HIP Working Group A. Keranen
Internet-Draft Ericsson
Intended status: Experimental October 25, 2010
Expires: April 28, 2011
Host Identity Protocol Signaling Message Transport Modes
draft-ietf-hip-over-hip-03
Abstract
This document specifies two transport modes for Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) signaling messages that allow conveying them over
encrypted connections initiated with the Host Identity Protocol.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2011.
Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Mode Negotiation in HIP Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Mode Negotiation After HIP Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. HIP Messages on Encrypted Connections . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3.1. ESP mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3.2. ESP-TCP mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Recovering from Failed Encrypted Connections . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Host Mobility and Multihoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Notify Packet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] signaling messages can be
exchanged over plain IP using the protocol number reserved for this
purpose, or over UDP using the UDP port reserved for HIP NAT
traversal [RFC5770]. When two hosts perform a HIP base exchange,
they set up an encrypted connection between them for data traffic,
but continue to use plain IP or UDP for HIP signaling messages.
This document defines how the encrypted connection can be used also
for HIP signaling messages. Two different modes are defined: HIP
over Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and HIP over TCP. The
benefit of sending HIP messages over ESP is that all signaling
traffic (including HIP headers) will be encrypted. If HIP messages
are sent over TCP (which in turn is transported over ESP), TCP can
handle also message fragmentation where needed.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Protocol Extensions
This section defines how support for different HIP signaling message
transport modes is negotiated and the normative behavior required by
the extension.
3.1. Mode Negotiation in HIP Base Exchange
A HIP host implementing this specification SHOULD indicate the modes
it supports, and is willing to use, in the base exchange. The HIP
signaling message transport mode negotiation is similar to HIP NAT
traversal mode negotiation: first the Responder lists the supported
modes in a HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter (see Figure 1) in the R1
packet. The modes are listed in priority order; the more preferred
mode(s) first. If the Initiator supports, and is willing to use, any
of the modes proposed by the Responder, it selects one of the modes
by adding a HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter containing the selected mode
to the I2 packet. Finally, if the Initiator selected one of the
modes and the base exchange succeeds, hosts MUST use the selected
mode for the following HIP signaling messages sent between them for
the duration of the HIP association or until another mode is
negotiated.
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If the Initiator cannot or will not use any of the modes proposed by
the Responder, the Initiator SHOULD include an empty
HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter to the I2 packet to signal that it
support this extension but will not use any of the proposed modes.
Depending on local policy, the Responder MAY either abort the base
exchange or continue HIP signaling without using an encrypted
connection, if there was no HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter in I2 or the
parameter was empty. If the Initiator selects a mode that the
Responder does not support (and hence was not included in R1), the
Responder MUST abort the base exchange. If the base exchange is
aborted due to (possibly lack of) HIP_TRANSPORT_PARAMETER, the
Responder SHOULD send a NO_VALID_HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE NOTIFY packet
(see Section 4) to the Initiator.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Port | Mode ID #1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Mode ID #2 | Mode ID #3 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Mode ID #n | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type [ TBD by IANA; 7680 ]
Port transport layer port number (or zero if not used)
Length length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Mode ID defines the proposed or selected transport mode(s)
The following Mode IDs are defined:
ID name Value
RESERVED 0
DEFAULT 1
ESP 2
ESP-TCP 3
Figure 1: Format of the HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter
The mode DEFAULT indicates that the same transport mode (e.g., plain
IP or UDP) that was used for the base exchange should be used for
subsequent HIP signaling messages. In the ESP mode the messages are
sent as such on the encrypted ESP connection and in the ESP-TCP mode
TCP is used within the ESP tunnel. If a mode that uses a transport
layer connection (e.g., ESP-TCP) is offered, the Port field MUST
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contain the local port number the host will use for the connection.
If none of the modes utilize a transport layer protocol, the Port
field SHOULD be set to zero when the parameter is sent and ignored
when received. The Port and Mode ID fields are encoded as unsigned
integers using network byte order.
3.2. Mode Negotiation After HIP Base Exchange
If a HIP hosts wants to change to a different transport mode (or
start using a transport mode) some time after the base exchange, it
sends a HIP UPDATE packet with a HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter
containing the mode(s) it would prefer to use. The host receiving
the UPDATE SHOULD respond with an UPDATE packet containing the mode
that is selected as in the negotiation during the base exchange. If
the receiving host does not support, or is not willing to use, any of
the listed modes, it SHOULD respond with an UPDATE packet where the
HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter contains only the currently used
transport mode (even if one was not included in the previous UPDATE
packet) and continue using that mode.
Since the HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter's type is not critical (as
defined in Section 5.2.1 of [RFC5201]), a host not supporting this
extension would simply reply with an acknowledgement UPDATE packet
without a HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter. In such a case, depending on
local policy as in mode negotiation during the base exchange, the
host that requested the new transport mode MAY close the HIP
association. If the association is closed, the host closing the
association SHOULD send a NO_VALID_HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE NOTIFY packet
to the other host before closing the association.
3.3. HIP Messages on Encrypted Connections
This specification defines two different transport modes for sending
HIP packets over encrypted ESP connections. These modes require that
the ESP transport format [RFC5202] is negotiated to be used between
the hosts. If the ESP transport format is not used, these modes MUST
NOT be offered in the HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter. If a
HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter containing an ESP transport mode is
received but the ESP transport format is not used, a host MUST NOT
select such a mode but act as specified in Section 3.1 (if performing
a base exchange) or Section 3.2 (if performing an UPDATE) when no
valid mode is offered.
The ESP mode provides simple protection for all the signaling traffic
and can be used as a generic replacement for the DEFAULT mode in
cases where all signaling traffic should be encrypted. If the HIP
messages may become so large that they would need to be fragmented,
e.g., because of HIP certificates [I-D.ietf-hip-cert] or DATA
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messages [I-D.ietf-hip-hiccups], it is RECOMMENDED to use the ESP-TCP
mode which can handle message fragmentation at TCP level instead of
relying on IP level fragmentation.
HIP messages that result in changing or generating new keying
material, i.e., the base exchange and re-keying UPDATE messages, MUST
NOT be sent over the encrypted connection that is created using the
keying material that is being changed, nor over an encrypted
connection using the newly created keying material.
It should be noted that when HIP messages are sent using an encrypted
connection, on-path network elements (e.g., firewalls) that would
normally see the HIP headers and contents of the un-encrypted
parameters, cannot see any part of the messages unless they have
access to the encryption keying material.
3.3.1. ESP mode
If the ESP mode is selected in the base exchange, both hosts MUST
listen for incoming HIP signaling messages and send outgoing messages
on the encrypted connection. The ESP header's next header value for
such messages MUST be set to HIP (139).
3.3.2. ESP-TCP mode
If the ESP-TCP mode is selected, the host with the larger HIT
(calculated as defined in Section 6.5 of [RFC5201]) MUST start to
listen for an incoming TCP connection on the encrypted connection on
the port it used in the Port field of the transport mode parameter.
The other host MUST create a TCP connection to that port and the host
SHOULD use the port it sent in the transport mode parameter as the
source port for the TCP connection. Once the TCP connection is
established, both hosts MUST listen for incoming HIP signaling
messages and send the outgoing messages using the TCP connection.
The ESP next header value for messages sent using the ESP-TCP mode
connections MUST be set to TCP (6).
If the hosts are unable to create the TCP connection, the host that
initiated the mode negotiation MUST restart the negotiation with
UPDATE message and SHOULD NOT propose the ESP-TCP mode. If local
policy does not allow using any other mode than ESP-TCP, the HIP
association MUST be closed. The UPDATE or CLOSE message MUST be sent
using the same transport mode that was used for negotiating the use
of the ESP-TCP mode.
Since TCP provides reliable transport, the HIP messages sent over TCP
MUST NOT be retransmitted for the purpose of achieving reliable
transmission. Instead, a host SHOULD wait to detect that the TCP
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connection has failed to retransmit the packet successfully in a
timely manner (such detection is platform- and policy-specific)
before concluding that there is no response.
3.4. Recovering from Failed Encrypted Connections
If the encrypted connection fails for some reason, it can no longer
be used for HIP signaling and the hosts SHOULD re-establish the
connection using HIP messages that are sent outside of the encrypted
connection. Hence, while listening for incoming HIP messages on the
encrypted connection, hosts MUST still accept incoming HIP messages
using the same transport method (e.g., UDP or plain IP) that was used
for the base exchange. When responding to a HIP message sent outside
of encrypted connection, the response MUST be sent using the same
transport method as the original message used. If encryption was
used, hosts SHOULD send outside of the encrypted connection only HIP
messages that are used to reestablish the encrypted connection.
Especially, messages that are intended to be sent only encrypted
(e.g., DATA messages using an encrypted transport mode) MUST NOT be
sent before the encrypted connection is reestablished.
The UPDATE messages used for re-establishing the encrypted connection
MUST contain a HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter and the negotiation
proceeds as described in Section 3.2.
3.5. Host Mobility and Multihoming
If the host's address changes, usually a new Security Association
(SA) is created for the new address as described in [RFC5206] and if
an ESP or ESP-TCP transport mode is used, HIP signaling continues
using the new SA and the same transport mode as before. If the ESP-
TCP mode is used, the HIP signaling TCP connection is moved to the
new SA like any other TCP connection.
In some cases the host may not be able to send the mobility UPDATE
messages using the encrypted connection before it breaks. This
results in a similar situation as if the encrypted connection had
failed and the hosts need to re-negotiate the new addresses using un-
encrypted UPDATE messages and possibly rendezvous [RFC5204] or HIP
relay [RFC5770] servers. Also these UPDATE messages MUST contain the
HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter and perform the transport mode
negotiation.
4. Notify Packet Types
The new Notify Packet Type [RFC5201] defined in this document is
shown below. The Notification Data field for the error notifications
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SHOULD contain the HIP header of the rejected packet.
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ -----
NO_VALID_HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE [TBD by IANA;100]
If a host sends an UPDATE message that does not have any transport
mode the receiving host is willing to use, the receiving host
sends back a NOTIFY error packet with this type.
5. Security Considerations
By exchanging the HIP messages over ESP connection, all HIP signaling
data (after the base exchange but excluding keying material
(re)negotiation) will be encrypted, but only if NULL encryption is
not used. Thus, a host requiring confidentiality for the HIP
signaling messages must check that encryption is negotiated to be
used on the ESP connection. Moreover, the level of protection
provided by the ESP transport modes depends on the selected ESP
transform; see [RFC5202] and [RFC4303] for security considerations of
the different ESP transforms.
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Gonzalo Camarillo, Kristian Slavov, Tom Henderson, Miika
Komu, Jan Melen, and Tobias Heer for comments on the draft.
7. IANA Considerations
This section is to be interpreted according to [RFC5226].
This document updates the IANA Registry for HIP Parameter Types
[RFC5201] by assigning new HIP Parameter Type value for the
HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter (defined in Section 3.1).
The HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE parameter has 16-bit unsigned integer fields
for different modes, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
sub-registry entitled "HIP Transport Modes" under the "Host Identity
Protocol (HIP) Parameters" registry. Initial values for the
transport mode registry are given in Section 3.1; future assignments
are to be made through IETF Review [RFC5226]. Assignments consist of
a transport mode identifier name and its associated value.
This document also defines new HIP Notify Packet Type [RFC5201]
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NO_VALID_HIP_TRANSPORT_MODE in Section 4.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
[RFC5202] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and P. Nikander, "Using the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with
the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)", RFC 5202, April 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
8.2. Informational References
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC5204] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 5204, April 2008.
[RFC5206] Nikander, P., Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "End-
Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity
Protocol", RFC 5206, April 2008.
[RFC5770] Komu, M., Henderson, T., Tschofenig, H., Melen, J., and A.
Keranen, "Basic Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Extensions
for Traversal of Network Address Translators", RFC 5770,
April 2010.
[I-D.ietf-hip-cert]
Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "HIP Certificates",
draft-ietf-hip-cert-04 (work in progress), September 2010.
[I-D.ietf-hip-hiccups]
Camarillo, G. and J. Melen, "HIP (Host Identity Protocol)
Immediate Carriage and Conveyance of Upper- layer Protocol
Signaling (HICCUPS)", draft-ietf-hip-hiccups-05 (work in
progress), July 2010.
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Author's Address
Ari Keranen
Ericsson
Hirsalantie 11
02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: Ari.Keranen@ericsson.com
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