DOTS WG R. Dobbins, Ed.
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational S. Fouant
Expires: May 4, 2017 Corero Network Security
D. Migault
Ericsson
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
N. Teague
Verisign Inc
L. Xia
Huawei
October 31, 2016
Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-02.txt
Abstract
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a
protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor
solutions/services. This document presents use cases to evaluate the
interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as the DOTS
exchanges. The purpose of the use cases is to identify the
interacting DOTS component, how they collaborate and what are the
type of informations to be exchanged.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use Cases Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. CPE Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Service/System Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Orchestrating Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Inter-domain DDoS Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Use Cases Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. DOTS Client Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. DOTS Server Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. DOTS Message Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A.1. Primary Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1.1. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators
Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services . . . . . . 14
A.1.2. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Network
Infrastructure Element Request to Upstream Mitigator 16
A.1.3. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification System Request to
Upstream Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1.4. Automatic or Operator-Assisted Targeted Service/
Application Request to Upstream Mitigator . . . . . . 19
A.1.5. Manual Web Portal Request to Upstream Mitigator . . 21
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A.1.6. Manual Mobile Device Application Request to
Upstream Mitigator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1.7. Unsuccessful Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or
PE Mitigators Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation
Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.2. Ancillary Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2.1. Auto-registration of DOTS clients with DOTS servers 26
A.2.2. Auto-provisioning of DDoS countermeasures . . . . . . 26
A.2.3. Informational DDoS attack notification to
interested and authorized third parties . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction
Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
solutions/services are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
communications paradigms which result in vendor/service lock-in, and
as a side-effect make the configuration, provisioning, operation, and
activation of these solutions a highly manual and often time-
consuming process. Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS
mitigation solutions/services simultaneously engaged in defending the
same organization against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical
and process-related hurdles which greatly increase operational
complexity and often result in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation
efficacy.
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a
protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor
solutions/services. As DDoS solutions/services are broadly
heterogeneous among different vendor, the primary goal for DOTS is to
provide a high level interaction with these DDoS solutions/services
such as initiating or terminating the the service/solution. In
addition, DOTS is limited to DDoS and may be used by a node under
attack. More specifically, DOTS does not intend to become a generic
purpose used to orchestrate different DDoS mitigation services/
solutions and the use of DOTS by node under a DDoS attack is expected
to impact the design of the DOTS protocol. As a result, although
DOTS may be used in the future for further signaling, the current
document limits DOTS to a DDoS signaling protocol. It should be
noted that DOTS is not in and of itself intended to perform
orchestration functions duplicative of the functionality being
developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is intended to allow
devices, services, and applications to request mitigation assistance
and receive mitigation status updates from systems of this nature.
This document provides use cases where DDoS mitigation is handled
using DOTS. The use case presented in the document are intended to
clarify what interactions are envisioned with DOTS, as well as the
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nodes interacting using DOTS. In both cases, the use cases are
expected to provide inputs for the design of DOTS.
2. Terminology and Acronyms
2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Acronyms
This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], except where noted.
3. Use Cases Scenarios
This section provides a high level description of scenarios addressed
by DOTS. These scenarios are described in more details in
Appendix A. In both sections, the scenarios are provided in order to
illustrate the purpose of DOTS. They are not limitative and other
use cases are expected to appear during the deployment of DOTS.
All scenarios presents a coordination between the DDoS target, the
DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator. The coordination and
communication between these entity depends, for example on the
characteristic or functionality of the equipment, the reliability of
the information provided by DDoS attack telemetry, the business
relationship between the DDoS target domain and the mitigator.
More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS telemetry attack may simply
activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in some case, it may collaborate
by providing some information. In some cases, the DDoS mitigation
may be orchestrated, which includes selecting an specific appliance
as well as starting/ending a mitigation.
3.1. CPE Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation
The most elementary scenario considers a equipment such as a CPE that
when overloaded sends an alert to specific equipment located
upstream. In most cases, these very basic equipment are unlikely to
diagnose whether an DDoS attack is ongoing or not and detection as
well as potential mitigation is left to the upstream equipment.
In most deployment, the upstream equipment belong to the same domain
as the CPE. In such case, it is not expected that a specific
contract is established between the CPE and the DDoS mitigation
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service. The CPE and concerned traffic is likely to be identified by
the source of the alert, which also imply the mitigator is aware of
the nature of the equipment as well as the architecture of the
domain.
The DDoS mitigation service may be for example an equipment that is
located on path or a controller that will configure the network to
the traffic to be analyzed and mitigated is redirected to a dedicated
vendor specific equipment or solution. The DDoS mitigation service
may be activated only for the traffic associated to the CPE sending
the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE. Such
decision are not part of DOTS, but instead depends on the policies of
the network administrator.
The DDoS mitigation service is expected to acknowledge the reception
of the alert in order to avoid retransmission. This may become an
issue for example if an ISP receives alerts from all CPEs multiple
time. However, it is unlikely that in such cases the CPE will follow
the status of the mitigation. Instead, as the DDoS mitigation
service and the CPE belongs to the same administrative domain, it is
expected that the decision of mitigating or not, as well as the
decision to end an ongoing mitigation will be left to DDoS mitigation
service without notice to the CPEs.
3.2. Service/System Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation
This section considers that some more specialized equipment are
sending the DDoS alert. As opposed to the CPE, these equipment are
likely to provide reliable information about the ongoing attack.
Such equipment could typically be a telemetry system, or a specific
target service such as a specific instance of web server, or a
specific web application detecting application specific attacks.
Such information is likely to be carried in the alert and taken into
account by the DDoS mitigation service to proceed to further action.
Typically a telemetry system may indicate selectors of the suspicious
traffic as well indicators or qualification of the detected attack.
As the telemetry system is expected to monitor multiple aspect of the
traffic. Similarly when an attack is detected by the target service.
The destination of the alert is likely to receive alert from multiple
different services (DNS, HTTP, TCP, UDP, application layer
specific...). Such information is likely to be trusted and
considered by the mitigator to apply the appropriated security
appliance.
Note that within a single domain it likely that the service or the
telemetry system are most accurate equipment to qualify the attack.
As a result, not providing the information is likely to re-do the
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analysis phase. Providing the information while sending the alert
avoid re-processing the analysis. Instead the mitigator uses
directly the information to redirect the traffic to the appropriated
specialized appliance.
For the same reasons as the CPE, as mitigation of the DDoS Service is
performed in a single administrative domain, the source of the alert
may not manage the end of the mitigation service and leave such
decision to the administrator of domain or the DDoS mitigation
service.
3.3. Orchestrating Intra-domain DDoS Mitigation
This section presents a generalization of the Service/System intra-
domain scenario. Orchestration goes one step further and considers
that the information carried by the alert could have some management
purpose. This includes explicitly starting / ending a mitigation as
well as selecting a specific DDoS mitigation service. This differs
from the previous case in that the source of the alert does not leave
anymore the decision on how to mitigate the attack by the mitigator.
Instead the mitigator is orchestrated.
Typical example of orchestrators could be a network administrator
that monitors the traffic and initiates manually a DDoS mitigation
from its web portal. Orchestration may also applied automatically by
an orchestrator.
3.4. Inter-domain DDoS Mitigation
In the case of inter-domain mitigation, it is expected that the DDoS
mitigation service has more resource, know-how than the target
domain. As a result, there is little benefit of sharing the
information collected in the target domain. In addition, the
relation between the two domains are also expected to be described
into a pre-agreed contract. In that sense, the alert can be
restraint to an activation of the DDoS mitigation service.
On the other hand, has there is a contract agreement, it is also
expected that target domain is able to stop the DDoS mitigation
service itself, and that the end of the mitigation is not
unilaterally provided to the DDoS mitigation service.
4. Use Cases Taxonomy
The purpose of DDoS Open Threat Signaling DOTS is to enable the
coordination of multiple vendor DDoS mitigation services/systems.
DOTS communication is a communication between a DOTS Client and a
DOTS Server. A DOTS Client or DOTS Server can be hosted on different
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nodes which are associated to different functionalities, and thus
leading to different expectations from DOTS. This section provides a
classification of the DOTS Client, the DOTS Servers as well as the
different type of exchanges.
The high level classification is then illustrated on concrete nodes
and examples. Appendix also illustrate the current classification
with scenario and complete description of the process.
4.1. DOTS Client Taxonomy
DOTS Client initiates a DOTS communication in order to alert an DDoS
attack is ongoing or to coordinate a DDoS mitigation. Coordination
of a DDOS Mitigation with DOTS includes initiating/terminations of an
DDoS mitigation service/system as well as controlling the status of
an ongoing DDoS mitigation.
Note that the section only considers DOTS Client that are actually
initiating an exchange with a DOTS Server, and nodes that simply
relay DOTS messages are not considered here.
Here are the categories of DOTS Client envisioned in this document:
(a) DOTS Client alerting a DDoS attack is ongoing
i) hosted on the target attack
ii) hosted on a monitoring service/system
(b) DOTS Client coordinating an DDoS attack mitigation
i) hosted on an orchestrator
ii) hosted on administrative GUI
When the DOTS Client is hosted on the attack target. The DOTS Client
mostly raised an alert to the DDoS Mitigation service/system. When a
alert is raised by the node under attack, very little information is
expected to be provided by DOTS Client to the DDoS mitigation
service/system. More particularly telemetric information or
characteristics of the attack are likely to be unreliable as the host
is already overload. As a result, such DOTS Client may raise an
alert without any additional information. Eventually, information
such as the asset under attack which can simply be configured. The
asset under attack is especially useful for the DDoS mitigation
service/system to indicate the origin of the alert. It is not
necessary, for example, if the origin of the alert is implicit. The
origin of the alert my be implicit, for example when DOTS Clients are
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authenticated or when the device is identified by the links (i.e when
the host is a CPE). Note also that the asset to protect is only
informational and optional. This information may be spoofed, and the
DDoS mitigation is likely to be derived from the authentication of
the alert. In most cases, the DDoS mitigation has been pre-agreed
between the host under attack and the DDoS mitigation service/system.
When the DOTS Client is hosted on a monitoring system, the monitoring
system may raise an alert an attack is ongoing. Unlike the host
under attack, the monitoring system is expected to have sufficient
resource so it is not itself overload and impacted by the ongoing
attack. As a result, the DOTS Client is more likely to provide
additional information associated to the alert, as this information
is expected to be reliable. The type of information associated may
be associated to the asset to protect and eventually some information
qualifying the attack. On the other hand, the information associated
also depends on how the what has been agreed with DDoS mitigation
service/system. In most cases, when a DDoS attack is detected all
the traffic is redirected to the DDoS mitigation procedure has been
agreed between the DDoS mitigation service/system and the entity
hosting the monitoring service. In such cases, very few information
is needed.
When the DOTS Client is hosted on an orchestrator, the DOTS Client
contacts the DDoS mitigation service/system to initiates a DDoS
mitigation. The orchestrator is responsible for setting the network
to redirect the traffic to the DDoS mitigation service/system. If
the DDoS mitigation service/system is not available, the orchestrator
is responsible to find an alternative. Again the orchestrator is
likely to provide additional information to the DDoS mitigation
service/system. For example, typical information may be the asset to
protect, as well as the specific mitigation function requested. On
the other hand, the service is usually expected to be associated to
the mitigation service, and so may not be explicitly specified. In
addition, the DOTS Client is also expected to control how the DDoS
mitigation is performed. More specifically, it is expected that the
DOTS Client can terminate the DDoS mitigation. In addition, the DOTS
Client should have sufficient information to decide how to operate
next. For example, it should be able to check if the mitigation is
ongoing as well as the efficiency of the mitigation.
When the DOTS client is hosted on an administrative system, the DOTS
Client may be triggered by the network administrator to initiate a
DDoS mitigation. In this case, the DOTS Server is likely to be an
orchestrator, and all necessary information may be provided so the
DDoS mitigation can be initiated. This includes, the asset to be
protected, the action expected to be performed by the orchestrator,
the DDoS mitigation service/system to contact...
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Note that information associated by the DOTS Client to a request for
mitigation is not limited. However, as DDoS mitigation systems are
highly heterogeneous, if there is a need to provide interoperability
between the vendors and DDoS mitigation services/systems, that
actions provided by a DOTS Clients remains small and accepted by all
services/systems. As a result here are the envisioned optional
information provided by the DOTS Client.
(a) recommended asset to protect (IP, port). This information
specifies the expected action from the DDoS mitigation service/
system.
(b) optional DDoS Mitigation Contract ID: which references the
contract agreed out-of-band. This information specifies the
expected action from the DDoS mitigation service/system.
(c) optional Requested Service: which designates the function or
service associated to the DDoS mitigation service/system. This
information specifies the expected action from the DDoS
mitigation service/system.
(d) optional DDoS attack information (suspected attack, telemetry ):
This information is expected to help the mitigation service/
system to diagnose the ongoing attack.
In both cases, the DOTS Client sends a request for DDoS mitigation to
the DOTS Server, and expects the DDoS mitigation service/system
mitigates the DDoS attack. The difference between sending a request
for DDoS mitigation as an alert or for coordinating an DDoS
mitigation is that an alert is a request to completely outsource the
mitigation, whereas the coordination requires additional control over
the DDoS mitigation. An alert may be acknowledged by the DOTS Server
to acknowledge the reception whereas during the coordination, the the
DOTS server may acknowledge the initiation of the DDoS mitigation.
4.2. DOTS Server Taxonomy
DOTS Servers terminate the DOTS communication. The DOTS Server is
typically hosted on a DDoS mitigation service/system or an
intermediary node such as an orchestrator.
The DOTS Server is expected to be the entry point of a DDoS
mitigation service/system. Some DOTS Client do not expect any
interaction from the DOTS Server, once a DDoS mitigation has been
requested. This is especially true for DOTS Client hosted on attack
target. Other DOTS Client hosted on orchestrators or DDoS mitigation
service/systems are likely to expect for the DOTS Server a
confirmation the system accepts the DDoS mitigation task.
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Respectively, these DOTS Client are also likely to expect a
confirmation when a DDoS mitigation termination has been requested.
In addition, DOTS Server are also expected to provide information
related to the mitigation status when requested by the DOTS Client.
In addition, it is also expected that the DOTS Server could provide
some status report of the DDoS mitigation on a push basis.
4.3. DOTS Message Taxonomy
The core essential messages to coordination an heterogeneous set of
DDoS mitigation services/system needs to be small and enable future
options. Here are the different exchanges envisioned in this
document between a DOTS Client and a DOTS Server.
(a) DOTS MITIGATION CONTROL messages are used by the DOTS Client to
initiate or terminate a DDoS mitigation. The initiator the
termination can be specified by the action type START or STOP.
Such message can carry some additional options that specify
additional information such as the asset under attack for
example. These DOTS MITIGATION CONTROL messages are expected to
be ACKed by the DOTS Server, in order to indicate the DOTS
Server will perform the requested action. In any other case an
error is expected to be returned. ven in the case of a DOTS
Client sends an alert, ACK is recommended so the DOTS Client
stop sending the alert.
(b) DOTS MITIGATION INFORMATIONAL message are left for any
additional interaction between a DOTS Client and DOTS Server
regarding an ongoing request. INFORMATIONAL message can be
ignored by the receiver if it does not not understand the the
requested information or options. In the current document an
informational message can be the status of the ongoing
mitigation.
(c) DOTS ERROR contains the errors associated to a request.
DOTS OPTIONS: options can be used to indicate some optional
information. The option is expected to specify whether the DOTS
Server can ignore it or must return an error if it is not understood.
Options are not message, but part of the message.
5. Security Considerations
DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation,
traffic injection, and signaling blocking. The DOTS protocol MUST be
designed for minimal data transfer to address the blocking risk.
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Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed through
current secure communications best practices. DOTS is not subject to
anything new in this area. One consideration could be to minimize
the security technologies in use at any one time. The more needed,
the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one
technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of
another technology.
Additional details of DOTS security requirements may be found in
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].
6. IANA Considerations
No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.
7. Acknowledgments
TBD
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
8.2. Informative References
[APACHE] "Apache mod_security", <https://www.modsecurity.org>.
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]
Mortensen, A., Moskowitz, R., and T. Reddy, "Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
Requirements", draft-ietf-dots-requirements-03 (work in
progress), October 2016.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RRL] "BIND RRL", <https://deepthought.isc.org/article/AA-
00994/0/Using-the-Response-Rate-Limiting-Feature-in-BIND-
9.10.html>.
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Appendix A. Use Cases
This section provides a high-level overview of likely use cases and
deployment scenarios for DOTS-enabled DDoS mitigation services. It
should be noted that DOTS servers may be standalone entities which,
upon receiving a DOTS mitigation service request from a DOTS client,
proceed to initiate DDoS mitigation service by communicating directly
or indirectly with DDoS mitigators, and likewise terminate the
service upon receipt of a DOTS service termination request;
conversely, the DDoS mitigators themselves may incorporate DOTS
servers and/or DOTS clients. The mechanisms by which DOTS servers
initiate and terminate DDoS mitigation service with DDoS mitigators
is beyond the scope of this document.
All of the primary use cases described in this section are derived
from current, real-world DDoS mitigation functionality, capabilities,
and operational models.
The posited ancillary use cases described in this section are
reasonable and highly desirable extrapolations of the functionality
of baseline DOTS capabilities, and are readily attainable in the near
term.
Each of the primary and ancillary use cases described in this section
may be read as involving one or more DDoS mitigation service
providers; DOTS makes multi-provider coordinated DDoS defenses much
more effective and practical due to abstraction of the particulars of
a given DDoS mitigation service/solution set.
Both the primary and ancillary use cases may be facilitated by direct
DOTS client - DOTS server communications or via DOTS relays deployed
in order to aggregate DOTS mitigation service requests/responses, to
mediate between stateless and stateful underlying transport
protocols, to aggregate multiple DOTS requests and/or responses, to
filter DOTS requests and/or responses via configured policy
mechanisms, or some combination of these functions.
All DOTS messages exchanged between the DOTS clients and DOTS servers
in these use cases may be communicated directly between DOTS clients
and servers, or mediated by one or more DOTS relays residing on the
network of the originating network, the network where upstream DDoS
mitigation service takes place, an intervening network or networks,
or some combination of the above.
DOTS is intended to apply to both inter- and intra-domain DDoS attack
mitigation scenarios. The technical and operational requirements for
inter- and intra-domain DOTS communications are identical. The main
difference is administrative in nature; although it should be noted
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that provisioning challenges which are typically associated with
inter- domain DOTS communications relationships may also apply in
intra- domain deployment scenarios, based upon organizational
factors. All of the same complexities surrounding authentication and
authorization can apply in both contexts, including considerations
such as network access policies to allow DOTS communications, DOTS
transport selection (including considerations of the implications of
link congestion if a stateful DOTS transport option is selected),
etc. Registration of well-known ports for DOTS transports per
[RFC6335] should be considered in light of these challenges.
It should also be noted that DOTS does not directly ameliorate the
various administrative challenges required for successful DDoS attack
mitigation. Letters of authorization, RADB updates, DNS zone
delegations, alteration of network access policies, technical
configurations required to facilitate network traffic diversion and
re-injection, etc., are all outside the scope of DOTS. DOTS may,
however, prove useful in automating the registration of DOTS clients
with DOTS servers, as well as in the automatic provisioning of
situationally- appropriate DDoS defenses and countermeasures. This
ancillary DOTS functionality is described in Appendix A.2.
Many of the 'external' administrative challenges associated with
establishing workable DDoS attack mitigation service may be addressed
by work currently in progress in the I2RS and I2NSF WGs. Interested
parties may wish to consider tracking those efforts, and coordination
with both I2RS and I2NSF is highly desirable.
Note that all the use-cases in this document are universal in nature.
They apply equally to endpoint networks, transit backbone providers,
cloud providers, broadband access providers, ASPs, CDNs, etc. They
are not specific to particular business models, topological models,
or application types, and are deliberately generalizable. Both
networks targeted for attack as well as any adjacent or topologically
distant networks involved in a given scenario may be either single-
or multi-homed. In the accompanying vector illustrations
incorporated into draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-01.pdf, specific business
and topological models are described in order to provide context.
Likewise, both DOTS itself and the use cases described in this
document are completely independent of technologies utilized for the
detection, classification, traceback, and mitigation of DDoS attacks.
Flow telemetry such as NetFlow and IPFIX, direct full-packet
analysis, log-file analysis, indirection manual observation, etc. can
and will be enablers for detection, classification and traceback.
Intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMSes), flowspec, S/RTBH, ACLs,
and other network traffic manipulation tools and techniques may be
used for DDoS attack mitigation. BGP, flowspec, DNS, inline
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deployment, and various 'NFV' technologies may be used for network
traffic diversion into mitigation centers or devices in applicable
scenarios; GRE, MPLS, 'NFV', inline deployment and other techniques
may be utilized for 'cleaned' traffic re-injection to its intended
destination.
The scope, format, and content of all DOTS message types cited in
this document must be codified by the DOTS WG.
The following use cases are intended to inform the DOTS requirements
described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].
A.1. Primary Use Cases
A.1.1. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators Request
Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services
One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may be
configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to request
upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an attack when
DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics exceed the
capabilities of such CPE mitigators. DDoS mitigation service may be
terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request initiated by the mitigator when it has
been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
mitigators.
(b) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
the DDoS attack.
(c) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks. This DOTS mitigation
service initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
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initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on
their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(e) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service has been initiated.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators.
(g) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE
mitigators may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation
efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
(h) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(i) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
CPE or PE mitigators indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
(j) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation service
termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS mitigation
service termination request may be automatically initiated by
the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
from the mitigators or a management system which monitors them
(the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
scope of this document).
(k) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(l) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
CPE or PE mitigators indicating that DDoS mitigation services
have been terminated.
(m) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation
termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
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A.1.2. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Network Infrastructure
Element Request to Upstream Mitigator
CPE or PE network infrastructure elements such as routers, switches,
load-balancers, firewalls, 'IPSes', etc. which have the capability to
detect and classify DDoS attacks and which have DOTS client
capabilities may be configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers
in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation
during an attack. DDoS mitigation service may be terminated either
automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation service termination
request initiated by the network element when it has been determined
that the DDoS attack has ended.
In this use-case, the network elements involved are not engaged in
mitigating DDoS attack traffic. They are signaling for upstream
attack mitigation assistance. This can be an inter- or intra- domain
use-case.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization with DOTS-client-capable network infrastructure
elements deployed.
(b) The network infrastructure elements utilize their DOTS client
functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or more
upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP
networks, either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays
residing upon the requesting organization's network, the
upstream mitigation provider's network, or both. The scope,
format, and content of these messages must be codified by the
DOTS WG. This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may be
automatically initiated by the network infrastructure elements,
or may be manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
organization in response to an alert from the network elements
or a management system which monitors them (the mechanism by
which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
(c) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting network infrastructure
elements, and initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation
service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which
this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting network infrastructure elements indicating that
upstream DDoS mitigation service has been initiated.
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(e) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting requesting network infrastructure elements.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the network
infrastructure elements may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
(g) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(h) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
network infrastructure elements indicating that the DDoS attack
has ceased.
(i) The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS
mitigation service termination request may be automatically
initiated by the network infrastructure elements, or may be
manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization
in response to an alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by
which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
(j) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(k) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
network infrastructure elements indicating that DDoS mitigation
services have been terminated.
(l) The network infrastructure elements transmit a DOTS mitigation
termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
A.1.3. Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification System Request to Upstream Mitigator
CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems which
have DOTS client capabilities may be configured so that upon
detecting and classifying a DDoS attack, they signal one or more DOTS
servers in order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service
initiation. DDoS mitigation service may be terminated either
automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation service termination
request initiated by the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
System when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
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In this use-case, the Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification does
not possess any inherent capability to mitigate DDoS attack traffic,
and is signaling for upstream mitigation assistance. This can be an
inter- or intra-domain use-case.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization with DOTS-client-capable CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems deployed.
(b) The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting
organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service initiation
request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually
triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in
response to an alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this
process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(c) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems, and initiate situationally-
appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective networks
(the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
Systems indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
been initiated.
(e) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification
Systems.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE Attack
Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems may optionally
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the
relevant DOTS servers.
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(g) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(h) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
(i) The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
transmit a DOTS mitigation service termination request to the
DOTS servers. This DOTS mitigation service termination request
may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry
Detection/Classification Systems, or may be manually triggered
by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
alert from the CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/
Classification Systems (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(j) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(k) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been terminated.
(l) The CPE or PE Attack Telemetry Detection/Classification Systems
transmit a DOTS mitigation termination status acknowledgement to
the DOTS servers.
A.1.4. Automatic or Operator-Assisted Targeted Service/ Application
Request to Upstream Mitigator
A service or application which is the target of a DDoS attack and
which has the capability to detect and classify DDoS attacks (i.e,
Apache mod_security [APACHE], BIND RRL [RRL], etc.) as well as DOTS
client functionality may be configured so that upon detecting and
classifying a DDoS attack, it signals one or more DOTS servers in
order to request upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation. DDoS
mitigation service may be terminated either automatically or manually
via a DOTS mitigation service termination request initiated by the
service/application when it has been determined that the DDoS attack
has ended.
In this use-case, the service/application does not possess inherent
DDoS attack mitigation capabilities, and is signaling for upstream
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mitigation assistance. This can be an inter- or intra-domain use-
case.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which include DOTS-client-capable services or
applications that are the specific target(s) of the attack.
(b) The targeted services or applications utilize their DOTS client
functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation
request to one or more DOTS servers residing on the same network
as the services or applications, one or more upstream transit
networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either
directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the
requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
provider's network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service
initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
targeted services or applications, or may be manually triggered
by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an
alert from the targeted services or applications or a system
which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(c) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
honor requests from the requesting services or applications, and
initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on
their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
services or applications indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service has been initiated
(e) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the
requesting services or applications.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the requesting
services or applications may optionally regularly transmit DOTS
mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
(g) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
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(h) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
requesting services or applications indicating that the DDoS
attack has ceased.
(i) The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS
mitigation service termination request may be automatically
initiated by the targeted services or applications, or may be
manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization
in response to an alert from a system which monitors them (the
mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
of this document).
(j) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(k) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
targeted services or applications indicating that DDoS
mitigation services have been terminated.
(l) The targeted services or applications transmit a DOTS mitigation
termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
A.1.5. Manual Web Portal Request to Upstream Mitigator
A Web portal which has DOTS client capabilities has been configured
in order to allow authorized personnel of organizations which are
targeted by DDoS attacks to manually request upstream DDoS mitigation
service initiation from a DOTS server. When an organization has
reason to believe that it is under active attack, authorized
personnel may utilize the Web portal to manually initiate a DOTS
client mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers. DDoS
mitigation service may be terminated manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request through the Web portal when it has been
determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
In this use-case, the organization targeted for attack does not
possess any automated or operator-assisted mechanisms for DDoS attack
detection, classification, traceback, or mitigation; the existence of
an attack has been inferred manually, and the organization is
requesting upstream mitigation assistance. This can theoretically be
an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is more typically an inter-
domain scenario.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates DOTS
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client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation service
requests upon demand.
(b) Authorized personnel utilize the Web portal to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more upstream
transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks,
either directly or via intermediate DOTS relays residing upon
the requesting organization's network, the upstream mitigation
provider's network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service
initiation request is manually triggered by personnel of the
requesting organization when it is judged that the organization
is under DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(c) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
honor requests from the Web portal, and initiate situationally-
appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective networks
(the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the
scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
Web portal indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has
been initiated.
(e) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the Web
portal.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the Web portal may
optionally regularly transmit manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
(g) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(h) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
Web portal indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
(i) The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
(j) The Web portal transmits a manually-triggered DOTS mitigation
service termination request to the DOTS servers (the mechanism
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by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this
document).
(k) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
Web portal indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been
terminated.
(l) The Web portal transmits a DOTS mitigation termination status
acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
A.1.6. Manual Mobile Device Application Request to Upstream Mitigator
An application for mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
which incorporates DOTS client capabilities has been made available
to authorized personnel of an organization. When the organization
has reason to believe that it is under active DDoS attack, authorized
personnel may utilize the mobile device application to manually
initiate a DOTS client mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers
in order to initiate upstream DDoS mitigation services. DDoS
mitigation service may be terminated manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request initiated through the mobile device
application when it has been determined that the DDoS attack has
ended.
This use-case is similar to the one described in Appendix A.1.5; the
difference is that a mobile application provided by the DDoS
mitigation service provider is used to request upstream attack
mitigation assistance. This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-
domain use-case, but is more typically an inter-domain scenario.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization have access to a Web portal which incorporates DOTS
client functionality and can generate DOTS mitigation service
requests upon demand.
(b) Authorized personnel utilize the mobile application to send a
DOTS mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on the same network as the targeted Internet
properties, one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks, either directly or via
intermediate DOTS relays residing upon the requesting
organization's network, the upstream mitigation provider's
network, or both. This DOTS mitigation service initiation
request is manually triggered by personnel of the requesting
organization when it is judged that the organization is under
DDoS attack (the mechanism by which this process takes place is
beyond the scope of this document).
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(c) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been provisioned to
honor requests from the mobile application, and initiate
situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
mobile application indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation
service has been initiated.
(e) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the mobile
application.
(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the mobile
application may optionally regularly transmit manually-triggered
DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.
(g) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack
has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their
respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process
takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(h) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
mobile application indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.
(i) The mobile application transmits a manually-triggered DOTS
mitigation service termination request to the DOTS servers (the
mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
of this document).
(j) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their
respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(k) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the
mobile application indicating that DDoS mitigation services have
been terminated.
(l) The mobile application transmits a DOTS mitigation termination
status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.
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A.1.7. Unsuccessful Automatic or Operator-Assisted CPE or PE Mitigators
Request Upstream DDoS Mitigation Services
One or more CPE or PE mitigators with DOTS client capabilities may be
configured to signal to one or more DOTS servers in order to request
upstream DDoS mitigation service initiation during an attack when
DDoS attack volumes and/or attack characteristics exceed the
capabilities of such CPE mitigators. DDoS mitigation service may be
terminated either automatically or manually via a DOTS mitigation
service termination request initiated by the mitigator when it has
been determined that the DDoS attack has ended.
This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is
more typically an inter-domain scenario.
(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS
mitigators.
(b) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating
the DDoS attack.
(c) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or
capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and
utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS
servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer
networks, or overlay MSSP networks. This DOTS mitigation
service initiation request may be automatically initiated by the
CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by
personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert
from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process takes
place is beyond the scope of this document).
(d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to
honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and
attempt to initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation
service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which
this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).
(e) The DDoS mitigators on the upstream network report back to the
DOTS servers that they are unable to initiate DDoS mitigation
service for the requesting organization due to mitigation
capacity constraints, bandwidth constraints, functionality
constraints, hardware casualties, or other impediments (the
mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope
of this document).
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(f) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS
mitigation service cannot be initiated as requested.
(g) The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally regularly re-transmit
DOTS mitigation status request messages to the relevant DOTS
servers until acknowledgement that mitigation services have been
initiated.
(h) The CPE or PE mitigators may optionally transmit a DOTS
mitigation service initiation request to DOTS servers associated
with a configured fallback upstream DDoS mitigation service.
Multiple fallback DDoS mitigation services may optionally be
configured.
(i) The process describe above cyclically continues until the DDoS
mitigation service request is fulfilled; the CPE or PE
mitigators determine that the DDoS attack volume has decreased
to a level and/or complexity which they themselves can
successfully mitigate; the DDoS attack has ceased; or manual
intervention by personnel of the requesting organization has
taken place.
A.2. Ancillary Use Cases
A.2.1. Auto-registration of DOTS clients with DOTS servers
An additional benefit of DOTS is that by utilizing agreed-upon
authentication mechanisms, DOTS clients can automatically register
for DDoS mitigation service with one or more upstream DOTS servers.
The details of such registration are beyond the scope of this
document.
A.2.2. Auto-provisioning of DDoS countermeasures
The largely manual tasks associated with provisioning effective,
situationally-appropriate DDoS countermeasures is a significant
barrier to providing/obtaining DDoS mitigation services for both
mitigation providers and mitigation recipients. Due to the 'self-
descriptive' nature of DOTS registration messages and mitigation
requests, the implementation and deployment of DOTS has the potential
to automate countermeasure selection and configuration for DDoS
mitigators. The details of such provisioning are beyond the scope of
this document.
This can theoretically be an inter- or intra-domain use-case, but is
more typically an inter-domain scenario.
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A.2.3. Informational DDoS attack notification to interested and
authorized third parties
In addition to its primary role of providing a standardized,
programmatic approach to the automated and/or operator-assisted
request of DDoS mitigation services and providing status updates of
those mitigations to requesters, DOTS may be utilized to notify
security researchers, law enforcement agencies, regulatory bodies,
etc. of DDoS attacks against attack targets, assuming that
organizations making use of DOTS choose to share such third-party
notifications, in keeping with all applicable laws, regulations,
privacy and confidentiality considerations, and contractual
agreements between DOTS users and said third parties.
This is an inter-domain scenario.
Authors' Addresses
Roland Dobbins (editor)
Arbor Networks
30 Raffles Place
Level 17 Chevron House
Singapore 048622
Singapore
Email: rdobbins@arbor.net
Stefan Fouant
Corero Network Security
Email: Stefan.Fouant@corero.com
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
Canada
Phone: +1 514-452-2160
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
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Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
USA
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Nik Teague
Verisign Inc
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
USA
Phone: +44 791 763 5384
Email: nteague@verisign.com
Liang Xia
Huawei
No. 101, Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District
Nanjing
China
Email: Frank.xialiang@huawei.com
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