DHC Working Group                                   Charles Monia
   INTERNET DRAFT                                         Josh Tseng
   Expires: May 2005                                   Kevin Gibbons
   Internet Draft                                             McDATA
                                                         Corporation
   Document: <draft-ietf-dhc-isnsoption-13.txt>
   Category: Standards Track                           November 2004


         The IPv4 DHCP Option for the Internet Storage Name Service

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
   patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
   or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
   disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.



   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of
   six months and may be updated, replaced, or made obsolete by other
   documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Comments

   Comments should be sent to the DHCP mailing list (dhcwg@ietf.org) or
   to the authors.













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                             Table of Contents

Status of this Memo...................................................1
Comments..............................................................1
Abstract..............................................................3
Conventions used in this document.....................................3
1. Introduction.......................................................3
2. iSNS Option for DHCP...............................................4
2.1 iSNS Functions Field..............................................5
2.2 Discovery Domain Access Field.....................................7
2.3 Administrative Flags Field........................................8
2.4 iSNS Server Security Bitmap.......................................9
3. Security Considerations...........................................10
4. IANA Considerations...............................................11
5. Normative References..............................................12
6. Non-Normative References..........................................12
7. Author's Addresses................................................13
8. Intellectual Property.............................................13
9. Full Copyright Statement..........................................13
10. Disclaimer of Validity...........................................13
11. Acknowledgement..................................................14
12. Expiration Notice................................................14































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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

Abstract

   This document describes the DHCP option to allow Internet Storage
   Name Service (iSNS) clients to automatically discover the location
   of the iSNS server through the use of DHCP for IPv4. iSNS provides
   discovery and management capabilities for Internet SCSI (iSCSI) and
   Internet Fibre Channel Protocol (iFCP) storage devices in an
   enterprise-scale IP storage network.  iSNS provides intelligent
   storage management services comparable to those found in Fibre
   Channel networks, allowing a commodity IP network to function in a
   similar capacity as a storage area network.

Conventions used in this document

   iSNS refers to the Internet Storage Name Service framework
   consisting of the storage network model and associated services.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   All frame formats are in big endian network byte order.  RESERVED
   fields SHOULD be set to zero.

   This document uses the following terms:

   "iSNS Client" - iSNS clients are processes resident in iSCSI and
   iFCP devices that initiate transactions with the iSNS server using
   the iSNS Protocol.

   "iSNS Server" - The iSNS server responds to iSNS protocol query and
   registration messages, and initiates asynchronous notification
   messages.  The iSNS server stores information registered by iSNS
   clients.

   "iSCSI (Internet SCSI)" - iSCSI is an encapsulation of SCSI for a
   new generation of storage devices interconnected with TCP/IP.

   "iFCP (Internet Fibre Channel Protocol)" - iFCP is a gateway-to-
   gateway protocol designed to interconnect existing Fibre Channel
   devices using TCP/IP.  iFCP maps the Fibre Channel transport and
   fabric services to TCP/IP.

1.       Introduction

   The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 provides a
   framework for passing configuration information to hosts.  Its
   usefulness extends to hosts and devices using the iSCSI and iFCP
   protocols to connect to block level storage assets over a TCP/IP
   network.



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   The iSNS Protocol provides a framework for automated discovery,
   management, and configuration of iSCSI and iFCP devices on a TCP/IP
   network.  It provides functionality similar to that found on Fibre
   Channel networks, except that iSNS works within the context of an IP
   network.  iSNS thereby provides the requisite storage intelligence
   to IP networks that are standard on existing Fibre Channel networks.

   Existing DHCP options cannot be used to find iSNS servers for the
   following reasons:

    a) iSNS functionality is distinctly different from other protocols
       using DHCP options.  Specifically, iSNS provides a significant
       superset of capabilities compared to typical name resolution
       protocols such as DNS.  It is designed to support client devices
       that allow themselves to be configured and managed from a
       central iSNS server

    b) iSNS requires a DHCP option format that provides more than the
       location of the iSNS server.  The DHCP option needs to specify
       the subset of iSNS services that may be actively used by the
       iSNS client.

   The DHCP option number for iSNS is used by iSCSI and iFCP devices to
   discover the location and role of the iSNS server.  The DHCP option

   number assigned for iSNS by IANA is <<TBD>>.

2.       iSNS Option for DHCP

   This option specifies the location of the primary and backup iSNS
   servers and the iSNS services available to an iSNS client.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   Code = TBD  |    Length     |          iSNS Functions       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |           DD Access           |     Administrative FLAGS      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                 iSNS Server Security Bitmap                   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      a1       |       a2      |       a3      |       a4      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      b1       |       b2      |       b3      |       b4      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            . . . .                            |
   |                 Additional Secondary iSNS Servers             |
   |                            . . . .                            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      Figure 1 -- iSNS Server Option

   The iSNS Option specifies a list of IP addresses used by iSNS
   servers. The option contains the following parameters:

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   Length: the number of bytes that follow the Length field.

   iSNS Functions: A bitmapped field defining the functions supported
           by the iSNS servers.  The format of this field is described
           in section 2.1.

   Discovery Domain Access: A bit field indicating the types of iSNS
           clients that are allowed to modify Discovery Domains. The
           field contents are described in section 2.2.

   Administrative Flags field: Contains the administrative settings for
           the iSNS servers discovered through the DHCP query.  The
           contents of this field are described in section 2.3.

   iSNS Server Security Bitmap: Contains the iSNS server security
           settings specified in section 2.4.

   a1...a4: Depending on the setting of the Heartbeat bit in the
           Administrative Flags field (see section 2.3), this field
           contains either the IP address from which the iSNS heartbeat
           originates (see [ISNS]) or the IP address of the primary
           iSNS server.

   b1...b4: Depending on the setting of Heartbeat bit in the
           Administrative Flags field (see section 2.3), this field
           contains either the IP address of the primary iSNS server or
           a secondary iSNS server.

   Additional Secondary iSNS Servers: Each set of four octets specifies
           the IP address of a secondary iSNS server.

   The Code field through IP address field a1...a4 MUST be present in
   every response to the iSNS query, hence the Length field has a
   minimum value of 14.

   If the Heartbeat bit is set in the Administrative Flags field (see
   section 2.3), then b1...b4 MUST also be present. In this case, the
   minimum value of the Length field is 18.

   The inclusion of Additional Secondary iSNS Servers in the response
   MUST be indicated by increasing the Length field accordingly.

2.1      iSNS Functions Field

   The iSNS Functions Field defines the iSNS server's operational role
   (i.e., how the iSNS server is to be used).  The iSNS server's role
   can be as basic as providing simple discovery information, or as
   significant as providing IKE/IPSec security policies and
   certificates for the use of iSCSI and iFCP devices. The format of
   the iSNS Functions field is shown in Figure 2:



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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

                 0                   1         1
                 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                |       RESERVED          |S|A|E|
                +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                Figure 2 -- iSNS Functions Field

           Bit field     Significance
           ---------     ------------
           15            Function Fields Enabled
           14            DD-Based Authorization
           13            Security Policy Distribution

   iSNS Functions Field definitions:


           Function Fields This bit specifies the validity of the
           Enabled:        remaining iSNS Function fields.  If set to
                            one, then the contents of all other iSNS
                            Function fields are valid.  If set to zero,
                            then the contents of all other iSNS
                            Function fields MUST be ignored.

           DD-based        Indicates whether or not devices in a
           Authorization:  common Discovery Domain (DD) are implicitly
                            authorized to access one another. Although
                            Discovery Domains control the scope of
                            device discovery, they do not necessarily
                            indicate whether or not a domain member is
                            authorized to access discovered devices.
                            If this bit is set to one, then devices in
                            a common Discovery Domain are automatically
                            allowed access to each other (if
                            successfully authenticated).  If this bit
                            is set to zero, then access authorization
                            is not implied by domain membership and
                            must be explicitly performed by each
                            device. In either case, devices not in a
                            common discovery domain are not allowed to
                            access each other.

           Security Policy Indicates whether the iSNS client is to
           Distribution:   download and use the security policy
                            configuration stored in the iSNS server.
                            If set to one, then the policy is stored in
                            the iSNS server and must be used by the
                            iSNS client for its own security policy.
                            If set to zero, then the iSNS client must
                            obtain its security policy configuration by
                            other means.



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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

2.2      Discovery Domain Access Field

   The format of the DD Access bit field is shown in Figure 3:

                  0           1   1   1   1   1   1
                  0  ...  9   0   1   2   3   4   5
                +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                | RESERVED  | if| tf| is| ts| C | E |
                +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
               Figure 3 -- Discovery Domain Access Field

            Bit field  Significance
            ---------  ------------
                15     Enabled
                14     Control Node
                13     iSCSI Target
                12     iSCSI Initiator
                11     iFCP Target Port
                10     iFCP Initiator Port


   Discovery Domain Access Field Definitions:

           Enabled:           This bit specifies the validity of the

                  remaining DD Access bit fields.  If this
                              bit is set to one, then the contents of
                              the remainder of the DD Access field are
                              valid.  If this bit is set to zero, then
                              the contents of the remainder of this
                              field MUST be ignored.

           Control Node:      Specifies whether the iSNS server allows
                              Discovery Domains to be added, modified
                              or deleted by means of Control Nodes. If
                              set to one, then Control Nodes are
                              allowed to modify the Discovery Domain
                              configuration.  If set to zero, then
                              Control Nodes are not allowed to modify
                              Discovery Domain configurations.

           iSCSI Target,      These bits determine whether the
           iSCSI Initiator,   respective registered iSNS client
           iFCP Target Port,  (determined by iSCSI Node Type or iFCP
           iFCP Initiator     Port Role) is allowed to add, delete, or
           Port:              modify Discovery Domains.  If set to
                              one, then modification by the specified
                              client type is allowed. If set to zero,
                              then modification by the specified
                              client type is not allowed.

                              (A node may implement multiple node


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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

                              types.)



2.3      Administrative Flags Field

   The format of the Administrative Flags bit field is shown in
   Figure 4:

                      0                   1         1
                      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
                     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                     |    RESERVED           |D|M|H|E|
                     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      Figure 4 -- Administrative Flags

                       Bit Field      Significance
                       ---------      ------------
                           15          Enabled
                           14          Heartbeat
                           13          Management SCNs
                           12          Default Discovery Domain


   Administrative Flags Field definitions:

           Enabled:           Specifies the validity of the remainder
                              of the Administrative Flags field.  If
                              set to one, then the contents of the
                              remaining Administrative Flags are
                              valid.  If set to zero, then the
                              remaining contents MUST be ignored,
                              indicating that iSNS administrative
                              settings are obtained through means
                              other than DHCP.

           Heartbeat:         Indicates whether the first IP address
                              is the multicast address to which the
                              iSNS heartbeat message is sent.  If set
                              to one, then a1-a4 contains the
                              heartbeat multicast address and b1-b4
                              contains the IP address of the primary
                              iSNS server, followed by the IP
                              address(es) of any backup servers (see
                              Figure 1).  If set to zero, then a1-a4
                              contains the IP address of the primary
                              iSNS server, followed by the IP
                              address(es) of any backup servers.

           Management SCNs:   Indicates whether control nodes are
                              authorized to register to receive
                              Management State Change Notifications

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                              (SCN's).  Management SCN's are a special
                              class of State Change Notification whose
                              scope is the entire iSNS database.  If
                              set to one, then control nodes are
                              authorized to register to receive
                              Management SCN's.  If set to zero, then
                              control nodes are not authorized to
                              receive Management SCN's (although they
                              may receive normal SCN's).

           Default Discovery  Indicates whether a newly registered
           Domain:            device that is not explicitly placed
                              into a Discovery Domain (DD) and
                              Discovery Domain Set (DDS) should be
                              automatically placed into a default DD
                              and DDS.  If set to one, then a default
                              DD shall contain all devices in the iSNS
                              database that have not been explicitly
                              placed into a DD by an iSNS client.  If
                              set to zero, then devices not explicitly
                              placed into a DD are not members of any
                              DD.



2.4      iSNS Server Security Bitmap

   The format of the iSNS server security Bitmap field is shown in
   Figure 5. If valid, this field communicates to the DHCP client the
   security settings that are required to communicate with the
   indicated iSNS server.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                     RESERVED                    |T|X|P|A|M|S|E|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                  Figure 5 -- iSNS Server Security Bitmap

           Bit Field     Significance
           ---------     ----------------
                31      Enabled
                30      IKE/IPSec
                29      Main Mode
                28      Aggressive Mode
                27      PFS
                26      Transport Mode
                25      Tunnel Mode


   iSNS Server Security Bitmap definitions:


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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

           Enabled          This bit specifies the validity of the
                             remainder of the iSNS server security
                             bitmap.  If set to one, then the contents
                             of the remainder of the field are valid.
                             If set to zero, then the contents of the
                             rest of the field are undefined and MUST
                             be ignored.

           IKE/IPSec        1 = IKE/IPSec enabled; 0 = IKE/IPSec
                             disabled.

           Main Mode        1 = Main Mode enabled; 0 = Main Mode
                             disabled.

           Aggressive Mode  1 = Aggressive mode enabled; 0 =
                             Aggressive mode disabled.

           PFS              1 = PFS enabled; 0 = PFS disabled.

           Transport Mode   1 = Transport mode preferred; 0 = No
                             preference.


           Tunnel Mode      1 = Tunnel mode preferred; 0 = No
                             preference.



   If IKE/IPSec is disabled, this indicates that the Internet Key
   Exchange (IKE) Protocol is not available to configure IPSec keys for
   iSNS sessions to this iSNS server.  It does not necessarily preclude
   other key exchange methods (e.g., manual keying) from establishing
   an IPSec security association for the iSNS session.

   If IKE/IPsec is enabled, then for each of the bit pairs
   <Main Mode, Aggressive Mode> and <Transport Mode, Tunnel Mode>,
   one of the two bits MUST be set to 1 and the other bit
   MUST be set to 0.


3.       Security Considerations

   The DHCP Authentication security option as specified in [RFC3118]
   to protect the iSNS option may present a problem due to the limited
   implementation and deployment of the DHCP authentication option.
   The IPsec security mechanisms for iSNS itself are specified in
   [iSNS] to provide confidentiality when sensitive information is
   distributed via iSNS. See the Security Considerations section of
   [iSNS] for details and specific requirements for implementation of
   IPsec.

   In addition, [iSNS] describes an authentication block that provides
   message integrity for multicast or broadcast iSNS messages (i.e. for

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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                      November 2004

   heartbeat/discovery messages only). See [RFC 3723] for further
   discussion of security for these protocols.

   If no sensitive information, as described in [iSNS], is being
   distributed via iSNS, and an Entity is discovered via iSNS,
   authentication and authorization are handled by the IP Storage
   protocols whose endpoints are discovered via iSNS, specifically iFCP
   [iFCP] and iSCSI [RFC 3720]. It is the responsibility of the
   providers  of  these  services  to  ensure  that an inappropriately
   advertised or discovered service does not compromise their security.

   When no DHCP security is used, there is a risk of distribution of
   false discovery information (e.g., via the iSNS DHCP option
   identifying a false iSNS server that distributes the false
   discovery information).  The primary countermeasure for this risk
   is authentication by the IP storage protocols discovered through
   iSNS. When this risk is a significant concern, IPsec SAs SHOULD be
   used (as specified in RFC 3723). For example, if an attacker uses
   DHCP and iSNS to distribute discovery information that falsely
   identifies an iSCSI endpoint, that endpoint will lack the
   credentials necessary to successfully complete IKE authentication,
   and hence will be prevented from falsely sending or receiving iSCSI
   traffic. When this risk of false discovery information is a
   significant concern and IPsec is implemented for iSNS, IPsec SAs
   SHOULD also be used for iSNS traffic to prevent use of a false iSNS
   server; this is more robust than relying only on the IP Storage
   protocols to detect false discovery information.

   When IPsec is implemented for iSNS, there is a risk of a denial of
   service attack based on repeated use of false discovery information
   that will cause initiation of IKE negotiation. The countermeasures
   for this are administrative configuration of each iSNS Entity to
   limit the peers that it is willing to communicate with (i.e., by IP
   address range and/or DNS domain), and maintenance of a negative
   authentication cache to avoid repeatedly contacting an iSNS Entity
   that fails to authenticate. These three measures (i.e., IP address
   range limits, DNS domain limits, negative authentication cache)
   MUST be implemented for iSNS entities when this DHCP option is
   used.  An analogous argument applies to the IP storage protocols
   that can be discovered via iSNS as discussed in RFC 3723.

    In addition, use of the techniques described in [RFC2827] and
    [RFC3833] may also be relevant to reduce denial of service attacks.





4.       IANA Considerations

   In accordance with the policy defined in [DHCP], IANA has assigned a
   value of TBD for this option.

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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

   There are no other IANA-assigned values defined by this
   specification.

5.       Normative References

       [DHCP]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC
               2131, Bucknell University, March 1997.

       [iSNS]  Tseng, J. et al., "iSNS - Internet Storage Name
               Service", Internet draft (work in progress), draft-ietf-
               ips-isns-12.txt, August 2002

       [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process --
               Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996

       [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997

       [RFC3118] Arbaugh, W., Droms, R., "Authentication for DHCP
               Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001

       [RFC3667] Bradner, S., "IETF Rights in Contributions", BCP 78,
               RFC 3667, February 2004

       [RFC3668] Bradner, S., "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF
               Technology", BCP 79, RFC 3668, February 2004

       [RFC3720] Satran, J., et al., "Internet Small Computer Systems
               Interface (iSCSI)", RFC 3720, April 2004

       [RFC3723] Aboba, B., et al., "Securing Block Storage Protocols
               over IP", RFC 3723, April 2004



6.       Non-Normative References

       [iFCP]  Monia, C., et al., "iFCP - A Protocol for Internet Fibre
               Channel Storage Networking", Internet draft (work in
               progress), draft-ietf-ips-ifcp-13.txt, May 2002

       [RFC2827] Ferguson, P., et al., "Network Ingress Filtering:
               Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP
               Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000

       [RFC3833] Atkins, D., et al., "Threat Analysis of the Domain
                 Name System (DNS)", RFC 3833, August 2004






Monia, et-al               Standards Track                  [Page 12]


7.       Author's Addresses

   Kevin Gibbons,
   Charles Monia,
   Josh Tseng

   McDATA Corporation
   3850 North First Street
   San Jose, CA 95134-1702
   Phone: (408) 519-3700
   Email: charles.monia@mcdata.com
          joshtseng@yahoo.com
          kevin.gibbons@mcdata.com


8.       Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this
   document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or
   might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any
   independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
   procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78
   and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances
   of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
   obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary
   rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained
   from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights
   that may cover technology that may be required to implement this
   standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
   ipr@ietf.org.

9.       Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Inter
net Society July 2004. This document is subject to
   the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as
   set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

10.      Disclaimer of Validity

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS
   IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS
   SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT
   NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL


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DHCP Option Number for iSNS Revision 13                  November 2004

   NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR
   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task
   Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups
   may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and
   may be upated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It
   is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite
   them other than a "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

11.      Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet
   Society.

12.      Expiration Notice

   This Internet-Draft expires in May 2005.



























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