EMU Working Group                                              T. Clancy
Internet-Draft                                                       LTS
Intended status: Standards Track                           H. Tschofenig
Expires: October 7, 2007                          Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                           April 5, 2007


               EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK)
                       draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-05

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 7, 2007.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol
   method called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK).  This method
   is a lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
   authentication and key derivation.






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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

   3.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

   4.  Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9

   5.  Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

   6.  Ciphersuites Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     6.1.   Ciphersuite #1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       6.1.1.  Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       6.1.2.  Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       6.1.3.  Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     6.2.   Ciphersuite #2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       6.2.1.  Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       6.2.2.  Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       6.2.3.  Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

   7.  Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.1.   Header Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     7.2.   Ciphersuite Formatting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.3.   Payload Formatting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     7.4.   Protected Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       7.4.1.  Protected Results Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

   8.  Packet Processing Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

   9.  Example Message Exchanges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     10.1.  Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     10.2.  Protected Result Indications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.3.  Integrity Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.4.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.5.  Reflection attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.6.  Dictionary Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.7.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.8.  Denial of Service Resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     10.9.  Session Independence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.10. Exposition of the PSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     10.11. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.12. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.13. Fast Reconnect  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.14. Identity Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30



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     10.15. Protected Ciphersuite Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.16. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     10.17. Cryptographic Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

   12. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

   13. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

   14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     14.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     14.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 34



































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1.  Introduction

   EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) is an EAP method defining a
   generalized pre-shared key authentication technique.  Mutual
   authentication is achieved through a nonce-based exchange that is
   secured by a pre-shared key.

   EAP-GPSK addresses a large number of design goals with the intention
   of being applicable in a broad range of usage scenarios.

   The main design goals of EAP-GPSK are

   Simplicity:

      EAP-GPSK should be easy to implement.

   Security Model:

      EAP-GPSK has been designed in a threat model where the attacker
      has full control over the communication channel.  This is the EAP
      threat model that is presented in Section 7.1 of [RFC3748].

   Efficiency:

      EAP-GPSK does not make use of public key cryptography and fully
      relies of symmetric cryptography.  The restriction on symmetric
      cryptographic computations allows for low computational overhead.
      Hence, EAP-GPSK is lightweight and well suited for any type of
      device, especially those with processing power, memory and battery
      constraints.  Additionally it seeks to minimize the number of
      round trips.

   Flexibility:

      EAP-GPSK offers cryptographic flexibility.  At the beginning, the
      EAP server selects a set of cryptographic algorithms and key
      sizes, a so called ciphersuite.  The current version of EAP-GPSK
      comprises two ciphersuites, but additional ones can be easily
      added.

   Extensibility:

      The design of EAP-GPSK allows to securely exchange information
      between the EAP peer and the EAP server using protected data
      fields.  These fields might, for example, be used to exchange
      channel binding information or to provide support for identity
      confidentiality.




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2.  Terminology

   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
   words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   This section describes the various variables and functions used in
   the EAP-GPSK method.

   Variables:

   CSuite_List:  An octet array listing available ciphersuites (variable
      length)

   CSuite_Sel:  Ciphersuite selected by the peer (6 octets)

   ID_Peer:  Peer NAI [RFC4282]

   ID_Server:  Server identity as an opaque blob.

   KS:  Integer representing the key size in octets of the selected
      ciphersuite CSuite_Sel. The key size is one of the ciphersuite
      parameters.

   PD_Payload:  Data carried within the protected data payload

   PD_Payload_Block:  Block of possibly multiple PD_Payloads carried by
      a GPSK packet

   PL:  Integer representing the length of the PSK in octets (2 octets)

   RAND_Peer:  Random integer generated by the peer (32 octets)

   RAND_Server:  Random integer generated by the server (32 octets)


   Operations:

   A || B:  Concatenation of octet strings A and B

   ENC_X(Y):  Encryption of message Y with a symmetric key X, using a
      defined block cipher







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   KDF_X(Y):  Key Derivation Function that generates an arbitrary number
      of octets of output using secret X and seed Y

   length(X):  Function that returns the length of input X in octets,
      encoded as a 2-octet integer in network byte order

   MAC_X(Y):  Keyed message authentication code computed over Y with
      symmetric key X

   SEC_X(Y):  SEC is a function that provides integrity protection based
      on the chosen ciphersuite.  The function SEC uses the algorithm
      defined by the selected ciphersuite and applies it to the message
      content Y with key X. In short, SEC_X(Y) = Y || MAC_X(Y).

   X[A..B]:  Notation representing octets A through B of octet array X


   The following abbreviations are used for the keying material:

   EMSK:  Extended Master Session Key is exported by the EAP method (64
      octets)

   MK:  Master Key between the peer and EAP server from which all other
      EAP method session keys are derived (KS octets)

   MSK:  Master Session Key exported by the EAP method (64 octets)

   PK:  Session key generated from the MK and used during protocol
      exchange to encrypt protected data (KS octets)

   PSK:  Long-term key shared between the peer and the server (PL
      octets)

   SK:  Session key generated from the MK and used during protocol
      exchange to demonstrate knowledge of the PSK (KS octets)



3.  Overview

   The EAP framework (see Section 1.3 of [RFC3748]) defines three basic
   steps that occur during the execution of an EAP conversation between
   the EAP peer, the Authenticator and the EAP server.

   1.  The first phase, discovery, is handled by the underlying
       protocol.





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   2.  The EAP authentication phase with EAP-GPSK is defined in this
       document.
   3.  The secure association distribution and secure association phases
       are handled differently depending on the underlying protocol.

   EAP-GPSK performs mutual authentication between EAP peer ("Peer") and
   EAP server ("Server") based on a pre-shared key (PSK).  The protocol
   consists of four message exchanges (GPSK-1, ..., GPSK-4), in which
   both sides exchange nonces and their identities, compute and exchange
   a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the previously exchanged
   values, keyed with the pre-shared key.  This MAC is considered as
   proof of possession of the pre-shared key.

   A successful protocol exchange is shown in Figure 1.


   +--------+                                     +--------+
   |        |                EAP-Request/Identity |        |
   |  EAP   |<------------------------------------|  EAP   |
   |  peer  |                                     | server |
   |        | EAP-Response/Identity               |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-1 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-2                 |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-3 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-4                 |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |          EAP-Success                |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   +--------+                                     +--------+

                  Figure 1: EAP-GPSK: Successful Exchange

   The full EAP-GPSK protocol is as follows:
   GPSK-1:

      ID_Server, RAND_Server, CSuite_List






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   GPSK-2:

      SEC_SK(ID_Peer, ID_Server, RAND_Peer, RAND_Server, CSuite_List,
      CSuite_Sel, [ ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )

   GPSK-3

      SEC_SK(RAND_Peer, RAND_Server, CSuite_Sel, [
      ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )

   GPSK-4:

      SEC_SK( [ ENC_PK(PD_Payload_Block) ] )


   The EAP server begins EAP-GPSK by selecting a random number
   RAND_Server and by encoding the supported ciphersuites into
   CSuite_List.  A ciphersuite consists of an encryption algorithm, a
   key derivation function and a message authentication code.

   In GPSK-1, the EAP server sends its identity ID_Server, a random
   number RAND_Server and a list of supported ciphersuites CSuite_List.
   The decision which ciphersuite to offer and which ciphersuite to pick
   is policy- and implementation-dependent and therefore outside the
   scope of this document.

   In GPSK-2, the peer sends its identity ID_Peer and a random number
   RAND_Peer.  Furthermore, it repeats the received parameters of the
   GPSK-1 message (ID_Server, RAND_Server, CSuite_List) and the selected
   ciphersuite.  It computes a Message Authentication Code over all the
   transmitted parameters.

   The EAP server verifies the received Message Authentication Code.  In
   case of successful verification, the EAP server computes a Message
   Authentication Code over the session parameter and returns it to the
   peer (within GPSK-3).  Within GPSK-2 and GPSK-3, peer and EAP server
   have the possibility to exchange encrypted protected data parameters.

   The peer verifies the received Message Authentication Code.  If the
   verification is successful, GPSK-4 is prepared.  This message can
   optionally contain the peer's protected data parameters.

   Upon receipt of GPSK-4, the server processes any included
   PD_Payload_Block.  Then, the EAP server sends an EAP Success message
   to indicate the successful outcome of the authentication.






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4.  Key Derivation

   EAP-GPSK provides key derivation in compliance to the requirements of
   [RFC3748] and [I-D.ietf-eap-keying].  Note that this section provides
   an abstract description for the key derivation procedure that needs
   to be instantiated with a specific ciphersuite.

   The long-term credential shared between EAP peer and EAP server
   SHOULD be a strong pre-shared key PSK of at least 16 octets, though
   its length and entropy is variable.  While it is possible to use a
   password or passphrase, doing so is NOT RECOMMENDED as it would make
   EAP-GPSK vulnerable to dictionary attacks.

   During an EAP-GPSK authentication, a Master Key MK, a Session Key SK
   and a Protected Data Encryption Key PK (if using an encrypting
   ciphersuite) are derived using the ciphersuite-specified KDF and data
   exchanged during the execution of the protocol, namely 'RAND_Peer ||
   ID_Peer || RAND_Server || ID_Server' referred as inputString as its
   short-hand form.

   In case of successful completion, EAP-GPSK derives and exports an MSK
   and EMSK both in length of 64 octets.

   The following notation is used: KDF-X(Y, Z)[A..B], whereby
   X  is the length, in octets, of the desired output,
   Y  is a secret key,
   Z  is the inputString,
   [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
      with octet B from the output of the KDF function.

   This keying material is derived using the ciphersuite-specified KDF
   as follows:

   o  inputString = RAND_Peer || ID_Peer || RAND_Server || ID_Server
   o  MK = KDF-KS(0x00, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)[0..KS-1]
   o  MSK = KDF-{128+2*KS}(MK, inputString)[0..63]
   o  EMSK = KDF-{128+2*KS}(MK, inputString)[64..127]
   o  SK = KDF-{128+2*KS}(MK, inputString)[128..127+KS]
   o  PK = KDF-{128+2*KS}(MK, inputString)[128+KS..127+2*KS] (if using
      an encrypting ciphersuite)

   Additionally, the EAP keying framework [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] requires
   the definition of a Method-ID, Session-ID, Peer-ID, and Server-ID.
   These values are defined as:

   o  Method-ID = KDF-16(0x00, "Method ID" || EAP_Method_Type ||
      CSuite_Sel || inputString)[0..15]




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   o  Session-ID = Type_Code || Method_ID
   o  Peer-ID = ID_Peer
   o  Server-ID = ID_Server

   EAP_Method_Type refers to the integer value of the IANA allocated EAP
   Type code.

   Figure 2 depicts the key derivation procedure of EAP-GPSK.


   +-------------+     +-------------------------------+
   |   PL-octet  |     | RAND_Peer || ID_Peer ||       |
   |     PSK     |     | RAND_Server || ID_Server      |
   +-------------+     +-------------------------------+
          |                            |            |
          |     +------------+         |            |
          |     | CSuite_Sel |         |            |
          |     +------------+         |            |
          |           |                |            |
          v           v                v            |
   +--------------------------------------------+   |
   |                    KDF                     |   |
   +--------------------------------------------+   |
                             |                      |
                             v                      |
                      +-------------+               |
                      |   KS-octet  |               |
                      |     MK      |               |
                      +-------------+               |
                             |                      |
                             v                      v
   +---------------------------------------------------+
   |                      KDF                          |
   +---------------------------------------------------+
        |             |             |            |
        v             v             v            v
   +---------+   +---------+  +----------+  +----------+
   | 64-octet|   | 64-octet|  | KS-octet |  | KS-octet |
   |   MSK   |   |  EMSK   |  |    SK    |  |   PK     |
   +---------+   +---------+  +----------+  +----------+

                     Figure 2: EAP-GPSK Key Derivation


5.  Ciphersuites

   The design of EAP-GPSK allows cryptographic algorithms and key sizes,
   called ciphersuites, to be negotiated during the protocol run.  The



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   ability to specify block-based and hash-based ciphersuites is
   offered.  Extensibility is provided with the introduction of new
   ciphersuites; this document specifies an initial set.  The CSuite/
   Specifier column in Figure 3 uniquely identifies a ciphersuite.

   For a vendor-specific ciphersuite the first three octets are the
   vendor-specific OID, and the last three octets are vendor assigned
   for the specific ciphersuite.

   The following ciphersuites are specified in this document:


   +-----------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
   | CSuite/   | KS | Encryption  | Integrity /  | Key Derivation |
   | Specifier |    |             | KDF MAC      | Function       |
   +-----------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
   | 0x000001  | 16 | AES-CBC-128 | AES_CMAC_128 | GKDF           |
   +-----------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+
   | 0x000002  | 32 | NULL        | HMAC-SHA256  | GKDF           |
   +-----------+----+-------------+--------------+----------------+

                          Figure 3: Ciphersuites

   Ciphersuite 1, which is based on AES as a cryptographic primitive, is
   mandatory to implement.  This document specifies also a second
   ciphersuite, but its support is optional.

   Each ciphersuite needs to specify a key derivation function.  The
   ciphersuites defined in this document make use of the Generalized Key
   Distribution Function (GKDF) which utilizes the MAC function defined
   in the ciphersuite.  Future ciphersuites can use any other formally
   specified KDF that takes as arguments a key and a seed value, and
   produces at least 128+2*KS octets of output.

   GKDF has the following structure:

   GKDF-X(Y, Z)

   X  length, in octets, of the desired output
   Y  secret key
   Z  inputString










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   GKDF-X (Y, Z) {
     n = ceiling integer of ( X / KS );
        /* determine number of output blocks */

     M_0 = "";
     result = "";

     for i = 1 to n {
       M_i = MAC_Y (i || Z);
       result = result || M_i;
     }

     return truncate (result)
   }

   Note that the variable 'i' in M_i is represented as a 2-octet value
   in network byte order.


6.  Ciphersuites Processing Rules

6.1.  Ciphersuite #1

6.1.1.  Encryption

   With this ciphersuite all cryptography is built around a single
   cryptographic primitive, AES-128.  Within the protected data frames,
   AES-128 is used in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation (see
   [CBC]).  This EAP method uses encryption in a single payload, in the
   protected data payload (see Section 7.4).

   In a nutshell, the CBC mode proceeds as follows.  The IV is XORed
   with the first plaintext block before it is encrypted.  Then for
   successive blocks, the previous ciphertext block is XORed with the
   current plaintext, before it is encrypted.

6.1.2.  Integrity

   Ciphersuite 1 uses CMAC as Message Authentication Code.  CMAC is
   recommended by NIST.  Among its advantages, CMAC is capable to work
   with messages of arbitrary length.  A detailed description of CMAC
   can be found in [CMAC].


   The following instantiation is used: AES-128-CMAC(SK, Input) denotes
   the MAC of Input under the key SK.

   where Input refers to the following content:



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   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-2
   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-3
   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-4

6.1.3.  Key Derivation

   This ciphersuite instantiates the KDF in the following way:

   inputString = RAND_Peer || ID_Peer || RAND_Server || ID_Server

   MK = GKDF-32 (0x00, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)

   MSK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[0..63]

   EMSK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[64..127]

   SK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[128..143]

   PK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[144..159]

   Method-ID = GKDF-16 (0x00, "Method ID" || EAP_Method_Type ||
   CSuite_Sel || inputString)

6.2.  Ciphersuite #2

6.2.1.  Encryption

   Ciphersuite 2 does not include an algorithm for encryption.  With a
   NULL encryption algorithm, encryption is defined as:

   E_X(Y) = Y

   When using this ciphersuite, the data exchanged inside the protected
   data block is not encrypted.  Therefore this mode MUST NOT be used if
   confidential information appears inside the protected data block.

6.2.2.  Integrity

   Ciphersuite 2 uses the keyed MAC function HMAC, with the SHA256 hash
   algorithm (see [RFC4634]).

   For integrity protection the following instantiation is used:

   HMAC-SHA256(SK, Input) denotes the MAC of Input under the key SK
   where Input refers to the following content:






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   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-2
   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-3
   o  Value of SEC_SK(Value) in message GPSK-4

6.2.3.  Key Derivation

   This ciphersuite instantiates the KDF in the following way:

   inputString = RAND_Peer || ID_Peer || RAND_Server || ID_Server

   MK = GKDF-32 (0x00, PL || PSK || CSuite_Sel || inputString)

   MSK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[0..63]

   EMSK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[64..127]

   SK = GKDF-160 (MK, inputString)[128..159]

   Method-ID = GKDF-16 (0x00, "Method ID" || EAP_Method_Type ||
   CSuite_Sel || inputString)


7.  Packet Formats

   This section defines the packet format of the EAP-GPSK messages.

7.1.  Header Format

   The EAP-GPSK header has the following structure:

   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |     Type      |    OP-Code    |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                         Payload                           ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 5

   The Code, Identifier, Length, and Type fields are all part of the EAP
   header, and defined in [RFC3748].  IANA has allocated EAP Method Type
   XX for EAP-GPSK, thus the Type field in the EAP header MUST be XX.



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   The OP-Code field is one of four values:

   o  0x01 : GPSK-1
   o  0x02 : GPSK-2
   o  0x03 : GPSK-3
   o  0x04 : GPSK-4
   o  0x05 : GPSK-Fail
   o  0x06 : GPSK-Protected-Fail

7.2.  Ciphersuite Formatting

   Ciphersuites are encoded as 6-octet arrays.  The first three octets
   indicate the CSuite/Vendor field.  For vendor-specific ciphersuites,
   this represents the vendor OID.  The last three octets indicate the
   CSuite/Specifier field, which identifies the particular ciphersuite.
   The 3-octet CSuite/Vendor value 0x000000 indicates ciphersuites
   allocated by the IETF.

   Graphically, they are represented as

   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |        CSuite/Vendor = 0x000000 or OID        |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
          CSuite / Specifier       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                 Figure 6

   CSuite_Sel is encoded as a 6-octet ciphersuite CSuite/Vendor and
   CSuite/Specifier pair.

   CSuite_List is a variable-length octet array of ciphersuites.  It is
   encoded by concatenating encoded ciphersuite values.  Its length in
   octets MUST be a multiple of 6.

7.3.  Payload Formatting

   Payload formatting is based on the protocol exchange description in
   Section 3.

   The GPSK-1 payload format is defined as follows:







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   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       length(ID_Server)       |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                         ID_Server                         ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                   32-octet RAND_Server                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      length(CSuite_List)      |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                        CSuite_List                        ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                         Figure 7: GPSK-1 Payload

   The GPSK-2 payload format is defined as follows:



























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   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |        length(ID_Peer)        |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                         ID_Peer                         ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |       length(ID_Server)       |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                         ID_Server                         ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                     32-octet RAND_Peer                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                    32-octet RAND_Server                   ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |      length(CSuite_List)      |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                        CSuite_List                        ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           CSuite_Sel                          |
   +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                               |   length(PD_Payload_Block)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                 optional PD_Payload_Block                 ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                   KS-octet payload MAC                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                         Figure 8: GPSK-2 Payload

   If the optional protected data payload is not included, then
   length(PD_Payload_Block)=0 and the PD payload is excluded.




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   The GPSK-3 payload is defined as follows:


   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                    32-octet RAND_Peer                   ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                    32-octet RAND_Server                   ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           CSuite_Sel                          |
   +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                               |   length(PD_Payload_Block)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                 optional PD_Payload_Block                 ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                   KS-octet payload MAC                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                         Figure 9: GPSK-3 Payload

   If the optional protected data payload is not included, then
   length(PD_Payload_Block)=0 and the PD payload is excluded.

   The GPSK-4 payload format is defined as follows:

















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   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   length(PD_Payload_Block)    |                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
   |                                                               |
   ...                 optional PD_Payload_Block                 ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                   KS-octet payload MAC                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                         Figure 10: GPSK-4 Payload

   If the optional protected data payload is not included, then
   length(PD_Payload_Block)=0 and the PD payload is excluded.  The MAC
   MUST always be included, regardless of the presence of
   PD_Payload_Block.

   The GPSK-Fail payload format is defined as follows:


   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Failure-Code                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                       Figure 11: GPSK-Fail Payload

   The GPSK-Protected-Fail payload format is defined as follows:


   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                         Failure-Code                          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                   KS-octet payload MAC                    ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




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                  Figure 12: GPSK-Protected-Fail Payload

   The Failure-Code field is one of three values, but can be extended:

   o  0x00000001: PSK Not Found
   o  0x00000002: Authentication Failure
   o  0x00000003: Authorization Failure
   o  0x00000004 through 0xFFFFFFFF : Unallocated

   "PSK Not Found" indicates a key for a particular user could not be
   located, making authentication impossible.  "Authentication Failure"
   indicates a MAC failure due to a PSK mismatch.  "Authorization
   Failure" indicates that while the PSK being used is correct, the user
   is not authorized to connect.

7.4.  Protected Data

   The protected data blocks are a generic mechanism for the peer and
   server to securely exchange data.  If the specified ciphersuite has a
   NULL encryption primitive, then this channel only offers
   authenticity, and not confidentiality.

   These payloads are encoded as the concatenation of type-length-value
   (TLV) triples called PD_Payloads.

   Type values are encoded as a 6-octet string and represented by a
   3-octet vendor and 3-octet specifier field.  The vendor field
   indicates the type as either standards-specified or vendor-specific.
   If these three octets are 0x000000, then the value is standards-
   specified, and any other value represents a vendor-specific OID.

   The specifier field indicates the actual type.  For vendor field
   0x000000, the specifier field is maintained by IANA.  For any other
   vendor field, the specifier field is maintained by the vendor.

   Length fields are specified as 2-octet integers in network byte
   order, and reflect only the length of the value, and do not include
   the length of the type and length fields.

   Graphically, this can be depicted as follows:











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   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   PData/Vendor                |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
            PData/Specifier        |         PData/Length          |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                        PData/Value                        ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

              Protected Data Payload (PD_Payload) Formatting

   These PD_Payloads are concatenated together to form a
   PD_Payload_Block.  The If the CSuite_Sel includes support for
   encryption, then the PD_Payload_Block includes fields specifying an
   initialization vector (IV), and the necessary padding.  This can be
   depicted as follows:


   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                      Initialization Vector                    |
   ...       (length is block size for encryption algorithm)     ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                        PD_Payload                         ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                 optional PD_Payload, etc                  ...
   |                                                               |
   +               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |               |             Padding (0-255 octets)            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                               |  Pad Length   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Protected Data Block (PD_Payload_Block) Formatting if Encryption
                                 Supported

   The Initialization Vector is a randomly chosen value whose length is
   equal to the block length of the underlying encryption algorithm.



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   Recipients MUST accept any value.  Senders SHOULD either pick this
   value pseudo-randomly and independently for each message or use the
   final ciphertext block of the previous message sent.  Senders MUST
   NOT use the same value for each message, use a sequence of values
   with low hamming distance (e.g., a sequence number), or use
   ciphertext from a received message.

   The concatenation of PD_Payloads along with the padding and padding
   length are all encrypted using the negotiated block cipher.  If no
   block cipher is specified, then these fields are not encrypted.

   The Padding field MAY contain any value chosen by the sender, and
   MUST have a length that makes the combination of the concatenation of
   PD_Payloads, the Padding, and the Pad Length to be a multiple of the
   encryption block size.

   The Pad Length field is the length of the Padding field.  The sender
   SHOULD set the Pad Length to the minimum value that makes the
   combination of the PD_Payloads, the Padding, and the Pad Length a
   multiple of the block size, but the recipient MUST accept any length
   that results in proper alignment.  This field is encrypted with the
   negotiated cipher.

   If the negotiated ciphersuite does not support encryption, then the
   padding field MUST be of length zero.  The padding length field MUST
   still be present, and contain the value zero.  This is depicted in
   the following figure.


   --- bit offset --->
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                        PD_Payload                         ...
   |                                                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                                               |
   ...                 optional PD_Payload, etc    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                                               |      0x00     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

   Protected Data Block (PD_Payload_Block) Formatting Without Encryption

   For PData/Vendor field 0x000000, the following PData/Specifier fields
   are defined:





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   o  0x000000 : Reserved
   o  0x000001 : Protected Results Indication
   o  0x000002 through 0xFFFFFF : Unallocated

7.4.1.  Protected Results Indication

   Based on the PData/Specifier allocation the following 8-bit payload
   is specified to be placed in the PD_Payload Value to provide the
   functionality of protected results indication.


        0
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |I|R|R|R|R|R|R|R|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

        I: Result Indicator

           The bits have the following meaning:

           (0): Success
           (1): Failure

        R: Reserved
           These bits are used for padding.

   The 8 bits of protected results indication functionality MUST only be
   sent in GPSK-3 from the EAP server to the EAP peer.


8.  Packet Processing Rules

   This section defines how the EAP peer and EAP server MUST behave when
   received packet is deemed invalid.

   Any EAP-GPSK packet that cannot be parsed by the EAP peer or the EAP
   server MUST be silently discarded.  An EAP peer or EAP server
   receiving any unexpected packet (e.g., an EAP peer receiving GPSK-3
   before receiving GPSK-1 or before transmitting GPSK-2) MUST silently
   discard the packet.

   GPSK-1 contains no MAC protection, so provided it properly parses, it
   MUST be accepted by the peer.  Note that the ciphersuite list
   provided by the EAP server in CSuite_List MUST always include the
   mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite defined in this document.  Hence,
   there is always at least one ciphersuite in common between the EAP
   peer and the EAP server.  If the EAP peer decides the ID_Server is



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   that of a AAA server to which it does not wish to authenticate, the
   EAP peer should respond with an EAP-NAK.

   For GPSK-2, if ID_Peer is for an unknown user, the EAP server MUST
   send either a "PSK Not Found" GPSK-Fail message, or an
   "Authentication Failure" GPSK-Fail, depending on its policy, and
   discard the received packet.  If the MAC validation fails, the server
   MUST transmit a GPSK-Fail message specifying "Authentication Failure"
   and discard the received packet.  If the RAND_Server or CSuite_List
   field in GPSK-2 does not match the values in GPSK-1, the server MUST
   silently discard the packet.  If server policy determines the peer is
   not authorized and the MAC is correct, the server MUST transmit a
   GPSK-Protected-Fail message indicating "Authorization Failure" and
   discard the received packet.

   A peer receiving a GPSK-Fail / GPSK-Protected-Fail message in
   response to a GPSK-2 message MUST replay the received GPSK-Fail /
   GPSK-Protected-Fail message.  Then, the EAP server returns an EAP-
   Failure after receiving the GPSK-Fail / GPSK-Protected-Fail message
   to correctly finish the EAP conversation.  If MAC validation on a
   GPSK-Protected-Fail packet fails, then the received packet MUST be
   silently discarded.

   For GPSK-3, a peer MUST silently discard messages where the
   RAND_Peer, the RAND_Server, or the CSuite_Sel fields do match those
   transmitted in GPSK-2.  An EAP peer MUST silently discard any packet
   whose MAC fails.

   For GPSK-4, a server MUST silently discard any packet whose MAC fails
   validation.

   If a decryption failure of a protected payload is detected, the
   recipient MUST silently discard the GPSK packet.


9.  Example Message Exchanges

   This section shows a couple of example message flows.

   A successful EAP-GPSK message exchange is shown in Figure 1.











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   +--------+                                     +--------+
   |        |                EAP-Request/Identity |        |
   |  EAP   |<------------------------------------|  EAP   |
   |  peer  |                                     | server |
   |        | EAP-Response/Identity               |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-1 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/EAP-NAK                |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |          EAP-Failure                |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   +--------+                                     +--------+

    EAP-GPSK: Unsuccessful Exchange (Unacceptable AAA server identity;
                                ID_Server)


   +--------+                                     +--------+
   |        |                EAP-Request/Identity |        |
   |  EAP   |<------------------------------------|  EAP   |
   |  peer  |                                     | server |
   |        | EAP-Response/Identity               |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-1 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-2                 |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Request/GPSK-3 (GPSK-Fail       |        |
   |        | (PSK Not Found or AuthenFail)       |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-4 (GPSK-Fail)     |        |
   |        | (PSK Not Found or AuthenFail)       |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |          EAP-Failure                |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   +--------+                                     +--------+

              EAP-GPSK: Unsuccessful Exchange (Unknown user)




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   +--------+                                     +--------+
   |        |                EAP-Request/Identity |        |
   |  EAP   |<------------------------------------|  EAP   |
   |  peer  |                                     | server |
   |        | EAP-Response/Identity               |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-1 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-2                 |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Request/GPSK-3 (GPSK-Fail       |        |
   |        | (AuthenFail)                        |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-4 (GPSK-Fail)     |        |
   |        | (AuthenFail)                        |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |          EAP-Failure                |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   +--------+                                     +--------+

          EAP-GPSK: Unsuccessful Exchange (Invalid MAC in GPSK-2)

























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   +--------+                                     +--------+
   |        |                EAP-Request/Identity |        |
   |  EAP   |<------------------------------------|  EAP   |
   |  peer  |                                     | server |
   |        | EAP-Response/Identity               |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |                  EAP-Request/GPSK-1 |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Response/GPSK-2                 |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Request/GPSK-3                  |        |
   |        | GPSK-Protected-Fail                 |        |
   |        | (Authorization Failure)             |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        | EAP-Request/GPSK-4                  |        |
   |        | GPSK-Protected-Fail                 |        |
   |        | (Authorization Failure)             |        |
   |        |------------------------------------>|        |
   |        |                                     |        |
   |        |          EAP-Failure                |        |
   |        |<------------------------------------|        |
   +--------+                                     +--------+

          EAP-GPSK: Unsuccessful Exchange (Authorization failure)


10.  Security Considerations

   [RFC3748] highlights several attacks that are possible against EAP
   since EAP itself does not provide any security.

   This section discusses the claimed security properties of EAP-GPSK as
   well as vulnerabilities and security recommendations in the threat
   model of [RFC3748].

10.1.  Mutual Authentication

   EAP-GPSK provides mutual authentication.

   The server believes that the peer is authentic because it can
   calculate a valid MAC and the peer believes that the server is
   authentic because it can calculate another valid MAC.

   The key used for mutual authentication is computed again based on the



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   long-term secret PSK that has to provide sufficient entropy and
   therefore sufficient strength.  In this way EAP-GPSK is no different
   than other authentication protocols based on pre-shared keys.

10.2.  Protected Result Indications

   EAP-GPSK offers the capability to exchange protected result
   indications using the protected data payloads.

10.3.  Integrity Protection

   EAP-GPSK provides integrity protection based on the ciphersuites
   suggested in this document.

10.4.  Replay Protection

   EAP-GPSK provides replay protection of its mutual authentication part
   thanks to the use of random numbers RAND_Server and RAND_Peer.  Since
   RAND_Server is 32 octets long, one expects to have to record 2**64
   (i.e., approximately 1.84*10**19) EAP-GPSK successful authentication
   before an protocol run can be replayed.  Hence, EAP-GPSK provides
   replay protection of its mutual authentication part as long as
   RAND_Server and RAND_Peer are chosen at random, randomness is
   critical for replay protection.

10.5.  Reflection attacks

   EAP-GPSK provides protection against reflection attacks in case of an
   extended authentication because the messages are constructed in a
   different fashion.

10.6.  Dictionary Attacks

   EAP-GPSK relies on a long-term shared secret (PSK) that MUST be based
   on at least 16 octets of entropy to guarantee security against
   dictionary attacks.  Users who use passwords are not guaranteed
   security against dictionary attacks.  Derivation of the long-term
   shared secret from a password is strongly discouraged.

10.7.  Key Derivation

   EAP-GPSK supports key derivation as shown in Section 4.

10.8.  Denial of Service Resistance

   Denial of Service (DoS) resistance has not been a design goal for
   EAP-GPSK.




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   It is however believed that EAP-GPSK does not provide any obvious and
   avoidable venue for such attacks.

   It is worth noting that the server has to maintain some state when it
   engages in an EAP-GPSK conversation, namely to generate and to
   remember the 32-octet RAND_Server.  This should however not lead to
   resource exhaustion as this state and the associated computation are
   fairly lightweight.

   It is recommended that EAP-GPSK does not allow EAP notifications to
   be interleaved in its dialog to prevent potential DoS attacks.
   Indeed, since EAP Notifications are not integrity protected, they can
   easily be spoofed by an attacker.  Such an attacker could force a
   peer that allows EAP Notifications to engage in a discussion which
   would delay his authentication or result in the peer taking
   unexpected actions (e.g., in case a notification is used to prompt
   the peer to do some "bad" action).

   It is up to the implementation of EAP-GPSK or to the peer and the
   server to specify the maximum number of failed cryptographic checks
   that are allowed.

10.9.  Session Independence

   Thanks to its key derivation mechanisms, EAP-GPSK provides session
   independence: passive attacks (such as capture of the EAP
   conversation) or active attacks (including compromise of the MSK or
   EMSK) do not enable compromise of subsequent or prior MSKs or EMSKs.
   The assumption that RAND_Peer and RAND_Server are random is central
   for the security of EAP-GPSK in general and session independence in
   particular.

10.10.  Exposition of the PSK

   EAP-GPSK does not provide perfect forward secrecy.  Compromise of the
   PSK leads to compromise of recorded past sessions.

   Compromise of the PSK enables the attacker to impersonate the peer
   and the server and it allows the adversary to compromise future
   sessions.

   EAP-GPSK provides no protection against a legitimate peer sharing its
   PSK with a third party.  Such protection may be provided by
   appropriate repositories for the PSK, which choice is outside the
   scope of this document.  The PSK used by EAP-GPSK must only be shared
   between two parties: the peer and the server.  In particular, this
   PSK must not be shared by a group of peers communicating with the
   same server.



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   The PSK used by EAP-GPSK must be cryptographically separated from
   keys used by other protocols, otherwise the security of EAP-GPSK may
   be compromised.

10.11.  Fragmentation

   EAP-GPSK does not support fragmentation and reassembly since the
   message size is small.

10.12.  Channel Binding

   This document enables the ability to exchange channel binding
   information.  It does not, however, define the encoding of channel
   binding information in the document.

10.13.  Fast Reconnect

   EAP-GPSK does not provide the fast reconnect capability since this
   method is already at (or close to) the lower limit of the number of
   roundtrips and the cryptographic operations.

10.14.  Identity Protection

   Identity protection is not specified in this document.  Extensions
   can be defined that enhance this protocol to provide this feature.

10.15.  Protected Ciphersuite Negotiation

   EAP-GPSK provides protected ciphersuite negotiation via the
   indication of available ciphersuites by the server in the first
   message and a confirmation by the peer in the subsequent message.

10.16.  Confidentiality

   Although EAP-GPSK provides confidentiality in its protected data
   payloads, it cannot claim to do so as per Section 7.2.1 of [RFC3748].

10.17.  Cryptographic Binding

   Since EAP-GPSK does not tunnel another EAP method, it does not
   implement cryptographic binding.


11.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires IANA to allocate a new EAP Type for EAP-GPSK.

   This document requires IANA to create a new registry for



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   ciphersuites, protected data types, and failure codes.  IANA is
   furthermore instructed to add the specified ciphersuites, protected
   data types, and failure codes to this registry as defined in this
   document.  Values can be added or modified with informational RFCs
   defining either block-based or hash-based ciphersuites, protected
   data payloads, or failure codes.  Each ciphersuite needs to provide
   processing rules and needs to specify how the following algorithms
   are instantiated: Encryption, Integrity and Key Derivation.
   Additionally, the preferred key size needs to be specified.

   The following layout represents the initial ciphersuite CSuite/
   Specifier registry setup:

   o  0x000000 : Reserved
   o  0x000001 : AES-CBC-128, AES-CMAC-128, GKDF-128
   o  0x000002 : NULL, HMAC-SHA256, GKDF-256
   o  0x000003 through 0xFFFFFF : Unallocated

   The following is the initial protected data PData/Specifier registry
   setup:

   o  0x000000 : Reserved
   o  0x000001 : Protected Results Indication
   o  0x000002 through 0xFFFFFF : Unallocated

   The following layout represents the initial Failure-Code registry
   setup:

   o  0x00000001: PSK Not Found
   o  0x00000002: Authentication Failure
   o  0x00000003: Authorization Failure
   o  0x00000004 through 0xFFFFFFFF : Unallocated


12.  Contributors

   This work is a joint effort of the EAP Method Update (EMU) design
   team of the EMU Working Group that was created to develop a mechanism
   based on strong shared secrets that meets RFC 3748 [RFC3748] and RFC
   4017 [RFC4017] requirements.  The design team members (in
   alphabetical order) were:

   o  Jari Arkko
   o  Mohamad Badra
   o  Uri Blumenthal
   o  Charles Clancy





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   o  Lakshminath Dondeti
   o  David McGrew
   o  Joe Salowey
   o  Sharma Suman
   o  Hannes Tschofenig
   o  Jesse Walker

   Finally, we would like to thank Thomas Otto for his draft reviews,
   feedback and text contributions.


13.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank

   o  Jouni Malinen and Bernard Aboba for their early draft comments in
      June 2006.  Jouni Malinen developed the first prototype
      implementation.  It can be found at:
      http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/snapshots/
   o  Lakshminath Dondeti, David McGrew, Bernard Aboba, Michaela
      Vanderveen and Ray Bell for their input to the ciphersuite
      discussions between July and August 2006.
   o  Lakshminath Dondeti for his detailed draft review (sent to the EMU
      ML on the 12th July 2006).
   o  Based on a review requested from NIST Quynh Dang suggested changes
      to the GKDF function (December 2006).
   o  Jouni Malinen and Victor Fajardo for their review in January 2007.
   o  Jouni Malinen for his suggestions regarding the examples and the
      key derivation function in February 2007.
   o  Bernard Aboba and Jouni Malinen for their review in February 2007.
   o  Vidya Narayanan for her review in March 2007.


14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4282]  Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
              Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.





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14.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
              Aboba, B., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key
              Management Framework", draft-ietf-eap-keying-18 (work in
              progress), February 2007.

   [RFC4017]  Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for
              Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

   [RFC4634]  Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
              (SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, August 2006.

   [CMAC]     National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
              CMAC Mode for Authentication", Special Publication
              (SP) 800-38B, May 2005.

   [CBC]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Encryption.
              Methods and Techniques.", Special Publication (SP) 800-
              38A, December 2001.


Authors' Addresses

   T. Charles Clancy
   DoD Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences
   8080 Greenmead Drive
   College Park, MD  20740
   USA

   Email: clancy@ltsnet.net


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   Munich, Bavaria  81739
   Germany

   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.com







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