drip S. Card
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 26 January 2022 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
S. Zhao (Editor)
Tencent
A. Gurtov
Linköping University
25 July 2021
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-15
Abstract
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture
adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 January 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID)
and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1. Architecture Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . . . 10
4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . 11
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 13
4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . 13
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . 14
5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods . . . . . . 15
6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 15
6.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
(ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes
into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non-
IETF technical standards.
The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP
Requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) and
Standardization
CAAs currently promulgate performance-based regulations that do not
specify techniques, but rather cite industry consensus technical
standards as acceptable means of compliance.
UAS Remote Identification (RID) is an application enabler for a UAS
to be identified by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management
(UTM) and UAS Service Supplier (USS) (Appendix A) or third parties
entities such as law enforcement. Many considerations (e.g., safety)
dictate that UAS be remotely identifiable. Civil Aviation
Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating UAS RID. For example, the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published
[Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] in 2019
and whereafter published the "Final Rule" in 2021 [FAA_RID]. In
FAA's final rule, it is clearly stated that Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and transponders can not be
used to serve the purpose of an remote identification. More
details about ADS-B can be found in Appendix B.
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the
ASTM [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking.
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ASTM defines one set of RID information and two means, MAC-layer
broadcast and IP-layer network, of communicating it. If an UAS
uses both communication methods, the same information must be
provided via both means. [F3411-19] is cited by FAA in its RID
final rule [FAA_RID] as "a potential means of compliance" to a
Remote ID rule.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
With release 16, the 3GPP completed the UAS RID requirement study
[TS-22.825] and proposed a set of use cases in the mobile network
and the services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17
specification focuses on enhanced UAS service requirements and
provides the protocol and application architecture support that
will be applicable for both 4G and 5G networks.
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID
1.2.1. Broadcast RID
A set of RID messages are defined for direct, one-way, broadcast
transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These are
currently defined as MAC-Layer messages. Internet (or other Wide
Area Network) connectivity is only needed for UAS registry
information lookup by Observers using the directly received UAS ID.
Broadcast RID should be functionally usable in situations with no
Internet connectivity.
The minimum Broadcast RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 1.
x x UA
xxxxx
|
|
| app messages directly over
| one-way RF data link (no IP)
|
|
+
x
xxxxx
x
x
x x Observer's device (e.g. smartphone)
x x
Figure 1
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With queries sent over the Internet using harvested RID (see
Section 6), the Observer may gain more information about those
visible UAS" is only true if the locally observed UAS is (or very
recently was) observed somewhere else; harvesting RID is not so much
about learning more about directly observed nearby UAS as it is about
surveillance of areas too large for local direct visual observation &
direct RF link based ID (e.g., an entire air force base, or even
larger, a national forest)
1.2.2. Network RID
A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in
[F3411-19]. This data flow is emitted from an UAS via unspecified
means (but at least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID
Service Provider (Net-RID SP). A Net-RID SP provides the RID data to
Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID
DP that responds to queries from Network Remote ID Observers
(expected typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web-based)
specifying airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon
internet connectivity to fulfill Observers the RID data query to the
NET-RID DP. The summary of network RID data flows work as follows:
* The UA's RID data is generated from a UAS which consists of UAs
and GCSs.
* The RID data is transferred from the UA to the GCS via a RF (Radio
Frequency) link.
* The GCS or UA (e.g. BVLOS and autonomous operation) provides the
UA's RID data to a NET_RID_SP via a secure internet connection.
* NET_RID_DP as a NET_RID_SP subscriber and satisfies the Observer's
query request also via a secure internet connection.
The mimunum Network RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2:
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x x UA
xxxxx ********************
| \ * ------*---+------------+
| \ * / * | NET_RID_SP |
| \ * ------------/ +---*--+------------+
| RF \ */ | *
| * INTERNET | * +------------+
| /* +---*--| NET_RID_DP |
| / * +---*--+------------+
+ / * | *
x / *****************|*** x
xxxxx | xxxxx
x +------- x
x x
x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x
x x x x
Figure 2
Command and Control (C2) must flow from the GCS to the UA via some
path, currently (in the year of 2021) typically a direct RF link, but
with increasing beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations
expected often to be wireless links at either end with the Internet
between.
Telemetry (at least UA's position and heading) flows from the UA to
the GCS via some path, typically the reverse of the C2 path. Thus,
RID information pertaining to both the GCS and the UA can be sent, by
whichever has Internet connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the
USS managing the UAS operation.
The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to
subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward
RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices.
Regulations require and [F3411-19] describes RID data elements that
must be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed
Observer devices.
[F3411-19] prescribes the protocols only between the Net-RID SP, Net-
RID DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). DRIP
can address standardization of protocols between the UA and GCS,
between the UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and
Observer devices.
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[F3411-19] prescribes the protocols between the Net-RID SP, Net-RID
DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). It also
prescribes data elements (in JSON) between Observer and DSS. DRIP
addresses standardization of secure protocols between the UA and GCS
(over direct wireless and Internet connection), between the UAS and
the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer devices.
Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of
links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the
UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is
in the scope of [F3411-19] Network RID.
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability
With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its
USS. With Broadcast-RID, the UAS Operator has either pre-filed a 4D
space volume for USS operational knowledge and/or Observers can be
providing information about observed UA to a USS. USS exchange
information via a Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS) so all
USS collectively have knowledge about all activities in a 4D
airspace.
The interactions among Observer, UA, and USS are shown in Figure 3.
+----------+
| Observer |
+----------+
/ \
/ \
+-----+ +-----+
| UAS1 | | UAS2 |
+-----+ +-----+
\ /
\ /
+----------+
| Internet |
+----------+
/ \
/ \
+-------+ +-------+
| USS1 | <-------> | USS2 |
+-------+ +-------+
\ /
\ /
+------+
| DSS |
+------+
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Figure 3
1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture
The requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] provides an extended
introduction to the problem space and use cases. Only a brief
summary of that introduction is restated here as context, with
reference to the general UAS RID usage scenarios shown in Figure 4.
General x x Public
Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety
Observer x x Observer
x x
x x ---------+ +---------- x x
x x | | x x
| |
UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2
xxxxx | | | xxxxx
| + + + |
| xxxxxxxxxx |
| x x |
+----------+x Internet x+------------+
UA1 | x x | UA1
Pilot x | xxxxxxxxxx | x Pilot
Operator xxxxx + + + xxxxx Operator
GCS1 x | | | x GCS2
x | | | x
x x | | | x x
x x | | | x x
| | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| |------+ | +-------| |
| Public | | | Private |
| Registry | +-----+ | Registry |
| | | DNS | | |
+----------+ +-----+ +----------+
Figure 4
DRIP is meant to leverage existing Internet resources (standard
protocols, services, infrastructures, and business models) to meet
UAS RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply
IETF standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external
standards, to satisfy UAS RID requirements.
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This document outlines the UAS RID architecture. This includes
presenting the gaps between the CAAs' Concepts of Operations and
[F3411-19] as it relates to the use of Internet technologies and UA
direct RF communications. Issues include, but are not limited to:
- Design of trustworthy remote ID and trust in RID messages
(Section 4)
- Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (including DNS:
[RFC1034]), Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731])
and Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for
publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2).
- Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion
(Section 6).
- Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 9).
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Architecture Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown above.
2.2. Abbreviations
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service
EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCS: Ground Control Station
HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries
HIP: Host Identity Protocol
HIT: Host Identity Tag
RID: Remote ID
Net-RID SP: Network RID Service Provider
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Net-RID DP: Network RID Display Provider.
PII: Personally Identifiable Information
RF: Radio Frequency
SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider
UA: Unmanned Aircraft
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System
USS: UAS Service Supplier
UTM: UAS Traffic Management
2.3. Additional Definitions
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates
This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions",
"Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate
has a different context compared with security certificates and
Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509.
Claims:
A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property
Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y").
Assertions:
An assertion in DRIP is a set of claims. This definition is
borrowed from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT [RFC8392].
Attestations:
An attestation in DRIP is a signed assertion. The signer may be a
claimant or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used when
an entity asserts a relationship with another entity, along with
other information, and the asserting entity signs the assertion,
thereby making it an attestation.
Certificates:
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A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity
information, signed by a third party.
4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier
This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the
basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external
technical standard ASTM [F3411-19] and regulatory constraints. It
justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type
and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers.
Self-asserting in this usage is given the Host Identity (HI), the
HHIT ORCHID construction and a signature of the HHIT by the HI can
both be validated. The explicit registration hierarchy within the
HHIT provides registry discovery (managed by a Registrar) to either
yield the HI for 3rd-party (who is looking for ID attestation)
validation or prove the HHIT and HI have uniquely been registered.
4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space
A DRIP entity identifier needs to be "Trustworthy" (See DRIP
Requirement about GEN-1, ID-4 and ID-5 in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]).
This means that within the framework of the RID messages, an Observer
can establish that the DRIP identifier uniquely belong to the UAS.
That the only way for any other UAS to assert this DRIP identifier
would be to steal something from within the UAS. The DRIP identifier
is self-generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and registered with
the USS.
The Broadcast RID data exchange faces extreme challenges due to the
limitation of the demanding support for Bluetooth. The ASTM
[F3411-19] defines the basic RID message which is expected to contain
certain RID data and the Authentication message. The Basic RID
message has a maximum payload of 25 bytes and the maximum size
allocated by ASTM for the RID is 20 bytes. currently, the
authentication maximum payload is defined to be 201 bytes (9 paged
Bluetooth 4 messages).
4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier
A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode
can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key
signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee
name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived
directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable
attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this
cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association
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between the ID and the private key is ensured by cryptographically
binding the public key with the ID, more specifically the ID results
from the hash of the public key. It is statistically hard for
another entity to create a public key that would generate (spoof) the
ID.
The HITs is designed statistically unique through the cryptographic
hash feature of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-
bound addition of the Hierarchy and an HHIT registration process
(e.g. based on Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide
complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This registration forces the
attacker to generate the same public key rather than a public key
that generates the same HHIT. This is in contrast to general IDs
(e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the subject in an X.509
certificate.
A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its
manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a
hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT can only
be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA.
Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the
possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 8).
In another case, a UAS equipped for Broadcast RID can be provisioned
not only with its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the
HHIT was derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
signature. A UAS equipped for Network RID can be provisioned
likewise; the private key resides only in the ultimate source of
Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each Observer
device can be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP
identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate
registries.
HHITs can also be used throughout the USS/UTM system. The Operators,
Private Information Registries, as well as other UTM entities, can
use HHITs for their IDs. Such HHITs can facilitate DRIP security
functions such as used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
encrypt communications.
A self-attestation of the HHIT RID can be done in as little as 84
bytes, by avoiding an explicit encoding technology like ASN.1 or
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR [RFC8949]). This
attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and the EdDSA
signature on them.
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An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs
for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate
for that HHIT.
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup
Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly
provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the
size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the
Remote ID itself needs to be a non-spoofable inquiry input into the
lookup.
A DRIP registration process based on the explicit hierarchy within a
HHIT provides manageable uniqueness of the HI for the HHIT (defense
against a cryptographic hash second pre-image attack on the HHIT;
e.g. multiple HIs yielding the same HHIT). A lookup of the HHIT into
this registration data provides the registered HI for HHIT proof. A
first-come-first-serve registration for a HHIT provides deterministic
access to any other needed actionable information based on inquiry
access authority (more details in Section 5.2).
4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic
The only (known to the authors of this document at the time of its
writing) extant fixed-length ID cryptographically derived from a
public key are the Host Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and
Cryptographically Generated Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. However, both
HITs and CGAs lack registration/retrieval capability. HHIT, on the
other hand, is capable of providing a cryptographic hashing function,
along with a registration process to mitigate the probability of a
hash collision (first registered, first allowed).
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries
DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information
resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these
different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity
of administration, the public and private information can be stored
in different registries. This section introduces the public and
private information registries for DRIP identifiers.
5.1. Public Information Registry
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5.1.1. Background
The public registry provides trustable information such as
attestations of RID ownership and registration with the HDA
(Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority). Optionally, pointers to the
repositories for the HDA and RAA (Registered Assigning
Authority)implicit in the RID can be included (e.g., for HDA and RAA
HHIT|HI used in attestation signing operations). This public
information will be principally used by Observers of Broadcast RID
messages. Data on UAS that only use Network RID, is available via an
Observer's Net-RID DP that would tend to directly provide all public
registry information. The Observer may visually "see" these Net-RID
UAS, but they may be silent to the Observer. The Net-RID DP is the
only source of information based on a query for an airspace volume.
5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry
A DRIP identifier is amenable to handling as an Internet domain name
(at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy, e.g. in .ip6.arpa). Thus
DNS can provide all the needed public DRIP information. A
standardized HHIT FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) can deliver the
HI via a HIP RR (Resource Record) [RFC8005] and other public
information (e.g., RRA and HDA ptrs, and HIP RVS (Rendezvous Servers)
[RFC8004]). These public information registries can use secure DNS
transport (e.g. DNS over TLS) to deliver public information that is
not inherently trustable (e.g. everything other than attestations).
5.2. Private Information Registry
5.2.1. Background
The private information required for DRIP identifiers is similar to
that required for Internet domain name registration. A DRIP
identifier solution can leverage existing Internet resources:
registration protocols, infrastructure, and business models, by
fitting into an ID structure compatible with DNS names. The HHIT
hierarchy can provide the needed scalability and management
structure. It is expected that the private registry function will be
provided by the same organizations that run a USS, and likely
integrated with a USS. The lookup function may be implemented by the
Net-RID DPs.
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5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier Registry
A DRIP private information registry supports essential registry
operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) using interoperable open
standard protocols. It can accomplish this by using the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5730]) and the Registry Data Access
Protocol (RDAP RFC7480] [RFC7482] [RFC7483]). The DRIP private
information registry in which a given UAS is registered needs to be
findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in
[RFC7484].
5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods
A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS
(e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be
deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with
specific customers.
6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion
ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and
Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS
to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or
Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of
essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA
RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] only specify Broadcast RID for UAS,
however, still encourages Network RID for complementary
functionality, especially in support of UTM.
One obvious opportunity is to enhance the architecture with gateways
from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This provides the best of both
and gives regulators and operators flexibility. It offers
considerable enhancement over some Network RID options such as only
reporting planned 4D operation space by the operator.
These gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around airports, public
gatherings, and other sensitive areas) and/or crowd-sourced (as
nothing more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). As
Broadcast RID media have limited range, gateways receiving messages
claiming locations far from the gateway can alert authorities or a
SDSP to the failed sanity check possibly indicating intent to
deceive. Surveillance SDSPs can use messages with precise date/time/
position stamps from the gateways to multilaterate UA location,
independent of the locations claimed in the messages (which may have
a natural time lag as it is), which are entirely operator self-
reported in UAS RID and UTM, and thus are subject not only to natural
time lag and error but also operator misconfiguration or intentional
deception.
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Further, gateways with additional sensors (e.g. smartphones with
cameras) can provide independent information on the UA type and size,
confirming or refuting those claims made in the RID messages. This
Crowd Sourced Remote ID (CS-RID) would be a significant enhancement,
beyond baseline DRIP functionality; if implemented, it adds two more
entity types.
6.1. The CS-RID Finder
A CS-RID Finder is the gateway for Broadcast Remote ID Messages into
the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS-
RID Finder could implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a
Broadcast RID receiver. However, it should not depend upon a direct
interface with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP or Network RID client.
It would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP; this interface
should be based upon but readily distinguishable from that between a
GCS and a Net-RID SP.
6.2. The CS-RID SDSP
A CS-RID SDSP would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this
interface should be based upon but readily distinguishable from that
between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e.
present the same interface) to a Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP.
7. IANA Consideration
This document does not make any IANA request.
8. Security Considerations
The security provided by asymmetric cryptographic techniques depends
upon protection of the private keys. A manufacturer that embeds a
private key in an UA may have retained a copy. A manufacturer whose
UA are configured by a closed source application on the GCS which
communicates over the Internet with the factory may be sending a copy
of a UA or GCS self-generated key back to the factory. Keys may be
extracted from a GCS or UA. The RID sender of a small harmless UA
(or the entire UA) could be carried by a larger dangerous UA as a
"false flag." Compromise of a registry private key could do
widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be
determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator
key management practices.
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9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations
Broadcast RID messages can contain PII. A viable architecture for
PII protection would be symmetric encryption of the PII using a
session key known to the UAS and its USS. An authorized Observer
could send the encrypted PII along with the UAS ID (to the USS in
which the UAS ID is registered if that can be determined, e.g., from
received Broadcast RID information such as the UAS ID itself, or to
the Observer's USS, or to a Public Safety USS) to get the plaintext.
Alternatively, the authorized Observer can receive the key to
directly decrypt all PII content sent by that UA during that session
(UAS operation).
An authorized Observer can instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions
have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA (abort the
operation).
PII can be protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This
could come as part of UTM operation authorization. It can be special
instructions at the start or during an operation. PII protection can
not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the USS. The UAS always
has the option to abort the operation if PII protection is
disallowed.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]
Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.
Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-17, 7 July 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-
17.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
10.2. Informative References
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[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
2019.
[Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
2019.
[FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021,
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/
pdf/2020-28948.pdf>.
[FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops]
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM)
Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/
traffic_management/media/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf>.
[Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", 2019.
[LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d.,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
data_exchange/>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", 2019.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.
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[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.
[RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
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[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[TS-22.825]
3GPP, "Study on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aerial
Systems (UAS)", n.d.,
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3527>.
[U-Space] European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL), "U-space Concept of Operations", 2019,
<https://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/u-
space/CORUS%20ConOps%20vol2.pdf>.
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM)
A.1. Operation Concept
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAA's
effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace
system (NAS) led to the development of the concept of UTM and the
ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in 2013
and version 2.0 was published in 2020 [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops].
The eventual concept refinement, initial prototype implementation and
testing were conducted by the UTM research transition team which is
the joint workforce by FAA and NASA. World efforts took place
afterward. The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the
CORUS project to research its UTM counterpart concept, namely
[U-Space]. This effort is led by the European Organization for the
Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).
Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to
guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM)
system and ensure safe and efficient integrations of manned and
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.
The UTM comprises UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and local
regulation compliance policies to guarantee safe UAS integration and
operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes, but is not
limited to, providing means of communication between UAS operators
and service providers and a platform to facilitate communication
among UAS service providers.
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A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS)
A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance
indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a
proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides
services like real-time UAS traffic monitoring and planning,
aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control,
interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can
coexist with other USS to build a large service coverage map which
can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information.
The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LAANC] program
which is the first system to realize some of the UTM envisioned
functionality. The LAANC program can automate the UAS's flight plan
application and approval process for airspace authorization in real-
time by checking against multiple aeronautical databases such as
airspace classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS
facility map, special use airspace, Notice to Airman (NOTAM), and
Temporary Flight Rule (TFR).
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations
This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS
participation in UTM has significant safety improvement.
1. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in a
controlled airspace (e.g., Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo
in the United States), the USS under which the UAS is operating
is responsible for verifying UA registration, authenticating the
UAS operational intent (flight plan) by checking against
designated UAS fly map database, obtaining the air traffic
control (ATC) authorization and monitor the UAS flight path in
order to maintain safe margins and follow the pre-authorized
sequence of authorized 4-D volumes (route).
2. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in an
uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States),
pre-flight authorization must be obtained from a USS when
operating beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS). The USS either accepts
or rejects received operational intent (flight plan) from the
UAS. Accepted UAS operation may share its current flight data
such as GPS position and altitude to USS. The USS may keep the
UAS operation status near real-time and may keep it as a record
for overall airspace air traffic monitoring.
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Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
The ADS-B is the de jure technology used in manned aviation for
sharing location information, from the aircraft to ground and
satellite-based systems, designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID
is conceptually similar to ADS-B, but with the receiver target being
the general public on generally available devices (e.g. smartphones).
For numerous technical reasons, ADS-B itself is not suitable for low-
flying small UA. Technical reasons include but not limited to the
following:
1. Lack of support for the 1090 MHz ADS-B channel on any consumer
handheld devices
2. Weight and cost of ADS-B transponders on CSWaP constrained UA
3. Limited bandwidth of both uplink and downlink, which would likely
be saturated by large numbers of UAS, endangering manned aviation
Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators worldwide have
ruled out the use of ADS-B for the small UAS for which UAS RID and
DRIP are intended.
Acknowledgements
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia
Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair.
Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY, 13495
United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
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Yorkville, NY, 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI, 48237
United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Shuai Zhao
Tencent
2747 Park Blvd
Palo Alto, 94588
United States of America
Email: shuai.zhao@ieee.org
Andrei Gurtov
Linköping University
IDA
SE-58183 Linköping Linköping
Sweden
Email: gurtov@acm.org
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