EAP Working Group B. Aboba
Internet-Draft D. Simon
Expires: April 26, 2004 Microsoft
J. Arkko
Ericsson
H. Levkowetz, Ed.
ipUnplugged
October 27, 2003
EAP Key Management Framework
<draft-ietf-eap-keying-01.txt>
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document provides a framework for EAP key management, including
a statement of applicability and guidelines for generation, transport
and usage of EAP keying material. Algorithms for key derivation or
mechanisms for key transport are not specified in this document.
Rather, this document provides a framework within which algorithms
and transport mechanisms can be discussed and evaluated.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1 Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Conversation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3.1 Discovery Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2 Authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.3 Secure Association Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Authorization issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.1 Correctness in fast handoff . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. EAP Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1 EAP Invariants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Media Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2 Method Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.3 Ciphersuite Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3. Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 EAP SA (peer - EAP server) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 EAP method SA (peer - EAP server) . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.1 Example: EAP-TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.2 Example: EAP-AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 EAP-key SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4 AAA SA(s) (authenticator - backend auth. server) . . . 25
3.4.1 Example: RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.4.2 Example: Diameter with TLS . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.5 Unicast Secure Association SA . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Multicast Secure Association SA . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7 Key Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 Security Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.1 EAP method requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2.2 AAA Protocol Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.2.3 Secure Association Protocol Requirements . . . . 36
4.2.4 Ciphersuite Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.1 Key Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2 Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.3 Man-in-the-middle Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.4 Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.5 Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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A. Ciphersuite Keying Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B. Transient EAP Key (TEK) Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
C. MSK and EMSK Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
D. Transient Session Key (TSK) Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . 51
E. AAA-Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
F. Open issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 54
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1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in
[I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis], was designed to enable extensible
authentication for network access in situations in which the IP
protocol is not available. Originally developed for use with PPP
[RFC1661], it has subsequently also been applied to IEEE 802 wired
networks [IEEE8021X].
This document provides a framework for the generation, transport and
usage of keying material generated by EAP authentication algorithms,
known as "methods". Since in EAP keying material is generated by EAP
methods, transported by AAA protocols, transformed into session keys
by secure association protocols and used by lower layer ciphersuites,
it is necessary to describe each of these elements and provide a
system-level security analysis.
1.1 Requirements Language
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119].
1.2 Terminology
This document frequently uses the following terms:
authenticator
The end of the link initiating EAP authentication. Where no
backend authentication server is present, the authenticator acts
as the EAP server, terminating the EAP conversation with the peer.
Where a backend authentication server is present, the
authenticator may act as a pass-through for one or more
authentication methods and for non-local users. This terminology
is also used in [IEEE8021X], and has the same meaning in this
document.
backend authentication server
A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this
server typically executes EAP Methods for the authenticator. This
terminology is also used in [IEEE8021X].
AAA-Token
The package within which keying material and one or more
attributes is transported between the backend authentication
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server and the authenticator. The attributes provide the
authenticator with usage context and key names suitable to bind
the key to the appropriate context. The format and wrapping of the
AAA-Token, which is intended to be accessible only to the backend
authentication server and authenticator, is defined by the AAA
protocol. Examples include RADIUS [RFC2548], and Diameter
[I-D.ietf-aaa-eap].
Cryptographic binding
The demonstration of the EAP peer to the EAP server that a single
entity has acted as the EAP peer for all methods executed within a
sequence or tunnel. Binding MAY also imply that the EAP server
demonstrates to the peer that a single entity has acted as the EAP
server for all methods executed within a sequence or tunnel. If
executed correctly, binding serves to mitigate man-in-the-middle
vulnerabilities.
Cryptographic separation
Two keys (x and y) are "cryptographically separate" if an
adversary that knows all messages exchanged in the protocol cannot
compute x from y or y from x without "breaking" some cryptographic
assumption. In particular, this definition allows that the
adversary has the knowledge of all nonces sent in cleartext as
well as all predictable counter values used in the protocol.
Breaking a cryptographic assumption would typically require
inverting a one-way function or predicting the outcome of a
cryptographic pseudo-random number generator without knowledge of
the secret state. In other words, if the keys are
cryptographically separate, there is no shortcut to compute x from
y or y from x.
EAP server
The entity which terminates EAP authentication with the peer is
known as the EAP server. Where pass-through is supported, the
backend authentication server functions as the EAP server; where
authentication occurs locally, the EAP server is the
authenticator.
AAA-Key
A key derived by the EAP peer and EAP server and transported to
the authenticator. In 802.11 terminology, the first 32 octets of
the AAA-Key is known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK).
Key strength
If the effective key strength is N bits, the best currently known
methods to recover the key (with non-negligible probability)
require an effort comparable to 2^N operations of a typical block
cipher.
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Mutual authentication
This refers to an EAP method in which, within an interlocked
exchange, the authenticator authenticates the peer and the peer
authenticates the authenticator. Two one-way conversations,
running in opposite directions do not provide mutual
authentication as defined here.
peer
The end of the link that responds to the authenticator. In
[IEEE8021X], this end is known as the Supplicant.
1.3 Conversation Overview
Where EAP key derivation is supported, EAP authentication is
typically a component of a three phase exchange:
Discovery phase (phase 0)
EAP authentication, key derivation and transport (phase 1)
Unicast and multicast secure association establishment (phase 2)
In the discovery phase (phase 0), the EAP peers locate each other
and discover their capabilities. This can include an EAP peer
locating an authenticator suitable for access to a particular
network, or it could involve an EAP peer locating an authenticator
behind a bridge with which it desires to establish a secure
association. Typically the discovery phase takes place between the
EAP peer and authenticator.
Once the EAP peer and authenticator discover each other, EAP
authentication may begin (phase 1a). EAP enables deployment of new
authentication methods without requiring development of new code on
the authenticator. While the authenticator may implement some EAP
methods locally and use those methods to authenticate local users, it
may at the same time act as a pass-through for other users and
methods, forwarding EAP packets back and forth between the backend
authentication server and the peer.
As described in Section 2, in addition to supporting authentication,
EAP methods may also support derivation of keying material for
purposes including protection of the EAP conversation and subsequent
data exchanges. EAP key derivation takes place between the EAP peer
and EAP server, and methods supporting key derivation MUST also
support mutual authentication. Where an authenticator server is
present, it acts as the EAP server and transports derived keying
material (known as the AAA-Key) to the authenticator (phase 1b).
EAP methods may mutually authenticate and derive keys. However a
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distinct secure association exchange is required in order to manage
the creation and deletion of unicast (phase 2a) and multicast (phase
2b) security associations between the EAP peer and authenticator.
The phases and the relationship between the parties is illustrated
below.
EAP peer Authenticator Auth. Server
-------- ------------- ------------
|<----------------------------->| |
| Discovery (phase 0) | |
|<----------------------------->|<----------------------------->|
| EAP auth (phase 1a) | AAA pass-through (optional) |
| | |
| |<----------------------------->|
| | AAA-Key transport |
| | (optional; phase 1b) |
|<----------------------------->| |
| Unicast Secure association | |
| (phase 2a) | |
| | |
|<----------------------------->| |
| Multicast Secure association | |
| (optional; phase 2b) | |
| | |
Figure 1: Conversation Overview
1.3.1 Discovery Phase
In the peer discovery exchange (phase 0), the EAP peer and
authenticator locate each other and discover each other's
capabilities. For example, PPPoE [RFC2516] includes support for a
Discovery Stage to allow a peer to identify the Ethernet MAC address
of one or more authenticators and establish a PPPoE SESSION_ID. In
IEEE 802.11 [IEEE80211], the EAP peer (also known as the Station or
STA) discovers the authenticator (Access Point or AP) and determines
its capabilities using Beacon or Probe Request/Response frames.
Since device discovery is handled outside of EAP, there is no need to
provide this functionality within EAP.
Device discovery can occur manually or automatically. In EAP
implementations running over PPP, the EAP peer might be configured
with a phone book providing phone numbers of authenticators and
associated capabilities such as supported rates, authentication
protocols or ciphersuites.
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Since device discovery can occur prior to authentication and key
derivation, it may not be possible for the discovery phase to be
protected using keying material derived during an authentication
exchange. As a result, device discovery protocols may be insecure,
leaving them vulnerable to spoofing unless the discovered parameters
can subsequently be securely verified.
1.3.2 Authentication Phase
Once the EAP peer and authenticator discover each other, they
exchange EAP packets. Typically, the peer desires access to the
network, and the authenticators are Network Access Servers (NASes)
providing that access. In such a situation, access to the network
can be provided by any authenticator attaching to the desired
network, and the EAP peer is typically willing to send data traffic
through any authenticator that can demonstrate that it is authorized
to provide access to the desired network.
An EAP authenticator may handle the authentication locally, or it may
act as a pass-through to a backend authentication server. In the
latter case the EAP exchange occurs between the EAP peer and a
backend authenticator server, with the authenticator forwarding EAP
packets between the two. The entity which terminates EAP
authentication with the peer is known as the EAP server. Where
pass-through is supported, the backend authentication server
functions as the EAP server; where authentication occurs locally, the
EAP server is the authenticator. Where a backend authentication
server is present, at the successful completion of an authentication
exchange, the AAA-Key is transported to the authenticator (phase 1b).
EAP may also be used when it is desired for two network devices (e.g.
two switches or routers) to authenticate each other, or where two
peers desire to authenticate each other and set up a secure
association suitable for protecting data traffic.
Some EAP methods exist which only support one-way authentication;
however, EAP methods deriving keys are required to support mutual
authentication. In either case, it can be assumed that the parties
do not utilize the link to exchange data traffic unless their
authentication requirements have been met. For example, a peer
completing mutual authentication with an EAP server will not send
data traffic over the link until the EAP server has authenticated
successfully to the peer, and a secure association has been
negotiated.
Since EAP is a peer-to-peer protocol, an independent and simultaneous
authentication may take place in the reverse direction. Both peers
may act as authenticators and authenticatees at the same time.
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Successful completion of EAP authentication and key derivation by an
EAP peer and EAP server does not necessarily imply that the peer is
committed to joining the network associated with an EAP server.
Rather, this commitment is implied by the creation of a security
association between the EAP peer and authenticator, as part of the
secure association protocol (phase 2). As a result, EAP may be used
for "pre-authentication" in situations where it is necessary to
pre-establish EAP security associations in order to decrease handoff
or roaming latency.
1.3.3 Secure Association Phase
The secure association phase (phase 2) always occurs after the
completion of EAP authentication (phase 1a) and key transport (phase
1b), and typically supports the following features:
[1] The secure negotiation of capabilities. This includes usage
modes, session parameters and ciphersuites, and required filters,
including confirmation of the capabilities discovered during
phase 0. By securely negotiating session parameters, the secure
association protocol protects against spoofing during the
discovery phase and ensures that the peer and authenticator are
in agreement about how data is to be secured.
[2] Generation of fresh transient session keys. This is typically
accomplished via the exchange of nonces within the secure
association protocol, and includes generation of both unicast
(phase 2a) and multicast (phase 2b) session keys. By not using
the AAA-Key directly to protect data, the secure association
protocol protects against compromise of the AAA-Key, and by
guaranteeing the freshness of transient session key, assures that
session keys are not reused.
[3] Key activation and deletion.
[4] Mutual proof of possession of the AAA-Key. This demonstrates
that both the EAP peer and authenticator have been authenticated
and authorized by the AAA server. Since mutual proof of
possession is not the same as mutual authentication, the EAP peer
cannot verify authenticator assertions (including the
authenticator identity) as a result of this exchange.
1.4 Authorization issues
In a typical network access scenario (dial-in, wireless LAN, etc.)
access control mechanisms are typically applied. These mechanisms
include user authentication as well as authorization for the offered
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service.
As a part of the authentication process, the AAA network determines
the user's authorization profile. The user authorizations are
transmitted by the AAA server to the EAP authenticator (also known as
the Network Access Server or NAS) included with the AAA-Token, which
also contains the AAA-Key, in Phase 1b of the EAP conversation.
Typically, the profile is determined based on the user identity, but
a certificate presented by the user may also provide authorization
information.
The AAA server is responsible for making a user authorization
decision, answering the following questions:
o Is this a legitimate user for this particular network?
o Is this user allowed the type of access he or she is requesting?
o Are there any specific parameters (mandatory tunneling, bandwidth,
filters, and so on) that the access network should be aware of for
this user?
o Is this user within the subscription rules regarding time of day?
o Is this user within his limits for concurrent sessions?
o Are there any fraud, credit limit, or other concerns that indicate
that access should be denied?
While the authorization decision is in principle simple, the process
is complicated by the distributed nature of AAA decision making.
Where brokering entities or proxies are involved, all of the AAA
devices in the chain from the NAS to the home AAA server are involved
in the decision. For instance, a broker can disallow access even if
the home AAA server would allow it, or a proxy can add authorizations
(e.g., bandwidth limits).
Decisions can be based on static policy definitions and profiles as
well as dynamic state (e.g. time of day or limits on the number of
concurrent sessions). In addition to the Accept/Reject decision made
by the AAA chain, parameters or constraints can be communicated to
the NAS.
The criteria for Accept/Reject decisions or the reasons for choosing
particular authorizations are typically not communicated to the NAS,
only the final result. As a result, the NAS has no way to know what
the decision was based on. Was a set of authorization parameters
sent because this service is always provided to the user, or was the
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decision based on the time/day and the capabilities of the requesting
NAS device?
Within EAP, "fast handoff" is defined as a conversation in which the
EAP exchange (phase 1a) and associated AAA passthrough is bypassed,
so as to reduce latency. Depending on the fast handoff mechanism,
AAA-Key transport (phase 1b) may also be bypassed in favor a context
transfer (see [IEEE80211f] and [I-D.aboba-802-context]) or it may be
provided in a pre-emptive manner as in [IEEE-03-084] and
[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff].
As we will discuss, the introduction of fast handoff creates a new
class of security vulnerabilities as well as requirements for the
secure handling of authorization context.
1.4.1 Correctness in fast handoff
Bypassing all or portions of the AAA conversation creates challenges
in ensuring that authorization is properly handled. These include:
o Consistent application of session time limits. A fast handoff
should not automatically increase the available session time,
allowing a user to endlessly extend their network access by
changing the point of attachment.
o Avoidance of privilege elevation. A fast handoff should not
result in a user being granted access to services which they are
not entitled to.
o Consideration of dynamic state. In situations in which dynamic
state is involved in the access decision (day/time, simultaneous
session limit) it should be possible to take this state into
account either before or after access is granted. Note that
consideration of network-wide state such as simultaneous session
limits can typically only be taken into account by the AAA server.
o Encoding of restrictions. Since a NAS may not be aware of the
criteria considered by a AAA server when allowing access, in order
to ensure consistent authorization during a fast handoff it may be
necessary to explicitly encode the restrictions within the
authorizations provided in the AAA-Token.
o State validity. The introduction of fast handoff should not
render the authentication server incapable of keeping track of
network-wide state.
A fast handoff mechanism capable of addressing these concerns is said
to be "correct". One condition for correctness is as follows:
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For a fast handoff to be "correct" it MUST establish on the new
device the same context as would have been created had the new device
completed a AAA conversation with the authentication server.
A properly designed fast handoff scheme will only succeed if it is
"correct" in this way. If a successful fast handoff would establish
"incorrect" state, it is preferable for it to fail, in order to avoid
creation of incorrect context.
Some AAA server and NAS configurations are incapable of meeting this
definition of "correctness". For example, if the old and new device
differ in their capabilities, it may be difficult to meet this
definition of correctness in a fast handoff mechanism that bypasses
AAA. AAA servers often perform conditional evaluation, in which the
authorizations returned in an Access-Accept message are contingent on
the NAS or on dynamic state such as the time of day or number of
simultaneous sessions. For example, in a heterogeneous deployment,
the AAA server might return different authorizations depending on the
NAS making the request, in order to make sure that the requested
service is consistent with the NAS capabilities.
If differences between the new and old device would result in the AAA
server sending a different set of messages to the new device than
were sent to the old device, then if the fast handoff mechanism
bypasses AAA, then the fast handoff cannot be carried out correctly.
For example, if some NAS devices within a deployment support dynamic
VLANs while others do not, then attributes present in the
Access-Request (such as the NAS-IP-Address, NAS-Identifier,
Vendor-Identifier, etc.) could be examined to determine when VLAN
attributes will be returned, as described in [RFC3580]. VLAN
support is defined in [IEEE8021Q]. If a fast handoff bypassing the
AAA server were to occur between a NAS supporting dynamic VLANs and
another NAS which does not, then a guest user with access restricted
to a guest VLAN could be given unrestricted access to the network.
Similarly, in a network where access is restricted based on the day
and time, SSID, Calling-Station-Id or other factors, unless the
restrictions are encoded within the authorizations, or a partial AAA
conversation is included, then a fast handoff could result in the
user bypassing the restrictions.
In practice, these considerations limit the situations in which fast
handoff mechanisms bypassing AAA can be expected to be successful.
Where the deployed devices implement the same set of services, it may
be possible to do successful fast handoffs within such mechanisms.
However, where the supported services differ between devices, the
fast handoff may not succeed. For example, [RFC2865], section 1.1
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states:
"A NAS that does not implement a given service MUST NOT implement
the RADIUS attributes for that service. For example, a NAS that
is unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS
attributes for ARAP. A NAS MUST treat a RADIUS access-accept
authorizing an unavailable service as an access-reject instead."
Note that this behavior only applies to attributes that are known,
but not implemented. For attributes that are unknown, section of 5
of [RFC2865] states:
"A RADIUS server MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type. A
RADIUS client MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type."
In order to perform a correct fast handoff, if a new device is
provided with RADIUS context for a known but unavailable service,
then it MUST process this context the same way it would handle a
RADIUS Access-Accept requesting an unavailable service. This MUST
cause the fast handoff to fail. However, if a new device is provided
with RADIUS context that indicates an unknown attribute, then this
attribute MAY be ignored.
Although it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, failure is indeed
the "correct" result where a known but unsupported service is
requested. Presumably a correctly configured AAA server would not
request that a device carry out a service that it does not implement.
This implies that if the new device were to complete a AAA
conversation that it would be likely to receive different service
instructions. In such a case, failure of the fast handoff is the
desired result. This will cause the new device to go back to the AAA
server in order to receive the appropriate service definition.
In practice, this implies that fast handoff mechanisms which bypass
AAA are most likely to be successful within a homogeneous device
deployment within a single administrative domain. For example, it
would not be advisable to carry out a fast handoff bypassing AAA
between a NAS providing confidentiality and another NAS that does not
support this service. The correct result of such a fast handoff
would be a failure, since if the handoff were blindly carried out,
then the user would be moved from a secure to an insecure channel
without permission from the AAA server. Thus the definition of a
"known but unsupported service" MUST encompass requests for
unavailable security services. This includes vendor-specific
attributes related to security, such as those described in
[RFC2548]."
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2. EAP Key Hierarchy
2.1 EAP Invariants
The EAP key management framework assumes that certain basic
characteristics, known as the "EAP Invariants" hold true for all
implementations of EAP. These include:
Media independence
Method independence
Ciphersuite independence
2.1.1 Media Independence
As described in [I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis], EAP authentication can run
over multiple lower layers, including PPP [RFC1661] and IEEE 802
wired networks [IEEE8021X]. Use with IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs is
also contemplated [IEEE80211i]. Since EAP methods cannot be assumed
to have knowledge of the lower layer over which they are transported,
EAP methods can function on any lower layer meeting the criteria
outlined in [I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis], Section 3.1. As a result, EAP
methods should not utilize identifiers associated with a particular
usage environment (e.g. MAC addresses).
2.1.2 Method Independence
Supporting pass-through of authentication to the backend
authentication server enables the authenticator to support any
authentication method implemented on the backend authentication
server and peer, not just locally implemented methods.
This implies that the authenticator need not implement code for each
EAP method required by authenticating peers. In fact, the
authenticator is not required to implement any EAP methods at all,
nor can it be assumed to implement code specific to any EAP method.
This is useful where there is no single EAP method that is both
mandatory-to-implement and offers acceptable security for the media
in use. For example, the [I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis]
mandatory-to-implement EAP method (MD5-Challenge) does not provide
dictionary attack resistance, mutual authentication or key
derivation, and as a result is not appropriate for use in wireless
authentication.
2.1.3 Ciphersuite Independence
While EAP methods may negotiate the ciphersuite used in protection of
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the EAP conversation, the ciphersuite used for the protection of data
is negotiated within the secure association protocol, out-of-band of
EAP. The backend authentication server is not a party to this
negotiation nor is it an intermediary in the data flow between the
EAP peer and authenticator. The backend authentication server may
not even have knowledge of the ciphersuites implemented by the peer
and authenticator, or be aware of the ciphersuite negotiated between
them, and therefore does not implement ciphersuite-specific code.
Since ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the secure association
protocol, not in EAP, ciphersuite-specific key generation, if
implemented within an EAP method, would potentially conflict with the
transient session key derivation occurring in the secure association
protocol. As a result, EAP methods generate keying material that is
ciphersuite-independent. Additional advantages of
ciphersuite-independence include:
Update requirements
If EAP methods were to specify how to derive transient session
keys for each ciphersuite, they would need to be updated each time
a new ciphersuite is developed. In addition, backend
authentication servers might not be usable with all EAP-capable
authenticators, since the backend authentication server would also
need to be updated each time support for a new ciphersuite is
added to the authenticator.
EAP method complexity
Requiring each EAP method to include ciphersuite-specific code for
transient session key derivation would increase the complexity of
each EAP method and would result in duplicated effort.
Knowledge of capabilities
In practice, an EAP method may not have knowledge of the
ciphersuite that has been negotiated between the peer and
authenticator. In PPP, ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the
Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) [RFC1968]. Since ECP
negotiation occurs after authentication, unless an EAP method is
utilized that supports ciphersuite negotiation, the peer,
authenticator and backend authentication server may not be able to
anticipate the negotiated ciphersuite and therefore this
information cannot be provided to the EAP method. Since
ciphersuite negotiation is assumed to occur out-of-band, there is
no need for ciphersuite negotiation within EAP.
2.2 Key Hierarchy
The EAP keying hierarchy, illustrated in Figure 2, makes use of the
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following types of keys:
EAP Master key (MK)
A key derived between the EAP client and server during the EAP
authentication process, and that is kept local to the EAP method
and not exported or made available to a third party.
Master Session Key (MSK)
Keying material (at least 64 octets) that is derived between the
EAP client and server and exported by the EAP method.
AAA-Key
Where a backend authentication server is present, acting as an EAP
server, keying material known as the AAA-Key is transported from
the authentication server to the authenticator wrapped within the
AAA-Token. The AAA-Key is used by the EAP peer and authenticator
in the derivation of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) for the
ciphersuite negotiated between the EAP peer and authenticator. As
a result, the AAA-Key is typically known by all parties in the EAP
exchange: the peer, authenticator and the authentication server
(if present). AAA-Key derivation is discussed in Appendix E.
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
Additional keying material (64 octets) derived between the EAP
client and server that is exported by the EAP method. The EMSK is
known only to the EAP peer and server and is not provided to a
third party.
Initialization Vector (IV)
A quantity of at least 64 octets, suitable for use in an
initialization vector field, that is derived between the EAP
client and server. Since the IV is a known value in methods such
as EAP-TLS [RFC2716], it cannot be used by itself for computation
of any quantity that needs to remain secret. As a result, its use
has been deprecated and EAP methods are not required to generate
it.
Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
The AAA-Key is divided into two halves, the "Peer to Authenticator
Encryption Key" (Enc-RECV-Key) and "Authenticator to Peer
Encryption Key" (Enc-SEND-Key) (reception is defined from the
point of view of the authenticator). Within [IEEE80211i] Octets
0-31 of the AAA-Key (Enc-RECV-Key) are known as the Pairwise
Master Key (PMK). IEEE 802.11i ciphersuites [IEEE80211i] derive
their Transient Session Keys (TSKs) solely from the PMK, whereas
the WEP ciphersuite, when used with [IEEE8021X], as noted in
[RFC3580], derives its TSKs from both halves of the AAA-Key, the
Enc-RECV-Key and the Enc-SEND-Key.
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Transient EAP Keys (TEKs)
Session keys which are used to establish a protected channel
between the EAP peer and server during the EAP authentication
exchange. The TEKs are appropriate for use with the ciphersuite
negotiated between EAP peer and server for use in protecting the
EAP conversation. Note that the ciphersuite used to set up the
protected channel between the EAP peer and server during EAP
authentication is unrelated to the ciphersuite used to
subsequently protect data sent between the EAP peer and
authenticator. An example TEK key hierarchy is described in
Appendix C.
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | ^
| EAP Method | |
| | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| | | | |
| | EAP Method Key | | |
| | Derivation | | |
| | | | Local |
| | | | to EAP |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Method |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| V | | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| | TEK | | MSK | |EMSK | |IV | | |
| |Derivation | |Derivation | |Derivation | |Derivation | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | | ^
| MSK (64B) | EMSK (64B) | IV (64B) |
| | | |
| | | Exported |
| | | by EAP |
V V V Method |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| AAA Key Derivation, | | Known | |
| Naming & Binding | |(Not Secret) | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ V
| ---+
| Transported |
| AAA-Key by AAA |
| Protocol |
V V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | ^
| TSK | Ciphersuite |
| Derivation | Specific |
| | V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
Figure 2: EAP Key Hierarchy
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Transient Session Keys (TSKs)
Session keys used to protect data which are appropriate for the
ciphersuite negotiated between the EAP peer and authenticator.
The TSKs are derived from the keying material included in the
AAA-Token via the secure association protocol. In the case of IEEE
802.11, the role of the secure association protocol is handled by
the 4-way handshake and group key derivation. An example TSK
derivation is provided in Appendix D.
2.3 Exchanges
EAP supports both a two party exchange between an EAP peer and an
authenticator, as well as a three party exchange between an EAP peer,
an authenticator and an EAP server.
Figure 3 illustrates the two party exchange. Here EAP is spoken
between the peer and authenticator, encapsulated within a lower layer
protocol, such as PPP, defined in [RFC1661] or IEEE 802, defined in
[IEEE802].
Since the authenticator acts as an endpoint of the EAP conversation
rather than a pass-through, EAP methods are implemented on the
authenticator as well as the peer. If the EAP method negotiated
between the EAP peer and authenticator supports mutual authentication
and key derivation, the EAP Master Session Key (MSK) and Extended
Master Session Key (EMSK) are derived on the EAP peer and
authenticator and exported by the EAP method.
Where no backend authentication server is present, the MSK and EMSK
are known only to the peer and authenticator and neither is
transported to a third party. As demonstrated in
[I-D.ietf-roamops-cert], despite the absence of a backend
authentication server, such exchanges can support roaming between
providers; it is even possible to support fast handoff without
re-authentication. However, this is typically only possible where
both the EAP peer and authenticator support certificate-based
authentication, or where the user base is sufficiently small that EAP
authentication can occur locally.
In order to protect the EAP conversation, the EAP method may
negotiate a ciphersuite and derive Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) to
provide keys for that ciphersuite in order to protect some or all of
the EAP exchange. The TEKs are stored locally within the EAP method
and are not exported.
Once EAP mutual authentication completes and is successful, the
secure association protocol is run between the peer and
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authenticator. This derives fresh transient session keys (TSKs),
provides for the secure negotiation of the ciphersuite used to
protect data, and supports mutual proof of possession of the AAA-Key.
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| Cipher- | | Cipher- |
| Suite | | Suite |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
V V
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| |===============| |
| |EAP, TEK Deriv.|Authenti-|
| |<------------->| cator |
| | | |
| | Secure Assoc. | |
| peer |<------------->| (EAP |
| |===============| server) |
| | Link layer | |
| | (PPP,IEEE802) | |
| | | |
|MSK,EMSK | |MSK,EMSK |
| (TSKs) | | (TSKs) |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
| MSK, EMSK | MSK, EMSK
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| EAP | | EAP |
| Method | | Method |
| | | |
|(MK,TEKs)| |(MK,TEKs)|
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 3: Relationship between EAP peer and authenticator (acting as
an EAP server), where no backend authentication server is present.
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+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| | | |
| Cipher- | | Cipher- |
| Suite | | Suite |
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
| |
| |
V V
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| |===============| |========| |
| |EAP, TEK Deriv.| | | |
| |<-------------------------------->| backend |
| | | | | |
| | Secure Assoc. | | AAA-Key| |
| peer |<------------->|Authenti-|<-------| auth |
| |===============| cator |========| server |
| | Link Layer | | AAA | (EAP |
| | (PPP,IEEE 802)| |Protocol| server) |
| | | | | |
|MSK,EMSK | | MSK | |MSK,EMSK |
| (TSKs) | | (TSKs) | | |
| | | | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
^ ^
| |
| MSK, EMSK | MSK, EMSK
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
| | | |
| EAP | | EAP |
| Method | | Method |
| | | |
|(MK,TEKs)| |(MK,TEKs)|
| | | |
+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4: Pass-through relationship between EAP peer, authenticator
and backend authentication server.
Where these conditions cannot be met, a backend authentication server
is typically required. In this exchange, as described in [RFC3579],
the authenticator acts as a pass-through between the EAP peer and a
backend authentication server. In this model, the authenticator
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delegates the access control decision to the backend authentication
server, which acts as a Key Distribution Center (KDC), supplying
keying material to both the EAP peer and authenticator.
Figure 4 illustrates the case where the authenticator acts as a
pass-through. Here EAP is spoken between the peer and authenticator
as before. The authenticator then encapsulates EAP packets within a
AAA protocol such as RADIUS [RFC3579] or Diameter [I-D.ietf-aaa-eap],
and forwards packets to and from the backend authentication server,
which acts as the EAP server. Since the authenticator acts as a
pass-through, EAP methods (as well as the derived EAP Master Key, and
TEKs) reside only on the peer and backend authentication server.
On completion of a successful authentication, EAP methods on the EAP
peer and EAP server export the Master Session Key (MSK) and Extended
Master Session Key (EMSK). The backend authentication server then
sends a message to the authenticator indicating that authentication
has been successful, providing the AAA-Key within a protected package
known as the AAA-Token. Along with the keying material, the
AAA-Token contains attributes naming the enclosed keys and providing
context.
The MSK and EMSK are used to derive the AAA-Key and key name which
are enclosed within the AAA-Token, transported to the NAS by the AAA
server, and used within the secure association protocol for
derivation of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) required for the
negotiated ciphersuite. The TSKs are known only to the peer and
authenticator.
3. Security Associations
EAP key management involves four types of security associations
(SAs):
[1] EAP SA. This is an SA between the peer and EAP server, which
allows them to authenticate each other.
[2] EAP method SA. This SA is also between the peer and EAP server.
It stores state that can be used for "fast resume" or other
functionality in some EAP methods. Not all EAP methods create
such an SA.
[3] EAP-Key SA. This is an SA between the peer and EAP server, which
is used to store the keying material exported by the EAP method.
Current EAP server implementations do not retain this SA after
the EAP conversation completes, but future implementations could
use this SA for pre-emptive key distribution.
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[4] AAA SA(s). These SAs are between the authenticator and the
backend authentication server. They permit the parties to
mutually authenticate each other and protect the communications
between them.
3.1 EAP SA (peer - EAP server)
In order for the peer and EAP server to authenticate each other, they
need to store some information.
The authentication can be based on different mechanisms, such as
shared secrets or certificates. If the authentication is based on a
shared secret key, the parties store the EAP method to be used and
the key. The EAP server also stores the peer's identity and/or other
information necessary to decide whether access to some service should
be granted. The peer stores information necessary to choose which
secret to use for which service.
3.2 EAP method SA (peer - EAP server)
An EAP method may store some state on the peer and EAP server even
after phase 1a has completed.
Typically, this is used for "fast resume": the peer and EAP server
can confirm that they are still talking to the same party, perhaps
using fewer roundtrips or less computational power. In this case,
the EAP method SA is essentially a cache for performance
optimization, and either party may remove the SA from its cache at
any point.
An EAP method may also keep state in order to support pseudonym-based
identity protection. This is typically a cache as well (the
information can be recreated if the original EAP method SA is lost),
but may be stored for longer periods of time.
The EAP method SA is not restricted to a particular service or
authenticator and is most useful when the peer accesses many
different authenticators.
An EAP method is responsible for specifying how the parties select if
an existing EAP method SA should be used, and if so, which one.
Where multiple backend authentication servers are used, EAP method
SAs are not typically synchronized between them.
EAP method implementations should consider the appropriate lifetime
for the EAP method SA. "Fast resume" assumes that the information
required (primarily the keys in the EAP method SA) hasn't been
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compromised. In case the original authentication was carried out
using, for instance, a smart card, it may be easier to compromise the
EAP method SA (stored on the PC, for instance), so typically the EAP
method SAs have a limited lifetime.
Contents:
o Implicitly, the EAP method this SA refers to
o One or more internal (non-exported) keys
o EAP method SA name
o SA lifetime
3.2.1 Example: EAP-TLS
In EAP-TLS [RFC2716], after the EAP authentication the client (peer)
and server can store the following information:
o Implicitly, the EAP method this SA refers to (EAP-TLS)
o Session identifier (a value selected by the server)
o Certificate of the other party (server stores the clients's
certificate and vice versa)
o Ciphersuite and compression method
o TLS Master secret (known as the EAP-TLS Master Key or MK)
o SA lifetime (ensuring that the SA is not stored forever)
o If the client has multiple different credentials (certificates and
corresponding private keys), a pointer to those credentials
When the server initiates EAP-TLS, the client can look up the EAP-TLS
SA based on the credentials it was going to use (certificate and
private key), and the expected credentials (certificate or name) of
the server. If an EAP-TLS SA exists, and it is not too old, the
client informs the server about the existence of this SA by including
its Session-Id in the TLS ClientHello message. The server then looks
up the correct SA based on the Session-Id (or detects that it doesn't
yet have one).
3.2.2 Example: EAP-AKA
In EAP-AKA [I-D.arkko-pppext-eap-aka], after EAP authentication the
client and server can store the following information:
o Implicitly, the EAP method this SA refers to (EAP-AKA)
o A re-authentication pseudonym
o The client's permanent identity (IMSI) (server)
o Replay protection counter
o Authentication key (K_aut)
o Encryption key (K_encr)
o Original Master Key (MK)
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o SA lifetime (ensuring that the SA is not stored forever)
When the server initiates EAP-AKA, the client can look up the EAP-AKA
SA based on the credentials it was going to use (permanent identity).
If an EAP-AKA SA exists, and it is not too old, the client informs
the server about the existence of this SA by sending its
re-authentication pseudonym as its identity in EAP Identity Response
message, instead of its permanent identity. The server then looks up
the correct SA based on this identity.
3.3 EAP-key SA
This is an SA between the peer and EAP server, which is used to store
the keying material exported by the EAP method. Current EAP server
implementations do not retain this SA after the EAP conversation
completes, but future implementations could use this SA for
pre-emptive key distribution.
Contents:
o Name/identifier for this SA
o Identities of the parties
o MSK and EMSK
3.4 AAA SA(s) (authenticator - backend auth. server)
In order for the authenticator and backend authentication server to
authenticate each other, they need to store some information.
In case the authenticator and backend authentication server are
colocated, and they communicate using local procedure calls or shared
memory, this SA need not necessarily contain any information.
3.4.1 Example: RADIUS
In RADIUS, where shared secret authentication is used, the client and
server store each other's IP address and the shared secret, which is
used to calculate the Response Authenticator [RFC2865] and
Message-Authenticator [RFC3579] values, and to encrypt some
attributes (such as the AAA-Key [RFC2548]).
Where IPsec is used to protect RADIUS [RFC3579] and IKE is used for
key management, the parties store information necessary to
authenticate and authorize the other party (e.g. certificates, trust
anchors and names). The IKE exchange results in IKE Phase 1 and
Phase 2 SAs containing information used to protect the conversation
(session keys, selected ciphersuite, etc.)
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3.4.2 Example: Diameter with TLS
When using Diameter protected by TLS, the parties store information
necessary to authenticate and authorize the other party (e.g.
certificates, trust anchors and names). The TLS handshake results in
a short-term TLS SA that contains information used to protect the
actual communications (session keys, selected TLS ciphersuite, etc.).
3.5 Unicast Secure Association SA
The unicast secure association SA exists between the EAP peer and
authenticator. It includes:
the peer port identifier (Calling-Station-Id)
the NAS port identifier (Called-Station-Id)
the unicast Transient Session Keys (TSKs)
the unicast secure association peer nonce
the unicast secure association authenticator nonce
the negotiated unicast capabilities and unicast ciphersuite.
During the phase 2a exchange, the EAP peer and authenticator
demonstrate mutual possession of the AAA-Key derived and transported
in phase 1; securely negotiate the session capabilities (including
unicast ciphersuites), and derive fresh unicast transient session
keys. The AAA-Key SA (phase 1b) is therefore used to create the
unicast secure association SA (phase 2a), and in the process the
phase 2a unicast secure association SA is bound to ports on the EAP
peer and authenticator. However in order for a phase 2a security
association to be established, it is not necessary for the phase 1a
exchange to be rerun each time. This enables the EAP exchange to be
bypassed when fast handoff support is desired.
Since both peer and authenticator nonces are used in the creation of
the unicast secure association SA, the transient session keys (TSKs)
are guaranteed to be fresh, even if the AAA-Key is not. As a result
one or more unicast secure association SAs (phase 2a) may be derived
from a single AAA-Key SA (phase 1b). The phase 2a security
associations may utilize the same security parameters (e.g. mode,
ciphersuite, etc.) or they may utilize different parameters.
A unicast secure association SA (phase 2a) may not persist longer
than the maximum lifetime of its parent AAA-Key SA (if known).
However, the deletion of a parent EAP or AAA-Key SA does not
necessarily imply deletion of the corresponding unicast secure
association SA. Similarly, the deletion of a unicast secure
association protocol SA does not imply the deletion of the parent
AAA-key SA or EAP SA. Failure to mutually prove possession of the
AAA-Key during the unicast secure association protocol exchange
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(phase 2a) need not be grounds for removal of a AAA-Key SA by both
parties; rate-limiting unicast secure association exchanges should
suffice to prevent a brute force attack.
An EAP peer may be able to negotiate multiple phase 2a SAs with a
single EAP authenticator, or may be able to maintain multiple phase
2a SAs with multiple authenticators, based on a single EAP SA derived
in phase 1a. For example, during a re-key of the secure association
protocol SA, it is possible for two phase 2a SAs to exist during the
period between when the new phase 2a SA parameters (such as the TSKs)
are calculated and when they are installed. Except where explicitly
specified by the semantics of the unicast secure association
protocol, it should not be assumed that the installation of a new
phase 2a SA necessarily implies deletion of the old phase 2a SA.
On some media (e.g. 802.11) a port on an EAP peer may only establish
phase 2a and 2b SAs with a single port of an authenticator within a
given Local Area Network (LAN). This implies that the successful
negotiation of phase 2a and/or 2b SAs between an EAP peer port and a
new authentiator port within a given LAN implies the deletion of
existing phase 2a and 2b SAs with authenticators offering access to
that Local Area Network (LAN). However, since a given IEEE 802.11
SSID may be comprised of multiple LANs, this does not imply an
implicit binding of phase 2a and 2b SAs to an SSID.
3.6 Multicast Secure Association SA
The multicast secure association SA includes:
the multicast Transient Session Keys
the direction vector (for a uni-directional SA)
the negotiated multicast capabilities and multicast ciphersuite
It is possible for more than one multicast secure association SA to
be derived from a single unicast secure association SA. However, a
multicast secure association SA is bound to a single EAP SA and a
single AAA-Key SA.
During a re-key of the multicast secure association protocol SA, it
is possible for two phase 2b SAs to exist during the period between
when the new phase 2b SA parameters (such as the multicast TSKs) are
calculated and when they are installed. Except where explicitly
specified by the semantics of the multicast secure association
protocol, it should not be assumed that the installation of a new
phase 2b SA necessarily implies deletion of the old phase 2b SA.
A multicast secure association SA (phase 2b) may not persist longer
than the maximum lifetime of its parent AAA-Key or unicast secure
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association SA. However, the deletion of a parent EAP, AAA-Key or
unicast secure association SA does not necessarily imply deletion of
the corresponding multicast secure association SA. For example, a
unicast secure association SA may be rekeyed without implying a rekey
of the multicast secure association SA.
Similarly, the deletion of a multicast secure association protocol SA
does not imply the deletion of the parent EAP, AAA-Key or unicast
secure association SA. Failure to mutually prove possession of the
AAA-Key during the unicast secure association protocol exchange
(phase 2a) need not be grounds for removal of the AAA-Key, unicast
secure association and multicast secure association SAs;
rate-limiting unicast secure association exchanges should suffice to
prevent a brute force attack.
3.7 Key Naming
In order to support the correct processing of phase 2 security
associations, the secure association (phase 2) protocol supports the
naming of phase 2 security associations and associated transient
session keys, so that the correct set of transient session keys can
be identified for processing a given packet. Explicit creation and
deletion operations are also typically supported so that
establishment and re-establishment of transient session keys can be
synchronized between the parties.
In order to securely bind the AAA SA (phase 1b) to its child phase 2
security associations, the phase 2 secure association protocol allows
the EAP peer and authenticator to mutually prove possession of the
AAA-Key. In order to avoid confusion in the case where an EAP peer
has more than one AAA-Key (phase 1b) applicable to establishment of a
phase 2 security association, it is necessary for the secure
association protocol (phase 2) to support key selection, so that the
appropriate phase 1b keying material can be utilized by both parties
in the secure association protocol exchange.
For example, a peer might be pre-configured with policy indicating
the ciphersuite to be used in communicating with a given
authenticator. Within PPP, the ciphersuite is negotiated within the
Encryption Control Protocol (ECP), after EAP authentication is
completed. Within [IEEE80211i], the AP ciphersuites are advertised
in the Beacon and Probe Responses, and are securely verified during a
4-way exchange after EAP authentication has completed.
As part of the secure association protocol (phase 2), it is necessary
to bind the Transient Session Keys (TSKs) to the keying material
provided in the AAA-Token. This ensures that the EAP peer and
authenticator are both clear about what key to use to provide mutual
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proof of possession. Keys within the EAP key hierarchy are named as
follows:
EAP SA name
The EAP security association is negotiated between the EAP peer
and EAP server, and is uniquely named as follows <EAP peer name,
EAP server name, EAP Method Type, EAP peer nonce, EAP server
nonce>. Here the EAP peer name and EAP server name are the
identifiers securely exchanged within the EAP method. Since
multiple EAP SAs may exist between an EAP peer and EAP server, the
EAP peer nonce and EAP server nonce allow EAP SAs to be
differentiated. The inclusion of the Method Type in the EAP SA
name ensures that each EAP method has a distinct EAP SA space.
MK Name
The EAP Master Key, if supported by an EAP method, is named by the
concatenation of the EAP SA name and a method-specific session-id.
AAA-Key Name
The AAA-Key is named by the concatenation of the EAP SA name,
"AAA-Key" and the authenticator name, since the AAA-Key is bound
to a particular authenticator. For the purpose of identification,
the NAS-Identifier attribute is recommended. In order to ensure
that all parties can agree on the NAS name this requires the NAS
to advertise its name (typically using a media-specific mechanism,
such as the 802.11 Beacon/Probe Response)."
4. Threat Model
4.1 Security Assumptions
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the peer, authenticator
and backend authentication server. As noted in the figure, each party
in the exchange mutually authenticates with each of the other
parties, and derives a unique key. All parties in the diagram have
access to the AAA-Key.
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EAP peer
/\\
/ \\
Protocol: EAP / \\ Protocol: Secure Association
Auth: Mutual / \\ Auth: Mutual
Unique keys: MK, / \\ Unique keys: TSKs
TEKs,EMSK / \\
/ \\
Auth. server +--------------+ Authenticator
Protocol: AAA
Auth: Mutual
Unique key: AAA session key
Figure 5: Three-party EAP key distribution
The EAP peer and backend authentication server mutually authenticate
via the EAP method, and derive the MK, TEKs and EMSK which are known
only to them. The TEKs are used to protect some or all of the EAP
conversation between the peer and authenticator, so as to guard
against modification or insertion of EAP packets by an attacker. The
degree of protection afforded by the TEKs is determined by the EAP
method; some methods may protect the entire EAP packet, including the
EAP header, while other methods may only protect the contents of the
Type-Data field, defined in [I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis].
Since EAP is spoken only between the EAP peer and server, if a
backend authentication server is present then the EAP conversation
does not provide mutual authentication between the peer and
authenticator, only between the EAP peer and EAP server (backend
authentication server). As a result, mutual authentication between
the peer and authenticator only occurs where a secure association
protocol is used, such the unicast and group key derivation handshake
supported in [IEEE80211i]. This means that absent use of a secure
association protocol, from the point of view of the peer, EAP mutual
authentication only proves that the authenticator is trusted by the
backend authentication server; the identity of the authenticator is
not confirmed.
Utilizing the AAA protocol, the authenticator and backend
authentication server mutually authenticate and derive session keys
known only to them, used to provide per-packet integrity and replay
protection, authentication and confidentiality. The MSK is
distributed by the backend authentication server to the authenticator
over this channel, bound to attributes constraining its usage, as
part of the AAA-Token. The binding of attributes to the MSK within a
protected package is important so the authenticator receiving the
AAA-Token can determine that it has not been compromised, and that
the keying material has not been replayed, or mis-directed in some
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way.
The security properties of the EAP exchange are dependent on each leg
of the triangle: the selected EAP method, AAA protocol and the secure
association protocol.
Assuming that the AAA protocol provides protection against rogue
authenticators forging their identity, then the AAA-Token can be
assumed to be sent to the correct authenticator, and where it is
wrapped appropriately, it can be assumed to be immune to compromise
by a snooping attacker.
Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is present, the AAA-Token must
not be provided to the intermediary so as to avoid compromise of the
AAA-Token. This can be avoided by use of re-direct as defined in
[RFC3588].
When EAP is used for authentication on PPP or wired IEEE 802
networks, it is typically assumed that the link is physically secure,
so that an attacker cannot gain access to the link, or insert a rogue
device. EAP methods defined in [I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis] reflect this
usage model. These include EAP MD5, as well as One-Time Password
(OTP) and Generic Token Card. These methods support one-way
authentication (from EAP peer to authenticator) but not mutual
authentication or key derivation. As a result, these methods do not
bind the initial authentication and subsequent data traffic, even
when the the ciphersuite used to protect data supports per-packet
authentication and integrity protection. As a result, EAP methods not
supporting mutual authentication are vulnerable to session hijacking
as well as attacks by rogue devices.
On wireless networks such as IEEE 802.11 [IEEE80211], these attacks
become easy to mount, since any attacker within range can access the
wireless medium, or act as an access point. As a result, new
ciphersuites have been proposed for use with wireless LANs
[IEEE80211i] which provide per-packet authentication, integrity and
replay protection. In addition, mutual authentication and key
derivation, provided by methods such as EAP-TLS [RFC2716] are
required [IEEE80211i], so as to address the threat of rogue devices,
and provide keying material to bind the initial authentication to
subsequent data traffic.
If the selected EAP method does not support mutual authentication,
then the peer will be vulnerable to attack by rogue authenticators
and backend authentication servers. If the EAP method does not derive
keys, then TSKs will not be available for use with a negotiated
ciphersuite, and there will be no binding between the initial EAP
authentication and subsequent data traffic, leaving the session
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vulnerable to hijack.
If the backend authentication server does not protect against
authenticator masquerade, or provide the proper binding of the
AAA-Key to the session within the AAA-Token, then one or more
AAA-Keys may be sent to an unauthorized party, and an attacker may be
able to gain access to the network. If the AAA-Token is provided to
an untrusted AAA intermediary, then that intermediary may be able to
modify the AAA-Key, or the attributes associated with it, as
described in [RFC2607].
If the secure association protocol does not provide mutual proof of
possession of the AAA-Key material, then the peer will not have
assurance that it is connected to the correct authenticator, only
that the authenticator and backend authentication server share a
trust relationship (since AAA protocols support mutual
authentication). This distinction can become important when multiple
authenticators receive AAA-Keys from the backend authentication
server, such as where fast handoff is supported. If the TSK
derivation does not provide for protected ciphersuite and
capabilities negotiation, then downgrade attacks are possible.
4.2 Security Requirements
This section describes the security requirements for EAP methods, AAA
protocols, secure association protocols and Ciphersuites. These
requirements MUST be met by specifications requesting publication as
an RFC. Based on these requirements, the security properties of EAP
exchanges are analyzed.
4.2.1 EAP method requirements
It is possible for the peer and EAP server to mutually authenticate
and derive keys. In order to provide keying material for use in a
subsequently negotiated ciphersuite, an EAP method supporting key
derivation MUST export a Master Session Key (MSK) of at least 64
octets, and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of at least 64
octets. EAP Methods deriving keys MUST provide for mutual
authentication between the EAP peer and the EAP Server.
The MSK and EMSK MUST NOT be used directly to protect data; however,
they are of sufficient size to enable derivation of a AAA-Key
subsequently used to derive Transient Session Keys (TSKs) for use
with the selected ciphersuite. Each ciphersuite is responsible for
specifying how to derive the TSKs from the AAA-Key.
The AAA-Key is derived from the keying material exported by the EAP
method (MSK and EMSK). This derivation occurs on the AAA server. In
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many existing protocols that use EAP, the AAA-Key and MSK are
equivalent, but more complicated mechanisms are possible (see
Appendix E for details).
EAP methods SHOULD ensure the freshness of the MSK and EMSK even in
cases where one party may not have a high quality random number
generator. A RECOMMENDED method is for each party to provide a nonce
of at least 128 bits, used in the derivation of the MSK and EMSK.
EAP methods export the MSK and EMSK and not Transient Session Keys so
as to allow EAP methods to be ciphersuite and media independent.
Keying material exported by EAP methods MUST be independent of the
ciphersuite negotiated to protect data.
Depending on the lower layer, EAP methods may run before or after
ciphersuite negotiation, so that the selected ciphersuite may not be
known to the EAP method. By providing keying material usable with
any ciphersuite, EAP methods can used with a wide range of
ciphersuites and media.
It is RECOMMENDED that methods providing integrity protection of EAP
packets include coverage of all the EAP header fields, including the
Code, Identifier, Length, Type and Type-Data fields.
In order to preserve algorithm independence, EAP methods deriving
keys SHOULD support (and document) the protected negotiation of the
ciphersuite used to protect the EAP conversation between the peer and
server. This is distinct from the ciphersuite negotiated between the
peer and authenticator, used to protect data.
The strength of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) used to protect data is
ultimately dependent on the strength of keys generated by the EAP
method. If an EAP method cannot produce keying material of
sufficient strength, then the TSKs may be subject to brute force
attack. In order to enable deployments requiring strong keys, EAP
methods supporting key derivation SHOULD be capable of generating an
MSK and EMSK, each with an effective key strength of at least 128
bits.
Methods supporting key derivation MUST demonstrate cryptographic
separation between the MSK and EMSK branches of the EAP key
hierarchy. Without violating a fundamental cryptographic assumption
(such as the non-invertibility of a one-way function) an attacker
recovering the MSK or EMSK MUST NOT be able to recover the other
quantity with a level of effort less than brute force.
Non-overlapping substrings of the MSK MUST be cryptographically
separate from each other. That is, knowledge of one substring MUST
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NOT help in recovering some other substring without breaking some
hard cryptographic assumption. This is required because some
existing ciphersuites form TSKs by simply splitting the AAA-Key to
pieces of appropriate length. Likewise, non-overlapping substrings
of the EMSK MUST be cryptographically separate from each other, and
from substrings of the MSK.
The EMSK MUST remain on the EAP peer and EAP server where it is
derived; it MUST NOT be transported to, or shared with, additional
parties, or used to derive any other keys.
Since EAP does not provide for explicit key lifetime negotiation, EAP
peers, authenticators and authentication servers MUST be prepared for
situations in which one of the parties discards key state which
remains valid on another party.
The development and validation of key derivation algorithms is
difficult, and as a result EAP methods SHOULD reuse well established
and analyzed mechanisms for key derivation (such as those specified
in IKE [RFC2409] or TLS [RFC2246]), rather than inventing new ones.
EAP methods SHOULD also utilize well established and analyzed
mechanisms for MSK and EMSK derivation.
4.2.2 AAA Protocol Requirements
AAA protocols suitable for use in transporting EAP MUST provide the
following facilities:
Security services
AAA protocols used for transport of EAP keying material MUST
implement and SHOULD use per-packet integrity and authentication,
replay protection and confidentiality. These requirements are met
by Diameter EAP [I-D.ietf-aaa-eap], as well as RADIUS over IPsec
[RFC3579].
Session Keys
AAA protocols used for transport of EAP keying material MUST
implement and SHOULD use dynamic key management in order to derive
fresh session keys, as in Diameter EAP [I-D.ietf-aaa-eap] and
RADIUS over IPsec [RFC3579], rather than using a static key, as
originally defined in RADIUS [RFC2865].
Mutual authentication
AAA protocols used for transport of EAP keying material MUST
provide for mutual authentication between the authenticator and
backend authentication server. These requirements are met by
Diameter EAP [I-D.ietf-aaa-eap] as well as by RADIUS EAP
[RFC3579].
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Authorization
AAA protocols used for transport of EAP keying material SHOULD
provide protection against rogue authenticators masquerading as
other authenticators. This can be accomplished, for example, by
requiring that AAA agents check the source address of packets
against the origin attributes (Origin-Host AVP in Diameter,
NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address, NAS-Identifier in RADIUS). For
details, see Section 4.3.7 of [RFC3579].
Key transport
Since EAP methods do not export Transient Session Keys (TSKs) in
order to maintain media and ciphersuite independence, the AAA
server MUST NOT transport TSKs from the backend authentication
server to authenticator.
Key transport specification
In order to enable backend authentication servers to provide
keying material to the authenticator in a well defined format, AAA
protocols suitable for use with EAP MUST define the format and
wrapping of the AAA-Token.
EMSK transport
Since the EMSK is a secret known only to the backend
authentication server and peer, the AAA-Token MUST NOT transport
the EMSK from the backend authentication server to the
authenticator.
AAA-Token protection
To ensure against compromise, the AAA-Token MUST be integrity
protected, authenticated, replay protected and encrypted in
transit, using well-established cryptographic algorithms.
Session Keys
The AAA-Token SHOULD be protected with session keys as in Diameter
[RFC3588] or RADIUS over IPsec [RFC3579] rather than static keys,
as in [RFC2548].
Key naming
In order to ensure against confusion between the appropriate
keying material to be used in a given secure association protocol
exchange, the AAA-Token SHOULD include explicit key names and
context appropriate for informing the authenticator how the keying
material is to be used.
Key Compromise
Where untrusted intermediaries are present, the AAA-Token SHOULD
NOT be provided to the intermediaries. In Diameter, handling of
keys by intermediaries can be avoided using Redirect functionality
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[RFC3588].
4.2.3 Secure Association Protocol Requirements
The Secure Association Protocol supports the following:
Mutual proof of possession
The peer and authenticator MUST each demonstrate possession of the
keying material transported between the AAA server and
authenticator (AAA-Key).
Key Naming
The Secure Association Protocol MUST explicitly name the keys used
in the proof of possession exchange, so as to prevent confusion
when more than one set of keying material could potentially be
used as the basis for the exchange.
Creation and Deletion
In order to support the correct processing of phase 2 security
associations, the secure association (phase 2) protocol MUST
support the naming of phase 2 security associations and associated
transient session keys, so that the correct set of transient
session keys can be identified for processing a given packet. The
phase 2 secure association protocol also MUST support transient
session key activation and SHOULD support deletion, so that
establishment and re-establishment of transient session keys can
be synchronized between the parties.
Integrity and Replay Protection
The Secure Association Protocol MUST support integrity and replay
protection of all messages.
Direct operation
Since the phase 2 secure association protocol is concerned with
the establishment of security associations between the EAP peer
and authenticator, including the derivation of transient session
keys, only those parties have "a need to know" the transient
session keys. The secure association protocol MUST operate
directly between the peer and authenticator, and MUST NOT be
passed-through to the backend authentication server, or include
additional parties.
Derivation of transient session keys
The secure association protocol negotiation MUST support
derivation of unicast and multicast transient session keys
suitable for use with the negotiated ciphersuite.
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TSK freshness
The secure association (phase 2) protocol MUST support the
derivation of fresh unicast and multicast transient session keys,
even when the keying material provided by the AAA server is not
fresh. This is typically supported by including an exchange of
nonces within the secure association protocol.
Bi-directional operation
While some ciphersuites only require a single set of transient
session keys to protect traffic in both directions, other
ciphersuites require a unique set of transient session keys in
each direction. The phase 2 secure association protocol SHOULD
provide for the derivation of unicast and multicast keys in each
direction, so as not to require two separate phase 2 exchanges in
order to create a bi-directional phase 2 security association.
Secure capabilities negotiation
The Secure Association Protocol MUST support secure capabilities
negotiation. This includes security parameters such as the
security association identifier (SAID) and ciphersuites. It also
includes confirmation of the capabilities discovered during the
discovery phase (phase 0), so as to ensure that the announced
capabilities have not been forged.
4.2.4 Ciphersuite Requirements
Ciphersuites suitable for keying by EAP methods MUST provide the
following facilities:
TSK derivation
In order to allow a ciphersuite to be usable within the EAP keying
framework, a specification MUST be provided describing how
transient session keys suitable for use with the ciphersuite are
derived from the AAA-Key.
EAP method independence
Algorithms for deriving transient session keys from the AAA-Key
MUST NOT depend on the EAP method. However, algorithms for
deriving TEKs MAY be specific to the EAP method.
Cryptographic separation
The TSKs derived from the AAA-Key MUST be cryptographically
separate from each other. Similarly, TEKs MUST be
cryptographically separate from each other. In addition, the TSKs
MUST be cryptographically separate from the TEKs.
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5. IANA Considerations
This specification does not create any new registries, or define any
new EAP codes or types.
6. Security Considerations
6.1 Key Strength
In order to guard against brute force attacks, EAP methods deriving
keys need to be capable of generating keys with an appropriate
effective symmetric key strength. In order to ensure that key
generation is not the weakest link, it is necessary for EAP methods
utilizing public key cryptography to choose a public key that has a
cryptographic strength meeting the symmetric key strength
requirement.
As noted in Section 5 of [I-D.orman-public-key-lengths], this results
in the following required RSA or DH module and DSA subgroup size in
bits, for a given level of attack resistance in bits:
Attack Resistance RSA or DH Modulus DSA subgroup
(bits) size (bits) size (bits)
----------------- ----------------- ------------
70 947 128
80 1228 145
90 1553 153
100 1926 184
150 4575 279
200 8719 373
250 14596 475
6.2 Key Wrap
As described in [RFC3579], Section 4.3, known problems exist in the
key wrap specified in [RFC2548]. Where the same RADIUS shared secret
is used by a PAP authenticator and an EAP authenticator, there is a
vulnerability to known plaintext attack. Since RADIUS uses the
shared secret for multiple purposes, including per-packet
authentication, attribute hiding, considerable information is exposed
about the shared secret with each packet. This exposes the shared
secret to dictionary attacks. MD5 is used both to compute the RADIUS
Response Authenticator and the Message-Authenticator attribute, and
some concerns exist relating to the security of this hash
[MD5Attack]. As discussed in [RFC3579], Section 4.2, these and other
RADIUS vulnerabilities may be addressed by running RADIUS over IPsec.
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Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is present (such as a RADIUS
proxy or a Diameter agent), and data object security is not used, the
AAA-Key may be recovered by an attacker in control of the untrusted
intermediary. Possession of the AAA-Key enables decryption of data
traffic sent between the peer and a specific authenticator; however
where key separation is implemented, compromise of the AAA-Key does
not enable an attacker to impersonate the peer to another
authenticator, since that requires possession of the MK or EMSK,
which are not transported by the AAA protocol. This vulnerability
may be mitigated by implementation of redirect functionality, as
provided in[RFC3588].
6.3 Man-in-the-middle Attacks
As described in [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding], EAP method sequences
and compound authentication mechanisms may be subject to
man-in-the-middle attacks. When such attacks are successfully
carried out, the attacker acts as an intermediary between a victim
and a legitimate authenticator. This allows the attacker to
authenticate successfully to the authenticator, as well as to obtain
access to the network.
In order to prevent these attacks, [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
recommends derivation of a compound key by which the EAP peer and
server can prove that they have participated in the entire EAP
exchange. Since the compound key must not be known to an attacker
posing as an authenticator, and yet must be derived from quantities
that are exported by EAP methods, it may be desirable to derive the
compound key from a portion of the EMSK. In order to provide proper
key hygiene, it is recommended that the compound key used for
man-in-the-middle protection be cryptographically separate from other
keys derived from the EMSK, such as fast handoff keys, discussed in
Appendix E.
6.4 Impersonation
Both the RADIUS and Diameter protocols are potentially vulnerable to
impersonation by a rogue authenticator.
When RADIUS requests are forwarded by a proxy, the NAS-IP-Address or
NAS-IPv6-Address attributes may not correspond to the source address.
Since the NAS-Identifier attribute need not contain an FQDN, it also
may not correspond to the source address, even indirectly. [RFC2865]
Section 3 states:
A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS
UDP packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that
RADIUS requests can be proxied.
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This implies that it is possible for a rogue authenticator to forge
NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address or NAS-Identifier attributes within
a RADIUS Access-Request in order to impersonate another
authenticator. Among other things, this can result in messages (and
MSKs) being sent to the wrong authenticator. Since the rogue
authenticator is authenticated by the RADIUS proxy or server purely
based on the source address, other mechanisms are required to detect
the forgery. In addition, it is possible for attributes such as the
Called-Station-Id and Calling-Station-Id to be forged as well.
As recommended in [RFC3579], this vulnerability can be mitigated by
having RADIUS proxies check authenticator identification attributes
against the source address.
To allow verification of session parameters such as the
Called-Station- Id and Calling-Station-Id, these can be sent by the
EAP peer to the server, protected by the TEKs. The RADIUS server can
then check the parameters sent by the EAP peer against those claimed
by the authenticator. If a discrepancy is found, an error can be
logged.
While [RFC3588] requires use of the Route-Record AVP, this utilizes
FQDNs, so that impersonation detection requires DNS A/AAAA and PTR
RRs to be properly configured. As a result, it appears that Diameter
is as vulnerable to this attack as RADIUS, if not more so. To address
this vulnerability, it is necessary to allow the backend
authentication server to communicate with the authenticator directly,
such as via the redirect functionality supported in [RFC3588].
6.5 Denial of Service Attacks
The caching of security associations may result in vulnerability to
denial of service attacks. Since an EAP peer may derive multiple EAP
SAs with a given EAP server, and creation of a new EAP SA does not
implicitly delete a previous EAP SA, EAP methods that result in
creation of persistant state may be vulnerable to denial of service
attacks by a rogue EAP peer.
As a result, EAP methods creating persistent state may wish to limit
the number of cached EAP SAs (Phase 1a) corresponding to an EAP peer.
For example, an EAP server may choose to only retain a few EAP SAs
for each peer. This prevents a rogue peer from denying access to
other peers.
Similarly, an authenticator may have multiple AAA-Key SAs
corresponding to a given EAP peer; to conserve resources an
authenticator may choose to limit the number of cached AAA-Key (Phase
1 b) SAs for each peer.
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Depending on the media, creation of a new unicast secure association
SA may or may not imply deletion of a previous unicast secure
association SA. Where there is no implied deletion, the
authenticator may choose to limit Phase 2 (unicast and multicast)
secure association SAs for each peer.
7. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Arun Ayyagari, Ashwin Palekar, and Tim Moore of Microsoft,
Dorothy Stanley of Agere, Bob Moskowitz of TruSecure, and Russ
Housley of Vigil Security for useful feedback.
Normative References
[RFC1661] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51,
RFC 1661, July 1994.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[I-D.ietf-eap-rfc2284bis]
Blunk, L., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
draft-ietf-eap-rfc2284bis-06 (work in progress), September
2003.
[IEEE802] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
Overview and Architecture", ANSI/IEEE Standard 802, 1990.
Informative References
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
793, September 1981.
[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
[RFC1968] Meyer, G. and K. Fox, "The PPP Encryption Control Protocol
(ECP)", RFC 1968, June 1996.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
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[RFC2246] Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.
and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,
January 1999.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2419] Sklower, K. and G. Meyer, "The PPP DES Encryption
Protocol, Version 2 (DESE-bis)", RFC 2419, September 1998.
[RFC2420] Kummert, H., "The PPP Triple-DES Encryption Protocol
(3DESE)", RFC 2420, September 1998.
[RFC2516] Mamakos, L., Lidl, K., Evarts, J., Carrel, D., Simone, D.
and R. Wheeler, "A Method for Transmitting PPP Over
Ethernet (PPPoE)", RFC 2516, February 1999.
[RFC2548] Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
RFC 2548, March 1999.
[RFC2607] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.
[RFC2716] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.
[RFC2855] Fujisawa, K., "DHCP for IEEE 1394", RFC 2855, June 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC2960] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C.,
Schwarzbauer, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M.,
Zhang, L. and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.
[RFC3078] Pall, G. and G. Zorn, "Microsoft Point-To-Point Encryption
(MPPE) Protocol", RFC 3078, March 2001.
[RFC3079] Zorn, G., "Deriving Keys for use with Microsoft
Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)", RFC 3079, March 2001.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
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Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G. and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[FIPSDES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Data
Encryption Standard", FIPS PUB 46, January 1977.
[DESMODES]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "DES Modes
of Operation", FIPS PUB 81, December 1980, <http://
www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip81.htm>.
[FIPS197] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001.
[FIPS.180-1.1995]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS PUB 180-1, April 1995, <http://
www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip180-1.htm>.
[IEEE80211]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Information technology - Telecommunications and
information exchange between systems - Local and
metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements Part
11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE IEEE Standard
802.11-1997, 1997.
[IEEE8021X]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local
and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access
Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2001, June 2002.
[IEEE8021Q]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Draft
Standard for Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks", IEEE
Standard 802.1Q/D8, January 1998.
[IEEE80211f]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
"Recommended Practice for Multi-Vendor Access Point
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Interoperability via an Inter-Access Point Protocol Across
Distribution Systems Supporting IEEE 802.11 Operation",
IEEE 802.11F, July 2003.
[IEEE80211i]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Draft
Supplement to STANDARD FOR Telecommunications and
Information Exchange between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific
Requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control
(MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications:
Specification for Enhanced Security", IEEE Draft 802.11I/
D6.1, August 2003.
[IEEE-02-758]
Mishra, A., Shin, M., Arbaugh, W., Lee, I. and K. Jang,
"Proactive Caching Strategies for IAPP Latency Improvement
during 802.11 Handoff", IEEE 802.11 Working Group,
IEEE-02-758r1-F Draft 802.11I/D5.0, November 2002.
[IEEE-03-084]
Mishra, A., Shin, M., Arbaugh, W., Lee, I. and K. Jang,
"Proactive Key Distribution to support fast and secure
roaming", IEEE 802.11 Working Group, IEEE-03-084r1-I,
http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/
3-084.zip, January 2003.
[IEEE-03-155]
Aboba, B., "Fast Handoff Issues", IEEE 802.11 Working
Group, IEEE-03-155r0-I, http://www.ieee802.org/11/
Documents/DocumentHolder/3-155.zip, March 2003.
[EAPAPI] Microsoft Developer Network, "Windows 2000 EAP API",
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/
library/en-us/eap/eapport_0fj9.asp, August 2000.
[I-D.ietf-roamops-cert]
Aboba, B., "Certificate-Based Roaming",
draft-ietf-roamops-cert-02 (work in progress), April 1999.
[I-D.ietf-aaa-eap]
Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
draft-ietf-aaa-eap-02 (work in progress), July 2003.
[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]
Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Experimental Handoff Extension
to RADIUS", draft-irtf-aaaarch-handoff-03 (work in
progress), October 2003.
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[I-D.orman-public-key-lengths]
Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys",
draft-orman-public-key-lengths-05 (work in progress),
January 2002.
[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
Puthenkulam, J., "The Compound Authentication Binding
Problem", draft-puthenkulam-eap-binding-03 (work in
progress), July 2003.
[I-D.aboba-802-context]
Aboba, B. and T. Moore, "A Model for Context Transfer in
IEEE 802", draft-aboba-802-context-03 (work in progress),
October 2003.
[I-D.arkko-pppext-eap-aka]
Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "EAP AKA Authentication",
draft-arkko-pppext-eap-aka-10 (work in progress), June
2003.
[8021XHandoff]
Pack, S. and Y. Choi, "Pre-Authenticated Fast Handoff in a
Public Wireless LAN Based on IEEE 802.1X Model", School of
Computer Science and Engineering, Seoul National
University, Seoul, Korea, 2002.
[MD5Attack]
Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack",
CryptoBytes, Vol.2 No.2, 1996.
Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
Phone: +1 425 706 6605
Fax: +1 425 936 6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
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Dan Simon
Microsoft Research
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
USA
Phone: +1 425 706 6711
Fax: +1 425 936 7329
EMail: dansimon@microsoft.com
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
Jorvas 02420
Finland
Phone:
EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com
Henrik Levkowetz (editor)
ipUnplugged AB
Arenavagen 27
Stockholm S-121 28
SWEDEN
Phone: +46 708 32 16 08
EMail: henrik@levkowetz.com
Appendix A. Ciphersuite Keying Requirements
To date, PPP and IEEE 802.11 ciphersuites are suitable for keying by
EAP. This Appendix describes the keying requirements of common PPP
and 802.11 ciphersuites.
PPP ciphersuites include DESEbis [RFC2419], 3DES [RFC2420], and MPPE
[RFC3078]. The DES algorithm is described in [FIPSDES], and DES modes
(such as CBC, used in [RFC2419] and DES-EDE3-CBC, used in [RFC2420])
are described in [DESMODES]. For PPP DESEbis, a single 56-bit
encryption key is required, used in both directions. For PPP 3DES, a
168-bit encryption key is needed, used in both directions. As
described in [RFC2419] for DESEbis and [RFC2420] for 3DES, the IV,
which is different in each direction, is "deduced from an explicit
64-bit nonce, which is exchanged in the clear during the ECP
negotiation phase [RFC1968]." There is therefore no need for the IV
to be provided by EAP.
For MPPE, 40-bit, 56-bit or 128-bit encryption keys are required in
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each direction, as described in [RFC3078]. No initialization vector
is required.
While these PPP ciphersuites provide encryption, they do not provide
per-packet authentication or integrity protection, so an
authentication key is not required in either direction.
Within [IEEE80211], Transient Session Keys (TSKs) are required both
for unicast traffic as well as for multicast traffic, and therefore
separate key hierarchies are required for unicast keys and multicast
keys. IEEE 802.11 ciphersuites include WEP-40, described in
[IEEE80211], which requires a 40-bit encryption key, the same in
either direction; and WEP-128, which requires a 104-bit encryption
key, the same in either direction. These ciphersuites also do not
support per-packet authentication and integrity protection. In
addition to these unicast keys, authentication and encryption keys
are required to wrap the multicast encryption key.
Recently, new ciphersuites have been proposed for use with IEEE
802.11 that provide per-packet authentication and integrity
protection as well as encryption [IEEE80211i]. These include TKIP,
which requires a single 128-bit encryption key and a 128-bit
authentication key (used in both directions); AES CCMP, which
requires a single 128-bit key (used in both directions) in order to
authenticate and encrypt data; and WRAP, which requires a single
128-bit key (used in both directions).
As with WEP, authentication and encryption keys are also required to
wrap the multicast encryption (and possibly, authentication) keys.
Appendix B. Transient EAP Key (TEK) Hierarchy
Figure B-1 illustrates the TEK key hierarchy for EAP-TLS [RFC2716],
which is based on the TLS key hierarchy [RFC2246]. The TLS-negotiated
ciphersuite is used to set up a protected channel for use in
protecting the EAP conversation, keyed by the derived TEKs. The TEK
derivation proceeds as follows:
master_secret = TLS-PRF-48(pre_master_secret, "master secret",
client.random || server.random)
TEK = TLS-PRF-X(master_secret, "key expansion",
server.random || client.random)
Where:
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TLS-PRF-X = TLS pseudo-random function [RFC2246], computed to X
octets.
master_secret = TLS term for the MK.
| | |
| | pre_master_secret |
server| | | client
Random| V | Random
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | | |
| | | |
+---->| master_secret |<------+
| | (MK) | |
| | | |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | |
| | |
| | |
V V V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| |
| Key Block |
| (TEKs) |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | | | | |
| client | server | client | server | client | server
| MAC | MAC | write | write | IV | IV
| | | | | |
V V V V V V
Figure B-1 - TLS [RFC2246] Key Hierarchy
Appendix C. MSK and EMSK Hierarchy
In EAP-TLS [RFC2716], the MSK is divided into two halves,
corresponding to the "Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key"
(Enc-RECV-Key, 32 octets, also known as the PMK) and "Authenticator
to Peer Encryption Key" (Enc-SEND-Key, 32 octets). In [RFC2548], the
Enc-RECV-Key (the PMK) is transported in the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key
attribute, and the Enc-SEND-Key is transported in the
MS-MPPE-Send-Key attribute.
The EMSK is also divided into two halves, corresponding to the "Peer
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to Authenticator Authentication Key" (Auth-RECV-Key, 32 octets) and
"Authenticator to Peer Authentication Key" (Auth-SEND-Key, 32
octets). The IV is a 64 octet quantity that is a known value; octets
0-31 are known as the "Peer to Authenticator IV" or RECV-IV, and
Octets 32-63 are known as the "Authenticator to Peer IV", or SEND-IV.
In EAP-TLS, the MSK, EMSK and IV are derived from the MK via a
one-way function. This ensures that the MK cannot be derived from
the MSK, EMSK or IV unless the one-way function (TLS PRF) is broken.
Since the MSK is derived from the MK, if the MK is compromised then
the MSK is also compromised.
As described in [RFC2716], the formula for the derivation of the MSK,
EMSK and IV from the MK is as follows:
MSK = TLS-PRF-64(MK, "client EAP encryption",
client.random || server.random)
EMSK = second 64 octets of:
TLS-PRF-128(MK, "client EAP encryption",
client.random || server.random)
IV = TLS-PRF-64("", "client EAP encryption",
client.random || server.random)
AAA-Key(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Encryption Key (Enc-RECV-Key)
(MS-MPPE-Recv-Key in [RFC2548]). Also known as the
PMK.
AAA-Key(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Encryption Key (Enc-SEND-Key)
(MS-MPPE-Send-Key in [RFC2548])
EMSK(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Authentication Key
(Auth-RECV-Key)
EMSK(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Authentication Key
(Auth-Send-Key)
IV(0,31) = Peer to Authenticator Initialization Vector
(RECV-IV)
IV(32,63) = Authenticator to Peer Initialization vector
(SEND-IV)
Where:
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AAA-Key(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the AAA-Key.
IV(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the IV.
MSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the MSK.
EMSK(W,Z) = Octets W through Z inclusive of the EMSK.
MK = TLS master_secret
TLS-PRF-X = TLS PRF function [RFC2246], computed to X octets
client.random = Nonce generated by the TLS client.
server.random = Nonce generated by the TLS server.
Figure C-1 describes the process by which the MSK,EMSK,IV and
ultimately the TSKs, are derived from the MK. Note that in
[RFC2716], the MK is referred to as the "TLS Master Secret".
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---+
| ^
| TLS Master Secret (MK) |
| |
V |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| | EAP
| Master Session Key (MSK) | Method
| Derivation | |
| | V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | | ^
| MSK | EMSK | IV EAP
| | | API
V V V v
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | |
| | |
| AAA server | |
| | |
| | V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | ^
| AAA-Key(0,31) | AAA-Key(32,63) |
| (PMK) | Transported
| | via AAA
| | |
V V V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
| | ^
| Ciphersuite-Specific Transient Session | Auth.
| Key Derivation | |
| | V
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
Figure C-1 - EAP TLS [RFC2716] Key hierarchy
Appendix D. Transient Session Key (TSK) Derivation
Within IEEE 802.11 RSN, the Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), a transient
session key used to protect unicast traffic, is derived from the PMK
(octets 0-31 of the MSK), known in [RFC2716] as the Peer to
Authenticator Encryption Key. In [IEEE80211i], the PTK is derived
from the PMK via the following formula:
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PTK = EAPOL-PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion",
Min(AA,SA) || Max(AA, SA) || Min(ANonce,SNonce) ||
Max(ANonce,SNonce))
Where:
PMK = AAA-Key(0,31)
SA = Station MAC address (Calling-Station-Id)
AA = Access Point MAC address (Called-Station-Id)
ANonce = Access Point Nonce
SNonce = Station Nonce
EAPOL-PRF-X = Pseudo-Random Function based on HMAC-SHA1,
generating a PTK of size X octets.
TKIP uses X = 64, while CCMP, WRAP, and WEP use X = 48.
The EAPOL-Key Confirmation Key (KCK) is used to provide data origin
authenticity in the TSK derivation. It utilizes the first 128 bits
(bits 0-127) of the PTK. The EAPOL-Key Encryption Key (KEK) provides
confidentiality in the TSK derivation. It utilizes bits 128-255 of
the PTK. Bits 256-383 of the PTK are used by Temporal Key 1, and
Bits 384-511 are used by Temporal Key 2. Usage of TK1 and TK2 is
ciphersuite specific. Details are available in [IEEE80211i].
Appendix E. AAA-Key Derivation
As discussed in [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff], [IEEE-02-758],
[IEEE-03-084], and [8021XHandoff], keying material may be required
for use in fast handoff between IEEE 802.11 authenticators. Where the
backend authentication server provides keying material to multiple
authenticators in order to fascilitate fast handoff, it is highly
desirable for the keying material used on different authenticators to
be cryptographically separate, so that if one authenticator is
compromised, it does not lead to the compromise of other
authenticators. Where keying material is provided by the backend
authentication server, a key hierarchy derived from the EMSK, as
suggested in [IEEE-03-155] can be used to provide cryptographically
separate keying material for use in fast handoff:
AAA-Key-A = MSK(0,63)
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AAA-Key-B = PRF(EMSK(0,63),AAA-Key-A,
B-Called-Station-Id,Calling-Station-Id)
AAA-Key-E = PRF(EMSK(0,63),AAA-Key-A,
E-Called-Station-Id,Calling-Station-Id)
Where:
Calling-Station-Id = STA MAC address
B-Called-Station-Id = AP B MAC address
E-Called-Station-Id = AP E MAC address
Here AAA-Key-A is the AAA-Key derived during the initial EAP
authentication between the peer and authenticator A. Based on this
initial EAP authentication, the EMSK is also derived, which can be
used to derive AAA-Keys for fast authentication between the EAP peer
and authenticators B and E. Since the EMSK is cryptographically
separate from the MSK, each of these AAA-Keys is cryptographically
separate from each other, and are guaranteed to be unique between the
EAP peer (also known as the STA) and the authenticator (also known as
the AP).
Appendix F. Open issues
(This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publication)
Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
following web site:
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues.html
The current working documents for this draft are available at this
web site:
http://www.levkowetz.com/pub/ietf/drafts/eap/keying/
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