Network Working Group S. Krishnan
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track J. Laganier
Expires: January 14, 2010 DoCoMo Euro-Labs
M. Bonola
Rome Tor Vergata University
July 13, 2009
Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND
draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-01
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Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Abstract
Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) specifies a method for securing
Neighbor Discovery (ND) signaling against specific threats. As
specified today, SEND assumes that the node advertising an address is
the owner of the address and is in possession of the private key used
to generate the digital signature on the message. This means that
the Proxy ND signaling initiated by nodes that do not possess
knowledge of the address owner's private key cannot be secured using
SEND. This document extends the current SEND specification with
support for Proxy ND, the Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Application Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Scenario 1: RFC 4389 Neighbor Discovery Proxy . . . . . . 7
4.2. Scenario 2: Mobile IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Scenario 3: Proxy Mobile IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Secure Proxy ND Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Secure Proxy ND Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Proxy Signature Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Modified SEND processing rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2.1. Processing rules for senders . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2.2. Processing rules for receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Backward Compatibility with legacy SEND nodes . . . . . . . . 18
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
Secure Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971] specifies a method for securing
neighbor discovery signaling [RFC4861] against specific threats. As
specified today, SEND assumes that the node advertising an address is
the owner of the address and is in possession of the private key used
to generate the digital signature on the message. This means that
the Proxy ND signaling initiated by nodes that do not possess
knowledge of the address owner's private key cannot be secured using
SEND.
This document extends the current SEND specification with support for
Proxy ND. From this point on we refer to such extension as "Secure
Proxy ND Support for SEND".
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3. Terminology
Secure Proxy ND
A node authorized to either modify or generate a SEND message
without knowing the private key related to the source address of
the ICMPv6 ND message.
Proxied IPv6 address
An IPv6 address that doesn't belong to the Secure Proxy ND and for
which the Secure Proxy ND is advertising.
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4. Application Scenarios
In this section we provide three different application scenarios for
which the ICMPv6 Neighbor Discovery signaling cannot be secured by
using the current SEND specification.
Either of the entities described in the following three scenarios,
(i.e.: ND Proxy, MIPv6 Home Agent, PMIPv6 Mobile Access Gateway) can
be consider as a Secure Proxy ND.
4.1. Scenario 1: RFC 4389 Neighbor Discovery Proxy
Link 1 Link 2
Host A ND Proxy (P) Host B
| | |
| SRC = A | |
| DST = solicited_node(B) | |
| ICMPv6 NS | |
| TARGET = B | |
| SLLAO = B_LL | |
|------------------------->| |
| | SRC = A |
| | DST = solicited_node(B) |
| | ICMPv6 NS |
| | TARGET = B |
| | SLLAO = P_LL |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
| | SRC = B |
| | DST = A |
| | ICMPv6 NA |
| | TARGET = B |
| | TLLAO = B_LL |
| |<-------------------------|
| SRC = B | |
| DST = A | |
| ICMPv6 NA | |
| TARGET = B | |
| TLLAO = B_LL | |
|<-------------------------| |
| | |
Figure 1: Proxy ND operations
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The Neighbor Discovery (ND) Proxy specification [RFC4389] provides a
method by which multiple link layer segments are bridged into a
single segment and specifies the IP-layer support that enables
bridging under these circumstances.
A ND Proxy shall parse any IPv6 packet it receives on a proxy
interface to check whether it contains one of the following ICMPv6
messages: Neighbor Solicitation (NS), Neighbor Advertisement (NA),
Router Advertisement, or Redirect. Since each of these messages
contains a link-layer address which might not be valid on another
segment, the ND Proxy proxies these packets as follows, and as
illustrated in Figure 1:
1. The source link layer address will be the address of the outgoing
interface.
2. The destination link layer address will be the address in the
neighbor entry corresponding to the destination IPv6 address.
3. A link layer address within the payload (that is, in a Source
Local Link Address option - SLLAO, or a Target Local Link Address
option - TLLAO) is substituted with the link-layer address of the
outgoing interface.
Moreover, when any other IPv6 unicast packet is received on a proxy
interface, if it is not locally destined then it is forwarded
unchanged (other than using a new link-layer header) to the proxy
interface for which the next hop address appears in the neighbor
cache. If no neighbor cache entry is present, the ND proxy should
queue the packet and initiate a Neighbor Discovery signalling as if
the ICMPv6 NS message were locally generated.
A ND proxy cannot protect proxied ND messages since protection of an
ND message as per the current SEND specification requires knowledge
of the private key of each node for which it is generating or
forwarding a ND message on the bridged link layer segments.
4.2. Scenario 2: Mobile IPv6
The Mobile IPv6 protocol [RFC3775] allows a mobile node (MN) to move
from one link to another while maintaining reachability at a stable
address, the so-called MN's home address (HoA.) When a mobile node
attaches to a foreign network, all the packets sent to the MN's HoA
and forwarded on the home link by a correspondent node (CN) or a
router are intercepted by the home agent (HA) on that home link,
encapsulated and tunneled to the mobile node's registered care-of
address (CoA.)
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The HA intercepts these packets by being a Neighbor Discovery proxy
for this MN. When a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) is intercepted on the
home link, the home agent checks if the Target address within the NS
matches with any of the MN's Home Address in the Binding Cache and if
so, it replies with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) containing its own
link layer address (HA_LL) as the Target Link Layer Address Option
(TLLAO), as illustrated in Figure 2.
Node (N) Home Agent (HA) Mobile Node (MN)
on Home Link on Home Link on Foreign Link
| | |
| SRC = N | |
| DST = solicited_node(MN) | |
| ICMPv6 NS | |
| TARGET = MN | |
| SLLAO = N_LL | |
|------------------------->| |
| | |
| SRC = MN | |
| DST = N | |
| ICMPv6 NA | |
| TARGET = MN | |
| TLLAO = HA_LL | |
|<-------------------------| |
| | |
| traffic | |
| dest= MN HoA | |
|------------------------->| |
| | |
| | tunnelled traffic |
| | dest= MN CoA |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 2: Proxy ND role of the Home agent in MIPv6
It is not possible to apply the current SEND specification to protect
the NA message issued by the HA. To generate an ICMPv6 NA with a
valid CGA option and the corresponding RSA Signature option, the HA
needs knowledge of the private key related to the MN's
Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA.) Any ICMPv6 NA without a
valid CGA and RSA signature option is to be treated as insecure by a
SEND receiver.
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4.3. Scenario 3: Proxy Mobile IPv6
MN new MAG LMA
| | |
MN Attached | |
| | |
| MN Attached Event from MN/Network |
| | |
|--- ICMPv6 RS ------->| |
| | |
| |--- PBU ------------->|
| | |
| | Accept PBU
| | |
| |<------------- PBA ---|
| | |
| Accept PBA |
| | |
| |==== Bi-Dir Tunnel ===|
| | |
|<------ ICMPv6 RA ----| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
Figure 3: Mobile node's handover in PMIPv6
Proxy Mobile IPv6 [I-D.ietf-netlmm-proxymip6] is a network-based
mobility management protocol that provides an IP mobility management
support for MNs without requiring MNs being involved in the mobility
related signaling. The IP mobility management is totally hidden to
the MN in a Proxy Mobile IPv6 domain and is performed by two
functional entities: the Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and the Mobile
Access Gateway (MAG.)
When the MN connects to a new access link it will send a multicast
ICMPv6 Router Solicitation (RS.) The MAG on the new access link,
upon detecting the MN's attachment, will signal the LMA for updating
the binding state of the MN (Proxy Binding Update - PBU) and once the
signaling is complete (Proxy Binding Ack - PBA - received), it will
reply to the MN with a ICMPv6 Router Advertisement (RA) containing
its home network prefix(es) that were assigned to that mobility
session, making the MN believe it is still on the same link and not
triggering the IPv6 address reconfiguration (figure Figure 3.)
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To avoid potential link-local address collisions between the MAG and
the MN after a handoff to a new link, the Proxy Mobile IPv6
specification requires the MAG's link-local address configured on the
link to which the MN is attached to be generated once by the LMA when
the MN first attach to a PMIPv6 domain, and to be provided to the new
MN's serving MAG after each handoff. Thus, from the MN's point of
view, the MAG's link-local address remains constant for the duration
of that MN's session.
The approach described above and the current SEND specification are
incompatible since:
Sharing the same link-local address on different MAGs would
require all MAGs of a PMIPv6 domain to construct the CGA and the
RSA Signature option with the same public-private key pair, which
is not acceptable from a security point of view.
Using different public-private key pairs on different MAGs would
mean different MAGs use different CGAs as link-local address.
Thus the serving MAG's link-local address changes after each
handoff of the MN which is contradiction with the way MAG link-
local address assignment occurs in a PMIPv6 domain.
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5. Secure Proxy ND Overview
The original SEND specification [RFC3971] has implicitly assumed that
the owner of the address was the one who was advertising the prefix.
This assumption does not allow proxying of a CGA based address as the
receiver requires the advertiser to generate a valid CGA and RSA
Signature option, which in turns requires possession of the public-
private key pair that was used to generate the CGA.
This specification explicitly separates the roles of ownership and
advertiser by extending the SEND protocol as follows:
o A certificate authorizing an entity to act as an ND proxy is
introduced. This is achieved via specifying explicitly in the
X509v3 certificate the purpose for which the certificate is
issued, as described in a companion document
[I-D.krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku]. Briefly, two KeyPurposeID
values are defined: one for authorizing routers, and one for
authorizing proxies. The inclusion of the proxy authorization
value allows the certificate owner to perform proxying of SEND
messages for a set of prefixes indicated in the same certificate.
o A new option called Proxy Signature option (PSO) is defined. This
option contains the key hash value of the Secure Proxy ND's public
key and the digital signature computed over the SEND message. The
key has value is computed over the public key within the Secure
Proxy ND's certificate.
o The SEND processing rules are modified for all Neighbor Discovery
messages: NA, NS, RS, RA, and Redirect. When any of these
messages is received with a valid Proxy Signature option, it is
considered as secure even if it doesn't contain a CGA option.
The Secure Proxy ND becomes part of the trusted infrastructure just
like a SEND router. The Secure Proxy ND is granted a certificate
that specifies the range of addresses for which it is allowed to
perform proxying of SEND messages. Hosts can use the same process to
discover the certification path between a proxy and one of the host's
trust anchors as the one defined for routers in Section 6 of SEND
specification [RFC3971].
The proposed approach resolves the incompatibilities between the
current SEND specification and the application scenarios described in
Section 4. Since SEND messages containing a Proxy Signature option
are not required to carry a CGA option, the IPv6 source address is no
longer cryptographically bound to the signature, and the sender of a
Neighbor Discovery message is not required to be the owner of the
claimed address. Thus, the Secure Proxy ND is able to either forward
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and generate SEND messages for a proxied address within the set of
prefixes for which it is authorized.
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6. Secure Proxy ND Specification
A Secure ND Proxy performs all the operation described in the SEND
specification [RFC3971] with the addition of new processing rules to
ensure that the receiving node can differentiate between an
authorized proxy generating or forwarding a SEND message for a
proxied address, and a malicious node doing the same.
This is accomplished by signing the message with the public key of
the authorized Secure Proxy ND. The signature of the neighbor
discovery proxy is included in a new option called Proxy Signature
option (PSO.) The signature is performed over all the NDP options
present in the message and the PSO is appended as the last option in
the message.
6.1. Proxy Signature Option
The Proxy Signature option allows public key-based signatures to be
attached to NDP messages. The format of the PSO is described in the
following diagram:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Key Hash |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Digital Signature .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
. .
. Padding .
. .
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: PSO layout
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Type
TBA
Length
The length of the option (including the Type, Length, Reserved,
Key Hash, Digital Signature, and Padding fields) in units of 8
octets.
Reserved
A 16-bit field reserved for future use. The value MUST be
initialized to zero by the sender, and MUST be ignored by the
receiver.
Key Hash
A 128-bit field containing the most significant (leftmost) 128
bits of a SHA-1 [SHA1] hash of the public key used for
constructing the signature. Its purpose is to associate the
signature to a particular key known by the receiver. Such a key
MUST be the same one within the Secure Proxy ND's certificate.
Digital Signature
A variable-length field containing a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature,
constructed by using the sender's private key over the following
sequence of octets:
1. The 128-bit CGA Message Type tag [RFC3972] value for Secure
Proxy ND, 0x09F5 2BE5 3B62 4C76 CB96 4E7F CDC9 2804 (The tag
value has been generated randomly by the editor of this
specification.)
2. The 128-bit Source Address field from the IP header.
3. The 128-bit Destination Address field from the IP header.
4. The 8-bit Type, 8-bit Code, and 16-bit Checksum fields from
the ICMP header.
5. The NDP message header, starting from the octet after the ICMP
Checksum field and continuing up to but not including NDP
options.
6. All NDP options preceding the Proxy Signature option.
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The signature value is computed with the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
algorithm and SHA-1 hash, as defined in [RSA].
This field starts after the Key Hash field. The length of the
Digital Signature field is determined by the length of the RSA
Signature option minus the length of the other fields (including
the variable length Pad field.)
Padding
This variable-length field contains padding, as many bytes long as
remain after the end of the signature.
6.2. Modified SEND processing rules
The modifications described in the following section applies when a
SEND message contains the Proxy Signature option (PSO), i.e. the
message was sent by a Secure Proxy ND.
This specification modifies the sender and receiver processing rules
for the following options defined in the SEND specification
[RFC3971]: CGA option, RSA option.
6.2.1. Processing rules for senders
A ICMPv6 message sent by a Secure Proxy ND for a proxied address MUST
contain a Proxy Signature option (PSO) and MUST NOT contain CGA and
RSA Signature options.
A Secure Proxy ND sending a SEND message with the PSO Signature
option MUST construct the message as follows:
1. The SEND message is constructed without the PSO as follow:
A. If the Secure Proxy ND is locally generating the SEND message
for a proxied address, the message is constructed as
described in Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6
specification [RFC4861].
B. If the Secure Proxy ND is forwarding a SEND message, first
the authenticity of the intercepted message is verified as
specified in SEND specification [RFC3971] Section 5. If the
SEND message is valid, any CGA or RSA option MUST be removed
from the message. The intercepted message is finally
modified as described in Section 4 of the ND Proxy
specification [RFC4389].
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2. The Proxy Signature option is added as the last option in the
message.
3. The data is signed as explained in Section 6.1.
6.2.2. Processing rules for receivers
Any SEND message without a Proxy Signature option MUST be treated as
specified in the SEND specification [RFC3971].
A SEND message including a Proxy Signature option MUST be processed
as specified below:
1. The receiver MUST ignore any RSA and CGA options, as well as any
options that might come after the first PSO. The options are
ignored for both signature verification and NDP processing
purposes.
2. The Key Hash field MUST indicate the use of a known public key.
A valid certification path (see [RFC3971] Section 6.3) between
the receiver's trust anchor and the sender's public key MUST be
known. The Secure Proxy ND's X509v3 certificate MUST contain a
extended key usage extension including the KeyPurposeId value for
the proxy authorization.
3. The Digital Signature field MUST have correct encoding and MUST
NOT exceed the length of the Proxy Signature option minus the
Padding.
4. The Digital Signature verification MUST show that the signature
has been calculated as specified in Section 6.1.
Messages that do not pass all the above tests MUST be silently
discarded if the host has been configured to accept only secured ND
messages.
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7. Backward Compatibility with legacy SEND nodes
The PSO added by a Secure Proxy ND will be ignored by nodes
implementing the original SEND specification and hence will not cause
any interoperability problems. Since the Secure Proxy ND also
removes the original RSA option, these messages will be treated as
"unsecured" message as described in Section 8 "Transitions Issues" of
the SEND specification [RFC3971]. Thus, this specification does not
introduce any new transition issue compared to the original SEND
specification.
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8. Security Considerations
The mechanism described in this document introduce a new Proxy
Signature Option (PSO) allowing a Secure Proxy ND to generate or
modify a SEND message for a proxied address. A node will only accept
such a message if it includes a valid PSO generated by an authorized
Secure Proxy ND.
If, on the other hand, a message does not include a PSO, then the
Secure Proxy ND support doens't introduce any further security issues
since this specification does not modify the SEND processing rules if
an ICMPv6 ND message does not contain a PSO. Thus, the same security
considerations than that of SEND applies (cf. Section 9 of the SEND
specification [RFC3971].)
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9. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate:
A new IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option types for the PSO, as TBA.
The value need to be allocated from the namespace specified in the
IANA registry IPv6 NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY OPTION FORMATS located at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-parameters.
A new 128-bit value under the CGA Message Type [RFC3972]
namespace, 0x09F5 2BE5 3B62 4C76 CB96 4E7F CDC9 2804.
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10. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netlmm-proxymip6]
Gundavelli, S., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V., Chowdhury, K.,
and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6",
draft-ietf-netlmm-proxymip6-18 (work in progress),
May 2008.
[I-D.krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku]
Krishnan, S., Kukec, A., and K. Ahmed, "Certificate
profile and certificate management for SEND",
draft-krishnan-cgaext-send-cert-eku-03 (work in progress),
March 2009.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, March 2005.
[RFC4389] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery
Proxies (ND Proxy)", RFC 4389, April 2006.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
[RSA] RSA Laboratories, "RSA Encryption Standard, Version 2.1",
PKCS 1 , November 2002.
[SHA1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1 , April 1995.
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Authors' Addresses
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com
Julien Laganier
DoCoMo Communications Laboratories Europe GmbH
Landsberger Strasse 312
Munich D-80687
Germany
Phone: +49 89 56824 231
Email: julien.ietf@laposte.net
URI: http://www.docomolab-euro.com/
Marco Bonola
Rome Tor Vergata University
Via del Politecnico, 1
Rome I-00133
Italy
Phone:
Email: marco.bonola@gmail.com
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