Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders
Expires: September 28, 2017 NTT
G. Hankins
Nokia
March 27, 2017
Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04
Abstract
This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP
session.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
There are BGP routing security issues that need to be addressed to
make the Internet more stable. Route leaks [RFC7908] are part of the
problem, but software defects or operator misconfigurations can
contribute too. This document provides guidance to BGP [RFC4271]
implementers to improve the default level of Internet routing
security.
Many deployed BGP speakers send and accept any and all route
announcements between their BGP neighbors by default. This practice
dates back to the early days of the Internet, where operators were
permissive in sending routing information to allow all networks to
reach each other. As the Internet has become more densely
interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing.
This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any
External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or
confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this
solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes
without policies configured on EBGP sessions.
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2. Solution Requirements
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
document:
o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection
(section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for
the EBGP peer.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
export policy was configured.
o Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export
nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a
policy engine.
o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability.
3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi,
Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald
Smith.
4. Security Considerations
This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by
permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need
implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to
mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or
adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be
mitigated by a secure default behavior.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Contributors
The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
described in this document:
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Jakob Heitz
Cisco
Email: jheitz@cisco.com
Ondrej Filip
CZ.NIC
Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch
Akamai Technologies
8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US
Email: jared@akamai.com
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Job Snijders
NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
NL
Email: job@ntt.net
Greg Hankins
Nokia
777 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com
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