Network Working Group R. Moskowitz
Internet-Draft ICSAlabs, a Division of TruSecure
Expires: April 25, 2005 Corporation
P. Nikander
P. Jokela (editor)
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
T. Henderson
The Boeing Company
October 25, 2004
Host Identity Protocol
draft-ietf-hip-base-01
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
and any of which I become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This memo specifies the details of the Host Identity Protocol (HIP).
The overall description of protocol and the underlying architectural
thinking is available in the separate HIP architecture specification.
The Host Identity Protocol is used to establish a rapid
authentication between two hosts and to provide continuity of
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
communications between those hosts independent of the networking
layer.
The various forms of the Host Identity, Host Identity Tag (HIT) and
Local Scope Identifier (LSI), are covered in detail. It is described
how they are used to support authentication and the establishment of
keying material, which is then used by IPsec Encapsulated Security
payload (ESP) to establish a two-way secured communication channel
between the hosts. The basic state machine for HIP provides a HIP
compliant host with the resiliency to avoid many denial-of-service
(DoS)attacks. The basic HIP exchange for two public hosts shows the
actual packet flow. Other HIP exchanges, including those that work
across NATs are covered elsewhere.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1 A new name space and identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The HIP protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Host Identifier (HI) and its representations . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1 Generating a HIT from a HI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 Local Scope Identifier (LSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3 Security Parameter Index (SPI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Host Identity Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 HIP base exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.3 HIP replay protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 TCP and UDP pseudo-header computation . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Updating a HIP association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4 Error processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.5 Certificate distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.6 Sending data on HIP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. HIP protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1 HIP Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2 Refusing a HIP exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3 Reboot and SA timeout restart of HIP . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.4 HIP State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.1 HIP States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.2 HIP State Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Packet formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1 Payload format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1.1 HIP Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1.2 Checksum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.2 HIP parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.1 TLV format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2.2 Defining new parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.3 SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.2.4 R1_COUNTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2.5 PUZZLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.2.6 SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.2.7 DIFFIE_HELLMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.2.8 HIP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.9 ESP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.2.10 HOST_ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2.11 CERT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.12 HMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.13 HMAC_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.14 HIP_SIGNATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.2.15 HIP_SIGNATURE_2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2.16 NES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2.17 SEQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.2.18 ACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2.19 ENCRYPTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
6.2.20 NOTIFY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
6.2.21 ECHO_REQUEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2.22 ECHO_RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3 ICMP messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3.1 Invalid Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6.3.2 Other problems with the HIP header and packet
structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3.3 Unknown SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3.4 Invalid Cookie Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
6.3.5 Non-existing HIP association . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7. HIP Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.1 I1 - the HIP initiator packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.2 R1 - the HIP responder packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.3 I2 - the second HIP initiator packet . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.4 R2 - the second HIP responder packet . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.5 CER - the HIP Certificate Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.6 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.7 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.8 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet . . . . . . . . 60
7.9 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP closing acknowledgment packet . . . . 61
8. Packet processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.1 Processing outgoing application data . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8.2 Processing incoming application data . . . . . . . . . . . 63
8.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE calculation and verification . . . . . 64
8.3.1 HMAC calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.3.2 Signature calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
8.4 Initiation of a HIP exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8.4.1 Sending multiple I1s in parallel . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.4.2 Processing incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.5 Processing incoming I1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
8.5.1 R1 Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
8.5.2 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.6 Processing incoming R1 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.6.1 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.7 Processing incoming I2 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.7.1 Handling malformed messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.8 Processing incoming R2 packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.9 Dropping HIP associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.10 Initiating rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.11 Processing UPDATE packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
8.11.1 Processing an UPDATE packet in state ESTABLISHED . . 75
8.11.2 Processing an UPDATE packet in state REKEYING . . . 75
8.11.3 Leaving REKEYING state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.12 Processing CER packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.13 Processing NOTIFY packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
8.14 Processing CLOSE packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
8.15 Processing CLOSE_ACK packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
9. HIP KEYMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
10. HIP Fragmentation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
11. ESP with HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
11.1 ESP Security Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
11.2 Updating ESP SAs during rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
11.3 Security Association Management . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.4 Security Parameter Index (SPI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.5 Supported Transforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
11.6 Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
12. HIP Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
16.1 Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
16.2 Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A. API issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
B. Probabilities of HIT collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
C. Probabilities in the cookie calculation . . . . . . . . . . 96
D. Using responder cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
E. Running HIP over IPv4 UDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
F. Example checksums for HIP packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
F.1 IPv6 HIP example (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
F.2 IPv4 HIP packet (I1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
F.3 TCP segment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
G. 384-bit group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 104
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
1. Introduction
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) provides a rapid exchange of Host
Identities between two hosts. The exchange also establishes a pair
IPsec Security Associations (SA), to be used with IPsec Encapsulated
Security Payload (ESP) [19]. The HIP protocol is designed to be
resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Man-in-the-middle (MitM)
attacks, and when used to enable ESP, provides DoS and MitM
protection for upper layer protocols, such as TCP and UDP.
1.1 A new name space and identifiers
The Host Identity Protocol introduces a new namespace, the Host
Identity. The effects of this change are explained in the companion
document, the HIP architecture [21] specification.
There are two main representations of the Host Identity, the full
Host Identifier (HI) and the Host Identity Tag (HIT). The HI is a
public key and directly represents the Identity. Since there are
different public key algorithms that can be used with different key
lengths, the HI is not good for using as a packet identifier, or as a
index into the various operational tables needed to support HIP.
Consequently, a hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), becomes
the operational representation. It is 128 bits long and is used in
the HIP payloads and to index the corresponding state in the end
hosts.
1.2 The HIP protocol
The base HIP exchange consists of four packets. The four-packet
design helps to make HIP DoS resilient. The protocol exchanges
Diffie-Hellman keys in the 2nd and 3rd packets, and authenticates the
parties in the 3rd and 4th packets. Additionally, it starts the
cookie exchange in the 2nd packet, completing it in the 3rd packet.
The exchange uses the Diffie-Hellman exchange to hide the Host
Identity of the Initiator in packet 3. The Responder's Host Identity
is not protected. It should be noted, however, that both the
Initiator's and the Responder's HITs are transported as such (in
cleartext) in the packets, allowing an eavesdropper with a priori
knowledge about the parties to verify their identities.
Data packets start after the 4th packet. The 3rd and 4th HIP packets
may carry a data payload in the future. However, the details of this
are to be defined later as more implementation experience is gained.
Finally, HIP is designed as an end-to-end authentication and key
establishment protocol. It lacks much of the fine-grained policy
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
control found in Internet Key Exchange IKE RFC2409 [8] that allows
IKE to support complex gateway policies. Thus, HIP is not a complete
replacement for IKE.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [5].
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
3. Host Identifier (HI) and its representations
A public key of an asymmetric key pair is used as the Host Identifier
(HI). Correspondingly, the host itself is the entity that holds the
private key from the key pair. See the HIP architecture
specification [21] for more details about the difference between an
identity and the corresponding identifier.
HIP implementations MUST support the Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) [14]
public key algorithm, and SHOULD support the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) [13] algorithm; other algorithms MAY be supported.
A hash of the HI, the Host Identity Tag (HIT), is used in protocols
to represent the Host Identity. The HIT is 128 bits long and has the
following three key properties: i) it is the same length as an IPv6
address and can be used in address-sized fields in APIs and
protocols, ii) it is self-certifying (i.e., given a HIT, it is
computationally hard to find a Host Identity key that matches the
HIT), and iii) the probability of HIT collision between two hosts is
very low.
In many environments, 128 bits is still considered large. For
example, currently used IPv4 based applications are constrained with
32-bit address fields. Another problem is that the cohabitation of
IPv6 and HIP might require some applications to differentiate an IPv6
address from a HIT. Thus, a third representation, the Local Scope
Identifier (LSI), may be needed. There are two types of such LSIs:
32 bits long IPv4-compatible one and 128 bits long IPv6-compatible
one. The LSI provides a compression of the HIT with only a local
scope so that it can be carried efficiently in any application level
packet and used in API calls. LSIs do not have the same properties
as HITs (i.e., they are not self-certifying nor are they as unlikely
to collide -- hence their local scope), and consequently they must be
used more carefully.
Finally, HIs, HITs, and LSIs are not carried explicitly in the
headers of user data packets. Instead, the IPsec Security Parameter
Index (SPI) is used in data packets to index the right host context.
The SPIs are selected during the HIP exchange. For user data packets,
then, the combination of IPsec SPIs and IP addresses are used
indirectly to identify the host context, thereby avoiding an
additional explicit protocol header.
3.1 Host Identity Tag (HIT)
The Host Identity Tag is a 128 bit value -- a hash of the Host
Identifier. There are two advantages of using a hash over the actual
Identity in protocols. Firstly, its fixed length makes for easier
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
protocol coding and also better manages the packet size cost of this
technology. Secondly, it presents a consistent format to the
protocol whatever underlying identity technology is used.
There are two types of HITs. HITs of the first type, called *type 1
HIT*, consist of 128 bits of the SHA-1 hash of the public key. HITs
of the second type consist of a Host Assigning Authority Field (HAA),
and only the last 64 bits come from a SHA-1 hash of the Host
Identity. This latter format for HIT is recommended for 'well known'
systems. It is possible to support a resolution mechanism for these
names in hierarchical directories, like the DNS. Another use of HAA
is in policy controls, see Section 12.
As the type of a HIT cannot be determined by inspecting its contents,
the HIT type must be communicated by some external means.
When comparing HITs for equality, it is RECOMMENDED that conforming
implementations ignore the TBD top most bits. This is to allow
better compatibility for legacy IPv6 applications; see Appendix A.
However, independent of how many bits are actually used for HIT
comparison, it is also RECOMMENDED that the final equality decision
is based on the public key and not the HIT, if possible. See also
Section 3.2 for related discussion.
This document fully specifies only type 1 HITs. HITs that consists
of the HAA field and the hash are specified in [24].
Any conforming implementation MUST be able to deal with Type 1 HITs.
When handling other than type 1 HITs, the implementation is
RECOMMENDED to explicitly learn and record the binding between the
Host Identifier and the HIT, as it may not be able to generate such
HITs from the Host Identifiers.
3.1.1 Generating a HIT from a HI
The 128 or 64 hash bits in a HIT MUST be generated by taking the
least significant 128 or 64 bits of the SHA-1 [22] hash of the Host
Identifier as it is represented in the Host Identity field in a HIP
payload packet.
For Identities that are either RSA or DSA public keys, the HIT is
formed as follows:
1. The public key is encoded as specified in the corresponding
DNSSEC document, taking the algorithm specific portion of the
RDATA part of the KEY RR. There is currently only two defined
public key algorithms: RSA and DSA. Hence, either of the
following applies:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The RSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC3110 [14]
Section 2, taking the exponent length (e_len), exponent (e)
and modulus (n) fields concatenated. The length of the
modulus (n) can be determined from the total HI length
(hi_len) and the preceding HI fields including the exponent
(e). Thus, the data to be hashed has the same length than the
HI (hi_len). The fields MUST be encoded in network byte order,
as defined in RFC3110 [14].
The DSA public key is encoded as defined in RFC2536 [13]
Section 2, taking the fields T, Q, P, G, and Y, concatenated.
Thus, the data to be hashed is 1 + 20 + 3 * 64 + 3 * 8 * T
octets long, where T is the size parameter as defined in
RFC2536 [13]. The size parameter T, affecting the field
lengths, MUST be selected as the minimum value that is long
enough to accommodate P, G, and Y. The fields MUST be encoded
in network byte order, as defined in RFC2536 [13].
2. A SHA-1 hash [22] is calculated over the encoded key.
3. The least significant 128 or 64 bits of the hash result are used
to create the HIT, as defined above.
The following pseudo-codes illustrates the process for both RSA and
DSA. The symbol := denotes assignment; the symbol += denotes
appending. The pseudo-function encode_in_network_byte_order takes
two parameters, an integer (bignum) and a length in bytes, and
returns the integer encoded into a byte string of the given length.
switch ( HI.algorithm )
{
case RSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e_len,
( HI.RSA.e_len > 255 ) ? 3 : 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.e, HI.RSA.e_len )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.RSA.n, HI.hi_len )
break;
case DSA:
buffer := encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.T , 1 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Q , 20 )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.P , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.G , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
buffer += encode_in_network_byte_order ( HI.DSA.Y , 64 + 8 * HI.DSA.T )
break;
}
digest := SHA-1 ( buffer )
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
hit_128 := low_order_bits ( digest, 128 )
hit_haa := concatenate ( HAA, low_order_bits ( digest, 64 ) )
3.2 Local Scope Identifier (LSI)
LSIs are 32 or 128 bits long localized representations of a Host
Identity. The purpose of an LSI is to facilitate using Host
Identities in existing IPv4 or IPv6 based protocols and APIs. The
LSI can be used anywhere in system processes where IP addresses have
traditionally been used, such as IPv4 and IPv6 API calls and FTP PORT
commands.
The IPv4-compatible LSIs MUST be allocated from the TBD subnet and
the IPv6-compatible LSIs MUST be allocated from the TBD subnet. That
makes it easier to differentiate between LSIs and IP addresses at the
API level. By default, the low order 24 bits of an IPv4-compatible
LSI are equal to the low order 24 bits of the corresponding HIT,
while the low order TBD bits of an IPv6-compatible LSI are equal to
the low order TBD bits of the corresponding HIT.
A host performing a HIP handshake may discover that the LSI formed
from the peer's HIT collides with another LSI in use locally (i.e.,
the lower 24 or TBD bits of two different HITs are the same). In
that case, the host MUST handle the LSI collision locally such that
application calls can be disambiguated. One possible means of doing
so is to perform a Host NAT function to locally convert a peer's LSI
into a different LSI value. This would require the host to ensure
that LSI bits on the wire (i.e., in the application data stream) are
converted back to match that host's LSI. Other alternatives for
resolving LSI collisions may be added in the future.
3.3 Security Parameter Index (SPI)
SPIs are used in ESP to find the right security association for
received packets. The ESP SPIs have added significance when used
with HIP; they are a compressed representation of the HITs in every
packet. Thus, SPIs MAY be used by intermediary systems in providing
services like address mapping. Note that since the SPI has
significance at the receiver, only the < DST, SPI >, where DST is a
destination IP address, uniquely identifies the receiver HIT at every
given point of time. The same SPI value may be used by several
hosts. A single < DST, SPI > value may denote different hosts at
different points of time, depending on which host is currently
reachable at the DST.
Each host selects for itself the SPI it wants to see in packets
received from its peer. This allows it to select different SPIs for
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
different peers. The SPI selection SHOULD be random; the rules of
Section 2.1 of the ESP specification [19] must be followed. A
different SPI SHOULD be used for each HIP exchange with a particular
host; this is to avoid a replay attack. Additionally, when a host
rekeys, the SPI MUST be changed. Furthermore, if a host changes over
to use a different IP address, it MAY change the SPI.
One method for SPI creation that meets these criteria would be to
concatenate the HIT with a 32-bit random or sequential number, hash
this (using SHA1), and then use the high order 32 bits as the SPI.
The selected SPI is communicated to the peer in the third (I2) and
fourth (R2) packets of the base HIP exchange. Changes in SPI are
signaled with NES parameters.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
4. Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol is IP protocol TBD (number will be
assigned by IANA). The HIP payload could be carried in every
datagram. However, since HIP datagrams are relatively large (at
least 40 bytes), and ESP already has all of the functionality to
maintain and protect state, the HIP payload is 'compressed' into an
ESP payload after the HIP exchange. Thus in practice, HIP packets
only occur in datagrams to establish or change HIP state.
For testing purposes, the protocol number 99 is currently used.
4.1 HIP base exchange
The base HIP exchange serves to manage the establishment of state
between an Initiator and a Responder. During the exchange, an IPsec
Security Association is created between the hosts. The last three
packets of the exchange, R1, I2, and R2, constitute a standard
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange for session key generation.
The Initiator first sends a trigger packet, I1, to the Responder.
The packet contains only the HIT of the Initiator and possibly the
HIT of the Responder, if it is known.
The second packet, R1, starts the actual exchange. It contains a
puzzle, that is, a cryptographic challenge that the Initiator must
solve before continuing the exchange. In addition, it contains the
initial Diffie-Hellman parameters and a signature, covering part of
the message. Some fields are left outside the signature to support
pre-created R1s.
In the I2 packet, the Initiator must display the solution to the
received puzzle. Without a correct solution, the I2 message is
discarded. The I2 also contains a Diffie-Hellman parameter that
carries needed information for the Responder. The packet is signed
by the sender.
The R2 packet finalizes the 4-way handshake, containing the SPI value
of the Responder. The packet is signed.
The base exchange is illustrated below. During this D-H procedure,
the hosts create an IPsec session key.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Initiator Responder
I1: trigger exchange
-------------------------->
select pre-computed R1
R1: puzzle, D-H, key, sig
<-------------------------
check sig remain stateless
solve puzzle
I2: solution, D-H, {key}, sig
-------------------------->
compute D-H check cookie
check puzzle
check sig
R2: sig
<--------------------------
check sig compute D-H
In R1, the signature covers the packet, after setting the Initiator
HIT, header checksum, and the PUZZLE parameter's Opaque and Random #I
fields temporarily to zero, and excluding any TLVs that follow the
signature.
In I2, the signature covers the whole packet, excluding any TLVs that
follow the signature.
In R2, the signature and the HMAC cover the whole envelope.
In this section we cover the overall design of the base exchange.
The details are the subject of the rest of this memo.
4.1.1 HIP Cookie Mechanism
The purpose of the HIP cookie mechanism is to protect the Responder
from a number of denial-of-service threats. It allows the Responder
to delay state creation until receiving I2. Furthermore, the puzzle
included in the cookie allows the Responder to use a fairly cheap
calculation to check that the Initiator is "sincere" in the sense
that it has churned CPU cycles in solving the puzzle.
The Cookie mechanism has been explicitly designed to give space for
various implementation options. It allows a responder implementation
to completely delay session specific state creation until a valid I2
is received. In such a case a validly formatted I2 can be rejected
earliest only once the Responder has checked its validity by
computing one hash function. On the other hand, the design also
allows a responder implementation to keep state about received I1s,
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
and match the received I2s against the state, thereby allowing the
implementation to avoid the computational cost of the hash function.
The drawback of this latter approach is the requirement of creating
state. Finally, it also allows an implementation to use any
combination of the space-saving and computation-saving mechanisms.
One possible way for a Responder to remain stateless but drop most
spoofed I2s is to base the selection of the cookie on some function
over the Initiator's Host Identity. The idea is that the Responder
has a (perhaps varying) number of pre-calculated R1 packets, and it
selects one of these based on the information carried in I1. When
the Responder then later receives I2, it checks that the cookie in
the I2 matches with the cookie sent in the R1, thereby making it
impractical for the attacker to first exchange one I1/R1, and then
generate a large number of spoofed I2s that seemingly come from
different IP addresses or use different HITs. The method does not
protect from an attacker that uses fixed IP addresses and HITs,
though. Against such an attacker it is probably best to create a
piece of local state, and remember that the puzzle check has
previously failed. See Appendix D for one possible implementation.
Note, however, that the implementations MUST NOT use the exact
implementation given in the appendix, and SHOULD include sufficient
randomness to the algorithm so that algorithm complexity attacks
become impossible [26].
The Responder can set the difficulty for Initiator, based on its
concern of trust of the Initiator. The Responder SHOULD use
heuristics to determine when it is under a denial-of-service attack,
and set the difficulty value K appropriately.
The Responder starts the cookie exchange when it receives an I1. The
Responder supplies a random number I, and requires the Initiator to
find a number J. To select a proper J, the Initiator must create the
concatenation of I, the HITs of the parties, and J, and take a SHA-1
hash over this concatenation. The lowest order K bits of the result
MUST be zeros.
To generate a proper number J, the Initiator will have to generate a
number of Js until one produces the hash target of zero. The
Initiator SHOULD give up after exceeding the puzzle lifetime received
in PUZZLE TLV. The Responder needs to re-create the concatenation of
I, the HITs, and the provided J, and compute the hash once to prove
that the Initiator did its assigned task.
To prevent pre-computation attacks, the Responder MUST select the
number I in such a way that the Initiator cannot guess it.
Furthermore, the construction MUST allow the Responder to verify that
the value was indeed selected by it and not by the Initiator. See
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix D for an example on how to implement this.
Using the Opaque data field in the ECHO_REQUEST, the Responder can
include some data in R1 that the Initiator must copy unmodified in
the corresponding I2 packet. The Responder can generate the Opaque
data e.g. using the sent I, some secret and possibly other related
data. Using this same secret, received I in I2 packet and possible
other data, the Receiver can verify that it has itself sent the I to
the Initiator. The Responder must change the secret periodically.
It is RECOMMENDED that the Responder generates a new cookie and a new
R1 once every few minutes. Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that the
Responder remembers an old cookie at least 2*lifetime seconds after
it has been deprecated. These time values allow a slower Initiator
to solve the cookie puzzle while limiting the usability that an old,
solved cookie has to an attacker.
NOTE: The protocol developers explicitly considered whether R1 should
include a timestamp in order to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks. The decision was NOT to include a timestamp.
In R1, the values I and K are sent in network byte order. Similarly,
in I2 the values I and J are sent in network byte order. The SHA-1
hash is created by concatenating, in network byte order, the
following data, in the following order:
64-bit random value I, in network byte order, as appearing in R1
and I2.
128-bit initiator HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
128-bit responder HIT, in network byte order, as appearing in the
HIP Payload in R1 and I2.
64-bit random value J, in network byte order, as appearing in I2.
In order to be a valid response cookie, the K low-order bits of the
resulting SHA-1 digest must be zero.
Notes:
The length of the data to be hashed is 48 bytes.
All the data in the hash input MUST be in network byte order.
The order of the initiator and responder HITs are different in the
R1 and I2 packets, see Section 6.1. Care must be taken to copy
the values in right order to the hash input.
Precomputation by the Responder
Sets up the challenge difficulty K.
Creates a signed R1 and caches it.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Responder
Selects a suitable cached R1.
Generates a random number I.
Sends I and K in a HIP Cookie in the R1.
Saves I and K for a Delta time.
Initiator
Generates repeated attempts to solve the challenge until a
matching J is found:
Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K ) == 0
Sends I and J in HIP Cookie in a I2.
Responder
Verifies that the received I is a saved one.
Finds the right K based on I.
Computes V := Ltrunc( SHA-1( I | HIT-I | HIT-R | J ), K )
Rejects if V != 0
Accept if V == 0
The Ltrunc (SHA-1(), K) denotes the lowest order K bits of the SHA-1
result.
4.1.2 Authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol
The packets R1, I2, and R2 implement a standard authenticated
Diffie-Hellman exchange. The Responder sends its public
Diffie-Hellman key and its public authentication key, i.e., its host
identity, in R1. The signature in R1 allows the Initiator to verify
that the R1 has been once generated by the Responder. However, since
it is precomputed and therefore does not cover all of the packet, it
does not protect from replay attacks.
When the Initiator receives an R1, it computes the Diffie-Hellman
session key. It creates a HIP security association using keying
material from the session key (see Section 9), and uses the security
association to encrypt its public authentication key, i.e., host
identity. The resulting I2 contains the Initiator's Diffie-Hellman
key and its the encrypted public authentication key. The signature
in I2 covers all of the packet.
The Responder extracts the Initiator Diffie-Hellman public key from
the I2, computes the Diffie-Hellman session key, creates a
corresponding HIP security association, and decrypts the Initiator's
public authentication key. It can then verify the signature using
the authentication key.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The final message, R2, is needed to protect the Initiator from replay
attacks.
4.1.3 HIP replay protection
The HIP protocol includes the following mechanisms to protect against
malicious replays. Responders are protected against replays of I1
packets by virtue of the stateless response to I1s with presigned R1
messages. Initiators are protected against R1 replays by a
monotonically increasing "R1 generation counter" included in the R1.
Responders are protected against replays or false I2s by the cookie
mechanism (Section 4.1.1 above), and optional use of opaque data.
Hosts are protected against replays to R2s and UPDATEs by use of a
less expensive HMAC verification preceding HIP signature
verification.
The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing 64-bit
counter that may be initialized to any value. The scope of the
counter MAY be system-wide but SHOULD be per host identity, if there
is more than one local host identity. The value of this counter
SHOULD be kept across system reboots and invocations of the HIP
signaling process. This counter indicates the current generation of
cookie puzzles. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current
generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. A
system's local counter MUST be incremented at least as often as every
time old R1s cease to be valid, and SHOULD never be decremented, lest
the host expose its peers to the replay of previously generated,
higher numbered R1s. Also, the R1 generation counter MUST NOT roll
over; if the counter is about to become exhausted, the corresponding
HI must be abandoned and replaced with a new one.
A host may receive more than one R1, either due to sending multiple
I1s (Section 8.4.1) or due to a replay of an old R1. When sending
multiple I1s, an initiator SHOULD wait for a small amount of time
after the first R1 reception to allow possibly multiple R1s to
arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set with the largest
R1 generation counter. If an initiator is processing an R1 or has
already sent an I2 (still waiting for R2) and it receives another R1
with a larger R1 generation counter, it MAY elect to restart R1
processing with the fresher R1, as if it were the first R1 to arrive.
Upon conclusion of an active HIP association with another host, the
R1 generation counter associated with the peer host SHOULD be
flushed. A local policy MAY override the default flushing of R1
counters on a per-HIT basis. The reason for recommending the
flushing of this counter is that there may be hosts where the R1
generation counter (occasionally) decreases; e.g., due to hardware
failure.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
4.2 TCP and UDP pseudo-header computation
When computing TCP and UDP checksums on sockets bound to HITs or
LSIs, the IPv6 pseudo-header format [11] MUST be used. Additionally,
the HITs MUST be used in the place of the IPv6 addresses in the IPv6
pseudo-header. Note that the pseudo-header for actual HIP payloads
is computed differently; see Section 6.1.2.
4.3 Updating a HIP association
A HIP association between two hosts may need to be updated over time.
Examples include the need to rekey expiring security associations,
add new security associations, or change IP addresses associated with
hosts. This document only specifies how UPDATE is used for rekeying;
other uses are deferred to other drafts.
HIP provides a general purpose UPDATE packet, which can carry
multiple HIP parameters, for updating the HIP state between two
peers. The UPDATE mechanism has the following properties:
UPDATE messages carry a monotonically increasing sequence number
and are explicitly acknowledged by the peer. Lost UPDATEs or
acknowledgments may be recovered via retransmission. Multiple
UPDATE messages may be outstanding.
UPDATE is protected by both HMAC and HIP_SIGNATURE parameters,
since processing UPDATE signatures alone is a potential DoS attack
against intermediate systems.
The UPDATE packet is defined in Section 7.6.
4.4 Error processing
HIP error processing behaviour depends on whether there exists an
active HIP association or not. In general, if an HIP security
association exists between the sender and receiver of a packet
causing an error condition, the receiver SHOULD respond with a NOTIFY
packet. On the other hand, if there are no existing HIP security
associations between the sender and receiver, or the receiver cannot
reasonably determine the identity of the sender, the receiver MAY
respond with a suitable ICMP message; see Section 6.3 for more
details.
4.5 Certificate distribution
HIP does not define how to use certificates. However, it does define
a simple certificate transport mechanisms that MAY be used to
implement certificate based security policies. The certificate
payload is defined in Section 6.2.11, and the certificate packet in
Section 7.5.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
4.6 Sending data on HIP packets
A future version of this document may define how to include ESP
protected data on various HIP packets. However, currently the HIP
header is a terminal header, and not followed by any other headers.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
5. HIP protocol overview
The following material is an overview of the HIP protocol operation.
Section 8 describes the packet processing steps in more detail.
A typical HIP packet flow is shown below, between an Initiator (I)
and a Responder (R). It illustrates the exchange of four HIP packets
(I1, R1, I2, and R2).
I --> Directory: lookup R
I <-- Directory: return R's addresses, and HI and/or HIT
I1 I --> R (Hi. Here is my I1, let's talk HIP)
R1 I <-- R (OK. Here is my R1, handle this HIP cookie)
I2 I --> R (Compute, compute, here is my counter I2)
R2 I <-- R (OK. Let's finish HIP with my R2)
I --> R (ESP protected data)
I <-- R (ESP protected data)
By definition, the system initiating a HIP exchange is the Initiator,
and the peer is the Responder. This distinction is forgotten once
the base exchange completes, and either party can become the
initiator in future communications.
5.1 HIP Scenarios
The HIP protocol and state machine is designed to recover from one of
the parties crashing and losing its state. The following scenarios
describe the main use cases covered by the design.
No prior state between the two systems.
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The process
follows the standard four packet base exchange, establishing
the SAs.
The system with data to send has no state with the receiver, but
the receiver has a residual SA.
The system with data to send is the Initiator. The Initiator
acts as in no prior state, sending I1 and getting R1. When the
Responder receives a valid I2, the old SAs are 'discovered' and
deleted, and the new SAs are established.
The system with data to send has an SA, but the receiver does not.
The system sends data on the outbound SA. The receiver
'detects' the situation when it receives an ESP packet that
contains an unknown SPI. The receiving host MUST discard this
packet, in accordance with IPsec architecture. Optionally, the
receiving host MAY send an ICMP packet with the Parameter
Problem type to inform about invalid SPI (see Section 6.3, and
it MAY initiate a new HIP negotiation. However, responding
with these optional mechanisms is implementation or policy
dependent.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
A system determines that it needs to reset ESP Sequence Number, or
rekey.
The system sends a HIP UPDATE packet. The peer responds with a
HIP UPDATE response. The UPDATE exchanges can refresh or
establish new SAs for peers.
5.2 Refusing a HIP exchange
A HIP aware host may choose not to accept a HIP exchange. If the
host's policy is to only be an Initiator, it should begin its own HIP
exchange. A host MAY choose to have such a policy since only the
Initiator HI is protected in the exchange. There is a risk of a race
condition if each host's policy is to only be an Initiator, at which
point the HIP exchange will fail.
If the host's policy does not permit it to enter into a HIP exchange
with the Initiator, it should send an ICMP 'Destination Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited' message. A more complex HIP packet is
not used here as it actually opens up more potential DoS attacks than
a simple ICMP message.
5.3 Reboot and SA timeout restart of HIP
Simulating a loss of state is a potential DoS attack. The following
process has been crafted to manage state recovery without presenting
a DoS opportunity.
If a host reboots or times out, it has lost its HIP state. If the
system that lost state has a datagram to deliver to its peer, it
simply restarts the HIP exchange. The peer replies with an R1 HIP
packet, but does not reset its state until it receives the I2 HIP
packet. The I2 packet MUST have a valid solution to the puzzle and,
if inserted in R1, a valid Opaque data as well as a valid signature.
Note that either the original Initiator or the Responder could end up
restarting the exchange, becoming the new Initiator.
If a system receives an ESP packet for an unknown SPI, it is possible
that it has lost the state and its peer has not. It MAY send an ICMP
packet with the Parameter Problem type, the Pointer pointing to the
SPI value within the ESP header. Reacting to ESP traffic with unknown
SPI depends on the implementation and the environment where the
implementation is used.
The initiating host cannot know, if the SA indicated by the received
ESP packet is either a HIP SA or and IKE SA. If the old SA was not a
HIP SA, the peer may not respond to the I1 packet.
After sending the I1, the HIP negotiation proceeds as normally and,
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
when successful, the SA is created at the initiating end. The peer
end removes the OLD SA and replaces it with the new one.
5.4 HIP State Machine
The HIP protocol itself has very little state. In the HIP base
exchange, there is an Initiator and a Responder. Once the SAs are
established, this distinction is lost. If the HIP state needs to be
re-established, the controlling parameters are which peer still has
state and which has a datagram to send to its peer. The following
state machine attempts to capture these processes.
The state machine is presented in a single system view, representing
either an Initiator or a Responder. There is not a complete overlap
of processing logic here and in the packet definitions. Both are
needed to completely implement HIP.
Implementors must understand that the state machine, as described
here, is informational. Specific implementations are free to
implement the actual functions differently. Section 8 describes the
packet processing rules in more detail. This state machine focuses
on the HIP I1, R1, I2, R2, and UPDATE packets only, and specifically,
the state induced by an UPDATE that triggers a rekeying event. Other
states may be introduced by mechanisms in other drafts (such as
mobility and multihoming).
5.4.1 HIP States
UNASSOCIATED State machine start
I1-SENT Initiating HIP
I2-SENT Waiting to finish HIP
R2-SENT Waiting to finish HIP
ESTABLISHED HIP SA established
REKEYING HIP SA established, but UPDATE is outstanding for rekeying
CLOSING HIP SA closing, no data (ESP) can be sent
CLOSED HIP SA closed, no data (ESP) can be sent
E-FAILED HIP exchange failed
5.4.2 HIP State Processes
+------------+
|UNASSOCIATED| Start state
+------------+
Datagram to send requiring a new SA, send I1 and go to I1-SENT
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
if fail, stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive ESP for unknown SA, optionally send ICMP as defined
in
Section 6.3
and stay at UNASSOCIATED
Receive CLOSE, or UPDATE, optionally send ICMP Parameter
Problem and stay in UNASSOCIATED.
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at UNASSOCIATED
+---------+
| I1-SENT | Initiating HIP
+---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at I1-SENT
Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at I1-SENT
Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT
if fail, go to E-FAILED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I1-SENT
Timeout, increment timeout counter
If counter is less than I1_RETRIES_MAX, send I1 and stay at I1-SENT
If counter is greater than I1_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED
+---------+
| I2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP
+---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at I2-SENT
Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and cycle at I2-SENT
if fail, stay at I2-SENT
Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at I2-SENT
Receive R2, process
if successful, go to ESTABLISHED
if fail, go to E-FAILED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at I2-SENT
Timeout, increment timeout counter
If counter is less than I2_RETRIES_MAX, send I2 and stay at I2-SENT
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
If counter is greater than I2_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED
+---------+
| R2-SENT | Waiting to finish HIP
+---------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at R2-SENT
Receive I2, process,
if successful, send R2, and cycle at R2-SENT
if failed, stay at R2-SENT
Receive R1, drop and stay at R2-SENT
Receive R2, drop and stay at R2-SENT
Receive ESP for SA, process and go to ESTABLISHED
Receive UPDATE, go to ESTABLISHED and process from ESTABLISHED state
Move to ESTABLISHED after an implementation specific time.
+------------+
|ESTABLISHED | HIP SA established
+------------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive I2, process with cookie and possible Opaque data verification
if successful, send R2, drop old SAs, establish new SA, go to
R2-SENT
if fail, stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive R1, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive R2, drop and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive ESP for SA, process and stay at ESTABLISHED
Receive UPDATE, process
if successful, send UPDATE in reply and go to REKEYING
if failed, stay at ESTABLISHED
Need rekey,
send UPDATE and go to REKEYING
No packet sent/received during UAL minutes, send CLOSE and go to
CLOSING.
Receive CLOSE, process
if successful, send CLOSE_ACK and go to CLOSED
if failed, stay at ESTABLISHED
+---------+
| CLOSING | HIP association has not been used for UAL (Unused
+---------+ Association Lifetime) minutes.
Datagram to send, requires the creation of another incarnation
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
of the HIP association, started by sending an I1,
and stay at CLOSING
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at CLOSING
Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at CLOSING
Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT
if fail, stay at CLOSING
Receive CLOSE, process
if successful, send CLOSE_ACK, discard state and go to CLOSED
if failed, stay at CLOSING
Receive CLOSE_ACK, process
if successful, discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED
if failed, stay at CLOSING
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at CLOSING
Timeout, increment timeout sum, reset timer
if timeout sum is less than UAL+MSL minutes, retransmit CLOSE
and stay at CLOSING
if timeout sum is greater than UAL+MSL minutes, go to
UNASSOCIATED
+--------+
| CLOSED | CLOSE_ACK sent, resending CLOSE_ACK if necessary
+--------+
Datagram to send, requires the creation of another incarnation
of the HIP association, started by sending an I1,
and stay at CLOSED
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at CLOSED
Receive I2, process
if successful, send R2 and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at CLOSED
Receive R1, process
if successful, send I2 and go to I2-SENT
if fail, stay at CLOSED
Receive CLOSE, process
if successful, send CLOSE_ACK, stay at CLOSED
if failed, stay at CLOSED
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Receive CLOSE_ACK, process
if successful, discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED
if failed, stay at CLOSED
Receive ANYOTHER, drop and stay at CLOSED
Timeout (UAL + 2MSL), discard state and go to UNASSOCIATED
+----------+
| REKEYING | HIP SA established, rekey pending
+----------+
Receive I1, send R1 and stay at REKEYING
Receive I2, process with cookie and possible Opaque data verification
if successful, send R2, drop old SA and go to R2-SENT
if fail, stay at REKEYING
Receive R1, drop and stay at REKEYING
Receive R2, drop and stay at REKEYING
Receive ESP for SA, process and stay at REKEYING
Receive UPDATE, process
if successful completion of rekey, go to ESTABLISHED
if failed, stay at REKEYING
Timeout, increment timeout counter
If counter is less than UPDATE_RETRIES_MAX, send UPDATE and stay at
REKEYING
If counter is greater than UPDATE_RETRIES_MAX, go to E-FAILED
+----------+
| E-FAILED | HIP failed to establish association with peer
+----------+
Move to UNASSOCIATED after an implementation specific time. Re-negotiation
is possible after moving to UNASSOCIATED state.
5.4.3 Simplified HIP State Diagram
The following diagram shows the major state transitions. Transitions
based on received packets implicitly assume that the packets are
successfully authenticated or processed. The diagram assumes that
UPDATE messages are being used for rekeying.
+-+ +------------------------------+
I1 received, send R1 | | | |
| v v |
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Datagram to send +--------------+ I2 received, send R2 |
+---------------| UNASSOCIATED |---------------+ |
| +--------------+ | |
v | |
+---------+ I2 received, send R2 | |
+---->| I1-SENT |---------------------------------------+ | |
| +---------+ | | |
| | +------------------------+ | | |
| | R1 received, | I2 received, send R2 | | | |
| v send I2 | v v v |
| +---------+ | +---------+ |
| +->| I2-SENT |------------+ | R2-SENT |<-----+ |
| | +---------+ +---------+ | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| |receive | | | |
| |R1, send | timeout, | receive I2,| |
| |I2 |R2 received +--------------+ ESP | send R2| |
| | +----------->| ESTABLISHED |<---------+ | |
| | +--------------+ | |
| | Update received/ | ^ | | | | |
| | Update triggered | | | | +---------------------------+ |
| | +----------------+ | | | | |
| | | | | | No packet sent/received | |
| | v | | | for UAL min, send CLOSE | |
| | +----------+ | | | | |
| | | REKEYING |-------------+ | | +---------+<-+ timeout | |
| | +----------+ UPDATE acked | +--->| CLOSING |--+ (UAL+MSL) | |
| | and NES received | +---------+ retransmit | |
+--+----------------------------+---------+ | | | | CLOSE | |
| +----------------------------+-----------+ | | +----------------+ |
| | | +-----------+ +------------------+--+
| | | | receive CLOSE, CLOSE_ACK | |
| | | | send CLOSE_ACK received or | |
| | v v timeout | |
| | +--------+ (UAL+MSL) | |
| +---------------------------| CLOSED |---------------------------+ |
+------------------------------+--------+------------------------------+
Datagram to send ^ | timeout (UAL+2MSL),
+-+ move to UNASSOCIATED
CLOSE received,
send CLOSE_ACK
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6. Packet formats
6.1 Payload format
All HIP packets start with a fixed header.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Payload Len | Type | VER. | RES. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Controls | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sender's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Receiver's Host Identity Tag (HIT) |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ HIP Parameters /
/ /
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The HIP header is logically an IPv6 extension header. However, this
document does not describe processing for Next Header values other
than decimal 59, IPPROTO_NONE, the IPV6 no next header value. Future
documents MAY do so. However, implementations MUST ignore trailing
data if a Next Header value is received that is not implemented.
The Header Length field contains the length of the HIP Header and the
length of HIP parameters in 8 bytes units, excluding the first 8
bytes. Since all HIP headers MUST contain the sender's and
receiver's HIT fields, the minimum value for this field is 4, and
conversely, the maximum length of the HIP Parameters field is
(255*8)-32 = 2008 bytes. Note: this sets an additional limit for
sizes of TLVs included in the Parameters field, independent of the
individual TLV parameter maximum lengths.
The Packet Type indicates the HIP packet type. The individual packet
types are defined in the relevant sections. If a HIP host receives a
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
HIP packet that contains an unknown packet type, it MUST drop the
packet.
The HIP Version is four bits. The current version is 1. The version
number is expected to be incremented only if there are incompatible
changes to the protocol. Most extensions can be handled by defining
new packet types, new parameter types, or new controls.
The following four bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be
zero when sent, and they SHOULD be ignored when handling a received
packet.
The HIT fields are always 128 bits (16 bytes) long.
6.1.1 HIP Controls
The HIP control section transfers information about the structure of
the packet and capabilities of the host.
The following fields have been defined:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SHT | DHT | | | | | | | | |C|A|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
C - Certificate One or more certificate packets (CER) follows this
HIP packet (see Section 7.5).
A - Anonymous If this is set, the sender's HI in this packet is
anonymous, i.e., one not listed in a directory. Anonymous HIs
SHOULD NOT be stored. This control is set in packets R1 and/or
I2. The peer receiving an anonymous HI may choose to refuse it by
silently dropping the exchange.
SHT - Sender's HIT Type Currently the following values are specified:
0 RESERVED
1 Type 1 HIT
2 Type 2 HIT
3-6 UNASSIGNED
7 RESERVED
DHT - Destination's HIT Type Using the same values as SHT.
The rest of the fields are reserved for future use and MUST be set to
zero on sent packets and ignored on received packets.
6.1.2 Checksum
The checksum field is located at the same location within the header
as the checksum field in UDP packets, enabling hardware assisted
checksum generation and verification. Note that since the checksum
covers the source and destination addresses in the IP header, it must
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
be recomputed on HIP based NAT boxes.
If IPv6 is used to carry the HIP packet, the pseudo-header [11]
contains the source and destination IPv6 addresses, HIP packet length
in the pseudo-header length field, a zero field, and the HIP protocol
number (TBD, see Section 4) in the Next Header field. The length
field is in bytes and can be calculated from the HIP header length
field: (HIP Header Length + 1) * 8.
In case of using IPv4, the IPv4 UDP pseudo header format [1] is used.
In the pseudo header, the source and destination addresses are those
used in the IP header, the zero field is obviously zero, the protocol
is the HIP protocol number (TBD, see Section 4), and the length is
calculated as in the IPv6 case.
6.2 HIP parameters
The HIP Parameters are used to carry the public key associated with
the sender's HIT, together with other related security information.
The HIP Parameters consists of ordered parameters, encoded in TLV
format.
The following parameter types are currently defined.
TLV Type Length Data
SPI 1 4 Remote's SPI.
R1_COUNTER 2 12 System Boot Counter
PUZZLE 5 12 K and Random #I
SOLUTION 7 20 K, Random #I and puzzle solution
NES 9 12 Old SPI, New SPI and other
info needed for UPDATE
SEQ 11 4 Update packet ID number
ACK 13 variable Update packet ID number
DIFFIE_HELLMAN 15 variable public key
HIP_TRANSFORM 17 variable HIP Encryption and Integrity
Transform
ESP_TRANSFORM 19 variable ESP Encryption and
Authentication Transform
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
ENCRYPTED 21 variable Encrypted part of I2 or CER
packets
HOST_ID 35 variable Host Identity with Fully
Qualified Domain Name
CERT 64 variable HI certificate
NOTIFY 256 variable Informational data
ECHO_REQUEST 1022 variable Opaque data to be echoed back;
under signature
ECHO_RESPONSE 1024 variable Opaque data echoed back; under
signature
HMAC 65245 20 HMAC based message
authentication code, with
key material from HIP_TRANSFORM
HMAC_2 65247 20 HMAC based message
authentication code, with
key material from HIP_TRANSFORM
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 65277 variable Signature of the R1 packet
HIP_SIGNATURE 65279 variable Signature of the packet
ECHO_REQUEST 65281 variable Opaque data to be echoed back
ECHO_RESPONSE 65283 variable Opaque data echoed back; after
signature
6.2.1 TLV format
The TLV encoded parameters are described in the following
subsections. The type-field value also describes the order of these
fields in the packet. The parameters MUST be included into the
packet so that the types form an increasing order. If the order does
not follow this rule, the packet is considered to be malformed and it
MUST be discarded.
All the TLV parameters have a length (including Type and Length
fields) which is a multiple of 8 bytes. When needed, padding MUST be
added to the end of the parameter so that the total length becomes a
multiple of 8 bytes. This rule ensures proper alignment of data. If
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
padding is added, the Length field MUST NOT include the padding. Any
added padding bytes MUST be set zero by the sender, but their content
SHOULD NOT be checked on the receiving end.
Consequently, the Length field indicates the length of the Contents
field (in bytes). The total length of the TLV parameter (including
Type, Length, Contents, and Padding) is related to the Length field
according to the following formula:
Total Length = 11 + Length - (Length + 3) % 8;
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |C| Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
/ Contents /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type Type code for the parameter
C Critical. One if this parameter is critical, and
MUST be recognized by the recipient, zero otherwise.
The C bit is considered to be a part of the Type field.
Consequently, critical parameters are always odd
and non-critical ones have an even value.
Length Length of the Contents, in bytes.
Contents Parameter specific, defined by Type
Padding Padding, 0-7 bytes, added if needed
Critical parameters MUST be recognized by the recipient. If a
recipient encounters a critical parameter that it does not recognize,
it MUST NOT process the packet any further.
Non-critical parameters MAY be safely ignored. If a recipient
encounters a non-critical parameter that it does not recognize, it
SHOULD proceed as if the parameter was not present in the received
packet.
6.2.2 Defining new parameters
Future specifications may define new parameters as needed. When
defining new parameters, care must be taken to ensure that the
parameter type values are appropriate and leave suitable space for
other future extensions. One must remember that the parameters MUST
always be arranged in the increasing order by the type code, thereby
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
limiting the order of parameters.
The following rules must be followed when defining new parameters.
1. The low order bit C of the Type code is used to distinguish
between critical and non-critical parameters.
2. A new parameter may be critical only if an old recipient ignoring
it would cause security problems. In general, new parameters
SHOULD be defined as non-critical, and expect a reply from the
recipient.
3. If a system implements a new critical parameter, it MUST provide
the ability to configure the associated feature off, such that
the critical parameter is not sent at all. The configuration
option must be well documented. By default, sending of such a new
critical parameter SHOULD be off. In other words, the management
interface MUST allow vanilla standards only mode as a default
configuration setting, and MAY allow new critical payloads to be
configured on (and off).
4. The following type codes are reserved for future base protocol
extensions, and may be assigned only through an appropriate WG or
RFC action.
0 - 511
65024 - 65535
5. The following type codes are reserved for experimentation and
private use. Types SHOULD be selected in a random fashion from
this range, thereby reducing the probability of collisions. A
method employing genuine randomness (such as flipping a coin)
SHOULD be used.
32768 - 49141
6. All other parameter type codes MUST be registered by the IANA.
See Section 14.
6.2.3 SPI
The SPI parameter contains the SPI that the receiving host must use
when sending data to the sending host. It may be possible, in future
extensions of this protocol, for multiple SPIs to exist in a
host-host communications context.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 1
Length 4
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
SPI Security Parameter Index
6.2.4 R1_COUNTER
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved, 4 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| R1 generation counter, 8 bytes |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 2
Length 12
R1 generation
counter The current generation of valid puzzles
The R1_COUNTER parameter contains an 64-bit unsigned integer in
network byte order, indicating the current generation of valid
puzzles. The sender is supposed to increment this counter
periodically. It is RECOMMENDED that the counter value is
incremented at least as often as old PUZZLE values are deprecated so
that SOLUTIONs to them are no longer accepted.
The R1_COUNTER parameter is optional. It SHOULD be included in the
R1 (in which case it is covered by the signature), and if present in
the R1, it MAY be echoed (including the Reserved field) by the
Initiator in the I2.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.5 PUZZLE
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Lifetime | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random # I, 8 bytes |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 5
Length 12
K K is the number of verified bits
Lifetime Puzzle lifetime 2^(value-32) seconds
Opaque Data set by the Responder, indexing the puzzle
Random #I random number
Random #I is represented as 64-bit integer, K and Lifetime as 8-bit
integer, all in network byte order.
The PUZZLE parameter contains the puzzle difficulty K and an 64-bit
puzzle random integer #I. Puzzle Lifetime indicates the time during
which the puzzle solution is valid and sets a time limit for
initiator which it should not exceed while trying to solve the
puzzle. The lifetime is indicated as power of 2 using formula
2^(Lifetime-32) seconds. A puzzle MAY be augmented by including an
ECHO_REQUEST parameter to an R1. The contents of the ECHO_REQUEST
are then echoed back in ECHO_RESPONSE, allowing the Responder to use
the included information as a part of puzzle processing.
The Opaque and Random #I field are not covered by the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.6 SOLUTION
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| K, 1 byte | Reserved | Opaque, 2 bytes |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Random #I, 8 bytes |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Puzzle solution #J, 8 bytes |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 7
Length 20
K K is the number of verified bits
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Opaque Copied unmodified from the received PUZZLE TLV
Random #I random number
Puzzle solution
#J random number
Random #I, and Random #J are represented as 64-bit integers, K as
8-bit integer, all in network byte order.
The SOLUTION parameter contains a solution to a puzzle. It also
echoes back the random difficulty K, the Opaque field, and the puzzle
integer #I.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.7 DIFFIE_HELLMAN
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Group ID | Public Value /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 15
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding
Group ID defines values for p and g
Public Value the sender's public Diffie-Hellman key
The following Group IDs have been defined:
Group Value
Reserved 0
384-bit group 1
OAKLEY well known group 1 2
1536-bit MODP group 3
3072-bit MODP group 4
6144-bit MODP group 5
8192-bit MODP group 6
The MODP Diffie-Hellman groups are defined in [18]. The OAKLEY group
is defined in [9]. The OAKLEY well known group 5 is the same as the
1536-bit MODP group.
A HIP implementation MUST support Group IDs 1 and 3. The 384-bit
group can be used when lower security is enough (e.g. web surfing)
and when the equipment is not powerful enough (e.g. some PDAs).
Equipment powerful enough SHOULD implement also group ID 5. The
384-bit group is defined in Appendix G.
To avoid unnecessary failures during the 4-way handshake, the rest of
the groups SHOULD be implemented in hosts where resources are
adequate.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.8 HIP_TRANSFORM
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transform-ID #1 | Transform-ID #2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Transform-ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 17
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding
Transform-ID Defines the HIP Suite to be used
The Suite-IDs are identical to those defined in Section 6.2.9.
There MUST NOT be more than six (6) HIP Suite-IDs in one HIP
transform TLV. The limited number of transforms sets the maximum
size of HIP_TRANSFORM TLV. The HIP_TRANSFORM TLV MUST contain at
least one of the mandatory Suite-IDs.
Mandatory implementations: ENCR-AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 and ENCR-NULL
with HMAC-SHA1.
6.2.9 ESP_TRANSFORM
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |E| Suite-ID #1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Suite-ID #2 | Suite-ID #3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Suite-ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 19
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding
E One if the ESP transform requires 64-bit sequence
numbers
(see
Section 11.6
)
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Suite-ID defines the ESP Suite to be used
The following Suite-IDs are defined ([20],[23]):
Suite-ID Value
RESERVED 0
ESP-AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 1
ESP-3DES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 2
ESP-3DES-CBC with HMAC-MD5 3
ESP-BLOWFISH-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 4
ESP-NULL with HMAC-SHA1 5
ESP-NULL with HMAC-MD5 6
There MUST NOT be more than six (6) ESP Suite-IDs in one
ESP_TRANSFORM TLV. The limited number of Suite-IDs sets the maximum
size of ESP_TRANSFORM TLV. The ESP_TRANSFORM MUST contain at least
one of the mandatory Suite-IDs.
Mandatory implementations: ESP-AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA1 and ESP-NULL
with HMAC-SHA1.
6.2.10 HOST_ID
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HI Length |DI-type| DI Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Host Identity /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Domain Identifier /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 35
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
Padding
DI-type type of the following Domain Identifier field
DI Length length of the FQDN or NAI in octets
N if set, the following FQDN/NAI field contains a
NAI
Host Identity actual host identity
Domain Identifier the identifier of the sender
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The Host Identity is represented in RFC2535 [12] format. The
algorithms used in RDATA format are the following:
Algorithms Values
RESERVED 0
DSA 3 [RFC2536] (RECOMMENDED)
RSA 5 [RFC3110] (REQUIRED)
The following DI-types have been defined:
Type Value
none included 0
FQDN 1
NAI 2
FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name, in binary format.
NAI Network Access Identifier, in binary format. The
format of the NAI is login@FQDN.
The format for the FQDN is defined in RFC1035 [3] Section 3.1.
If there is no Domain Identifier, i.e. the DI-type field is zero,
also the DI Length field is set to zero.
6.2.11 CERT
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 64
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and padding
Cert count total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
in several consecutive CER packets
Cert ID the order number for this certificate
Cert Type describes the type of the certificate
The receiver must know the total number (Cert count) of certificates
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
that it will receive from the sender, related to the R1 or I2. The
Cert ID identifies the particular certificate and its order in the
certificate chain. The numbering in Cert ID MUST go from 1 to Cert
count.
The following certificate types are defined:
Cert format Type number
X.509 v3 1
The encoding format for X.509v3 certificate is defined in [15].
6.2.12 HMAC
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| HMAC |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65245
Length 20
HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the HIP
packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any
following HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameters. The checksum field MUST be set to zero
and the HIP header length in the HIP common header
MUST be calculated not to cover any excluded
parameters when the HMAC is calculated.
The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in Section
8.3.1
6.2.13 HMAC_2
The TLV structure is the same as in Section 6.2.12. The fields are:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Type 65247
Length 20
HMAC 160 low order bits of the HMAC computed over the HIP
packet, excluding the HMAC parameter and any
following HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2
parameters and including an additional sender's
HOST_ID TLV during the HMAC calculation. The
checksum field MUST be set to zero and the HIP
header length in the HIP common header MUST be
calculated not to cover any excluded parameters when
the HMAC is calculated.
The HMAC calculation and verification process is presented in Section
8.3.1
6.2.14 HIP_SIGNATURE
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SIG alg | Signature /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65279 (2^16-2^8-1)
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
SIG alg Signature algorithm
Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP packet,
excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV field and any TLVs
that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV. The checksum field
MUST be set to zero, and the HIP header length in the
HIP common header MUST be calculated only to the
beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV when the signature
is calculated.
The signature algorithms are defined in Section 6.2.10. The
signature in the Signature field is encoded using the proper method
depending on the signature algorithm (e.g. according to [14] in case
of RSA, or according to [13] in case of DSA).
The HIP_SIGNATURE calculation and verification process is presented
in Section 8.3.2
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.15 HIP_SIGNATURE_2
The TLV structure is the same as in Section 6.2.14. The fields are:
Type 65277 (2^16-2^8-3)
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
SIG alg Signature algorithm
Signature the signature is calculated over the HIP R1 packet,
excluding the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV field and any
TLVs that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV. Initiator's
HIT, checksum field, and the Opaque and Random #I
fields in the PUZZLE TLV MUST be set to zero while
computing the HIP_SIGNATURE_2 signature. Further, the
HIP packet length in the HIP header MUST be
calculated to the beginning of the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
TLV when the signature is calculated.
Zeroing the Initiator's HIT makes it possible to create R1 packets
beforehand to minimize the effects of possible DoS attacks. Zeroing
the I and Opaque fields allows these fields to be populated
dynamically on precomputed R1s.
Signature calculation and verification follows the process in Section
8.3.2.
6.2.16 NES
During the life of an SA established by HIP, one of the hosts may
need to reset the Sequence Number to one (to prevent wrapping) and
rekey. The reason for rekeying might be an approaching sequence
number wrap in ESP, or a local policy on use of a key. Rekeying ends
the current SAs and starts new ones on both peers.
The NES parameter is carried in the HIP UPDATE packet. It is used to
reset Security Associations. It introduces a new SPI to be used when
sending data to the sender of the UPDATE packet. The keys for the
new Security Association will be drawn from KEYMAT. If the packet
contains a Diffie-Hellman parameter, the KEYMAT is first recomputed
before drawing the new keys.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Keymat Index |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Old SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| New SPI |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 9
Length 12
Keymat Index Index, in bytes, where to continue to draw ESP keys
from KEYMAT. If the packet includes a new
Diffie-Hellman key, the field MUST be zero. Note
that the length of this field limits the amount of
keying material that can be drawn from KEYMAT. If
that amount is exceeded, the NES packet MUST contain
a new Diffie-Hellman key.
Old SPI Old SPI for data sent to the source address of
this packet
New SPI New SPI for data sent to the source address of
this packet
A host that receives an NES must reply shortly thereafter with an
NES. Any middleboxes between the communicating hosts will learn the
mappings from the pair of UPDATE messages.
6.2.17 SEQ
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 11
Length 4
Update ID 32-bit sequence number
The Update ID is an unsigned quantity, initialized by a host to zero
upon moving to ESTABLISHED state. The Update ID has scope within a
single HIP association, and not across multiple associations or
multiple hosts. The Update ID is incremented by one before each new
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
UPDATE that is sent by the host (i.e., the first UPDATE packet
originated by a host has an Update ID of 1).
6.2.18 ACK
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| peer Update ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 13
Length variable (multiple of 4)
peer Update ID 32-bit sequence number corresponding to the
Update ID being acked.
The ACK parameter includes one or more Update IDs that have been
received from the peer. The Length field identifies the number of
peer Update IDs that are present in the parameter.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.19 ENCRYPTED
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IV /
/ /
/ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ /
/ Encrypted data /
/ /
/ +-------------------------------+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 21
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
IV Initialization vector, if needed, otherwise nonexistent.
The length of the IV is inferred from the HIP transform.
Encrypted The data is encrypted using an encryption algorithm as
data defined in HIP transform.
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes.
The encrypted data is in TLV format itself. Consequently, the first
fields in the contents are Type and Length, allowing the contents to
be easily parsed after decryption. Each of the TLVs to be encrypted,
must be padded according to rules in Section 6.2.1 before encryption.
If the encryption algorithm requires the length of the data to be
encrypted to be a multiple of the cipher algorithm block size,
thereby necessitating padding, and if the encryption algorithm does
not specify the padding contents, then an implementation MUST append
the TLV parameter that is to be encrypted with an additional padding,
so that the length of the resulting cleartext is a multiple of the
cipher block size length. Such a padding MUST be constructed as
specified in [19] Section 2.4. On the other hand, if the data to be
encrypted is already a multiple of the block size, or if the
encryption algorithm does specify padding as per [19] Section 2.4,
then such additional padding SHOULD NOT be added.
The Length field in the inside, to be encrypted TLV does not include
the padding. The Length field in the outside ENCRYPTED TLV is the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
length of the data after encryption (including the Reserved field,
the IV field, and the output from the encryption process specified
for that suite, but not any additional external padding). Note that
the length of the cipher suite output may be smaller or larger than
the length of the data to be encrypted, since the encryption process
may compress the data or add additional padding to the data.
The ENCRYPTED payload may contain additional external padding, if the
result of encryption, the TLV header and the IV is not a multiple of
8 bytes. The contents of this external padding MUST follow the rules
given in Section 6.2.1.
6.2.20 NOTIFY
The NOTIFY parameter is used to transmit informational data, such as
error conditions and state transitions, to a HIP peer. A NOTIFY
parameter may appear in the NOTIFY packet type. The use of the
NOTIFY parameter in other packet types is for further study.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| /
/ Notification data /
/ +---------------+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 256
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Reserved zero when sent, ignored when received
Notify Message Specifies the type of notification
Type
Notification Informational or error data transmitted in addition
Data to the Notify Message Type. Values for this field are
type specific (see below).
Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
of 8 bytes.
Notification information can be error messages specifying why an SA
could not be established. It can also be status data that a process
managing an SA database wishes to communicate with a peer process.
The table below lists the Notification messages and their
corresponding values.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
To avoid certain types of attacks, a Responder SHOULD avoid sending a
NOTIFY to any host with which it has not successfully verified a
puzzle solution.
Types in the range 0 - 16383 are intended for reporting errors. An
implementation that receives a NOTIFY error parameter in response to
a request packet (e.g., I1, I2, UPDATE), SHOULD assume that the
corresponding request has failed entirely. Unrecognized error types
MUST be ignored except that they SHOULD be logged.
Notify payloads with status types MUST be ignored if not recognized.
NOTIFY PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------ -----
UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PARAMETER_TYPE 1
Sent if the parameter type has the "critical" bit set and the
parameter type is not recognized. Notification Data contains
the two octet parameter type.
INVALID_SYNTAX 7
Indicates that the HIP message received was invalid because
some type, length, or value was out of range or because the
request was rejected for policy reasons. To avoid a denial
of service attack using forged messages, this status may
only be returned for and in an encrypted packet if the
message ID and cryptographic checksum were valid. To avoid
leaking information to someone probing a node, this status
MUST be sent in response to any error not covered by one of
the other status types. To aid debugging, more detailed
error information SHOULD be written to a console or log.
NO_DH_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 14
None of the proposed group IDs was acceptable.
INVALID_DH_CHOSEN 15
The D-H Group ID field does not correspond to one offered
by the responder.
NO_HIP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 16
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
None of the proposed HIP Transform crypto suites was
acceptable.
INVALID_HIP_TRANSFORM_CHOSEN 17
The HIP Transform crypto suite does not correspond to
one offered by the responder.
NO_ESP_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN 18
None of the proposed ESP Transform crypto suites was
acceptable.
INVALID_ESP_TRANSFORM_CHOSEN 19
The ESP Transform crypto suite does not correspond to
one offered by the responder.
AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 24
Sent in response to a HIP signature failure.
CHECKSUM_FAILED 26
Sent in response to a HIP checksum failure.
HMAC_FAILED 28
Sent in response to a HIP HMAC failure.
ENCRYPTION_FAILED 32
The responder could not successfully decrypt the
ENCRYPTED TLV.
INVALID_HIT 40
Sent in response to a failure to validate the peer's
HIT from the corresponding HI.
BLOCKED_BY_POLICY 42
The responder is unwilling to set up an association
for some policy reason (e.g. received HIT is NULL
and policy does not allow opportunistic mode).
SERVER_BUSY_PLEASE_RETRY 44
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The responder is unwilling to set up an association
as it is suffering under some kind of overload and
has chosen to shed load by rejecting your request.
You may retry if you wish, however you MUST find
another (different) puzzle solution for any such
retries. Note that you may need to obtain a new
puzzle with a new I1/R1 exchange.
I2_ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 46
The responder has received your I2 but had to queue
the I2 for processing. The puzzle was correctly solved
and the responder is willing to set up an association
but has currently a number of I2s in processing queue.
R2 will be sent after the I2 has been processed.
NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES Value
------------------------------ -----
(None defined at present)
6.2.21 ECHO_REQUEST
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65281 or 1022
Length variable
Opaque data Opaque data, supposed to be meaningful only to the
node that sends ECHO_REQUEST and receives a corresponding
ECHO_RESPONSE.
The ECHO_REQUEST parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the
sender wants to get echoed back in the corresponding reply packet.
The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any
purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet
and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_REQUEST MAY be
covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type
field selected for the parameter; Type 1022 ECHO_REQUEST is covered
and Type 65281 is not.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.2.22 ECHO_RESPONSE
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Opaque data (variable length) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 65283 or 1024
Length variable
Opaque data Opaque data, copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST
parameter that triggered this response.
The ECHO_RESPONSE parameter contains an opaque blob of data that the
sender of the ECHO_REQUEST wants to get echoed back. The opaque data
is copied unmodified from the ECHO_REQUEST parameter.
The ECHO_REQUEST and ECHO_RESPONSE parameters MAY be used for any
purpose where a node wants to carry some state in a request packet
and get it back in a response packet. The ECHO_RESPONSE MAY be
covered by the HMAC and SIGNATURE. This is dictated by the Type field
selected for the parameter; Type 1024 ECHO_RESPONSE is covered and
Type 65283 is not.
6.3 ICMP messages
When a HIP implementation detects a problem with an incoming packet,
and it either cannot determine the identity of the sender of the
packet or does not have any existing HIP security association with
the sender of the packet, it MAY respond with an ICMP packet. Any
such replies MUST be rate limited as described in [4]. In most
cases, the ICMP packet will have the Parameter Problem type (12 for
ICMPv4, 4 for ICMPv6), with the Pointer field pointing to the field
that caused the ICMP message to be generated.
XXX: Should we say something more about rate limitation here?
6.3.1 Invalid Version
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has an
unrecognized HIP version number, it SHOULD respond, rate limited,
with an ICMP packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing
to the VER./RES. byte in the HIP header.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6.3.2 Other problems with the HIP header and packet structure
If a HIP implementation receives a HIP packet that has other
unrecoverable problems in the header or packet format, it MAY
respond, rate limited, with an ICMP packet with type Parameter
Problem, the Pointer pointing to the field that failed to pass the
format checks. However, an implementation MUST NOT send an ICMP
message if the Checksum fails; instead, it MUST silently drop the
packet.
6.3.3 Unknown SPI
If a HIP implementation receives an ESP packet that has an
unrecognized SPI number, it MAY responder, rate limited, with an ICMP
packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing to the the
beginning of SPI field in the ESP header.
6.3.4 Invalid Cookie Solution
If a HIP implementation receives an I2 packet that has an invalid
cookie solution, the behaviour depends on the underlying version of
IP. If IPv6 is used, the implementation SHOULD respond with an ICMP
packet with type Parameter Problem, the Pointer pointing to the
beginning of the Puzzle solution #J field in the SOLUTION payload in
the HIP message.
If IPv4 is used, the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP packet
with the type Parameter Problem, copying enough of bytes form the I2
message so that the SOLUTION parameter fits in to the ICMP message,
the Pointer pointing to the beginning of the Puzzle solution #J
field, as in the IPv6 case. Note, however, that the resulting ICMPv4
message exceeds the typical ICMPv4 message size as defined in [2].
6.3.5 Non-existing HIP association
If a HIP implementation receives a CLOSE, or UPDATE packet, or any
other packet whose handling requires an existing association, that
has either a Receiver or Sender HIT that does not match with any
existing HIP association, the implementation MAY respond, rate
limited, with an ICMP packet with the type Parameter Problem, the
Pointer pointing to the the beginning of the first HIT that does not
match.
A host MUST NOT reply with such an ICMP if it receives any of the
following messages: I1, R2, I2, R2, CER, and NOTIFY. When
introducing new packet types, a specification SHOULD define the
appropriate rules for sending or not sending this kind of ICMP
replies.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
7. HIP Packets
There are nine basic HIP packets. Four are for the base HIP
exchange, one is for updating, one is a broadcast for use when there
is no IP addressing (e.g., before DHCP exchange), one is used to send
certificates, one for sending notifications, and one is for sending
unencrypted data.
Packets consist of the fixed header as described in Section 6.1,
followed by the parameters. The parameter part, in turn, consists of
zero or more TLV coded parameters.
In addition to the base packets, other packets types will be defined
later in separate specifications. For example, support for mobility
and multi-homing is not included in this specification.
Packet representation uses the following operations:
() parameter
x{y} operation x on content y
<x>i x exists i times
[] optional parameter
x | y x or y
In the future, an OPTIONAL upper layer payload MAY follow the HIP
header. The payload proto field in the header indicates if there is
additional data following the HIP header. The HIP packet, however,
MUST NOT be fragmented. This limits the size of the possible
additional data in the packet.
7.1 I1 - the HIP initiator packet
The HIP header values for the I1 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 1
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT, or NULL
IP ( HIP () )
The I1 packet contains only the fixed HIP header.
Valid control bits: none
The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT either from a DNS lookup of
the Responder's FQDN, from some other repository, or from a local
table. If the Initiator does not know the Responder's HIT, it may
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
attempt opportunistic mode by using NULL (all zeros) as the
Responder's HIT. If the Initiator send a NULL as the Responder's
HIT, it MUST be able to handle all MUST and SHOULD algorithms from
Section 3, which are currently RSA and DSA.
Since this packet is so easy to spoof even if it were signed, no
attempt is made to add to its generation or processing cost.
Implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1 packets,
discarding those with common content that arrive within a small time
delta.
7.2 R1 - the HIP responder packet
The HIP header values for the R1 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 2
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [ R1_COUNTER, ]
PUZZLE,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_TRANSFORM,
ESP_TRANSFORM,
HOST_ID,
[ ECHO_REQUEST, ]
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 )
[, ECHO_REQUEST ])
Valid control bits: C, A
The R1 packet may be followed by one or more CER packets. In this
case, the C-bit in the control field MUST be set.
If the responder HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
The initiator HIT MUST match the one received in I1. If the
Responder has multiple HIs, the responder HIT used MUST match
Initiator's request. If the Initiator used opportunistic mode, the
Responder may select freely among its HIs.
The R1 generation counter is used to determine the currently valid
generation of puzzles. The value is increased periodically, and it
is RECOMMENDED that it is increased at least as often as solutions to
old puzzles are not accepted any longer.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The Puzzle contains a random #I and the difficulty K. The difficulty
K is the number of bits that the Initiator must get zero in the
puzzle. The random #I is not covered by the signature and must be
zeroed during the signature calculation, allowing the sender to
select and set the #I into a pre-computed R1 just prior sending it to
the peer.
The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral, but can be reused over a
number of connections. In fact, as a defense against I1 storms, an
implementation MAY use the same Diffie-Hellman value for a period of
time, for example, 15 minutes. By using a small number of different
Cookies for a given Diffie-Hellman value, the R1 packets can be
pre-computed and delivered as quickly as I1 packets arrive. A
scavenger process should clean up unused DHs and Cookies.
The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the encryption and integrity algorithms
supported by the Responder to protect the HI exchange, in the order
of preference. All implementations MUST support the AES [10] with
HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6].
The ESP_TRANSFORM contains the ESP modes supported by the Responder,
in the order of preference. All implementations MUST support AES
[10] with HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6].
The ECHO_REQUEST contains data that the sender wants to receive
unmodified in the corresponding response packet in the ECHO_RESPONSE
parameter. The ECHO_REQUEST can be either covered by the signature,
or it can be left out from it. In the first case, the ECHO_REQUEST
gets Type number 1022 and in the latter case 65281.
The signature is calculated over the whole HIP envelope, after
setting the initiator HIT, header checksum as well as the Opaque
field and the Random #I in the PUZZLE parameter temporarily to zero,
and excluding any TLVs that follow the signature, as described in
Section 6.2.15. This allows the Responder to use precomputed R1s.
The Initiator SHOULD validate this signature. It SHOULD check that
the responder HI received matches with the one expected, if any.
7.3 I2 - the second HIP initiator packet
The HIP header values for the I2 packet:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Header:
Type = 3
SRC HIT = Initiator's HIT
DST HIT = Responder's HIT
IP ( HIP ( SPI,
[R1_COUNTER,]
SOLUTION,
DIFFIE_HELLMAN,
HIP_TRANSFORM,
ESP_TRANSFORM,
ENCRYPTED { HOST_ID },
[ ECHO_RESPONSE ,]
HMAC,
HIP_SIGNATURE
[, ECHO_RESPONSE] ) )
Valid control bits: C, A
The HITs used MUST match the ones used previously.
If the initiator HI is an anonymous one, the A control MUST be set.
The Initiator MAY include an unmodified copy of the R1_COUNTER
parameter received in the corresponding R1 packet into the I2 packet.
The Solution contains the random # I from R1 and the computed # J.
The low order K bits of the SHA-1(I | ... | J) MUST be zero.
The Diffie-Hellman value is ephemeral. If precomputed, a scavenger
process should clean up unused DHs.
The HIP_TRANSFORM contains the encryption and integrity used to
protect the HI exchange selected by the Initiator. All
implementations MUST support the AES transform [10].
The Initiator's HI is encrypted using the HIP_TRANSFORM encryption
algorithm. The keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman
exchanged as defined in Section 9.
The ESP_TRANSFORM contains the ESP mode selected by the Initiator.
All implementations MUST support AES [10] with HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6].
The ECHO_RESPONSE contains the the unmodified Opaque data copied from
the corresponding ECHO_REQUEST TLV. The ECHO_RESPONSE can be either
covered by the signature, or it can be left out from it. In the
first case, the ECHO_RESPONSE gets Type number 1024 and in the latter
case 65283.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The HMAC is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any TLVs
after the HMAC, as described in Section 8.3.1. The Responder MUST
validate the HMAC.
The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope, excluding any
TLVs after the HIP_SIGNATURE, as described in Section 6.2.14. The
Responder MUST validate this signature. It MAY use either the HI in
the packet or the HI acquired by some other means.
7.4 R2 - the second HIP responder packet
The HIP header values for the R2 packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 4
SRC HIT = Responder's HIT
DST HIT = Initiator's HIT
IP ( HIP ( SPI, HMAC_2, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none
The HMAC_2 is calculated over whole HIP envelope, with Responder's
HOST_ID TLV concatenated with the HIP envelope. The HOST_ID TLV is
removed after the HMAC calculation. The procedure is described in
8.3.1.
The signature is calculated over whole HIP envelope.
The Initiator MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature.
7.5 CER - the HIP Certificate Packet
The CER packet is OPTIONAL.
The Optional CER packets over the Announcer's HI by a higher level
authority known to the Recipient is an alternative method for the
Recipient to trust the Announcer's HI (over DNSSEC or PKI).
The HIP header values for CER packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 5
SRC HIT = Announcer's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( <CERT>i , HIP_SIGNATURE ) ) or
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
IP ( HIP ( ENCRYPTED { <CERT>i }, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: None
Certificates in the CER packet MAY be encrypted. The encryption
algorithm is provided in the HIP transform of the previous (R1 or I2)
packet.
7.6 UPDATE - the HIP Update Packet
Support for the UPDATE packet is MANDATORY.
The HIP header values for the UPDATE packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 6
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( [NES, SEQ, ACK, DIFFIE_HELLMAN, ] HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: None
The UPDATE packet contains mandatory HMAC and HIP_SIGNATURE
parameters, and other optional parameters.
The UPDATE packet contains zero or one SEQ parameter. The presence
of a SEQ parameter indicates that the receiver MUST ack the UPDATE.
An UPDATE that does not contain a SEQ parameter is simply an ACK of a
previous UPDATE and itself MUST not be acked.
An UPDATE packet contains zero or one ACK parameters. The ACK
parameter echoes the SEQ sequence number of the UPDATE packet being
acked. A host MAY choose to ack more than one UPDATE packet at a
time; e.g., the ACK may contain the last two SEQ values received, for
robustness to ack loss. ACK values are not cumulative; each received
unique SEQ value requires at least one corresponding ACK value in
reply. Received ACKs that are redundant are ignored.
The UPDATE packet may contain both a SEQ and an ACK parameter. In
this case, the ACK is being piggybacked on an outgoing UPDATE. In
general, UPDATEs carrying SEQ SHOULD be acked upon completion of the
processing of the UPDATE. A host MAY choose to hold the UPDATE
carrying ACK for a short period of time to allow for the possibility
of piggybacking the ACK parameter, in a manner similar to TCP delayed
acknowledgments.
A sender MAY choose to forego reliable transmission of a particular
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
UPDATE (e.g., it becomes overcome by events). The semantics are such
that the receiver MUST acknowledge the UPDATE but the sender MAY
choose to not care about receiving the ACK.
UPDATEs MAY be retransmitting without incrementing SEQ. If the same
subset of parameters is included in multiple UPDATEs with different
SEQs, the host MUST ensure that receiver processing of the parameters
multiple times will not result in a protocol error.
In the case of rekeying (Section 8.10), the UPDATE packet MUST carry
NES and MAY carry DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter, unless the UPDATE is a
bare ack.
Intermediate systems that use the SPI will have to inspect HIP
packets for a UPDATE packet. The packet is signed for the benefit of
the intermediate systems. Since intermediate systems may need the
new SPI values, the contents of this packet cannot be encrypted.
7.7 NOTIFY - the HIP Notify Packet
The NOTIFY packet is OPTIONAL. The NOTIFY packet MAY be used to
provide information to a peer. Typically, NOTIFY is used to indicate
some type of protocol error or negotiation failure.
The HIP header values for the NOTIFY packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 7
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT, or zero if unknown
IP ( HIP (<NOTIFY>i, [HOST_ID, ] HIP_SIGNATURE) )
Valid control bits: None
The NOTIFY packet is used to carry one or more NOTIFY parameters.
7.8 CLOSE - the HIP association closing packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 8
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REQUEST, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 60]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Valid control bits: none
The sender MUST include an ECHO_REPLY used to validate CLOSE_ACK
received in response, and both an HMAC and a signature (calculated
over the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature if it
has a HIP association state, and MUST reply with a CLOSE_ACK
containing an ECHO_REPLY corresponding to the received ECHO_REQUEST.
7.9 CLOSE_ACK - the HIP closing acknowledgment packet
The HIP header values for the CLOSE_ACK packet:
Header:
Packet Type = 9
SRC HIT = Sender's HIT
DST HIT = Recipient's HIT
IP ( HIP ( ECHO_REPLY, HMAC, HIP_SIGNATURE ) )
Valid control bits: none
The sender MUST include both an HMAC and signature (calculated over
the whole HIP envelope).
The receiver peer MUST validate both the HMAC and the signature.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 61]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
8. Packet processing
Each host is assumed to have a single HIP protocol implementation
that manages the host's HIP associations and handles requests for new
ones. Each HIP association is governed by a conceptual state
machine, with states defined above in Section 5.4. The HIP
implementation can simultaneously maintain HIP associations with more
than one host. Furthermore, the HIP implementation may have more
than one active HIP association with another host; in this case, HIP
associations are distinguished by their respective HITs and IPsec
SPIs. It is not possible to have more than one HIP associations
between any given pair of HITs. Consequently, the only way for two
hosts to have more than one parallel association is to use different
HITs, at least at one end.
The processing of packets depends on the state of the HIP
association(s) with respect to the authenticated or apparent
originator of the packet. A HIP implementation determines whether it
has an active association with the originator of the packet based on
the HITs or the SPI of the packet.
8.1 Processing outgoing application data
In a HIP host, an application can send application level data using
HITs or LSIs as source and destination identifiers. The HITs and
LSIs may be specified via a backwards compatible API (see Appendix A)
or a completely new API. However, whenever there is such outgoing
data, the stack has to protect the data with ESP, and send the
resulting datagram using appropriate source and destination IP
addresses. Here, we specify the processing rules only for the base
case where both hosts have only single usable IP addresses; the
multi-address multi-homing case will be specified separately.
If the IPv4 or IPv6 backward compatible APIs and therefore LSIs are
supported, it is assumed that the LSIs will be converted into proper
HITs somewhere in the stack. The exact location of the conversion is
an implementation specific issue and not discussed here. The
following conceptual algorithm discusses only HITs, with the
assumption that the LSI-to-HIT conversion takes place somewhere.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
outgoing datagrams destined to a HIT.
1. If the datagram has a specified source address, it MUST be a HIT.
If it is not, the implementation MAY replace the source address
with a HIT. Otherwise it MUST drop the packet.
2. If the datagram has an unspecified source address, the
implementation must choose a suitable source HIT for the
datagram. In selecting a proper local HIT, the implementation
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 62]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
SHOULD consult the table of currently active HIP sessions, and
preferably select a HIT that already has an active session with
the target HIT.
3. If there no active HIP session with the given < source,
destination > HIT pair, one must be created by running the base
exchange. The implementation SHOULD queue at least one packet
per HIP session to be formed, and it MAY queue more than one.
4. Once there is an active HIP session for the given < source,
destination > HIT pair, the outgoing datagram is protected using
the associated ESP security association. In a typical
implementation, this will result in an transport mode ESP
datagram that still has HITs in the place of IP addresses.
5. The HITs in the datagram are replaced with suitable IP addresses.
For IPv6, the rules defined in [16] SHOULD be followed. Note
that this HIT-to-IP-address conversion step MAY also be performed
at some other point in the stack, e.g., before ESP processing.
However, care must be taken to make sure that the right ESP SA is
employed.
8.2 Processing incoming application data
Incoming HIP datagrams arrive as ESP protected packets. In the usual
case the receiving host has a corresponding ESP security association,
identified by the SPI and destination IP address in the packet.
However, if the host has crashed or otherwise lost its HIP state, it
may not have such an SA.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
incoming ESP protected datagrams targeted to an ESP security
association created with HIP.
1. Detect the proper IPsec SA using the SPI. If the resulting SA is
a non-HIP ESP SA, process the packet according to standard IPsec
rules. If there are no SAs identified with the SPI, the host MAY
send an ICMP packet as defined in Section 6.3.3. How to handle
lost state is an implementation issue.
2. If a proper HIP ESP SA is found, the packet is processed normally
by ESP, as if the packet were a transport mode packet. The
packet may be dropped by ESP, as usual. In a typical
implementation, the result of successful ESP decryption and
verification is a datagram with the original IP addresses as
source and destination.
3. The IP addresses in the datagram are replaced with the HITs
associated with the ESP SA. Note that this IP-address-to-HIT
conversion step MAY also be performed at some other point in the
stack, e.g., before ESP processing.
4. The datagram is delivered to the upper layer. Demultiplexing the
datagram the right upper layer socket is based on the HITs (or
LSIs).
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 63]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
8.3 HMAC and SIGNATURE calculation and verification
The following subsections define the actions for processing HMAC,
HIP_SIGNATURE and HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs.
8.3.1 HMAC calculation
The following process applies both to the HMAC and HMAC_2 TLVs. When
processing HMAC_2, the difference is that the HMAC calculation
includes pseudo HOST_ID field containing the Responder's information
as sent in the R1 packet earlier.
The HMAC TLV is defined in Section 6.2.12 and HMAC_2 TLV in Section
6.2.13. HMAC calculation and verification process:
Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet, without the HMAC or any possible
HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs.
2. In case of HMAC_2 calculation, add a HOST_ID (Responder) TLV to
the packet.
3. Calculate the Length field in the HIP header.
4. Compute the HMAC.
5. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet.
6. Add the HMAC TLV to the packet and any HIP_SIGNATURE or
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs that may follow.
7. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header.
Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Remove the HMAC or HMAC_2 TLV, and if the packet contains any
HIP_SIGNATURE or HIP_SIGNATURE_2 fields, remove them too, saving
the contents if they will be needed later.
3. In case of HMAC_2, build and add a HOST_ID TLV (with Responder
information) to the packet.
4. Recalculate the HIP packet length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros).
5. Compute the HMAC and verify it against the received HMAC.
6. In case of HMAC_2, remove the HOST_ID TLV from the packet before
further processing.
8.3.2 Signature calculation
The following process applies both to the HIP_SIGNATURE and
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLVs. When processing HIP_SIGNATURE_2, the only
difference is that instead of HIP_SIGNATURE TLV, the HIP_SIGNATURE_2
TLV is used, and the Initiator's HIT and PUZZLE Opaque and Random #I
fields are cleared (set to all zeros) before computing the signature.
The HIP_SIGNATURE TLV is defined in Section 6.2.14 and the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 64]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
HIP_SIGNATURE_2 TLV in Section 6.2.15.
Signature calculation and verification process:
Packet sender:
1. Create the HIP packet without the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV or any TLVs
that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV.
2. Calculate the Length field in the HIP header.
3. Compute the signature.
4. Add the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV to the packet.
5. Add any TLVs that follow the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV.
6. Recalculate the Length field in the HIP header.
Packet receiver:
1. Verify the HIP header Length field.
2. Save the contents of the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and any TLVs following
the HIP_SIGNATURE TLV and remove them from the packet.
3. Recalculate the HIP packet Length in the HIP header and clear the
Checksum field (set it to all zeros).
4. Compute the signature and verify it against the received
signature.
The verification can use either the HI received from a HIP packet,
the HI from a DNS query, if the FQDN has been received either in the
HOST_ID or in the CER packet, or one received by some other means.
8.4 Initiation of a HIP exchange
An implementation may originate a HIP exchange to another host based
on a local policy decision, usually triggered by an application
datagram, in much the same way that an IPsec IKE key exchange can
dynamically create a Security Association. Alternatively, a system
may initiate a HIP exchange if it has rebooted or timed out, or
otherwise lost its HIP state, as described in Section 5.3.
The implementation prepares an I1 packet and sends it to the IP
address that corresponds to the peer host. The IP address of the
peer host may be obtained via conventional mechanisms, such as DNS
lookup. The I1 contents are specified in Section 7.1. The selection
of which host identity to use, if a host has more than one to choose
from, is typically a policy decision.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
initiating a HIP exchange:
1. The Initiator gets the Responder's HIT and one or more addresses
either from a DNS lookup of the responder's FQDN, from some other
repository, or from a local table. If the initiator does not know
the responder's HIT, it may attempt opportunistic mode by using
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 65]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
NULL (all zeros) as the responder's HIT.
2. The Initiator sends an I1 to one of the Responder's addresses.
The selection of which address to use is a local policy decision.
3. Upon sending an I1, the sender shall transition to state I1-SENT,
start a timer whose timeout value should be larger than the
worst-case anticipated RTT, and shall increment a timeout counter
associated with the I1.
4. Upon timeout, the sender SHOULD retransmit the I1 and restart the
timer, up to a maximum of I1_RETRIES_MAX tries.
8.4.1 Sending multiple I1s in parallel
For the sake of minimizing the session establishment latency, an
implementation MAY send the same I1 to more than one of the
Responder's addresses. However, it MUST NOT send to more than three
(3) addresses in parallel. Furthermore, upon timeout, the
implementation MUST refrain from sending the same I1 packet to
multiple addresses. These limitations are placed order to avoid
congestion of the network, and potential DoS attacks that might
happen, e.g., because someone claims to have hundreds or thousands of
addresses.
As the Responder is not guaranteed to distinguish the duplicate I1's
it receives at several of its addresses (because it avoids to store
states when it answers back an R1), the Initiator may receive several
duplicate R1's.
The Initiator SHOULD then select the initial preferred destination
address using the source address of the selected received R1, and use
the preferred address as a source address for the I2. Processing
rules for received R1s are discussed in Section 8.6.
8.4.2 Processing incoming ICMP Protocol Unreachable messages
A host may receive an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable message
as a response to sending an HIP I1 packet. Such a packet may be an
indication that the peer does not support HIP, or it may be an
attempt to launch an attack by making the Initiator believe that the
Responder does not support HIP.
When a system receives an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable
message while it is waiting for an R1, it MUST NOT terminate the
wait. It MAY continue as if it had not received the ICMP message,
and send a few more I1s. Alternatively, it MAY take the ICMP message
as a hint that the peer most probably does not support HIP, and
return to state UNASSOCIATED earlier than otherwise. However, at
minimum, it MUST continue waiting for an R1 for a reasonable time
before returning to UNASSOCIATED.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 66]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
8.5 Processing incoming I1 packets
An implementation SHOULD reply to an I1 with an R1 packet, unless the
implementation is unable or unwilling to setup a HIP association. If
the implementation is unable to setup a HIP association, the host
SHOULD send an ICMP Destination Protocol Unreachable,
Administratively Prohibited, message to the I1 source address. If
the implementation is unwilling to setup a HIP association, the host
MAY ignore the I1. This latter case may occur during a DoS attack
such as an I1 flood.
The implementation MUST be able to handle a storm of received I1
packets, discarding those with common content that arrive within a
small time delta.
A spoofed I1 can result in an R1 attack on a system. An R1 sender
MUST have a mechanism to rate limit R1s to an address.
Under no circumstances does the HIP state machine transition upon
sending an R1.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I1 packet:
1. The responder MUST check that the responder HIT in the received
I1 is either one of its own HITs, or NULL.
2. If the responder is in ESTABLISHED state, the responder MAY
respond to this with an R1 packet, prepare to drop existing SAs
and stay at ESTABLISHED state.
3. If the implementation chooses to respond to the I1 with and R1
packet, it creates a new R1 or selects a precomputed R1 according
to the format described in Section 7.2.
4. The R1 MUST contain the received responder HIT, unless the
received HIT is NULL, in which case the Responder SHOULD select a
HIT that is constructed with the MUST algorithm in Section 3,
which is currently RSA. Other than that, selecting the HIT is a
local policy matter.
5. The responder sends the R1 to the source IP address of the I1
packet.
8.5.1 R1 Management
All compliant implementations MUST produce R1 packets. An R1 packet
MAY be precomputed. An R1 packet MAY be reused for time Delta T,
which is implementation dependent. R1 information MUST not be
discarded until Delta S after T. Time S is the delay needed for the
last I2 to arrive back to the responder.
An implementation MAY keep state about received I1s and match the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 67]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
received I2s against the state, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
8.5.2 Handling malformed messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I1 message, it SHOULD NOT
respond with a NOTIFY message, as such practice could open up a
potential denial-of-service danger. Instead, it MAY respond with an
ICMP packet, as defined in Section 6.3.
8.6 Processing incoming R1 packets
A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent an I1
to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it is in state I1-SENT). If so,
it SHOULD process the R1 as described below, send an I2, and go to
state I2-SENT, setting a timer to protect the I2. If the system is
in state I2-SENT, it MAY respond to an R1 if the R1 has a larger R1
generation counter; if so, it should drop its state due to processing
the previous R1 and start over from state I1-SENT. If the system is
in any other state with respect to that host, it SHOULD silently drop
the R1.
When sending multiple I1s, an initiator SHOULD wait for a small
amount of time after the first R1 reception to allow possibly
multiple R1s to arrive, and it SHOULD respond to an R1 among the set
with the largest R1 generation counter.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an R1 packet:
1. A system receiving an R1 MUST first check to see if it has sent
an I1 to the originator of the R1 (i.e., it has a HIP
association that is in state I1-SENT and that is associated with
the HITs in the R1). If so, it should process the R1 as
described below.
2. Otherwise, if the system is in any other state than I1-SENT or
I2-SENT with respect to the HITs included in the R1, it SHOULD
silently drop the R1 and remain in the current state.
3. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT or I2-SENT, the received
Initiator's HIT MUST correspond to the HIT used in the original,
I1 and the Responder's HIT MUST correspond to the one used,
unless the I1 contained a NULL HIT.
4. The system SHOULD validate the R1 signature before applying
further packet processing, according to Section 6.2.15.
5. If the HIP association state is I1-SENT, and multiple valid R1s
are present, the system SHOULD select from among the R1s with
the largest R1 generation counter.
6. If the HIP association state is I2-SENT, the system MAY reenter
state I1-SENT and process the received R1 if it has a larger R1
generation counter than the R1 responded to previously.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 68]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
7. The R1 packet may have the C bit set -- in this case, the system
should anticipate the receipt of HIP CER packets that contain
the host identity corresponding to the responder's HIT.
8. The R1 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the R1 and returning to
state UNASSOCIATED. The system SHOULD consider dropping the R1
only if it used a NULL HIT in I1. If the A bit is set, the
Responder's HIT is anonymous and should not be stored.
9. The system SHOULD attempt to validate the HIT against the
received Host Identity.
10. The system MUST store the received R1 generation counter for
future reference.
11. The system attempts to solve the cookie puzzle in R1. The
system MUST terminate the search after exceeding the remaining
lifetime of the puzzle. If the cookie puzzle is not
successfully solved, the implementation may either resend I1
within the retry bounds or abandon the HIP exchange.
12. The system computes standard Diffie-Hellman keying material
according to the public value and Group ID provided in the
DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. The Diffie-Hellman keying material
Kij is used for key extraction as specified in Section 9. If
the received Diffie-Hellman Group ID is not supported, the
implementation may either resend I1 within the retry bounds or
abandon the HIP exchange.
13. The system selects the HIP transform and ESP transform from the
choices presented in the R1 packet and uses the selected values
subsequently when generating and using encryption keys, and when
sending the I2. If the proposed alternatives are not acceptable
to the system, it may either resend I1 within the retry bounds
or abandon the HIP exchange.
14. The system prepares and creates an incoming IPsec ESP security
association. It may also prepare a security association for
outgoing traffic, but since it does not have the correct SPI
value yet, it cannot activate it.
15. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters.
16. The system prepares and sends an I2, as described in Section
7.3.
17. The system SHOULD start a timer whose timeout value should be
larger than the worst-case anticipated RTT, and MUST increment a
timeout counter associated with the I2. The sender SHOULD
retransmit the I2 upon a timeout and restart the timer, up to a
maximum of I2_RETRIES_MAX tries.
18. If the system is in state I1-SENT, it shall transition to state
I2-SENT. If the system is in any other state, it remains in the
current state.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 69]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
8.6.1 Handling malformed messages
If an implementation receives a malformed R1 message, it MUST
silently drop the packet. Sending a NOTIFY or ICMP would not help,
as the sender of the R1 typically doesn't have any state. An
implementation SHOULD wait for some more time for a possible good R1,
after which it MAY try again by sending a new I1 packet.
8.7 Processing incoming I2 packets
Upon receipt of an I2, the system MAY perform initial checks to
determine whether the I2 corresponds to a recent R1 that has been
sent out, if the Responder keeps such state. For example, the sender
could check whether the I2 is from an address or HIT that has
recently received an R1 from it. The R1 may have had Opaque data
included that was echoed back in the I2. If the I2 is considered to
be suspect, it MAY be silently discarded by the system.
Otherwise, the HIP implementation SHOULD process the I2. This
includes validation of the cookie puzzle solution, generating the
Diffie-Hellman key, decrypting the Initiator's Host Identity,
verifying the signature, creating state, and finally sending an R2.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
responding to an I2 packet:
1. The system MAY perform checks to verify that the I2 corresponds
to a recently sent R1. Such checks are implementation
dependent. See Appendix D for a description of an example
implementation.
2. The system MUST check that the Responder's HIT corresponds to
one of its own HITs.
3. If the system is in the R2-SENT state, it MAY check if the newly
received I2 is similar to the one that triggered moving to
R2-SENT. If so, it MAY retransmit a previously sent R2, reset
the R2-SENT timer, and stay in R2-SENT.
4. If the system is in any other state, it SHOULD check that the
echoed R1 generation counter in I2 is within the acceptable
range. Implementations MUST accept puzzles from the current
generation and MAY accept puzzles from earlier generations. If
the newly received I2 is outside the accepted range, the I2 is
stale (perhaps replayed) and SHOULD be dropped.
5. The system MUST validate the solution to the cookie puzzle by
computing the SHA-1 hash described in Section 7.3.
6. The I2 MUST have a single value in each of the HIP_TRANSFORM and
ESP_TRANSFORM parameters, which MUST each match one of the
values offered to the Initiator in the R1 packet.
7. The system must derive Diffie-Hellman keying material Kij based
on the public value and Group ID in the DIFFIE_HELLMAN
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 70]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
parameter. This key is used to derive the HIP and ESP
association keys, as described in Section 9. If the
Diffie-Hellman Group ID is unsupported, the I2 packet is
silently dropped.
8. The encrypted HOST_ID decrypted by the Initiator encryption key
defined in Section 9. If the decrypted data is not an HOST_ID
parameter, the I2 packet is silently dropped.
9. The implementation SHOULD also verify that the Initiator's HIT
in the I2 corresponds to the Host Identity sent in the I2.
10. The system MUST verify the HMAC according to the procedures in
Section 6.2.12.
11. The system MUST verify the HIP_SIGNATURE according to Section
6.2.14 and Section 7.3.
12. If the checks above are valid, then the system proceeds with
further I2 processing; otherwise, it discards the I2 and remains
in the same state.
13. The I2 packet may have the C bit set -- in this case, the system
should anticipate the receipt of HIP CER packets that contain
the host identity corresponding to the responder's HIT.
14. The I2 packet may have the A bit set -- in this case, the system
MAY choose to refuse it by dropping the I2 and returning to
state UNASSOCIATED. If the A bit is set, the Initiator's HIT is
anonymous and should not be stored.
15. The SPI field is parsed to obtain the SPI that will be used for
the Security Association outbound from the Responder and inbound
to the Initiator.
16. The system prepares and creates both incoming and outgoing ESP
security associations.
17. The system initialized the remaining variables in the associated
state, including Update ID counters.
18. Upon successful processing of an I2 in states UNASSOCIATED,
I1-SENT, I2-SENT, and R2-SENT, an R2 is sent and the state
machine transitions to state ESTABLISHED.
19. Upon successful processing of an I2 in state ESTABLISHED/
REKEYING, the old Security Association is dropped and a new one
is installed, an R2 is sent, and the state machine transitions
to R2-SENT, dropping any possibly ongoing rekeying attempt.
20. Upon transitioning to R2-SENT, start a timer. Leave R2-SENT if
either the timer expires (allowing for maximal retransmission of
I2s), some data has been received on the incoming SA, or an
UPDATE packet has been received (or some other packet that
indicates that the peer has moved to ESTABLISHED).
8.7.1 Handling malformed messages
If an implementation receives a malformed I2 message, the behaviour
SHOULD depend on how much checks the message has already passed. If
the puzzle solution in the message has already been checked, the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 71]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
implementation SHOULD report the error by responding with a NOTIFY
packet. Otherwise the implementation MAY respond with an ICMP
message as defined in Section 6.3.
8.8 Processing incoming R2 packets
An R2 received in states UNASSOCIATED, I1-SENT, ESTABLISHED, or
REKEYING results in the R2 being dropped and the state machine
staying in the same state. If an R2 is received in state I2-SENT, it
SHOULD be processed.
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules for
incoming R2 packet:
1. The system MUST verify that the HITs in use correspond to the
HITs that were received in R1.
2. The system MUST verify the HMAC_2 according to the procedures in
Section 6.2.13.
3. The system MUST verify the HIP signature according to the
procedures in Section 6.2.14.
4. If any of the checks above fail, there is a high probability of
an ongoing man-in-the-middle or other security attack. The
system SHOULD act accordingly, based on its local policy.
5. If the system is in any other state than I2-SENT, the R2 is
silently dropped.
6. The SPI field is parsed to obtain the SPI that will be used for
the ESP Security Association inbound to the Responder. The
system uses this SPI to create or activate the outgoing ESP
security association used to send packets to the peer.
7. Upon successful processing of the R2, the state machine moves to
state ESTABLISHED.
8.9 Dropping HIP associations
A HIP implementation is free to drop a HIP association at any time,
based on its own policy. If a HIP host decides to drop an HIP
association, it deletes the IPsec SAs related to that association and
the corresponding HIP state, including the keying material. The
implementation MUST also drop the peer's R1 generation counter value,
unless a local policy explicitly defines that the value of that
particular host is stored. An implementation MUST NOT store R1
generation counters by default, but storing R1 generation counter
values, if done, MUST be configured by explicit HITs.
8.10 Initiating rekeying
A system may initiate the rekey procedure at any time. It MUST
initiate a rekey if its incoming ESP sequence counter is about to
overflow. The system MUST NOT replace its keying material until the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 72]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
rekeying packet exchange successfully completes. Optionally,
depending on policy, a system may include a new Diffie-Hellman key
for use in new KEYMAT generation. New KEYMAT generation occurs prior
to drawing the new keys.
In the conceptual state machine, a system rekeys when it sends a NES
parameter to the peer and receives both an ACK of the relevant UPDATE
message and its peer's NES parameter. To leave REKEYING state, both
parameters must be received. It may be that the ACK and the NES
arrive in different UPDATE messages. This is always true if a system
does not initiate rekeying but responds to a rekeying request from
the peer, but may also occur if two systems initiate a rekey nearly
simultaneously. In such a case, if the system is in state REKEYING,
it saves the one parameter and waits for the other before leaving
state REKEYING. This implies that the REKEYING state may have
conceptual substates.
The following steps define the processing rules for initiating a
rekey:
1. The system decides whether to continue to use the existing KEYMAT
or to generate new KEYMAT. In the latter case, the system MUST
generate a new Diffie-Hellman public key.
2. The system increments its outgoing Update ID by one.
3. The system creates a UPDATE packet, which contains an SEQ
parameter (with the current value of Update ID), NES parameter
and an optional DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. If the UPDATE packet
contains the DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter, the Keymat Index in the
NES parameter MUST be zero. If the UPDATE does not contain
DIFFIE_HELLMAN, the NES Keymat Index MUST be larger or equal to
the index of the next byte to be drawn from the current KEYMAT.
4. The system sends the UPDATE packet and transitions to state
REKEYING.
5. The system SHOULD start a timer whose timeout value should be
larger than the worst-case anticipated RTT, and MUST increment a
timeout counter associated with UPDATE. The sender SHOULD
retransmit the UPDATE upon a timeout and restart the timer, up to
a maximum of UPDATE_RETRIES_MAX tries.
6. The system MUST NOT delete its existing SAs, but continue using
them if its policy still allows. The UPDATE procedure SHOULD be
initiated early enough to make sure that the SA replay counters
do not overflow.
7. In case a protocol error occurs and the peer system acknowledges
the UPDATE but does not itself send a NES, the system may hang in
state REKEYING. To guard against this, a system MAY re-initiate
the rekeying procedure after some time waiting for the peer to
respond, or it MAY decide to abort the HIP association after
waiting for an implementation-dependent time. The system MUST
NOT hang in state REKEYING for an indefinite time.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 73]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
To simplify the state machine, a host MUST NOT generate new UPDATEs
(with higher Update IDs) while in state REKEYING, unless it is
restarting the rekeying process.
8.11 Processing UPDATE packets
When a system receives an UPDATE packet, its processing depends on
the state of the HIP association and the presence of and values of
the SEQ and ACK parameters. An UPDATE MUST be processed if the
following conditions hold (note: UPDATEs may also be processed when
additional conditions hold, as specified in other drafts):
1. If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation
MAY reply with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in Section
6.3.5.
2. The state of the HIP association is ESTABLISHED or REKEYING, and
both the SEQ and NES parameters are present in the UPDATE. This
is the case for which the peer host is in the process of
rekeying.
3. The state of the HIP association is REKEYING and an ACK (of
outstanding Update ID) is in the UPDATE. This case usually
corresponds to the peer completing the rekeying process first.
If the above conditions hold, the following steps define the
conceptual processing rules for handling a received UPDATE packet:
1. If the SEQ parameter is present, and the Update ID in the
received SEQ is smaller than the stored Update ID for the host,
the packet MUST BE dropped.
2. If the SEQ parameter is present, and the Update ID in the
received SEQ is equal to the stored Update ID for the host, the
packet is treated as a retransmission. However, the HMAC
verification (next step) MUST NOT be skipped. (A byte-by-byte
comparison of the received and a store packet would be OK,
though.) It is recommended that a host cache the last packet
that was acked to avoid the cost of generating a new ACK packet
to respond to a replayed UPDATE. Systems MUST again acknowledge
such apparent UPDATE message retransmissions but SHOULD also
consider rate-limiting such retransmission responses to guard
against replay attacks.
3. The system MUST verify the HMAC in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet MUST be dropped.
4. If the received UPDATE contains a DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter, the
received Keymat Index MUST be zero. If this test fails, the
packet SHOULD be dropped and the system SHOULD log an error
message.
5. The system MAY verify the SIGNATURE in the UPDATE packet. If the
verification fails, the packet SHOULD be dropped and an error
message logged.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 74]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
6. If a new SEQ parameter is being processed, the system MUST record
the Update ID in the received SEQ parameter, for replay
protection.
7. If the system is in state ESTABLISHED, and the UPDATE has the NES
and SEQ parameters, the packet processing continues as specified
in Section 8.11.1.
8. If the system is in state REKEYING, the packet processing
continues as specified in Section 8.11.2.
8.11.1 Processing an UPDATE packet in state ESTABLISHED
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules responding
handling a received initial UPDATE packet:
1. The system consults its policy to see if it needs to generate a
new Diffie-Hellman key, and generates a new key if needed. The
system records any newly generated or received Diffie-Hellman
keys, for use in KEYMAT generation upon leaving the REKEYING
state.
2. If the system generated new Diffie-Hellman key in the previous
step, or it received a DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter, it sets NES
Keymat Index to zero. Otherwise, the NES Keymat Index MUST be
larger or equal to the index of the next byte to be drawn from
the current KEYMAT. In this case, it is RECOMMENDED that the
host use the Keymat Index requested by the peer in the received
NES.
3. The system increments its outgoing Update ID by one.
4. The system creates a UPDATE packet, which contains an SEQ
parameter (with the current value of Update ID), NES parameter
and the optional DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter. The UPDATE packet also
includes the ACK of the Update ID found in the received UPDATE
SEQ parameter.
5. The system sends the UPDATE packet and transitions to state
REKEYING. The system stores any received NES and DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameters. At this point, it only needs to receive an ACK of
its current Update ID to finish rekeying.
8.11.2 Processing an UPDATE packet in state REKEYING
The following steps define the conceptual processing rules responding
handling a received reply UPDATE packet:
1. If the packet contains a SEQ and NES parameters, then the system
sends a new UPDATE packet with an ACK of the peer's Update ID as
received in the SEQ parameter. Additionally, if the UPDATE packet
contained an ACK of the outstanding Update ID, or if the ACK of
the UPDATE packet that contained the NES has already been
received, the system stores the received NES and (optional)
DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameters and finishes the rekeying procedure as
described in Section 8.11.3. If the ACK of the outstanding Update
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 75]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
ID has not been received, stay in state REKEYING after storing
the received NES and (optional) DIFFIE_HELLMAN.
2. If the packet contains an ACK parameter that ACKs the outstanding
Update ID, and the system has previously received a NES from the
peer, the system finishes the rekeying procedure as described in
Section 8.11.3. If the system is still waiting for the peer's
NES parameter (to arrive in subsequent UPDATE message), the
system stays in state REKEYING.
8.11.3 Leaving REKEYING state
A system leaves REKEYING state when it has received both a NES from
its peer and the ACK of the Update ID that was sent in its own NES to
the peer. The following steps are taken:
1. If either the received UPDATE contains a new Diffie-Hellman key,
the system has a new Diffie-Hellman key from initiating rekey, or
both, the system generates new KEYMAT. If there is only one new
Diffie-Hellman key, the old key is used as the other key.
2. If the system generated new KEYMAT in the previous step, it sets
Keymat Index to zero, independent on whether the received UPDATE
included a Diffie-Hellman key or not. If the system did not
generate new KEYMAT, it uses the lowest Keymat Index of the two
NES parameters.
3. The system draws keys for new incoming and outgoing ESP SAs,
starting from the Keymat Index, and prepares new incoming and
outgoing ESP SAs. The SPI for the outgoing SA is the new SPI
value from the UPDATE. The SPI for the incoming SA was generated
when NES was sent. The order of the keys retrieved from the
KEYMAT during rekeying process is similar to that described in
Section 9. Note, that only IPsec ESP keys are retrieved during
rekeying process, not the HIP keys.
4. The system cancels any timers protecting the UPDATE and
transitions to ESTABLISHED.
5. The system starts to send to the new outgoing SA and prepares to
start receiving data on the new incoming SA.
8.12 Processing CER packets
Processing CER packets is OPTIONAL, and currently undefined.
8.13 Processing NOTIFY packets
Processing NOTIFY packets is OPTIONAL. If processed, any errors
noted by the NOTIFY parameter SHOULD be taken into account by the HIP
state machine (e.g., by terminating a HIP handshake), and the error
SHOULD be logged.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 76]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
8.14 Processing CLOSE packets
When the host receives a CLOSE message it responds with a CLOSE_ACK
message and moves to CLOSED state. (The authenticity of the CLOSE
message is verified using both HMAC and SIGNATURE). This processing
applies whether or not the HIP association state is CLOSING in order
to handle CLOSE messages from both ends crossing in flight.
The HIP association is not discarded before the host moves from the
UNASSOCIATED state.
Once the closing process has started, any need to send data packets
will trigger creating and establishing of a new HIP association,
starting with sending an I1.
If there is no corresponding HIP association, the implementation MAY
reply to a CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem, as specified in
Section 6.3.5.
8.15 Processing CLOSE_ACK packets
When a host receives a CLOSE_ACK message it verifies that it is in
CLOSING or CLOSED state and that the CLOSE_ACK was in response to the
CLOSE (using the included ECHO_REPLY in response to the sent
ECHO_REQUEST).
The CLOSE_ACK uses HMAC and SIGNATURE for verification. The state is
discarded when the state changes to UNASSOCIATED and, after that,
NOTIFY is sent as a response to a CLOSE message.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 77]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
9. HIP KEYMAT
HIP keying material is derived from the Diffie-Hellman Kij produced
during the base HIP exchange. The Initiator has Kij during the
creation of the I2 packet, and the Responder has Kij once it receives
the I2 packet. This is why I2 can already contain encrypted
information.
The KEYMAT is derived by feeding Kij and the HITs into the following
operation; the | operation denotes concatenation.
KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
where
K1 = SHA-1( Kij | sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) | 0x01 )
K2 = SHA-1( Kij | K1 | 0x02 )
K3 = SHA-1( Kij | K2 | 0x03 )
...
K255 = SHA-1( Kij | K254 | 0xff )
K256 = SHA-1( Kij | K255 | 0x00 )
etc.
Sort(HIT-I | HIT-R) is defined as the network byte order
concatenation of the two HITs, with the smaller HIT preceding the
larger HIT, resulting from the numeric comparison of the two HITs
interpreted as positive (unsigned) 128-bit integers in network byte
order.
The initial keys are drawn sequentially in the order that is
determined by the numeric comparison of the two HITs, with comparison
method described in the previous paragraph. HOST_g denotes the host
with the greater HIT value, and HOST_l the host with the lower HIT
value.
The drawing order for initial keys:
HIP-gl encryption key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-gl integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_g's outgoing HIP packets
HIP-lg encryption key (currently unused) for HOST_l's outgoing HIP
packets
HIP-lg integrity (HMAC) key for HOST_l's outgoing HIP packets
SA-gl ESP encryption key for HOST_g's outgoing traffic
SA-gl ESP authentication key for HOST_g's outgoing traffic
SA-lg ESP encryption key for HOST_l's outgoing traffic
SA-lg ESP authentication key for HOST_l's outgoing traffic
The number of bits drawn for a given algorithm is the "natural" size
of the keys. For the mandatory algorithms, the following sizes
apply:
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 78]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
AES 128 bits
SHA-1 160 bits
NULL 0 bits
The four HIP keys are only drawn from KEYMAT during a HIP I1->R2
exchange. Subsequent rekeys using UPDATE will only draw the four ESP
keys from KEYMAT. Section 8.11 describes the rules for reusing or
regenerating KEYMAT based on the UPDATE exchange.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 79]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
10. HIP Fragmentation Support
A HIP implementation must support IP fragmentation / reassembly.
Fragment reassembly MUST be implemented in both IPv4 and IPv6, but
fragment generation MUST be implemented only in IPv4 (IPv4 stacks and
networks will usually do this by default) and SHOULD be implemented
in IPv6. In the IPv6 world, the minimum MTU is larger, 1280 bytes,
than in the IPv4 world. The larger MTU size is usually sufficient
for most HIP packets, and therefore fragment generation may not be
needed. If a host expects to send HIP packets that are larger than
the minimum IPv6 MTU, it MUST implement fragment generation even for
IPv6.
In the IPv4 world, HIP packets may encounter low MTUs along their
routed path. Since HIP does not provide a mechanism to use multiple
IP datagrams for a single HIP packet, support of path MTU discovery
does not bring any value to HIP in the IPv4 world. HIP aware NAT
systems MUST perform any IPv4 reassembly/fragmentation.
All HIP implementations MUST employ a reassembly algorithm that is
sufficiently resistant against DoS attacks.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 80]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
11. ESP with HIP
HIP is designed to be used in end-to-end fashion. The IPsec mode
used with HIP is the BEET mode (A Bound End-to-End mode for ESP)
[27]. The BEET mode provides some features from both IPsec tunnel
and transport modes. The HIP uses HITs and LSIs as the "inner"
addresses and IP addresses as "outer" addresses like IP addresses are
used in the tunnel mode. Instead of tunneling packets between hosts,
a conversion between inner and outer addresses is made at end-hosts
and the inner address is never sent in the wire after the initial HIP
negotiation. BEET provides IPsec transport mode syntax (no inner
headers) with limited tunnel mode semantics (fixed logical inner
addresses - the HITs - and changeable outer IP addresses).
Since HIP does not negotiate any lifetimes, all lifetimes are local
policy. The only lifetimes a HIP implementation MUST support are
sequence number rollover (for replay protection), and SA timeout. An
SA times out if no packets are received using that SA. The default
timeout value is 15 minutes. Implementations MAY support lifetimes
for the various ESP transforms.
11.1 ESP Security Associations
Each HIP association is linked with two ESP SAs, one incoming and one
outgoing. The Initiator's incoming SA corresponds with the
Responder's outgoing one. The initiator defines the SPI for this
association, as defined in Section 3.3. This SA is called SA-RI, and
the corresponding SPI is called SPI-RI. Respectively, the
Responder's incoming SA corresponds with the Initiator's outgoing SA
and is called SA-IR, with the SPI-IR.
The Initiator creates SA-RI as a part of R1 processing, before
sending out the I2, as explained in Section 8.6. The keys are
derived from KEYMAT, as defined in Section 9. The Responder creates
SA-RI as a part of I2 processing, see Section 8.7.
The Responder creates SA-IR as a part of I2 processing, before
sending out R2, see Step 17 in Section 8.7. The Initiator creates
SA-IR when processing R2, see Step 7 in Section 8.8.
11.2 Updating ESP SAs during rekeying
After the initial 4-way handshake and SA establishment, both hosts
are in state ESTABLISHED. There are no longer Initiator and
Responder roles and the association is symmetric. In this
subsection, the initiating party of the rekey procedure is denoted
with I' and the peer with R'.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 81]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The I' initiates the rekeying process when needed (see Section 8.10).
It creates an UPDATE packet with required information and sends it to
the peer node. The old SAs are still in use.
The R', after receiving and processing the UPDATE (see Section 8.11),
generates new SAs: SA-I'R' and SA-R'I'. It does not take the new
outgoing SA into use, but uses still the old one, so there exists two
SA pairs towards the same peer host. For the new outgoing SA, the
SPI-R'I' value is picked from the received UPDATE packet. The R'
generates the new SPI value for the incoming SA, SPI-I'R', and
includes it in the response UPDATE packet.
When the I' receives a response UPDATE from the R', it generates new
SAs, as described in Section 8.11: SA-I'R' and SA-R'I'. It starts
using the new outgoing SA immediately.
The R' starts using the new outgoing SA when it receives traffic from
the new incoming SA. After this, the R' can remove old SAs.
Similarly, when the I' receives traffic from the new incoming SA, it
can safely remove old SAs.
11.3 Security Association Management
An SA pair is indexed by the 2 SPIs and 2 HITs (both HITs since a
system can have more than one HIT). An inactivity timer is
recommended for all SAs. If the state dictates the deletion of an
SA, a timer is set to allow for any late arriving packets.
11.4 Security Parameter Index (SPI)
The SPIs in ESP provide a simple compression of the HIP data from all
packets after the HIP exchange. This does require a per HIT- pair
Security Association (and SPI), and a decrease of policy granularity
over other Key Management Protocols like IKE.
When a host rekeys, it gets a new SPI from its partner.
11.5 Supported Transforms
All HIP implementations MUST support AES [10] and HMAC-SHA-1-96 [6].
If the Initiator does not support any of the transforms offered by
the Responder in the R1 HIP packet, it MUST use AES and HMAC-SHA-1-96
and state so in the I2 HIP packet.
In addition to AES, all implementations MUST implement the ESP NULL
encryption and authentication algorithms. These algorithms are
provided mainly for debugging purposes, and SHOULD NOT be used in
production environments. The default configuration in
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 82]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
implementations MUST be to reject NULL encryption or authentication.
11.6 Sequence Number
The Sequence Number field is MANDATORY in ESP. Anti-replay
protection MUST be used in an ESP SA established with HIP.
This means that each host MUST rekey before its sequence number
reaches 2^32, or if extended sequence numbers are used, 2^64. Note
that in HIP rekeying, unlike IKE rekeying, only one Diffie-Hellman
key can be changed, that of the rekeying host. However, if one host
rekeys, the other host SHOULD rekey as well.
In some instances, a 32-bit sequence number is inadequate. In the
ESP_TRANSFORM parameter, a peer MAY require that a 64 bit sequence
number be used. In this case the higher 32 bits are NOT included in
the ESP header, but are simply kept local to both peers. 64 bit
sequence numbers must only be used for ciphers that will not be open
to cryptanalysis as a result. AES is one such cipher.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 83]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
12. HIP Policies
There are a number of variables that will influence the HIP exchanges
that each host must support. All HIP implementations MUST support
more than one simultaneous HIs, at least one of which SHOULD be
reserved for anonymous usage. Although anonymous HIs will be rarely
used as responder HIs, they will be common for Initiators. Support
for more than two HIs is RECOMMENDED.
Many Initiators would want to use a different HI for different
Responders. The implementations SHOULD provide for an ACL of
initiator HIT to responder HIT. This ACL SHOULD also include
preferred transform and local lifetimes. For HITs with HAAs,
wildcarding SHOULD be supported. Thus if a Community of Interest,
like Banking, gets an RAA, a single ACL could be used. A global
wildcard would represent the general policy to be used. Policy
selection would be from most specific to most general.
The value of K used in the HIP R1 packet can also vary by policy. K
should never be greater than 20, but for trusted partners it could be
as low as 0.
Responders would need a similar ACL, representing which hosts they
accept HIP exchanges, and the preferred transform and local
lifetimes. Wildcarding SHOULD be supported for this ACL also.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 84]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
13. Security Considerations
HIP is designed to provide secure authentication of hosts and to
provide a fast key exchange for IPsec ESP. HIP also attempts to
limit the exposure of the host to various denial-of-service and man-
in-the-middle attacks. In so doing, HIP itself is subject to its own
DoS and MitM attacks that potentially could be more damaging to a
host's ability to conduct business as usual.
HIP enabled ESP is IP address independent. This might seem to make
it easier for an attacker, but ESP with replay protection is already
as well protected as possible, and the removal of the IP address as a
check should not increase the exposure of ESP to DoS attacks.
Furthermore, this is in line with the forthcoming revision of ESP.
Denial-of-service attacks take advantage of the cost of start of
state for a protocol on the Responder compared to the 'cheapness' on
the Initiator. HIP makes no attempt to increase the cost of the
start of state on the Initiator, but makes an effort to reduce the
cost to the Responder. This is done by having the Responder start
the 3-way exchange instead of the Initiator, making the HIP protocol
4 packets long. In doing this, packet 2 becomes a 'stock' packet
that the Responder MAY use many times. The duration of use is a
paranoia versus throughput concern. Using the same Diffie- Hellman
values and random puzzle I has some risk. This risk needs to be
balanced against a potential storm of HIP I1 packets.
This shifting of the start of state cost to the Initiator in creating
the I2 HIP packet, presents another DoS attack. The attacker spoofs
the I1 HIP packet and the Responder sends out the R1 HIP packet.
This could conceivably tie up the 'initiator' with evaluating the R1
HIP packet, and creating the I2 HIP packet. The defense against this
attack is to simply ignore any R1 packet where a corresponding I1 or
ESP data was not sent.
A second form of DoS attack arrives in the I2 HIP packet. Once the
attacking Initiator has solved the cookie challenge, it can send
packets with spoofed IP source addresses with either invalid
encrypted HIP payload component or a bad HIP signature. This would
take resources in the Responder's part to reach the point to discover
that the I2 packet cannot be completely processed. The defense
against this attack is after N bad I2 packets, the Responder would
discard any I2s that contain the given Initiator HIT. Thus will shut
down the attack. The attacker would have to request another R1 and
use that to launch a new attack. The Responder could up the value of
K while under attack. On the downside, valid I2s might get dropped
too.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 85]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
A third form of DoS attack is emulating the restart of state after a
reboot of one of the partners. A host restarting would send an I1 to
a peer, which would respond with an R1 even if it were in state
ESTABLISHED. If the I1 were spoofed, the resulting R1 would be
received unexpectedly by the spoofed host and would be dropped, as in
the first case above.
A fourth form of DoS attack is emulating the end of state. HIP
relies on timers plus a CLOSE/CLOSE_ACK handshake to explicitly
signals the end of a state. Because both CLOSE and CLOSE_ACK
messages contain an HMAC, an outsider cannot close a connection. The
presence of an additional SIGNATURE allows middle-boxes to inspect
these messages and discard the associated state (for e.g.,
firewalling, SPI-based NATing, etc.). However, the optional behavior
of replying to CLOSE with an ICMP Parameter Problem packet (as
described in Section 6.3.5), might allow an IP spoofer sending CLOSE
messages to launch reflection attacks.
A fifth form of DoS attack is replaying R1s to cause the initiator to
solve stale puzzles and become out of synchronization with the
responder. The R1 generation counter is a monotonically increasing
counter designed to protect against this attack, as described in
section Section 4.1.3.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without
third-party authentication. A skillful MitM could easily handle all
parts of HIP; but HIP indirectly provides the following protection
from a MitM attack. If the Responder's HI is retrieved from a signed
DNS zone, a certificate, or through some other secure means, the
Initiator can use this to validate the R1 HIP packet.
Likewise, if the Initiator's HI is in a secure DNS zone, a trusted
certificate, or otherwise securely available, the Responder can
retrieve it after it gets the I2 HIP packet and validate that.
However, since an Initiator may choose to use an anonymous HI, it
knowingly risks a MitM attack. The Responder may choose not to
accept a HIP exchange with an anonymous Initiator.
If an initiator wants to use opportunistic mode, it is vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, the available HI types are
limited to the MUST implement algorithms, as per Section 3. Hence,
if a future specification deprecates the current MUST implement
algorithm(s) and replaces it (them) with some new one(s), backward
compatibility cannot be preserved.
Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMP 'Destination Protocol
Unreachable' are to be expected and present a DoS attack. Against an
Initiator, the attack would look like the Responder does not support
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 86]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
HIP, but shortly after receiving the ICMP message, the Initiator
would receive a valid R1 HIP packet. Thus to protect from this
attack, an Initiator should not react to an ICMP message until a
reasonable delta time to get the real Responder's R1 HIP packet. A
similar attack against the Responder is more involved. First an ICMP
message is expected if the I1 was a DoS attack and the real owner of
the spoofed IP address does not support HIP. The Responder SHOULD
NOT act on this ICMP message to remove the minimal state from the R1
HIP packet (if it has one), but wait for either a valid I2 HIP packet
or the natural timeout of the R1 HIP packet. This is to allow for a
sophisticated attacker that is trying to break up the HIP exchange.
Likewise, the Initiator should ignore any ICMP message while waiting
for an R2 HIP packet, deleting state only after a natural timeout.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 87]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
14. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned IP Protocol number TBD to HIP.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 88]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
15. Acknowledgments
The drive to create HIP came to being after attending the MALLOC
meeting at IETF 43. Baiju Patel and Hilarie Orman really gave the
original author, Bob Moskowitz, the assist to get HIP beyond 5
paragraphs of ideas. It has matured considerably since the early
drafts thanks to extensive input from IETFers. Most importantly, its
design goals are articulated and are different from other efforts in
this direction. Particular mention goes to the members of the
NameSpace Research Group of the IRTF. Noel Chiappa provided the
framework for LSIs and Keith Moore the impetus to provide
resolvability. Steve Deering provided encouragement to keep working,
as a solid proposal can act as a proof of ideas for a research group.
Many others contributed; extensive security tips were provided by
Steve Bellovin. Rob Austein kept the DNS parts on track. Paul Kocher
taught Bob Moskowitz how to make the cookie exchange expensive for
the Initiator to respond, but easy for the Responder to validate.
Bill Sommerfeld supplied the Birthday concept to simplify reboot
management. Rodney Thayer and Hugh Daniels provide extensive
feedback. In the early times of this draft, John Gilmore kept Bob
Moskowitz challenged to provide something of value.
During the later stages of this document, when the editing baton was
transfered to Pekka Nikander, the input from the early implementors
were invaluable. Without having actual implementations, this
document would not be on the level it is now.
In the usual IETF fashion, a large number of people have contributed
to the actual text or ideas. The list of these people include Jeff
Ahrenholz, Francis Dupont, Derek Fawcus, George Gross, Andrew
McGregor, Julien Laganier, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jan Melen, Henrik
Petander, Michael Richardson, Tim Shepard, Jorma Wall, and Jukka
Ylitalo. Our apologies to anyone who's name is missing.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 89]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
16. References
16.1 Normative references
[1] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, August
1980.
[2] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC
792, September 1981.
[3] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[4] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 1885,
December 1995.
[5] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[6] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
[7] Maughan, D., Schneider, M. and M. Schertler, "Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408,
November 1998.
[8] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[9] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", RFC 2412,
November 1998.
[10] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms",
RFC 2451, November 1998.
[11] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[12] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999.
[13] Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System
(DNS)", RFC 2536, March 1999.
[14] Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 90]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
[15] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[16] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 3484, February 2003.
[17] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Addressing Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003.
[18] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", RFC
3526, May 2003.
[19] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
draft-ietf-ipsec-esp-v3-05 (work in progress), April 2003.
[20] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-07 (work in progress), April 2003.
[21] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol Architecture",
draft-moskowitz-hip-arch-03 (work in progress), May 2003.
[22] NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure Hash Standard", April 1995.
16.2 Informative references
[23] Bellovin, S. and W. Aiello, "Just Fast Keying (JFK)",
draft-ietf-ipsec-jfk-04 (work in progress), July 2002.
[24] Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Using Domain Name System (DNS)
with Host Identity Protocol (HIP)", draft-nikander-hip-dns-00
(to be issued) (work in progress), June 2003.
[25] Nikander, P., "SPI assisted NAT traversal (SPINAT) with Host
Identity Protocol (HIP)", draft-nikander-hip-nat-00 (to be
issued) (work in progress), June 2003.
[26] Crosby, SA. and DS. Wallach, "Denial of Service via Algorithmic
Complexity Attacks", in Proceedings of Usenix Security
Symposium 2003, Washington, DC., August 2003.
[27] Nikander, P., "A Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode for ESP",
draft-nikander-esp-beet-mode-00 (expired) (work in progress),
Oct 2003.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 91]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Authors' Addresses
Robert Moskowitz
ICSAlabs, a Division of TruSecure Corporation
1000 Bent Creek Blvd, Suite 200
Mechanicsburg, PA
USA
EMail: rgm@icsalabs.com
Pekka Nikander
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
JORVAS FIN-02420
FINLAND
Phone: +358 9 299 1
EMail: pekka.nikander@nomadiclab.com
Petri Jokela
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
JORVAS FIN-02420
FINLAND
Phone: +358 9 299 1
EMail: petri.jokela@nomadiclab.com
Thomas R. Henderson
The Boeing Company
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA
USA
EMail: thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 92]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix A. API issues
The following text is informational and may be expanded upon or
revised in a separate Informational document.
HIP may be used to support application data transfers in one of three
ways:
the application may be HIP-aware and may explicitly use a
HIP-based API and/or resolver library;
the application may not be HIP-aware but may be provided with HITs
or LSIs in place of IP addresses as part of the address resolution
process; and
the application may or may not be HIP-aware and may present IP
addresses to the system, but the system may decide to
opportunistically invoke HIP or use a pre-existing HIP-based SA on
its behalf.
The first case is the most straightforward. The HIP-based API is
outside the scope of this document.
The second case is one way to provide HIP support to non-HIP-aware
applications. HITs may be stored in the DNS or some other
infrastructure, and the resolver library may choose to supply a
querying application with a HIT or LSI in place of an IP address.
Note that if the application truly needs IP addresses for a domain
name for some reason (e.g., a diagnostic application, or for use in a
referral scenario to a non-HIP-based host), blindly providing HITs or
LSIs in place of actual IP addresses may cause some applications to
break.
In both of the first two cases, the means whereby a system can
resolve an LSI or HIT to an IP address, when such a mapping is not
locally cached in the system, is outside the scope of this document.
In the third case, the system is explicitly invoking HIP to a
particular destination IP address on the basis of a local policy
decision. This approach resembles the way that opportunistic IPsec
works. Effectively, this approach is implicitly associating IP
addresses with host identities, and is prone to certain failures or
ambiguity in an environment where IP addresses are dynamic (e.g., an
application connects to an IP address, the peer host moves at some
later time, then another host acquires the old IP address, and the
system again receives a request to connect to that IP address, in
which case it is ambiguous whether the application wants to connect
to the host previously at that IP address or the new host at that
address).
If HIP is used to support an application, the application data stream
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 93]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
may contain either IP addresses or LSIs or HITs in place of the IP
addresses.
Historically, the first two bits of a HIT were used to differentiate
between Type 1, Type 2, and IPv6 address formats. This was changed
in October 2004, when the Working Group decided that all (currently
defined) HITs are 128-bit long. Hence, a Type 1 HIT consists of 128
bits of the SHA-1 hash of the public key, and a Type 2 HIT consists
of a 64-bits long HAA field, followed by a 64-bits of the SHA-1 hash.
[The format of the HAA field is left undefined in this document.]
In this document, we additionally define an internal IPv6-compatible
LSI representation format, to be used within the legacy
IPv6-compatible API (e.g., socket over AF_INET6). The format of
these IPv6-compatible LSIs is designed to avoid the most commonly
occurring IPv6 addresses in RFC3596 [9]. An IPv6-compatible LSI
representation of a HIT can be easily computed by replacing the first
TBDth bits of the HIT by the TBD bits long prefix "0xTBD".
Accordingly, this specification also RECOMMENDS that conforming
implementations ignore the TBD prefix bits when comparing HITs for
equality; see Section 3.1.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 94]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix B. Probabilities of HIT collisions
The birthday paradox sets a bound for the expectation of collisions.
It is based on the square root of the number of values. A 64-bit
hash, then, would put the chances of a collision at 50-50 with 2^32
hosts (4 billion). A 1% chance of collision would occur in a
population of 640M and a .001% collision chance in a 20M population.
A 128 bit hash will have the same .001% collision chance in a 9x10^16
population.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 95]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix C. Probabilities in the cookie calculation
A question: Is it guaranteed that the Initiator is able to solve the
puzzle in this way when the K value is large?
Answer: No, it is not guaranteed. But it is not guaranteed even in
the old mechanism, since the Initiator may start far away from J and
arrive to J after far too many steps. If we wanted to make sure that
the Initiator finds a value, we would need to give some hint of a
suitable J, and I don't think we want to do that.
In general, if we model the hash function with a random function, the
probability that one iteration gives are result with K zero bits is
2^-K. Thus, the probability that one iteration does *not* give K
zero bits is (1 - 2^-K). Consequently, the probability that 2^K
iterations does not give K zero bits is (1 - 2^-K)^(2^K).
Since my calculus starts to be rusty, I made a small experiment and
found out that
lim (1 - 2^-k)^(2^k) = 0.36788
k->inf
lim (1 - 2^-k)^(2^(k+1)) = 0.13534
k->inf
lim (1 - 2^-k)^(2^(k+2)) = 0.01832
k->inf
lim (1 - 2^-k)^(2^(k+3)) = 0.000335
k->inf
Thus, if hash functions were random functions, we would need about
2^(K+3) iterations to make sure that the probability of a failure is
less than 1% (actually less than 0.04%). Now, since my perhaps
flawed understanding of hash functions is that they are "flatter"
than random functions, 2^(K+3) is probably an overkill. OTOH, the
currently suggested 2^K is clearly too little.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 96]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix D. Using responder cookies
As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, the Responder may delay state creation
and still reject most spoofed I2s by using a number of pre-calculated
R1s and a local selection function. This appendix defines one
possible implementation in detail. The purpose of this appendix is
to give the implementors an idea on how to implement the mechanism.
The method described in this appendix SHOULD NOT be used in any real
implementation. If the implementation is based on this appendix, it
SHOULD contain some local modification that makes an attacker's task
harder.
The basic idea is to create a cheap, varying local mapping function
f:
f( IP-I, IP-R, HIT-I, HIT-R ) -> cookie-index
That is, given the Initiator's and Responder's IP addresses and
HITs, the function returns an index to a cookie. When processing an
I1, the cookie is embedded in an pre-computed R1, and the Responder
simply sends that particular R1 to the Initiator. When processing an
I2, the cookie may still be embedded in the R1, or the R1 may be
deprecated (and replaced with a new one), but the cookie is still
there. If the received cookie does not match with the R1 or saved
cookie, the I2 is simply dropped. That prevents the Initiator from
generating spoofed I2s with a probability that depends on the number
of pre-computed R1s.
As a concrete example, let us assume that the Responder has an array
of R1s. Each slot in the array contains a timestamp, an R1, and an
old cookie that was sent in the previous R1 that occupied that
particular slot. The Responder replaces one R1 in the array every
few minutes, thereby replacing all the R1s gradually.
To create a varying mapping function, the Responder generates a
random number every few minutes. The octets in the IP addresses and
HITs are XORed together, and finally the result is XORed with the
random number. Using pseudo-code, the function looks like the
following.
Pre-computation:
r1 := random number
Index computation:
index := r1 XOR hit_r[0] XOR hit_r[1] XOR ... XOR hit_r[15]
index := index XOR hit_i[0] XOR hit_i[1] XOR ... XOR hit_i[15]
index := index XOR ip_r[0] XOR ip_r[1] XOR ... XOR ip_r[15]
index := index XOR ip_i[0] XOR ip_i[1] XOR ... XOR ip_i[15]
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 97]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
The index gives the slot used in the array.
It is possible that an Initiator receives an I1, and while it is
computing I2, the Responder deprecates an R1 and/or chooses a new
random number for the mapping function. Therefore the Responder must
remember the cookies used in deprecated R1s and the previous random
number.
To check an received I2, the Responder can use a simple algorithm,
expressed in pseudo-code as follows.
If I2.hit_r does not match my_hits, drop the packet.
index := compute_index(current_random_number, I2)
If current_cookie[index] == I2.cookie, go to cookie check.
If previous_cookie[index] == I2.cookie, go to cookie check.
index := compute_index(previous_random_number, I2)
If current_cookie[index] == I2.cookie, go to cookie check.
If previous_cookie[index] == I2.cookie, go to cookie check.
Drop packet.
cookie_check:
V := Ltrunc( SHA-1( I2.I, I2.hit_i, I2.hit_r, I2.J ), K )
if V != 0, drop the packet.
Whenever the Responder receives an I2 that fails on the index check,
it can simply drop the packet on the floor and forget about it. New
I2s with the same or other spoofed parameters will get dropped with a
reasonable probability and minimal effort.
If a Responder receives an I2 that passes the index check but fails
on the puzzle check, it should create a state indicating this. After
two or three failures the Responder should cease checking the puzzle
but drop the packets directly. This saves the Responder from the
SHA-1 calculations. Such block should not last long, however, or
there would be a danger that a legitimate Initiator could be blocked
from getting connections.
A key for the success of the defined scheme is that the mapping
function must be considerably cheaper than computing SHA-1. It also
must detect any changes in the IP addresses, and preferably most
changes in the HITs. Checking the HITs is not that essential,
though, since HITs are included in the cookie computation, too.
The effectivity of the method can be varied by varying the size of
the array containing pre-computed R1s. If the array is large, the
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 98]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
probability that an I2 with a spoofed IP address or HIT happens to
map to the same slot is fairly slow. However, a large array means
that each R1 has a fairly long life time, thereby allowing an
attacker to utilize one solved puzzle for a longer time.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 99]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix E. Running HIP over IPv4 UDP
In the IPv4 world, with the deployed NAT devices, it may make sense
to run HIP over UDP. When running HIP over UDP, the following packet
structure is used. The structure is followed by the HITs, as usual.
Both the Source and Destination port MUST be 272.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+\
| Source port | Destination port | \
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ >UDP
| Length | Checksum | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+<
| HIP Controls | HIP pkt Type | Ver. | Res. | >HIP
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+/
It is currently undefined how the actual data transfer, using ESP, is
handled. Plain ESP may not go through all NAT devices.
It is currently FORBIDDEN to use this packet format with IPv6.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 100]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix F. Example checksums for HIP packets
The HIP checksum for HIP packets is specified in Section 6.1.2.
Checksums for TCP and UDP packets running over HIP-enabled security
associations are specified in Section 3.5. The examples below use IP
addresses of 192.168.0.1 and 192.168.0.2 (and their respective
IPv4-compatible IPv6 formats), and type 1 HITs with the first two
bits "01" followed by 124 zeroes followed by a decimal 1 or 2,
respectively.
F.1 IPv6 HIP example (I1)
Source Address: ::c0a8:0001
Destination Address: ::c0a8:0002
Upper-Layer Packet Length: 40 0x28
Next Header: 99 0x63
Payload Protocol: 59 0x3b
Header Length: 4 0x04
Packet Type: 1 0x01
Version: 1 0x1
Reserved: 0 0x0
Control: 0 0x0000
Checksum: 49672 0xc208
Sender's HIT: 4000::0001
Receiver's HIT: 4000::0002
F.2 IPv4 HIP packet (I1)
The IPv4 checksum value for the same example I1 packet is the same as
the IPv6 checksum (since the checksums due to the IPv4 and IPv6
pseudo-header components are the same).
F.3 TCP segment
Regardless of whether IPv6 or IPv4 is used, the TCP and UDP sockets
use the IPv6 pseudo-header format [8], with the HITs used in place of
the IPv6 addresses.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 101]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Sender's HIT: 4000::0001
Receiver's HIT: 4000::0002
Upper-Layer Packet Length: 20 0x14
Next Header: 6 0x06
Source port: 32769 0x8001
Destination port: 22 0x0016
Sequence number: 1 0x00000001
Acknowledgment number: 0 0x00000000
Header length: 20 0x14
Flags: SYN 0x02
Window size: 5840 0x16d0
Checksum: 54519 0xd4f7
Urgent pointer: 0 0x0000
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 102]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Appendix G. 384-bit group
This 384-bit group is defined only to be used with HIP. NOTE: The
security level of this group is very low! The encryption may be
broken in a very short time, even real-time. It should be used only
when the host is not powerful enough (e.g. some PDAs) and when
security requirements are low (e.g. during normal web surfing).
This prime is: 2^384 - 2^320 - 1 + 2^64 * { [ 2^254 pi] + 5857 }
Its hexadecimal value is:
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B13B202 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
The generator is: 2.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 103]
Internet-Draft Host Identity Protocol October 2004
Intellectual Property Statement
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in IETF Documents can
be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Disclaimer of Validity
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Moskowitz, et al. Expires April 25, 2005 [Page 104]
