Network Working Group J. Bournelle
Internet-Draft L. Morand
Intended status: Standards Track Orange Labs
Expires: March 9, 2012 S. Decugis
Free Diameter
Q. Wu
Huawei
G. Zorn
Network Zen
September 6, 2011
Diameter support for EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP)
draft-ietf-dime-erp-07.txt
Abstract
The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) defines extensions to the
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to support efficient re-
authentication between the peer and an EAP Re-authentication (ER)
server through a compatible authenticator. This document specifies
Diameter support for ERP. It defines a new Diameter ERP application
to transport ERP messages between an ER authenticator and the ER
server, and a set of new AVPs that can be used to transport the
cryptographic material needed by the re-authentication server.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 9, 2012.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Bootstrapping the ER Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication . . . 6
5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication . . . . . 7
6. Re-Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Application Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. ERP-Realm AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.3. Key AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3.1. Key-Type AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3.3. Key-Name AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Diameter Application Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. New AVPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
RFC5296 [RFC5296] defines the EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP).
It consists of the following steps:
Bootstrapping
A root key for re-authentication is derived from the Extended
Master Session Key (EMSK) created during EAP authentication
[RFC5295]. This root key is transported from the EAP server to
the ER server.
Re-authentication
A one-round-trip exchange between the peer and the ER server,
resulting in mutual authentication. To support the EAP
reauthentication functionality, ERP defines two new EAP codes -
EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish.
This document defines how Diameter transports the ERP messages during
the re-authentication process. For this purpose, we define a new
Application Identifier for ERP, and re-use the Diameter EAP commands
(DER/DEA).
This document also discusses the distribution of the root key during
bootstrapping, in conjunction with either the initial EAP
authentication (implicit bootstrapping) or the first ERP exchange
(explicit bootstrapping). Security considerations for this key
distribution are detailed in RFC 5295 [RFC5295].
2. Terminology
This document uses terminology defined in RFC3748 [RFC3748], RFC5295
[RFC5295], RFC5296 [RFC5296], and RFC4072 [RFC4072].
"Root key" (RK) or "bootstrapping material" refer to the rRK or rDSRK
derived from an EMSK, depending on the location of the ER server in
home or foreign domain.
We use the notation "ERP/DER" and "ERP/DEA" in this document to refer
to Diameter-EAP-Request and Diameter-EAP-Answer commands with the
Application Id set to "Diameter ERP Application" Section 11.1; the
same commands are denoted "EAP/DER" and "EAP/DEA" when the
Application Id in the message is set to "Diameter EAP Application"
[RFC4072].
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2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Assumptions
This document assumes the existence of at most one logical ER server
entity in a domain. If several physical servers are deployed for
robustness, a replication mechanism must be deployed to synchronize
the ERP states (root keys) between these servers. This replication
mechanism is out of the scope of this document. If multiple ER
servers are deployed in the domain, we assume that they can be used
interchangeably. If multiple ER servers are deployed across the
domains, we assume only one ER server that is near to the peer is
getting involved in the ERP.
Also this document assumes the existence of at most one EAP server
entity in the home domain.In case of multiple physical home EAP
servers in the same domain, if the ER server wants to reach the same
home EAP server, the ER server may cache the Destination-Host AVP
corresponding to the home EAP server it requests.
4. Protocol Overview
The following figure shows the components involved in ERP, and their
interactions.
Diameter +--------+
+-------------+ ERP +-----------+ (*) | Home |
Peer <->|Authenticator|<=======>| ER server | <---> | EAP |
+-------------+ +-----------+ | server |
+--------+
(*) Diameter EAP application, explicit bootstrapping scenario only.
Figure 1. Diameter ERP Overview.
The ER server is located either in the home domain (same as EAP
server) or in the visited domain (same as authenticator, when it
differs from the home domain).
When the peer initiates an ERP exchange, the authenticator creates a
Diameter-EAP-Request message [RFC4072]. The Application Id of the
message is set to that of the Diameter ERP application (code: TBD) in
the message. The generation of the ERP/DER message is detailed in
Section 6.
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If there is an ER server in the same domain as the authenticator
(local domain), Diameter routing must be configured so that this ERP/
DER message reaches this server, even if the Destination-Realm is not
the local domain.
If there is no local ER server, the message is routed according to
its Destination-Realm AVP content, extracted from the realm component
of the keyName-NAI attribute. As specified in RFC5296 [RFC5296],
this realm is the home domain of the peer in case of bootstrapping
exchange ('B' flag is set in ERP message) or the domain of the
bootstrapped ER server otherwise .
If no ER server is available in the home domain either, the ERP/DER
message cannot be delivered, and an error DIAMETER_UNABLE_TO_DELIVER
is generated as specified in [RFC3588] and returned to the
authenticator. The authenticator may cache this information (with
limited duration) to avoid further attempts for ERP with this realm.
It may also fallback to full EAP authentication to authenticate the
peer.
When an ER server receives the ERP/DER message, it searches its local
database for a root key matching the keyName part of the User-Name
AVP. If such key is found, the ER server processes the ERP message
as described in [RFC5296] then creates the ERP/DEA answer as
described in Section 6. The rMSK is included in this answer.
Finally, the authenticator extracts the rMSK from the ERP/DEA as
described in RFC5296 [RFC5296], and forwards the content of the EAP-
Payload AVP, the EAP-Finish/Re-Auth message, to the peer.
The ER server may or may not possess the root key in its local
database. If the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth message has its 'B' flag set
(Bootstrapping exchange) and the ER server possess the root key,the
ER server should respond directly to the peer that initiate ERP
exchange otherwise, Otherwise, the ER server should act as a proxy,
and forwards the message to the home EAP server after changing its
Application Id to Diameter EAP and adding the ERP-RK-Request AVP to
request the root key. See Section 5 for more detail on this process.
5. Bootstrapping the ER Server
The bootstrapping process involves the home EAP server and the ER
server, but also impacts the peer and the authenticator. In ERP, the
peer must derive the same keying material as the ER server. To
achieve this, it must learn the domain name of the ER server. How
this information is acquired is outside the scope of this
specification, but it may involves that the authenticator is
configured to advertize this domain name, especially in the case of
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re-authentication after a handover.
The bootstrapping of an ER server with a given root key happens
either during the initial EAP authentication of the peer when the
EMSK -- from which the root key is derived -- is created, during the
first re-authentication, or sometime between those events. We only
consider the first two possibilities in this specification, in the
following sub-sections.
5.1. Bootstrapping During the Initial EAP authentication
Bootstrapping the ER server during the initial EAP authentication
(also known as implicit bootstrapping) offers the advantage that the
server is immediately available for re-authentication of the peer,
thus minimizing the re-authentication delay. On the other hand, it
is possible that only a small number of peers will use re-
authentication in the visited domain. Deriving and caching key
material for all the peers (for example, for the peers that do not
support ERP) is a waste of resources and should be avoided.
To achieve implicit bootstrapping, the ER server acts as a Diameter
EAP Proxy , and Diameter routing must be configured so that Diameter
EAP application messages are routed through this proxy. The figure
bellow illustrates this mechanism.
ER server &
Authenticator EAP Proxy Home EAP server
============= =========== ===============
------------------------->
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Response)
------------------------->
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Response)
(ERP-RK-Request)
<==================================================>
Multi-round Diameter EAP exchanges, unmodified
<-------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Success)
(MSK)
(Key AVP (rRK))
<-------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Success)
(MSK)
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[ERP-Realm]
Figure 2: ERP Bootstrapping During Full EAP Authentication
The authenticator creates the first DER of the full EAP
authentication and send it to the ER server. The ER server proxies
the first DER of the full EAP authentication and adds the ERP-RK-
Request AVP inside, then forwards the request to the home EAP server.
If the home EAP server does not support the Diameter ERP extensions
for ERP-RK-Request AVP, it simply ignores the ERP-RK-Request AVP and
continues as specified in RFC 4072 [RFC4072]. If the server supports
the ERP extensions, it saves the value of the ERP-Realm AVP found
inside the ERP-RK-Request AVP, and continues with the EAP
authentication. When the authentication completes, if it is
successful and the EAP method has generated an EMSK, the server MUST
derive the rRK as specified in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], using the saved
domain name. It then includes the rRK inside a Key AVP Section 8.3
with the Key-Type AVP set to rRK, before sending the DEA as usual.
When the ER server proxies a Diameter-EAP-Answer message with a
Session-Id corresponding to a message to which it added an ERP-RK-
Request AVP, and the Result-Code is DIAMETER_SUCCESS, it MUST examine
the message and save and remove any Key AVP Section 8.3 with Key-Type
AVP set to rRK. If the message does not contain such Key AVP, the ER
server may cache the information that ERP is not possible for this
session to avoid possible subsequent attempts. In any case, the
information stored in ER server concerning a session should not have
a lifetime greater than the EMSK for this session.
If the ER server is successfully bootstrapped, it should also add the
ERP-Realm AVP after removing the Key AVP with Key-Type of rRK in the
EAP/DEA message. This ERP-Realm information can be used by the
authenticator to notify the peer that ER server is bootstrapped, and
for which domain. How this information can be transmitted to the
peer is outside the scope of this document. This information needs
to be sent to the peer if both implicit and explicit bootstrapping
mechanisms are possible, because the ERP message and the root key
used for protecting this message are different in bootstrapping
exchanges and non-bootstrapping exchanges.
5.2. Bootstrapping During the First Re-authentication
Bootstrapping the ER server during the first re-authentication (also
known as explicit bootstrapping) is only needed when there is no
local ER server in the visited domain and there is the ER server in
the home domain. It is less resource-consuming, since EMSK generated
during initial EAP authentication is reused to derive root keys. On
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the other hand, in that case first re-authentication requires a one-
round-trip exchange with the home EAP server, since the EMSK is
generated during initial EAP authentication and never leaves the home
EAP server, which is less efficient than the implicit bootstrapping
scenario.
The EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message is sent to the home ER server. The
home ER server receives the ERP/DER message containing the EAP-
Initiate/Re-Auth message with the 'B' flag set. It creates the new
EAP/DER message using the received DRP/DER message and performs the
following processing:
Set the Application Id in the header of the message as Diameter
EAP Application (code 5).
Extract ERP-RK-request from ERP/DER, which contains the name of
domain where the ER server is located and add it into newly
created ERP/DER message.
Then the newly created EAP/DER is sent and routed to the home
Diameter EAP server.
If the home EAP server does not support ERP extensions, it replies
with an error since the encapsulated ERP-RK-request AVP is not
understood. Otherwise, it processes the DSRK request as described in
[RFC5296]. In particular, it includes the Domain- Name TLV attribute
with the content from the ERP-Realm AVP. It creates the EAP/DEA
reply message [RFC4072]including an instance of the Key AVP Section
8.3 with Key-Type AVP set to rRK. In particular, it includes the
Domain- Name TLV attribute with the content from the ERP-Realm AVP.
The ER server receives this EAP/DEA and proxies it as follows, in
addition to standard proxy operations:
Set the Application Id back to Diameter ERP Application Id (code
TBD)
Extract and cache the content of the Key AVP with Key-Type set to
rRK, as described in implicit scenario.
The ERP/DEA message is then forwarded to the authenticator, that can
use the rMSK as described in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
The figure below captures this proxy behavior:
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Authenticator ER server Home EAP server
============= ========= ===============
----------------------->
Diameter ERP/DER
(EAP-Initiate)
------------------------>
Diameter EAP/DER
(EAP-Response)
(ERP-RK-Request)
<------------------------
Diameter EAP/DEA
(EAP-Success)
(Key AVP (rRK))
(Key AVP (rMSK))
<----------------------
Diameter ERP/DEA
(EAP-Finish)
(Key AVP (rMSK))
Figure 3: ERP Explicit Bootstrapping Message Flow
6. Re-Authentication
This section describes in detail a re-authentication exchange with an
ER server that was previously bootstrapped. The following figure
summarizes the re-authentication exchange.
ER server
Peer Authenticator (bootstrapped)
==== ============= ======================
[ <------------------------ ]
[optional EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-start,]
[ possibly with ERP domain name ]
----------------------->
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
===============================>
Diameter ERP, cmd code DER
User-Name: Keyname-NAI
EAP-Payload: EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
<===============================
Diameter ERP, cmd code DEA
EAP-Payload: EAP-Finish/Re-auth
Key AVP: rMSK
<----------------------
EAP-Finish/Re-auth
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Figure 4: Diameter ERP Re-authentication Exchange
The peer sends an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message to the ER server via
the authenticator. Alternatively, the authenticator may send an EAP-
Initiate/Re-auth-Start message to the peer to trigger the mechanism.
In this case, the peer responds with an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message.
If the authenticator does not support ERP (pure Diameter EAP
[RFC4072] support), it discards the EAP packets with an unknown ERP-
specific code (EAP-Initiate). The peer should fallback to full EAP
authentication in this case.
When the authenticator receives an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message from
the peer, it process as described in [RFC5296] with regards to the
EAP state machine. It creates a Diameter ERP/DER message following
the general process of Diameter EAP [RFC4072], with the following
differences:
The Application Id in the header is set to Diameter ERP (code TBD
).
The value in Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to Diameter ERP
Application.
The keyName-NAI attribute from ERP message is used to create the
content of User-Name AVP and Destination-Realm AVP.
The Auth-Request-Type AVP content is set to the appropriate value.
The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth.
Then this ERP/DER message is sent as described in Section 4.
The ER server receives and processes this request as described in
Section 4. It then creates an ERP/DEA message following the general
processing described in RFC4072 [RFC4072], with the following
differences:
The Application Id in the header is set to Diameter ERP (code
TBD).
The value of the Auth-Application-Id AVP is also set to Diameter
ERP Application.
The EAP-Payload AVP contains the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message.
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In case of successful authentication, an instance of the Key AVP
containing the Re-authentication Master Session Key (rMSK) derived
by ERP is included.
When the authenticator receives this ERP/DEA answer, it processes it
as described in Diameter EAP [RFC4072] and RFC5296 [RFC5296]: the
content of EAP-Payload AVP content is forwarded to the peer, and the
contents of the Keying-Material AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is
used as a shared secret for Secure Association Protocol.
7. Application Id
We define a new Diameter application in this document, Diameter ERP
Application, with an Application Id value of TBD. Diameter nodes
conforming to this specification in the role of ER server MUST
advertise support by including an Auth-Application-Id AVP with a
value of Diameter ERP Application in the of the Capabilities-
Exchange-Request and Capabilities-Exchange-Answer commands [RFC3588].
The primary use of the Diameter ERP Application Id is to ensure
proper routing of the messages, and that the nodes that advertise the
support for this application do understand the new AVPs defined in
Section 8 , although these AVP have the 'M' flag cleared.
8. AVPs
This section discusses the AVPs used by the Diameter ERP application.
8.1. ERP-RK-Request AVP
The ERP-RK-Request AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type grouped AVP. This
AVP is used by the ER server to indicate its willingness to act as ER
server for a particular session.
This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.
ERP-RK-Request ::= < AVP Header: TBD >
{ ERP-Realm }
* [ AVP ]
Figure 5: ERP-RK-Request ABNF
8.2. ERP-Realm AVP
The ERP-Realm AVP (AVP Code TBD) is of type DiameterIdentity. It
contains the name of the realm in which the ER server is located.
This AVP has the M and V bits cleared.
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8.3. Key AVP
The Key AVP [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] is of type "Grouped" and is
used to carry the rRK or rMSK and associated attributes. The usage
of the Key AVP and its constituent AVPs in this application is
specified in the following sub-sections.
8.3.1. Key-Type AVP
The value of the Key-Type AVP MUST be set to 2 for rRK or 3 for rMSK.
8.3.2. Keying-Material AVP
The Keying-Material AVP contains rRK sent by the home EAP server to
the ER server, in answer to a request containing an ERP-RK-Request
AVP, or the rMSK sent by ER server to authenticator. How this
material is derived and used is specified in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
8.3.3. Key-Name AVP
This AVP contains the EMSKname which identifies the keying material.
The derivation of this name is specified in RGC 5296 [RFC5296].
8.3.4. Key-Lifetime AVP
The Key-Lifetime AVP contains the lifetime of the keying material in
seconds. It MUST NOT be greater than the remaining lifetime of the
EMSK from which the material was derived.
9. Acknowledgements
Hannes Tschofenig wrote the initial draft for this document and
provided useful reviews.
Vidya Narayanan reviewed a rough draft version of the document and
found some errors.
Lakshminath Dondeti contributed to the early versions of the
document.
Many thanks to these people!
10. IANA Considerations
This document requires IANA registration of the following new
elements in the Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
Parameters [1] registries.
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10.1. Diameter Application Identifier
This specification requires IANA to allocate a new value "Diameter
ERP" in the "Application IDs" registry using the policy specified in
Section 11.3 of RFC 3588 [RFC3588].
10.2. New AVPs
This specification requires IANA to allocate new values from the "AVP
Codes" registry according to the policy specified in Section 11.1 of
RFC 3588 [RFC3588] for the following AVPs:
ERP-RK-Request
ERP-Realm
These AVPs are defined in Section 8.
11. Security Considerations
The security considerations from the following documents apply here:
o RFC3588 [RFC3588]
o RFC4072 [RFC4072]
o RFC5296 [RFC5296]
o I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]
12. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Wu, Q., Zorn, G., and V. Cakulev,
"Diameter support for local key
transport protocol between local
server and home AAA server",
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-09 (work
in progress), April 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",
BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,
E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter
Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
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[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J.,
Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
August 2005.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,
V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification
for the Derivation of Root Keys from
an Extended Master Session Key
(EMSK)", RFC 5295, August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP
Extensions for EAP Re-authentication
Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296,
August 2008.
[1] <http://www.iana.org/assignments/aaa-parameters/>
Authors' Addresses
Julien Bournelle
Orange Labs
38-40 rue du general Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
France
EMail: julien.bournelle@orange-ftgroup.com
Lionel Morand
Orange Labs
38-40 rue du general Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux 92794
France
EMail: lionel.morand@orange-ftgroup.com
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Sebastien Decugis
Free Diameter
4-2-1 Nukui-Kitamachi
Tokyo, Koganei 184-8795
Japan
EMail: sdecugis@freediameter.net
Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Site B, Floor 12F, Huihong Mansion, No.91 Baixia Rd.
Nanjing 210001
China
EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com
Glen Zorn
Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand
EMail: gwz@net-zen.net
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