Network Working Group J. Bournelle
Internet-Draft L. Morand
Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs
Expires: September 8, 2010 S. Decugis, Ed.
NICT
Q. Wu
Huawei
G. Zorn, Ed.
Network Zen
March 7, 2010
Diameter support for the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
draft-ietf-dime-erp-03.txt
Abstract
The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-
authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)
server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies
Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application
to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER
server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the
cryptographic material needed by the re-authentication server.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2010.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Bootstrapping the ER Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication . . . 6
5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication . . . . . 8
6. Re-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Application Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. ERP-Realm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3.3. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Open issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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1. Introduction
RFC 5296 [RFC5296] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP).
It consists of the following steps:
Bootstrapping
A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended
Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication
[RFC5295]. This root key is transported from the EAP server to
the ER server.
Re-authentication
A one-round-trip exchange between the peer and the ER server,
resulting in mutual authentication. To support the EAP
reauthentication functionality, ERP defines two new EAP codes -
EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish.
This document defines how Diameter transports the ERP messages during
the re-authentication process. For this purpose, we define a new
Application Identifier for ERP, and re-use the Diameter EAP commands
(DER/DEA).
This document also discusses the distribution of the root key during
bootstrapping, in conjunction with either the initial EAP
authentication (implicit bootstrapping) or the first ERP exchange
(explicit bootstrapping). Security considerations for this key
distribution are detailed in RFC 5295 [RFC5295].
2. Terminology
This document uses terminology defined in RFC 3748 [RFC3748], RFC
5295 [RFC5295], RFC 5296 [RFC5296], and RFC 4072 [RFC4072].
"Root key" (RK) or "bootstrapping material" refer to the rRK or rDSRK
derived from an EMSK, depending on the location of the ER server in
home or foreign domain.
We use the notation "ERP/DER" in this document to refer to a
Diameter-EAP-Request command with its Application Id set to Diameter
ERP application. Similarly, we use the "ERP/DEA", "EAP/DER", and
"EAP/DEA".
2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Assumptions
This document assumes the existence of at most one logical ER server
entity in a domain. If several physical servers are deployed for
robustness, a replication mechanism must be deployed to synchronize
the ERP states (root keys) between these servers. This replication
mechanism is out of the scope of this document. If multiple ER
servers are deployed in the domain, we assume that they can be used
interchangeably.
4. Protocol Overview
The following figure shows the components involved in ERP, and their
interactions.
Diameter +--------+
+-------------+ ERP +-----------+ (*) | Home |
Peer <->|Authenticator|<=======>| ER server | <---> | EAP |
+-------------+ +-----------+ | server |
+--------+
(*) Diameter EAP application, explicit bootstrapping scenario only.
Figure 1: Diameter ERP Overview
The ER server is located either in the home domain (same as EAP
server) or in the visited domain (same as authenticator, when it
differs from the home domain).
QUESTION:
Can the ER server be located in a third domain (ex: broker's)
according to ERP mechanism?
When the peer initiates an ERP exchange, the authenticator creates a
Diameter-EAP-Request message, as described in Diameter EAP
application [RFC4072]. The Application Id of the message is set to
that of the Diameter ERP application (code: TBD) in the message. The
generation of the ERP/DER message is detailed in section Section 6.
If there is an ER server in the same domain as the authenticator
(local domain), Diameter routing MUST
QUESTION:
Should this say "SHOULD: instead of "MUST"?
be configured so that this ERP/DER message reachs this server, even
if the Destination-Realm is not the local domain.
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If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to
its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component
of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC 5296 [RFC5296],
this realm is the home domain of the peer in case of a bootstrapping
exchange (the 'B' flag is set in the ERP message) or the domain of
the bootstrapped ER server otherwise.
NOTE:
This actually might allow the ER server to be in a third party
realm.
If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER
message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER
is generated [RFC3588] and returned to the authenticator. The
authenticator may cache this information (with limited duration) to
avoid further attempts for ERP with this realm. It may also fallback
to full EAP authentication to authenticate the peer.
When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local
database for a root key
FFS:
and authorization state?
matching the keyName part of the User-Name AVP. If such key is
found, the ER server processes the ERP message as described in RFC
5296 [RFC5296] then creates the ERP/DEA answer as described in
Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.
Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as
described in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], and forwards the content of the EAP-
Payload AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message has its 'B' flag set
(Bootstrapping exchange), the ER server should not possess the root
key in its local database
COMMENT:
This may not be true in future RFC5296bis?
In this case, the ER server acts as a proxy, and forwards the message
to the home EAP server after changing its Application Id to Diameter
EAP and adding an AVP to request the root key. See section Section 5
for more detail on this process.
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5. Bootstrapping the ER Server
The bootstrapping process involves the home EAP server and the ER
server, but also impacts the peer and the authenticator. In ERP, the
peer must derive the same keying material as the ER server. To
achieve this, it must learn the domain name of the ER server. How
this information is acquired is outside the scope of this
specification, but it may involves that the authenticator is
configured to advertize this domain name, especially in the case of
re-authentication after a handover.
The bootstrapping of an ER server with a given root key happens
either during the initial EAP authentication of the peer when the
EMSK -- from which the root key is derived -- is created, during the
first re-authentication, or sometime between those events. We only
consider the first two possibilities in this specification, in the
following subsections.
5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication
Bootstrapping the ER server during the initial EAP authentication
(also known as implicit bootstrapping) offers the advantage that the
server is immediatly available for re-authentication of the peer,
thus minimizing re-authentication delay. On the other hand, it is
possible that only a small number of peers will use re-authentication
in the visited domain. Deriving and caching key material for all the
peers (for example, for the peers that do not support ERP) is a waste
of resources and SHOULD be avoided.
To achieve implicit bootstrapping, the ER server must act as a
Diameter EAP Proxy as defined in the Diameter Base Protocol
[RFC3588], and routing must be configured so that Diameter messages
of a full EAP authentication are routed through this proxy. The
figure bellow illustrates this mechanism.
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ER server &
Authenticator EAP Proxy Home EAP server
============= =========== ===============
------------------------->
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Response)
------------------------->
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Response)
(ERP-RK-Request)
<==================================================>
Multi-round Diameter EAP exchanges, unmodified
<-------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Success)
(MSK)
(Key AVP (rRK))
<-------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Success)
(MSK)
[ERP-Realm]
Figure 2: ERP Bootstrapping During Full EAP Authentication
The ER server proxies the first DER of the full EAP authentication
and adds the ERP-RK-Request AVP inside, if this AVP is not already in
the message (which might happen if there are ER servers in the
visited and the home domains), then forwards the request.
If the EAP server does not support the ERP extensions, it will simply
ignore this grouped AVP and continue as specified in RFC 4072
[RFC4072]. If the server supports the ERP extensions, it caches the
ERP-Realm value with the session data, and continues the EAP
authentication. When the authentication is complete, if it is
successful and the EAP method generated an EMSK, the server MUST
derive the rRK as specified in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], and include an
instance of the Key AVP Section 8.3 in the Diameter-EAP-Answer
message.
When the ER server proxies a Diameter-EAP-Answer message with a
Session-Id corresponding to a message to which it added an ERP-RK-
Answer, and the Result-Code is DIAMETER_SUCCESS, it MUST examine the
message, extract and remove any Key AVP Section 8.3 from the message,
and save its content. If the message does not contain an ERP-RK-
Answer AVP, the ER server MAY cache this information to avoid
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possible subsequent re-authentication attempts for this session. In
any case, the information stored SHOULD NOT have a lifetime greater
than the EMSK lifetime
QUESTION:
How does the ER server knows the EMSK lifetime, if there is no
ERP-RK-Answer? What is the lifetime of the MSK for example?
If the ER server is successfully bootstrapped, it MAY also add the
ERP-Realm AVP after removing the ERP-RK-Answer AVP in the EAP/DEA
message. This could be used by the authenticator to notify the peer
that ERP is bootstrapped, with the ER domain information. How this
information can be transmitted to the peer is outside the scope of
this document.
QUESTION:
Is this possible? It might be useful...
5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication
Bootstrapping the ER server during the first re-authentication (also
known as explicit bootstrapping) offers several advantages: it saves
resources, since we generate and cache only root keys that we
actually need, and it can accomodate inter-domain handovers or ER
servers that lose their state (for example after reboot).
COMMENT:
This last point might not be true currently, since the peer would
not issue a bootstrapping exchange... But this might change also
with RFC5296bis AFAIU
On the other hand, the first re-authentication with the ER server
requires a one-round-trip exchange with the home EAP server, which
adds some delay to the process (but it is more efficient than a full
EAP authentication in any case). It also requires some
synchronization between the peer and the visited domain: since the
ERP message used is different
QUESTION:
and the root key used also?
for the explicit bootstrapping exchange than for normal re-
authentication; explicit bootstrapping should not be used if implicit
bootstrapping was already performed.
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QUESTION:
What should we do if the ER server receives an explicit
bootstrapping request but already possess the rDSRK? Can it
answer without going to the home server? That would be simpler --
planned in rfc5296bis ?
The ER server receives the ERP/DER message containing the EAP-
Initiate/Re-Auth message with the 'B' flag set. It proxies this
message, and performs the following processing in addition to
standard proxy operations:
Changes the Application Id in the header of the message to
Diameter EAP Application (code 5).
Change the content of Application-Auth-Id accordingly.
QUESTION:
Is t better to leave it unmodified?
Add the ERP-RK-Request AVP, which contains the name of the domain
where the ER server is located.
QUESTION:
Add the Destination-Host to reach the appropriate EAP server,
the one with the EMSK. How does the ER server know this
information?
Then the server forwards the EAP/DER request, which is routed to the
home EAP server.
If the home EAP server does not support the ERP extensions, it
replies with an error since the encapsulated EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
command is not understood. Otherwise, it processes the ERP request
as described in [RFC5296]. In particular, it includes the Domain-
Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm AVP. It
creates the EAP/DEA reply message [RFC4072]. including an instance of
the Key AVP Section 8.3.
QUESTION:
What about authorization AVPs?
The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in
addition to standard proxy operations:
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Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP (code TBD)
Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP.
QUESTION:
And authorization AVPs ?
The DEA is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can use the rMSK
as described in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
The figure below captures this proxy behavior:
Authenticator ER server Home EAP server
============= ========= ===============
----------------------->
Diameter ERP/DER
(EAP-Initiate)
------------------------>
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Initiate)
(ERP-RK-Request)
<------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Finish)
(Key AVP)
<----------------------
Diameter ERP/DEA
(EAP-Finish)
(Key AVP)
Figure 3: ERP Explicit Bootstrapping Message Flow
6. Re-Authentication
This section describes in detail a re-authentication exchange with a
(bootstrapped) ER server. The following figure summarizes the re-
authentication exchange.
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ER server
(bootstrapped)
Peer Authenticator (local or home domain)
==== ============= ======================
[ <------------------------ ]
[optional EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-start]
----------------------->
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
===============================>
Diameter ERP, cmd code DER
User-Name: Keyname-NAI
EAP-Payload: EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
<===============================
Diameter ERP, cmd code DEA
EAP-Payload: EAP-Finish/Re-auth
Key AVP: rMSK
<----------------------
EAP-Finish/Re-auth
Figure 4: Diameter ERP Re-authentication Exchange
In ERP, the peer sends an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message to the ER
server via the authenticator. Alternatively, the authenticator may
send an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message to the peer to trigger the
start of ERP. In this case, the peer responds with an EAP-Initiate/
Re-auth message.
If the authenticator does not support ERP (pure [RFC4072] support),
it discards the EAP packets with an unknown ERP-specific code (EAP-
Initiate). The peer may fallback to full EAP authentication in this
case.
When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from
the peer, it process as described in [RFC5296] with regards to the
EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter EAP Request message
following the general process of DiameterEAP [RFC4072], with the
following differences:
The Application Id in the header is set to Diameter ERP (code
TBD).
The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to Diameter ERP
Application.
The keyName-NAI attribute from ERP message is used to create the
content of User-Name AVP and Destination-Realm AVP.
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FFS:
What about Session-ID AVP -- in case of re-auth at the same
place, and in case of handover?
The Auth-Request-Type AVP content is set to [Editor's note: FFS].
QUESTION:
Do we really do authorization with Diameter ERP ? -- need to
pass the authorization attrs to the ER server in that case.
Idea FFS: we do authorization only for explicit bootstrapping
exchanges...
The EAP-Payload AVP contains the ERP message, EAP-Initiate/
Re-Auth.
Then this ERP/DER message is sent as described in Section 4.
The ER server receives and processes this request as described in
Section 4. It then creates an ERP/DEA message following the general
processing described in RFC 4072 [RFC4072], with the following
differences:
The Application Id in the header is set to Diameter ERP (code
TBD).
The value of the Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to Diameter
ERP Application.
The EAP-Payload AVP contains the ERP message, EAP-Finish/Re-auth.
In case of successful authentication, an instance of the Key AVP
containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived
by ERP is included.
QUESTION:
What about all the authorization attributes? If we want to
include them, they have to be present on the ER server...
When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it
as described in Diameter EAP [RFC4072] and RFC 5296 [RFC5296]: the
content of EAP-Payload AVP content is forwarded to the peer, and the
contents of the Keying-Material AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is
used as a shared secret for Secure Association Protocol.
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7. Application Id
We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP
Application, with an Application Id value of TBD. Diameter nodes
conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST
advertise support by including an Auth-Application-Id AVP with a
value of Diameter ERP Application in the of the Capabilities-
Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands [RFC3588].
The primary use of the Diameter ERP Application Id is to ensure
proper routing of the messages, and that the nodes that advertise the
support for this application do understand the new AVPs defined in
section Section 8, although these AVP have the 'M' flag cleared.
8. AVPs
This section discusses the AVPs used by the Diameter ERP application.
8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP
The ERP-RK-Request AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type grouped AVP. This
AVP is used by the ER server to indicate its willingness to act as ER
server for a particular session.
This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.
ERP-RK-Request ::= < AVP Header: TBD >
{ ERP-Realm }
* [ AVP ]
Figure 5: ERP-RK-Request ABNF
8.2. ERP-Realm AVP
The ERP-Realm AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type DiameterIdentity. It
contains the name of the realm in which the ER server is located.
FFS:
We may re-use Origin-Realm here instead? On the other hand, ERP-
Realm may be useful if the ER server is in a third-party realm, if
this is possible.
This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.
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8.3. Key AVP
The Key AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is of type "Grouped" and is
used to carry the rMSK and associated attributes. The usage of the
Key AVP and its constituent AVPs in this application is specified in
the following sub-sections.
8.3.1. Key-Type AVP
The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 3 for rRK.
8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP
The Keying-Material AVP contains rRK sent by the home EAP server to
the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request
AVP. How this material is derived and used is specified in RFC 5296
[RFC5296].
8.3.3. Key-Name AVP
This AVP contains the EMSKname which identifies the keying material.
The derivation of this name is specified in RGC 5296 [RFC5296].
8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in
seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the
EMSK from which the material was derived.
9. Open issues
This document does not address some known issues in Diameter ERP
mechanism. The authors would like to hear ideas about how to address
them.
The main issue is the use of ERP for authentication after a handover
of the peer to a new authenticator (or different authenticator port).
Diameter ERP is not meant to be a mobility protocol. A number of
issues appear when we try to do handover in Diameter ERP (alone): how
to manage the Session-Id AVP; how does the ER server provide the
Authorization AVPs; how does the peer learn the ERP domain of the new
authenticator; how does the home server reachs the peer to for
example terminate the session; and so on... Therefore, the
management of the session for a mobile peer is not (yet) addressed in
this document. It must be studied how Diameter ERP can be for
example used in conjunction with a mobility application (Diameter
MIP4, Diameter MIP6) to support the optimized re-authentication in
such situation.
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Another issue concerns the case where the home realm contains several
EAP servers. In multi rounds full EAP authentication, the
Destination-Host AVP provides the solution to reach the same server
across the exchanges. Only this server possess the EMSK for the
session. In case of explicit bootstrapping, the ER server must
therefore be able to reach the correct server to request the DSRK. A
solution might consist in saving the Origin-Host AVP of all
successful EAP/DEA in the ER server, which is a bit similar to the
implicit bootstrapping scenario described here -- only we save the
server name instead of the root key, and we must then be able to
match the DSRK with the user name.
Finally, this document currently lacks a description of what happens
when a Re-Auth-Request is received for a peer on the authenticator.
10. Acknowledgements
Hannes Tschofenig wrote the initial draft for this document and
provided useful reviews.
Vidya Narayanan reviewed a rough draft version of the document and
found some errors.
Lakshminath Dondeti contributed to the early versions of the
document.
Many thanks to these people!
11. IANA Considerations
This document requires IANA registration of the following new
elements in the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
Parameters [1] registries.
11.1. Diameter Application Identifier
This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value "Diameter
ERP" in the "Application IDs" registry using the policy specified in
Section 11.3 of RFC 3588 [RFC3588].
11.2. New AVPs
This specification requires IANA to allocate new values from the "AVP
Codes" registry according to the policy specified in Section 11.1 of
RFC 3588 [RFC3588] for the following AVPs:
ERP-RK-Request
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ERP-Realm
These AVPs are defined in section Section 8.
12. Security Considerations
The security considerations from the following documents also apply
here:
o RFC 3588 [RFC3588]
o RFC 4072 [RFC4072]
o RFC 5247 [RFC5247]
o RFC 5295 [RFC5295]
o [RFC5296]
FFS:
Do we really respect these security considerations with the
mechanism we describe here? Is it safe to use ERP-RK-Request /
Answer AVPs? What is the worst case?
EAP channel bindings may be necessary to ensure that the Diameter
client and the server are in sync regarding the key Requesting
Entity's Identity. Specifically, the Requesting Entity advertises
its identity through the EAP lower layer, and the user or the EAP
peer communicates that identity to the EAP server (and the EAP server
communicates that identity to the Diameter server) via the EAP method
for user/peer to server verification of the Requesting Entity's
Identity.
QUESTION:
What does this paragraph actually mean?
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,
"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
Cryptographic Key Transport",
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-02 (work
in progress), March 2010.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",
Bournelle, et al. Expires September 8, 2010 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Diameter support for ERP March 2010
BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,
E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter
Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J.,
Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,
V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification
for the Derivation of Root Keys from
an Extended Master Session Key
(EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP
Extensions for EAP Re-authentication
Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296,
August 2008.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, August 2008.
URIs
[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/>
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Authors' Addresses
Julien Bournelle
Orange Labs
38-40 rue du general Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
France
EMail: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com
Lionel Morand
Orange Labs
38-40 rue du general Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
France
EMail: lionel.morand@orange-ftgroup.com
Sebastien Decugis (editor)
NICT
4-2-1 Nukui-Kitamachi
Tokyo 184-8795
Koganei, Japan
EMail: sdecugis@nict.go.jp
Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd.
Nanjing 210001
China
EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com
Glen Zorn (editor)
Network Zen
1463 East Republican Street
Seattle, Washington 98112
USA
Phone: +1 206 931 0768
EMail: gwz@net-zen.net
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