Network Working Group R. Gagliano
Internet-Draft LACNIC
Intended status: Standards Track S. Krishnan
Expires: August 20, 2010 Ericsson
A. Kukec
University of Zagreb
February 16, 2010
Certificate profile and certificate management for SEND
draft-ietf-csi-send-cert-02
Abstract
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) Utilizes X.509v3 certificates for
performing router authorization. This document specifies a
certificate profile for SEND based on Resource Certificates along
with extended key usage values required for SEND.
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. SEND Certificate profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Trust Anchor Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Extended Key Usage Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. CRL profile and revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. OCSP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Appendix A: Router Authorization Certificate
certificate example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
SEcure Neighbor Discovery [RFC3971] (SEND) utilizes X.509v3
certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses
to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the Neighbor
Discovery (ND) Protocol. SEND specification defines neither the
certificate profile nor any certificate management routines. It
specifies only the certificate path validation and the IP address
extension verification procedures. This document defines the
certificate profile, as well as certificate issuance and revocation
routines for SEND.
The SIDR WG in the IETF is working on a Certificate Profile for the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The RPKI represents the
centralized model referred in Section 6.2 of [RFC3971].
Consequently, SEND will use the SIDR certificate profile and
certificate validation detailed in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].
Since the RFC 3779 IPv6 addresses extension does not mention what
functions the node can perform for the certified IPv6 space, it
becomes impossible to know the reason for which the certificate was
issued. In order to facilitate issuance of certificates for specific
functions, it is necessary to utilize the ExtKeyUsageSyntax field
(optional in RPKI Certificates) of the X.509 certificate to mention
the purpose why the certificate was issued. This document specifies
three extended key usage values, one for routers, one for proxies,
and one for address owners, for use with SEND.
In RFC 3971 two deployment models were described: centralized and
decentralized. With the advance of RPKI standardization we introduce
two different deployment models: local and public deployment models.
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3. Terminology
Certified IPv6 address space IPv6 address space included in an
X.509v3 certificate using RFC 3779
extension for IPv6 addresses.
End Entity (EE) user of PKI certificates and/or end user
system that is the subject of a
certificate;
ISP Internet Service Provider.
NIR National Internet Registry.
RIR Regional Internet Registry.
RPKI Resource PKI established in accordance with
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch].
RPKI certificates Certificates defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].
SEND certificates Certificates described in [RFC3971] and
extended in this document. They are end-
entity certificates that belong either to
SEND routers or Secure Proxy ND nodes:
* Router Authorization Certificates.
* Secure Proxy ND certificates for ND
Proxy, Mobile IPv6 Home Agent or Proxy
Mobile Access Gateway
[I-D.ietf-csi-proxy-send].
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4. SEND Certificate profile
SEND certificates MUST comply with the RPKI resource profile
[I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]. A Router Authorization Certificate
example is included in the Appendix A.
In sections 2, 3.9.10 and 3.9.11 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] it is
stated that RFC 3779 resource extensions MUST be critical and MUST be
present in all Resource Certificates. SEND certificates MUST include
the IP Resources extension for IPv6 Address Family (AFI=0002)
described in section 3.9.10 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] and MUST be
the only resource extension present. The IPv6 resource extension
MUST NOT specify the "inherit" element. Certified IPv6 address space
SHOULD be expressed using either addressPrefix or addressesOrRange
elements.
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5. Deployment Models
RFC 3971 describes two deployment models:centralized and
decentralized. These models were differentiated by having one or
many trust anchor. In this document we introduced two new deployment
models, not based on the number of trust anchors but on the
localization of the SEND deployment.
The local SEND deployment model represent those cases where SEND
deployment is confined to an administrative domain. In this
scenario, the deployment of SEND MAY be done independently of the
existence of deployment in the upper RPKI hierarchy (i.e. an end user
could local SEND deployment without the need of RPKI deployment in
its ISP). This model requires the use of local trust anchors and
configuring islands of trust. This model MAY include ULA addresses.
The public SEND deployment models represent those cases where SEND
deployment is linked to RPKI deployment as described in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. Trust anchor material MAY be part of a
different administrative domain (i.e. RIR, NIR or ISPs). It is a
global model suitable for mobile users.
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6. Trust Anchor Material
Relying parties (e.g., user devices that implement SEND and process
these router certificates) MUST be configured with one or more trust
anchors to enable validation of the routers' certificates. The trust
anchor material MAY be either a CA certificate (which MAY be self-
signed) containing an RFC 3779 address extension or it MAY be trust
anchor material as defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta].
In a local SEND deployment model, it is possible to use as trust
anchor material a certificate that includes in its RFC 3779 address
extension the prefix ::/0. In this case no new trust anchor material
would be needed when renumbering. However, if trying to move from
the local deployment model to the public deployment model, new trust
anchor material will have to be distributed to relying parties.
By using the trust anchor model described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta],
relying parties will use as trust anchor material the ETA (External
Trust Anchor) certificate, which does not list any address space.
This configuration allows network renumbering without the need for
issuing trust anchor material in both the local and the public model.
In this case the Relying party MUST obtain an RTA (RPKI Trust Anchor)
certificate from the publication point of the ETA certificate as
defined at [I-D.ietf-sidr-ta].
The identification for the Trust Anchor Material will be included in
the Name Type Field of the ICMP Trust Anchor Option as described in
RFC 3971 and MUST always to refer to a certificate that includes a
RFC 3779 address extension.
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7. Extended Key Usage Values
The Internet PKI document [RFC5280] specifies the extended key usage
X.509 certificate extension. The extension indicates one or more
purposes for which the certified public key may be used. The
extended key usage extension can be used in conjunction with key
usage extension, which indicates the intended purpose of the
certified public key. The Extended Key Usage extension is defined as
optional in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] for end entity certificates but
MUST be present when issuing end entity certificates for SEND.
The extended key usage extension syntax is repeated here for
convenience:
ExtKeyUsageSyntax ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId
KeyPurposeId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
This specification defines three KeyPurposeId values: one for
authorizing routers, one for authorizing proxies, and one for address
owners.
The inclusion of the router authorization value indicates that the
certificate has been issued for allowing the router to advertise
prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP
addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]
The inclusion of the proxy authorization value indicates that the
certificate has been issued for allowing the proxy to perform
proxying of neighbor discovery messages for the prefix(es) that are
mentioned using the X.509 extensions for IP addresses and AS
identifiers [RFC3779]
The inclusion of the owner authorization value indicates that the
certificate has been issued for allowing the node to use the
address(es) or prefix(es) that are mentioned using the X.509
extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]
Inclusion of multiple values indicates that the certified public key
is appropriate for use by a node performing more than one of these
functions.
send-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) TBA }
id-kp-sendRouter OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 1 }
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id-kp-sendProxy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 2 }
id-kp-sendOwner OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { send-kp 3 }
As described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs], the extended key usage
extension, if present, MUST be non-critical.
Certificate-using applications MAY require the extended key usage
extension to be present in a certificate, and they MAY require a
particular KeyPurposeId value to be present (such as id-kp-sendRouter
or id-kp-sendProxy) within the extended key usage extension. If
multiple KeyPurposeId values are included, the certificate-using
application need not recognize all of them, as long as the required
KeyPurposeId value is present.
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8. CRL profile and revocation
RPKI requires the use of CRLs [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]. The host
will obtain the necessary CRLs and perform the certificate validation
method described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs].
8.1. OCSP Considerations
By addopting the [I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs] as the certificate profile
for SEND, the use of the OCSP protocol is not allowed by the RPKI
Certicate Policies [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]. As CRLs are expected to be
small, the fetching of the required CRLs are not expected to demand
important bandwith.
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9. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
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10. Security Considerations
The certification authority needs to ensure that the correct values
for the extended key usage are inserted in each certificate that is
issued. Relying parties may accept or reject a particular
certificate for an intended use based on the information provided in
these extensions. Incorrect representation of the information in the
extended key usage field can cause the relying party to reject an
otherwise appropriate certificate or accept a certificate that ought
to be rejected.
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11. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the contributions from Stephen Kent.
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12. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-csi-proxy-send]
Krishnan, S., Laganier, J., and M. Bonola, "Secure Proxy
ND Support for SEND", draft-ietf-csi-proxy-send-01 (work
in progress), July 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09 (work in
progress), October 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]
Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)",
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-08 (work in progress), January 2010.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-res-certs]
Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-17 (work in progress),
September 2009.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-ta]
Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and G. Huston, "A Profile for
Trust Anchor Material for the Resource Certificate PKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-ta-02 (work in progress), September 2009.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3971] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
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Appendix A. Appendix A: Router Authorization Certificate certificate
example
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 29 (0x1d)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346
Validity
Not Before: Feb 15 23:06:53 2010 GMT
Not After : Feb 15 23:06:53 2011 GMT
Subject: CN=SEND-EXAMPLE-123432
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit):
00:bf:64:da:82:fb:b6:fd:a6:2d:c4:3a:10:d7:2c:
7b:8c:22:0a:30:b7:45:b1:7d:ae:c0:fd:f1:06:04:
5b:4a:6c:21:e7:de:15:cb:9a:07:c8:c4:80:6f:55:
cd:71:33:01:04:9f:87:57:db:d5:b3:c7:91:c5:81:
28:7f:a8:eb:b1:53:80:3a:01:8a:7c:97:d2:d3:41:
92:f4:68:db:3b:86:64:12:24:1e:e1:84:f8:33:5c:
0f:fa:ae:8a:a0:1f:e7:b7:4e:5a:ad:0a:a0:a1:2d:
42:5a:54:10:37:e2:13:84:88:ed:70:e4:76:6c:d6:
75:ab:8a:5c:c9:42:39:60:55:49:c2:66:ee:e7:64:
a1:67:fa:69:27:de:f6:2f:55:4d:09:89:29:75:c0:
61:02:41:7e:99:4f:81:1d:78:5a:45:8b:1c:9c:85:
87:76:51:a3:24:3b:0e:63:72:e8:b9:c5:81:32:91:
46:bb:87:81:82:5d:14:48:60:4a:ae:79:4f:f4:7e:
bd:ce:cf:01:de:19:e0:34:1a:12:fe:10:9d:1e:a6:
91:8b:28:ca:d6:83:71:8a:f3:39:fa:7a:49:c6:36:
b5:66:39:3a:a3:f8:02:70:a1:7a:8c:92:55:bd:b6:
84:cf:18:02:78:82:4f:2f:8e:f1:08:db:54:02:e0:
c5:e9
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Certificate Policies: critical
Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:F7:EB:16:AB:D2:43:E3:72:16:41:
E0:B7:99:CA:1F:A4:37:C3:74:FB
Authority Information Access:
CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.lacnic.net/
EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346/EXAMPLE-CA.cer
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X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
URI:rsync://rsync.example.exampledomain/
EXAMPLE-CA-2342342652346/EXAMPLE-CA.crl
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
5F:AB:EC:98:8A:E1:47:41:55:4F:67:57:98:
22:CE:99:85:8F:2A:85
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
1.3.6.1.5.5.TBA.1
sbgp-ipAddrBlock: critical
IPv6:
2001:db8:CAFE:BEBE::/64
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
6f:ec:08:b2:5f:2c:84:6b:99:4c:fe:7d:00:db:fa:c1:90:a2:
de:34:0a:31:b0:f6:f1:95:d9:4a:ef:09:79:90:51:84:a9:5a:
a1:5a:a2:cd:09:69:e2:cb:ff:da:f1:34:32:bd:cc:b5:c8:7e:
b1:fa:46:78:93:a5:cc:d5:1b:03:30:42:c4:ab:55:d7:e5:0d:
74:de:e8:f3:00:6b:68:df:0d:64:ba:58:49:d0:0b:5d:a5:7c:
82:ec:5c:95:18:fe:67:f5:25:21:9c:07:8e:ba:81:80:c8:c2:
95:e6:0a:ea:bd:4b:a2:fc:10:53:cf:c9:16:83:83:88:7c:06:
39:04:dd:49:4e:75:b5:4b:6b:8d:4c:9f:d7:59:33:c3:95:c4:
7f:48:f5:83:da:37:e0:c1:a5:5d:09:7d:65:78:b6:77:a7:f9:
49:59:f8:83:3e:14:dd:e0:86:e1:5e:fa:6d:42:ee:dd:eb:c0:
f6:4b:0a:31:f1:37:1b:77:12:79:99:1b:2f:d5:e7:7f:2f:a2:
6e:54:71:17:17:0d:a4:7b:7d:5a:6e:40:02:1d:5c:6a:06:ab:
5d:33:ea:b6:8a:1b:f6:85:16:ef:d4:00:db:54:e8:ac:53:b8:
0f:39:d8:a4:3e:9b:87:41:f3:f5:05:d6:a0:44:cc:82:bc:b9:
fd:72:40:ff
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Authors' Addresses
Roque Gagliano
LACNIC
Rambla Rep Mexico 6125
Montevideo, 11400
Uruguay
Phone: +598 2 4005633
Email: roque@lacnic.net
Suresh Krishnan
Ericsson
8400 Decarie Blvd.
Town of Mount Royal, QC
Canada
Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com
Ana Kukec
University of Zagreb
Unska 3
Zagreb
Croatia
Email: ana.kukec@fer.hr
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