Network Working Group T. Henderson, Ed.
Internet-Draft The Boeing Company
Obsoletes: 5206 (if approved) C. Vogt
Intended status: Standards Track J. Arkko
Expires: January 16, 2014 Ericsson Research NomadicLab
July 15, 2013
Host Mobility with the Host Identity Protocol
draft-ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis-06
Abstract
This document defines mobility extensions to the Host Identity
Protocol (HIP). Specifically, this document defines a general
"LOCATOR_SET" parameter for HIP messages that allows for a HIP host
to notify peers about alternate addresses at which it may be reached.
This document also defines elements of procedure for mobility of a
HIP host -- the process by which a host dynamically changes the
primary locator that it uses to receive packets. While the same
LOCATOR_SET parameter can also be used to support end-host
multihoming, detailed procedures are out of scope for this document.
This document obsoletes RFC 5206.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Protocol Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Mobility Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Mobility with a Single SA Pair (No Rekeying) . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Mobility with a Single SA Pair (Mobile-Initiated
Rekey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Using LOCATOR_SETs across Addressing Realms . . . . . 12
3.2.4. Network Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Other Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.1. Address Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3.2. Credit-Based Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3.3. Preferred Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. LOCATOR_SET Parameter Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Traffic Type and Preferred Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Locator Type and Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. UPDATE Packet with Included LOCATOR_SET . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Locator Data Structure and Status . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2. Sending LOCATOR_SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3. Handling Received LOCATOR_SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Verifying Address Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.5. Changing the Preferred Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.6. Credit-Based Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.6.1. Handling Payload Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.6.2. Credit Aging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6.1. Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.1. Flooding Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.2. Memory/Computational-Exhaustion DoS Attacks . . . . . 29
6.3. Mixed Deployment Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8. Authors and Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Appendix A. Document Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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1. Introduction and Scope
The Host Identity Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] (HIP) supports
an architecture that decouples the transport layer (TCP, UDP, etc.)
from the internetworking layer (IPv4 and IPv6) by using public/
private key pairs, instead of IP addresses, as host identities. When
a host uses HIP, the overlying protocol sublayers (e.g., transport
layer sockets and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Security
Associations (SAs)) are instead bound to representations of these
host identities, and the IP addresses are only used for packet
forwarding. However, each host must also know at least one IP
address at which its peers are reachable. Initially, these IP
addresses are the ones used during the HIP base exchange
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
One consequence of such a decoupling is that new solutions to
network-layer mobility and host multihoming are possible. There are
potentially many variations of mobility and multihoming possible.
The scope of this document encompasses messaging and elements of
procedure for basic network-level host mobility, leaving more
complicated scenarios and other variations for further study. More
specifically:
This document defines a generalized LOCATOR_SET parameter for use
in HIP messages. The LOCATOR_SET parameter allows a HIP host to
notify a peer about alternate locators at which it is reachable.
The locators may be merely IP addresses, or they may have
additional multiplexing and demultiplexing context to aid the
packet handling in the lower layers. For instance, an IP address
may need to be paired with an ESP Security Parameter Index (SPI)
so that packets are sent on the correct SA for a given address.
This document also specifies the messaging and elements of
procedure for end-host mobility of a HIP host -- the sequential
change in the preferred IP address used to reach a host. In
particular, message flows to enable successful host mobility,
including address verification methods, are defined herein.
However, while the same LOCATOR_SET parameter is intended to
support host multihoming (parallel support of a number of
addresses), and experimentation is encouraged, detailed elements
of procedure for host multihoming are out of scope.
While HIP can potentially be used with transports other than the ESP
transport format [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis], this document largely
assumes the use of ESP and leaves other transport formats for further
study.
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There are a number of situations where the simple end-to-end
readdressing functionality is not sufficient. These include the
initial reachability of a mobile host, location privacy, simultaneous
mobility of both hosts, and some modes of NAT traversal. In these
situations, there is a need for some helper functionality in the
network, such as a HIP rendezvous server [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis].
Such functionality is out of the scope of this document. We also do
not consider localized mobility management extensions (i.e., mobility
management techniques that do not involve directly signaling the
correspondent node); this document is concerned with end-to-end
mobility. Making underlying IP mobility transparent to the transport
layer has implications on the proper response of transport congestion
control, path MTU selection, and Quality of Service (QoS).
Transport-layer mobility triggers, and the proper transport response
to a HIP mobility or multihoming address change, are outside the
scope of this document.
2. Terminology and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
LOCATOR_SET. The name of a HIP parameter containing zero or more
Locator fields. This parameter's name is distinguished from the
Locator fields embedded within it by the use of all capital
letters.
Locator. A name that controls how the packet is routed through the
network and demultiplexed by the end host. It may include a
concatenation of traditional network addresses such as an IPv6
address and end-to-end identifiers such as an ESP SPI. It may
also include transport port numbers or IPv6 Flow Labels as
demultiplexing context, or it may simply be a network address.
Address. A name that denotes a point-of-attachment to the network.
The two most common examples are an IPv4 address and an IPv6
address. The set of possible addresses is a subset of the set of
possible locators.
Preferred locator. A locator on which a host prefers to receive
data. With respect to a given peer, a host always has one active
Preferred locator, unless there are no active locators. By
default, the locators used in the HIP base exchange are the
Preferred locators.
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Credit Based Authorization. A host must verify a peer host's
reachability at a new locator. Credit-Based Authorization
authorizes the peer to receive a certain amount of data at the new
locator before the result of such verification is known.
3. Protocol Model
This section is an overview; more detailed specification follows this
section.
3.1. Operating Environment
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] is a key
establishment and parameter negotiation protocol. Its primary
applications are for authenticating host messages based on host
identities, and establishing security associations (SAs) for the ESP
transport format [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis] and possibly other
protocols in the future.
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
| | | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
| | Key | | HIP | | Key | |
| | Management | <-+-----------------------+-> | Management | |
| | Process | | | | Process | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | | | | |
| v | | v |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
| | IPsec | | ESP | | IPsec | |
| | Stack | <-+-----------------------+-> | Stack | |
| | | | | | | |
| +------------+ | | +------------+ |
| | | |
| | | |
| Initiator | | Responder |
+--------------------+ +--------------------+
Figure 1: HIP Deployment Model
The general deployment model for HIP is shown above, assuming
operation in an end-to-end fashion. This document specifies
extensions to the HIP protocol to enable end-host mobility and basic
multihoming. In summary, these extensions to the HIP base protocol
enable the signaling of new addressing information to the peer in HIP
messages. The messages are authenticated via a signature or keyed
hash message authentication code (HMAC) based on its Host Identity.
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This document specifies the format of this new addressing
(LOCATOR_SET) parameter, the procedures for sending and processing
this parameter to enable basic host mobility, and procedures for a
concurrent address verification mechanism.
---------
| TCP | (sockets bound to HITs)
---------
|
---------
----> | ESP | {HIT_s, HIT_d} <-> SPI
| ---------
| |
---- ---------
| MH |-> | HIP | {HIT_s, HIT_d, SPI} <-> {IP_s, IP_d, SPI}
---- ---------
|
---------
| IP |
---------
Figure 2: Architecture for HIP Host Mobility (MH)
Figure 2 depicts a layered architectural view of a HIP-enabled stack
using the ESP transport format. In HIP, upper-layer protocols
(including TCP and ESP in this figure) are bound to Host Identity
Tags (HITs) and not IP addresses. The HIP sublayer is responsible
for maintaining the binding between HITs and IP addresses. The SPI
is used to associate an incoming packet with the right HITs. The
block labeled "MH" is introduced below.
Consider first the case in which there is no mobility or multihoming,
as specified in the base protocol specification
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. The HIP base exchange establishes the
HITs in use between the hosts, the SPIs to use for ESP, and the IP
addresses (used in both the HIP signaling packets and ESP data
packets). Note that there can only be one such set of bindings in
the outbound direction for any given packet, and the only fields used
for the binding at the HIP layer are the fields exposed by ESP (the
SPI and HITs). For the inbound direction, the SPI is all that is
required to find the right host context. ESP rekeying events change
the mapping between the HIT pair and SPI, but do not change the IP
addresses.
Consider next a mobility event, in which a host moves to another IP
address. Two things must occur in this case. First, the peer must
be notified of the address change using a HIP UPDATE message.
Second, each host must change its local bindings at the HIP sublayer
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(new IP addresses). It may be that both the SPIs and IP addresses
are changed simultaneously in a single UPDATE; the protocol described
herein supports this. However, simultaneous movement of both hosts,
notification of transport layer protocols of the path change, and
procedures for possibly traversing middleboxes are not covered by
this document.
3.1.1. Locator
This document defines a generalization of an address called a
"locator". A locator specifies a point-of-attachment to the network
but may also include additional end-to-end tunneling or per-host
demultiplexing context that affects how packets are handled below the
logical HIP sublayer of the stack. This generalization is useful
because IP addresses alone may not be sufficient to describe how
packets should be handled below HIP. For example, in a host
multihoming context, certain IP addresses may need to be associated
with certain ESP SPIs to avoid violating the ESP anti-replay window.
Addresses may also be affiliated with transport ports in certain
tunneling scenarios. Locators may simply be traditional network
addresses. The format of the locator fields in the LOCATOR_SET
parameter is defined in Section 4.
3.1.2. Mobility Overview
When a host moves to another address, it notifies its peer of the new
address by sending a HIP UPDATE packet containing a LOCATOR_SET
parameter. This UPDATE packet is acknowledged by the peer. For
reliability in the presence of packet loss, the UPDATE packet is
retransmitted as defined in the HIP protocol specification
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. The peer can authenticate the contents
of the UPDATE packet based on the signature and keyed hash of the
packet.
When using ESP Transport Format [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis], the host
may at the same time decide to rekey its security association and
possibly generate a new Diffie-Hellman key; all of these actions are
triggered by including additional parameters in the UPDATE packet, as
defined in the base protocol specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]
and ESP extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis].
When using ESP (and possibly other transport modes in the future),
the host is able to receive packets that are protected using a HIP
created ESP SA from any address. Thus, a host can change its IP
address and continue to send packets to its peers without necessarily
rekeying. However, the peers are not able to send packets to these
new addresses before they can reliably and securely update the set of
addresses that they associate with the sending host. Furthermore,
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mobility may change the path characteristics in such a manner that
reordering occurs and packets fall outside the ESP anti-replay window
for the SA, thereby requiring rekeying.
3.2. Protocol Overview
In this section, we briefly introduce a number of usage scenarios for
HIP host mobility. These scenarios assume that HIP is being used
with the ESP transform [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis], although other
scenarios may be defined in the future. To understand these usage
scenarios, the reader should be at least minimally familiar with the
HIP protocol specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. However, for
the (relatively) uninitiated reader, it is most important to keep in
mind that in HIP the actual payload traffic is protected with ESP,
and that the ESP SPI acts as an index to the right host-to-host
context. More specification details are found later in Section 4 and
Section 5.
The scenarios below assume that the two hosts have completed a single
HIP base exchange with each other. Both of the hosts therefore have
one incoming and one outgoing SA. Further, each SA uses the same
pair of IP addresses, which are the ones used in the base exchange.
The readdressing protocol is an asymmetric protocol where a mobile
host informs a peer host about changes of IP addresses on affected
SPIs. The readdressing exchange is designed to be piggybacked on
existing HIP exchanges. The majority of the packets on which the
LOCATOR_SET parameters are expected to be carried are UPDATE packets.
However, some implementations may want to experiment with sending
LOCATOR_SET parameters also on other packets, such as R1, I2, and
NOTIFY.
The scenarios below at times describe addresses as being in either an
ACTIVE, VERIFIED, or DEPRECATED state. From the perspective of a
host, newly-learned addresses of the peer must be verified before put
into active service, and addresses removed by the peer are put into a
deprecated state. Under limited conditions described below
(Section 5.6), an UNVERIFIED address may be used. The addressing
states are defined more formally in Section 5.1.
Hosts that use link-local addresses as source addresses in their HIP
handshakes may not be reachable by a mobile peer. Such hosts SHOULD
provide a globally routable address either in the initial handshake
or via the LOCATOR_SET parameter.
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3.2.1. Mobility with a Single SA Pair (No Rekeying)
A mobile host must sometimes change an IP address bound to an
interface. The change of an IP address might be needed due to a
change in the advertised IPv6 prefixes on the link, a reconnected PPP
link, a new DHCP lease, or an actual movement to another subnet. In
order to maintain its communication context, the host must inform its
peers about the new IP address. This first example considers the
case in which the mobile host has only one interface, IP address, a
single pair of SAs (one inbound, one outbound), and no rekeying
occurs on the SAs. We also assume that the new IP addresses are
within the same address family (IPv4 or IPv6) as the first address.
This is the simplest scenario, depicted in Figure 3.
Mobile Host Peer Host
UPDATE(ESP_INFO, LOCATOR_SET, SEQ)
----------------------------------->
UPDATE(ESP_INFO, SEQ, ACK, ECHO_REQUEST)
<-----------------------------------
UPDATE(ACK, ECHO_RESPONSE)
----------------------------------->
Figure 3: Readdress without Rekeying, but with Address Check
The steps of the packet processing are as follows:
1. The mobile host may be disconnected from the peer host for a
brief period of time while it switches from one IP address to
another; this case is sometimes referred to in the literature as
a "break-before-make" case. The host may also obtain its new IP
address before loosing the old one ("make-before-break" case).
In either case, upon obtaining a new IP address, the mobile host
sends a LOCATOR_SET parameter to the peer host in an UPDATE
message. The UPDATE message also contains an ESP_INFO parameter
containing the values of the old and new SPIs for a security
association. In this case, the OLD SPI and NEW SPI parameters
both are set to the value of the preexisting incoming SPI; this
ESP_INFO does not trigger a rekeying event but is instead
included for possible parameter-inspecting middleboxes on the
path. The LOCATOR_SET parameter contains the new IP address
(Locator Type of "1", defined below) and a locator lifetime. The
mobile host waits for this UPDATE to be acknowledged, and
retransmits if necessary, as specified in the base specification
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
2. The peer host receives the UPDATE, validates it, and updates any
local bindings between the HIP association and the mobile host's
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destination address. The peer host MUST perform an address
verification by placing a nonce in the ECHO_REQUEST parameter of
the UPDATE message sent back to the mobile host. It also
includes an ESP_INFO parameter with the OLD SPI and NEW SPI
parameters both set to the value of the preexisting incoming SPI,
and sends this UPDATE (with piggybacked acknowledgment) to the
mobile host at its new address. The peer MAY use the new address
immediately, but it MUST limit the amount of data it sends to the
address until address verification completes.
3. The mobile host completes the readdress by processing the UPDATE
ACK and echoing the nonce in an ECHO_RESPONSE. Once the peer
host receives this ECHO_RESPONSE, it considers the new address to
be verified and can put the address into full use.
While the peer host is verifying the new address, the new address is
marked as UNVERIFIED in the interim, and the old address is
DEPRECATED. Once the peer host has received a correct reply to its
UPDATE challenge, it marks the new address as ACTIVE and removes the
old address.
3.2.2. Mobility with a Single SA Pair (Mobile-Initiated Rekey)
The mobile host may decide to rekey the SAs at the same time that it
notifies the peer of the new address. In this case, the above
procedure described in Figure 3 is slightly modified. The UPDATE
message sent from the mobile host includes an ESP_INFO with the OLD
SPI set to the previous SPI, the NEW SPI set to the desired new SPI
value for the incoming SA, and the KEYMAT Index desired. Optionally,
the host may include a DIFFIE_HELLMAN parameter for a new Diffie-
Hellman key. The peer completes the request for a rekey as is
normally done for HIP rekeying, except that the new address is kept
as UNVERIFIED until the UPDATE nonce challenge is received as
described above. Figure 4 illustrates this scenario.
Mobile Host Peer Host
UPDATE(ESP_INFO, LOCATOR_SET, SEQ, [DIFFIE_HELLMAN])
----------------------------------->
UPDATE(ESP_INFO, SEQ, ACK, [DIFFIE_HELLMAN,] ECHO_REQUEST)
<-----------------------------------
UPDATE(ACK, ECHO_RESPONSE)
----------------------------------->
Figure 4: Readdress with Mobile-Initiated Rekey
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3.2.3. Using LOCATOR_SETs across Addressing Realms
It is possible for HIP associations to migrate to a state in which
both parties are only using locators in different addressing realms.
For example, the two hosts may initiate the HIP association when both
are using IPv6 locators, then one host may loose its IPv6
connectivity and obtain an IPv4 address. In such a case, some type
of mechanism for interworking between the different realms must be
employed; such techniques are outside the scope of the present text.
The basic problem in this example is that the host readdressing to
IPv4 does not know a corresponding IPv4 address of the peer. This
may be handled (experimentally) by possibly configuring this address
information manually or in the DNS, or the hosts exchange both IPv4
and IPv6 addresses in the locator.
3.2.4. Network Renumbering
It is expected that IPv6 networks will be renumbered much more often
than most IPv4 networks. From an end-host point of view, network
renumbering is similar to mobility.
3.3. Other Considerations
3.3.1. Address Verification
When a HIP host receives a set of locators from another HIP host in a
LOCATOR_SET, it does not necessarily know whether the other host is
actually reachable at the claimed addresses. In fact, a malicious
peer host may be intentionally giving bogus addresses in order to
cause a packet flood towards the target addresses [RFC4225].
Likewise, viral software may have compromised the peer host,
programming it to redirect packets to the target addresses. Thus,
the HIP host must first check that the peer is reachable at the new
address.
An additional potential benefit of performing address verification is
to allow middleboxes in the network along the new path to obtain the
peer host's inbound SPI.
Address verification is implemented by the challenger sending some
piece of unguessable information to the new address, and waiting for
some acknowledgment from the Responder that indicates reception of
the information at the new address. This may include the exchange of
a nonce, or the generation of a new SPI and observation of data
arriving on the new SPI.
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3.3.2. Credit-Based Authorization
Credit-Based Authorization (CBA) allows a host to securely use a new
locator even though the peer's reachability at the address embedded
in the locator has not yet been verified. This is accomplished based
on the following three hypotheses:
1. A flooding attacker typically seeks to somehow multiply the
packets it generates for the purpose of its attack because
bandwidth is an ample resource for many victims.
2. An attacker can often cause unamplified flooding by sending
packets to its victim, either by directly addressing the victim
in the packets, or by guiding the packets along a specific path
by means of an IPv6 Routing header, if Routing headers are not
filtered by firewalls.
3. Consequently, the additional effort required to set up a
redirection-based flooding attack (without CBA and return
routability checks) would pay off for the attacker only if
amplification could be obtained this way.
On this basis, rather than eliminating malicious packet redirection
in the first place, Credit-Based Authorization prevents
amplifications. This is accomplished by limiting the data a host can
send to an unverified address of a peer by the data recently received
from that peer. Redirection-based flooding attacks thus become less
attractive than, for example, pure direct flooding, where the
attacker itself sends bogus packets to the victim.
Figure 5 illustrates Credit-Based Authorization: Host B measures the
amount of data recently received from peer A and, when A readdresses,
sends packets to A's new, unverified address as long as the sum of
the packet sizes does not exceed the measured, received data volume.
When insufficient credit is left, B stops sending further packets to
A until A's address becomes ACTIVE. The address changes may be due
to mobility, multihoming, or any other reason. Not shown in Figure 5
are the results of credit aging (Section 5.6.2), a mechanism used to
dampen possible time-shifting attacks.
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+-------+ +-------+
| A | | B |
+-------+ +-------+
| |
address |------------------------------->| credit += size(packet)
ACTIVE | |
|------------------------------->| credit += size(packet)
|<-------------------------------| do not change credit
| |
+ address change |
+ address verification starts |
address |<-------------------------------| credit -= size(packet)
UNVERIFIED |------------------------------->| credit += size(packet)
|<-------------------------------| credit -= size(packet)
| |
|<-------------------------------| credit -= size(packet)
| X credit < size(packet)
| | => do not send packet!
+ address verification concludes |
address | |
ACTIVE |<-------------------------------| do not change credit
| |
Figure 5: Readdressing Scenario
3.3.3. Preferred Locator
When a host has multiple locators, the peer host must decide which to
use for outbound packets. It may be that a host would prefer to
receive data on a particular inbound interface. HIP allows a
particular locator to be designated as a Preferred locator and
communicated to the peer (see Section 4).
4. LOCATOR_SET Parameter Format
The LOCATOR_SET parameter is a critical parameter as defined by
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. It consists of the standard HIP
parameter Type and Length fields, plus zero or more Locator sub-
parameters. Each Locator sub-parameter contains a Traffic Type,
Locator Type, Locator Length, Preferred locator bit, Locator
Lifetime, and a Locator encoding. A LOCATOR_SET containing zero
Locator fields is permitted but has the effect of deprecating all
addresses.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Traffic Type | Locator Type | Locator Length | Reserved |P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Locator Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Locator |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
. .
. .
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Traffic Type | Locator Type | Locator Length | Reserved |P|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Locator Lifetime |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Locator |
| |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: LOCATOR_SET Parameter Format
Type: 193
Length: Length in octets, excluding Type and Length fields, and
excluding padding.
Traffic Type: Defines whether the locator pertains to HIP signaling,
user data, or both.
Locator Type: Defines the semantics of the Locator field.
Locator Length: Defines the length of the Locator field, in units of
4-byte words (Locators up to a maximum of 4*255 octets are
supported).
Reserved: Zero when sent, ignored when received.
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P: Preferred locator. Set to one if the locator is preferred for
that Traffic Type; otherwise, set to zero.
Locator Lifetime: Locator lifetime, in seconds.
Locator: The locator whose semantics and encoding are indicated by
the Locator Type field. All Locator sub-fields are integral
multiples of four octets in length.
The Locator Lifetime indicates how long the following locator is
expected to be valid. The lifetime is expressed in seconds. Each
locator MUST have a non-zero lifetime. The address is expected to
become deprecated when the specified number of seconds has passed
since the reception of the message. A deprecated address SHOULD NOT
be used as a destination address if an alternate (non-deprecated) is
available and has sufficient scope.
4.1. Traffic Type and Preferred Locator
The following Traffic Type values are defined:
0: Both signaling (HIP control packets) and user data.
1: Signaling packets only.
2: Data packets only.
The "P" bit, when set, has scope over the corresponding Traffic Type.
That is, when a "P" bit is set for Traffic Type "2", for example, it
means that the locator is preferred for data packets. If there is a
conflict (for example, if the "P" bit is set for an address of Type
"0" and a different address of Type "2"), the more specific Traffic
Type rule applies (in this case, "2"). By default, the IP addresses
used in the base exchange are Preferred locators for both signaling
and user data, unless a new Preferred locator supersedes them. If no
locators are indicated as preferred for a given Traffic Type, the
implementation may use an arbitrary locator from the set of active
locators.
4.2. Locator Type and Locator
The following Locator Type values are defined, along with the
associated semantics of the Locator field:
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0: An IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address [RFC4291]
(128 bits long). This locator type is defined primarily for non-
ESP-based usage.
1: The concatenation of an ESP SPI (first 32 bits) followed by an
IPv6 address or an IPv4-in-IPv6 format IPv4 address (an additional
128 bits). This IP address is defined primarily for ESP-based
usage.
4.3. UPDATE Packet with Included LOCATOR_SET
A number of combinations of parameters in an UPDATE packet are
possible (e.g., see Section 3.2). In this document, procedures are
defined only for the case in which one LOCATOR_SET and one ESP_INFO
parameter is used in any HIP packet. Furthermore, the LOCATOR_SET
SHOULD list all of the locators that are active on the HIP
association (including those on SAs not covered by the ESP_INFO
parameter). Any UPDATE packet that includes a LOCATOR_SET parameter
SHOULD include both an HMAC and a HIP_SIGNATURE parameter. The
relationship between the announced Locators and any ESP_INFO
parameters present in the packet is defined in Section 5.2. The
sending of multiple LOCATOR_SET and/or ESP_INFO parameters is for
further study; receivers may wish to experiment with supporting such
a possibility.
5. Processing Rules
This section describes rules for sending and receiving the
LOCATOR_SET parameter, testing address reachability, and using
Credit-Based Authorization (CBA) on UNVERIFIED locators.
5.1. Locator Data Structure and Status
In a typical implementation, each outgoing locator is represented by
a piece of state that contains the following data:
o the actual bit pattern representing the locator,
o the lifetime (seconds),
o the status (UNVERIFIED, ACTIVE, DEPRECATED),
o the Traffic Type scope of the locator, and
o whether the locator is preferred for any particular scope.
The status is used to track the reachability of the address embedded
within the LOCATOR_SET parameter:
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UNVERIFIED indicates that the reachability of the address has not
been verified yet,
ACTIVE indicates that the reachability of the address has been
verified and the address has not been deprecated,
DEPRECATED indicates that the locator lifetime has expired.
The following state changes are allowed:
UNVERIFIED to ACTIVE The reachability procedure completes
successfully.
UNVERIFIED to DEPRECATED The locator lifetime expires while the
locator is UNVERIFIED.
ACTIVE to DEPRECATED The locator lifetime expires while the locator
is ACTIVE.
ACTIVE to UNVERIFIED There has been no traffic on the address for
some time, and the local policy mandates that the address
reachability must be verified again before starting to use it
again.
DEPRECATED to UNVERIFIED The host receives a new lifetime for the
locator.
A DEPRECATED address MUST NOT be changed to ACTIVE without first
verifying its reachability.
Note that the state of whether or not a locator is preferred is not
necessarily the same as the value of the Preferred bit in the Locator
sub-parameter received from the peer. Peers may recommend certain
locators to be preferred, but the decision on whether to actually use
a locator as a preferred locator is a local decision, possibly
influenced by local policy.
5.2. Sending LOCATOR_SETs
The decision of when to send LOCATOR_SETs is basically a local policy
issue. However, it is RECOMMENDED that a host send a LOCATOR_SET
whenever it recognizes a change of its IP addresses in use on an
active HIP association, and assumes that the change is going to last
at least for a few seconds. It is possible to delay the exposure of
additional locators to the peer, and to send data from previously
unannounced locators, as might arise in certain mobility situations.
Rapidly sending LOCATOR_SETs that force the peer to change the
preferred address SHOULD be avoided.
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When a host decides to inform its peers about changes in its IP
addresses, it has to decide how to group the various addresses with
SPIs. The grouping should consider also whether middlebox
interaction requires sending the same LOCATOR_SET in separate UPDATEs
on different paths. Since each SPI is associated with a different
Security Association, the grouping policy may also be based on ESP
anti-replay protection considerations. In the typical case, simply
basing the grouping on actual kernel level physical and logical
interfaces may be the best policy. Grouping policy is outside of the
scope of this document.
Note that the purpose of announcing IP addresses in a LOCATOR_SET is
to provide connectivity between the communicating hosts. In most
cases, tunnels or virtual interfaces such as IPsec tunnel interfaces
or Mobile IP home addresses provide sub-optimal connectivity.
Furthermore, it should be possible to replace most tunnels with HIP
based "non-tunneling", therefore making most virtual interfaces
fairly unnecessary in the future. Therefore, virtual interfaces
SHOULD NOT be announced in general. On the other hand, there are
clearly situations where tunnels are used for diagnostic and/or
testing purposes. In such and other similar cases announcing the IP
addresses of virtual interfaces may be appropriate.
Hosts MUST NOT announce broadcast or multicast addresses in
LOCATOR_SETs. Link-local addresses MAY be announced to peers that
are known to be neighbors on the same link, such as when the IP
destination address of a peer is also link-local. The announcement
of link-local addresses in this case is a policy decision; link-local
addresses used as Preferred locators will create reachability
problems when the host moves to another link. In any case, link-
local addresses MUST NOT be announced to a peer unless that peer is
known to be on the same link.
Once the host has decided on the groups and assignment of addresses
to the SPIs, it creates a LOCATOR_SET parameter that serves as a
complete representation of the addresses and affiliated SPIs intended
for active use. We now describe a few cases introduced in
Section 3.2. We assume that the Traffic Type for each locator is set
to "0" (other values for Traffic Type may be specified in documents
that separate the HIP control plane from data plane traffic). Other
mobility cases are possible but are left for further experimentation.
1. Host mobility with no multihoming and no rekeying. The mobile
host creates a single UPDATE containing a single ESP_INFO with a
single LOCATOR_SET parameter. The ESP_INFO contains the current
value of the SPI in both the OLD SPI and NEW SPI fields. The
LOCATOR_SET contains a single Locator with a "Locator Type" of
"1"; the SPI must match that of the ESP_INFO. The Preferred bit
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SHOULD be set and the "Locator Lifetime" is set according to
local policy. The UPDATE also contains a SEQ parameter as usual.
This packet is retransmitted as defined in the HIP protocol
specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. The UPDATE should be
sent to the peer's preferred IP address with an IP source address
corresponding to the address in the LOCATOR_SET parameter.
2. Host mobility with no multihoming but with rekeying. The mobile
host creates a single UPDATE containing a single ESP_INFO with a
single LOCATOR_SET parameter (with a single address). The
ESP_INFO contains the current value of the SPI in the OLD SPI and
the new value of the SPI in the NEW SPI, and a KEYMAT Index as
selected by local policy. Optionally, the host may choose to
initiate a Diffie Hellman rekey by including a DIFFIE_HELLMAN
parameter. The LOCATOR_SET contains a single Locator with
"Locator Type" of "1"; the SPI must match that of the NEW SPI in
the ESP_INFO. Otherwise, the steps are identical to the case in
which no rekeying is initiated.
The sending of multiple LOCATOR_SETs, locators with Locator Type "0",
and multiple ESP_INFO parameters is for further study. Note that the
inclusion of LOCATOR_SET in an R1 packet requires the use of Type "0"
locators since no SAs are set up at that point.
5.3. Handling Received LOCATOR_SETs
A host SHOULD be prepared to receive a LOCATOR_SET parameter in the
following HIP packets: R1, I2, UPDATE, and NOTIFY.
This document describes sending both ESP_INFO and LOCATOR_SET
parameters in an UPDATE. The ESP_INFO parameter is included when
there is a need to rekey or key a new SPI, and is otherwise included
for the possible benefit of HIP-aware middleboxes. The LOCATOR_SET
parameter contains a complete map of the locators that the host
wishes to make or keep active for the HIP association.
In general, the processing of a LOCATOR_SET depends upon the packet
type in which it is included. Here, we describe only the case in
which ESP_INFO is present and a single LOCATOR_SET and ESP_INFO are
sent in an UPDATE message; other cases are for further study. The
steps below cover each of the cases described in Section 5.2.
The processing of ESP_INFO and LOCATOR_SET parameters is intended to
be modular and support future generalization to the inclusion of
multiple ESP_INFO and/or multiple LOCATOR_SET parameters. A host
SHOULD first process the ESP_INFO before the LOCATOR_SET, since the
ESP_INFO may contain a new SPI value mapped to an existing SPI, while
a Type "1" locator will only contain a reference to the new SPI.
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When a host receives a validated HIP UPDATE with a LOCATOR_SET and
ESP_INFO parameter, it processes the ESP_INFO as follows. The
ESP_INFO parameter indicates whether an SA is being rekeyed, created,
deprecated, or just identified for the benefit of middleboxes. The
host examines the OLD SPI and NEW SPI values in the ESP_INFO
parameter:
1. (no rekeying) If the OLD SPI is equal to the NEW SPI and both
correspond to an existing SPI, the ESP_INFO is gratuitous
(provided for middleboxes) and no rekeying is necessary.
2. (rekeying) If the OLD SPI indicates an existing SPI and the NEW
SPI is a different non-zero value, the existing SA is being
rekeyed and the host follows HIP ESP rekeying procedures by
creating a new outbound SA with an SPI corresponding to the NEW
SPI, with no addresses bound to this SPI. Note that locators in
the LOCATOR_SET parameter will reference this new SPI instead of
the old SPI.
3. (new SA) If the OLD SPI value is zero and the NEW SPI is a new
non-zero value, then a new SA is being requested by the peer.
This case is also treated like a rekeying event; the receiving
host must create a new SA and respond with an UPDATE ACK.
4. (deprecating the SA) If the OLD SPI indicates an existing SPI and
the NEW SPI is zero, the SA is being deprecated and all locators
uniquely bound to the SPI are put into the DEPRECATED state.
If none of the above cases apply, a protocol error has occurred and
the processing of the UPDATE is stopped.
Next, the locators in the LOCATOR_SET parameter are processed. For
each locator listed in the LOCATOR_SET parameter, check that the
address therein is a legal unicast or anycast address. That is, the
address MUST NOT be a broadcast or multicast address. Note that some
implementations MAY accept addresses that indicate the local host,
since it may be allowed that the host runs HIP with itself.
The below assumes that all locators are of Type "1" with a Traffic
Type of "0"; other cases are for further study.
For each Type "1" address listed in the LOCATOR_SET parameter, the
host checks whether the address is already bound to the SPI
indicated. If the address is already bound, its lifetime is updated.
If the status of the address is DEPRECATED, the status is changed to
UNVERIFIED. If the address is not already bound, the address is
added, and its status is set to UNVERIFIED. Mark all addresses
corresponding to the SPI that were NOT listed in the LOCATOR_SET
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parameter as DEPRECATED.
As a result, at the end of processing, the addresses listed in the
LOCATOR_SET parameter have either a state of UNVERIFIED or ACTIVE,
and any old addresses on the old SA not listed in the LOCATOR_SET
parameter have a state of DEPRECATED.
Once the host has processed the locators, if the LOCATOR_SET
parameter contains a new Preferred locator, the host SHOULD initiate
a change of the Preferred locator. This requires that the host first
verifies reachability of the associated address, and only then
changes the Preferred locator; see Section 5.5.
If a host receives a locator with an unsupported Locator Type, and
when such a locator is also declared to be the Preferred locator for
the peer, the host SHOULD send a NOTIFY error with a Notify Message
Type of LOCATOR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED, with the Notification Data field
containing the locator(s) that the receiver failed to process.
Otherwise, a host MAY send a NOTIFY error if a (non-preferred)
locator with an unsupported Locator Type is received in a LOCATOR_SET
parameter.
A host MAY add the source IP address of a received HIP packet as a
candidate locator for the peer even if it is not listed in the peer's
LOCATOR_SET, but it SHOULD prefer locators explicitly listed in the
LOCATOR_SET.
5.4. Verifying Address Reachability
A host MUST verify the reachability of an UNVERIFIED address. The
status of a newly learned address MUST initially be set to UNVERIFIED
unless the new address is advertised in a R1 packet as a new
Preferred locator. A host MAY also want to verify the reachability
of an ACTIVE address again after some time, in which case it would
set the status of the address to UNVERIFIED and reinitiate address
verification.
A host typically starts the address-verification procedure by sending
a nonce to the new address. For example, when the host is changing
its SPI and sending an ESP_INFO to the peer, the NEW SPI value SHOULD
be random and the value MAY be copied into an ECHO_REQUEST sent in
the rekeying UPDATE. However, if the host is not changing its SPI,
it MAY still use the ECHO_REQUEST parameter in an UPDATE message sent
to the new address. A host MAY also use other message exchanges as
confirmation of the address reachability.
Note that in the case of receiving a LOCATOR_SET in an R1 and
replying with an I2 to the new address in the LOCATOR_SET, receiving
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the corresponding R2 is sufficient proof of reachability for the
Responder's preferred address. Since further address verification of
such an address can impede the HIP-base exchange, a host MUST NOT
separately verify reachability of a new Preferred locator that was
received on an R1.
In some cases, it MAY be sufficient to use the arrival of data on a
newly advertised SA as implicit address reachability verification as
depicted in Figure 7, instead of waiting for the confirmation via a
HIP packet. In this case, a host advertising a new SPI as part of
its address reachability check SHOULD be prepared to receive traffic
on the new SA.
Mobile host Peer host
prepare incoming SA
NEW SPI in ESP_INFO (UPDATE)
<-----------------------------------
switch to new outgoing SA
data on new SA
----------------------------------->
mark address ACTIVE
Figure 7: Address Activation Via Use of a New SA
When address verification is in progress for a new Preferred locator,
the host SHOULD select a different locator listed as ACTIVE, if one
such locator is available, to continue communications until address
verification completes. Alternatively, the host MAY use the new
Preferred locator while in UNVERIFIED status to the extent Credit-
Based Authorization permits. Credit-Based Authorization is explained
in Section 5.6. Once address verification succeeds, the status of
the new Preferred locator changes to ACTIVE.
5.5. Changing the Preferred Locator
A host MAY want to change the Preferred outgoing locator for
different reasons, e.g., because traffic information or ICMP error
messages indicate that the currently used preferred address may have
become unreachable. Another reason may be due to receiving a
LOCATOR_SET parameter that has the "P" bit set.
To change the Preferred locator, the host initiates the following
procedure:
1. If the new Preferred locator has ACTIVE status, the Preferred
locator is changed and the procedure succeeds.
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2. If the new Preferred locator has UNVERIFIED status, the host
starts to verify its reachability. The host SHOULD use a
different locator listed as ACTIVE until address verification
completes if one such locator is available. Alternatively, the
host MAY use the new Preferred locator, even though in UNVERIFIED
status, to the extent Credit-Based Authorization permits. Once
address verification succeeds, the status of the new Preferred
locator changes to ACTIVE and its use is no longer governed by
Credit-Based Authorization.
3. If the peer host has not indicated a preference for any address,
then the host picks one of the peer's ACTIVE addresses randomly
or according to policy. This case may arise if, for example,
ICMP error messages that deprecate the Preferred locator arrive,
but the peer has not yet indicated a new Preferred locator.
4. If the new Preferred locator has DEPRECATED status and there is
at least one non-deprecated address, the host selects one of the
non-deprecated addresses as a new Preferred locator and
continues. If the selected address is UNVERIFIED, the address
verification procedure described above will apply.
5.6. Credit-Based Authorization
To prevent redirection-based flooding attacks, the use of a Credit-
Based Authorization (CBA) approach is mandatory when a host sends
data to an UNVERIFIED locator. The following algorithm meets the
security considerations for prevention of amplification and time-
shifting attacks. Other forms of credit aging, and other values for
the CreditAgingFactor and CreditAgingInterval parameters in
particular, are for further study, and so are the advanced CBA
techniques specified in [CBA-MIPv6].
5.6.1. Handling Payload Packets
A host maintains a "credit counter" for each of its peers. Whenever
a packet arrives from a peer, the host SHOULD increase that peer's
credit counter by the size of the received packet. When the host has
a packet to be sent to the peer, and when the peer's Preferred
locator is listed as UNVERIFIED and no alternative locator with
status ACTIVE is available, the host checks whether it can send the
packet to the UNVERIFIED locator. The packet SHOULD be sent if the
value of the credit counter is higher than the size of the outbound
packet. If the credit counter is too low, the packet MUST be
discarded or buffered until address verification succeeds. When a
packet is sent to a peer at an UNVERIFIED locator, the peer's credit
counter MUST be reduced by the size of the packet. The peer's credit
counter is not affected by packets that the host sends to an ACTIVE
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locator of that peer.
Figure 8 depicts the actions taken by the host when a packet is
received. Figure 9 shows the decision chain in the event a packet is
sent.
Inbound
packet
|
| +----------------+ +---------------+
| | Increase | | Deliver |
+-----> | credit counter |-------------> | packet to |
| by packet size | | application |
+----------------+ +---------------+
Figure 8: Receiving Packets with Credit-Based Authorization
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Outbound
packet
| _________________
| / \ +---------------+
| / Is the preferred \ No | Send packet |
+-----> | destination address |-------------> | to preferred |
\ UNVERIFIED? / | address |
\_________________/ +---------------+
|
| Yes
|
v
_________________
/ \ +---------------+
/ Does an ACTIVE \ Yes | Send packet |
| destination address |-------------> | to ACTIVE |
\ exist? / | address |
\_________________/ +---------------+
|
| No
|
v
_________________
/ \ +---------------+
/ Credit counter \ No | |
| >= |-------------> | Drop packet |
\ packet size? / | |
\_________________/ +---------------+
|
| Yes
|
v
+---------------+ +---------------+
| Reduce credit | | Send packet |
| counter by |----------------> | to preferred |
| packet size | | address |
+---------------+ +---------------+
Figure 9: Sending Packets with Credit-Based Authorization
5.6.2. Credit Aging
A host ensures that the credit counters it maintains for its peers
gradually decrease over time. Such "credit aging" prevents a
malicious peer from building up credit at a very slow speed and using
this, all at once, for a severe burst of redirected packets.
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Credit aging may be implemented by multiplying credit counters with a
factor, CreditAgingFactor (a fractional value less than one), in
fixed time intervals of CreditAgingInterval length. Choosing
appropriate values for CreditAgingFactor and CreditAgingInterval is
important to ensure that a host can send packets to an address in
state UNVERIFIED even when the peer sends at a lower rate than the
host itself. When CreditAgingFactor or CreditAgingInterval are too
small, the peer's credit counter might be too low to continue sending
packets until address verification concludes.
The parameter values proposed in this document are as follows:
CreditAgingFactor 7/8
CreditAgingInterval 5 seconds
These parameter values work well when the host transfers a file to
the peer via a TCP connection and the end-to-end round-trip time does
not exceed 500 milliseconds. Alternative credit-aging algorithms may
use other parameter values or different parameters, which may even be
dynamically established.
6. Security Considerations
The HIP mobility mechanism provides a secure means of updating a
host's IP address via HIP UPDATE packets. Upon receipt, a HIP host
cryptographically verifies the sender of an UPDATE, so forging or
replaying a HIP UPDATE packet is very difficult (see
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]). Therefore, security issues reside in
other attack domains. The two we consider are malicious redirection
of legitimate connections as well as redirection-based flooding
attacks using this protocol. This can be broken down into the
following:
Impersonation attacks
- direct conversation with the misled victim
- man-in-the-middle attack
DoS attacks
- flooding attacks (== bandwidth-exhaustion attacks)
* tool 1: direct flooding
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* tool 2: flooding by zombies
* tool 3: redirection-based flooding
- memory-exhaustion attacks
- computational-exhaustion attacks
We consider these in more detail in the following sections.
In Section 6.1 and Section 6.2, we assume that all users are using
HIP. In Section 6.3 we consider the security ramifications when we
have both HIP and non-HIP users. Security considerations for Credit-
Based Authorization are discussed in [SIMPLE-CBA].
6.1. Impersonation Attacks
An attacker wishing to impersonate another host will try to mislead
its victim into directly communicating with them, or carry out a man-
in-the-middle (MitM) attack between the victim and the victim's
desired communication peer. Without mobility support, both attack
types are possible only if the attacker resides on the routing path
between its victim and the victim's desired communication peer, or if
the attacker tricks its victim into initiating the connection over an
incorrect routing path (e.g., by acting as a router or using spoofed
DNS entries).
The HIP extensions defined in this specification change the situation
in that they introduce an ability to redirect a connection (like
IPv6), both before and after establishment. If no precautionary
measures are taken, an attacker could misuse the redirection feature
to impersonate a victim's peer from any arbitrary location. The
authentication and authorization mechanisms of the HIP base exchange
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] and the signatures in the UPDATE message
prevent this attack. Furthermore, ownership of a HIP association is
securely linked to a HIP HI/HIT. If an attacker somehow uses a bug
in the implementation or weakness in some protocol to redirect a HIP
connection, the original owner can always reclaim their connection
(they can always prove ownership of the private key associated with
their public HI).
MitM attacks are always possible if the attacker is present during
the initial HIP base exchange and if the hosts do not authenticate
each other's identities. However, once the opportunistic base
exchange has taken place, even a MitM cannot steal the HIP connection
anymore because it is very difficult for an attacker to create an
UPDATE packet (or any HIP packet) that will be accepted as a
legitimate update. UPDATE packets use HMAC and are signed. Even
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when an attacker can snoop packets to obtain the SPI and HIT/HI, they
still cannot forge an UPDATE packet without knowledge of the secret
keys.
6.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks
6.2.1. Flooding Attacks
The purpose of a denial-of-service attack is to exhaust some resource
of the victim such that the victim ceases to operate correctly. A
denial-of-service attack can aim at the victim's network attachment
(flooding attack), its memory, or its processing capacity. In a
flooding attack, the attacker causes an excessive number of bogus or
unwanted packets to be sent to the victim, which fills their
available bandwidth. Note that the victim does not necessarily need
to be a node; it can also be an entire network. The attack basically
functions the same way in either case.
An effective DoS strategy is distributed denial of service (DDoS).
Here, the attacker conventionally distributes some viral software to
as many nodes as possible. Under the control of the attacker, the
infected nodes, or "zombies", jointly send packets to the victim.
With such an 'army', an attacker can take down even very high
bandwidth networks/victims.
With the ability to redirect connections, an attacker could realize a
DDoS attack without having to distribute viral code. Here, the
attacker initiates a large download from a server, and subsequently
redirects this download to its victim. The attacker can repeat this
with multiple servers. This threat is mitigated through reachability
checks and credit-based authorization. Both strategies do not
eliminate flooding attacks per se, but they preclude: (i) their use
from a location off the path towards the flooded victim; and (ii) any
amplification in the number and size of the redirected packets. As a
result, the combination of a reachability check and credit-based
authorization lowers a HIP redirection-based flooding attack to the
level of a direct flooding attack in which the attacker itself sends
the flooding traffic to the victim.
6.2.2. Memory/Computational-Exhaustion DoS Attacks
We now consider whether or not the proposed extensions to HIP add any
new DoS attacks (consideration of DoS attacks using the base HIP
exchange and updates is discussed in [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]). A
simple attack is to send many UPDATE packets containing many IP
addresses that are not flagged as preferred. The attacker continues
to send such packets until the number of IP addresses associated with
the attacker's HI crashes the system. Therefore, there SHOULD be a
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limit to the number of IP addresses that can be associated with any
HI. Other forms of memory/computationally exhausting attacks via the
HIP UPDATE packet are handled in the base HIP document
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
A central server that has to deal with a large number of mobile
clients may consider increasing the SA lifetimes to try to slow down
the rate of rekeying UPDATEs or increasing the cookie difficulty to
slow down the rate of attack-oriented connections.
6.3. Mixed Deployment Environment
We now assume an environment with both HIP and non-HIP aware hosts.
Four cases exist.
1. A HIP host redirects its connection onto a non-HIP host. The
non-HIP host will drop the reachability packet, so this is not a
threat unless the HIP host is a MitM that could somehow respond
successfully to the reachability check.
2. A non-HIP host attempts to redirect their connection onto a HIP
host. This falls into IPv4 and IPv6 security concerns, which are
outside the scope of this document.
3. A non-HIP host attempts to steal a HIP host's session (assume
that Secure Neighbor Discovery is not active for the following).
The non-HIP host contacts the service that a HIP host has a
connection with and then attempts to change its IP address to
steal the HIP host's connection. What will happen in this case
is implementation dependent but such a request should fail by
being ignored or dropped. Even if the attack were successful,
the HIP host could reclaim its connection via HIP.
4. A HIP host attempts to steal a non-HIP host's session. A HIP
host could spoof the non-HIP host's IP address during the base
exchange or set the non-HIP host's IP address as its preferred
address via an UPDATE. Other possibilities exist, but a simple
solution is to prevent the use of HIP address check information
to influence non-HIP sessions.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines a LOCATOR_SET parameter for the Host Identity
Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. This parameter is defined in
Section 4 with a Type of 193.
This document also defines a LOCATOR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED Notify Message
Type as defined in the Host Identity Protocol specification
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[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. This parameter is defined in Section 5.3
with a value of 46.
8. Authors and Acknowledgments
Pekka Nikander and Jari Arkko originated this document, and Christian
Vogt and Thomas Henderson (editor) later joined as co-authors. Greg
Perkins contributed the initial draft of the security section. Petri
Jokela was a co-author of the initial individual submission.
The authors thank Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Jeff Ahrenholz, Jan Melen,
Baris Boyvat, and Samu Varjonen for many improvements to the
document.
9. References
9.1. Normative references
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol
Architecture",
draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-05 (work in
progress), September 2012.
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and
T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol
Version 2 (HIPv2)",
draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-12 (work in
progress), June 2013.
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis] Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen,
"Using the Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) Transport Format with the Host
Identity Protocol (HIP)",
draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-03 (work in
progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous
Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-02
(work in progress), September 2012.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs
to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3484] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection
for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)",
RFC 3484, February 2003.
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[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6
Addressing Architecture", RFC 4291,
February 2006.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.
9.2. Informative references
[CBA-MIPv6] Vogt, C. and J. Arkko, "Credit-Based
Authorization for Mobile IPv6 Early
Binding Updates", Work in Progress,
February 2005.
[RFC4225] Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T.,
Montenegro, G., and E. Nordmark, "Mobile
IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security
Design Background", RFC 4225,
December 2005.
[SIMPLE-CBA] Vogt, C. and J. Arkko, "Credit-Based
Authorization for Concurrent Reachability
Verification", Work in Progress,
February 2006.
Appendix A. Document Revision History
To be removed upon publication
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision | Comments |
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| draft-00 | Initial version from RFC5206 xml (unchanged). |
| draft-01 | Remove multihoming-specific text; no other changes. |
| draft-02 | Update references to point to -bis drafts; no other |
| | changes. |
| draft-03 | issue 4: add make before break use case |
| | issue 6: peer locator exposure policies |
| | issue 10: rename LOCATOR to LOCATOR_SET |
| | issue 14: use of UPDATE packet's IP address |
| draft-04 | Document refresh; no other changes. |
| draft-05 | Document refresh; no other changes. |
| draft-06 | Document refresh; no other changes. |
+----------+--------------------------------------------------------+
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Authors' Addresses
Thomas R. Henderson (editor)
The Boeing Company
P.O. Box 3707
Seattle, WA
USA
EMail: thomas.r.henderson@boeing.com
Christian Vogt
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
Hirsalantie 11
JORVAS FIN-02420
FINLAND
Phone:
EMail: christian.vogt@ericsson.com
Jari Arkko
Ericsson Research NomadicLab
JORVAS FIN-02420
FINLAND
Phone: +358 40 5079256
EMail: jari.arkko@ericsson.com
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