INTERNET-DRAFT                                             Samuel Weiler
Expires: February 2004                                    August 4, 2003
Updates: RFC 2535, [DS]

         Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation Signer
         draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-2535typecode-change-04.txt

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
   of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in
   progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html

   Comments should be sent to the author or to the DNSEXT WG mailing
   list: namedroppers@ops.ietf.org

Abstract

   As the DNS Security (DNSSEC) specifications have evolved, the
   syntax and semantics of the DNSSEC resource records (RRs) have
   changed.  Many deployed nameservers understand variants of these
   semantics.  Dangerous interactions can occur when a resolver that
   understands an earlier version of these semantics queries an
   authoritative server that understands the new delegation signer
   semantics, including at least one failure scenario that will cause
   an unsecured zone to be unresolvable.  This document changes the
   type codes and mnemonics of the DNSSEC RRs (SIG, KEY, and NXT) to
   avoid those interactions.

Changes between 03 and 04:

   Clarified that RRSIG(0) may be defined by standards action.

   Created a new algorithm registry and renamed the old algorithm
   registry for SIG(0) only.  Added references to the appropriate
   crypto algorithm and format specifications.

   Several minor rephrasings.

Changes between 02 and 03:

   KEY (as well as SIG) retained for SIG(0) use only.

Changes between 01 and 02:

   SIG(0) still uses SIG, not RRSIG.  Added 2931 reference.

   Domain names embedded in NSECs and RRSIGs are not compressible and
   are not downcased.  Added unknown-rrs reference (as informative).

   Simplified the last paragraph of section 3 (NSEC doesn't always
   signal a negative answer).

   Changed the suggested type code assignments.

   Added 2119 reference.

   Added definitions of "unsecure delegation" and "unsecure referral",
   since they're not clearly defined elsewhere.

   Moved 2065 to informative references, not normative.

. Introduction

   The DNSSEC protocol has been through many iterations whose syntax
   and semantics are not completely compatible.  This has occurred as
   part of the ordinary process of proposing a protocol, implementing
   it, testing it in the increasingly complex and diverse environment
   of the Internet, and refining the definitions of the initial
   Proposed Standard.  In the case of DNSSEC, the process has been
   complicated by DNS's criticality and wide deployment and the need
   to add security while minimizing daily operational complexity.

   A weak area for previous DNS specifications has been lack of detail
   in specifying resolver behavior, leaving implementors largely on
   their own to determine many details of resolver function.  This,
   combined with the number of iterations the DNSSEC spec has been
   through, has resulted in fielded code with a wide variety of
   behaviors.  This variety makes it difficult to predict how a
   protocol change will be handled by all deployed resolvers.  The
   risk that a change will cause unacceptable or even catastrophic
   failures makes it difficult to design and deploy a protocol change.
   One strategy for managing that risk is to structure protocol
   changes so that existing resolvers can completely ignore input that
   might confuse them or trigger undesirable failure modes.

   This document addresses a specific problem caused by Delegation
   Signer's [DS] introduction of new semantics for the NXT RR that are
   incompatible with the semantics in RFC 2535 [RFC2535].  Answers
   provided by DS-aware servers can trigger an unacceptable failure
   mode in some resolvers that implement RFC 2535, which provides a
   great disincentive to sign zones with DS.  The changes defined in
   this document allow for the incremental deployment of DS.

1.1 Terminology

   In this document, the term "unsecure delegation" means any
   delegation for which no DS record appears at the parent.  An
   "unsecure referral" is an answer from the parent containing an NS
   RRset and a proof that no DS record exists for that name.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2 The Problem

   Delegation Signer introduces new semantics for the NXT RR that are
   incompatible with the semantics in RFC 2535.  In RFC 2535, NXT
   records were only required to be returned as part of a
   non-existence proof.  With DS, an unsecure referral returns, in
   addition to the NS, a proof of non-existence of a DS RR in the form
   of an NXT and SIG(NXT).  RFC 2535 didn't specify how a resolver was
   to interpret a response with both an NS and an NXT in the authority
   section, RCODE=0, and AA=0.  Some widely deployed 2535-aware
   resolvers interpret any answer with an NXT as a proof of
   non-existence of the requested record.  This results in unsecure
   delegations being invisible to 2535-aware resolvers and violates
   the basic architectural principle that DNSSEC must do no harm --
   the signing of zones must not prevent the resolution of unsecured
   delegations.

. Possible Solutions

   This section presents several solutions that were considered.
   Section 3 describes the one selected.

2.1. Change SIG, KEY, and NXT type codes

   To avoid the problem described above, legacy (RFC2535-aware)
   resolvers need to be kept from seeing unsecure referrals that
   include NXT records in the authority section.  The simplest way to
   do that is to change the type codes for SIG, KEY, and NXT.

   The obvious drawback to this is that new resolvers will not be able
   to validate zones signed with the old RRs.  This problem already
   exists, however, because of the changes made by DS, and resolvers
   that understand the old RRs (and have compatibility issues with DS)
   are far more prevalent than 2535-signed zones.

2.2. Change a subset of type codes

   The observed problem with unsecure referrals could be addressed by
   changing only the NXT type code or another subset of the type codes
   that includes NXT.  This has the virtue of apparent simplicity, but
   it risks introducing new problems or not going far enough.  It's
   quite possible that more incompatibilities exist between DS and
   earlier semantics.  Legacy resolvers may also be confused by seeing
   records they recognize (SIG and KEY) while being unable to find
   NXTs.  Although it may seem unnecessary to fix that which is not
   obviously broken, it's far cleaner to change all of the type codes
   at once.  This will leave legacy resolvers and tools completely
   blinded to DNSSEC -- they will see only unknown RRs.

2.3. Replace the DO bit

   Another way to keep legacy resolvers from ever seeing DNSSEC
   records with DS semantics is to have authoritative servers only
   send that data to DS-aware resolvers.  It's been proposed that
   assigning a new EDNS0 flag bit to signal DS-awareness (tentatively
   called "DA"), and having authoritative servers send DNSSEC data
   only in response to queries with the DA bit set, would accomplish
   this.  This bit would presumably supplant the DO bit described in
   RFC 3225.

   This solution is sufficient only if all 2535-aware resolvers zero
   out EDNS0 flags that they don't understand.  If one passed through
   the DA bit unchanged, it would still see the new semantics, and it
   would probably fail to see unsecure delegations.  Since it's
   impractical to know how every DNS implementation handles unknown
   EDNS0 flags, this is not a universal solution.  It could, though,
   be considered in addition to changing the RR type codes.

2.4. Increment the EDNS version

   Another possible solution is to increment the EDNS version number
   as defined in RFC 2671 [RFC2671], on the assumption that all
   existing implementations will reject higher versions than they
   support, and retain the DO bit as the signal for DNSSEC awareness.
   This approach has not been tested.

2.5. Do nothing

   There is a large deployed base of DNS resolvers that understand
   DNSSEC as defined by the standards track RFC 2535 and RFC 2065
   and, due to under specification in those documents, interpret any
   answer with an NXT as a non-existence proof.  So long as that is
   the case, zone owners will have a strong incentive to not sign any
   zones that contain unsecure delegations, lest those delegations be
   invisible to such a large installed base.  This will dramatically
   slow DNSSEC adoption.

   Unfortunately, without signed zones there's no clear incentive for
   operators of resolvers to upgrade their software to support the new
   version of DNSSEC, as defined in [DS].  Historical data suggests
   that resolvers are rarely upgraded, and that old nameserver code
   never dies.

   Rather than wait years for resolvers to be upgraded through natural
   processes before signing zones with unsecure delegations,
   addressing this problem with a protocol change will immediately
   remove the disincentive for signing zones and allow widespread
   deployment of DNSSEC.

. Protocol changes

   This document changes the type codes of SIG, KEY, and NXT.  This
   approach is the cleanest and safest of those discussed above,
   largely because the behavior of resolvers that receive unknown type
   codes is well understood.  This approach has also received the most
   testing.

   To avoid operational confusion, it's also necessary to change the
   mnemonics for these RRs.  DNSKEY will be the replacement for KEY,
   with the mnemonic indicating that these keys are not for
   application use, per [RFC3445].  RRSIG (Resource Record SIGnature)
   will replace SIG, and NSEC (Next SECure) will replace NXT.  These
   new types completely replace the old types, except that SIG(0)
   [RFC2931] will continue to use SIG and KEY.

   The new types will have exactly the same syntax and semantics as
   specified for SIG, KEY, and NXT in RFC 2535 and [DS] except for
   the following:

      1) Consistent with [UNKNOWN-RRs], domain names embedded in
      RRSIG and NSEC RRs MUST NOT be compressed,

      2) Embedded domain names in RRSIG and NSEC RRs are not downcased
      for purposes of DNSSEC canonical form and ordering nor for
      equality comparison, and

      3) An RRSIG with a type-covered field of zero has undefined
      semantics.  The meaning of such a resource record may only be
      defined by IETF Standards Action.

   If a resolver receives the old types, it SHOULD treat them as
   unknown RRs and SHOULD NOT assign any special meaning to them or
   give them any special treatment.  It MUST NOT use them for DNSSEC
   validations or other DNS operational decision making.  For example,
   a resolver MUST NOT use DNSKEYs to validate SIGs or use KEYs to
   validate RRSIGs.  If SIG, KEY, or NXT RRs are included in a zone,
   they MUST NOT receive special treatment.  As an example, if a SIG
   is included in a signed zone, there MUST be an RRSIG for it.
   Authoritative servers may wish to give error messages when loading
   zones containing SIG or NXT records (KEY records may be included
   for SIG(0)).

   As a clarification to previous documents, some positive responses,
   particularly wildcard proofs and unsecure referrals, will contain
   NSEC RRs.  Resolvers MUST NOT treat answers with NSEC RRs as
   negative answers merely because they contain an NSEC.

. IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA registry for DNS Resource Record
   Types by assigning types 46, 47, and 48 to the RRSIG, NSEC, and
   DNSKEY RRs, respectively.

   Types 24 and 25 (SIG and KEY) are retained for SIG(0) [RFC2931]
   use only.  Type 30 (NXT) should be marked as Obsolete.

   In order to allow DNS Security and SIG(0) to use different sets of
   algorithms, the existing "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry
   is renamed as the "SIG(0) Algorithm Numbers" registry and a new
   "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry is established.  The
   initial algorithm values are:

     2        Diffie-Hellman                    [RFC2539]
     3        DSA/SHA1                          [RFC2536]
     5        RSA/SHA-1                         [RFC3110]
   253        Private algorithms - domain name  [RFC2535]
   254        Private algorithms - OID          [RFC2535]

   Values 0, 1, and 255 are reserved.  Values 4 and 6 through 252 are
   available for assignment by IETF Standards Action.

   It is suggested, but not required, that new algorithms usable by
   both DNS Security and SIG(0) be assigned the same number in both
   registries.

. Security Considerations

   The change introduced here does not materially affect security.
   The implications of trying to use both new and legacy types
   together are not well understood, and attempts to do so would
   probably lead to unintended and dangerous results.

   Changing type codes will leave code paths in legacy resolvers that
   are never exercised.  Unexercised code paths are a frequent source
   of security holes, largely because those code paths do not get
   frequent scrutiny.

   Doing nothing, as described in 3.1, will slow DNSSEC deployment.
   While this does not decrease security, it also fails to increase
   it.

. Normative references

   [RFC2535] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
             RFC 2535, March 1999.

   [DS]      Gudmundsson, O., "Delegation Signer Resource Record",
             draft-ietf-dnsext-delegation-signer-14.txt, work in
             progress, May 2003.

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2931] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
             (SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.

   [RFC2536] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name
             System (DNS)", RFC 2436, March 1999.

   [RFC2539] Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
             Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.

   [RFC3110] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the
             Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.

. Informative References

   [RFC2065] Eastlake, D. and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System Security
             Extensions", RFC 2065, January 1997.

   [RFC2671] Vixie, P., "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC
             2671, August 1999.

   [RFC3225] Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC", RFC
             3225, December 2001.

   [RFC2929] Eastlake, D., E. Brunner-Williams, and B. Manning.
             Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations. BCP 42,
             RFC 2929, September 2000.

   [RFC3445] Massey, D., and S. Rose.  Limiting the Scope of the KEY
             Resource Record (RR).  RFC 3445, December 2002.

   [UNKNOWN-RRs] Gustafsson, A.  Handling of Unknown DNS Resource
             Record Types.  draft-ietf-dnsext-unknown-rrs-05.txt
             Publication as RFC pending.

. Acknowledgments

   The changes introduced here and the analysis of alternatives had
   many contributors.  With apologies to anyone overlooked, those
   include: Micheal Graff, John Ihren, Olaf Kolkman, Mark Kosters, Ed
   Lewis, Bill Manning, and Suzanne Woolf.

   Thanks to Jakob Schlyter and Mark Andrews for identifying the
   incompatibility described in section 1.2.

   In addition to the above, the author would like to thank Scott
   Rose, Olafur Gudmundsson, and Sandra Murphy for their substantive
   comments.

. Author's Address

   Samuel Weiler
   SPARTA, Inc.
   7075 Samuel Morse Drive
   Columbia, MD 21046
   USA
   weiler@tislabs.com