ECRIT T. Taylor
Internet-Draft (Editor) Nortel
Expires: January 13, 2007 H. Tschofenig
Siemens
H. Schulzrinne
Columbia U.
M. Shanmugam
Siemens
July 12, 2006
Security Threats and Requirements for Emergency Call Marking and Mapping
draft-ietf-ecrit-security-threats-03.txt
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Abstract
This document reviews the security threats associated with:
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o the marking of signalling messages to indicate that they are
related to an emergency; and
o the process of mapping from locations to Universal Resource
Identifiers (URIs) pointing to Public Safety Answering Points
(PSAPs). This mapping occurs as part of the process of routing
emergency calls through the IP network.
Based on the identified threats, this document establishes a set of
security requirements for the mapping protocol and for the handling
of emergency-marked calls.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Marking, Mapping, and the Emergency Call Routing Process . . . 5
4. Objectives of Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Potential Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Attacks Involving the Emergency Identifier . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Attacks Against or Using the Mapping Process . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. Attacks Against the Emergency Response System . . . . 7
5.2.2. Attacks To Prevent a Specific Individual From
Receiving Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.3. Attacks To Gain Information About an Emergency . . . . 9
6. Security Requirements Relating To Emergency Marking and
Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 18
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1. Introduction
Legacy telephone network users can summon help for emergency services
such as ambulance, fire and police using a well known number (e.g.,
911 in North America, 112 in Europe). A key factor in the handling
of such calls is the ability of the system to determine caller
location and to route the call to the appropriate Public Safety
Answering Point (PSAP) based on that location. With the introduction
of IP-based telephony and multimedia services, support for emergency
calling via the Internet also has to be provided. As one of the
steps to achieve this, an emergency marker is being defined that can
be attached to call signalling to indicate that the call relates to
an emergency. In addition, a protocol is being developed to allow a
client entity to submit a location and receive a URI pointing to the
applicable PSAP for that location.
Attacks against the PSTN have taken place for decades. The Internet
is seen as an even more hostile environment. Thus it is important to
understand the types of attacks that might be mounted against the
infrastructure providing emergency services, and to develop security
mechanisms to counter those attacks. While this can be a broad
topic, the present document restricts itself to attacks on the
mapping of locations to PSAP URIs and attacks based on emergency
marking.
This document is organized as follows: Section 2 describes basic
terminology. Section 3 briefly describes how emergency marking and
mapping fit within the process of routing emergency calls. Section 4
describes some motivations of attackers in the context of emergency
calling, Section 5 describes and illustrates the attacks that might
be used, and Section 6 lists the security-related requirements that
must be met if these attacks are to be mitigated.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119], with the
qualification that unless otherwise stated they apply to the design
of the mapping protocol, not its implementation or application.
The terms call taker, mapping service, emergency caller, emergency
identifier, mapping, mapping client, mapping server, mapping
protocol, and Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) are taken from
[I-D.ecrit-requirements].
The term "location information" is taken from RFC 3693 [RFC3693].
The term "emergency caller's device" designates the IP host closest
to the emergency caller in the signalling path between the emergency
caller and the PSAP. Examples include an IP phone running SIP,
H.323, or a proprietary signalling protocol, a PC running a soft
client, or an analogue terminal adapter or a residential gateway
controlled by a softswitch.
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3. Marking, Mapping, and the Emergency Call Routing Process
This memo deals with two topics relating to the routing of emergency
calls to their proper destination. The first is the marking of call
signalling to enable entities along the signalling path to recognize
that a particular signalling message is associated with an emergency
call. Signalling containing the emergency identifier may be given
priority treatment, special processing, and/or special routing.
The first goal of emergency call routing is to ensure that any
emergency call is routed to a PSAP. Preferably the call is routed to
the PSAP responsible for the caller's location, since misrouting
consumes valuable time while the call taker locates and forwards the
call to the right PSAP. As described in [I-D.ecrit-requirements],
mapping is part of the process of achieving this preferable outcome.
In brief, mapping involves a mapping client, a mapping server, and
the protocol that passes between them. The protocol allows the
client to pass location information to the mapping server and to
receive back a URI which can be used to direct call signalling to a
PSAP.
Since mapping requires location information for input, when and where
the location information is acquired imposes constraints upon when
mapping can be done and which devices can act as mapping clients.
The key distinction in "when" is before the emergency or during the
emergency. The key distinction in "where" is at the emergency
caller's device or at another device in the signalling path between
the emergency caller and the PSAP. The mapping client can be the
device that acquires the location information or any device
downstream of that point. It is even possible for a PSAP itself to
initiate mapping, to determine whether an arriving call should be
handled by a call taker at that PSAP or should be proxied to another
PSAP.
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4. Objectives of Attackers
Attackers may direct their efforts either against a portion of the
emergency response system or against an individual. Attacks against
the emergency response system have three possible objectives:
o to deny system services to all users in a given area. The
motivation may range from thoughtless vandalism, to wide-scale
criminality, to terrorism. One interesting variant on this
motivation is the case where a victim of a large emergency hopes
to gain faster service by blocking others' competing calls for
help.
o to gain fraudulent use of services, by using an emergency
identifier to bypass normal authentication, authorization, and
accounting procedures;
o to divert emergency responders to non-emergency sites. This memo
has not identified any attacks within its intended scope that
achieve this objective, so it will not be mentioned further.
Attacks against an individual fall into two classes:
o attacks to prevent an individual from receiving aid;
o attacks to gain information about an emergency that can be applied
either against an individual involved in that emergency or to the
profit of the attacker.
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5. Potential Attacks
5.1. Attacks Involving the Emergency Identifier
The main attack possibility involving the emergency identifier is to
use it to bypass normal procedures in order to achieve fraudulent use
of services. An attack of this sort is possible only if the
following conditions are true:
a. The attacker is the emergency caller.
b. The call routing system assumes that the emergency caller's
device signals the correct PSAP URI for the caller's location.
c. The call enters the domain of a service provider, which accepts
it without applying normal procedures for authentication and
authorization because the signalling carries the emergency
identifier.
d. The service provider routes it according to the called address
(e.g., SIP Request-URI), without verifying that this is the
address of a PSAP (noting that a URI by itself does not indicate
the nature of the entity it is pointing to).
If these conditions are satisfied, the attacker can bypass normal
service provider authorization procedures for arbitrary destinations,
simply by reprogramming the emergency caller's device to add the
emergency identifier to non-emergency call signalling. Most probably
in this case, the call signalling will not include any location
information, or there could be location information, but it is false.
An attacker wishing to disrupt the emergency call routing system may
use a similar technique to target components of that system for a
denial of service attack. The attacker will find this attractive to
reach components that handle emergency calls only. Flooding attacks
are the most likely application of the technique, but it may also be
used to identify target components for other attacks by analyzing the
content of responses to the original signalling messages.
5.2. Attacks Against or Using the Mapping Process
This section describes classes of attacks involving the mapping
process that could be used to achieve the attacker goals described in
Section 4.
5.2.1. Attacks Against the Emergency Response System
This section considers attacks intended to reduce the effectiveness
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of the emergency response system for all callers in a given area. If
the mapping operation is disabled, then the emergency caller's device
might not have the correct PSAP URI. As a consequence, the
probability that emergency calls are routed to the wrong PSAP is
increased. In the worst case the emergency caller's device might not
be able to obtain a PSAP URI at all. Routing to the wrong PSAP has a
double consequence: emergency response to the affected calls is
delayed, and PSAP call taker resources outside the immediate area of
the emergency are consumed due to the extra effort required to
redirect the calls. Alternatively, attacks that cause the client to
receive a URI that does not lead to a PSAP have the immediate effect
of causing emergency calls to fail.
Three basic attacks on the mapping process can be identified: denial
of service, impersonation of the mapping server, or corruption of the
mapping database. Denial of service can be achieved in several ways:
o by a flooding attack on the mapping server;
o by taking control of the mapping server and either preventing it
from responding or causing it to send incorrect responses; or
o by taking control of a router through which the mapping queries
and responses pass and using that control to block them. An
adversary may also attempt to modify the mapping protocol
signaling messages. Additionally, the adversary may be able to
replay past communication exchanges to fool an emergency caller by
returning incorrect results.
In an impersonation attack, the attacker induces the mapping client
to direct its queries to a host under the attacker's control rather
than the real mapping server. Impersonation itself is an issue for
mapping server discovery rather than for the mapping protocol
directly. However, the mapping protocol may allow impersonation to
be detected, thereby preventing acceptance of responses from an
impersonating entity and possibly triggering a more secure discovery
procedure.
Corruption of the mapping database cannot be mitigated directly by
mapping protocol design. The mapping protocol may have a role to
play in analysis of which records have been corrupted, once that
corruption has been detected.
Beyond these attacks on the mapping operation itself, it is possible
to use mapping to attack other entities. One possibility is that
mapping clients are misled into sending mapping queries to the target
of the attack instead of the mapping server. Prevention of such an
attack is an operational issue rather than one of protocol design.
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The other possible attack is one where the the mapping server is
tricked into sending responses to the target of the attack through
spoofing of the source address in the query.
5.2.2. Attacks To Prevent a Specific Individual From Receiving Aid
If an attacker wishes to deny emergency service to a specific
individual the mass attacks described in Section 5.2.1 will obviously
work provided that the target individual is within the affected
population. Except for the flooding attack on the mapping server,
the attacker can in theory limit these attacks to the target, but
this requires extra effort that the attacker is unlikely to expend.
It is more likely, if the attacker is using a mass attack but does
not wish it to have too broad an effect, that it is used for a
carefully limited period of time.
If the attacker wants to be selective, however, it may make more
sense to attack the mapping client rather than the mapping server.
This is particularly so if the mapping client is the emergency
caller's device. The choices available to the attacker are similar
to those for denial of service on the server side:
o a flooding attack on the mapping client;
o taking control of a router through which the mapping queries and
responses pass and using that control to block or modify them.
Taking control of the mapping client is also a logical possibility,
but raises no issues for the mapping protocol.
5.2.3. Attacks To Gain Information About an Emergency
This section discusses attacks used to gain information about an
emergency. The attacker may be seeking the location of the caller
(e.g., to effect a criminal attack). Alternatively, the attacker may
be seeking information that could be used to link an individual (the
caller or someone else involved in the emergency) with embarrassing
information related to the emergency (e.g., "Who did the police take
away just now?"). Finally, the attacker could be seeking to profit
from the emergency, perhaps by offering his or her services (e.g.,
news reporter, lawyer aggressively seeking new business).
The primary information that interceptions of mapping requests and
responses will reveal are a location, a URI identifying a PSAP, and
the addresses of the mapping client and server. The location
information can be directly useful to an attacker if the attacker has
high assurance that the observed query is related to an emergency
involving the target. The other pieces of information may provide
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the basis for further attacks on emergency call routing, but because
of the time factor, are unlikely to be applicable to the routing of
the current call. However, if the mapping client is the emergency
caller's device, the attacker may gain information that allows for
interference with the call after it has been set up or for
interception of the media stream between the caller and the PSAP.
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6. Security Requirements Relating To Emergency Marking and Mapping
This section describes the security requirements which must be
fulfilled to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of the attacks
described in Section 5. The requirements are presented in the same
order as the attacks.
From Section 5.1:
Attack: fraudulent calls.
Requirement: for calls which meet conditions a) to c) of Section 5.1,
the service provider's call routing entity MUST verify that the
destination address (e.g., SIP Request-URI) presented in the call
signalling is that of a PSAP.
Attack: use of emergency identifier to probe in order to identify
emergency call routing entities.
Requirement: topology hiding SHOULD be applied to call signalling
returned to the emergency caller, so that the identity of
intermediate routing entities is not disclosed. The obvious
exception is where these entities are already visible to the caller.
Note that there is little point in hiding the PSAP itself.
From Section 5.2.1:
Attack: flooding attack on the mapping client, mapping server, or a
third entity.
Requirement: The mapping protocol MUST NOT create new opportunities
for flooding attacks, including amplification attacks.
Attack: insertion of interfering messages.
Requirement: The protocol MUST permit the mapping client to verify
that the response it receives is responding to the query it sent out.
Attack: man-in-the-middle alteration of messages.
Requirement: The protocol or the system within which it is
implemented MUST maintain request and response integrity.
Attack: impersonation of the mapping server.
Requirement: the security considerations for any discussion of
mapping server discovery MUST address measures to prevent
impersonation of the mapping server.
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Requirement: the protocol or the system within which it is
implemented MUST permit the mapping client to authenticate the source
of mapping responses.
Attack: corruption of the mapping database.
Requirement: the security considerations for the mapping protocol
MUST address measures to prevent database corruption by an attacker.
Requirement: the protocol SHOULD include information in the response
that allows subsequent correlation of that response with internal
logs that may be kept on the mapping server, to allow debugging of
mis-directed calls. One example of a way to meet this requirement
would be by means of an opaque parameter in the returned URI.
From Section 5.2.2: no new requirements.
From Section 5.2.3:
Attack: snooping of location and other information.
Requirement: the protocol or the system within which it is
implemented MUST maintain confidentiality of the request and
response.
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7. Security Considerations
This document addresses security threats and security requirements.
Therefore, security is considered throughout this document.
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8. Acknowledgements
The writing of this document has been a task made difficult by the
temptation to consider the security concerns of the entire personal
emergency calling system, not just the specific pieces of work within
the scope of the ECRIT Working Group. Hannes Tschofenig performed
the initial security analysis for ECRIT, but it has been shaped since
then by the comments and judgement of the ECRIT WG at large. At an
earlier stage in the evolution of this document, Stephen Kent of the
Security Directorate was asked to review it and provided extensive
comments which led to a complete rewriting of it. Brian Rosen, Roger
Marshall, Andrew Newton, and most recently, Spencer Dawkins, Kamran
Aquil, and Ron Watro have also provided detailed reviews of this
document at various stages. The authors thank them.
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9. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by the IANA.
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10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3693] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J., and
J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", RFC 3693, February 2004.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ecrit-requirements]
Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, "Requirements for
Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies",
March 2006.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
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Authors' Addresses
Tom Taylor
Nortel
1852 Lorraine Ave
Ottawa, Ontario K1H 6Z8
Canada
Email: taylor@nortel.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bayern 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
Henning Schulzrinne
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
450 Computer Science Building
New York, NY 10027
USA
Phone: +1 212 939 7042
Email: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu
URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hgs
Murugaraj Shanmugam
Siemens
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bayern 81739
Germany
Email: murugaraj.shanmugam@siemens.com
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