Store the attribute-value pair (Token, {Security Context, PIV})
in order to be able to find the Recipient Context and the
request_piv from the Token in the response.
8.2. Verifying the Request
A server receiving a request containing the OSCORE option SHALL
perform the following steps:
1. Process Outer Block options according to [RFC7959], until all
blocks of the request have been received (see Section 4.1.3.3).
2. Discard the message Code and all non-special Inner option
message fields (marked in Figure 5 with 'x' in column E only)
present in the received message. For example, an If-Match Outer
option is discarded, but an Uri-Host Outer option is not
discarded.
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3. Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6) and retrieve the
Recipient Context associated with the Recipient ID in the 'kid'
parameter. If either the decompression or the COSE message
fails to decode, or the server fails to retrieve a Recipient
Context with Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter
received, then the server SHALL stop processing the request.
If:
* either the decompression or the COSE message fails to decode,
the server MAY respond with a 4.02 Bad Option error message.
The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero.
The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string "Failed to
decode COSE".
* the server fails to retrieve a Recipient Context with
Recipient ID corresponding to the 'kid' parameter received,
the server MAY respond with a 4.01 Unauthorized error
message. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with
value zero. The diagnostic payload SHOULD contain the string
"Security context not found".
4. Verify the 'Partial IV' parameter using the Replay Window, as
described in Section 7.4.
5. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in
Section 5.4.
6. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the
'Partial IV' parameter, received in the COSE Object.
7. Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per
[RFC8152] Section 5.3. (The decrypt operation includes the
verification of the integrity.)
* If decryption fails, the server MUST stop processing the
request and MAY respond with a 4.00 Bad Request error
message. The server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with
value zero. The diagnostic payload MAY contain the
"Decryption failed" string.
* If decryption succeeds, update the Replay Window, as
described in Section 7.
8. For each decrypted option, check if the option is also present
as an Outer option: if it is, discard the Outer. For example:
the message contains a Max-Age Inner and a Max-Age Outer option.
The Outer Max-Age is discarded.
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9. Add decrypted code, options and payload to the decrypted
request. The OSCORE option is removed.
10. The decrypted CoAP request is processed according to [RFC7252].
8.3. Protecting the Response
If a CoAP response is generated in response to an OSCORE request, the
server SHALL perform the following steps to create an OSCORE
response. Note that CoAP error responses derived from CoAP
processing (point 10. in Section 8.2) are protected, as well as
successful CoAP responses, while the OSCORE errors (point 3, 4, and 7
in Section 8.2) do not follow the processing below, but are sent as
simple CoAP responses, without OSCORE processing.
1. Retrieve the Sender Context in the Security Context used to
verify the request.
2. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data and the plaintext, as
described in Section 5.4 and Section 5.3.
3. Compute the AEAD nonce
* For Observe notifications, encode the Partial IV (Sender
Sequence Number in network byte order) and increment the
Sender Sequence Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from
the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV as described in
Section 5.2.
* For responses that are not Observe notifications, either use
the nonce from the request, or compute a new nonce from the
Sender ID, Common IV, and a new Partial IV as described in
Section 5.2, and increment the Sender Sequence Number by one.
4. Encrypt the COSE object using the Sender Key. Compress the COSE
Object as specified in Section 6. If the AEAD nonce was
constructed from a new Partial IV, this Partial IV MUST be
included in the message. If the AEAD nonce from the request was
used, the Partial IV MUST NOT be included in the message.
5. Format the OSCORE message according to Section 4. The OSCORE
option is added (see Section 4.1.2).
8.4. Verifying the Response
A client receiving a response containing the OSCORE option SHALL
perform the following steps:
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1. Process Outer Block options according to [RFC7959], until all
blocks of the OSCORE message have been received (see
Section 4.1.3.3).
2. Discard the message Code and all non-special Class E options
from the message. For example, ETag Outer option is discarded,
Max-Age Outer option is not discarded.
3. Retrieve the Recipient Context associated with the Token.
Decompress the COSE Object (Section 6). If either the
decompression or the COSE message fails to decode, then go to
11.
4. If the Observe option is present in the response, but the
request was not an Observe registration, then go to 11. If a
Partial IV is required (i.e. an Observe option is included or
the Notification number for the observation has already been
initiated), but not present in the response, then go to 11. For
Observe notifications, verify the received 'Partial IV'
parameter against the corresponding Notification Number as
described in Section 7.4.
5. Compose the Additional Authenticated Data, as described in
Section 5.4.
6. Compute the AEAD nonce
* If the Partial IV are not present in the response, the nonce
from the request is used.
* If the Partial IV is present in the response, compute the
nonce from the Recipient ID, Common IV, and the 'Partial IV'
parameter, received in the COSE Object.
7. Decrypt the COSE object using the Recipient Key, as per
[RFC8152] Section 5.3. (The decrypt operation includes the
verification of the integrity.) If decryption fails, then go to
11.
8. If the response is a notification, initiate or update the
corresponding Notification Number, as described in Section 7.
Otherwise, delete the attribute-value pair (Token, {Security
Context, PIV}).
9. For each decrypted option, check if the option is also present
as an Outer option: if it is, discard the Outer. For example:
the message contains a Max-Age Inner and a Max-Age Outer option.
The Outer Max-Age is discarded.
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10. Add decrypted code, options and payload to the decrypted
request. The OSCORE option is removed.
11. The decrypted CoAP response is processed according to [RFC7252].
12. In case any of the previous erroneous conditions apply: the
client SHALL stop processing the response.
An error condition occurring while processing a response in an
observation does not cancel the observation. A client MUST NOT react
to failure in step 7 by re-registering the observation immediately.
9. Web Linking
The use of OSCORE MAY be indicated by a target attribute "osc" in a
web link [RFC8288] to a resource, e.g. using a link-format document
[RFC6690] if the resource is accessible over CoAP.
The "osc" attribute is a hint indicating that the destination of that
link is only accessible using OSCORE, and unprotected access to it is
not supported. Note that this is simply a hint, it does not include
any security context material or any other information required to
run OSCORE.
A value MUST NOT be given for the "osc" attribute; any present value
MUST be ignored by parsers. The "osc" attribute MUST NOT appear more
than once in a given link-value; occurrences after the first MUST be
ignored by parsers.
The example in Figure 11 shows a use of the "osc" attribute: the
client does resource discovery on a server, and gets back a list of
resources, one of which includes the "osc" attribute indicating that
the resource is protected with OSCORE. The link-format notation (see
Section 5. of [RFC6690]) is used.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core
RES: 2.05 Content
</sensors/temp>;osc,
</sensors/light>;if="sensor"
Figure 11: The web link
10. CoAP-to-CoAP Forwarding Proxy
CoAP is designed for proxy operations (see Section 5.7 of [RFC7252]).
Security requirements for forwarding are presented in Section 2.2.1
of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs].
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OSCORE is designed to work with legacy CoAP proxies. Since a CoAP
response is only applicable to the original CoAP request, caching is
in general not useful. In support of legacy proxies, OSCORE defines
special Max-Age processing, see Section 4.1.3.1. An OSCORE-aware
proxy SHOULD NOT cache a response to a request with an OSCORE option
Proxy processing of the (Outer) Proxy-Uri option is as defined in
[RFC7252].
Proxy processing of the (Outer) Block options is as defined in
[RFC7959].
Proxy processing of the (Outer) Observe option is as defined in
[RFC7641]. OSCORE-aware proxies may look at the Partial IV value
instead of the Outer Observe option.
11. HTTP Operations
The CoAP request/response model may be mapped to HTTP and vice versa
as described in Section 10 of [RFC7252]. The HTTP-CoAP mapping is
further detailed in [RFC8075]. This section defines the components
needed to map and transport OSCORE messages over HTTP hops. By
mapping between HTTP and CoAP and by using cross-protocol proxies
OSCORE may be used end-to-end between e.g. an HTTP client and a CoAP
server. Examples are provided at the end of the section.
11.1. The HTTP OSCORE Header Field
The HTTP OSCORE Header Field (see Section 13.4) is used for carrying
the content of the CoAP OSCORE option when transporting OSCORE
messages over HTTP hops.
The HTTP OSCORE header field is only used in POST requests and 200
(OK) responses. When used, the HTTP header field Content-Type is set
to 'application/oscore' (see Section 13.5) indicating that the HTTP
body of this message contains the OSCORE payload (see Section 6.2}.
No additional semantics is provided by other message fields.
Using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of [RFC5234],
including the following core ABNF syntax rules defined by that
specification: ALPHA (letters) and DIGIT (decimal digits), the HTTP
OSCORE header field value is as follows.
base64url-char = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_"
OSCORE = 2*base64url-char
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The HTTP OSCORE header field is not appropriate to list in the
Connection header field (see Section 6.1 of [RFC7230]) since it is
not hop-by-hop. The HTTP OSCORE header field is not appropriate to
list in a Vary response header field (see Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231])
since a cached response would in general not be useful for other
clients. The HTTP OSCORE header field is not useful in trailers (see
Section 4.1 of [RFC7230]).
Intermediaries are in general not allowed to insert, delete, or
modify the OSCORE header. Changes to the HTTP OSCORE header field
will in general violate the integrity of the OSCORE message resulting
in an error. For the same reason the HTTP OSCORE header field is in
general not preserved across redirects. A CoAP-to-HTTP proxy
receiving a request for redirect may copy the HTTP OSCORE header
field to the new request, although the condition for this being
successful is that the server to which the OSCORE message is
redirected needs to be a clone of the server for which the OSCORE
message was intended (same target resource, same OSCORE security
context etc.). If an HTTP/OSCORE client receives a redirect it
should instead generate a new OSCORE request for the server it was
redirected to.
11.2. CoAP-to-HTTP Mapping
Section 10.1 of [RFC7252] describes the fundamentals of the CoAP-to-
HTTP cross-protocol mapping process. The additional rules for OSCORE
messages are:
o The HTTP OSCORE header field value is set to
* AA if the CoAP OSCORE option is empty, otherwise
* the value of the CoAP OSCORE option (Section 6.1) in base64url
(Section 5 of [RFC4648]) encoding without padding.
Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C
of [RFC7515].
o The HTTP Content-Type is set to 'application/oscore' (see
Section 13.5), independent of CoAP Content-Format.
11.3. HTTP-to-CoAP Mapping
Section 10.2 of [RFC7252] and [RFC8075] specify the behavior of an
HTTP-to-CoAP proxy. The additional rules for HTTP messages with the
OSCORE header field are:
o The CoAP OSCORE option is set as follows:
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* empty if the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field is a single
zero byte (0x00) represented by AA, otherwise
* the value of the HTTP OSCORE header field decoded from
base64url (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) without padding.
Implementation notes for this encoding are given in Appendix C
of [RFC7515].
o The CoAP Content-Format option is omitted, the content format for
OSCORE (Section 13.6) MUST NOT be used.
11.4. HTTP Endpoints
Restricted to subsets of HTTP and CoAP supporting a bijective
mapping, OSCORE can be originated or terminated in HTTP endpoints.
The sending HTTP endpoint uses [RFC8075] to translate the HTTP
message into a CoAP message. The CoAP message is then processed with
OSCORE as defined in this document. The OSCORE message is then
mapped to HTTP as described in Section 11.2 and sent in compliance
with the rules in Section 11.1.
The receiving HTTP endpoint maps the HTTP message to a CoAP message
using [RFC8075] and Section 11.3. The resulting OSCORE message is
processed as defined in this document. If successful, the plaintext
CoAP message is translated to HTTP for normal processing in the
endpoint.
11.5. Example: HTTP Client and CoAP Server
This section is giving an example of how a request and a response
between an HTTP client and a CoAP server could look like. The
example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how
the message fields are translated in the different steps.
Mapping and notation here is based on "Simple Form" (Section 5.4.1 of
[RFC8075]).
[HTTP request -- Before client object security processing]
GET http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/orders
HTTP/1.1
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[HTTP request -- HTTP Client to Proxy]
POST http://proxy.url/hc/?target_uri=coap://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: CSU
Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]
[CoAP request -- Proxy to CoAP Server]
POST coap://server.url/
OSCORE: 09 25
Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]
[CoAP request -- After server object security processing]
GET coap://server.url/orders
[CoAP response -- Before server object security processing]
2.05 Content
Content-Format: 0
Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!
[CoAP response -- CoAP Server to Proxy]
2.04 Changed
OSCORE: [empty]
Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]
[HTTP response -- Proxy to HTTP Client]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: AA
Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]
[HTTP response -- After client object security processing]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!
Note that the HTTP Status Code 200 in the next-to-last message is the
mapping of CoAP Code 2.04 (Changed), whereas the HTTP Status Code 200
in the last message is the mapping of the CoAP Code 2.05 (Content),
which was encrypted within the compressed COSE object carried in the
Body of the HTTP response.
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11.6. Example: CoAP Client and HTTP Server
This section is giving an example of how a request and a response
between a CoAP client and an HTTP server could look like. The
example is not a test vector but intended as an illustration of how
the message fields are translated in the different steps
[CoAP request -- Before client object security processing]
GET coap://proxy.url/
Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/orders
[CoAP request -- CoAP Client to Proxy]
POST coap://proxy.url/
Proxy-Uri=http://server.url/
OSCORE: 09 25
Payload: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]
[HTTP request -- Proxy to HTTP Server]
POST http://server.url/ HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: CSU
Body: 09 07 01 13 61 f7 0f d2 97 b1 [binary]
[HTTP request -- After server object security processing]
GET http://server.url/orders HTTP/1.1
[HTTP response -- Before server object security processing]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/plain
Body: Exterminate! Exterminate!
[HTTP response -- HTTP Server to Proxy]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/oscore
OSCORE: AA
Body: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]
[CoAP response -- Proxy to CoAP Client]
2.04 Changed
OSCORE: [empty]
Payload: 00 31 d1 fc f6 70 fb 0c 1d d5 ... [binary]
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[CoAP response -- After client object security processing]
2.05 Content
Content-Format: 0
Payload: Exterminate! Exterminate!
Note that the HTTP Code 2.04 (Changed) in the next-to-last message is
the mapping of HTTP Status Code 200, whereas the CoAP Code 2.05
(Content) in the last message is the value that was encrypted within
the compressed COSE object carried in the Body of the HTTP response.
12. Security Considerations
An overview of the security properties is given in Appendix D.
12.1. End-to-end Protection
In scenarios with intermediary nodes such as proxies or gateways,
transport layer security such as (D)TLS only protects data hop-by-
hop. As a consequence, the intermediary nodes can read and modify
any information. The trust model where all intermediary nodes are
considered trustworthy is problematic, not only from a privacy
perspective, but also from a security perspective, as the
intermediaries are free to delete resources on sensors and falsify
commands to actuators (such as "unlock door", "start fire alarm",
"raise bridge"). Even in the rare cases where all the owners of the
intermediary nodes are fully trusted, attacks and data breaches make
such an architecture brittle.
(D)TLS protects hop-by-hop the entire message. OSCORE protects end-
to-end all information that is not required for proxy operations (see
Section 4). (D)TLS and OSCORE can be combined, thereby enabling end-
to-end security of the message payload, in combination with hop-by-
hop protection of the entire message, during transport between end-
point and intermediary node. In particular when OSCORE is used with
HTTP, the additional TLS protection of HTTP hops is recommended, e.g.
between an HTTP endpoint and a proxy translating between HTTP and
CoAP.
The consequences of unprotected message fields are analyzed in
Appendix D.4. Error messages occurring during CoAP processing are
protected end-to-end. Error messages occurring during OSCORE
processing are not always possible to protect, e.g. if the receiving
endpoint cannot locate the right security context. It may still be
favorable to send an unprotected error message, e.g. to prevent
extensive retransmissions, so unprotected error messages are allowed
as specified. Similar to error messages, signaling messages are not
always possible to protect as they may be intended for an
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intermediary. Applications using unprotected error and signaling
messages need to consider the threat that these messages may be
spoofed.
12.2. Security Context Establishment
The use of COSE_Encrypt0 and AEAD to protect messages as specified in
this document requires an established security context. The method
to establish the security context described in Section 3.2 is based
on a common Master Secret and unique Sender IDs. The necessary input
parameters may be pre-established or obtained using a key
establishment protocol augmented with establishment of Sender/
Recipient ID such as the OSCORE profile of the ACE framework
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]. This procedure must ensure that the
requirements of the security context parameters are complied with
Section 3.3 for the intended use and also in error situations. It is
recommended to use a key establishment protocol which provides
forward secrecy whenever possible. Considerations for the deploying
OSCORE with a fixed Master Secret are given in Appendix B.
12.3. Master Secret
OSCORE uses HKDF [RFC5869] and the established input parameters to
derive the security context. The required properties of the security
context parameters are discussed in Section 3.3, in this section we
focus on the Master Secret. HKDF denotes in this specification the
composition of the expand and extract functions as defined in
[RFC5869] and the Master Secret is used as Input Key Material (IKM).
Informally, HKDF takes as source an IKM containing some good amount
of randomness but not necessarily distributed uniformly (or for which
an attacker has some partial knowledge) and derive from it one or
more cryptographically strong secret keys [RFC5869].
Therefore, the main requirement for the OSCORE Master Secret, in
addition to being secret, is that it is has a good amount of
randomness. The selected key establishment schemes must ensure that
the necessary properties for the Master Secret are fulfilled. For
pre-shared key deployments and key transport solutions such as
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], the Master Secret can be generated
offline using a good random number generator.
12.4. Replay Protection
Most AEAD algorithms require a unique nonce for each message, for
which the sender sequence numbers in the COSE message field 'Partial
IV' is used. If the recipient accepts any sequence number larger
than the one previously received, then the problem of sequence number
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synchronization is avoided. With reliable transport, it may be
defined that only messages with sequence number which are equal to
previous sequence number + 1 are accepted. The alternatives to
sequence numbers have their issues: very constrained devices may not
be able to support accurate time, or to generate and store large
numbers of random nonces. The requirement to change key at counter
wrap is a complication, but it also forces the user of this
specification to think about implementing key renewal.
12.5. Client Aliveness
A verified OSCORE request enables the server to verify the identity
of the entity who generated the message. However, it does not verify
that the client is currently involved in the communication, since the
message may be a delayed delivery of a previously generated request
which now reaches the server. To verify the aliveness of the client
the server may use the Echo option in the response to a request from
the client (see [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]).
12.6. Cryptographic Considerations
The maximum sender sequence number is dependent on the AEAD
algorithm. The maximum sender sequence number is 2^40 - 1, or any
algorithm specific lower limit, after which a new security context
must be generated. The mechanism to build the nonce (Section 5.2)
assumes that the nonce is at least 56 bits, and the Partial IV is at
most 40 bits. The mandatory-to-implement AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-
16-64-128 is selected for compatibility with CCM*.
In order to prevent cryptanalysis when the same plaintext is
repeatedly encrypted by many different users with distinct keys, the
nonce is formed by mixing the sequence number with a secret per-
context initialization vector (Common IV) derived along with the keys
(see Section 3.1 of [RFC8152]), and by using a Master Salt in the key
derivation (see [MF00] for an overview). The Master Secret, Sender
Key, Recipient Key, and Common IV must be secret, the rest of the
parameters may be public. The Master Secret must have a good amount
of randomness (see Section 12.3)).
12.7. Message Segmentation
The Inner Block options enable the sender to split large messages
into OSCORE-protected blocks such that the receiving endpoint can
verify blocks before having received the complete message. The Outer
Block options allow for arbitrary proxy fragmentation operations that
cannot be verified by the endpoints, but can by policy be restricted
in size since the Inner Block options allow for secure fragmentation
of very large messages. A maximum message size (above which the
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sending endpoint fragments the message and the receiving endpoint
discards the message, if complying to the policy) may be obtained as
part of normal resource discovery.
12.8. Privacy Considerations
Privacy threats executed through intermediary nodes are considerably
reduced by means of OSCORE. End-to-end integrity protection and
encryption of the message payload and all options that are not used
for proxy operations, provide mitigation against attacks on sensor
and actuator communication, which may have a direct impact on the
personal sphere.
The unprotected options (Figure 5) may reveal privacy sensitive
information, see Appendix D.4. CoAP headers sent in plaintext allow,
for example, matching of CON and ACK (CoAP Message Identifier),
matching of request and responses (Token) and traffic analysis.
OSCORE does not provide protection for HTTP header fields which are
not both CoAP-mappable and class E. The HTTP message fields which
are visible to on-path entity are only used for the purpose of
transporting the OSCORE message, whereas the application layer
message is encoded in CoAP and encrypted.
Unprotected error messages reveal information about the security
state in the communication between the endpoints. Unprotected
signaling messages reveal information about the reliable transport
used on a leg of the path. Using the mechanisms described in
Section 7.5 may reveal when a device goes through a reboot. This can
be mitigated by the device storing the precise state of sender
sequence number and replay window on a clean shutdown.
The length of message fields can reveal information about the
message. Applications may use a padding scheme to protect against
traffic analysis.
13. IANA Considerations
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "[[this
document]]" with the RFC number of this specification.
Note to IANA: Please note all occurrences of "TBDx" in this
specification should be assigned the same number.
13.1. COSE Header Parameters Registry
The 'kid context' parameter is added to the "COSE Header Parameters
Registry":
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o Name: kid context
o Label: TBD2
o Value Type: bstr
o Value Registry:
o Description: Identifies the kid context
o Reference: Section 5.1 of this document
Note to IANA: Label assignment in (Integer value between 1 and 255)
is requested. (RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)
13.2. CoAP Option Numbers Registry
The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Option Numbers registry:
+--------+-----------------+-------------------+
| Number | Name | Reference |
+--------+-----------------+-------------------+
| TBD1 | OSCORE | [[this document]] |
+--------+-----------------+-------------------+
13.3. CoAP Signaling Option Numbers Registry
The OSCORE option is added to the CoAP Signaling Option Numbers
registry:
+------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+
| Applies to | Number | Name | Reference |
+------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+
| 7.xx (any) | TBD1 | OSCORE | [[this document]] |
+------------+--------+---------------------+-------------------+
13.4. Header Field Registrations
The HTTP OSCORE header field is added to the Message Headers
registry:
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
| Header Field Name | Protocol | Status | Reference |
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
| OSCORE | http | standard | [[this document]] |
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
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13.5. Media Type Registrations
This section registers the 'application/oscore' media type in the
"Media Types" registry. These media types are used to indicate that
the content is an OSCORE message. The OSCORE body cannot be
understood without the OSCORE header field value and the security
context.
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Type name: application
Subtype name: oscore
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[This document]].
Interoperability considerations: N/A
Published specification: [[This document]]
Applications that use this media type: IoT applications sending
security content over HTTP(S) transports.
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): N/A
* File extension(s): N/A
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: N/A
Author: Goeran Selander, goran.selander@ericsson.com
Change Controller: IESG
Provisional registration? No
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13.6. CoAP Content-Formats Registry
Note to IANA: ID assignment in the 10000-64999 range is requested.
(RFC Editor: Delete this note after IANA assignment)
This section registers the media type 'application/oscore' media type
in the "CoAP Content-Format" registry. This Content-Format for the
OSCORE payload is defined for potential future use cases and SHALL
NOT be used in the OSCORE message. The OSCORE payload cannot be
understood without the OSCORE option value and the security context.
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
| Media Type | Encoding | ID | Reference |
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
| application/oscore | | TBD3 | [[this document]] |
+----------------------+----------+----------+-------------------+
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
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[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[RFC8075] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
[RFC8132] van der Stok, P., Bormann, C., and A. Sehgal, "PATCH and
FETCH Methods for the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP)", RFC 8132, DOI 10.17487/RFC8132, April 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8132>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8288] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 8288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8288, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8288>.
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[RFC8323] Bormann, C., Lemay, S., Tschofenig, H., Hartke, K.,
Silverajan, B., and B. Raymor, Ed., "CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets",
RFC 8323, DOI 10.17487/RFC8323, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8323>.
14.2. Informative References
[I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie]
Bormann, C., "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) over
IEEE 802.15.4 Information Element for IETF", draft-
bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie-00 (work in progress), April
2016.
[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]
Selander, G., Palombini, F., and K. Hartke, "Requirements
for CoAP End-To-End Security", draft-hartke-core-e2e-
security-reqs-03 (work in progress), July 2017.
[I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security]
Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson,
"Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf-
6tisch-minimal-security-05 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-11
(work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]
Seitz, L., Palombini, F., Gunnarsson, M., and G. Selander,
"OSCORE profile of the Authentication and Authorization
for Constrained Environments Framework", draft-ietf-ace-
oscore-profile-01 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR data structures", draft-ietf-cbor-cddl-02
(work in progress), February 2018.
[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]
Amsuess, C., Mattsson, J., and G. Selander, "Echo and
Request-Tag", draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag-01 (work in
progress), March 2018.
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[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]
Tiloca, M., Selander, G., Palombini, F., and J. Park,
"Secure group communication for CoAP", draft-ietf-core-
oscore-groupcomm-01 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.mattsson-core-coap-actuators]
Mattsson, J., Fornehed, J., Selander, G., Palombini, F.,
and C. Amsuess, "Controlling Actuators with CoAP", draft-
mattsson-core-coap-actuators-05 (work in progress), March
2018.
[MF00] McGrew, D. and S. Fluhrer, "Attacks on Encryption of
Redundant Plaintext and Implications on Internet
Security", the Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Workshop
on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2000), Springer-
Verlag. , 2000.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7390] Rahman, A., Ed. and E. Dijk, Ed., "Group Communication for
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7390, October 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7390>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
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[RFC7967] Bhattacharyya, A., Bandyopadhyay, S., Pal, A., and T.
Bose, "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Option for
No Server Response", RFC 7967, DOI 10.17487/RFC7967,
August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7967>.
Appendix A. Scenario Examples
This section gives examples of OSCORE, targeting scenarios in
Section 2.2.1.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. The message
exchanges are made, based on the assumption that there is a security
context established between client and server. For simplicity, these
examples only indicate the content of the messages without going into
detail of the (compressed) COSE message format.
A.1. Secure Access to Sensor
This example illustrates a client requesting the alarm status from a
server.
Client Proxy Server
| | |
+------>| | Code: 0.02 (POST)
| POST | | Token: 0x8c
| | | OSCORE: [kid:5f,Partial IV:42]
| | | Payload: {Code:0.01,
| | | Uri-Path:"alarm_status"}
| | |
| +------>| Code: 0.02 (POST)
| | POST | Token: 0x7b
| | | OSCORE: [kid:5f,Partial IV:42]
| | | Payload: {Code:0.01,
| | | Uri-Path:"alarm_status"}
| | |
| |<------+ Code: 2.04 (Changed)
| | 2.04 | Token: 0x7b
| | | OSCORE: -
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05, "OFF"}
| | |
|<------+ | Code: 2.04 (Changed)
| 2.04 | | Token: 0x8c
| | | OSCORE: -
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05, "OFF"}
| | |
Figure 12: Secure Access to Sensor. Square brackets [ ... ] indicate
content of compressed COSE object. Curly brackets { ... } indicate
encrypted data.
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The request/response Codes are encrypted by OSCORE and only dummy
Codes (POST/Changed) are visible in the header of the OSCORE message.
The option Uri-Path ("alarm_status") and payload ("OFF") are
encrypted.
The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (5f),
indicating which security context was used to protect the message and
a Partial IV (42).
The server verifies the request as specified in Section 8.2. The
client verifies the response as specified in Section 8.4.
A.2. Secure Subscribe to Sensor
This example illustrates a client requesting subscription to a blood
sugar measurement resource (GET /glucose), first receiving the value
220 mg/dl and then a second value 180 mg/dl.
Client Proxy Server
| | |
+------>| | Code: 0.05 (FETCH)
| FETCH | | Token: 0x83
| | | Observe: 0
| | | OSCORE: [kid:ca,Partial IV:15]
| | | Payload: {Code:0.01,
| | | Uri-Path:"glucose"}
| | |
| +------>| Code: 0.05 (FETCH)
| | FETCH | Token: 0xbe
| | | Observe: 0
| | | OSCORE: [kid:ca,Partial IV:15]
| | | Payload: {Code:0.01,
| | | Uri-Path:"glucose"}
| | |
| |<------+ Code: 2.05 (Content)
| | 2.05 | Token: 0xbe
| | | Observe: 7
| | | OSCORE: [Partial IV:32]
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05,
| | | Content-Format:0, "220"}
| | |
|<------+ | Code: 2.05 (Content)
| 2.05 | | Token: 0x83
| | | Observe: 7
| | | OSCORE: [Partial IV:32]
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05,
| | | Content-Format:0, "220"}
... ... ...
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| | |
| |<------+ Code: 2.05 (Content)
| | 2.05 | Token: 0xbe
| | | Observe: 8
| | | OSCORE: [Partial IV:36]
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05,
| | | Content-Format:0, "180"}
| | |
|<------+ | Code: 2.05 (Content)
| 2.05 | | Token: 0x83
| | | Observe: 8
| | | OSCORE: [Partial IV:36]
| | | Payload: {Code:2.05,
| | | Content-Format:0, "180"}
| | |
Figure 13: Secure Subscribe to Sensor. Square brackets [ ... ]
indicate content of compressed COSE object header. Curly brackets {
... } indicate encrypted data.
The dummy Codes (FETCH/Content) are visible in the header of the
OSCORE message to allow intermediary processing of Observe. The
options Content-Format (0) and the payload ("220" and "180"), are
encrypted.
The COSE header of the request contains an identifier (ca),
indicating the security context used to protect the message and a
Partial IV (15). The COSE headers of the responses contains Partial
IVs (32 and 36).
The server verifies that the Partial IV has not been received before.
The client verifies that the responses are bound to the request and
that the Partial IVs are greater than any Partial IV previously
received in a response bound to the request.
Appendix B. Deployment Examples
Two examples complying with the requirements on the security context
parameters (Section 3.3) are given in this section.
B.1. Master Secret Used Once
For settings where the Master Secret is only used during deployment,
the uniqueness of the AEAD nonce may be assured by persistent storage
of the security context as described in this specification (see
Section 7.5). For many IoT deployments, a 128 bit uniformly random
Master Key is sufficient for encrypting all data exchanged with the
IoT device throughout its lifetime.
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B.2. Master Secret Used Multiple Times
One Master Secret can be used to derive multiple security contexts if
unique Master Salts can be guaranteed. This may be useful e.g. in
case of recommissioning with reused Master Secret. In order to
prevent reuse of AEAD nonce and key, which would compromise the
security, the Master Salt must never be used twice, even if the
device is reset, recommissioned or in error cases. Examples of
failures include derivation of pseudorandom master salt from a static
seed, or a deterministic seeding procedure with inputs that are
repeated or can be replayed. Techniques for persistent storage of
security state may be used also in this case, to ensure uniqueness of
Master Salt.
Assuming the Master Salts are indeed unique (or stochastically
unique) we give an example of a procedure which may be implemented in
client and server to establish the OSCORE security context based on
pre-established input parameters (see Section 3.2) except for the
Master Salt, which is transported in kid context parameter (see
Section 5.1) of the request.
1. In order to establish a security context with a server for the
first time, or a new security context replacing an old security
context, the client generates a (pseudo-)random uniformly
distributed 64-bit Master Salt and derives the security context
as specified in Section 3.2. The client protects a request with
the new Sender Context and sends the message with kid context set
to the Master Salt.
2. The server, receiving an OSCORE request with a non-empty kid
context derives the new security context using the received kid
context as Master Salt. The server processes the request as
specified in this document using the new Recipient Context. If
the processing of the request completes without error, the server
responds with an Echo option as specified in
[I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]. The response is protected with
the new Sender Context.
3. The client, receiving a response with an Echo option to a request
which used a new security context, verifies the response using
the new Recipient Context, and if valid repeats the request with
the Echo option (see [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]) using the
new Sender Context. Subsequent message exchanges (unless
superseded) are processed using the new security context without
including the Master Salt in the kid context.
4. The server, receiving a request with a kid context and a valid
Echo option (see [I-D.ietf-core-echo-request-tag]), repeats the
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processing described in step 2. If it completes without error,
then the new security context is established, and the request is
valid. If the server already had an old security context with
this client that is now replaced by the new security context.
If the server receives a request without kid context from a client
with which no security context is established, then the server
responds with a 4.01 Unauthorized error message with diagnostic
payload containing the string "Security context not found". This
could be the result of the server having lost its security context or
that a new security context has not been successfully established,
which may be a trigger for the client to run this procedure.
Appendix C. Test Vectors
This appendix includes the test vectors for different examples of
CoAP messages using OSCORE.
C.1. Test Vector 1: Key Derivation with Master Salt
Given a set of inputs, OSCORE defines how to set up the Security
Context in both the client and the server. The default values are
used for AEAD Algorithm and KDF.
C.1.1. Client
Inputs:
o Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
o Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (8 bytes)
o Sender ID: 0x (0 byte)
o Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
From the previous parameters,
o info (for Sender Key): 0x84400A634b657910 (8 bytes)
o info (for Recipient Key): 0x8441010A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Common IV): 0x84400a6249560d (7 bytes)
Outputs:
o Sender Key: 0x7230aab3b549d94c9224aacc744e93ab (16 bytes)
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o Recipient Key: 0xe534a26a64aa3982e988e31f1e401e65 (16 bytes)
o Common IV: 0x01727733ab49ead385b18f7d91 (13 bytes)
C.1.2. Server
Inputs:
o Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
o Master Salt: 0x9e7ca92223786340 (64 bytes)
o Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
o Recipient ID: 0x (0 byte)
From the previous parameters,
o info (for Sender Key): 0x8441010A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Recipient Key): 0x84400A634b657910 (8 bytes)
o info (for Common IV): 0x84400a6249560d (7 bytes)
Outputs:
o Sender Key: 0xe534a26a64aa3982e988e31f1e401e65 (16 bytes)
o Recipient Key: 0x7230aab3b549d94c9224aacc744e93ab (16 bytes)
o Common IV: 0x01727733ab49ead385b18f7d91 (13 bytes)
C.2. Test Vector 2: Key Derivation without Master Salt
Given a set of inputs, OSCORE defines how to set up the Security
Context in both the client and the server. The default values are
used for AEAD Algorithm, KDF, and Master Salt.
C.2.1. Client
Inputs:
o Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
o Sender ID: 0x00 (1 byte)
o Recipient ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
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From the previous parameters,
o info (for Sender Key): 0x8441000A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Recipient Key): 0x8441010A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Common IV): 0x84400a6249560d (7 bytes)
Outputs:
o Sender Key: 0xf8f3b887436285ed5a66f6026ac2cdc1 (16 bytes)
o Recipient Key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o Common IV: 0xd1a1949aa253278f34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
C.2.2. Server
Inputs:
o Master Secret: 0x0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10 (16 bytes)
o Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
o Recipient ID: 0x00 (1 byte)
From the previous parameters,
o info (for Sender Key): 0x8441010A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Recipient Key): 0x8441000A634b657910 (9 bytes)
o info (for Common IV): 0x84400a6249560d (7 bytes)
Outputs:
o Sender Key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o Recipient Key: 0xf8f3b887436285ed5a66f6026ac2cdc1 (16 bytes)
o Common IV: 0xd1a1949aa253278f34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
C.3. Test Vector 3: OSCORE Request, Client
This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET
request using the security context derived in Appendix C.1. The
unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path option.
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Unprotected CoAP request:
0x440149c60000f2a7396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)
Common Context:
o AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
o Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
o Common IV: 0xd1a1949aa253278f34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
Sender Context:
o Sender ID: 0x00 (1 byte)
o Sender Key: 0xf8f3b887436285ed5a66f6026ac2cdc1 (16 bytes)
o Sender Sequence Number: 20
The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
o Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)
o kid: 0x00 (1 byte)
o external_aad: 0x8501810a4100411440 (9 bytes)
o AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040498501810a4100411440 (21 bytes)
o plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)
o encryption key: 0xf8f3b887436285ed5a66f6026ac2cdc1 (16 bytes)
o nonce: 0xd0a1949aa253278f34c528d2d8 (13 bytes)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
o OSCORE option value: 0x091400 (3 bytes)
o ciphertext: 0x55b3710d47c611cd3924838a44 (13 bytes)
From there:
o Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x44026dd30000acc5396c6f6
3616c686f7374d305091400ff55b3710d47c611cd3924838a44 (37 bytes)
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C.4. Test Vector 4: OSCORE Request, Client
This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected CoAP GET
request using the security context derived in Appendix C.2. The
unprotected request only contains the Uri-Path option.
Unprotected CoAP request:
0x440149c60000f2a7396c6f63616c686f737483747631 (22 bytes)
Common Context:
o AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
o Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
o Common IV: 0x01727733ab49ead385b18f7d91 (13 bytes)
Sender Context:
o Sender ID: 0x (0 bytes)
o Sender Key: 0x7230aab3b549d94c9224aacc744e93ab (16 bytes)
o Sender Sequence Number: 20
The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
o Partial IV: 0x14 (1 byte)
o kid: 0x (0 byte)
o external_aad: 0x8501810a40411440 (8 bytes)
o AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040488501810a40411440 (20 bytes)
o plaintext: 0x01b3747631 (5 bytes)
o encryption key: 0x7230aab3b549d94c9224aacc744e93ab (16 bytes)
o nonce: 0x01727733ab49ead385b18f7d85 (13 bytes)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
o OSCORE option value: 0x0914 (2 bytes)
o ciphertext: 0x6be9214aad448260ff1be1f594 (13 bytes)
From there:
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o Protected CoAP request (OSCORE message): 0x44023bfc000066ef396c6f6
3616c686f7374d2050914ff6be9214aad448260ff1be1f594 (36 bytes)
C.5. Test Vector 5: OSCORE Response, Server
This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05
Content response to the request in Appendix C.3. The unprotected
response has payload "Hello World!" and no options. The protected
response does not contain a kid nor a Partial IV. Note that some
parameters are derived from the request.
Unprotected CoAP response:
0x644549c60000f2a7ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (21 bytes)
Common Context:
o AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
o Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
o Common IV: 0xd1a1949aa253278f34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
Sender Context:
o Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
o Sender Key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o Sender Sequence Number: 0
The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
o external_aad: 0x8501810a4100411440 (9 bytes)
o AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040498501810a4100411440 (21 bytes)
o plaintext: 0x45ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (14 bytes)
o encryption key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o nonce: 0xd0a1949aa253278f34c528d2d8 (13 bytes)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
o OSCORE option value: 0x (0 bytes)
o ciphertext: 0xe4e8c28c41c8f31ca56eec24f6c71d94eacbcdffdc6d (22
bytes)
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From there:
o Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message): 0x64446dd30000acc5d008ff
e4e8c28c41c8f31ca56eec24f6c71d94eacbcdffdc6d (33 bytes)
C.6. Test Vector 6: OSCORE Response with Partial IV, Server
This section contains a test vector for an OSCORE protected 2.05
Content response to the request in Appendix C.3. The unprotected
response has payload "Hello World!" and no options. The protected
response does not contain a kid, but contains a Partial IV. Note
that some parameters are derived from the request.
Unprotected CoAP response:
0x644549c60000f2a7ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (21 bytes)
Common Context:
o AEAD Algorithm: 10 (AES-CCM-16-64-128)
o Key Derivation Function: HKDF SHA-256
o Common IV: 0xd1a1949aa253278f34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
Sender Context:
o Sender ID: 0x01 (1 byte)
o Sender Key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o Sender Sequence Number: 0
The following COSE and cryptographic parameters are derived:
o Partial IV: 0x00 (1 byte)
o external_aad: 0x8501810a4100411440 (9 bytes)
o AAD: 0x8368456e63727970743040498501810a4100411440 (21 bytes)
o plaintext: 0x45ff48656c6c6f20576f726c6421 (14 bytes)
o encryption key: 0xd904cb101f7341c3f4c56c300fa69941 (16 bytes)
o nonce: 0xd0a1949aa253278e34c528d2cc (13 bytes)
From the previous parameter, the following is derived:
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o OSCORE option value: 0x0100 (2 bytes)
o ciphertext: 0xa7e3ca27f221f453c0ba68c350bf652ea096b328a1bf (22
bytes)
From there:
o Protected CoAP response (OSCORE message): 0x64442b130000b29ed20801
00ffa7e3ca27f221f453c0ba68c350bf652ea096b328a1bf (35 bytes)
Appendix D. Overview of Security Properties
D.1. Supporting Proxy Operations
CoAP is designed to work with intermediaries reading and/or changing
CoAP message fields and performing supporting operations in
constrained environments, e.g. forwarding and cross-protocol
translations.
Securing CoAP on transport layer protects the entire message between
the endpoints in which case CoAP proxy operations are not possible.
In order to enable proxy operations, security on transport layer
needs to be terminated at the proxy in which case the CoAP message in
its entirety is unprotected in the proxy.
Requirements for CoAP end-to-end security are specified in
[I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. The client and server are
assumed to be honest, but proxies and gateways are only trusted to
perform their intended operations. Forwarding is specified in
Section 2.2.1 of [I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs]. HTTP-CoAP
translation is specified in [RFC8075]. Intermediaries translating
between different transport layers are intended to perform just that.
By working at the CoAP layer, OSCORE enables different CoAP message
fields to be protected differently, which allows message fields
required for proxy operations to be available to the proxy while
message fields intended for the other endpoint remain protected. In
the remainder of this section we analyze how OSCORE protects the
protected message fields and the consequences of message fields
intended for proxy operation being unprotected.
D.2. Protected Message Fields
Protected message fields are included in the Plaintext (Section 5.3)
and the Additional Authenticated Data (Section 5.4) of the
COSE_Encrypt0 object using an AEAD algorithm.
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OSCORE depends on a pre-established random Master Secret
(Section 12.3) which can be used to derive keys, and a construction
for making (key, nonce) pairs unique (Appendix D.3). Assuming this
is true, and the keys are used for no more data than indicated in
Section 7.2, OSCORE should provide the following guarantees:
o Confidentiality: An attacker should not be able to determine the
plaintext contents of a given OSCORE message or determine that
different plaintexts are related (Section 5.3).
o Integrity: An attacker should not be able to craft a new OSCORE
message with protected message fields different from an existing
OSCORE message which will be accepted by the receiver.
o Request-response binding: An attacker should not be able to make a
client match a response to the wrong request.
o Non-replayability: An attacker should not be able to cause the
receiver to accept a message which it has already accepted.
In the above, the attacker is anyone except the endpoints, e.g. a
compromised intermediary. Informally, OSCORE provides these
properties by AEAD-protecting the plaintext with a strong key and
uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs. AEAD encryption [RFC5116] provides
confidentiality and integrity for the data. Response-request binding
is provided by including the kid and Partial IV of the request in the
AAD of the response. Non-replayability of requests and notifications
is provided by using unique (key, nonce) pairs and a replay
protection mechanism (application dependent, see Section 7.4).
OSCORE is susceptible to a variety of traffic analysis attacks based
on observing the length and timing of encrypted packets. OSCORE does
not provide any specific defenses against this form of attack but the
application may use a padding mechanism to prevent an attacker from
directly determine the length of the padding. However, information
about padding may still be revealed by side-channel attacks observing
differences in timing.
D.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)
In this section we show that (key, nonce) pairs are unique as long as
the requirements Section 3.3 and Section 7.2 are followed.
Fix a security context and an endpoint, called the encrypting
endpoint. Endpoints may alternate between client and server roles,
but each endpoint encrypts with the Sender Key of its Sender Context.
Sender Keys are (stochastically) unique since they are derived with
HKDF from unique Sender IDs, so messages encrypted by different
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endpoints use different keys. It remains to prove that the nonces
used by the fixed endpoint are unique.
Since the Common IV is fixed, the nonces are determined by a Partial
IV (PIV) and the Sender ID of the endpoint generating that Partial IV
(ID_PIV). The nonce construction (Section 5.2) with the size of the
ID_PIV (S) creates unique nonces for different (ID_PIV, PIV) pairs.
For requests and responses with Partial IV (e.g. Observe
notifications):
o ID_PIV = Sender ID of the encrypting endpoint
o PIV = current Partial IV of the encrypting endpoint
Since the encrypting endpoint steps the Partial IV for each use, the
nonces used are all unique as long as the number of encrypted
messages is kept within the required range (Section 7.2).
For responses without Partial IV (i.e. single response to a request):
o ID_PIV = Sender ID of the endpoint generating the request
o PIV = Partial IV of the request
Since the Sender IDs are unique, ID_PIV is different from the Sender
ID of the encrypting endpoint. Therefore, the nonce is different
compared to nonces where the encrypting endpoint generated the
Partial IV. Since the Partial IV of the request is verified for
replay (Section 7.4) associated to this Recipient Context, PIV is
unique for this ID_PIV.
The argumentation also holds for group communication as specified in
[RFC7390] (see [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]).
D.4. Unprotected Message Fields
This section lists and discusses issues with unprotected message
fields.
D.4.1. CoAP Code
The CoAP Code of an OSCORE message is POST or FETCH for requests and
with corresponding response codes. Since the use of Observe is
indicated with the Outer Observe option, no additional information is
revealed by having a special codes for Observe messages. A change of
code does not affect the method of the end-to-end message but may be
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a denial service attack caused by error in the OSCORE processing.
Other aspects of Observe are discussed in Appendix D.4.3.
D.4.2. CoAP Header Fields
o Version. The CoAP version [RFC7252] is not expected to be
sensitive to disclose. Currently there is only one CoAP version
defined. A change of this parameter is potentially a denial of
service attack. Future versions of CoAP need to analyze attacks
to OSCORE protected messages due to an adversary changing the CoAP
version.
o Token/Token Length. The Token field is a client-local identifier
for differentiating between concurrent requests [RFC7252]. An
eavesdropper reading the token can match requests to responses
which can be used in traffic analysis. CoAP proxies are allowed
to change Token and Token Length between UDP hops. However,
modifications of Token and Token Length during a UDP hop may
become a denial of service attack, since it may prevent the client
to identify to which request the response belongs or to find the
correct information to verify integrity of the response.
o Type/Message ID. The Type/Message ID fields [RFC7252] reveal
information about the UDP transport binding, e.g. an eavesdropper
reading the Type or Message ID gain information about how UDP
messages are related to each other. CoAP proxies are allowed to
change Type and Message ID. These message fields are not present
in CoAP over TCP, and does not impact the request/response
message. A change of these fields in a UDP hop is a denial of
service attack similar to changing UDP header fields.
o Length. This field contain the length of the message [RFC8323]
which may be used for traffic analysis. These message fields are
not present in CoAP over UDP, and does not impact the request/
response message. A change of Length is a denial of service
attack similar to changing TCP header fields.
D.4.3. CoAP Options
o Max-Age. The Outer Max-Age is set to zero to avoid unnecessary
caching of OSCORE error responses. Changing this value thus may
cause unnecessary caching. No additional information is carried
with this option.
o Proxy-Uri/Proxy-Scheme/Uri-Host/Uri-Port. With OSCORE, the Proxy-
Uri option does not contain the Uri-Path/Uri-Query parts of the
URI. Proxy-Uri/Proxy-Scheme/Uri-Host/Uri-Port cannot be integrity
protected since they are allowed to be changed by a forward proxy.
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Depending on content, the Uri-Host may either reveal information
equivalent to that of the IP address or more privacy-sensitive
information, which is discouraged in Section 4.1.3.2.
o Observe. The Outer Observe option is intended for an OSCORE-
unaware proxy to support forwarding of Observe messages. Removing
this option in the request turns the notification request into a
normal request, which is allowed for a proxy and server and
understood by the client but changes the performed operation from
a request for notifications to a plain request, but the client
cannot tell what party removed the option.
Removing this option in the response may lead to notifications not
being forwarded or cause a denial of service. The Outer option value
indicates a relative order of notifications as read and written by
the proxy and a change of that may affect proxy operations and
potentially lead to denial of service. Since OSCORE provides
absolute ordering of notifications it is not possible for an
intermediary to spoof reordering (see Section 4.1.3.4). The size and
distributions of notifications over time may reveal information about
the content or nature of the notifications.
o Block1/Block2/Size1/Size2. The Outer Block options enables
fragmentation of OSCORE messages in addition to segmentation
performed by the Inner Block options. The presence of these
options indicates a large message being sent and the message size
can be estimated and used for traffic analysis. Manipulating
these options is a potential denial of service attack, e.g.
injection of alleged Block fragments. The specification of
MAX_UNFRAGMENTED_SIZE (Section 4.1.3.3.2), at which the messages
will be dropped, is intended as one measure to mitigate this kind
of attack.
o No-Response. The Outer No-Response option is used to support
proxy functionality, specifically to avoid error transmissions
from proxies to clients, and to avoid bandwidth reduction to
servers by proxies applying congestion control when not receiving
responses. Modifying or introducing this option is a potential
denial of service attack against the proxy operations, but since
the option has an Inner value its use can be securely agreed
between the endpoints. The presence of this option is not
expected to reveal any sensitive information about the message
exchange.
o OSCORE. The OSCORE option contains information about the
compressed COSE header. A change of this field may result in not
being able to verify the OSCORE message.
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D.4.4. HTTP Message Fields
In contrast to CoAP, where OSCORE does not protect header fields to
enable CoAP-CoAP proxy operations, the use of OSCORE with HTTP is
restricted to transporting a protected CoAP message over an HTTP hop.
Any unprotected HTTP message fields may reveal information about the
transport of the OSCORE message and enable various denial of service
attacks. It is recommended to additionally use TLS [RFC5246] for
HTTP hops, which enables encryption and integrity protection of
headers, but still leaves some information for traffic analysis.
Appendix E. CDDL Summary
Data structure definitions in the present specification employ the
CDDL language for conciseness and precision. CDDL is defined in
[I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl], which at the time of writing this appendix is
in the process of completion. As the document is not yet available
for a normative reference, the present appendix defines the small
subset of CDDL that is being used in the present specification.
Within the subset being used here, a CDDL rule is of the form "name =
type", where "name" is the name given to the "type". A "type" can be
one of:
o a reference to another named type, by giving its name. The
predefined named types used in the present specification are:
"uint", an unsigned integer (as represented in CBOR by major type
0); "int", an unsigned or negative integer (as represented in CBOR
by major type 0 or 1); "bstr", a byte string (as represented in
CBOR by major type 2); "tstr", a text string (as represented in
CBOR by major type 3);
o a choice between two types, by giving both types separated by a
"/";
o an array type (as represented in CBOR by major type 4), where the
sequence of elements of the array is described by giving a
sequence of entries separated by commas ",", and this sequence is
enclosed by square brackets "[" and "]". Arrays described by an
array description contain elements that correspond one-to-one to
the sequence of entries given. Each entry of an array description
is of the form "name : type", where "name" is the name given to
the entry and "type" is the type of the array element
corresponding to this entry.
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Acknowledgments
The following individuals provided input to this document: Christian
Amsuess, Tobias Andersson, Carsten Bormann, Joakim Brorsson, Esko
Dijk, Thomas Fossati, Martin Gunnarsson, Klaus Hartke, Jim Schaad,
Peter van der Stok, Dave Thaler, Marco Tiloca, William Vignat, and
Malisa Vucinic.
Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of
the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.
Authors' Addresses
Goeran Selander
Ericsson AB
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
John Mattsson
Ericsson AB
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Francesca Palombini
Ericsson AB
Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
Ludwig Seitz
RISE SICS
Email: ludwig.seitz@ri.se
Selander, et al. Expires October 1, 2018 [Page 72]
