INTERNET DRAFT Mats Jansson, LiNK draft-ietf-ediint-as1-01.txt Chuck Shih, Actra Nancy Turaj, Mitre Corp. Rik Drummond, Drummond Group 19 October, 1996 MIME-based Secure EDI Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as ``work in progress.'' To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the ``1id-abstracts.txt'' listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract This document describes how to securely exchange EDI documents using MIME and public key cryptography. Feedback Instructions: If you want to provide feedback on this draft, follow these guidelines: -Send feedback via e-mail to mjansson@agathon.com, with "AS#1" in the Subject field. -Be specific as to what section you are referring to, preferrably quoting the portion that needs modification, after which you state your comments. -If you are recommending some text to be replaced with your suggested text, again, quote the section to be replaced, and be clear on the section in question. -If you are questioning fundamental methods, make it clear to us and we will bring the issue to the ediint list for discussion. To follow the discussion, you need to subscribe at ietf-ediint@imc.org. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Overview 2.1 Purpose of a security guideline for MIME EDI 2.2 Definitions 2.2.1 Terms 2.2.2 The secure transmission loop 2.2.3 Definition of receipts 2.3 Assumptions 2.3.1 EDI process assumptions 2.3.2 Flexibility assumptions 3. Structure of an EDI MIME message 3.1 Referenced RFC's and their contribution 3.1.1 RFC 821 SMTP [7] 3.1.2 RFC 822 Text Message Format [3] 3.1.3 RFC 1521 MIME [1] 3.1.4 RFC 1847 MIME Security Multiparts [6] 3.1.5 RFC 1892 Multipart/report [9] 3.1.6 RFC 1767 EDI Content [2] 3.1.7 RFC 2015 PGP/MIME [4] 3.1.8 Internet draft (fajman): Message Disposition Notification [5] 3.1.9 RSA Specifications - S/MIME (RSA Security, Inc.) [8] 3.2 Vocabulary 3.3 Structure of an EDI MIME message - No encryption/No signature 3.4 Structure of an EDI MIME message - Encryption/No signature 3.4.1 S/MIME 3.4.2 PGP/MIME 3.5 Structure of an EDI MIME message - No encryption/Signature 3.5.1 S/MIME 3.5.2 PGP/MIME 3.6 Structure of an EDI MIME message - Encryption/Signature 3.6.1 S/MIME 3.6.2 PGP/MIME 4. Receipts 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Requesting a signed receipt 4.3 Message Disposition Notification Format 4.4 Message Disposition Notification Processing 4.4.1 Large File Processing 4.4.2 Example 5. Public key certificate handling 5.1 Near term approach 5.2 Long term approach 6. Authors' Addresses 7. References 1. Introduction Previous work on internet EDI focussed on specifying MIME content types for EDI data ([2] RFC 1767). This Applicability Statement expands on RFC 1767 to specify use of a comprehensive set of data security features, specifically data privacy, data integrity/authenticity, non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt. This draft recognizes contemporary RFCs and internet drafts and is attempting to "re-invent" as little as possible. With an enhancements in the area of "receipts", as described below (3.1.8), secure internet MIME based EDI can be accomplished by using and complying with the following RFC's and drafts: -RFC 821 SMTP -RFC 822 Text Message Formats -RFC 1521 MIME -RFC 1767 EDI Content Type -RFC 1847 Security Multiparts for MIME -RFC 1892 Multipart/Report -Internet draft: Message Disposition Notification (fajman) -RFC 2015 MIME/PGP (elkins) -S/MIME Specification (RSA) Our intent here is to define clearly and precisely how these are pieced together and what is required by user agents to be compliant with this Applicability Statement. 2. Overview 2.1 Purpose of a security guideline for MIME EDI The purpose of these specifications is to ensure interoperability between EDI user agents, invoking some or all of the commonly expected security features. This standard is also NOT limited to strict EDI use, but applies to any electronic commerce application where business data needs to be exchanged over the internet in a secure manner. 2.2 Definitions 2.2.1. Terms EDI Electronic Data Interchange EC Electronic Commerce Receipt The functional message that is sent from a receiver to a sender to acknowledge receipt of an EDI/EC interchange Signed Receipt Same as above, but with a digital signature Message Disposition The way by which a receipt or a signed Notification (MDN) receipt is accomplished within Internet Messaging. Non-repudiation of NRR is a "legal event" that occurs when the Receipt (NRR) original sender of an EDI/EC interchange has verified the signed receipt coming back from the receiver. NRR IS NOT a functional or a technical message. PGP/MIME Digital envelope security based on the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) standard (Zimmerman), integrated with MIME Security Multiparts [6]. S/MIME A protocol for adding cryptographic signature and/or encryption services to Internet MIME messages. 2.2.2 The secure transmission loop The functional requirements document, [9] "Requirements for Inter- operable Internet EDI" (can be found at www.ietf.org),provides extensive information on EDI security and the user/business related processes surrounding the need for and use of EDI security. In this document, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the requirements document. This document's focus is on the formats and protocols for exchanging EDI content that has had security applied to it using the Internet's messaging transport. The "secure transmission loop" for EDI involves one organization sending a signed and encrypted EDI interchange to another organization, requesting a "signed receipt", followed later by the receiving organization sending this "signed receipt" back to the sending organization. In other words, the following transpires: -The organization sending EDI/EC data encrypts the data and provides a digital signature, using either PGP/MIME or S/MIME. In addition, they request a "signed receipt". -The receiving organization decrypts the message and verifies the signature, resulting in verified integrity of the data and authenticity of the sender. -The receiving organization then sends a "signed receipt" in the form of a signature over the hash from the previous step. The above describes functionality which if implemented, would satisfy all security requirements. This specification, however, leaves full flexibility for users to decide the degree to which they want to deploy those features with their EDI trading partners. 2.2.3 Definition of receipts The term used for the both the functional activity and message for acknowledging receipt of an EDI/EC interchange is "receipt", or "signed receipt". The first term is used if the acknowledgment is for an interchange that was not signed, thereby resulting in a receipt which is also not signed. The second term is used if the acknowledgment is for an interchange which was signed, resulting in a receipt which is also signed. The rule is: If a receipt is requested, it will be signed only if the original interchange was signed. A term often used in combination with receipts is "Non- repudiation of Receipt (NRR). NRR refers to a legal event which occurs only when the original sender of an interchange has verified the sender and content of a "signed receipt". Note that NRR is not possible without signatures. 2.3 Assumptions 2.3.1 EDI process assumptions -Encrypted object is an EDI Interchange This specification assumes that a typical EDI interchange is the lowest level object that will be subject to security features. In ANSI X12, this means anything between, and including segments ISA and IEA. In EDIFACT, this means anything between, and including, segments UNA/UNB and UNZ. In other words, the EDI interchanges including envelope segments remain intact and unreadable during secure transport. -EDI envelope headers are encrypted Congruent with the above statement, EDI envelope headers are NOT visible in the MIME package. In order to optimize VAN-to- Internet routing, work may need to be done in the future to define ways to pull out some of the envelope information to make them visible, however, this specification does not go into any detail on that. -X12.58 and UN/EDIFACT security considerations The most common EDI standards, ANSI X12 and EDIFACT, have defined internal provisions for security. X12.58 is the security mechanism for ANSI X12 and AUTACK provides security for EDIFACT. This specification DOES NOT dictate use or non-use of these security standards. They are both fully compatible, though possibly redundant, with this specification. 2.3.2 Flexibility assumptions -Encrypted or un-encrypted data This specification allows for EDI message exchange where the EDI data is either un-protected or protected by means of encryption. -Signed or un-signed data This specification allows for EDI message exchange with or without digital signature of the original EDI transmission. -Use of receipt or not (signature required for "Signed Receipt") This specification allows for EDI message transmission with or without a request for receipt notification. If receipt notification is requested, however, a signature is required as part of both the original EDI transmission and the returned receipt. -Formatting choices This specification defines use of two methods for formatting EDI contents that have security applied to it: -PGP/MIME -S/MIME This specification relies on the guidelines set forth in the internet draft on PGP/MIME, as reflected in [4] MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), and [8] S/MIME Specification from RSA Security, Inc. Compliance with this specification dictates that AT LEAST one of these methods is supported. -Hash function, message digest choices When signature is used, unless specified otherwise by the chosen method (PGP/MIME or S/MIME), the MD5 checksum hash function is recommended. In summary, the following eight permutations are possible, in any given trading relationship: (1) Sender sends un-encrypted data, does NOT request a receipt. (2) Sender sends unencrypted data, requests a receipt. Receiver sends back a receipt. (3) Sender sends encrypted data, does NOT request a receipt. (4) Sender sends encrypted data, requests a receipt. Receiver sends back a receipt. (5) Sender sends signed data, does NOT request a signed receipt. (6) Sender sends signed data, requests a signed receipt. Receiver sends back a signed receipt. (7) Sender sends encrypted and signed data, does NOT request a signed receipt. (8) Sender sends encrypted and signed data, requests a signed receipt. Receiver sends back a signed receipt. NOTE: Users can choose any of the eight possibilities, but only example (8) offers the whole suite of security features described in the "Secure transmission loop" above. NOTE: A request for receipt that is signed, MUST result in a signed receipt. A request for receipt without signature MUST result in an un-signed receipt. 3. Structure of an EDI MIME message The following sub chapters describe the structure of EDI MIME messages, making use of security features in different ways. Please note that if a signed receipt is to be returned, the original EDI transmission also had to have been signed. The structures shown below represent the use of specifications outlined in the following RFCs and Internet-drafts, and before moving into the sructures themselves, there is a brief review of what each document contributes. NOTE: The examples below are just that - examples. Do not code according to them. Refer to the RFC's that specify the correct grammar in each case. 3.1 Referenced RFC's and their contribution 3.1.1 RFC 821 SMTP [7] This is the core mail transfer standard that all MTA's need to adhere to. 3.1.2 RFC 822 Text Message Format [3] Defines message header fields and the parts making up a message. 3.1.3 RFC 1521 MIME [1] This is the basic MIME standard, upon which all MIME related RFCs build, including this one. Key contributions include definition of "content type" and sub-type "multipart", in addition to encoding guidelines, which establish 7-bit US-ASCII as the lowest common denominator used. 3.1.4 RFC 1847 MIME Security Multiparts [6] This document defines security multiparts for MIME: multipart/encrypted and multipart/signed. 3.1.5 RFC 1892 Multipart/report [10] This RFC defines the use of Multipart/report content type, something that the MDN draft (fajman) relies on for the receipt functionality. 3.1.6 RFC 1767 EDI Content [2] This RFC defines the use of content type "application" for ANSI X12 (application/EDI-X12), EDIFACT (application/EDIFACT) and mutually defined EDI (application/EDI-Consent). 3.1.7 RFC 2015 PGP/MIME [4] This RFC defines the use of content types "multipart/encrypted", "multipart/signed", "application/pgp encrypted" and "application/pgp-signature" for defining MIME PGP content. 3.1.8 Internet draft (fajman): Message Disposition Notification [5] This Internet draft defines how a "signed receipt" is requested, and the structure of the signed receipt, also called message disposition notification. NOTE: This is the only specification we were not able to take "as is". Extension field-names beginning with "X-" will not be defined as a standard field. MDN field names not beginning with "X-" need to be registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and described in an RFC. The X-Received-MIC field described in this document will be registered with IANA. 3.1.9 RSA Specifications - S/MIME (RSA Security, Inc.) [8] This specification describes how MIME shall carry PKCS7 envelope information. 3.2 Vocabulary <recipient email> The email address of the receiving organization's EDI processing system. <sender email> The email address of the sending organi- zation's EDI processing system. <date> Transmission date <EDI standard> "EDI-FACT" or "EDI-X12" or "EDI-consent" <encoding> "Quoted-printable" or "Base64" <EDI Object> ANSI X12 or EDIFACT EDI Interchange, or mutually agreed electronic commerce file <char set> "us-ascii" or "iso-8859-1" (note that if iso-8859-1 is used, in most cases encoding will be required "Quoted printable" or "Base 64" <hash symbol> "md5" or "sha1" NOTE: The examples below are just that - examples. They are provided for illustration purposes only. Refer to the RFCs or drafts under "7. References" for the actual grammar and protocol definitions 3.3 Structure of an EDI MIME message - No encryption/No signature To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard> Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> <EDI object> 3.4 Structure of an EDI MIME message - Encryption/No signature 3.4.1 S/MIME To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Version: 1.5 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ContentType = EnvelopedData &MIME-Version: 1.0 &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard>; &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> & &<EDI object> Notes: -The text preceeded by "&" indicates that it is really encrypted, but presented as text for clarity 3.4.2 PGP/MIME To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="separator"; protocol="application/pgp-encrypted" --separator Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted Version: 1 --separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version 2.6.2 &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard>; &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> & &<EDI object> -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --separator-- Notes: -The text preceeded by "&" indicates that it is really encrypted, but presented as text for clarity 3.5 Structure of an EDI MIME message - No encryption/Signature 3.5.1 S/MIME To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Version: 1.5 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ContentType = SignedData MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="separator"; micalg=rsa-<hash-symbol>; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature" --separator &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard> &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> & &<EDI object> --separator Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 <encoded signature> --separator-- Notes: -The lines preceeded with "&" is what the signature is calculated over. 3.5.2 PGP/MIME To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="separator"; micalg=pgp-<hash symbol>; protocol="application/pgp-signature" --separator &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard> &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> & &<EDI object> --separator Content-Type: application/pgp-signature -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version 2.6.2 fgfjhHjhJhgljhgJGHGJHGJHJHJhghjhJHJuytIYTiutTYT34553//YRytdhfFFQere /876JHJHGIUIUgsdIUYgYTRdgggguytUTIUlbXssfdsfdREWrewREWREEWE88POF/DF frtFFKFG+GFff= =ndaj -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --separator-- Notes: -The lines preceeded with "&" is what the signature is calculated over. 3.6 Structure of an EDI MIME message - Encryption/Signature 3.6.1 S/MIME The sequence here is that the EDI data is first signed as a multipart/signature body. Then the data plus the signature are encrypted to form the final multipart/encrypted body. In other words, the multipart/signed body part is nested within the multipart/encrypted body part. To: <recipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Version: 1.5 Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 ContentType = SignedAndEnvelopedData *MIME-Version: 1.0 *Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="separator"; *protocol="application/x-pkcs7-mime" * *--separator * Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="signed separator"; * micalg=rsa-<hash-symbol>; protocol="application/x-pkcs7-signature" * * --signed separator * &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard> * &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> * & * &<EDI object> * * --signed separator * Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-signature * Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 * * <encrypted signature> * * --signed separator-- --separator-- Notes: - The lines preceded with "&" is what the signature is calculated over. - The text preceeded by "*" indicates that it is really encrypted, but presented as text for clarity 3.6.2 PGP/MIME The sequence here is that the EDI data is first signed as a multipart/signature body, and then the data plus the signature is encrypted to form the final multipart/encrypted body. Here goes: To: <receipient email> Subject: From: <sender email> Date: <date> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; boundary="separator"; protocol="application/pgp-encrypted" --separator Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted Version: 1 --separator Content-Type: application/octet-stream -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version 2.6.2 * Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="signed separator"; * micalg=pgp-<hash symbol>; protocol="application/pgp-signature" * * --signed separator * &Content-Type: Application/<EDI standard> * &Content-Transfer-Encoding: <encoding> * & * &<EDI object> * * --signed separator * Content-Type: application/pgp-signature * * -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- * Version 2.6.2 * * fgfjhHjhJhgljhgJGHGJHGJHJHJhghjhJHJuytIYTiutTYT34553//YRytd * /GIUIUgsIUYgYTRdgggguytUTIUlbXssfdsfdREWrewREWREEWE88POF/DF * frtFFKFG+GFff= * =ndaj * -----END PGP MESSAGE----- * * --signed separator-- -----END PGP MESSAGE----- --separator-- Notes: - The lines preceded with "&" is what the signature is calculated over. - The text preceeded by "*" indicates that it is really encrypted, but presented as text for clarity -Elkins draft allows another way to handle the above in a combined fashion, However, for the purpose of EDI we require the above method, which is based on [4] RFC 1847. 4. Receipts 4.1 Introduction In order to provide a non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) or signed receipt, a message disposition notification as specified by draft- ietf-receipt-mdn-01 is to be implemented by a receiving trading partner's UA (User Agent). The MDN is used to notify a sending trading partner that sent a signed, or signed and encrypted EDI Interchange that: 1). The receiving trading partner acknowledges receipt of the sent EDI Interchange. 2). The receiving trading partner has authenticated the sender of the EDI Interchange. 3). The receiving trading partner has verified the integrity of the received EDI Interchange. Regardless of whether the EDI Interchange was sent in S/MIME or PGP/MIME format, the receiving trading partner's UA must provide the following basic processing: 1). If the sent EDI Interchange is encrypted, then the encrypted symmetric key and initialization vector (if applicable) is decrypted using the receiver's private key. 2). The decrypted symmetric encryption key is then used to decrypt the EDI Interchange. 3). The sender's public key is then used to decrypt the received message integrity check (MIC or Message Digest) calculated by the sender using a one-way hash function, and digitally signed by the sender. The decryption of the MIC authenticates the sender of the EDI Interchange to the receiving trading partner. 4). The receiving trading partner, using the same one-way hash function that the sending trading partner used, then calculates a MIC value on the received EDI Interchange and the RFC 1767 MIME content header information. 5). The receiving trading partner compares the received MIC from the sending trading partner with the MIC that the receiving trading partner independently calculated. If the two MIC values are equal, then the receiving trading partner knows that the EDI Interchange that was received was not altered in transit from the sending trading partner. The receiving trading partner has verified the integrity of the sent EDI Interchange. 6). The receiving trading partner then digitally signs the MIC that was calculated on the received EDI Interchange and the RFC 1767 MIME content header information. 7). The receiving trading partner formats the MDN and returns the digitally signed MIC back to the sending trading partner in the MDN. The EDI Interchange and the RFC 1767 MIME EDI content header, can actually be part of a multi-part MIME content-type. When the EDI Interchange is part of a multi-part MIME content-type, the MIC is calculated across the entire multi-part content, including the MIME headers. The multi-part MIME content that contains the EDI Interchange is then enveloped in either PKCS #7 or PGP format. The signed MIC returned in the MDN is then a signed receipt for the entire multi-part MIME content The MDN when received by the sender of the EDI Interchange can then be used by the sender: 1). As an acknowledgment that the EDI Interchange sent, was delivered and acknowledged by the receiving trading partner. 2). As an acknowledgment that the integrity of the EDI Interchange was verified by the receiving trading partner. 3). As an acknowledgment that the receiving trading partner has authenticated the sender of the EDI Interchange. 4). As a non-repudiation of receipt, since the returned MIC signed by the receiving trading partner could only be signed by the receiving trading partner. 4.2 Requesting a signed receipt Message Disposition Notifications are requested as per the draft-ietf- receipt-mdn-01.txt. A request that the receiving user agent issue a message disposition notification is made by placing the following header into the message to be sent: mdn-request-header = "Disposition-notification-to" ":" address The address field is specified as an RFC 822 user@domain address, and is the return address for the message disposition notification. 4.3 Message Disposition Notification Format The format of a message disposition notification is as specified in draft- ietf-receipt-mdn-01.txt. For use in EDI over the Internet the following format will be used: - content-type - per RFC1892 and the ietf-receipt-mdn specification - reporting-ua-field - per ietf-receipt-mdn specification - mdn-gateway-field - per ietf-receipt-mdn specification - original-recipient-field - per ietf-receipt-mdn specification - final-recipient-field - per ietf-receipt-mdn specification - original-message-id-field - per ietf-receipt-mdn specification - disposition-field - for EDI use: * autoprocessed - when the received content(s) are successfully processed * decryption_failed - when the receiver could not decrypt the contents * authentication_failed - when the receiver could not authenticate the sender * integrity_check_failed - when the receiver could not verify content integrity - extension field - the following extension field will be added in order to support signed-receipts for RFC 1767 specified content types and multi-part specified content types which includes RFC 1767 content types. The extension field is sent only when the received contents are successfully processed. - extension field = "X-" "Received-MIC" ":" MIC MIC or message integrity check, is defined as the result of a one-way hash function applied to the received EDI Interchange and RFC 1767 MIME content type information, or the multi-part MIME content containing RFC 1767 MIME EDI content information. The MIC is also referred to as a MD5 or message digest. The MIC that is returned in this message disposition notification extension field is signed with the receiving trading partner's private key. 4.4 Message Disposition Notification Processing 4.4.1 Large File Processing Large EDI Interchanges sent via SMTP can be automatically fragmented by some message transfer agents. A subtype of message, "partial", is defined in RFC 1521 to allow large objects to be delivered as separate pieces of mail and to be automatically reassembled by the receiving user agent. Using message, "partial", can help alleviate fragmentation of large messages by different message transfer agents, but does not completely eliminate the problem. It is still possible that a piece of a partial message, upon re-assembly, may prove themselves to contain a partial message. This is allowed by the Internet standards, and it is the responsibility of the user agent to reassemble the fragmented pieces. It is recommended that the size of the EDI Interchange sent via SMTP be configurable so that if fragmentation does occur, then message, "partial" can be used to send the large EDI Interchange in smaller pieces. RFC 1521 defines the use of Content-Type: message/partial. It is also recommended that very large EDI files not be sent via SMTP and a file transfer protocol be used instead. The receiving UA is required to re-assemble the original message before sending the message disposition notification to the original sender of the message. A message disposition notification is used to specify the disposition of the entire message that was sent, and should not be returned by a processing UA until the entire message is received, even if the received message requires re-assembling. 4.4.2 Example The following is an example of an MDN returned by a UA after processing a MIME EDI content type that was signed and encrypted: NOTE: This example is provided as an illustration only, and is not considered part of the protocol specification. If an example conflicts with the protocol definitions specified above or in the other referenced RFCs, the example is wrong. Date: Thur, 19 Sep 1996 00:16:55 (EDT) -0400 From: Edi Recipient <Edi_Recipient@edicorp.com> Message-ID: <17759920005.12345@edicorp.com> Subject: Signed Receipt To: Edi Sender <Edi_Sender@othercorp.com> MIME-Version 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=disposition-notification; boundary = "xxxxx" --xxxxx The message sent to Edi Recipient <Edi_Recipient@edicorp.com> has been received, the EDI Interchange was succesfully decrypted and its integrity was verified. In addition, the sender of the message, Edi Sender <Edi_Sender@othercorp.com> was authenticated as the originator of the message. There is no guarantee however that the EDI Interchange was syntactically correct, or was received by the EDI application. --xxxxx content-type: message/disposition-notification Reporting-UA: good-edi-internet-ua.edicorp.com (ediua 1.0) Original-Recipient: rfc822; Edi_Recipient@edicorp.com Final-Recipient: rfc822; Edi_Recipient@edicorp.com Original-Message-ID: <17759920005.12345@edicorp.com> Disposition: autoprocessed X-Received-MIC: Q2hlY2sgSW50XwdyaXRIQ --xxxxx content-type: message/rfc822 --xxxxx-- As specified by RFC 1892. Returning the original message is not necessary. This is an optional body part. 5. Public key certificate handling 5.1 Near term approach In the near term, and compliant with this Applicability Statement, self certification according to guidelines described in the functional requirements document, "Requirements for Inter-operable Internet EDI" [9] (can be found at www.ietf.org). 5.2 Long term approach Long term, certifying authorities such as Verisign may be used in compliance with X.509 guidelines, however, this Applicability Statement does NOT require use of a certifying authority (CA). 6. Authors' Addresses Mats Jansson mjansson@agathon.com LiNK 2317 Broadway, Suite 330 Redwood City, CA 94063 USA Chuck Shih chucks@actracorp.com Actra Corp. 610 East Caribbean Drive Sunnyvale, CA XXXXX USA Nancy Turaj nturaj@mail04.mitre.org MITRE Corporation Mailstop: W657 1820 Dolley Madison Blvd. McLean, VA 22102-3481 USA Rik Drummond drummond@onramp.com The Drummond Group 5008 Bentwood Ct. Ft. Worth, TX 76132 USA 7. References [1] N. Borenstein, N.Freed, "MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part One: Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC 1521, September 23, 1993. [2] D. Crocker, "MIME Encapsulation of EDI Objects", RFC 1767, March 2, 1995. [3] D. Crocker, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 13, 1982. [4] M. Elkins, "MIME Security With Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)", RFC 2015, Sept. 1996. [5] R. Fajman, "An Extensible Message Format for Message Disposition Notifications", draft-ietf-receipt-mdn-01.txt, May 13, 1996. [6] J. Galvin, S. Murphy, S. Crocker, N. Freed, "Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and Multipart/Encrypted", RFC 1847, 1995 [7] J. Postel, "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", STD 10, RFC 821, August 1, 1982. [8] RSA Laboratories, "S/MIME Message Specification; PKCS Security Services for MIME", Version of February 23, 1996. [9] C. Shih, "Requirements for Inter-operable Internet EDI", July 1996. [10] G. Vaudreuil, "The Multipart/Report Content Type for the Reporting of Mail System Administrative Messages", RFC 1892, January 15, 1996.
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