Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: May 4, 2017 G. Hankins
Nokia
October 31, 2016
Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without
Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
Abstract
This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
there is no import or export policy associated with a BGP session for
the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a
need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks
[RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
we aim to address.
Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default.
This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where
operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow
all networks to reach each other. As the Internet has become more
densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP
speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation
boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is
implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without
policies configured on EBGP sessions.
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2. Solution Requirements
The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address
Family apply to the solution described in this document:
o Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no
import policy was configured.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
export policy was configured.
o Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures
preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes.
o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability.
3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and
Brian Dickson.
4. Security Considerations
This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP
speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without
policies. Operators have a need for implementers to address the
problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible
attacks from a permissive security behavior. Attacks and inadvertent
advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a
secure default behavior.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Contributors
The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
described in this document:
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Jakob Heitz
Cisco
Email: jheitz@cisco.com
Ondrej Filip
CZ.NIC
Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch
NTT Communications
8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US
Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
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Job Snijders
NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
NL
Email: job@ntt.net
Greg Hankins
Nokia
777 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com
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