HTTPAUTH Working Group Y. Oiwa
Internet-Draft H. Watanabe
Intended status: Experimental H. Takagi
Expires: January 8, 2017 ITRI, AIST
T. Hayashi
Lepidum
Y. Ioku
Individual
July 7, 2016
HTTP Authentication Extensions for Interactive Clients
draft-ietf-httpauth-extension-07
Abstract
This document specifies extensions for the HTTP authentication
framework for interactive clients. Currently, fundamental features
of HTTP-level authentication are insufficient for complex
requirements of various Web-based applications. This forces these
applications to implement their own authentication frameworks by
means like HTML forms, which becomes one of the hurdles against
introducing secure authentication mechanisms handled jointly by
servers and user-agent. The extended framework fills gaps between
Web application requirements and HTTP authentication provisions to
solve the above problems, while maintaining compatibility with
existing Web and non-Web uses of HTTP authentications.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Terms for describing authentication protocol flow . . . . 5
2.2. Syntax Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Optional Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Note on Optional-WWW-Authenticate and use of
WWW-Authenticate header with non-401 status . . . . . . . 9
4. Authentication-Control header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Non-ASCII extended header parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Auth-style parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Location-when-unauthenticated parameter . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. No-auth parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5. Location-when-logout parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6. Logout-timeout parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.7. Username parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. Usage examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Example 1: a portal site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.1. Case 1: a simple application . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.2. Case 2: specific action required on log-out . . . . . 19
5.1.3. Case 3: specific page displayed before log-in . . . . 19
5.2. Example 2: authenticated user-only sites . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3. When to use Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.4. Parallel deployment with Form/Cookie authentications . . . 20
6. Methods to extend this protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. (Informative) Applicability of features for each
messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. (Informative) Draft Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.1. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.2. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B.3. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.4. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.5. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.6. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.7. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.8. Changes in Httpauth revision 00 and HttpBis revision 00 . 26
B.9. Changes in revision 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.10. Changes in revision 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
B.11. Changes in revision 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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1. Introduction
This document defines several extensions to the current HTTP
authentication framework, to provide functionality comparable with
current widely-used form-based Web authentication. A majority of the
recent websites on the Internet use custom application-layer
authentication implementations using Web forms. The reasons for
these may vary, but many people believe that the current HTTP Basic
and Digest authentication methods do not have enough functionality
(including good user interfaces) to support most realistic Web-based
applications. However, such use of form-based Web authentication has
several weakness against attacks like phishing, because all behavior
of the authentication is controlled from the server-side application.
This makes it really hard to implement any cryptographically strong
authentication mechanisms into Web systems. To overcome this
problem, we need to "modernize" the HTTP authentication framework so
that better client-controlled secure methods can be used with Web
applications. The extensions proposed in this document include:
o optional authentication on HTTP (Section 3),
o log out from both server and client side (Section 4), and
o finer control for redirection depending on authentication status
(Section 4).
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
The terms "encouraged" and "advised" are used for suggestions that do
not constitute "SHOULD"-level requirements. People MAY freely choose
not to include the suggested items. However, complying with those
suggestions would be a best practice; it will improve the security,
interoperability, and/or operational performance.
This document distinguishes the terms "client" and "user" in the
following way: A "client" is an entity understanding and talking HTTP
and the specified authentication protocol, usually computer software;
a "user" is a (usually natural) person who wants to access data
resources using "a client".
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2. Definitions
2.1. Terms for describing authentication protocol flow
HTTP Authentication defined in [RFC7235] can involve several pairs of
HTTP requests/responses. Throughout this document, the following
terms are used to categorize those messages: for requests,
1) A non-authenticating request is a request not attempting any
authentication: a request without any Authorization header field.
2) An authenticating request is the opposite: a request with an
Authorization header field.
For responses,
1) A non-authenticated response is a response which does not involve
any HTTP authentication. It does not contain any WWW-Authenticate
or Authentication-Info header field.
Servers send this response when the requested resource is not
protected by an HTTP authentication mechanism. In context of this
specification, non-authentication-related negative responses (e.g.
403 and 404) are also considered non-authenticated responses.
(See note on successfully-authenticated responses below for some
ambiguous cases.)
2) An authentication-initializing response is a response which
requires or allows clients to start authentication attempts.
Servers send this response when the requested resource is
protected by HTTP authentication mechanism, and the request meets
one of the following cases:
* The request is a non-authenticating request, or
* The request contained an authentication trial directed to a
protection space (realm) other than the one the server
expected.
The server will specify the protection space for authentication in
this response.
Upon receiving this response, the client's behavior is further
divided to two possible cases.
* If the client has no prior knowledge on authentication
credentials (e.g. a user-name and a password) related to the
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requested protection space, the protocol flow terminates and
the client will ask the user to provide authentication
credentials,
* On the other hand, if client already has enough authentication
credentials to the requested protection space, the client will
automatically send an authenticating request. Such cases often
occur when the client did not know beforehand that the current
request-URL requires authentication.
3) A successfully-authenticated response is a response for an
authenticating request meaning that the authentication attempt was
granted. (Note: if the authentication scheme used does not use an
Authentication-Info header field, it can't be distinguishable from
a non-authenticated response.)
4) An intermediate authenticating response is a response for an
authenticating request which requires more reaction by the client
software without involving users. Such a response is required
when an authentication scheme requires two or more round-trip
messages to perform authentication, or when an authentication
scheme uses some speculative short-cut method (such as uses of
cached shared secrets) and it failed.
5) A negatively-authenticated response is a response for an
authenticating request which means that the authentication attempt
was declined and can not continue without a different set of
authentication credentials. Clients typically erase memory of the
active credentials and ask the user for other ones.
Usually the format of these responses are as same as the one for
authentication-initializing responses. Clients can distinguish
negatively-authenticated responses from authentication-
initializing responses by comparing the protection spaces
contained in the request and in the response.
Figure 1 shows a state diagram of generic HTTP authentication with
the above message categorization. Note that many authentication
schemes use only a subset of the transitions described on the
diagram. Labels in the figure show the abbreviated names of response
types.
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=========== -----------------
NEW REQUEST ( UNAUTHENTICATED )
=========== -----------------
| ^ non-auth.
v | response
+----------------------+ NO +-------------+
| The requested URI |--------------------------->| send normal |
| known to be auth'ed? | ---------------->| request |
+----------------------+ / +-------------+
YES | / initializing|
v / |
+------------------+ NO / |
| Can auth-req.(*1)|--------- |
| be constructed? | |
+------------------+ |
YES | initializing |
| ---------------------------------------. |
| / v v
| | ---------------- NO +-----------+
| | ( AUTH-REQUESTED )<------|credentials|
| | ---------------- | known? |
v | +-----------+
+-----------+ negative ------------- negative |YES
| send |---------->( AUTH-FAILED )<---------, |
/| auth-req | ------------- | |
/ +-----------+\ | v
| \ \ intermediate +-----------+
| \ -------------------------------->| send |
| \ | auth-req |
| non-auth. \successful successful +-----------+
| response (*2) \ / | ^
v \ / | |
----------------- \ -------------- / `----'
( UNAUTHENTICATED ) ----->( AUTH-SUCCEED )<---- intermediate
----------------- --------------
Figure 1: Generic state diagram for HTTP authentication
Note: (*1) For example, "Digest" scheme requires server-provided
nonce to construct client-side challenges.
(*2) In "Basic" and some others, this cannot be distinguished from a
successfully-authenticated response.
2.2. Syntax Notation
This specification uses an extended ABNF syntax defined in [RFC7230]
and [RFC5234]. The following syntax definitions are quoted from
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[RFC7230] and [RFC7235]: auth-scheme, quoted-string, auth-param, SP,
BWS, header-field, and challenge. It also uses the convention of
using header field names for specifying the syntax of values for the
header field.
Additionally, this specification uses the following syntax
definitions as a refinement for token and the right-hand-side of
auth-param in [RFC7235]. (Note: these definitions are consistent
with those in [I-D.ietf-httpauth-mutual].)
bare-token = 1*(%x30-39 / %x41-5A / %x61-7A / "-" / "_")
extension-token = "-" bare-token 1*("." bare-token)
extensive-token = bare-token / extension-token
integer = "0" / (%x31-39 *%x30-39) ; no leading zeros
Figure 2: the BNF syntax for common notations
Extensive-tokens are used in this protocol where the set of
acceptable tokens includes private extensions. Any extensions of
this protocol MAY use either bare-tokens allocated by IANA (under the
procedure described in Section 7), or extension-tokens with the
format "-<token>.<domain-name>", where <domain-name> is a valid
(sub-)domain name on the Internet owned by the party who defines the
extension.
3. Optional Authentication
The Optional-WWW-Authenticate header enables a non-mandatory
authentication, which is not possible under the current HTTP
authentication mechanism.
In several Web applications, users can access the same contents as
both a guest user and an authenticated user. In most Web
applications, this functionality is implemented using HTTP cookies
[RFC6265] and custom form-based authentication. The new
authentication method using this message will provide a replacement
for these authentication systems.
Servers MAY send HTTP non-interim responses containing the
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header as a replacement of a 401 response
when it the response is authentication-initializing. The
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header MUST NOT sent on 401 responses (i.e.
a usual WWW-Authenticate header MUST be used on 401 responses.)
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Optional-WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="xxxx"
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Optional-WWW-Authenticate = 1#challenge
Figure 3: BNF syntax for Optional-WWW-Authenticate header
The challenges contained in the Optional-WWW-Authenticate header are
the same as those for a 401 responses corresponding to the same
request. For authentication-related matters, an optional
authentication request will have the same meaning as a 401 message
with a corresponding WWW-Authenticate header (as an authentication-
initializing response). (The behavior for other matters MAY be
different between the optional authentication and 401 messages. For
example, clients MAY choose to cache the 200 messages with
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header field but not the 401 messages by
default.)
A response with an Optional-WWW-Authenticate header SHOULD be
returned from the server only when the request is either non-
authenticated or authenticating to a wrong (not the server's
expected) protection space. If a response is either an intermediate
or a negative response to a client's authentication attempt, the
server MUST respond with a 401 status response with a
WWW-Authenticate header instead. Failure to comply with this rule
will render clients unable to distinguish authentication successes
and failures.
The server is NOT RECOMMENDED to include an Optional-WWW-Authenticate
header in a positive response when a client's authentication attempt
succeeds.
Whenever an authentication scheme supports servers sending some
parameter which gives a hint of the URL space for the corresponding
protection space for the same realm (e.g. "path" or "domain"),
servers requesting non-mandatory authentication SHOULD send such
parameter with the response. Clients supporting non-mandatory
authentication MUST recognize the parameter, and MUST send a request
with an appropriate authentication credential in an Authorization
header for any URI inside the specified paths.
Support of this header is OPTIONAL; clients MAY also implement this
extension only for some selected authentication schemes. New
authentication schemes can make support of the optional
authentication mandatory by its specification, though.
3.1. Note on Optional-WWW-Authenticate and use of WWW-Authenticate
header with non-401 status
In the current specification of HTTP/1.1, it is clarified that the
WWW-Authenticate header can be used with messages with status codes
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other than 401 (Authentication Required). Especially, the use of
WWW-Authenticate header with the 200 status messages implies a very
similar meaning to the above-defined Optional-WWW-Authenticate
header.
The design of Optional-WWW-Authenticate header expects that the use
of a new header guarantees that clients which is unaware of this
extension will ignore the header, and that Web developers can rely on
that behavior to implement a secondary fallback method of
authentications. Several behavioral requirements written in the
above section also assumes this property, and defines a necessary
functionality to implement an HTTP optional authentication reliably
and consistently.
On the other hand, some experiments and discussions on the IETF
mailing list revealed that most of (but not necessarily all of) the
existing HTTP clients, at the time of writing, just ignores the WWW-
Authenticate headers in non-401 messages, giving the similar behavior
with the Optional-WWW-Authenticate. However, every corner case of
behavior was not fully tested, nor well-defined in the existing
specifications.
Considering these situations, the author of this document chose to
use a new header for a new feature "experiment". This is to avoid
defining every corner-case behavior for the existing standard WWW-
Authentication header in this experimental document, which could be
considered by some implementer as an "incompatible changes to
existing specification".
Experimentally, the authors propose implementer of the standard
HTTP/1.1 specification (especially implementer of this extension) to
implement undefined (implementation-dependant) detailed handling of
WWW-Authenticate header with non-401 status messages as similar as
those defined above for the Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. For
example, we propose for servers to return 401 status for failed
authentication attempts, even when the unauthenticated request to the
same resource will result in the 200 status. This can realize how
(whether) we can implement non-mandatory authentication using the
standard header fields and status codes. If this experiment is
successful, the future revision of this experimental document may
"bless" and recommend the use of standard WWW-Authenticate header,
with some "standard-level" requirements on some corner case behavior.
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4. Authentication-Control header
Authentication-Control = 1#auth-control-entry
auth-control-entry = auth-scheme 1*SP 1#auth-control-param
auth-control-param = extensive-token BWS "=" BWS token
/ extensive-token "*" BWS "=" BWS ext-value
ext-value = <see RFC 5987, Section 3.2>
Figure 4: the BNF syntax for the Authentication-Control header
The Authentication-Control header provides a more precise control of
the client behavior for Web applications using an HTTP authentication
protocol. This header is supposed to be generated in the application
layer, as opposed to WWW-Authenticate headers which will usually be
generated by the Web servers.
Support of this header is OPTIONAL, and clients MAY choose any subset
of these parameters to be supported. The set of supported parameters
MAY also be authentication scheme-dependent. However, some
authentication schemes can require mandatory/recommended support for
some or all of the features provided in this header.
The Authentication-Control header contains one or more
"authentication control entries" each of which corresponds to a
single realm for a specific authentication scheme. If the
auth-scheme specified for an entry supports the HTTP "realm" feature,
that entry MUST contain the "realm" parameter. If not, the entry
MUST NOT contain the "realm" parameter.
Among the multiple entries in the header, the relevant entries in the
header are those corresponding to an auth-scheme and a realm (if
any), for which "the authentication process is being performed, or
going to be performed". In more detail,
(1) If the response is either an authentication-initializing
response or a negatively-authenticated response, there can be
multiple challenges in the WWW-Authenticate header (or the
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header defined in this extension),
each of which corresponds to a different scheme and realm. In
this case, the client has a choice on the scheme and realm they
will use to authenticate. Only the entry in the
Authentication-Control header corresponding to that scheme and
realm are relevant.
(2) If the response is either an intermediate authenticating
response or a successfully-authenticated response, the scheme
and realm given in the Authorization header of the HTTP request
will determine the currently-ongoing authentication process.
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Only the entry corresponding to that scheme and realm are
relevant.
The server MAY send an Authentication-Control header containing non-
relevant entries. The client MUST ignore all non-relevant entries it
received.
Each entry contains one or more parameters, each of which is a name-
value pair. The name of each parameter MUST be an extensive-token.
Clients MUST ignore any unknown parameters contained in this header.
The entries for the same auth-scheme and the realm MUST NOT contain
duplicated parameters for the same name. Clients MAY either take any
one of those duplicated entries or ignore all of them.
The type of parameter value depends on the parameter name as defined
in the following subsections. Regardless of the type, however, the
recipients MUST accept both quoted and unquoted representations of
values as defined in HTTP. If the parameter is defined to have a
string value, implementations MUST send any value outside of the
"token" ABNF syntax in either a quoted form or an an ext-value form
(see Section 4.1). If the parameter is defined as a token (or
similar) or an integer, the value SHOULD follow the corresponding
ABNF syntax after possible unquoting of the quoted-string value (as
defined in HTTP), and MUST be sent in an plain (not an ext-value)
form. (Note: the rest of this document will show all string-value
parameters in quoted forms, and others in unquoted forms.)
Any parameters contained in this header MAY be ignored by clients.
Also, even when a client accepts this header, users are able to
circumvent the semantics of this header. Therefore, if this header
is used for security purposes, its use MUST be limited to providing
some non-fundamental additional security measures valuable for end-
users (such as client-side log-out for protecting against console
takeover). Server-side applications MUST NOT rely on the use of this
header for protecting server-side resources.
Note: The header syntax allows servers to specify Authentication-
Control for multiple authentication schemes, either as multiple
occurrences of this header or as a combined single header (see
Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7230] for rationale). The same care as for
parsing multiple authentication challenges needs to be taken.
4.1. Non-ASCII extended header parameters
Parameters contained in the Authentication-Control header MAY be
extended to non-ASCII values using the framework described in
[RFC5987]. All servers and clients MUST be capable of receiving and
sending values encoded in [RFC5987] syntax.
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If a value to be sent contains only ASCII characters, the field MUST
be sent using plain RFC 7235 syntax. The syntax as extended by ext-
value MUST NOT be used in this case.
If a value (except the "realm" header) contains one or more non-ASCII
characters, the parameter SHOULD be sent using the ext-value syntax
defined in Section 3.2 of [RFC5987]. Such a parameter MUST have a
charset value of "UTF-8", and the language value MUST always be
omitted (have an empty value). The same parameter MUST NOT be sent
more than once, regardless of the used syntax.
For example, a parameter "username" with value "Renee of France"
SHOULD be sent as < username="Renee of France" >. If the value is
"Ren<e acute>e of France", it SHOULD be sent as
< username*=UTF-8''Ren%C3%89e%20of%20France > instead.
Interoperability note: [RFC7235], Section 2.2, defines the "realm"
authentication parameter which cannot be replaced by the "realm*"
extend parameter. It means that the use of non-ASCII values for an
authentication realm is not the defined behavior in the HTTP.
Unfortunately, some people currently use non-ASCII realm parameter in
reality, but even its encoding scheme is not well-defined.
Given this background, this document does not specify how to handle
non-ASCII "realm" parameter in the extended header fields. If
needed, the authors propose to use a non-extended "realm" parameter
form, with a wish for maximum interoperability.
4.2. Auth-style parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Digest realm="protected space",
auth-style=modal
The parameter "auth-style" specifies the server's preferences for
user interface behavior for user authentication. This parameter can
be included in any kind of response, however, it is only meaningful
for either authentication-initializing or negatively-authenticated
responses. The value of this parameter MUST be one of the bare-
tokens "modal" or "non-modal". When the Optional-WWW-Authenticate
header is used, the value of this parameter MUST be disregarded and
the value "non-modal" is implied.
The value "modal" means that the server thinks the content of the
response (body and other content-related headers) is valuable only
for users refusing the authentication request. The clients are
expected to ask the user for a password before processing the
content. This behavior is common for most of the current
implementations of Basic and Digest authentication schemes.
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The value "non-modal" means that the server thinks the content of the
response (body and other content-related headers) is valuable for
users before processing an authentication request. The clients are
expected to first process the content and then provide users the
opportunity to perform authentication.
The default behavior for clients is implementation-dependent, and it
may also depending on authentication schemes. The proposed default
behavior is "modal" for all authentication schemes unless otherwise
specified.
The above two different methods of authentication possibly introduce
a observable difference of semantics when the response contains
state-changing side effects; for example, it can affect how Cookie
headers [RFC6265] in 401 responses are processed. However, the
server applications SHOULD NOT depend on existence of such side
effects.
4.3. Location-when-unauthenticated parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Mutual realm="auth-space-1",
location-when-unauthenticated="http://www.example.com/login.html"
The parameter "location-when-unauthenticated" specifies a location
where any unauthenticated clients should be redirected to. This
header can be used, for example, when there is a central login page
for the entire Web application. The value of this parameter is a
string that contains an URL location. If a received URL is not
absolute, the clients SHOULD consider it a relative URL from the
current location.
This parameter MAY be used with a 401 response for an authentication-
initializing response. It can also be contained, although this is
NOT RECOMMENDED, in a positive response with an
Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. The clients MUST ignore this
parameter when a response is either successfully-authenticated or
intermediately-authenticated.
When a client receives an authentication-initiating response with
this parameter, and if the client has to ask users for authentication
credentials, the client will treat the entire response as if it were
a 303 "See Other" response with a Location header that contains the
value of this parameter (i.e., client will be redirected to the
specified location with a GET request). Unlike a normal 303
response, if the client can process authentication without the user's
interaction, this parameter MUST be ignored.
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4.4. No-auth parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Basic realm="entrance", no-auth=true
The parameter "no-auth" is a variant of the
location-when-unauthenticated parameter; it specifies that new
authentication attempts are not to be performed on this location in
order to improve the user experience, without specifying the
redirection on the HTTP level. This header can be used, for example,
when there is a central login page for the entire Web application,
and when an explicit user interaction with the Web content is desired
before authentications. The value of this parameter MUST be a token
"true". If the value is incorrect, client MAY ignore this parameter.
This parameter MAY be used with authentication-initiating responses.
It can also be contained, although this is NOT RECOMMENDED, in a
positive response with an Optional-WWW-Authenticate header. The
clients MUST ignore this parameter when a response is either
successfully-authenticated or intermediately-authenticated.
When a client receives an authentication-initiating response with
this parameter, if the client has to ask users for authentication
credentials, the client will ignore the WWW-Authenticate header
contained in the response and treat the whole response as a normal
negative 4xx-class response instead of giving the user an opportunity
to start authentication. If the client can process authentication
without the user's interaction, this parameter MUST be ignored.
This parameter SHOULD NOT be used along with the
location-when-unauthenticated parameter. If both were supplied,
clients MAY choose which one is to be honored.
This parameter SHOULD NOT be used as a security measure to prevent
authentication attempts, as it is easily circumvented by users. This
parameter SHOULD be used solely for improving user experience of Web
applications.
4.5. Location-when-logout parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Digest realm="protected space",
location-when-logout="http://www.example.com/byebye.html"
The parameter "location-when-logout" specifies a location where the
client is to be redirected when the user explicitly requests a
logout. The value of this parameter MUST be a string that contains
an URL location. If a given URL is not absolute, the clients MUST
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consider it a relative URL from the current location.
This parameter MAY be used with successfully-authenticated responses.
If this parameter is contained in other kinds of responses, the
clients MUST ignore this parameter.
When the user requests termination of an authentication period, and
if the client currently displays a page supplied by a response with
this parameter, the client will be redirected to the specified
location by a new GET request (as if it received a 303 response).
The log-out operation (e.g. erasing memories of user name,
authentication credential and all related one-time credentials such
as nonce or keys) SHOULD occur before processing a redirection.
When the user requests termination of an authentication period, if
the client supports this parameter but the server response does not
contain this parameter, the client's RECOMMENDED behavior is as
follows: if the request corresponding to the current content was GET
method, reload the page without the authentication credential.
Otherwise, keep the current content as-is and simply forget the
authentication status. The client SHOULD NOT replay a non-idempotent
request without the user's explicit approval.
Web applications are encouraged to send this parameter with an
appropriate value for any responses (except those with redirection
(3XX) statuses) for non-GET requests.
4.6. Logout-timeout parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Basic realm="entrance", logout-timeout=300
The parameter "logout-timeout", when contained in a successfully-
authenticated response, means that any authentication credentials and
state related to the current protection space are to be discarded if
a time specified in this header (in seconds) has passed since from
the time this header was received. The value MUST be an integer. As
a special case, the value 0 means that the client is requested to
immediately log-out from the current authentication space and revert
to an unauthenticated status. This does not, however, mean that the
long-term memories for the passwords and passwords-related details
(such as the password reminders and auto fill-ins) should be removed.
If a new timeout value is received for the same authentication space,
it cancels the previous timeout and sets a new timeout.
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4.7. Username parameter
Example:
Authentication-Control: Basic realm="configuration", username="admin"
The parameter "username" tells that the only "user name" to be
accepted by the server is the value given in this parameter. This
parameter is particularly useful, for example, for routers and other
appliances with a Web configuration interface.
This parameter MAY be used with authentication-initiating responses
or negatively-authenticated responses requiring another attempt of
authentication. The clients MUST ignore this parameter when a
response is either successfully-authenticated or intermediately-
authenticated.
If the authentication scheme to be used has a syntax limitation on
the allowed user names (e.g. Basic and Digest do not allow colons in
user names), the specified value MUST follow that limitation.
Clients SHOULD ignore any values which do not conform to such
limitations.
Also, if the used authentication scheme requires a specific style of
text preparation for the user name (e.g., PRECIS [RFC7564] string
preparation or Unicode normalization), the server SHOULD send the
values satisfying such requirements (so that clients can use the
given user name as is).
Clients MAY still send any authentication requests with other user
names, possibly in vain. Servers are not strictly required to reject
user names other than specified, but doing so will give bad user
experiences and may confuse users and clients.
5. Usage examples
This section shows some examples for applying this extension to
typical websites which are using Forms and cookies for managing
authentication and authorization. The content of this section is not
normative and for illustrative purposes only.
In these examples, we assume that there are two kinds of clients (Web
browsers). One kind of these implements all features described in
the previous sections. We also assume that browsers will have a user
interface which allows users to deactivate (log-out from) current
authentication sessions. The other kind are the "existing"
implementations which do not support any of these features.
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When not explicitly specified, all settings described below are to be
applied with Authentication-Control headers, and these can be sent to
clients regardless of the authentication status (these will be
silently ignored whenever not effective).
5.1. Example 1: a portal site
This subsection provides an example application for a site whose
structure is somewhat similar to conventional portal sites. In
particular, most web pages are available for guest (unauthenticated)
users, and if authentication is performed, the content of these pages
is customized for each user. We assume the site has the following
kinds of pages currently:
o Content pages.
o Pages/mechanism for performing authentication:
* There is one page which asks a user name and a password using a
HTML POST form.
* After the authentication attempt, the user will be redirected
to either the page which is previously displayed before the
authentication, or some specific page.
o A de-authentication (log-out) page.
5.1.1. Case 1: a simple application
When such a site does not require specific actions upon log-in and
log-out, the following simple settings can be used.
o Set up an optional authentication to all pages available to
guests. Set up an Authentication-Control header with "auth-
style=non-modal" setting.
o If there are pages only available to authenticated users, set up a
mandatory authentication with "auth-style=non-modal" setting.
o No specific pages for authentication are needed. It will be
performed automatically, directed by the above setting.
o A de-authentication page is also not needed. If the site has one,
put "logout-timeout=0" there.
o For all pages for POST requests, it is advisable to have
"location-when-logout=<some page>".
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5.1.2. Case 2: specific action required on log-out
If the site requires specific actions upon log-out, the following
settings can be used.
o All settings in the Case 1 are applied.
o For all pages, set up the Authentication-Control header "location-
when-logout=<de-authentication page>".
o In the de-authentication page, no specific set-up is needed. If
there are any direct links to the de-authentication page, put
"logout-timeout=0".
5.1.3. Case 3: specific page displayed before log-in
If the site needs to display a specific page before log-in actions
(some announcements, user notices, or even advertisements), the
following settings can be applied.
o Set up an optional authentication to all pages available to
guests. Set up an Authentication-Control header with "no-
auth=true". Put a link to a specific log-in page in contents.
o If there are pages only available to authenticated users, set up a
mandatory authentication with "location-when-unauthenticated=<the
log-in page>".
o For the specific log-in page, set up a mandatory authentication.
o For all pages for POST requests, it is advisable to have
"location-when-logout=<some page>", too.
o De-authentication pages are not needed. If the site has one, put
"logout-timeout=0".
5.2. Example 2: authenticated user-only sites
If almost all pages in the target site require authentication (e.g.,
an Internet banking site), or if there are no needs to support both
unauthenticated and authenticated users on the same resource, the
settings will become simpler. The following are an example for such
a site:
o Set up a mandatory authentication to all pages available to
authenticated users. Set up an Authentication-Control header with
"auth-style=non-modal" setting.
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o Set up a handler for the 401-status which requests users to
authenticate.
o For all pages for POST requests, it is advisable to have
"location-when-logout=<some page>", too.
o De-authentication pages are not needed. If the site will have
one, put "logout-timeout=0" there.
5.3. When to use Cookies
In the current Web sites using form-based authentications, Cookies
[RFC6265] are used for managing both authorization and application
sessions. Using the extensions in this document, the former features
will be provided by using (extended) HTTP authentication/
authorization mechanisms. In some cases, there will be ambiguity on
whether some functions are for authorization management or for
session management. The following hints will be helpful for deciding
which features to use.
o If there is a need to serve multiple sessions for a single user
using multiple browsers concurrently, use a Cookie for
distinguishing between sessions for the same user. (C.f. if there
is a need to distinguish sessions in the same browser, HTML5 Web
Storage [W3C.REC-webstorage-20130730] features can be used instead
of Cookies.)
o If a web site is currently deploying a session time-out feature,
consider who benefits from the feature. In most cases, the main
requirement for such a feature is to protect users from having
their consoles and browsers hijacked (i.e. benefits are on the
users' side). In such cases, the time-out features provided in
this extension can be used. On the other hand, the requirement is
to protect server's privilege (e.g. when some regulations require
to limit the time difference between user's two-factor
authentication and financial transaction commitment; the
requirement is strictly on the servers' side), that should be
managed on the server side using Cookies or other session
management mechanisms.
5.4. Parallel deployment with Form/Cookie authentications
In some transition periods, sites can need to support both HTTP-layer
and form-based authentication. The following example shows one way
to achieve that.
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o If Cookies are used even for HTTP-authenticated users, each
session determined by Cookies SHOULD identify which authentication
has been used for the session.
o First, set up any of the above settings for enabling HTTP-layer
authentication.
o For unauthenticated users, add the following things to the Web
pages, unless the client supports this extension and HTTP-level
authentication.
* For non-mandatory authenticated pages, put a link to Form-based
authenticated pages.
* For mandatory authenticated pages, either put a link to Form-
based authenticated pages, or put a HTML-level redirection
(using >META http-equiv="refresh" ...< element) to such pages.
o In Form-based authenticated pages, if users are not authenticated,
the page can provide a redirection for HTTP-level authentication
by "location-when-unauthenticated" setting.
o Users are identified to authorization and content customization by
the following logic.
* First, check the result of the HTTP-level authentication. If
there is a Cookie session tied to a specific user, both should
match.
* If the user is not authenticated on the HTTP-level, use the
conventional Form-based method to determine the user.
* If there is a Cookie tied to HTTP authentication, but there is
no corresponding HTTP authentication result, that session will
be discarded (because it means that authentication is
deactivated by the corresponding user).
6. Methods to extend this protocol
If a private extension to this protocol is implemented, it MUST use
the extension-param to avoid conflicts with this protocol and any
other extensions. (Standardized or being-standardized extensions MAY
use either bare-tokens or extension-tokens.)
When bare-tokens are used in this protocol, these MUST be allocated
by IANA. Any tokens used for non-private, non-experimental
parameters are RECOMMENDED to be registered to IANA, regardless of
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the kind of tokens used.
Extension-tokens MAY be freely used for any non-standard, private,
and/or experimental uses. An extension-tokens MUST use the format
"-<bare-token>.<domain-name>", where <domain-name> is a validly
registered (sub-)domain name on the Internet owned by the party who
defines the extensions. Any unknown parameter name is to be ignored
regardless of whether it is an extension-token or a bare-token.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new entries for the "Permanent Message
Header Field Names" registry.
+---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
| Header Field Name | Protocol | Specification |
+---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
| Optional-WWW-Authenticate | http | Section 3 of this document |
| Authentication-Control | http | Section 4 of this document |
+---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
This document also establishes a registry for HTTP authentication
control parameters. The registry manages case-insensitive ASCII
strings. The string MUST follow the extensive-token syntax defined
in Section 2.2.
To acquire registered tokens, a specification for the use of such
tokens MUST be available as a publicly-accessible documents, as
outlined as "Specification Required" level in [RFC5226].
Registrations for authentication control parameters are required to
include a description of the control extension. New registrations
are advised to provide the following information:
o Token: a token used in HTTP headers for identifying the algorithm.
o Specification: A reference for a specification defining the
algorithm.
The initial content of this registry is as follows:
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+-------------------------------+------------------------------+
| Token | Specification |
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+
| auth-style | Section 4.2 of this document |
| location-when-unauthenticated | Section 4.3 of this document |
| no-auth | Section 4.4 of this document |
| location-when-logout | Section 4.5 of this document |
| logout-timeout | Section 4.6 of this document |
| username | Section 4.7 of this document |
+-------------------------------+------------------------------+
8. Security Considerations
The purpose of the log-out timeout feature in the Authentication-
control header is to protect users of clients from impersonation
caused by an attacker having access to the same console. The server
application implementer SHOULD be aware that the directive may always
be ignored by either malicious clients or clients not supporting this
extension. If the purpose of introducing a timeout for an
authentication period is to protect server-side resources, this
protection MUST be implemented by other means such as HTTP Cookies
[RFC6265].
All parameters in the Authentication-Control header SHOULD NOT be
used for any security-enforcement purposes. Server-side applications
MUST NOT assume that the header will be honored by clients and users.
The "username" parameter sometimes reveals sensitive information
about the HTTP server and its configurations, useful for security
attacks. The use of the "username" parameter SHOULD be limited to
cases where the all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the valid user name is pre-configured and not modifiable (such
as root, admin or similar ones);
(2) the valid user name for such an appliance is publicly known (for
example, written in a manual document); and
(3) either the valid user name for the server is easily guessable by
other means (for example, from the model number shown in an
unauthenticated page), or the server is only accessible from
limited networks.
Most importantly, the "username" parameter SHOULD NOT be used in any
case when the valid user names can be changed by users or
administrators.
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5234, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC5987] Reschke, J., "Character Set and Language Encoding for
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Header Field
Parameters", RFC 5987, DOI 10.17487/RFC5987, August 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5987>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-httpauth-mutual]
Oiwa, Y., Watanabe, H., Takagi, H., Maeda, K., Hayashi,
T., and Y. Ioku, "Mutual Authentication Protocol for
HTTP", draft-ietf-httpauth-mutual-08 (work in progress),
July 2016.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC7564] Saint-Andre, P. and M. Blanchet, "PRECIS Framework:
Preparation, Enforcement, and Comparison of
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Internationalized Strings in Application Protocols",
RFC 7564, DOI 10.17487/RFC7564, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7564>.
[W3C.REC-webstorage-20130730]
Hickson, I., "Web Storage", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-webstorage-20130730, July 2013,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-webstorage-20130730>.
Appendix A. (Informative) Applicability of features for each messages
This section provides a cross-reference table showing the
applicability of the features provided in this specification to each
kind of responses described in Section 2.1. The table provided in
this section is for informative purposes only.
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
| | init. | success. | intermed. | neg. |
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
| Optional auth. | O | n | N | N |
| auth-style | O | - | - | O |
| loc.-when-unauth. | O | I | I | i |
| no-auth | O | I | I | i |
| loc.-when-logout | - | O | - | - |
| logout-timeout | - | O | - | - |
| username | O | - | - | O |
+-------------------+-------+----------+-----------+------+
Legends:
O = MAY contain; n = SHOULD NOT contain; N = MUST NOT contain
i = SHOULD be ignored; I = MUST be ignored;
- = meaningless (to be ignored)
Appendix B. (Informative) Draft Change Log
[To be removed on final publication]
B.1. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 07
o WGLC comments are reflected to the text.
B.2. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 06
o Several comments from reviewers are reflected to the text.
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B.3. Changes in Httpauth WG Revision 05
o Authors' addresses updated.
B.4. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 04
o IANA consideration section added.
B.5. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 03
o Adopting RFC 5987 extended syntax for non-ASCII parameter values.
B.6. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 02
o Added realm parameter.
o Added username parameter. We acknowledge Michael Sweet's proposal
for including this to the Basic authentication.
B.7. Changes in Httpauth WG revision 01
o Clarification on peers' responsibility about handling of relative
URLs.
o Automatic reloading should be allowed only on safe methods, not
always on idempotent methods.
B.8. Changes in Httpauth revision 00 and HttpBis revision 00
None.
B.9. Changes in revision 02
o Added usage examples.
B.10. Changes in revision 01
o Syntax notations and parsing semantics changed to match httpbis
style.
B.11. Changes in revision 00
o Separated from HTTP Mutual authentication proposal (-09).
o Adopting httpbis works as a referencing point to HTTP.
o Generalized, now applicable for all HTTP authentication schemes.
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o Added "no-auth" and "auth-style" parameters.
o Loosened standardization requirements for parameter-name tokens
registration.
Authors' Addresses
Yutaka Oiwa
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Information Technology Research Institute
Tsukuba Central 1
1-1-1 Umezono
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki
JP
Email: mutual-auth-contact-ml@aist.go.jp
Hajime Watanabe
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Information Technology Research Institute
Tsukuba Central 1
1-1-1 Umezono
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki
JP
Hiromitsu Takagi
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Information Technology Research Institute
Tsukuba Central 1
1-1-1 Umezono
Tsukuba-shi, Ibaraki
JP
Tatsuya Hayashi
Lepidum Co. Ltd.
#602, Village Sasazuka 3
1-30-3 Sasazuka
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
JP
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Yuichi Ioku
Individual
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