Network Working Group Z. Cao
Internet-Draft H. Deng
Intended status: Standards Track China Mobile
Expires: September 15, 2011 Y. Wang
Q. Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
G. Zorn
Network Zen
March 14, 2011
EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory
Keying (ERP/AAK)
draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-04
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework
supporting multiple of authentication methods.
The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP
and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
re-authentication server through any authenticator.
Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) is a method by which
cryptographic keying material may be established prior to handover
upon one or more candidate attachment points (CAPs). AAK uses the
AAA infrastructure for key transport.
This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK
support in ERP.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 15, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ERP/AAK Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Packet and TLV Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet Extension . . . . . . . 6
5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet Extension . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. TV/TLV and sub-TLV Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Lower Layer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. AAA Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] is a generic
framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In
systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to not
repeat the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. The EAP
Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] specifies extensions to
EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
re-authentication server through any authenticator. The re-
authentication server may be in the home network or in the local
network to which the peer is connecting.
Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) [RFC5836] is a method by
which cryptographic keying material may be established prior to
handover upon one or more candidate attachment points (CAPs). AAK
utilizes the AAA infrastructure for key transport.
This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK
support in ERP.
2. Terminology
2.1. Standards Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.2. Acronyms
The following acronyms are used in this document; see the references
for more details.
AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting [RFC3588]
CAP Candidate Attachment Point [RFC5836]
EA Abbreviation for "ERP/AAK"; used in figures
MH Mobile Host
SAP Serving Attachment Point [RFC5836]
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3. ERP/AAK Overview
ERP/AAK is intended to allow the establishment of cryptographic
keying materials on a single Candidate Attachment Points prior to the
arrival of the MH at the Candidate Access Network (CAN). The
document also specifies a method by which the SAP may send the
identities of neighboring attachment points to the peer in the EAP-
Initiate/Re-auth-Start message.
It is assumed that the peer has previously completed full EAP
authentication. Figure 1 shows the general protocol exchange by
which the keying material is established on the CAP. This document
only discusses the case of distributing the key to a single CAP.
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----------+
| Peer | | SAP | | CAP | | EA Server |
+--+---+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +-----+-----+
| | | |
1. | [EAP-Initiate/ | | |
| Re-auth-start | | |
| (E-flag) | | |
|<---------------| | |
| | | |
2. | EAP-Initiate/ | | |
| Re-auth | | |
| (E-flag) | | |
|--------------->| | |
3. | | AAA(EAP-Initiate/Re-auth(E-flag))|
| |--------------------------------->|
| | | +---------+---------+
| | | | CA authorized & |
4. | | | | authenticated; |
| | | | EA keying |
| | | | materials derived |
| | | +---------+---------+
5. | | | |
| | | AAA(pMSK) |
| | |<----------------->|
| | | |
6. | | AAA (EAP-Finish/Re-auth(E-flag)) |
| |<---------------------------------|
7. | EAP-Finish/ | | |
| Re-auth(E-flag)| | |
|<---------------| | |
| | | |
Figure 1: ERP/AAK Operation
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ERP/AAK re-uses the packet format defined by ERP, but specifies a new
flag to differentiate EAP early-authentication from EAP re-
authentication. The peer initiates ERP/AAK itself, or does so in
response to an EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth-Start message from the SAP. In
this document, it is required that the SAP should support ERP/AAK.
If either the peer or the SAP does not support ERP/AAK, it should
fall back to full EAP authentication.
The peer sends an early-authentication request message (EAP-Initiate/
Re-auth with the 'E' flag set) containing the keyName-NAI, the NAS-
Identifier, rIK and sequence number. The realm in the keyName-NAI
field is used to locate the peer's ERP/AAK server. The NAS-
Identifier is used to identify the CAP. The rIK is used to protect
the message. The sequence number is used for replay protection. To
avoid the same pre-established Master Session Key (pMSK) being
derived for multiple CAPs, the sequence number MUST be unique for
each CAP.
The SAP encapsulates the early-authentication message into a AAA
message and sends it to the peer's ERP/AAK server in the realm
indicated in the keyName-NAI field.
Upon receiving the message, the ERP/AAK server first checks its
integrity and freshness, then authenticates and authorizes the CAP
presented in the NAS-Identifier TLV(s). After the CAP is
authenticated and authorized successfully, the ERP/AAK server derives
the pRK and the subsequent pMSK for the CAP.
The ERP/AAK server transports the pMSK to the authenticated and
authorized CAP(s) via AAA as described in Section 7.
Finally, the ERP/AAK server sends the early-authentication finish
message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E-flag set) containing the
determinated CAP to the peer via the SAP.
4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy
As an optimization of ERP, ERP/AAK uses key hierarchy similar to that
of ERP. The EMSK is used to derive the ERP/AAK pre-established Root
Key (pRK). Similarly, the ERP/AAK pre-established Integrity Key
(pIK) and the pre-established Master Session Key (pMSK) are derived
from the pRK. The pMSK is established for the CAP(s) when the peer
early authenticates to the network. The pIK is established for the
peer to re-authenticate the network after handover. The hierarchy
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2, below.
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DSRK EMSK
| |
+---+---+---+---+
| | |
pRK rRK ...
Figure 2
The EMSK and DSRK both can be used to derive the pRK. In general,
the pRK is derived from the EMSK in case of the peer moving in the
home AAA realm and derived from the DRSK in case of the peer moving
in the visited AAA realm. The DSRK is delivered from the EAP server
to the ERP/AAK server as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran].
If the peer has previously authenticated by means of ERP or ERP/AAK,
the DSRK SHOULD be directly re-used.
pRK
|
+--------+--------+
| | |
pIK pMSK ...
Figure 3
The pRK is used to derive the pIK and pMSK for the CAP(s). Different
sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive the unique
pMSK(s).
5. Packet and TLV Extension
This section describes the packet and TLV extensions for the ERP/AAK
exchange.
5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet Extension
Figure 4 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Initiate/
Re-auth-Start packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |E| Reserved | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4
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Flags
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
Reserved: MUST be set to 0.
TVs and TLVs
NAS-Identifier: As defined in [RFC5296], it is carried in a TLV
payload. It is used by the SAP to advertise the identifier(s) of
CAP(s) to the peer. One or more NAS-Identifier TLVs MAY be included
in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet if the SAP has performed CAP
discovery.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the
peer, it is discarded silently.
5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet Extension
Figure 5 illustrates the changed parameters contained in the EAP-
Initiate/Re-auth packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5
Flags
'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0.
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on
reception.
SEQ
A 16-bit sequence number is used for replay protection.
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TVs and TLVs
keyName-NAI: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], this is carried in a
TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not
exceeding 253 octets. The username part of the NAI is the EMSKname
used identify the peer. The realm part of the NAI is the peer's home
domain name or the domain to which the peer is currently attached.
Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-
Initiate/Re-auth packet.
NAS-Identifier: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], it is carried in a
TLV payload. It is used to indicate the identifier of a CAP. Though
this document only introduces the case of a single CAP, two or more
NAS-Identifier may be included in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet to
identify multiple CAPs.
Sequence number: It is carried in a TV payload. The Type is TBD
(which is lower than 128). It is used in the derivation of the pMSK
for each CAP to avoid multiple CAP using the same pMSK. Each NAS-
Identifier in the packet MUST be associated with a unique sequence
number.
Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm used for ERP/AAK. Key
lengths and output lengths are either indicated or are obvious from
the cryptosuite name. We specify some cryptosuites below:
0 RESERVED
1 HMAC-SHA256-64
2 HMAC-SHA256-128
3 HMAC-SHA256-256
HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory to implement and should be enabled in
the default configuration.
Authentication Tag
This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet,
excluding the authentication tag field itself. The length of the
field is indicated by the Cryptosuite.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is
discarded silently.
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5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth extension
Figure 6 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Finish/
Re-auth packet defined in [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6
Flags
'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0.
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on
reception.
SEQ
A 16-bit sequence number is used for replay protection.
TVs and TLVs
keyName-NAI: As defined in[RFC5296], this is carried in a TLV
payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not
exceeding 253 octets. The realm part of the NAI is the home domain
name. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-
Finish/Re-auth packet.
ERP/AAK-Key: It is carried in a TLV payload for the key container.
The type is TBD. One or more than one ERP/AAK-key may be present in
an EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet.
ERP/AAK-Key ::=
{ sub-TLV: NAS-Identifier }
{ sub-TLV: pMSK-lifetime }
{ sub-TLV: pRK-lifetime }
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{ sub-TLV: Cryptosuites }
NAS-Identifier: It is carried in a sub-TLV payload. It is used to
indicate the identifier of candidate authenticator. There exactly
one instance of the NAS-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/
AAK-Key TLV.
pMSK-lifetime: It is carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is
TBD. The value field is a 32-bit field and contains the lifetime
of the pMSK in seconds. If the 'L' flag is set, the pMSK Lifetime
attribute SHOULD be present.
pRK-lifetime: It is carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is
TBD. The value field is a 32-bit field and contains the lifetime
of the pRK in seconds. If the 'L' flag is set, the pRK Lifetime
attribute SHOULD be present.
List of Cryptosuites: This is a sub-TLV payload. The Type is TBD.
The value field contains a list of cryptosuites, each 1 octet in
length. The allowed cryptosuite values are as specified in
Section 5.2, above. The server SHOULD include this attribute if
the cryptosuite used in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message was not
acceptable and the message is being rejected. The server MAY
include this attribute in other cases. The server MAY use this
attribute to signal to the peer about its cryptographic algorithm
capabilities.
Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm and PRF used for ERP/
AAK. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or are
obvious from the cryptosuite name.
Authentication Tag
This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet,
excluding the authentication tag field itself. The length of the
field is indicated by the Cryptosuite.
5.4. TV/TLV and sub-TLV Attributes
The TV and TLV attributes are the same specified as section 5.3.4 of
[RFC5296]. In this document, some new TLV(s) which may be present in
the EAP-Initiate or EAP-Finish messages are defined as below:
Sequence number - This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
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ERP/AAK-Key - This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD.
The format of sub-TLV attributes that may be present in the EAP-
Initiate or EAP-Finish messages is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The following types are defined in this document:
pRK Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type of this sub-TLV is
TBD.
pMSK Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type of this sub-TLV is
TBD.
List of Cryptosuites: This is a TLV payload. The type of this
sub-TLV is TBD.
6. Lower Layer Considerations
Similar to ERP, some lower layer specifications may need to be
revised to support ERP/AAK; refer to section 6 of [RFC5296] for
additional guidance.
7. AAA Transport Considerations
AAA transport of ERP/AAK messages is the same as AAA transport of the
ERP message [RFC5296]. In addition, the document requires AAA
transport of the ERP/AAK keying materials delivered by the ERP/AAK
server to the CAP. Hence, a new Diameter ERP/AAK application message
should be specified to transport the keying materials.
8. Security Considerations
This section provides an analysis of the protocol in accordance with
the AAA key management requirements specified in [RFC4962]
o Cryptographic algorithm independence: ERP-AAK satisfies this
requirement. The algorithm chosen by the peer is indicated in the
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If the chosen algorithm is
unacceptable, the EAP server returns an EAP- Finish/Re-auth
message with Failure indication
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o Strong, fresh session keys: ERP-AAK results in the derivation of
strong, fresh keys that are unique for the given CAP. An pMSK is
always derived on-demand when the peer requires a key with a new
CAP. The derivation ensures that the compromise of one pMSK does
not result in the compromise of a different pMSK at any time.
o Limit key scope: The scope of all the keys derived by ERP-AAK is
well defined. The pRK is used to derive the pIK and pMSK for the
CAP. Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to
derive the unique pMSK.
o Replay detection mechanism: For replay protection of ERP-AAK
messages, a sequence number associated with the pMSK is used.
o Authenticate all parties: The EAP Re-auth Protocol provides mutual
authentication of the peer and the server. The peer and SAP are
authenticated via ERP. The CAP is authenticated and trusted by
the SAP.
o Peer and authenticator authorization: The sequence number is
maintained by the peer and the server, and incremented by them
synchronously.
o Keying material confidentiality: The peer and the server derive
the keys independently using parameters known to each entity.
o Uniquely named keys: All keys produced within the ERP context can
be referred to uniquely as specified in this document.
o Prevent the domino effect: Different sequence numbers for each CAP
MUST be used to derive the unique pMSK. So the compromise of one
pMSK does not hurt any other CAP.
o Bind key to its context: the pMSK are binded to the context where
the sequence numbers are transmitted.
o Confidentiality of identity: this is the same with ERP protocol as
analyzed in [RFC5296].
o Authorization restriction: All the keys derived are limited in
lifetime by that of the parent key or by server policy. Any
domain-specific keys are further restricted for use only in the
domain for which the keys are derived. Any other restrictions of
session keys may be imposed by the specific lower layer and are
out of scope for this specification.
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9. IANA Considerations
New TLV types:
Sequence number
ERP/AAK-Key
New sub-TLV types:
pRK Lifetime
pMSK Lifetime
10. Acknowledgement
In writing this document, we have received reviews from many experts
in IETF, including Tom Taylor, Tena Zou, Tim Polk. We apologize if
we miss some names that have helped us.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",
BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP
Extensions for EAP Re-authentication
Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296,
August 2008.
11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,
"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
Cryptographic Key Transport",
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-08 (work
in progress), October 2010.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,
E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter
Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J.,
Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz,
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"Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4962] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance
for Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
BCP 132, RFC 4962, July 2007.
[RFC5836] Ohba, Y., Wu, Q., and G. Zorn,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Early Authentication Problem
Statement", RFC 5836, April 2010.
Authors' Addresses
Zhen Cao
China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China
EMail: zehn.cao@gmail.com
Hui Deng
China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China
EMail: denghui02@gmail.com
Yungui Wang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Floor 10, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001
P.R. China
Phone: +86 25 84565893
EMail: w52006@huawei.com
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Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Floor 12, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001
P.R. China
Phone: +86 25 84565892
EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com
Glen Zorn
Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand
Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617
EMail: gwz@net-zen.net
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