DKIM E. Allman
Internet-Draft Sendmail, Inc.
Expires: January 16, 2007 J. Callas
PGP Corporation
M. Delany
M. Libbey
Yahoo! Inc
J. Fenton
M. Thomas
Cisco Systems, Inc.
July 15, 2006
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures
draft-ietf-dkim-base-04
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2007.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a domain-level
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authentication framework for email using public-key cryptography and
key server technology to permit verification of the source and
contents of messages by either Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) or Mail
User Agents (MUAs). The ultimate goal of this framework is to permit
a signing domain to assert responsibility for a message, thus
protecting message signer identity and the integrity of the messages
they convey while retaining the functionality of Internet email as it
is known today. Protection of email identity may assist in the
global control of "spam" and "phishing".
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 Signing Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Simple Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Signers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Verifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 White Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Common ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 Imported ABNF Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.6 DKIM-Quoted-Printable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Protocol Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Selectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Tag=Value Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3 Signing and Verification Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 Canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5 The DKIM-Signature header field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.6 Key Management and Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.7 Computing the Message Hashes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.8 Signing by Parent Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. Semantics of Multiple Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5. Signer Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1 Determine if the Email Should be Signed and by Whom . . . 33
5.2 Select a private-key and corresponding selector
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3 Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions . . 34
5.4 Determine the header fields to Sign . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.5 Compute the Message Hash and Signature . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.6 Insert the DKIM-Signature header field . . . . . . . . . . 36
6. Verifier Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1 Extract Signatures from the Message . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2 Communicate Verification Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1 DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2 DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.3 DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry . . . . . . . . . 45
7.4 _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications . . . . . . . 46
7.5 DKIM Key Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.6 DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.1 Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag) . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2 Misappropriated Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.3 Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.4 Attacks Against DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.5 Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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8.6 Limits on Revoking Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.7 Intentionally malformed Key Records . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.8 Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature header fields . . . 51
8.9 Information Leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.10 Remote Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A. Example of Use (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.1 The user composes an email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.2 The email is signed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.3 The email signature is verified . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
B. Usage Examples (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.1 Simple Message Forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.2 Outsourced Business Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.3 PDAs and Similar Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.4 Mailing Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B.5 Affinity Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B.6 Third-party Message Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B.7 SMTP Servers for Roaming Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
C. Creating a public key (INFORMATIVE) . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
D. MUA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
E. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
F. Edit History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
F.1 Changes since -ietf-03 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
F.2 Changes since -ietf-02 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
F.3 Changes since -ietf-01 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
F.4 Changes since -ietf-00 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
F.5 Changes since -allman-01 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
F.6 Changes since -allman-00 version . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 67
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1. Introduction
[[Note: text in double square brackets (such as this text) will be
deleted before publication.]]
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) defines a mechanism by which email
messages can be cryptographically signed, permitting a signing domain
to claim responsibility for the introduction of a message into the
mail stream. Message recipients can verify the signature by querying
the signer's domain directly to retrieve the appropriate public key,
and thereby confirm that the message was attested to by a party in
possession of the private key for the signing domain.
The approach taken by DKIM differs from previous approaches to
message signing (e.g. S/MIME [RFC1847], OpenPGP [RFC2440]) in that:
o the message signature is written as a message header field so that
neither human recipients nor existing MUA (Mail User Agent)
software are confused by signature-related content appearing in
the message body,
o there is no dependency on public and private key pairs being
issued by well-known, trusted certificate authorities,
o there is no dependency on the deployment of any new Internet
protocols or services for public key distribution or revocation,
o signature verification failure does not result in rejection of the
message,
o no attempt is made to include encryption as part of the mechanism,
o archival is not a design goal.
DKIM:
o is compatible with the existing email infrastructure and
transparent to the fullest extent possible
o requires minimal new infrastructure
o can be implemented independently of clients in order to reduce
deployment time
o does not require the use of an additional trusted third party
(such as a certificate authority or other entity) which might
impose significant costs or introduce delays to deployment
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o can be deployed incrementally
o allows delegation of signing to third parties
1.1 Signing Identity
DKIM separates the question of the identity of the signer of the
message from the purported author of the message. In particular, a
signature includes the identity of the signer. Verifiers can use the
signing information to decide how they want to process the message.
The signing identity is included as part of the signature header
field.
INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: The signing identity specified by a DKIM
signature is not required to match an address in any particular
header field because of the broad methods of interpretation by
recipient mail systems, including MUAs.
1.2 Scalability
DKIM is designed to support the extreme scalability requirements
which characterize the email identification problem. There are
currently over 70 million domains and a much larger number of
individual addresses. DKIM seeks to preserve the positive aspects of
the current email infrastructure, such as the ability for anyone to
communicate with anyone else without introduction.
1.3 Simple Key Management
DKIM differs from traditional hierarchical public-key systems in that
no key signing infrastructure is required; the verifier requests the
public key from the claimed signer directly.
The DNS is proposed as the initial mechanism for publishing public
keys. DKIM is designed to be extensible to other key fetching
services as they become available.
2. Terminology and Definitions
This section defines terms used in the rest of the document. Syntax
descriptions use the form described in Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications [RFC4234].
2.1 Signers
Elements in the mail system that sign messages are referred to as
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signers. These may be MUAs (Mail User Agents), MSAs (Mail Submission
Agents), MTAs (Mail Transfer Agents), or other agents such as mailing
list exploders. In general any signer will be involved in the
injection of a message into the message system in some way. The key
issue is that a message must be signed before it leaves the
administrative domain of the signer.
2.2 Verifiers
Elements in the mail system that verify signatures are referred to as
verifiers. These may be MTAs, Mail Delivery Agents (MDAs), or MUAs.
In most cases it is expected that verifiers will be close to an end
user (reader) of the message or some consuming agent such as a
mailing list exploder.
2.3 White Space
There are three forms of white space:
o WSP represents simple white space, i.e., a space or a tab
character, and is inherited from[RFC2822].
o SWSP is streaming white space, defined as WSP plus the CR and LF
characters.
o FWS, also from [RFC2822], is folding white space. It allows
multiple lines separated by CRLF followed by at least one white
space, to be joined.
The formal ABNF for SWSP is:
SWSP = CR / LF / WSP ; streaming white space
2.4 Common ABNF Tokens
The following ABNF tokens are used elsewhere in this document.
hyphenated-word = ALPHA [ *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-") (ALPHA / DIGIT) ]
base64string = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/" / "=" / SWSP)
2.5 Imported ABNF Tokens
The following tokens are imported from other RFCs as noted. Those
RFCs should be considered definitive. However, all tokens having
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names beginning with "obs-" should be excluded from this import, as
they have been obsoleted and are expected to go away in future
editions of those RFCs.
The following tokens are imported from [RFC2821]:
o "Local-part" (implementation warning: this permits quoted
strings)
o "sub-domain"
The following definitions are imported from [RFC2822]:
o "WSP" (space or tab)
o "FWS" (folding white space)
o "field-name" (name of a header field)
o "dot-atom-text" (in the local-part of an email address)
The following tokens are imported from [RFC2045]:
o "qp-section" (a single line of quoted-printable-encoded text)
o "hex-octet" (a quoted-printable encoded octet)
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Be aware that the ABNF in RFC 2045 does not
obey the rules of RFC 4234 and must be interpreted accordingly,
particularly as regards case folding.
Other tokens not defined herein are imported from [RFC4234]. These
are intuitive primitives such as SP, ALPHA, CRLF, etc.
2.6 DKIM-Quoted-Printable
The DKIM-Quoted-Printable encoding syntax resembles that described in
Quoted-Printable [RFC2045] section 6.7: any character MAY be encoded
as an "=" followed by two hexadecimal digits from the alphabet
"0123456789ABCDEF" (no lower case characters permitted) representing
the hexadecimal-encoded integer value of that character. All control
characters (those with values < %x20), eight-bit characters (values >
%x7F), and the characters DEL (%x7F), SPACE (%x20), and semicolon
(";", %x3B) MUST be encoded. Note that all white space, including
SPACE, CR and LF characters, MUST be encoded. After encoding, FWS
MAY be added at arbitrary locations in order to avoid excessively
long lines; such white space is NOT part of the value, and MUST be
removed before decoding.
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ABNF:
dkim-quoted-printable =
*(FWS / hex-octet / dkim-safe-char)
; hex-octet is from RFC 2045
dkim-safe-char = %x21-3A / %x3C / %x3E-7E
; '!' - ':', '<', '>' - '~'
; Characters not listed as "mail-safe" in
; RFC 2049 are also not recommended.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: DKIM-Quoted-Printable differs from Quoted-
Printable as defined in RFC 2045 in several important ways:
1. White space in the input text, including CR and LF, must be
encoded. RFC 2045 does not require such encoding, and does
not permit encoded of CR or LF characters that are part of a
CRLF line break.
2. White space in the encoded text is ignored. This is to allow
DKIM-Quoted-Printable to be wrapped as needed in headers. In
particular, RFC 2045 requires that line breaks in the input be
represented as physical line breaks; that is not the case
here.
3. The "soft line break" syntax ("=" as the last non-white-space
character on the line) does not apply.
4. DKIM-Quoted-Printable does not require that encoded lines be
no more than 76 characters long (although there may be other
requirements depending on the context in which the encoded
text is being used).
3. Protocol Elements
Protocol Elements are conceptual parts of the protocol that are not
specific to either signers or verifiers. The protocol descriptions
for signers and verifiers are described in later sections (Signer
Actions (Section 5) and Verifier Actions (Section 6)). NOTE: This
section must be read in the context of those sections.
3.1 Selectors
To support multiple concurrent public keys per signing domain, the
key namespace is subdivided using "Selectors". For example,
Selectors might indicate the names of office locations (e.g.,
"sanfrancisco", "coolumbeach", and "reykjavik"), the signing date
(e.g., "january2005", "february2005", etc.), or even the individual
user.
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Selectors are needed to support some important use cases. For
example:
o Domains which want to delegate signing capability for a specific
address for a given duration to a partner, such as an advertising
provider or other out-sourced function.
o Domains which want to allow frequent travelers to send messages
locally without the need to connect with a particular MSA.
o "Affinity" domains (e.g., college alumni associations) which
provide forwarding of incoming mail but which do not operate a
mail submission agent for outgoing mail.
Periods are allowed in Selectors and are component separators. When
keys are retrieved from the DNS, periods in Selectors define DNS
label boundaries in a manner similar to the conventional use in
domain names. Selector components might be used to combine dates
with locations; for example, "march2005.reykjavik". In a DNS
implementation, this can be used to allow delegation of a portion of
the Selector name-space.
ABNF:
selector = sub-domain *( "." sub-domain )
The number of public keys and corresponding Selectors for each domain
are determined by the domain owner. Many domain owners will be
satisfied with just one Selector whereas administratively distributed
organizations may choose to manage disparate Selectors and key pairs
in different regions or on different email servers.
Beyond administrative convenience, Selectors make it possible to
seamlessly replace public keys on a routine basis. If a domain
wishes to change from using a public key associated with Selector
"january2005" to a public key associated with Selector
"february2005", it merely makes sure that both public keys are
advertised in the public-key repository concurrently for the
transition period during which email may be in transit prior to
verification. At the start of the transition period, the outbound
email servers are configured to sign with the "february2005" private-
key. At the end of the transition period, the "january2005" public
key is removed from the public-key repository.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: A key may also be revoked as described below.
The distinction between revoking and removing a key selector
record is subtle. When phasing out keys as described above, a
signing domain would probably simply remove the key record after
the transition period. However, a signing domain could elect to
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revoke the key (but maintain the key record) for a further period.
There is no defined semantic difference between a revoked key and
a removed key.
While some domains may wish to make Selector values well known,
others will want to take care not to allocate Selector names in a way
that allows harvesting of data by outside parties. E.g., if per-user
keys are issued, the domain owner will need to make the decision as
to whether to associate this Selector directly with the user name, or
make it some unassociated random value, such as a fingerprint of the
public key.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTERS' NOTE: reusing a Selector with a new key
(for example, changing the key associated with a user's name)
makes it impossible to tell the difference between a message that
didn't verify because the key is no longer valid versus a message
that is actually forged. Signers should not change the key
associated with a Selector. When creating a new key, signers
should associate it with a new Selector.
3.2 Tag=Value Lists
DKIM uses a simple "tag=value" syntax in several contexts, including
in messages and domain signature records.
Values are a series of strings containing either plain text, "base64"
text (as defined in [RFC2045], section 6.8), "qp-section" (ibid,
section 6.7), or "dkim-quoted-printable" (as defined above). The
name of the tag will determine the encoding of each value; however,
no encoding may include the semicolon (";") character, since that
separates tag-specs.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Although the "plain text"
defined below (as "tag-value") only includes 7-bit characters, an
implementation that wished to anticipate future standards would be
advised to not preclude the use of UTF8-encoded text in tag=value
lists.
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Formally, the syntax rules are:
tag-list = tag-spec 0*( ";" tag-spec ) [ ";" ]
tag-spec = [FWS] tag-name [FWS] "=" [FWS] tag-value [FWS]
tag-name = ALPHA 0*ALNUMPUNC
tag-value = [ 1*VALCHAR 0*( 1*(WSP / FWS) 1*VALCHAR ) ]
; WSP and FWS prohibited at beginning and end
VALCHAR = %x21-3A / %x3C-7E
; EXCLAMATION to TILDE except SEMICOLON
ALNUMPUNC = ALPHA / DIGIT / "_"
Note that WSP is allowed anywhere around tags; in particular, any WSP
after the "=" and any WSP before the terminating ";" is not part of
the value; however, WSP inside the value is significant.
Tags MUST be interpreted in a case-sensitive manner. Values MUST be
processed as case sensitive unless the specific tag description of
semantics specifies case insensitivity.
Tags with duplicate names MUST NOT be specified within a single tag-
list.
Whitespace within a value MUST be retained unless explicitly excluded
by the specific tag description.
Tag=value pairs that represent the default value MAY be included to
aid legibility.
Unrecognized tags MUST be ignored.
Tags that have an empty value are not the same as omitted tags. An
omitted tag is treated as having the default value; a tag with an
empty value explicitly designates the empty string as the value. For
example, "g=" does not mean "g=*", even though "g=*" is the default
for that tag.
3.3 Signing and Verification Algorithms
DKIM supports multiple digital signature algorithms. Two algorithms
are defined by this specification at this time: rsa-sha1, and rsa-
sha256. The rsa-sha256 algorithm is the default if no algorithm is
specified. Verifiers MUST implement both rsa-sha1 and rsa-sha256.
Signers MUST implement and SHOULD sign using rsa-sha256.
3.3.1 The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm
The rsa-sha1 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described
in Section 3.7 below using SHA-1 as the hash-alg. That hash is then
signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm (defined in PKCS#1
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version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the signer's private key.
The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted into any form other than
the native binary form before being signed.
3.3.2 The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm
The rsa-sha256 Signing Algorithm computes a message hash as described
in Section 3.7 below using SHA-256 as the hash-alg. That hash is
then signed by the signer using the RSA algorithm (actually PKCS#1
version 1.5 [RFC3447]) as the crypt-alg and the signer's private key.
The hash MUST NOT be truncated or converted into any form other than
the native binary form before being signed.
3.3.3 Other algorithms
Other algorithms MAY be defined in the future. Verifiers MUST ignore
any signatures using algorithms that they do not implement.
3.3.4 Key sizes
Selecting appropriate key sizes is a trade-off between cost,
performance and risk. Since short RSA keys more easily succumb to
off-line attacks, signers MUST use RSA keys of at least 1024 bits for
long-lived keys. Verifiers MUST be able to validate signatures with
keys ranging from 512 bits to 2048 bits, and they MAY be able to
validate signatures with larger keys. Verifier policies may use the
length of the signing key as one metric for determining whether a
signature is acceptable.
Factors that should influence the key size choice include:
o The practical constraint that large keys may not fit within a 512
byte DNS UDP response packet
o The security constraint that keys smaller than 1024 bits are
subject to off-line attacks
o Larger keys impose higher CPU costs to verify and sign email
o Keys can be replaced on a regular basis, thus their lifetime can
be relatively short
o The security goals of this specification are modest compared to
typical goals of public-key systems
See [RFC3766] for further discussion of selecting key sizes.
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3.4 Canonicalization
Empirical evidence demonstrates that some mail servers and relay
systems modify email in transit, potentially invalidating a
signature. There are two competing perspectives on such
modifications. For most signers, mild modification of email is
immaterial to the authentication status of the email. For such
signers a canonicalization algorithm that survives modest in-transit
modification is preferred.
Other signers demand that any modification of the email, however
minor, result in a signature verification failure. These signers
prefer a canonicalization algorithm that does not tolerate in-transit
modification of the signed email.
Some signers may be willing to accept modifications to header fields
that are within the bounds of email standards such as [RFC2822], but
are unwilling to accept any modification to the body of messages.
To satisfy all requirements, two canonicalization algorithms are
defined for each of the header and the body: a "simple" algorithm
that tolerates almost no modification and a "relaxed" algorithm that
tolerates common modifications such as white-space replacement and
header field line re-wrapping. A signer MAY specify either algorithm
for header or body when signing an email. If no canonicalization
algorithm is specified by the signer, the "simple" algorithm defaults
for both header and body. Verifiers MUST implement both
canonicalization algorithms. Note that the header and body may use
different canonicalization algorithms. Further canonicalization
algorithms MAY be defined in the future; verifiers MUST ignore any
signatures that use unrecognized canonicalization algorithms.
[[WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION POINT: If a message is transmitted
using CHUNKING (that is, BDAT instead of the DATA command) and
BODY=BINARYMIME [RFC3030] then the body should be treated as a
binary stream, and no canonicalization whatsoever should be done.
Do we want to leave this for the future, say that canonicalization
is ignored in this circumstance, or add a third "binary" body
canonicalization algorithm? Or something else, of course.]]
Canonicalization simply prepares the email for presentation to the
signing or verification algorithm. It MUST NOT change the
transmitted data in any way. Canonicalization of header fields and
body are described below.
NOTE: This section assumes that the message is already in "network
normal" format (e.g., text is ASCII encoded, lines are separated with
CRLF characters, etc.). See also Section 5.3 for information about
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normalizing the message.
3.4.1 The "simple" Header Field Canonicalization Algorithm
The "simple" header canonicalization algorithm does not change header
fields in any way. Header fields MUST be presented to the signing or
verification algorithm exactly as they are in the message being
signed or verified. In particular, header field names MUST NOT be
case folded and white space MUST NOT be changed.
3.4.2 The "relaxed" Header Field Canonicalization Algorithm
The "relaxed" header canonicalization algorithm MUST apply the
following steps in order:
o Convert all header field names (not the header field values) to
lower case. For example, convert "SUBJect: AbC" to "subject:
AbC".
o Unfold all header field continuation lines as described in
[RFC2822]; in particular, lines with terminators embedded in
continued header field values (that is, CRLF sequences followed by
WSP) MUST be interpreted without the CRLF. Implementations MUST
NOT remove the CRLF at the end of the header field value.
o Convert all sequences of one or more WSP characters to a single SP
character. WSP characters here include those before and after a
line folding boundary.
o Delete all WSP characters at the end of each unfolded header field
value.
o Delete any WSP characters remaining before and after the colon
separating the header field name from the header field value. The
colon separator MUST be retained.
3.4.3 The "simple" Body Canonicalization Algorithm
The "simple" body canonicalization algorithm ignores all empty lines
at the end of the message body. An empty line is a line of zero
length after removal of the line terminator. If there is no trailing
CRLF on the message, a CRLF is added. It makes no other changes to
the message body. In more formal terms, the "simple" body
canonicalization algorithm converts "0*CRLF" at the end of the body
to a single "CRLF".
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3.4.4 The "relaxed" Body Canonicalization Algorithm
[[This section may be deleted; see discussion below.]] The "relaxed"
body canonicalization algorithm:
o Ignores all white space at the end of lines. Implementations MUST
NOT remove the CRLF at the end of the line.
o Reduces all sequences of WSP within a line to a single SP
character.
o Ignores all empty lines at the end of the message body. "Empty
line" is defined in Section 3.4.3.
[[WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION POINT (ISSUE 1326): Mike Thomas has
found bare CRs in the wild that are getting converted to CRLF by
some MTAs and thus breaking signatures. Shall we (a) drop
"relaxed" until we can figure out how to do it right and then put
it in as an extension, (b) change "relaxed" to handle this case,
probably by having it convert bare CR and LF to CRLF, or (c)
something else?]]
3.4.5 Body Length Limits
A body length count MAY be specified to limit the signature
calculation to an initial prefix of the body text, measured in
octets. If the body length count is not specified then the entire
message body is signed.
INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: This capability is provided because it is
very common for mailing lists to add trailers to messages (e.g.,
instructions how to get off the list). Until those messages are
also signed, the body length count is a useful tool for the
verifier since it may as a matter of policy accept messages having
valid signatures with extraneous data.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Using body length limits enables
an attack in which an attacker modifies a message to include
content that solely benefits the attacker. It is possible for the
appended content to completely replace the original content in the
end recipient's eyes and to defeat duplicate message detection
algorithms. To avoid this attack, signers should be wary of using
this tag, and verifiers might wish to ignore the tag or remove
text that appears after the specified content length, perhaps
based on other criteria.
The body length count allows the signer of a message to permit data
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to be appended to the end of the body of a signed message. The body
length count MUST be calculated following the canonicalization
algorithm; for example, any white space ignored by a canonicalization
algorithm is not included as part of the body length count. Signers
of MIME messages that include a body length count SHOULD be sure that
the length extends to the closing MIME boundary string.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: A signer wishing to ensure that
the only acceptable modifications are to add to the MIME postlude
would use a body length count encompassing the entire final MIME
boundary string, including the final "--CRLF". A signer wishing
to allow additional MIME parts but not modification of existing
parts would use a body length count extending through the final
MIME boundary string, omitting the final "--CRLF".
A body length count of zero means that the body is completely
unsigned.
Signers wishing to ensure that no modification of any sort can occur
should specify the "simple" canonicalization algorithm for both
header and body and omit the body length count.
3.4.6 Canonicalization Examples (INFORMATIVE)
(In the following examples, actual white space is used only for
clarity. The actual input and output text is designated using
bracketed descriptors: "<SP>" for a space character, "<TAB>" for a
tab character, and "<CRLF>" for a carriage-return/line-feed sequence.
For example, "X <SP> Y" and "X<SP>Y" represent the same three
characters.)
Example 1: A message reading:
A: <SP> X <CRLF>
B <SP> : <SP> Y <TAB><CRLF>
<TAB> Z <SP><SP><CRLF>
<CRLF>
<SP> C <SP><CRLF>
D <SP><TAB><SP> E <CRLF>
<CRLF>
<CRLF>
when canonicalized using relaxed canonicalization for both header and
body results in a header reading:
a:X <CRLF>
b:Y <SP> Z <CRLF>
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and a body reading:
<SP> C <CRLF>
D <SP> E <CRLF>
Example 2: The same message canonicalized using simple
canonicalization for both header and body results in a header
reading:
A: <SP> X <CRLF>
B <SP> : <SP> Y <TAB><CRLF>
<TAB> Z <SP><SP><CRLF>
and a body reading:
<SP> C <SP><CRLF>
D <SP><TAB><SP> E <CRLF>
Example 3: When processed using relaxed header canonicalization and
simple body canonicalization, the canonicalized version has a header
of:
a:X <CRLF>
b:Y <SP> Z <CRLF>
and a body reading:
<SP> C <SP><CRLF>
D <SP><TAB><SP> E <CRLF>
3.5 The DKIM-Signature header field
The signature of the email is stored in the "DKIM-Signature:" header
field. This header field contains all of the signature and key-
fetching data. The DKIM-Signature value is a tag-list as described
in Section 3.2.
The "DKIM-Signature:" header field SHOULD be treated as though it
were a trace header field as defined in section 3.6 of [RFC2822], and
hence SHOULD NOT be reordered and SHOULD be prepended to the message.
The "DKIM-Signature:" header field being created or verified is
always included in the signature calculation, after the body of the
message; however, when calculating or verifying the signature, the
value of the b= tag (signature value) of that DKIM-Signature header
field MUST be treated as though it were an empty string. Unknown
tags in the "DKIM-Signature:" header field MUST be included in the
signature calculation but MUST be otherwise ignored by verifiers.
Other "DKIM-Signature:" header fields that are included in the
signature should be treated as normal header fields; in particular,
the b= tag is not treated specially.
The encodings for each field type are listed below. Tags described
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as qp-section are as described in section 6.7 of MIME Part One
[RFC2045], with the additional conversion of semicolon characters to
"=3B"; intuitively, this is one line of quoted-printable encoded
text. Tags described as dkim-quoted-printable are as defined in
Section 2.6.
Tags on the DKIM-Signature header field along with their type and
requirement status are shown below. Unrecognized tags MUST be
ignored.
v= Version (MUST be included). This tag defines the version of this
specification that applies to the signature record. It MUST have
the value 0.4.
ABNF:
sig-v-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] "0.4"
INFORMATIVE NOTE: DKIM-Signature version numbers are
expected to increase arithmetically as new versions of this
specification are released.
[[INFORMATIVE NOTE: Upon publication, this version number
should be changed to "1", and this note should be deleted.]]
a= The algorithm used to generate the signature (plain-text;
REQUIRED). Verifiers MUST support "rsa-sha1" and "rsa-sha256";
signers SHOULD sign using "rsa-sha256". See Section 3.3 for a
description of algorithms.
ABNF:
sig-a-tag = %x61 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-a-tag-alg
sig-a-tag-alg = sig-a-tag-k "-" sig-a-tag-h
sig-a-tag-k = "rsa" / x-sig-a-tag-k
sig-a-tag-h = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-sig-a-tag-h
x-sig-a-tag-k = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT) ; for later extension
x-sig-a-tag-h = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT) ; for later extension
b= The signature data (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored in
this value and MUST be ignored when re-assembling the original
signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert
FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length
limits. See Signer Actions (Section 5) for how the signature is
computed.
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ABNF:
sig-b-tag = %x62 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-b-tag-data
sig-b-tag-data = base64string
bh= The hash of the canonicalized body part of the message as limited
by the "l=" tag (base64; REQUIRED). Whitespace is ignored in
this value and MUST be ignored when re-assembling the original
signature. In particular, the signing process can safely insert
FWS in this value in arbitrary places to conform to line-length
limits. See Section 3.7 for how the body hash is computed.
ABNF:
sig-bh-tag = %x62 %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-bh-tag-data
sig-bh-tag-data = base64string
c= Message canonicalization (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is
"simple/simple"). This tag informs the verifier of the type of
canonicalization used to prepare the message for signing. It
consists of two names separated by a "slash" (%d47) character,
corresponding to the header and body canonicalization algorithms
respectively. These algorithms are described in Section 3.4. If
only one algorithm is named, that algorithm is used for the
header and "simple" is used for the body. For example,
"c=relaxed" is treated the same as "c=relaxed/simple".
ABNF:
sig-c-tag = %x63 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-c-tag-alg
["/" sig-c-tag-alg]
sig-c-tag-alg = "simple" / "relaxed" / x-sig-c-tag-alg
x-sig-c-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for later extension
d= The domain of the signing entity (plain-text; REQUIRED). This is
the domain that will be queried for the public key. This domain
MUST be the same as or a parent domain of the "i=" tag (the
signing identity, as described below), or it MUST meet the
requirements for parent domain signing described in Section 3.8.
When presented with a signature that does not meet these
requirement, verifiers MUST consider the signature invalid.
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Internationalized domain names MUST be punycode-encoded
[RFC3492].
ABNF:
sig-d-tag = %x64 [FWS] "=" [FWS] domain-name
domain-name = sub-domain 1*("." sub-domain)
; from RFC 2821 Domain, but excluding address-literal
h= Signed header fields (plain-text, but see description; REQUIRED).
A colon-separated list of header field names that identify the
header fields presented to the signing algorithm. The field MUST
contain the complete list of header fields in the order presented
to the signing algorithm. The field MAY contain names of header
fields that do not exist when signed; nonexistent header fields
do not contribute to the signature computation (that is, they are
treated as the null input, including the header field name, the
separating colon, the header field value, and any CRLF
terminator). The field MUST NOT include the DKIM-Signature
header field that is being created or verified, but may include
others. Folding white space (FWS) MAY be included on either side
of the colon separator. Header field names MUST be compared
against actual header field names in a case insensitive manner.
This list MUST NOT be empty. See Section 5.4 for a discussion of
choosing header fields to sign.
ABNF:
sig-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] hdr-name
0*( *FWS ":" *FWS hdr-name )
hdr-name = field-name
INFORMATIVE EXPLANATION: By "signing" header fields that do
not actually exist, a signer can prevent insertion of those
header fields before verification. However, since a signer
cannot possibly know what header fields might be created in
the future, and that some MUAs might present header fields
that are embedded inside a message (e.g., as a message/rfc822
content type), the security of this solution is not total.
INFORMATIVE EXPLANATION: The exclusion of the header field
name and colon as well as the header field value for non-
existent header fields prevents an attacker from inserting an
actual header field with a null value.
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i= Identity of the user or agent (e.g., a mailing list manager) on
behalf of which this message is signed (dkim-quoted-printable;
OPTIONAL, default is an empty local-part followed by an "@"
followed by the domain from the "d=" tag). The syntax is a
standard email address where the local-part MAY be omitted. The
domain part of the address MUST be the same as or a subdomain of
the value of the "d=" tag.
Internationalized domain names MUST be punycode-encoded
[RFC3492].
ABNF:
sig-i-tag = %x69 [FWS] "=" [FWS] [ Local-part ] "@" domain-name
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The local-part of the "i=" tag is optional
because in some cases a signer may not be able to establish a
verified individual identity. In such cases, the signer may
wish to assert that although it is willing to go as far as
signing for the domain, it is unable or unwilling to commit
to an individual user name within their domain. It can do so
by including the domain part but not the local-part of the
identity.
INFORMATIVE DISCUSSION: This document does not require the
value of the "i=" tag to match the identity in any message
header field fields. This is considered to be a verifier
policy issue. Constraints between the value of the "i=" tag
and other identities in other header fields seek to apply
basic authentication into the semantics of trust associated
with a role such as content author. Trust is a broad and
complex topic and trust mechanisms are subject to highly
creative attacks. The real-world efficacy of any but the
most basic bindings between the "i=" value and other
identities is not well established, nor is its vulnerability
to subversion by an attacker. Hence reliance on the use of
these options should be strictly limited. In particular it
is not at all clear to what extent a typical end-user
recipient can rely on any assurances that might be made by
successful use of the "i=" options.
l= Body length count (plain-text unsigned decimal integer; OPTIONAL,
default is entire body). This tag informs the verifier of the
number of octets in the body of the email after canonicalization
included in the cryptographic hash, starting from 0 immediately
following the CRLF preceding the body. This value MUST NOT be
larger than the actual number of octets in the canonicalized
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message body.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION WARNING: Use of the l= tag might
allow display of fraudulent content without appropriate
warning to end users. The l= tag is intended for increasing
signature robustness when sending to mailing lists that both
modify their content and do not sign their messages.
However, using the l= tag enables attacks in which an
intermediary with malicious intent modifies a message to
include content that solely benefits the attacker. It is
possible for the appended content to completely replace the
original content in the end recipient's eyes and to defeat
duplicate message detection algorithms. Examples are
described in Security Considerations (Section 8). To avoid
this attack, signers should be extremely wary of using this
tag, and verifiers might wish to ignore the tag or remove
text that appears after the specified content length.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The value of the l= tag is constrained to
76 decimal digits, which will fit in a 256-bit binary integer
field. This constraint is not intended to predict the size
of future messages, but is intended to remind the implementer
to check the length of this and all other tags during
verification. Implementers may need to limit the actual
value expressed to a value smaller than 10^76, e.g., to allow
a message to fit within the available storage space.
ABNF:
sig-l-tag = %x6c [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*76DIGIT
q= A colon-separated list of query methods used to retrieve the
public key (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "dns/txt"). Each
query method is of the form "type[/options]", where the syntax
and semantics of the options depends on the type and specified
options. If there are multiple query mechanisms listed, the
choice of query mechanism MUST NOT change the interpretation of
the signature. Implementations MUST use the recognized query
mechanisms in the order presented.
Currently the only valid value is "dns/txt" which defines the DNS
TXT record lookup algorithm described elsewhere in this document.
The only option defined for the "dns" query type is "txt", which
MUST be included. Verifiers and signers MUST support "dns/txt".
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ABNF:
sig-q-tag = %x71 [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-q-tag-method
*([FWS] ":" [FWS] sig-q-tag-method)
sig-q-tag-method = "dns/txt" / x-sig-q-tag-type ["/" x-sig-q-tag-args]
x-sig-q-tag-type = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
x-sig-q-tag-args = qp-hdr-value
s= The Selector subdividing the namespace for the "d=" (domain) tag
(plain-text; REQUIRED).
ABNF:
sig-s-tag = %x73 [FWS] "=" [FWS] selector
t= Signature Timestamp (plain-text unsigned decimal integer;
RECOMMENDED, default is an unknown creation time). The time that
this signature was created. The format is the number of seconds
since 00:00:00 on January 1, 1970 in the UTC time zone. The
value is expressed as an unsigned integer in decimal ASCII. This
value is not constrained to fit into a 31- or 32-bit integer.
Implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle values up to at
least 10^12 (until approximately AD 200,000; this fits into 40
bits). To avoid denial of service attacks, implementations MAY
consider any value longer than 12 digits to be infinite.
ABNF:
sig-t-tag = %x74 [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*12DIGIT
x= Signature Expiration (plain-text unsigned decimal integer;
RECOMMENDED, default is no expiration). The format is the same
as in the "t=" tag, represented as an absolute date, not as a
time delta from the signing timestamp. The value is expressed as
an unsigned integer in decimal ASCII, with the same contraints on
the value in the "t=" tag. Signatures MAY be considered invalid
if the verification time at the verifier is past the expiration
date. The verification time should be the time that the message
was first received at the administrative domain of the verifier
if that time is reliably available; otherwise the current time
should be used. The value of the "x=" tag MUST be greater than
the value of the "t=" tag if both are present.
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INFORMATIVE NOTE: The x= tag is not intended as an anti-
replay defense.
ABNF:
sig-x-tag = %x78 [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*12DIGIT
z= Copied header fields (dkim-quoted-printable, but see description;
OPTIONAL, default is null). A vertical-bar-separated list of
selected header fields present when the message was signed,
including both the field name and value. It is not required to
include all header fields present at the time of signing. This
field need not contain the same header fields listed in the "h="
tag. The header field text itself must encode the vertical bar
("|", %x7C) character (i.e., vertical bars in the z= text are
metacharacters, and any actual vertical bar characters in a
copied header field must be encoded). Note that all white space
must be encoded, including white space between the colon and the
header field value. After encoding, SWSP MAY be added at
arbitrary locations in order to avoid excessively long lines;
such white space is NOT part of the value of the header field,
and MUST be removed before decoding.
Verifiers MUST NOT use the header field names or copied values
for checking the signature in any way. Copied header field
values are for diagnostic use only.
Header fields with characters requiring conversion (perhaps from
legacy MTAs which are not [RFC2822] compliant) SHOULD be
converted as described in MIME Part Three [RFC2047].
ABNF:
sig-z-tag = %x7A [FWS] "=" [FWS] sig-z-tag-copy
*( [FWS] "|" sig-z-tag-copy )
sig-z-tag-copy = hdr-name ":" qp-hdr-value
qp-hdr-value = dkim-quoted-printable ; with "|" encoded
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE of a signature header field spread across
multiple continuation lines:
DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=brisbane;
c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=@eng.example.net; t=1117574938; x=1118006938;
h=from:to:subject:date;
z=From:foo@eng.example.net|To:joe@example.com|
Subject:demo=20run|Date:July=205,=202005=203:44:08=20PM=20-0700;
bh=MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTAxMjM0NTY3ODkwMTI=;
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZ
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VoG4ZHRNiYzR
3.6 Key Management and Representation
Signature applications require some level of assurance that the
verification public key is associated with the claimed signer. Many
applications achieve this by using public key certificates issued by
a trusted third party. However, DKIM can achieve a sufficient level
of security, with significantly enhanced scalability, by simply
having the verifier query the purported signer's DNS entry (or some
security-equivalent) in order to retrieve the public key.
DKIM keys can potentially be stored in multiple types of key servers
and in multiple formats. The storage and format of keys are
irrelevant to the remainder of the DKIM algorithm.
Parameters to the key lookup algorithm are the type of the lookup
(the "q=" tag), the domain of the responsible signer (the "d=" tag of
the DKIM-Signature header field), and the Selector (the "s=" tag).
public_key = dkim_find_key(q_val, d_val, s_val)
This document defines a single binding, using DNS TXT records to
distribute the keys. Other bindings may be defined in the future.
3.6.1 Textual Representation
It is expected that many key servers will choose to present the keys
in an otherwise unstructured text format (for example, an XML form
would not be considered to be unstructured text for this purpose).
The following definition MUST be used for any DKIM key represented in
an otherwise unstructured textual form.
The overall syntax is a tag-list as described in Section 3.2. The
current valid tags are described below. Other tags MAY be present
and MUST be ignored by any implementation that does not understand
them.
v= Version of the DKIM key record (plain-text; RECOMMENDED, default
is "DKIM1"). If specified, this tag MUST be set to "DKIM1"
(without the quotes). This tag MUST be the first tag in the
record. Records beginning with a "v=" tag with any other value
MUST be discarded.
ABNF:
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key-v-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] "DKIM1"
g= granularity of the key (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "*").
This value MUST match the Local-part of the "i=" tag of the DKIM-
Signature header field (or its default value of the empty string
if "i=" is not specified), with a "*" character matching a
sequence of zero or more arbitrary characters ("wildcarding").
The intent of this tag is to constrain which signing address can
legitimately use this Selector. An email with a signing address
that does not match the value of this tag constitutes a failed
verification. Wildcarding allows matching for addresses such as
"user+*". An empty "g=" value never matches any addresses.
ABNF:
key-g-tag = %x67 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-g-tag-lpart
key-g-tag-lpart = [dot-atom-text] ["*"] [dot-atom-text]
[[NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION POINT: "*" is legal in a "dot-
atom-text". This should probably use a different character
for wildcarding. Unfortunately, the options are non-mnemonic
(e.g., "@", "(", ":"). Alternatively we could insist on
escaping a "*" intended as a literal "*" in the address.]]
h= Acceptable hash algorithms (plain-text; OPTIONAL, defaults to
allowing all algorithms). A colon-separated list of hash
algorithms that might be used. Signers and Verifiers MUST
support the "sha256" hash algorithm. Verifiers MUST also support
the "sha1" hash algorithm.
ABNF:
key-h-tag = %x68 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-h-tag-alg )
key-h-tag-alg = "sha1" / "sha256" / x-key-h-tag-alg
x-key-h-tag-alg = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
k= Key type (plain-text; OPTIONAL, default is "rsa"). Signers and
verifiers MUST support the "rsa" key type. The "rsa" key type
indicates that an ASN.1 DER-encoded [X.660] RSAPublicKey
[RFC3447] (see sections 3.1 and A.1.1) is being used in the p=
tag. (Note: the p= tag further encodes the value using the
base64 algorithm.)
ABNF:
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key-k-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-k-tag-type
key-k-tag-type = "rsa" / x-key-k-tag-type
x-key-k-tag-type = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
[[NON-NORMATIVE DISCUSSION NOTE: In some cases it can be
hard to separate h= and k=; for example DSA implies that
SHA-1 will be used. This might be an actual change to the
spec depending on how we decide to fix this.]]
n= Notes that might be of interest to a human (qp-section; OPTIONAL,
default is empty). No interpretation is made by any program.
This tag should be used sparingly in any key server mechanism
that has space limitations (notably DNS).
ABNF:
key-n-tag = %x6e [FWS] "=" [FWS] qp-section
p= Public-key data (base64; REQUIRED). An empty value means that
this public key has been revoked. The syntax and semantics of
this tag value before being encoded in base64 is defined by the
k= tag.
ABNF:
key-p-tag = %x70 [FWS] "=" [ [FWS] base64string ]
s= Service Type (plain-text; OPTIONAL; default is "*"). A colon-
separated list of service types to which this record applies.
Verifiers for a given service type MUST ignore this record if the
appropriate type is not listed. Currently defined service types
are:
* matches all service types
email electronic mail (not necessarily limited to SMTP)
This tag is intended to permit signers to constrain the use of
delegated keys, e.g., where a company is willing to delegate the
right to send mail in their name to an outsourcer, but not to
send IM or make VoIP calls. (This of course presumes that these
keys are used in other services in the future.)
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ABNF:
key-s-tag = %x73 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-s-tag-type
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-s-tag-type
key-s-tag-type = "email" / "*" / x-key-s-tag-type
x-key-s-tag-type = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
t= Flags, represented as a colon-separated list of names (plain-
text; OPTIONAL, default is no flags set). The defined flags are:
y This domain is testing DKIM. Verifiers MUST NOT treat
messages from signers in testing mode differently from
unsigned email, even should the signature fail to verify.
Verifiers MAY wish to track testing mode results to assist
the signer.
s Any DKIM-Signature header fields using the "i=" tag MUST have
the same domain value on the right hand side of the "@" in
the "i=" tag and the value of the "d=" tag. That is, the
"i=" domain MUST NOT be a subdomain of "d=". Use of this
flag is RECOMMENDED unless subdomaining is required.
ABNF:
key-t-tag = %x74 [FWS] "=" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag
0*( [FWS] ":" [FWS] key-t-tag-flag )
key-t-tag-flag = "y" / "s" / x-key-t-tag-flag
x-key-t-tag-flag = hyphenated-word ; for future extension
Unrecognized flags MUST be ignored.
3.6.2 DNS binding
A binding using DNS TXT records as a key service is hereby defined.
All implementations MUST support this binding.
3.6.2.1 Name Space
All DKIM keys are stored in a subdomain named "_domainkey". Given a
DKIM-Signature field with a "d=" tag of "example.com" and an "s=" tag
of "foo.bar", the DNS query will be for
"foo.bar._domainkey.example.com".
Wildcard DNS records (e.g., *.bar._domainkey.example.com) MUST NOT be
used. Note also that wildcards within domains (e.g.,
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s._domainkey.*.example.com) are not supported by the DNS.
3.6.2.2 Resource Record Types for Key Storage
The DNS Resource Record type used is specified by an option to the
query-type ("q=") tag. The only option defined in this base
specification is "txt", indicating the use of a TXT RR record. A
later extension of this standard may define another Resource Record
type.
TXT records are encoded as described in Section 3.6.1.
3.7 Computing the Message Hashes
Both signing and verifying message signatures starts with a step of
computing two cryptographic hashes over the message. Signers will
choose the parameters of the signature as described in Signer Actions
(Section 5); verifiers will use the parameters specified in the
"DKIM-Signature" header field being verified. In the following
discussion, the names of the tags in the "DKIM-Signature" header
field which either exists (when verifying) or will be created (when
signing) are used. Note that canonicalization (Section 3.4) is only
used to prepare the email for signing or verifying; it does not
affect the transmitted email in any way.
The signer or verifier must compute two hashes, one over the body of
the message and one over the selected header fields of the message.
Signers MUST compute them in the order shown. Verifiers MAY compute
them in any order convenient to the verifier, provided that the
result is semantically identical to the semantics that would be the
case had they been computed in this order.
In hash step 1, the signer or verifier MUST hash the message body,
canonicalized using the body canonicalization algorithm specified in
the "c=" tag and truncated to the length specified in the "l=" tag.
That hash value is then converted to base64 form and inserted into
the "bh=" tag of the DKIM-Signature: header field.
In hash step 2, the signer or verifier MUST pass the following to the
hash algorithm in the indicated order.
1. The header fields specified by the "h=" tag, in the order
specified in that tag, and canonicalized using the header
canonicalization algorithm specified in the "c=" tag. Each
header field must be terminated with a single CRLF.
2. The "DKIM-Signature" header field that exists (verifying) or will
be inserted (signing) in the message, with the value of the "b="
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tag deleted (i.e., treated as the empty string), canonicalized
using the header canonicalization algorithm specified in the "c="
tag, and without a trailing CRLF.
All tags and their values in the DKIM-Signature header field are
included in the cryptographic hash with the sole exception of the
value portion of the "b=" (signature) tag, which MUST be treated as
the null string. All tags MUST be included even if they might not be
understood by the verifier. The header field MUST be presented to
the hash algorithm after the body of the message rather than with the
rest of the header fields and MUST be canonicalized as specified in
the "c=" (canonicalization) tag. The DKIM-Signature header field
MUST NOT be included in its own h= tag.
When calculating the hash on messages that will be transmitted using
base64 or quoted-printable encoding, signers MUST compute the hash
after the encoding. Likewise, the verifier MUST incorporate the
values into the hash before decoding the base64 or quoted-printable
text. However, the hash MUST be computed before transport level
encodings such as SMTP "dot-stuffing."
With the exception of the canonicalization procedure described in
Section 3.4, the DKIM signing process treats the body of messages as
simply a string of octets. DKIM messages MAY be either in plain-text
or in MIME format; no special treatment is afforded to MIME content.
Message attachments in MIME format MUST be included in the content
which is signed.
More formally, the algorithm for the signature is:
body-hash = hash-alg(canon_body)
header-hash = hash-alg(canon_header || DKIM-SIG)
signature = sig-alg(header-hash, key)
where "sig-alg" is the signature algorithm specified by the "a=" tag,
"hash-alg" is the hash algorithm specified by the "a=" tag,
"canon_header" and "canon_body" are the canonicalized message header
and body (respectively) as defined in Section 3.4 (excluding the
DKIM-Signature header field), and "DKIM-SIG" is the canonicalized
DKIM-Signature header field sans the signature value itself, but with
"body-hash" included as the "bh=" tag.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Many digital signature APIs provide both
hashing and application of the RSA private key using a single
"sign()" primitive. When using such an API the last two steps in
the algorithm would probably be combined into a single call that
would perform both the "hash-alg" and the "sig-alg".
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3.8 Signing by Parent Domains
In some circumstances, it is desirable for a domain to apply a
signature on behalf of any of its subdomains without the need to
maintain separate selectors (key records) in each subdomain. By
default, private keys corresponding to key records can be used to
sign messages for any subdomain of the domain in which they reside,
e.g., a key record for the domain example.com can be used to verify
messages where the signing identity (i= tag of the signature) is
sub.example.com, or even sub1.sub2.example.com. In order to limit
the capability of such keys when this is not intended, the "s" flag
may be set in the t= tag of the key record to constrain the validity
of the record to exactly the domain of the signing identity. If the
referenced key record contains the "s" flag as part of the t= tag,
the domain of the signing identity (i= flag) MUST be the same as that
of the d= domain. If this flag is absent, the domain of the signing
identity MUST be the same as, or a subdomain of, the d= domain. Key
records which are not intended for use with subdomains SHOULD specify
the "s" flag in the t= tag.
4. Semantics of Multiple Signatures
A signer that is adding a signature to a message merely creates a new
DKIM-Signature header, using the usual semantics of the h= option. A
signer MAY sign previously existing DKIM-Signature headers using the
method described in section Section 5.4 to sign trace headers.
Signers should be cognizant that signing DKIM-Signature headers may
result in signature failures with intermediaries that do not
recognize that DKIM-Signatures are trace headers and unwittingly
reorder them.
When evaluating a message with multiple signatures, a verifier should
evaluate signatures independently and on their own merits. For
example, a verifier that by policy chooses not to accept signatures
with deprecated cryptographic algorithms should consider such
signatures invalid. As with messages with a single signature,
verifiers are at liberty to use the presence of valid signatures as
an input to local policy; likewise, the interpretation of multiple
valid signatures in combination is a local policy decision of the
verifier.
Signers SHOULD NOT remove any DKIM-Signature header fields from
messages they are signing, even if they know that the signatures
cannot be verified.
5. Signer Actions
The following steps are performed in order by signers.
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5.1 Determine if the Email Should be Signed and by Whom
A signer can obviously only sign email for domains for which it has a
private-key and the necessary knowledge of the corresponding public
key and Selector information. However there are a number of other
reasons beyond the lack of a private key why a signer could choose
not to sign an email.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: Signing modules may be incorporated into any
portion of the mail system as deemed appropriate, including an
MUA, a SUBMISSION server, or an MTA. Wherever implemented,
signers should beware of signing (and thereby asserting
responsibility for) messages that may be problematic. In
particular, within a trusted enclave the signing address might be
derived from the header according to local policy; SUBMISSION
servers might only sign messages from users that are properly
authenticated and authorized.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER ADVICE: SUBMISSION servers should not
sign Received header fields if the outgoing gateway MTA obfuscates
Received header fields, for example to hide the details of
internal topology.
If an email cannot be signed for some reason, it is a local policy
decision as to what to do with that email.
5.2 Select a private-key and corresponding selector information
This specification does not define the basis by which a signer should
choose which private-key and Selector information to use. Currently,
all Selectors are equal as far as this specification is concerned, so
the decision should largely be a matter of administrative
convenience. Distribution and management of private-keys is also
outside the scope of this document.
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS ADVICE: A signer should not sign with a
private key when the Selector containing the corresponding public
key is expected to be revoked or removed before the verifier has
an opportunity to validate the signature. The signer should
anticipate that verifiers may choose to defer validation, perhaps
until the message is actually read by the final recipient. In
particular, when rotating to a new key-pair, signing should
immediately commence with the new private key and the old public
key should be retained for a reasonable validation interval before
being removed from the key server.
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5.3 Normalize the Message to Prevent Transport Conversions
Some messages, particularly those using 8-bit characters, are subject
to modification during transit, notably conversion to 7-bit form.
Such conversions will break DKIM signatures. In order to minimize
the chances of such breakage, signers SHOULD convert the message to a
suitable MIME content transfer encoding such as quoted-printable or
base64 as described in MIME Part One [RFC2045] before signing. Such
conversion is outside the scope of DKIM; the actual message SHOULD be
converted to 7-bit MIME by an MUA or MSA prior to presentation to the
DKIM algorithm.
Should the message be submitted to the signer with any local encoding
that will be modified before transmission, such conversion to
canonical form MUST be done before signing. In particular, some
systems use local line separator conventions (such as the Unix
newline character) internally rather than the SMTP-standard CRLF
sequence. All such local conventions MUST be converted to canonical
format before signing.
More generally, the signer MUST sign the message as it is expected to
be received by the verifier rather than in some local or internal
form.
5.4 Determine the header fields to Sign
The From header field MUST be signed (that is, included in the h= tag
of the resulting DKIM-Signature header field). Signers SHOULD NOT
sign an existing header field likely to be legitimately modified or
removed in transit. In particular, [RFC2821] explicitly permits
modification or removal of the "Return-Path" header field in transit.
Signers MAY include any other header fields present at the time of
signing at the discretion of the signer.
INFORMATIVE OPERATIONS NOTE: The choice of which header fields to
sign is non-obvious. One strategy is to sign all existing, non-
repeatable header fields. An alternative strategy is to sign only
header fields that are likely to be displayed to or otherwise be
likely to affect the processing of the message at the receiver. A
third strategy is to sign only "well known" headers. Note that
verifiers may treat unsigned header fields with extreme
skepticism, including refusing to display them to the end user or
even ignore the signature if it does not cover certain header
fields. For this reason signing fields present in the message
such as Date, Subject, Reply-To, Sender, and all MIME headers is
highly advised.
The DKIM-Signature header field is always implicitly signed and MUST
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NOT be included in the h= tag except to indicate that other
preexisting signatures are also signed.
Signers MAY claim to have signed header fields that do not exist
(that is, signers MAY include the header field name in the h= tag
even if that header field does not exist in the message). When
computing the signature, the non-existing header field MUST be
treated as the null string (including the header field name, header
field value, all punctuation, and the trailing CRLF).
INFORMATIVE RATIONALE: This allows signers to explicitly assert
the absence of a header field; if that header field is added later
the signature will fail.
Signers choosing to sign an existing header field that occurs more
than once in the message (such as Received) MUST sign the physically
last instance of that header field in the header block. Signers
wishing to sign multiple instances of such a header field MUST
include the header field name multiple times in the h= tag of the
DKIM-Signature header field, and MUST sign such header fields in
order from the bottom of the header field block to the top. The
signer MAY include more instances of a header field name in h= than
there are actual corresponding header fields to indicate that
additional header fields of that name SHOULD NOT be added.
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE:
If the signer wishes to sign two existing Received header fields,
and the existing header contains:
Received: <A>
Received: <B>
Received: <C>
then the resulting DKIM-Signature header field should read:
DKIM-Signature: ... h=Received : Received : ...
and Received header fields <C> and <B> will be signed in that
order.
Signers should be careful of signing header fields that might have
additional instances added later in the delivery process, since such
header fields might be inserted after the signed instance or
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otherwise reordered. Trace header fields (such as Received and DKIM-
Signature) and Resent-* blocks are the only fields prohibited by
[RFC2822] from being reordered.
INFORMATIVE ADMONITION: Despite the fact that [RFC2822] permits
header fields to be reordered (with the exception of Received
header fields), reordering of signed header fields with multiple
instances by intermediate MTAs will cause DKIM signatures to be
broken; such anti-social behavior should be avoided.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER'S NOTE: Although not required by this
specification, all end-user visible header fields should be signed
to avoid possible "indirect spamming." For example, if the
"Subject" header field is not signed, a spammer can resend a
previously signed mail, replacing the legitimate subject with a
one-line spam.
5.5 Compute the Message Hash and Signature
The signer MUST compute the message hash as described in Section 3.7
and then sign it using the selected public-key algorithm. This will
result in a DKIM-Signature header field which will include the body
hash and a signature of the header hash, where that header includes
the DKIM-Signature header field itself.
Entities such as mailing list managers that implement DKIM and which
modify the message or a header field (for example, inserting
unsubscribe information) before retransmitting the message SHOULD
check any existing signature on input and MUST make such
modifications before re-signing the message.
The signer MAY elect to limit the number of bytes of the body that
will be included in the hash and hence signed. The length actually
hashed should be inserted in the "l=" tag of the "DKIM-Signature"
header field.
5.6 Insert the DKIM-Signature header field
Finally, the signer MUST insert the "DKIM-Signature:" header field
created in the previous step prior to transmitting the email. The
"DKIM-Signature" header field MUST be the same as used to compute the
hash as described above, except that the value of the "b=" tag MUST
be the appropriately signed hash computed in the previous step,
signed using the algorithm specified in the "a=" tag of the "DKIM-
Signature" header field and using the private key corresponding to
the Selector given in the "s=" tag of the "DKIM-Signature" header
field, as chosen above in Section 5.2
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The "DKIM-Signature" MUST be inserted before any other DKIM-Signature
fields in the header block.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: The easiest way to achieve this
is to insert the "DKIM-Signature" header field at the beginning of
the header block. In particular, it may be placed before any
existing Received header fields. This is consistent with treating
"DKIM-Signature" as a trace header.
6. Verifier Actions
Since a signer MAY remove or revoke a public key at any time, it is
recommended that verification occur in a timely manner with the most
timely place being during acceptance by the border MTA.
A border or intermediate MTA MAY verify the message signature(s). An
MTA who has performed verification MAY communicate the result of that
verification by adding a verification header field to incoming
messages. This considerably simplifies things for the user, who can
now use an existing mail user agent. Most MUAs have the ability to
filter messages based on message header fields or content; these
filters would be used to implement whatever policy the user wishes
with respect to unsigned mail.
A verifying MTA MAY implement a policy with respect to unverifiable
mail, regardless of whether or not it applies the verification header
field to signed messages.
Verifiers MUST produce a result that is semantically equivalent to
applying the following steps in the order listed. In practice,
several of these steps can be performed in parallel in order to
improve performance.
6.1 Extract Signatures from the Message
The order in which verifiers try DKIM-Signature header fields is not
defined; verifiers MAY try signatures in any order they would like.
For example, one implementation might prefer to try the signatures in
textual order, whereas another might want to prefer signatures by
identities that match the contents of the "From" header field over
other identities. Verifiers MUST NOT attribute ultimate meaning to
the order of multiple DKIM-Signature header fields. In particular,
there is reason to believe that some relays will reorder the header
fields in potentially arbitrary ways.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Verifiers might use the order as
a clue to signing order in the absence of any other information.
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However, other clues as to the semantics of multiple signatures
(such as correlating the signing host with Received headers) may
also be considered.
A verifier SHOULD NOT treat a message that has one or more bad
signatures and no good signatures differently from a message with no
signature at all; such treatment is a matter of local policy and is
beyond the scope of this document.
When a signature successfully verifies, a verifier will either stop
processing or attempt to verify any other signatures, at the
discretion of the implementation. A verifier MAY limit the number of
signatures it tries to avoid denial-of-service attacks.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: An attacker could send messages with large
numbers of faulty signatures, each of which would require a DNS
lookup. This could be an attack on the domain that receives the
message, by slowing down the verifier by requiring it to do large
number of DNS lookups and signature verifications. It could also
be an attack against the domains listed in the signatures,
essentially by enlisting innocent verifiers in launching an attack
against the DNS servers of the actual victim.
In the following description, text reading "return status
(explanation)" (where "status" is one of "PERMFAIL" or "TEMPFAIL")
means that the verifier MUST immediately cease processing that
signature. The verifier SHOULD proceed to the next signature, if any
is present, and completely ignore the bad signature. If the status
is "PERMFAIL", the signature failed and should not be reconsidered.
If the status is "TEMPFAIL", the signature could not be verified at
this time but may be tried again later. A verifier MAY either defer
the message for later processing, perhaps by queueing it locally or
issuing a 451/4.7.5 SMTP reply, or try another signature; if no good
signature is found and any of the signatures resulted in a TEMPFAIL
status, the verifier MAY save the message for later processing. The
"(explanation)" is not normative text; it is provided solely for
clarification.
Verifiers SHOULD ignore any DKIM-Signature header fields where the
signature does not validate. Verifiers that are prepared to validate
multiple signature header fields SHOULD proceed to the next signature
header field, should it exist. However, verifiers MAY make note of
the fact that an invalid signature was present for consideration at a
later step.
INFORMATIVE NOTE: The rationale of this requirement is to permit
messages that have invalid signatures but also a valid signature
to work. For example, a mailing list exploder might opt to leave
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the original submitter signature in place even though the exploder
knows that it is modifying the message in some way that will break
that signature, and the exploder inserts its own signature. In
this case the message should succeed even in the presence of the
known-broken signature.
For each signature to be validated, the following steps should be
performed in such a manner as to produce a result that is
semantically equivalent to performing them in the indicated order.
6.1.1 Validate the Signature Header Field
Implementers MUST meticulously validate the format and values in the
DKIM-Signature header field; any inconsistency or unexpected values
MUST cause the header field to be completely ignored and the verifier
to return PERMFAIL (signature syntax error). Being "liberal in what
you accept" is definitely a bad strategy in this security context.
Note however that this does not include the existence of unknown tags
in a DKIM-Signature header field, which are explicitly permitted.
Verifiers MUST ignore DKIM-Signature header fields with a "v=" tag
that is inconsistent with this specification and return PERMFAIL
(incompatible version).
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: An implementation may, of
course, choose to also verify signatures generated by older
versions of this specification.
If the DKIM-Signature header field does not contain any of the tags
listed as required in Section 3.5 the verifier MUST ignore the DKIM-
Signature header field and return PERMFAIL (signature missing
required tag).
If the "DKIM-Signature" header field does not contain the "i=" tag,
the verifier MUST behave as though the value of that tag were "@d",
where "d" is the value from the "d=" tag.
Verifiers MUST confirm that the domain specified in the "d=" tag is
the same as or a parent domain of the domain part of the "i=" tag.
If not, the DKIM-Signature header field MUST be ignored and the
verifier should return PERMFAIL (domain mismatch).
If the "h=" tag does not include the "From" header field the verifier
MUST ignore the DKIM-Signature header field and return PERMFAIL (From
field not signed).
Verifiers MAY ignore the DKIM-Signature header field and return
PERMFAIL (signature expired) if it contains an "x=" tag and the
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signature has expired.
Verifiers MAY ignore the DKIM-Signature header field and return
PERMFAIL (unacceptable signature header) for any other reason, for
example, if the signature does not sign header fields that the
verifier views to be essential. As a case in point, if MIME header
fields are not signed, certain attacks may be possible that the
verifier would prefer to avoid.
6.1.2 Get the Public Key
The public key for a signature is needed to complete the verification
process. The process of retrieving the public key depends on the
query type as defined by the "q=" tag in the "DKIM-Signature:" header
field. Obviously, a public key need only be retrieved if the process
of extracting the signature information is completely successful.
Details of key management and representation are described in
Section 3.6. The verifier MUST validate the key record and MUST
ignore any public key records that are malformed.
When validating a message, a verifier MUST perform the following
steps in a manner that is semantically the same as performing them in
the order indicated (in some cases the implementation may parallelize
or reorder these steps, as long as the semantics remain unchanged):
1. Retrieve the public key as described in (Section 3.6) using the
domain from the "d=" tag and the Selector from the "s=" tag.
2. If the query for the public key fails to respond, the verifier
MAY defer acceptance of this email and return TEMPFAIL (key
unavailable). If verification is occurring during the incoming
SMTP session, this MAY be achieved with a 451/4.7.5 SMTP reply
code. Alternatively, the verifier MAY store the message in the
local queue for later trial or ignore the signature. Note that
storing a message in the local queue is subject to denial-of-
service attacks.
3. If the query for the public key fails because the corresponding
key record does not exist, the verifier MUST immediately return
PERMFAIL (no key for signature).
4. If the query for the public key returns multiple key records, the
verifier may choose one of the key records or may cycle through
the key records performing the remainder of these steps on each
record at the discretion of the implementer. The order of the
key records is unspecified. If the verifier chooses to cycle
through the key records, then the "return with ..." wording in
the remainder of this section means "try the next key record, if
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any; if none, return to try another signature in the usual way."
5. If the result returned from the query does not adhere to the
format defined in this specification, the verifier MUST ignore
the key record and return PERMFAIL (key syntax error). Verifiers
are urged to validate the syntax of key records carefully to
avoid attempted attacks.
6. If the "g=" tag in the public key does not match the Local-part
of the "i=" tag in the message signature header field, the
verifier MUST ignore the key record and return PERMFAIL
(inapplicable key). If the Local-part of the "i=" tag on the
message signature is not present, the g= tag must be * (valid for
all addresses in the domain) or the entire g= tag must be omitted
(which defaults to "g=*"), otherwise the verifier MUST ignore the
key record and return PERMFAIL (inapplicable key). Other than
this test, verifiers SHOULD NOT treat a message signed with a key
record having a g= tag any differently than one without; in
particular, verifiers SHOULD NOT prefer messages that seem to
have an individual signature by virtue of a g= tag versus a
domain signature.
7. If the "h=" tag exists in the public key record and the hash
algorithm implied by the a= tag in the DKIM-Signature header is
not included in the contents of the "h=" tag, the verifier MUST
ignore the key record and return PERMFAIL (inappropriate hash
algorithm).
8. If the public key data (the "p=" tag) is empty then this key has
been revoked and the verifier MUST treat this as a failed
signature check and return PERMFAIL (key revoked). There is no
defined semantic difference between a key that has been revoked
and a key record that has been removed.
9. If the public key data is not suitable for use with the algorithm
and key types defined by the "a=" and "k=" tags in the "DKIM-
Signature" header field, the verifier MUST immediately return
PERMFAIL (inappropriate key algorithm).
6.1.3 Compute the Verification
Given a signer and a public key, verifying a signature consists of
actions semantically equivalent to the following steps.
1. Based on the algorithm defined in the "c=" tag, the body length
specified in the "l=" tag, and the header field names in the "h="
tag, prepare a canonicalized version of the message as is
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described in Section 3.7 (note that this version does not
actually need to be instantiated). When matching header field
names in the "h=" tag against the actual message header field,
comparisons MUST be case-insensitive.
2. Based on the algorithm indicated in the "a=" tag, compute the
message hashes from the canonical copy as described in
Section 3.7.
3. Verify that the hash of the canonicalized message body computed
in the previous step matches the hash value conveyed in the "bh="
tag.
4. Using the signature conveyed in the "b=" tag, verify the
signature against the header hash using the mechanism appropriate
for the public key algorithm described in the "a=" tag. If the
signature does not validate, the verifier SHOULD ignore the
signature and return PERMFAIL (signature did not verify).
5. Otherwise, the signature has correctly verified.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTER'S NOTE: Implementations might wish to
initiate the public-key query in parallel with calculating the
hash as the public key is not needed until the final decryption is
calculated. Implementations may also verify the signature on the
message header before validating that the message hash listed in
the "bh=" tag in the DKIM-Signature header field matches that of
the actual message body; however, if the body hash does not match,
the entire signature must be considered to have failed.
A body length specified in the "l=" tag of the signature limits the
number of bytes of the body passed to the verification algorithm.
All data beyond that limit is not validated by DKIM. Hence,
verifiers might treat a message that contains bytes beyond the
indicated body length with suspicion, such as by truncating the
message at the indicated body length, declaring the signature invalid
(e.g., by returning PERMFAIL (unsigned content)), or conveying the
partial verification to the policy module.
INFORMATIVE IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: Verifiers that truncate the body
at the indicated body length might pass on a malformed MIME
message if the signer used the "N-4" trick described in the
informative note in Section 5.5. Such verifiers may wish to check
for this case and include a trailing "--CRLF" to avoid breaking
the MIME structure. A simple way to achieve this might be to
append "--CRLF" to any "multipart" message with a body length; if
the MIME structure is already correctly formed, this will appear
in the postlude and will not be displayed to the end user.
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6.2 Communicate Verification Results
Verifiers wishing to communicate the results of verification to other
parts of the mail system may do so in whatever manner they see fit.
For example, implementations might choose to add an email header
field to the message before passing it on. Any such header field
SHOULD be inserted before any existing DKIM-Signature or preexisting
authentication status header fields in the header field block.
INFORMATIVE ADVICE to MUA filter writers: Patterns intended to
search for results header fields to visibly mark authenticated
mail for end users should verify that such header field was added
by the appropriate verifying domain and that the verified identity
matches the author identity that will be displayed by the MUA. In
particular, MUA filters should not be influenced by bogus results
header fields added by attackers. Verifiers may wish to delete
existing results header fields after verification and before
adding a new header field to circumvent this attack.
6.3 Interpret Results/Apply Local Policy
It is beyond the scope of this specification to describe what actions
a verifier system should make, but an authenticated email presents an
opportunity to a receiving system that unauthenticated email cannot.
Specifically, an authenticated email creates a predictable identifier
by which other decisions can reliably be managed, such as trust and
reputation. Conversely, unauthenticated email lacks a reliable
identifier that can be used to assign trust and reputation. It is
reasonable to treat unauthenticated email as lacking any trust and
having no positive reputation.
In general verifiers SHOULD NOT reject messages solely on the basis
of a lack of signature or an unverifiable signature. However, if the
verifier does opt to reject such messages, and the verifier runs
synchronously with the SMTP session and a signature is missing or
does not verify, the MTA SHOULD reject the message with an error such
as:
550 5.7.1 Unsigned messages not accepted
550 5.7.5 Message signature incorrect
If it is not possible to fetch the public key, perhaps because the
key server is not available, a temporary failure message MAY be
generated, such as:
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451 4.7.5 Unable to verify signature - key server unavailable
A temporary failure of the key server or other external service is
the only condition that should use a 4xx SMTP reply code. In
particular, signature verification failures MUST NOT return 4xx SMTP
replies.
Once the signature has been verified, that information MUST be
conveyed to higher level systems (such as explicit allow/white lists
and reputation systems) and/or to the end user. If the message is
signed on behalf of any address other than that in the From: header
field, the mail system SHOULD take pains to ensure that the actual
signing identity is clear to the reader.
The verifier MAY treat unsigned header fields with extreme
skepticism, including marking them as untrusted or even deleting them
before display to the end user.
While the symptoms of a failed verification are obvious -- the
signature doesn't verify -- establishing the exact cause can be more
difficult. If a Selector cannot be found, is that because the
Selector has been removed or was the value changed somehow in
transit? If the signature line is missing is that because it was
never there, or was it removed by an over-zealous filter? For
diagnostic purposes, the exact reason why the verification fails
SHOULD be made available to the policy module and possibly recorded
in the system logs. However in terms of presentation to the end
user, the result SHOULD be presented as a simple binary result:
either the email is verified or it is not. If the email cannot be
verified, then it SHOULD be rendered the same as all unverified email
regardless of whether it looks like it was signed or not.
7. IANA Considerations
DKIM introduces some new namespaces that require IANA registry.
[[Missing registries for signature t= (flags) tags, as well as key
record s= (service type) and t= (flags).]]
7.1 DKIM-Signature Tag Specifications
A DKIM-Signature provides for a list of tag specifications. IANA is
requested to establish the DKIM Signature Tag Specification Registry,
for tag specifications that can be used in DKIM-Signature fields and
that have been specified in any published RFC.
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The initial entries in the registry comprise:
+------+-----------------+
| TYPE | RFC |
+------+-----------------+
| v | (this document) |
| a | (this document) |
| b | (this document) |
| bh | (this document) |
| c | (this document) |
| d | (this document) |
| h | (this document) |
| i | (this document) |
| l | (this document) |
| q | (this document) |
| s | (this document) |
| t | (this document) |
| x | (this document) |
| z | (this document) |
+------+-----------------+
7.2 DKIM-Signature Query Method Registry
The "q=" tag-spec, as specified in Section 3.5 provides for a list of
query methods.
IANA is requested to establish the DKIM Query Method Registry, for
mechanisms that can be used to retrieve the key that will permit
validation processing of a message signed using DKIM and have been
specified in any published RFC.
The initial entry in the registry comprises:
+------+--------+-----------------+
| TYPE | OPTION | RFC |
+------+--------+-----------------+
| dns | txt | (this document) |
+------+--------+-----------------+
7.3 DKIM-Signature Canonicalization Registry
The "c=" tag-spec, as specified in Section 3.5 provides for a
specifier for canonicalization algorithms for the header and body of
the message.
IANA is requested to establish the DKIM Canonicalization Algorithm
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Registry, for algorithms for converting a message into a canonical
form before signing or verifying using DKIM and have been specified
in any published RFC.
The initial entries in the header registry comprise:
+---------+-----------------+
| TYPE | RFC |
+---------+-----------------+
| simple | (this document) |
| relaxed | (this document) |
+---------+-----------------+
The initial entries in the body registry comprise:
+---------+-----------------+
| TYPE | RFC |
+---------+-----------------+
| simple | (this document) |
| relaxed | (this document) |
+---------+-----------------+
7.4 _domainkey DNS TXT Record Tag Specifications
A _domainkey DNS TXT record provides for a list of tag
specifications. IANA is requested to establish the DKIM _domainkey
DNS TXT Tag Specification Registry, for tag specifications that can
be used in DNS TXT Records and that have been specified in any
published RFC.
The initial entries in the registry comprise:
+------+-----------------+
| TYPE | RFC |
+------+-----------------+
| v | (this document) |
| g | (this document) |
| h | (this document) |
| k | (this document) |
| n | (this document) |
| p | (this document) |
| s | (this document) |
| t | (this document) |
+------+-----------------+
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7.5 DKIM Key Type Registry
The "k=" <key-k-tag> (as specified in Section 3.6.1) and the "a="
<sig-a-tag-k> (Section 3.5) tags provide for a list of mechanisms
that can be used to decode a DKIM signature.
IANA is requested to establish the DKIM Key Type Registry, for such
mechanisms that have been specified in any published RFC.
The initial entry in the registry comprises:
+------+---------+
| TYPE | RFC |
+------+---------+
| rsa | RFC3447 |
+------+---------+
7.6 DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry
The "h=" <key-h-tag> list (specified in Section 3.6.1) and the "a="
<sig-a-tag-h> (Section 3.5) provide for a list of mechanisms that can
be used to produce a digest of message data.
IANA is requested to establish the DKIM Hash Algorithms Registry, for
such mechanisms that have been specified in any published RFC.
The initial entries in the registry comprise:
+--------+-----+
| TYPE | RFC |
+--------+-----+
| sha1 | ? |
| sha256 | ? |
+--------+-----+
8. Security Considerations
It has been observed that any mechanism that is introduced which
attempts to stem the flow of spam is subject to intensive attack.
DKIM needs to be carefully scrutinized to identify potential attack
vectors and the vulnerability to each. See also [ID-DKIM-THREATS].
8.1 Misuse of Body Length Limits ("l=" Tag)
Body length limits (in the form of the "l=" tag) are subject to
several potential attacks.
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8.1.1 Addition of new MIME parts to multipart/*
If the body length limit does not cover a closing MIME multipart
section (including the trailing ""--CRLF"" portion), then it is
possible for an attacker to intercept a properly signed multipart
message and add a new body part. Depending on the details of the
MIME type and the implementation of the verifying MTA and the
receiving MUA, this could allow an attacker to change the information
displayed to an end user from an apparently trusted source.
For example, if an attacker can append information to a "text/html"
body part, they may be able to exploit a bug in some MUAs that
continue to read after a "</html>" marker, and thus display HTML text
on top of already displayed text. If a message has a "multipart/
alternative" body part, they might be able to add a new body part
that is preferred by the displaying MTA.
8.1.2 Addition of new HTML content to existing content
Several receiving MUA implementations do not cease display after a
""</html>"" tag. In particular, this allows attacks involving
overlaying images on top of existing text.
INFORMATIVE EXAMPLE: Appending the following text to an existing,
properly closed message will in many MUAs result in inappropriate
data being rendered on top of existing, correct data:
<div style="position: relative; bottom: 350px; z-index: 2;">
<img src="http://www.ietf.org/images/ietflogo2e.gif"
width=578 height=370>
</div>
8.2 Misappropriated Private Key
If the private key for a user is resident on their computer and is
not protected by an appropriately secure mechanism, it is possible
for malware to send mail as that user and any other user sharing the
same private key. The malware would, however, not be able to
generate signed spoofs of other signers' addresses, which would aid
in identification of the infected user and would limit the
possibilities for certain types of attacks involving socially-
engineered messages. This threat applies mainly to MUA-based
implementations; protection of private keys on servers can be easily
achieved through the use of specialized cryptographic hardware.
A larger problem occurs if malware on many users' computers obtains
the private keys for those users and transmits them via a covert
channel to a site where they can be shared. The compromised users
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would likely not know of the misappropriation until they receive
"bounce" messages from messages they are purported to have sent.
Many users might not understand the significance of these bounce
messages and would not take action.
One countermeasure is to use a user-entered passphrase to encrypt the
private key, although users tend to choose weak passphrases and often
reuse them for different purposes, possibly allowing an attack
against DKIM to be extended into other domains. Nevertheless, the
decoded private key might be briefly available to compromise by
malware when it is entered, or might be discovered via keystroke
logging. The added complexity of entering a passphrase each time one
sends a message would also tend to discourage the use of a secure
passphrase.
A somewhat more effective countermeasure is to send messages through
an outgoing MTA that can authenticate the submitter using existing
techniques (e.g., SMTP Authentication), possibly validate the message
itself (e.g., verify that the header is legitimate and that the
content passes a spam content check), and sign the message using a
key appropriate for the submitter address. Such an MTA can also
apply controls on the volume of outgoing mail each user is permitted
to originate in order to further limit the ability of malware to
generate bulk email.
8.3 Key Server Denial-of-Service Attacks
Since the key servers are distributed (potentially separate for each
domain), the number of servers that would need to be attacked to
defeat this mechanism on an Internet-wide basis is very large.
Nevertheless, key servers for individual domains could be attacked,
impeding the verification of messages from that domain. This is not
significantly different from the ability of an attacker to deny
service to the mail exchangers for a given domain, although it
affects outgoing, not incoming, mail.
A variation on this attack is that if a very large amount of mail
were to be sent using spoofed addresses from a given domain, the key
servers for that domain could be overwhelmed with requests. However,
given the low overhead of verification compared with handling of the
email message itself, such an attack would be difficult to mount.
8.4 Attacks Against DNS
Since DNS is a required binding for key services, specific attacks
against DNS must be considered.
While the DNS is currently insecure [RFC3833], it is expected that
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the security problems should and will be solved by DNSSEC [RFC4033],
and all users of the DNS will reap the benefit of that work.
Secondly, the types of DNS attacks relevant to DKIM are very costly
and are far less rewarding than DNS attacks on other Internet
applications.
To systematically thwart the intent of DKIM, an attacker must conduct
a very costly and very extensive attack on many parts of the DNS over
an extended period. No one knows for sure how attackers will
respond, however the cost/benefit of conducting prolonged DNS attacks
of this nature is expected to be uneconomical.
Finally, DKIM is only intended as a "sufficient" method of proving
authenticity. It is not intended to provide strong cryptographic
proof about authorship or contents. Other technologies such as
OpenPGP [RFC2440] and S/MIME [RFC3851] address those requirements.
A second security issue related to the DNS revolves around the
increased DNS traffic as a consequence of fetching Selector-based
data as well as fetching signing domain policy. Widespread
deployment of DKIM will result in a significant increase in DNS
queries to the claimed signing domain. In the case of forgeries on a
large scale, DNS servers could see a substantial increase in queries.
8.5 Replay Attacks
In this attack, a spammer sends a message to be spammed to an
accomplice, which results in the message being signed by the
originating MTA. The accomplice resends the message, including the
original signature, to a large number of recipients, possibly by
sending the message to many compromised machines that act as MTAs.
The messages, not having been modified by the accomplice, have valid
signatures.
Partial solutions to this problem involve the use of reputation
services to convey the fact that the specific email address is being
used for spam, and that messages from that signer are likely to be
spam. This requires a real-time detection mechanism in order to
react quickly enough. However, such measures might be prone to
abuse, if for example an attacker resent a large number of messages
received from a victim in order to make them appear to be a spammer.
Large verifiers might be able to detect unusually large volumes of
mails with the same signature in a short time period. Smaller
verifiers can get substantially the same volume information via
existing collaborative systems.
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8.6 Limits on Revoking Keys
When a large domain detects undesirable behavior on the part of one
of its users, it might wish to revoke the key used to sign that
user's messages in order to disavow responsibility for messages which
have not yet been verified or which are the subject of a replay
attack. However, the ability of the domain to do so can be limited
if the same key, for scalability reasons, is used to sign messages
for many other users. Mechanisms for explicitly revoking keys on a
per-address basis have been proposed but require further study as to
their utility and the DNS load they represent.
8.7 Intentionally malformed Key Records
It is possible for an attacker to publish key records in DNS which
are intentionally malformed, with the intent of causing a denial-of-
service attack on a non-robust verifier implementation. The attacker
could then cause a verifier to read the malformed key record by
sending a message to one of its users referencing the malformed
record in a (not necessarily valid) signature. Verifiers MUST
thoroughly verify all key records retrieved from DNS and be robust
against intentionally as well as unintentionally malformed key
records.
8.8 Intentionally Malformed DKIM-Signature header fields
Verifiers MUST be prepared to receive messages with malformed DKIM-
Signature header fields, and thoroughly verify the header field
before depending on any of its contents.
8.9 Information Leakage
An attacker could determine when a particular signature was verified
by using a per-message Selector and then monitoring their DNS traffic
for the key lookup. This would act as the equivalent of a "web bug"
for verification time rather than when the message was read.
8.10 Remote Timing Attacks
In some cases it may be possible to extract private keys using a
remote timing attack [BONEH03]. Implementations should consider
obfuscating the timing to prevent such attacks.
9. References
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9.1 Normative References
[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[RFC2047] Moore, K., "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
Part Three: Message header field Extensions for Non-ASCII
Text", RFC 2047, November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2821] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 2821,
April 2001.
[RFC2822] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822,
April 2001.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode
for Internationalized Domain Names in Application(IDNA)",
March 2003.
[RFC4234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", RFC 4234, October 2005.
[X.660] "ITU-T Recommendation X.660 Information Technology - ASN.1
encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules
(BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER)", 1997.
9.2 Informative References
[BONEH03] Proc. 12th USENIX Security Symposium, "Remote Timing
Attacks are Practical", 2003, <http://www.usenix.org/
publications/library/proceedings/sec03/tech/brumley.html>.
[ID-DKIM-THREATS]
Fenton, J., "Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM)", draft-fenton-dkim-threats-02
(work in progress), April 2006.
[RFC1847] Galvin, J., Murphy, S., Crocker, S., and N. Freed,
"Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and
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Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, October 1995.
[RFC2440] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer,
"OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.
[RFC3766] Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths for
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys", RFC 3766,
April 2004.
[RFC3833] Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis of the Domain
Name System (DNS)", RFC 3833, August 2004.
[RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification",
RFC 3851, June 1999.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, March 2005.
Authors' Addresses
Eric Allman
Sendmail, Inc.
6425 Christie Ave, Suite 400
Emeryville, CA 94608
USA
Phone: +1 510 594 5501
Email: eric+dkim@sendmail.org
URI:
Jon Callas
PGP Corporation
3460 West Bayshore
Palo Alto, CA 94303
USA
Phone: +1 650 319 9016
Email: jon@pgp.com
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Mark Delany
Yahoo! Inc
701 First Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 95087
USA
Phone: +1 408 349 6831
Email: markd+dkim@yahoo-inc.com
URI:
Miles Libbey
Yahoo! Inc
701 First Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA 95087
USA
Email: mlibbeymail-mailsig@yahoo.com
URI:
Jim Fenton
Cisco Systems, Inc.
MS SJ-24/2
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
USA
Phone: +1 408 526 5914
Email: fenton@cisco.com
URI:
Michael Thomas
Cisco Systems, Inc.
MS SJ-9/2
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134-1706
Phone: +1 408 525 5386
Email: mat@cisco.com
Appendix A. Example of Use (INFORMATIVE)
This section shows the complete flow of an email from submission to
final delivery, demonstrating how the various components fit
together.
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A.1 The user composes an email
From: Joe SixPack <joe@football.example.com>
To: Suzie Q <suzie@shopping.example.net>
Subject: Is dinner ready?
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:00:37 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <20030712040037.46341.5F8J@football.example.com>
Hi.
We lost the game. Are you hungry yet?
Joe.
A.2 The email is signed
This email is signed by the example.com outbound email server and now
looks like this:
DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; s=brisbane; d=example.com;
c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=joe@football.example.com;
h=Received : From : To : Subject : Date : Message-ID;
bh=ZSVEYuq4ri3LR9S+qjlzCP+LxvJrIfrOI2g5hxp5+MI=;
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZ
VoG4ZHRNiYzR;
Received: from dsl-10.2.3.4.football.example.com [10.2.3.4]
by submitserver.example.com with SUBMISSION;
Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:01:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: Joe SixPack <joe@football.example.com>
To: Suzie Q <suzie@shopping.example.net>
Subject: Is dinner ready?
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:00:37 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <20030712040037.46341.5F8J@football.example.com>
Hi.
We lost the game. Are you hungry yet?
Joe.
The signing email server requires access to the private-key
associated with the "brisbane" Selector to generate this signature.
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A.3 The email signature is verified
The signature is normally verified by an inbound SMTP server or
possibly the final delivery agent. However, intervening MTAs can
also perform this verification if they choose to do so. The
verification process uses the domain "example.com" extracted from the
"d=" tag and the Selector "brisbane" from the "s=" tag in the "DKIM-
Signature" header field to form the DNS DKIM query for:
brisbane._domainkey.example.com
Signature verification starts with the physically last "Received"
header field, the "From" header field, and so forth, in the order
listed in the "h=" tag. Verification follows with a single CRLF
followed by the body (starting with "Hi."). The email is canonically
prepared for verifying with the "simple" method. The result of the
query and subsequent verification of the signature is stored in the
"Authentication-Results" header field line. After successful
verification, the email looks like this:
X-Authentication-Results: shopping.example.net
header.from=joe@football.example.com; dkim=pass
Received: from mout23.football.example.com (192.168.1.1)
by shopping.example.net with SMTP;
Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:01:59 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; s=brisbane; d=example.com;
c=simple; q=dns/txt; i=joe@football.example.com;
h=Received : From : To : Subject : Date : Message-ID;
bh=ZSVEYuq4ri3LR9S+qjlzCP+LxvJrIfrOI2g5hxp5+MI=;
b=dzdVyOfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZ
VoG4ZHRNiYzR
Received: from dsl-10.2.3.4.network.example.com [10.2.3.4]
by submitserver.example.com with SUBMISSION;
Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:01:54 -0700 (PDT)
From: Joe SixPack <joe@football.example.com>
To: Suzie Q <suzie@shopping.example.net>
Subject: Is dinner ready?
Date: Fri, 11 Jul 2003 21:00:37 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <20030712040037.46341.5F8J@football.example.com>
Hi.
We lost the game. Are you hungry yet?
Joe.
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Appendix B. Usage Examples (INFORMATIVE)
Studies in this appendix are for informational purposes only. In no
case should these examples be used as guidance when creating an
implementation.
B.1 Simple Message Forwarding
In some cases the recipient may request forwarding of email messages
from the original address to another, through the use of a Unix
.forward file or equivalent. In this case messages are typically
forwarded without modification, except for the addition of a Received
header field to the message and a change in the Envelope-to address.
In this case, the eventual recipient should be able to verify the
original signature since the signed content has not changed, and
attribute the message correctly.
B.2 Outsourced Business Functions
Outsourced business functions represent a use case that motivates the
need for Selectors (the "s=" signature tag) and granularity (the "g="
key tag). Examples of outsourced business functions are legitimate
email marketing providers and corporate benefits providers. In
either case, the outsourced function would like to be able to send
messages using the email domain of the client company. At the same
time, the client may be reluctant to register a key for the provider
that grants the ability to send messages for any address in the
domain.
The outsourcing company can generate a keypair and the client company
can register the public key using a unique Selector for a specific
address such as winter-promotions@example.com by specifying a
granularity of "g=winter-promotions" or "g=*-promotions" (to allow a
range of addresses). This would enable the provider to send messages
using that specific address and have them verify properly. The
client company retains control over the email address because it
retains the ability to revoke the key at any time.
B.3 PDAs and Similar Devices
PDAs are one example of the use of multiple keys per user. Suppose
that John Doe wanted to be able to send messages using his corporate
email address, jdoe@example.com, and the device did not have the
ability to make a VPN connection to the corporate network. If the
device was equipped with a private key registered for
jdoe@example.com by the administrator of that domain, and appropriate
software to sign messages, John could send signed messages through
the outgoing network of the PDA service provider.
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B.4 Mailing Lists
There is a wide range of behavior in forwarders and mailing lists
(collectively called "forwarders" below), ranging from those which
make no modification to the message itself (other than to add a
Received header field and change the envelope information) to those
which may add header fields, change the Subject header field, add
content to the body (typically at the end), or reformat the body in
some manner.
Forwarders which do not modify the body or signed header fields of a
message with a valid signature may re-sign the message as described
below.
Forwarders which make any modification to a message that could result
in its signature becoming invalid should sign or re-sign using an
appropriate identification (e.g., mailing-list-name@example.net).
Since in so doing the (re-)signer is taking responsibility for the
content of the message, modifying forwarders may elect to forward or
re-sign only for messages which were received with valid signatures
or other indications that the messages being signed are not spoofed.
Forwarders which wish to re-sign a message must apply a Sender header
field to the message to identify the address being used to sign the
message and must remove any preexisting Sender header field as
required by [RFC2822]. The forwarder applies a new DKIM-Signature
header field with the signature, public key, and related information
of the forwarder.
B.5 Affinity Addresses
"Affinity addresses" are email addresses that users employ to have an
email address that is independent of any changes in email service
provider they may choose to make. They are typically associated with
college alumni associations, professional organizations, and
recreational organizations with which they expect to have a long-term
relationship. These domains usually provide forwarding of incoming
email, but (currently) usually depend on the user to send outgoing
messages through their own service provider's MTA. They usually have
an associated Web application which authenticates the user and allows
the forwarding address to be changed.
With DKIM, affinity domains could use the Web application to allow
users to register their own public keys to be used to sign messages
on behalf of their affinity address. This is another application
that takes advantage of user-level keying, and domains used for
affinity addresses would typically have a very large number of user-
level keys. Alternatively, the affinity domain could handle outgoing
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mail, operating a mail submission agent that authenticates users
before accepting and signing messages for them. This is of course
dependent on the user's service provider not blocking the relevant
TCP ports used for mail submission.
B.6 Third-party Message Transmission
Third-party message transmission refers to the authorized sending of
mail by an Internet application on behalf of a user. For example, a
website providing news may allow the reader to forward a copy of the
message to a friend; this is typically done using the reader's email
address. This is sometimes referred to as the "Evite problem", named
after the website of the same name that allows a user to send
invitations to friends.
One way this can be handled is to continue to put the reader's email
address in the From header field of the message, but put an address
owned by the site into the Sender header field, and sign the message
on behalf of that address. A verifying MTA could accept this and
rewrite the From header field to indicate the address that was
verified, i.e., From: John Doe via news@news-site.com
<jdoe@example.com>. (However, such rewriting must be done after the
verification pass is complete, and will break any later attempts to
re-verify.)
B.7 SMTP Servers for Roaming Users
Roaming users may find themselves in circumstances where it is
convenient or necessary to use an SMTP server other than their home
server; examples are IETF conferences and many hotels. In such
circumstances the signature, if any, will be added by a party other
than the user's home system.
Ideally roaming users would connect back to their home server using
either a VPN or a SUBMISSION server running with SMTP AUTHentication
on port 587. If the signing can be performed on the roaming user's
laptop then they can sign before submission, although the risk of
further modification may be high. If neither of these are possible,
these roaming users will not be able to send mail signed using their
own domain key.
Appendix C. Creating a public key (INFORMATIVE)
The default signature is an RSA signed SHA256 digest of the complete
email. For ease of explanation, the openssl command is used to
describe the mechanism by which keys and signatures are managed. One
way to generate a 1024 bit, unencrypted private-key suitable for
DKIM, is to use openssl like this:
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$ openssl genrsa -out rsa.private 1024
For increased security, the "-passin" parameter can also be added to
encrypt the private key. Use of this parameter will require entering
a password for several of the following steps. Servers may prefer to
use hardware cryptographic support.
The "genrsa" step results in the file rsa.private containing the key
information similar to this:
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
To extract the public-key component from the private-key, use openssl
like this:
$ openssl rsa -in rsa.private -out rsa.public -pubout -outform PEM
This results in the file rsa.public containing the key information
similar to this:
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDwIRP/UC3SBsEmGqZ9ZJW3/DkM
oGeLnQg1fWn7/zYtIxN2SnFCjxOCKG9v3b4jYfcTNh5ijSsq631uBItLa7od+v/R
tdC2UzJ1lWT947qR+Rcac2gbto/NMqJ0fzfVjH4OuKhitdY9tf6mcwGjaNBcWToI
MmPSPDdQPNUYckcQ2QIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
This public-key data (without the BEGIN and END tags) is placed in
the DNS. With the signature, canonical email contents, and public
key, a verifying system can test the validity of the signature. The
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openssl invocation to verify a signature looks like this:
openssl dgst -verify rsa.public -sha256 -signature signature.file \
<input.file
Once a private-key has been generated, the openssl command can be
used to sign an appropriately prepared email, like this:
$ openssl dgst -sign rsa.private -sha256 <input.file
This results in signature data similar to this when represented in
Base64 [MIME] format:
aoiDeX42BB/gP4ScqTdIQJcpAObYr+54yvctqc4rSEFYby9+omKD3pJ/TVxATeTz
msybuW3WZiamb+mvn7f3rhmnozHJ0yORQbnn4qJQhPbbPbWEQKW09AMJbyz/0lsl
How this signature is added to the email is discussed elsewhere in
this document.
The final record entered into a DNS zone file would be:
brisbane IN TXT ("v=DKIM1; p=aoiDeX42BB/gP4ScqTdIQJcpAObYr+54yvct"
"qc4rSEFYby9+omKD3pJ/TVxATeTzmsybuW3WZiamb+mvn7f"
"3rhmnozHJ0yORQbnn4qJQhPbbPbWEQKW09AMJbyz/0lsl" )
Appendix D. MUA Considerations
When a DKIM signature is verified, one of the results is a validated
signing identity. MUAs might highlight the address associated with
this identity in some way to show the user the address from which the
mail is sent. An MUA might do this with visual cues such as
graphics, or it might include the address in an alternate views, or
it might even rewrite the original "From:" address using the verified
information. Some MUAs might want to indicate which headers were
covered in a validated DKIM signature. This might be done with a
positive indication on the signed headers, it might be done with a
negative indication on the unsigned headers or visually hiding the
unsigned headers, or some combination of both. If an MUA uses visual
indications for signed headers, the MUA needs to be careful not to
display unsigned headers in a way that might be construed by the end
user as having been signed. If the message has an l= tag whose value
does not extend to the end of the message, he MUA might also hide or
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mark the portion of the message body that is not signed.
The aforementioned information is not intended to be exhaustive. The
MUA may choose to highlight, accentuate, hide, or otherwise display
any other information that may, in the opinion of the MUA author, be
deemed important to the end user.
Appendix E. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Russ Allbery, Edwin Aoki, Claus Assmann,
Steve Atkins, Fred Baker, Mark Baugher, Nathaniel Borenstein, Dave
Crocker, Michael Cudahy, Dennis Dayman, Jutta Degener, Patrik
Faltstrom, Duncan Findlay, Elliot Gillum, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Tony
Hansen, Arvel Hathcock, Amir Herzberg, Paul Hoffman, Craig Hughes,
Don Johnsen, Harry Katz, Murray S. Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, John
Levine, Simon Longsdale, David Margrave, Justin Mason, David Mayne,
Steve Murphy, Russell Nelson, Dave Oran, Doug Otis, Shamim Pirzada,
Juan Altmayer Pizzorno, Sanjay Pol, Blake Ramsdell, Christian Renaud,
Scott Renfro, Eric Rescorla, Dave Rossetti, Hector Santos, the
Spamhaus.org team, Malte S. Stretz, Robert Sanders, Rand Wacker, and
Dan Wing for their valuable suggestions and constructive criticism.
The DomainKeys specification was a primary source from which this
specification has been derived. Further information about DomainKeys
is at
<http://domainkeys.sourceforge.net/license/patentlicense1-1.html>.
Appendix F. Edit History
[[This section to be removed before publication.]]
F.1 Changes since -ietf-03 version
The following changes were made between draft-ietf-dkim-base-03 and
draft-ietf-dkim-base-04:
o Re-worded Abstract to avoid use of "prove" and "non-repudiation".
o Use dot-atom-text instead of dot-atom to avoid inclusion of CFWS.
o Capitalize Selector throughout.
o Add discussion of plain text, mentioning informatively that
implementors should plan for eventual 8-bit requirements.
o Drop RSA requirement of exponent of 65537 (not required, since it
is already in the key) and clarify the key format.
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o Drop SHOULD that DKIM-Signature should precede header fields that
it signs.
o Mention that wildcard DNS records MUST NOT be used for selector
records.
o Add section 3.8 to clarify the t=s flag.
o Change the list of header fields that MUST be signed to include
only From.
o Require that verifier check that From is in the list of signed
header fields.
o Drop all reference to draft-kucherawy-sender-auth-header draft.
o Substantially expand Section 7 (IANA Considerations) to include
initial registries.
o Add section B.7 (use case: SMTP Servers for Roaming Users).
o Add several examples; update some others.
o Considerable minor editorial updating to clarify language, delete
redundant text, fix spelling errors, etc.
Still to be resolved:
o How does "simple" body canonicalization interact with BINARYMIME
data?
o Deal with "relaxed" body canonicalizations, especially in regard
to bare CRs and NLs.
o How to handle "*" in g= dot-atom-text (which allows "*" as a
literal character).
o The IANA Considerations need to be completed and cleaned up.
F.2 Changes since -ietf-02 version
The following changes were made between draft-ietf-dkim-base-02 and
draft-ietf-dkim-base-03:
o Section 5.2: changed key expiration text to be informational;
drop "seven day" wording in favor of something vaguer.
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o Don't indicate that the "i=" tag value should be passed to the key
lookup service; this can be added as an extension if required.
o Move Section 6.6 (MUA Considerations) to be Appendix D and modify
it to avoid any hint of normative language.
o Soften the DKIM_STAT_ language in section 6 so that it doesn't
appear normative. This involved using only PERMFAIL and TEMPFAIL
as status, with parenthetical explanations.
o Restructured section 6 to make it clearer which steps apply on a
per-signature basis versus a per-message basis.
o Clarification of "signing identity" in several places.
o Clarification that DKIM-Signature header fields being signed by
another DKIM-Signature header field should be treated as a normal
header field (i.e., their "b=" field is unchanged).
o Change ABNF on a= tag to separate the public key algorithm from
the hash algorithm.
o Add t=s flag in key record to disallow subdomains in the i= tag
relative to the d= tag of the DKIM-Signature header field.
o Add a new definition for "dkim-quoted-printable", which is a
simple case of quoted-printable from RFC2045. dkim-quoted-
printable requires that all white space in the original text be
escaped, and all unescaped white space in the encoded field should
be ignored to allow arbitrary wrapping of the header fields which
may contain the content.
o Use dkim-quoted-printable as the encoding used in z= rather than
referring to RFC2045, since they are different.
o Rewrite description of g= tag in the key record.
o Deleted use of Domain in ABNF, which permits address-literals;
define domain-name to act in stead.
F.3 Changes since -ietf-01 version
The following changes were made between draft-ietf-dkim-base-01 and
draft-ietf-dkim-base-02:
o Change wording on "x=" tag in DKIM-Signature header field
regarding verifier handling of expired signatures from MUST to MAY
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(per 20 April Jabber session). Also, make it clear that received
time is to be preferred over current time if reliably available.
o Several changes to limit wording that would intrude into verifier
policy. This is largely changing statements such as "... MUST
reject the message" to "... MUST consider the signature invalid."
o Drop normative references to ID-DKIM-RR, OpenSSL, PEM, and
Stringprep.
o Change "v=" tag in DKIM-Signature from "MUST NOT" to "MUST"; the
version number is 0.2 for this draft, with the expectation that
the first official version will be "v=1". (Per 18 May Jabber
session.)
o Change "q=dns" query access method to "q=dnstxt" to emphasize the
use of the TXT record. The expectation is that a later extension
will define "q=dnsdkk" to indicate use of a DKK record. (Per 18
May Jabber session.)
o Several typos fixed, including removing a paragraph that implied
that the DKIM-Signature header field should be hashed with the
body (it should not).
F.4 Changes since -ietf-00 version
The following changes were made between draft-ietf-dkim-base-00 and
draft-ietf-dkim-base-01:
o Added section 8.9 (Information Leakage).
o Replace section 4 (Multiple Signatures) with much less vague text.
o Fixed ABNF for base64string.
o Added rsa-sha256 signing algorithm.
o Expanded several examples.
o Changed signing algorithm to use separate hash of the body of the
message; this is represented as the "bh=" tag in the DKIM-
Signature header field.
o Changed "z=" tag so that it need not have the same header field
names as the "h=" tag.
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o Significant wordsmithing.
F.5 Changes since -allman-01 version
The following changes were made between draft-allman-dkim-base-01 and
draft-ietf-dkim-base-00:
o Remove references to Sender Signing Policy document. Such
consideration is implicitly included in Section 6.3.
o Added ABNF for all tags.
o Updated references (still includes some references to expired
drafts, notably ID-AUTH-RES.
o Significant wordsmithing.
F.6 Changes since -allman-00 version
The following changes were made between draft-allman-dkim-base-00 and
draft-allman-dkim-base-01:
o Changed "c=" tag to separate out header from body
canonicalization.
o Eliminated "nowsp" canonicalization in favor of "relaxed", which
is somewhat less relaxed (but more secure) than "nowsp".
o Moved the (empty) Compliance section to the Sender Signing Policy
document.
o Added several IANA Considerations.
o Fixed a number of grammar and formatting errors.
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