DRIP                                                        S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                           A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational                             AX Enterprize
Expires: 19 November 2020                                   R. Moskowitz
                                                          HTT Consulting
                                                             18 May 2020

        Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements


   This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote
   Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols and services
   to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID).

   Objectives include: complementing external technical standards as
   regulator-accepted means of compliance with UAS RID regulations;
   facilitating use of existing Internet resources to support UAS RID
   and to enable enhanced related services; and enabling verification
   that UAS RID information is trustworthy (to some extent, even in the
   absence of Internet connectivity at the receiving node).

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 November 2020.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/

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   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.  Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.3.  DRIP Focus  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   4.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.1.  General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   Many safety and other considerations dictate that UAS be remotely
   identifiable.  Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are
   mandating UAS RID.  The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
   has published [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations.  The United
   States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a
   Notice of Proposed Rule Making ([NPRM]).  CAAs currently promulgate
   performance-based regulations that do not specify techniques, but
   rather cite industry consensus technical standards as acceptable
   means of compliance.

   ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
   F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM
   F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and
   Tracking.  It defines 2 means of UAS RID.  Network RID defines a set
   of information for UAS to make available globally indirectly via the
   Internet.  Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned
   Aircraft (UA) to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or

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   Wi-Fi.  Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity, in several
   segments, from the UAS to the observer.  Broadcast RID should need
   Internet (or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS
   registry information lookup using the directly locally received UAS
   ID as a key.  It is expected that the same information will be
   provided via Broadcast and Network RID; in the US, the FAA NPRM so

   [F3411-19] specifies 3 UAS ID types.  Type 1 is a static,
   manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per ANSI/CTA-2063-A
   "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers" [CTA2063A].  Type 2 is
   a CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.  Type 3 is a UAS Traffic
   Management (UTM) system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need
   not be dynamic.  The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and
   3, but requires Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a
   single UAS flight, which in the context of UTM is called an
   "operation").  [F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information in
   the clear as plaintext (ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable
   trivial correlation of patterns of use, unacceptable in many
   applications, e.g. package delivery routes of competitors.

   An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
   provision of services complementing mere identification.

   Minimal specified information must be made available to the public;
   access to other data, e.g.  UAS operator Personally Identifiable
   Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
   personnel, properly authorized per policy.  The balance between
   privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and
   regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable
   trade space and enable trade-offs within that space.  [F3411-19]
   specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the observer; how the
   observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can
   be populated with information, is unspecified.

   Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
   applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA, which would impose
   tighter latency bounds than RID itself) is an obvious possibility,
   explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM.  However, applications of
   RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been
   explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions,
   based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a
   safety application.  Although dynamic establishment of secure
   communications between the observer and the UAS pilot seems to have
   been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
   Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
   any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical

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   The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing.  This
   implies the need to support use by observers of already ubiquitous
   mobile devices (smartphones and tablets).  Anticipating likely CAA
   requirements to support legacy devices, especially in light of
   [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending
   Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless
   of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices
   and observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely
   short "advertisement" (beacon) frames.

   UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Size, Weight and
   Power (SWaP).  Cost is a significant impediment to the necessary
   near-universal adoption of UAS send and observer receive RID
   capabilities.  To accommodate the most severely constrained cases,
   all these conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially
   for the Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design
   problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet-
   disconnected operation of UA onboard devices.  Internet-disconnected
   operation of observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too
   infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents
   further challenges.

   Given not only packet payload length and bandwidth, but also
   processing and storage within the SWaP constraints of very small
   (e.g. consumer toy) UA, heavyweight cryptographic security protocols
   are infeasible, yet trustworthiness of UAS RID information is
   essential.  Under [F3411-19], even the most basic datum, the UAS ID
   string (typically number) itself can be merely an unsubstantiated
   claim.  Observer devices being ubiquitous, thus popular targets for
   malware or other compromise, cannot be generally trusted (although
   the user of each device is compelled to trust that device, to some
   extent); a "fair witness" functionality (inspired by [Stranger]) may
   be desirable.

   DRIP's goal is to make RID immediately actionable, in both Internet
   and local-only connected scenarios (especially emergencies), in
   severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g.
   public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with
   UAS operators' privacy.  DRIP (originally called Trustworthy
   Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM-RID) potentially could be
   applied to verifiably identify other types of registered things
   reported to be in specified physical locations, but the urgent
   motivation and clear initial focus is UAS.  Existing Internet
   resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and business
   models) should be leveraged.  A natural Internet architecture for UAS
   RID conforming to proposed regulations and external technical
   standards will be described in a companion DRIP Architecture
   document; this document describes only requirements.

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2.  Terms and Definitions

2.1.  Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.2.  Definitions

      Cost, Size, Weight and Power.

      Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control,
      Accounting, Attribution, Audit.

      AirBorne DAA.  Also known as "self-separation".

      Above Ground Level.  Relative altitude, above the variously
      defined local ground level, typically of an UA, typically measured
      in feet.

      Air Traffic Control.  Explicit flight direction to pilots from
      ground controllers.  Contrast with ATM.

      Air Traffic Management.  All systems that assist aircraft from
      departure to landing.  A broader functional and geographic scope
      and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC.

   Authentication Message
      F3411 Message Type 2.  Provides framing for authentication data,

   Basic ID Message
      F3411 Message Type 0.  Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID,

      Civil Aviation Authority.  An example is the Federal Aviation
      Administration (FAA) in the United States of America.

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      Command and Control.  A set of organizational and technical
      attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and
      information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions.
      Mainly used in military contexts.  In the UAS context, typically
      refers to the link between GCS and UA over which the former
      controls the latter.  Out of scope for DRIP, even when this link
      is used to provide UA location to the GCS or vice-versa, for
      subsequent RID transmission.

      Detect And Avoid, formerly Sense And Avoid (SAA).  A means of
      keeping aircraft "well clear" of each other for safety.

   Direct RID
      Direct Remote Identification.  Per [Delegated], "a system that
      ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA in
      operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this
      information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".
      Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message
      with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message;
      System Message.  Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion
      of FAA NPRM Standard RID.

      End to End.

      Ground Based DAA.

      Ground Control Station.  The part of the UAS that the remote pilot
      uses to exercise C2 over the UA, whether by remotely exercising UA
      flight controls to fly the UA, by setting GPS waypoints, or
      otherwise directing its flight.

      Global Positioning System.  In this context, misused in place of
      Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) or more generally SATNAV
      to refer generically to satellite based timing and/or positioning.

      Global Resilient Aviation Information Network.  An effort to
      develop an international IPv6 overlay network with end-to-end
      security supporting all aspects of aviation.

      International Aviation Trust Framework.  ICAO effort to develop a

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      resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support
      of all aspects of aviation.

      International Civil Aviation Organization.  A United Nations
      specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international
      standards relating to aviation.

      Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability.  Supports
      ATC authorization requirements for UAS operations: remote pilots
      can apply to receive a near real-time authorization for operations
      under 400 feet in controlled airspace near airports.  US partial
      stopgap until UTM comes.

   Limited RID
      Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use Network RID,
      must not use Broadcast RID, and must provide pilot/GCS location
      only (not UA location).  This mode is only allowed for UA that
      neither require (due to e.g. size) nor are equipped for Standard
      RID, operated within V-LOS and within 400 feet of the pilot, below
      400 feet AGL, etc.

   Location/Vector Message
      F3411 Message Type 1.  Provides UA location, altitude, heading and
      speed, only.

      Line Of Sight.  An adjectival phrase describing any information
      transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g.
      electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other
      frequency range) and is subject to blockage.  A term to be avoided
      due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS.

      Mean Sea Level.  Relative altitude, above the variously defined
      mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM for a GCS),
      typically measured in feet.

   Net-RID DP
      Network RID Display Provider.  Logical entity that aggregates data
      from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding
      UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display
      by a user application on a user device.  Under the FAA NPRM, not
      recognized as a distinct entity, but a service provided by USS,
      including Public Safety USS that may exist primarily for this
      purpose rather than to manage any subscribed UAS.

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   Net-RID SP
      Network RID Service Provider.  Logical entity that participates in
      Network RID and provides to NetRID-DPs information on UAS it
      manages.  Under the FAA NPRM, the USS to which the UAS is
      subscribed ("Remote ID USS").

   Network Identification Service
      EU regulatory requirement for Network RID.  Requirement could be
      met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1;
      Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message.
      Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM
      Standard RID.

      Referred to in other UAS RID documents as a "user", but there are
      also other classes of UAS RID users, so we prefer "observer" to
      denote an individual who has observed an UA and wishes to know
      something about it, starting with its ID.

   Operator ID Message
      F3411 Message Type 5.  Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only.

      Personally Identifiable Information.  In this context, typically
      of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but
      possibly of an observer or other party.

      Radio Frequency.  May be used as an adjective or as a noun; in the
      latter case, typically means Radio Frequency energy.

      RF LOS.  Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio
      link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially
      subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
      vehicles, but less so than V-LOS.

   Self-ID Message
      F3411 Message Type 3.  Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23 byte
      ASCII free text field, only.

   Standard RID
      Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network
      RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the
      operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and
      must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location.  This mode
      is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size,
      range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID

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      (even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit
      Limited RID).  The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
      Direct RID; the Network RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
      Network Identification Service.

      Supplemental Data Service Provider.  An entity that participates
      in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as
      basic UTM system functions.

   System Message
      F3411 Message Type 4.  Provides general UAS information, including
      remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational area, etc.

      EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all
      classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban
      areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft.

      Unmanned Aircraft.  An aircraft which is intended to operate with
      no pilot on board.  In popular parlance, "drone".

      Unmanned Aircraft System.  Composed of UA, all required on-board
      subsystems, payload, control station, other required off-board
      subsystems, any required launch and recovery equipment, all
      required crew members, and C2 links between UA and control

      UAS identifier.  Although called "UAS ID", unique to the UA:
      neither to the operator (as previous registration numbers have
      been assigned), nor to the combination of GCS and UA that comprise
      the UAS.  Per [F3411-19], maximum length of 20 bytes.

   UAS ID Type
      Identifier type index.  Per [F3411-19], 4 bits, values 0-3 already

      UAS Remote Identification.  System for identifying UA during
      flight by other parties.

   UAS RID Verification Service
      System component designed to handle the authentication
      requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted

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      UAS Service Supplier.  Provide UTM services to support the UAS
      community, to connect Operators and other entities to enable
      information flow across the USS network, and to promote shared
      situational awareness among UTM participants.  (From FAA UTM
      ConOps V1, May 2018).

      UAS Traffic Management.  Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air
      traffic management which manages UAS operations safely,
      economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities
      and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties
      and involving airborne and ground-based functions."  In the US,
      per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low
      altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the
      FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft.

      Visual LOS.  Typically used in describing operation of an UA by a
      "remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or
      any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars)
      see the UA and its immediate flight environment.  Potentially
      subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
      vehicles, more so than RF-LOS.

3.  UAS RID Problem Space

   UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing
   (e.g. helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid.
   They may be single engine or multi engine.  The most common today are
   multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine.  The explosion in UAS was
   enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight
   stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off,
   fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off
   location or land at a distance.  UAS can be remotely piloted by a
   human (e.g. with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from Global
   Positioning System (GPS) waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of
   autonomy; stronger autonomy is coming.  UA are "low observable": they
   typically have a small radar cross section; they make noise quite
   noticeable at short range but difficult to detect at distances they
   can quickly close (500 meters in under 17 seconds at 60 knots); they
   typically fly at low altitudes (for the small UAS to which RID
   applies in the US, under 400 feet AGL); they are highly maneuverable
   so can fly under trees and between buildings.

   UA can carry payloads including sensors, cyber and kinetic weapons,
   or can be used themselves as weapons by flying them into targets.
   They can be flown by clueless, careless or criminal operators.  Thus

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   the most basic function of UAS RID is "Identification Friend or Foe"
   (IFF) to mitigate the significant threat they present.  Numerous
   other applications can be enabled or facilitated by RID: consider the
   importance of identifiers in many Internet protocols and services.

   Network RID from the UA itself (rather than from its GCS) and
   Broadcast RID require one or more wireless data links from the UA,
   but such communications are challenging due to $SWaP constraints and
   low altitude flight amidst structures and foliage over terrain.
   Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very
   challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position and
   velocity as accurately as it can.

3.1.  Network RID

   Network RID has several variants.  The UA may have persistent onboard
   Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID
   information directly over the Internet.  The UA may have intermittent
   onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID
   information whenever the UA itself is offline.  The UA may not have
   Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of
   communications to another node that can relay RID information to the
   Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its
   function must know where the UA is).  The UA may have no means of
   sourcing RID information, in which case the GCS must source it; this
   is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID proposed rules, which require
   providing the location of the GCS (not that of the UA).  In the
   extreme case, this could be the pilot using a web browser to
   designate, to an UAS Service Supplier (USS) or other UTM entity, a
   time-bounded airspace volume in which an operation will be conducted;
   this may impede disambiguation of ID if multiple UAS operate in the
   same or overlapping spatio-temporal volumes.

   In most cases in the near term, if the RID information is fed to the
   Internet directly by the UA or GCS, the first hop data links will be
   cellular Long Term Evolution (LTE) or WiFi, but provided the data
   link can support at least IP and ideally TCP, its type is generally
   immaterial to the higher layer protocols.  An UAS or other ultimate
   source of Network RID information feeds an USS acting as a Network
   RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP), which essentially proxies for that
   and other sources; an observer or other ultimate consumer of Network
   RID information obtains it from a Network RID Display Provider (Net-
   RID DP), which aggregates information from multiple Net-RID SPs to
   offer coverage of an airspace volume of interest.  Network RID
   Service and Display providers are expected to be implemented as
   servers in well-connected infrastructure, accessible via typical
   means such as web APIs/browsers.

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   Network RID is the more flexible and less constrained of the defined
   UAS RID means, but is only partially specified in [F3411-19].  It is
   presumed that IETF efforts supporting Broadcast RID (see next
   section) can be easily generalized for Network RID.

3.2.  Broadcast RID

   [F3411-19] specifies 3 Broadcast RID data links: Bluetooth 4.X;
   Bluetooth 5.X Long Range; and WiFi with Neighbor Awareness Networking
   (NAN).  For compliance with this standard, an UA must broadcast
   (using advertisement mechanisms where no other option supports
   broadcast) on at least one of these; if broadcasting on Bluetooth
   5.x, it is also required concurrently to do so on 4.x (referred to in
   [F3411-19] as Bluetooth Legacy).

   The selection of the Broadcast media was driven by research into what
   is commonly available on 'ground' units (smartphones and tablets) and
   what was found as prevalent or 'affordable' in UA.  Further, there
   must be an Application Programming Interface (API) for the observer's
   receiving application to have access to these messages.  As yet only
   Bluetooth 4.X support is readily available, thus the current focus is
   on working within the 26 byte limit of the Bluetooth 4.X "Broadcast
   Frame" transmitted on beacon channels.  After nominal overheads, this
   limits the UAS ID string to a maximum length of 20 bytes, and
   precludes the same frame carrying position, velocity and other
   information that should be bound to the UAS ID, much less strong
   authentication data.  This requires segmentation ("paging") of longer
   messages or message bundles ("Message Pack"), and/or correlation of
   short messages (anticipated by ASTM to be done on the basis of
   Bluetooth 4 MAC address, which is weak and unverifiable).

3.3.  DRIP Focus

   DRIP WG will focus on making information obtained via UAS RID
   immediately usable (for the observer to determine whether the UAS is
   trusted to fly in the airspace volume where and when observed, to
   establish communications whereby the observer can inquire of the
   pilot as to intent and/or direct the pilot to exit from the volume,

   1.  first by making it trustworthy (despite the severe constraints of
       Broadcast RID);

   2.  second by enabling verification that an UAS is registered, and if
       so, in which registry (for classification of trusted operators on
       the basis of known registry vetting, even by observers lacking
       Internet connectivity at observation time);

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   3.  third by enabling instant establishment, by authorized parties,
       of secure communications with the remote pilot.

   Any UA can assert any ID using the [F3411-19] required Basic ID
   message, which lacks any provisions for verification.  The Position/
   Vector message likewise lacks provisions for verification, and does
   not contain the ID, so must be correlated somehow with a Basic ID
   message: the developers of [F3411-19] have suggested using the MAC
   addresses, but these may be randomized by the operating system stack
   to avoid the adversarial correlation problems of static identifiers.
   The [F3411-19] optional Authentication Message specifies framing for
   authentication data, but does not specify any authentication method,
   and the maximum length of the specified framing is too short for
   conventional digital signatures and far too short for conventional
   certificates.  The one-way nature of Broadcast RID precludes
   challenge-response security protocols (e.g. observers sending nonces
   to UA, to be returned in signed messages).  An observer would be
   seriously challenged to validate the asserted UAS ID or any other
   information about the UAS or its operator looked up therefrom.

   Further, [F3411-19] provides very limited choices for an observer to
   communicate with the pilot, e.g.  to request further information on
   the UAS operation or exit from an airspace volume in an emergency.
   The System Message provides the location of the pilot/GCS, so an
   observer could physically go to the asserted GCS location to look for
   the remote pilot.  An observer with Internet connectivity could look
   up operator PII in a registry, then call a phone number in hopes
   someone who can immediately influence the UAS operation will answer
   promptly during that operation.

   Thus complementing [F3411-19] with protocols enabling strong
   authentication, preserving operator privacy while enabling immediate
   use of information by authorized parties, is critical to achieve
   widespread adoption of a RID system supporting safe and secure
   operation of UAS.

4.  Requirements

4.1.  General

   GEN-1   Provable Ownership: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
           UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message is that of the actual
           current sender of the message (i.e. the message is not a
           replay attack or other spoof, authenticating e.g. by
           verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a
           sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be
           at least partially derived).

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   GEN-2   Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other F3411
           messages from the same actual current sender to the UAS ID
           asserted in the Basic ID message.

   GEN-3   Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
           UAS ID is in a registry and identification of which one (with
           UAS ID Type 3, the same sender may have multiple IDs,
           potentially in different registries, but each ID should
           clearly indicate in which registry it can be found).

   GEN-4   Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of
           information designated by cognizant authority as public.

   GEN-5   Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, with AAA, per
           policy, of private information (i.e. any and all information
           in a registry, associated with the UAS ID, that is designated
           by neither cognizant authority nor the information owner as

   GEN-6   Readability: DRIP MUST enable information to be read and
           utilized by both humans and software.

   GEN-7   Provisioning: DRIP MUST enable provisioning registries with
           static information on the UAS and its operator, dynamic
           information on its current operation within the UTM
           (including means by which the USS under which the UAS is
           operating may be contacted for further, typically even more
           dynamic, information), and Internet direct contact
           information for services related to the foregoing.

   GEN-8   AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry
           loop by governing AAA per registered policies and
           administering policies only via AAA.

   GEN-9   Finger (placeholder name): DRIP MUST enable dynamically
           establishing, with AAA, per policy, E2E strongly encrypted
           communications with the UAS RID sender and entities looked up
           from the UAS ID, including at least the remote pilot and USS.

   GEN-10  QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of
           performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum
           message transmission intervals and delivery latencies.

   GEN-11  Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of
           UA, GCS and Observers.  DRIP SHOULD support mobility of all
           participating nodes.

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   GEN-12  Multihoming: DRIP MUST support multihoming of UA, for make-
           before-break smooth handoff and resiliency against path/link
           failure.  DRIP SHOULD support multihoming of all
           participating nodes.

   GEN-13  Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and
           flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g. of UAS
           reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes.

   GEN-14  Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and
           coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services.

   It is highly desirable that Broadcast RID receivers be able to stamp
   messages with accurate date/time received and receiver location, then
   relay them to a network service (e.g.  SDSP or distributed ledger).
   This supports 3 objectives: mark up a RID message with where and when
   it was actually received (which may agree or disagree with the self-
   report in the set of messages); defend against reply attacks; and
   support optional SDSP services such as multilateration (to complement
   UAS position self-reports with independent measurements).

4.2.  Identifier

   ID-1  Length: The DRIP [UAS] entity [remote] identifier must be no
         longer than 20 bytes.

   ID-2  Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify
         a registry in which the [UAS] entity identified therewith is

   ID-3  Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable
         lookup of other data associated with the [UAS] entity
         identified therewith in that registry.

   ID-4  Uniqueness: The DRIP identifier MUST be unique within a to-be-
         defined scope.

   ID-5  Non-spoofability: The DRIP identifier MUST be non-spoofable
         within the context of Remote ID broadcast messages (some
         collection of messages provides proof of UA ownership of ID).

   A DRIP UAS ID MUST NOT facilitate adversarial correlation of UAS
   operational patterns; this may be accomplished e.g. by limiting each
   identifier to a single use, but if so, the UAS ID MUST support
   defined scalable timely registration methods.

   Mechanisms standardized in DRIP WG MUST be capable of proving
   ownership of a claimed UAS ID, and SHOULD be capable of doing so

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   immediately on an observer device lacking Internet connectivity at
   the time of observation.

   Mechanisms standardized in DRIP WG MUST be capable of verifying that
   messages claiming to have been sent from a UAS with a given UAS ID
   indeed came from the claimed sender.

   Whether a UAS ID is generated by the operator, GCS, UA, USS or
   registry, or some collaboration thereamong, is unspecified; however,
   there must be agreement on the UAS ID among these entities.

4.3.  Privacy

   PRIV-1  Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling
           of private information (i.e. any and all information
           designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information
           owner as public, e.g. personal data).

   PRIV-2  Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong
           encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that
           only authorized actors can recover it.  If transport is via
           IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP

   PRIV-3  Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD enable selective strong
           encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only
           authorized actors can recover it.

   As satisfying these requirements may require that authorized actors
   have e.g.  Internet connectivity to a Remote ID USS to enable
   decryption, and such connectivity cannot be assured, DRIP SHOULD
   provide automatic fallback to plaintext transmission of safety-
   critical information when necessary.

5.  IANA Considerations

   It is likely that an IPv6 prefix or other namespace will be needed;
   this will be specified in other documents.

6.  Security Considerations

   DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
   is not limited to this section.  DRIP information must be divided
   into 2 classes: that which, to achieve the purpose, must be published
   openly in clear plaintext, for the benefit of any observer; and that
   which must be protected (e.g.  PII of pilots) but made available to
   properly authorized parties (e.g. public safety personnel who
   urgently need to contact pilots in emergencies).  Details of the

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   protection mechanisms will be provided in other documents.
   Classifying the information will be addressed primarily in external
   standards; herein it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry
   and operator policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be
   defined within the scope of DRIP WG and offered.  Mitigation of
   adversarial correlation will also be addressed.

7.  Acknowledgments

   The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
   Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
   [F3411-19] and IETF DRIP WG efforts.  The work of ASTM F38.02 in
   balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
   necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
              September 2019.

              European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
              Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on
              unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators
              of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.

   [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
              December 2019.

              European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
              Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on
              the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
              aircraft", May 2019.

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   [NPRM]     United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
              "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
              of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.

              FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
              Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
              Report", September 2017.

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
              Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,

   [Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961.

Authors' Addresses

   Stuart W. Card (editor)
   AX Enterprize
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America

   Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com

   Adam Wiethuechter
   AX Enterprize
   4947 Commercial Drive
   Yorkville, NY 13495
   United States of America

   Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com

   Robert Moskowitz
   HTT Consulting
   Oak Park, MI 48237
   United States of America

   Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com

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