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Internet Engineering Task Force                           Nevil Brownlee
INTERNET-DRAFT                                The University of Auckland
                                                              April 1996


              Expectations for Security Incident Response



Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and
its Working Groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute working
documents as Internet Drafts.  This Internet Draft is a product of the
Internet Accounting Working Group of the IETF.

Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months.
Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time.  It is not appropriate to use Internet Drafts as
reference material or to cite them other than as a 'working draft' or
'work in progress.'

Please check the I-D abstract listing contained in the Internet-drafts
Shadow Directories on nic.ddn.mil, nnsc.nsf.net, nic.nordu.net,
ftp.nisc.sri.com or munnari.oz.au to learn the current status of this or
any other Internet Draft.

Abstract

This document is intended to facilitate the setting of expectations
regarding the operation of Security Incicident Response Teams (SIRTs).
It describes the various important topics in the form of a 'template,'
through which every SIRT should describe itself and its functions.

SIRT clients have a legitimate need and right to fully understand the
policies and procedures of their Security Incident Response Team.  A
SIRT's template supplies details for the various important topics which
clients must consider when selecting a SIRT.



Contents


 1 Introduction                                                        2
   1.1 Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   1.2 Publishing SIRT Templates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   1.3 Establishing Peering Between SIRTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996



 2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team              6

 3 Purpose of the Template                                             8
   3.1 Other Related Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8

 4 The Security Incident Response Team Template                        9
   4.1 Contact Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.2 Template Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.1Date of last update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.2Distribution list for Template Updates  . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.3 Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.3.1Mission Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.2Constituency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.3Sponsoring organisation / affiliation . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.4Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.4 Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.1Types of incidents and level of support . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.4.2Co-operation and interaction with other organizations . . .  12
     4.4.3Reporting and Disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.4.4Communication and authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.5 Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.6 Incident reporting Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.7 Disclaimers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15


 5 Secondary Purposes of this Document                                 16


 6 Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions                           16

 7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams                           17

 8 Appendix C: Sample Incident Reporting Form                          17


 9 Security Considerations                                             25

10 Editor's Address                                                    25



1 Introduction


The GRIP Working Group was formed to produce guidelines and
recommendations to facilitate the consistent handling of security
incidents in the Internet community.  Although it is focused on the
Internet, many of the concepts discussed will also be useful for other
forms of local- and wide-area networks and internets.


Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 2]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

Many computer security incidents either originate outside local
community boundaries and affect other 'outside' sites, or originate
outside the local community and affect hosts or users within it.  The
handling of security incidents will therefore often involve multiple
Security Incident Response Teams.  Because of this characteristic it is
important for every community to have a good security policy, and to
have a Security Incident Response Team (SIRT) in place to manage
communications across community boundaries in a consistent way.

In the past there have been misunderstandings regarding expectations of
response teams.  The goal of this document is to provide a framework in
which to set expectations.  By defining such a framework the community
can express areas and topics that need to addressed by any SIRT.

'Consistent handling' implies that any group calling itself a SIRT must
react to security incidents or to threats of them in ways which the
Internet community agrees to be in its general interest.  Every SIRT
needs to define clearly the services they offer and the level at which
they are offered to the client.  Such definitions will be particularly
important in contracts and/or agreements which SIRTs make with their
clients.

The "Expectations for Security Incident Response" document is seen as
resting on the work of individual SIRTs and the cooperation between
them.  It recommends a 'template' through which every SIRT should
describe itself and its functions.  It further recommends that templates
should be accessible among teams, to make possible a fully effective
cooperative response framework for incidents or threats across the
entire domain affected by them.



1.1 Definitions


This section defines terms used in describing security incidents and
response teams.  For the purpose of the GRIP documents only a limited
list is really needed.  This should help maintain focus on the purpose
of the documents, and prevent a duplication of other definitions or -
even worse - a proliferation of competing definitions.


Constituency
------------


Implicit in the purpose of a Security Incident Response Team is the
existence of a constituency.  This is the group of clients, sites,
networks or organizations served by the team.




Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 3]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

Security Incident
-----------------



For the purpose of this document:


    'A computer security incident is any event which compromises
    some aspect of computer or network security.'


The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but at
least the following categories are generally applicable:


 * loss of confidentiality,
 * compromise of integrity,
 * denial of service,
 * misuse,
 * damage.



These are very general categories.  For instance the forging of an
electronic mail message and a successful password attack are two
examples of 'compromise of integrity.'

Within the definition of an incident the word 'compromised' is used.
Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident.  During the
handling of a call it must be established whether or not an incident
really occurred.


Security Incident Response Team
-------------------------------


Based on two of the definitions given above:


    'A Security Incident Response Team is a group authorized to
    manage response to security incidents that involve sites within
    its defined constituency.'


In order to be considered a SIRT, a group must:


 * provide a channel for receiving reports about suspected incidents,
 * provide assistance to members of its constituency in handling these
   incidents,

Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 4]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996


 * disseminate incident-related information to its constituency and to
   other related parties.



Vendor
------


A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
technology, and is responsible for the technical content of that
technology.  Examples of 'technology' include hardware (desktop
computers, routers, switches, etc.), and software (operating systems,
mail forwarding systems, etc.).

Note that the supplier of a technology is not necessarily the 'vendor'
of that technology.  As an example, an Internet Services Provider (ISP)
might supply routers to each of its customers, but the 'vendor' is the
manufacturer, being the entity responsible for the technical content of
the router, rather than the ISP.


Vulnerability
-------------


A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology which can
be exploited to perpetrate a security incident.  For example, if a
program allowed ordinary userss to execute operating system commands in
privileged mode, this "feature" would be a vulnerability.



1.2 Publishing SIRT Templates


Every SIRT should publish information about its policies and services in
the form of a completed template.  The simplest way for a SIRT to make
its template widely available is to publish it on its own information
server so that clients in its constituency can easily find it.
Templates published as pages in the World Wide Web should include the
phrase 'SIRT Template' in their title - this will allow Web search
engines to find them easily.

Whether or not templates are published in a repository, clients - and
potential clients - of a SIRT will need to be able to authenticate a
template (verify that it was indeed published by the SIRT) and check
that it has not been modified (for example by verifying a digital
signature for it).



Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 5]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

To facilitate interaction between SIRTs, it would be useful to have a
central repository for them.  The GRIP Working Group believe that some
of the existing Internet archive areas could be used for this purpose.
The keeper of each template repository will be responsibly for verifying
the identity of each SIRT lodging a template in the repository.


1.3 Establishing Peering Between SIRTs


When a SIRT (SIRT A) wishes to establish a working relationship with
another SIRT (SIRT B), a responsible person from SIRT A will need to
contact a similarly responsible person at SIRT B. The SIRT B person then
has the problem:  "how do I know who I'm talking to?"

It is very easy to send forged e-mail, and not hard to establish a
(false) identity by telephone.  PGP provides an effective way of
securing e-mail, but securing voice communications is much harder.  At
present call-back is probably the only simple authentication method.
This may change as technologies such as scrambled telephones, or
PGP-phone on the Internet become available.

PGP relies on a 'web of trust,' built up by having known (and trusted)
people sign PGP keys.  This model could also be used for SIRTs.  To
achieve this each SIRT should publish a list of the SIRTs they have
peering arrangements (i.e.  working relationships) with, including PGP
public keys for them.

Note that there is a difference between a peering agreement, where the
SIRTs involved agree to work together and share information, and simple
co-operation, where SIRT B (or any other client) simply contacts SIRT A
and asks for help or advice.  Note also that any client wanting direct
help in tracking an incident must be prepared to provide sufficient
information about the incident to make tracking possible.



2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team


The Template is summarized in the section immediately below, and the
remainder of the document describes its components.


Contact Information
-------------------
 * name of the team
 * address
 * time zone
 * telephone number
 * facsimile number


Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 6]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

 * other telecommunication like STU-III, secure facsimile
 * electronic mail address
 * encryption methods for communication: PGP, PEM, MOSS, ..
 * PGP public key (if PGP used)



Template Updates
----------------
 * date of last update
 * locations where this template may be found


Charter
-------
 * mission statement
 * constituency
 * sponsor / affiliation
 * authority


Policies
--------
 * types of incidents
 * level of support
 * disclosure
    - of compromised site's information
    - the compromise of SIRT site to constituency
    - incident reporting requirements
 * cooperation & interaction with
    - incident response teams
    - vendors
    - investigative agencies
    - involved sites
    - press
 * communication & authentication
 * point of customer contacts


Services
--------
 * incident response
    - verification
    - understanding
    - coping
    - notification
 * proactive activities






Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 7]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996


Incident Reporting Forms
------------------------


Disclaimers
-----------


3 Purpose of the Template


The Template which this document proposes is expected to be used by a
response team to describe what it does, and in the process create
criteria against which its performance can be measured.  The Template
does not attempt to specify a "correct" way for the team to operate, but
does recommend on specific policies and functions seen as necessary for
such a team to play a consistent role with other SIRTs throughout the
networking community.  It also comments on additional roles a team might
include in the ambit of its operations.

The primary purposes of the Template are:


  - to help SIRTs improve the way they operate;

  - to improve interactions between different SIRTs, and between SIRTs
    and other organizations such as vendors and law-enforcement
    agencies;

  - to note necessary interactions with their constituencies in setting
    expectations and defining policies;

  - to help new groups understand what it takes to "be" a SIRT.


A Template might appear to provide a marketing tool for comparing
different teams, but this kind of marketing use (or abuse) is strongly
discouraged by the GRIP Working Group.


3.1 Other Related Material


This 'Framework for Response Teams' document is the first produced by
the GRIP Working Group.  A second document will set out guide-lines for
technology vendors to help them handle security incidents.  The
definition of terms given in the next section applies to both documents.

Another relevant IETF document is RFC 1244, the Site Security Handbook,
produced by (and being updated by) the Site Security Handbook Working


Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 8]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

Group (SSH). Site requirements and recommendations are covered by the
Handbook, while response team expectations and procedures are addressed
by the GRIP documents.

Other documents of interest for the discussion of incident response
teams and their tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can
be found on:



 * ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/
                                    cert-nl/docs/reports/R-92-01


Some especially interesting documents are:


 * CERT-NL Framework
     ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/csir/docs/cert-nl.opframe.txt

 * FIRST potential members
     ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/newmemlt.txt
     ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/profile.txt
     ftp://ftp.first.org/pub/first/op`frame.txt
     http://www.first.org/first

 * NRL Incident Response Manual
     http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html

 * Bibliography
     http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html



4 The Security Incident Response Team Template


This material which follows is addressed to those responsible for
Security Incident Response Teams.



4.1 Contact Information


Full details of how to contact the SIRT should be listed here.







Nevil Brownlee                                                  [Page 9]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

4.2 Template Updates


Details of a Security IRT change with time, so the template must
indicate when it was last changed, who will be informed of future
changes, and (by implication) who will not.  Without this, it is
inevitable that misunderstandings and misconceptions will arise over
time.


4.2.1 Date of last update


This should be sufficient to allow anyone interested to evaluate the
currency of the template.


4.2.2 Distribution list for Template Updates


Persons on this list are notified automatically whenever the template is
changed.  The list might normally cover the constituency and any other
groups the SIRT has frequent interactions with.  Readers not on the list
can then recognise that they should check the central repository (above)
for possible updates.

Digital signatures should be used for update messages sent by a SIRT to
those on its distribution list.



4.3 Charter


Every SIRT must have a charter which specifying what it is to do, and
the authority under which it will do it.  The charter should include at
least the following:


 * mission statement
 * constituency
 * sponsor / affiliation
 * authority


4.3.1 Mission Statement

The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities,
already stated in the definition of a SIRT. In order to be considered a
Security Incident Response Team, the team MUST provide incident
response, as defined in section 1.1.


Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 10]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996



The goals and purposes of a team are especially important, and require
clear, succinct definition.


4.3.2 Constituency


A SIRT's constituency (as defined above) can be determined in many ways.
For example it could be a company's employees or its paid subscribers,
or it could be defined in terms of a technological focus, such as the
users of a particular operating system.

The definition of constituency should create a perimeter around the
group to whom the team will provide service.  The policy section (below)
should explain how requests from outside the perimeter will be handled.

Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP supports a SIRT, but
delivers services to customer sites which also have SIRTs.  The
Authority section (below) should make such relationships clear.

People within the constituency have to learn that there is a Security
IRT for their purposes; the building of a trusted relationship with the
constituency is an on-going process which never ends.


4.3.3 Sponsoring organisation / affiliation


Any sponsoring organisations or affiliations, if they exist, must be
disclosed to constituents.  For example, the CERT Coordination Centre's
sponsoring organisation is the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie
Mellon University; the sponsoring organisation for a SIRT within a large
coprporation would be the corporation itself.  SIRTs within smaller
organisations may have no sponsoring organisation, in which case they
should specify 'none.'


4.3.4 Authority

SIRTs may not have authority to intervene in the operation of all the
systems within their perimeters.  Each should identify the scope of its
control as distinct from the perimeter of its constituency; if other
SIRTs operate hierachically within this perimeter, they should be
identified.

For example, a corporate SIRT may have authority to force the
installation of software patches as the result of an incident.  Other
SIRTs, such as a national SIRT, may only be able to advise that such
patches should be installed.


Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 11]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996




4.4 Policies



4.4.1 Types of incidents and level of support


The types of incident which the team is authorised to address and the
level of support the team will contribute in assisting with each type of
incident should be summarized here in list form.  The Services section
(later) provides opportunity for more detailed definition.

The team should state whether it will act on information it receives
about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future incidents.
A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its constituency is
regarded as an optional pro-active service policy rather than a core
service requirement for a SIRT.


4.4.2 Co-operation and interaction with other organizations


This section should make explicit the related groups with which the SIRT
routinely interacts.  Examples of these are listed below.

Incident Response Teams:    A SIRT will often need to interact with
other SIRTs.  For example a SIRT within a large company may need to
report incidents to a national SIRT, and a national SIRT may need to
report incidents to national SIRTs in other countries.

Vendors:    The interaction here is in reporting vulnerabilities
discovered during an incident.  If your SIRT has relationships with
product vendors, these should be described here.  Larger vendors have
their own SIRTs, but smaller vendors may not.  In such cases a SIRT will
need to work directly with a vendor.

Law-enforcement agencies:    These include the police and other
investigative agencies.  SIRTs and users of the template should be
sensitive to local laws and regulations, which may vary considerably in
different countries.

Press:    A SIRT may be approached by the Press for information and
comment from time to time.  This is discussed in more detail below
(Reporting and Disclosure).






Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 12]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

4.4.3 Reporting and Disclosure


The default status of any and all security-related information which a
team receives can only be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence to this
makes the team a 'black hole.'  Its template should define what
information it will report or disclose, to whom, and under what
circumstances.

Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal restraints
requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work in different
jurisdictions.  In addition, they mave have reporting requirements
imposed by their sponsoring organisation, or they may be required by law
to report certain kinds of security incident.  Each team's template
should specify any such restraints and requirements, both to clarify
clients' expectations and to inform other teams.  As an example of such
restraints, the Dutch equivalent of the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has some kinds of documents which may NOT be
recorded electronically.

Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also
restrain disclosure by a team; this document does not recommend on how
such conflicts should be addressed.

An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the Press can be helpful,
particularly in clarifying the expectations of a SIRT's constituency.

'Disclosure' includes:



  - reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams;

  - handling incidents occurring within the constituency, but reported
    from outside it.

  - reporting observations from within the constituency indicating
    suspected or confirmed incidents outside it;

  - acting on reports of incidents occurring outside the constituency;

  - passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to Partner
    SIRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or outside the
    constituency;

  - feed-back to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities;

  - the provision of contact information relating to members of the
    constituency, members of other constituencies, other SIRTs or
    law-enforcement agencies.



Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 13]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be the
recipients of a SIRT's reports in each circumstance.  It should also
note whether the team will expect to deal through another Security IRT
or directly with a member of another constituency over matters directly
involving that member.

A team will normally collect statistics.  If they are distributed, the
template's reporting and disclosure policy should say so, and should
list the recipients.


4.4.4 Communication and authentication


Methods of secure and verifiable communication should be established.
This is necessary for communication between SIRTs and between a SIRT and
its constituents.  The template should include public keys or pointers
to them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how to
use this information to check authenticity.

At the moment it is recommended that every SIRT have, as a minimum, a
PGP key available, since PGP is available world-wide.  Teams may also
make other mechanisms available, for example PEM.

For communication via telephone or facsimile a SIRT may keep secret
authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an
agreed password or phrase.



4.5 Services


Services should be defined in two sections, as listed below.


 * direct incident response
    + verification of the incident, i.e. help in determining whether
        the problem really is caused by a security compromise
    + technical analysis assistance to understand the nature of the
        compromise
    + notification of other involved parties
    + guidance with eradication of the incident, i.e. steps
        to eliminate the compromise and prevent it recurring
    + guidance in recovery from the incident

 * optional
    + vulnerability analysis outside of direct incident activity
    + information provision
       - maintaining a vulnerability archive
       - developing and supplying patches and resolutions


Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 14]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996


    + tool development and distribution
    + education
    + audit and consulting
    + product evaluation



Security Incident response Teams may provide different kinds of services
to different sub-constituencies; this needs to be spelled out.  For
example, 'we are willing to provide direct incident response to other
communities as follows ..'


4.6 Incident reporting Forms


Samples of reporting forms used by the SIRT (or pointers to them) should
be included at this point in a template.  As an example, the CERT
Coordination Centre's incident reporting form is attached as Appendix C.



4.7 Disclaimers


Although the template does not constitute a contract, liability might
conceivably result from its descriptions of services and purposes.  The
inclusion of a disclaimer at the end of the template is recommended.

It should be noted that some forms of reporting or disclosure relating
to specific incidents or vulnerabilities can imply liability, and SIRTs
should consider the inclusion of disclaimers in such material.

In situations where the original version of a template must be
translated into another language, the translation should carry a
disclaimer and a pointer to the original.  For example:


    Although we tried to carefully translate our German template
    into English, we can not be certain that both documents express
    the same thoughts in the same level of detail and correctness.
    In all cases, where there is a difference between both
    versions, the German version is the binding version for our
    operation.








Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 15]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996

5 Secondary Purposes of this Document


The primary audience of this document are the administrators responsible
for communities of users, i.e.  'constituencies.'  This section provides
some brief notes on what SIRT clients should expect of their teams.

An incident response team exists primarily to support the clients in its
constituency.  It is vital that those clients understand what they
should expect of their team.  Provided that a SIRT has published its
template, a constituent/client should be able to read the template and
discover what to expect, for example in such areas as privacy and
confidentiality of information, and whether the response team will be
contacting downstream sites.  Clients should certainly expect a SIRT to
provide the services they detail in their template.

An important aspect of incident response is the 'follow through' - every
incident should be investigated and appropriate actions taken.  Clients
should be encouraged by their SIRT to report incidents so they can be
acted upon.  It must be emphasised that without active participation
(especially reporting) from clients the effectiveness of the services
they depend on can be greatly diminished.  As a minimum, clients need to
know that they should report security incidents, and know how and where
they should report them.

Individual users (i.e.  those who are not part of an organisation which
provides a SIRT for its members) who observe a security incident should
ask their Internet Service Provider for details of the most suitable
SIRT to report it to.

Appendix B (below) provides some pointers to SIRTs which were known when
this document was published.



6 Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions


Policies and statements of services in the template have to be
implemented as procedures, but descriptions of those procedures should
not be included in the template.

The following notes are intended to assist those seeking to form or to
improve their SIRTs.


 * External
    + identify other response teams
    + define supported clients:
        - by domain, through registration system, other means
    + establish secure communication practices
        - use of network, cell-phones, etc

Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 16]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996


    + define information that a client site must/should provide
        - use of reporting forms



* Internal
  + secure the team's infrastructure
  + protect information servers
  + protect sensitive data
  + define expiry of sensitive data
  + define disposal practice for sensitive data
  + establish methods for gathering and keeping statistics
  + establish 'knowledge base' of lessons learned from past incidents
  + create practical implementations of disclosure policies
  + document explicit practices for disclosure to the Press


The Site Security Handbook is a first resource to consult in securing a
team's infrastructure.  SIRT-specific security measures may evolve
later.



7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams


FIRST is the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams.  Information
about FIRST can be found via their World Wide Web home page:


   http://www.first.org/first


This page contains pointers to 'Team Contact Information' for SIRTs who
are FIRST members, and to 'Teams with WWW Servers.'



8 Appendix C: Sample Incident Reporting Form


The following is the form which clients should use to report incidents
to the CERT Co-ordination Centre:


version 3.0
February 28, 1996


                   CERT(sm) Coordination Center
                     Incident Reporting Form

Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 17]


INTERNET-DRAFT   Expectations for Security Incident Response  April 1996


The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has developed the following
form in an effort to gather incident information.  We would appreciate
your completing the form below in as much detail as possible.  The
information is optional, but from our experience we have found that
having the answers to all the questions enables us to provide the best
assistance.  Completing the form also helps avoid delays while we get
back to you requesting the information we need in order to help you.
Sites have told us, as well, that filling out the form has helped them
work through the incident.

Note that our policy is to keep any information specific to your site
confidential unless we receive your permission to release that
information.

Please feel free to duplicate any section as required.  Please return
this form to cert@cert.org.  If you are unable to email this form,
please send it by FAX.  The CERT/CC FAX number is

 +1 412 268 6989

Thank you for your cooperation and help.
............................................................................


1.0. General Information

     1.1. Incident number (to be assigned by the CERT/CC):  CERT#

     1.2. Reporting site information

          1.2.1.  Name (e.g., CERT Coordination Center):
          1.2.2.  Domain Name (e.g., cert.org):
          1.2.3.  Brief description of the organization:
          1.2.4.  Is your site an Internet Service Provider (Yes/No):


2.0. Contact Information

     2.1. Your contact information

           2.1.1.  Name:
           2.1.2.  Email address:
           2.1.3.  Telephone number:
           2.1.4.  FAX number:
           2.1.5.  Pager number:
           2.1.6.  Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
                    only):
           2.1.7.  Secure communication channel (e.g., PGP, PEM, DES,
                    secure telephone/FAX) [NOTE -- we will call to
                    obtain the secure communication channel
                    information] (Yes/No):

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     2.2. Additional contact information (if available)

           2.2.1.  Name:
           2.2.2.  Email address:
           2.2.3.  Telephone number:
           2.2.4.  FAX number:
           2.2.5.  Pager number:
           2.2.6.  Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
                    only):
           2.2.7.  Secure communication channel (Yes/No):

     2.3. Site security contact information (if applicable)

           2.3.1.  Name:
           2.3.2.  Email address:
           2.3.3.  Telephone number:
           2.3.4.  FAX number:
           2.3.5.  Pager number:
           2.3.6.  Home telephone number (for our internal use only):
           2.3.7.  Secure communication channel (Yes/No):

     2.4. Contact information for other site(s) involved in this
           incident (if available)

           2.4.1.  Site name:
           2.4.2.  Contact person name:
           2.4.3.  Email address:
           2.4.4.  Telephone number:
           2.4.5.  FAX number:
           2.4.6.  Pager number:
           2.4.7.  Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
                    only):
           2.4.8.  Secure communication channel (Yes/No):

     2.5. Contact information for any other incident response team(s)
           (IRTs) that has/have been notified (if available)

           2.5.1.  IRT name:
           2.5.2.  Constituency domain:
           2.5.3.  Contact person name:
           2.5.4.  Email address:
           2.5.5.  Telephone number:
           2.5.6.  FAX number:
           2.5.7.  Pager number:
           2.5.8.  Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
                    only):
           2.5.9.  Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
           2.5.10. IRT reference number:



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     2.6. Contact information for any law enforcement agency(ies) that
          has/have been notified (if available)

          2.6.1.  Law enforcement agency name:
          2.6.2.  Contact person name:
          2.6.3.  Email address:
          2.6.4.  Telephone number:
          2.6.5.  FAX number:
          2.6.6.  Pager number:
          2.6.7.  Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use
                   only):
          2.6.8.  Secure communication channel (Yes/No):
          2.6.9.  Law enforcement agency reference number:


3.0. Contacting Sites Involved

     3.1. We ask that reporting sites contact other sites involved in
  incident activity.  Please let us know if you need assistance
  in obtaining contact information for the site(s) involved.

          When contacting the other sites, we would very much
  appreciate a cc to the "cert@cert.org" alias.  This helps
  us identify connections between incidents and understand
  the scope of intruder activity.  We would also appreciate
  your including our incident number in the subject line of
  any correspondence relating to this incident if one
  has been assigned (see item 1.1.).

          If you are unable to contact the involved sites, please get
          in touch with us to discuss how we can assist you.

     3.2. Disclosure information -- may we give the following types of
          information to

          3.2.1. the sites involved in this incident

                  3.2.1.1. your domain (Yes/No):
                  3.2.1.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
                  3.2.1.3. your contact information (Yes/No):

          3.2.2. incident response teams, for sites from their
                 constituencies involved in this incident

                  3.2.2.1. your domain (Yes/No):
                  3.2.2.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
                  3.2.2.3. your contact information (Yes/No):

          3.2.3. law enforcement agency(ies) if there is a legal
                 investigation



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                  3.2.3.1. your domain (Yes/No):
                  3.2.3.2. your host(s) involved (Yes/No):
                  3.2.3.3. your contact information (Yes/No):


4.0. Host Information

     4.1. Host(s) involved at your site.  Please provide information
          on all host(s) involved in this incident at the time of the
          incident (one entry per host please)

          4.1.1.  Hostname:
          4.1.2.  IP address(es):
          4.1.3.  Vendor hardware, OS, and version:
          4.1.4.  Security patches applied/installed as currently
                   recommended by the vendor and the CERT/CC
                   (Yes/No/Unknown):
          4.1.5.  Function(s) of the involved host

                  4.1.5.1. Router (Yes/No):
                  4.1.5.2. Terminal server (Yes/No):
                  4.1.5.3. Other (e.g. mail hub, information server,
                           DNS [external or internal], etc.):

          4.1.6.  Where on the network is the involved host (e.g.
                   backbone, subnet):
          4.1.7.  Nature of the information at risk on the involved
                   host (e.g. router configuration, proprietary,
                   personnel, financial, etc.):
          4.1.8.  Timezone of the involved host (relative to GMT):
          4.1.9.  In the attack, was the host the source, the victim,
                   or both:
          4.1.10. Was this host compromised as a result of this attack
                   (Yes/No):

     4.2. Host(s) involved at other other sites (one entry per host
          please)

          4.2.1. Hostname:
          4.2.2. IP address(es):
          4.2.3. Vendor hardware, OS, and version:
          4.2.4. Has the site been notified (Yes/No):
          4.2.5. In the attack, was the host the source, the victim, or
                  both:
          4.2.6. Was this host compromised as a result of this attack
                  (Yes/No):


5.0. Incident Categories

     5.1. Please mark as many categories as are appropriate to


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          this incident

          5.1.1.  Probe(s):
          5.1.2.  Scan(s):
          5.1.3.  Prank:
          5.1.4.  Scam:
          5.1.5.  Email Spoofing:
          5.1.6.  Email bombardment:

                  5.1.6.1. was this denial-of-service attack successful
                           (Yes/No):

          5.1.7.  Sendmail attack:

                  5.1.7.1. did this attack result in a compromise
                           (Yes/No):

          5.1.8.  Break-in

                  5.1.8.1. Intruder gained root access (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.2. Intruder installed Trojan horse program(s)
                           (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.3. Intruder installed packet sniffer (Yes/No):

                           5.1.8.3.1. What was the full pathname(s) of
                                      the sniffer output file(s):
                           5.1.8.3.2. How many sessions did the sniffer
                                      log (use "grep -c 'DATA'
                                      <filename>" to obtain this
                                      information):

                  5.1.8.4.  NIS (yellow pages) attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.5.  NFS attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.6.  TFTP attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.7.  FTP attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.8.  Telnet attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.9.  Rlogin or rsh attack (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.10. Cracked password (Yes/No):
                  5.1.8.11. Easily-guessable password (Yes/No):

          5.1.9.  Anonymous FTP abuse (Yes/No):
          5.1.10. IP spoofing (Yes/No):
          5.1.11. Product vulnerability (Yes/No):

                  5.1.11.1. Vulnerability exploited:

          5.1.12. Configuration error (Yes/No):

                  5.1.12.1. Type of configuration error:

          5.1.13. Misuse of host(s) resources (Yes/No):


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          5.1.14. Worm (Yes/No):
          5.1.15. Virus (Yes/No):
          5.1.16. Other (please specify):


6.0. Security Tools

     6.1. At the time of the incident, were you any using the following
          security tools (Yes/No; How often)

          Network Monitoring tools
             6.1.1.  Argus:
             6.1.2.  netlog (part of the TAMU Security Package):

          Authentication/Password tools
             6.1.3.  Crack:
             6.1.4.  One-time passwords:
             6.1.5.  Proactive password checkers:
             6.1.6.  Shadow passwords:
             6.1.7.  Kerberos:

          Service filtering tools
             6.1.8.  Host access control via modified daemons or
                     wrappers:
             6.1.9.  Drawbridge (part of the TAMU Security Package):
             6.1.10. Firewall (what product):
             6.1.11. TCP access control using packet filtering:

          Tools to scan hosts for known vulnerabilities
             6.1.12. ISS:
             6.1.13. SATAN:

          Multi-purpose tools
             6.1.14. C2 security:
             6.1.15. COPS:
             6.1.16. Tiger (part of the TAMU Security Package):

          File Integrity Checking tools
             6.1.17. MD5:
             6.1.18. Tripwire:

          Other tools
             6.1.19. lsof:
             6.1.20. cpm:
             6.1.21. smrsh:
             6.1.22. append-only file systems:

          Additional tools (please specify):

     6.2. At the time of the incident, which of the following logs were
          you using, if any (Yes/No)


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          6.2.1. syslog:
          6.2.2. utmp:
          6.2.3. wtmp:
          6.2.4. TCP wrapper:
          6.2.5. process accounting:

     6.3. What do you believe to be the reliability and integrity of
          these logs (e.g., are the logs stored offline or on a
          different host):


7.0. Detailed description of the incident

     7.1. Please complete in as much detail as possible

          7.1.1.  Date and duration of incident:
          7.1.2.  How you discovered the incident:
          7.1.3.  Method used to gain access to the affected host(s):
          7.1.4.  Details of vulnerabilities exploited that are
                   not addressed in previous sections:
          7.1.5.  Other aspects of the "attack":
          7.1.6.  Hidden files/directories:
          7.1.7.  The source of the attack (if known):
          7.1.8.  Steps taken to address the incident (e.g., binaries
                   reinstalled, patches applied):
          7.1.9.  Planned steps to address the incident (if any):
          7.1.10. Do you plan to start using any of the tools listed
                   above in question 6.0 (please list tools expected
                   to use):
          7.1.11. Other:

     7.2. Please append any log information or directory listings and
           timezone information (relative to GMT).

     7.3. Please indicate if any of the following were left on your
           system by the intruder (Yes/No):

          7.3.1. intruder tool output (such as packet sniffer output
                  logs):
          7.3.2. tools/scripts to exploit vulnerabilities:
          7.3.3. source code programs (such as Trojan horse programs,
                  sniffer programs):
          7.3.4. binary code programs (such as Trojan horse programs,
                  sniffer programs):
          7.3.5. other files:

          If you answered yes to any of the last 5 questions, please
          call the CERT/CC hotline (+1 412 268 7090) for instructions
          on uploading files to us by FTP.  Thanks.



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     7.4. What assistance would you like from the CERT/CC?



Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University.
This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission
provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT
Coordination Center is acknowledged.

CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.




9 Security Considerations


This document discusses the operation of Security Incident Response
Teams, and is therefore not directly concerned with the security of
protocols or network systems themselves.

Nonetheless, it is vital that SIRTs establish secure communication
channels with other teams, and with members of their constituency.  They
must also secure their own systems and infrastructure.


10 Editor's Address


    Nevil Brownlee
    ITSS Technology Developmenta
    The University of Auckland

    Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941
    E-mail: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz


















Nevil Brownlee                                                 [Page 25]