Network Working Group S. Farrell
Internet-Draft Trinity College Dublin
Intended status: Experimental P. Hoffman
Expires: January 16, 2014 VPN Consortium
M. Thomas
Phresheez
July 15, 2013
HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA)
draft-ietf-httpauth-hoba-01
Abstract
HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA) is a design for an HTTP
authentication method with credentials that are not vulnerable to
phishing attacks, and that does not require a server-side password
database. The design can also be used in Javascript-based
authentication embedded in HTML. HOBA is an alternative to HTTP
authentication schemes that require passwords with all the negative
attributes that come with password-based systems.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 16, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Interfacing to Applications (Cookies) . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. The HOBA Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. HOBA HTTP Authentication Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Using HOBA-http . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. CPK Preparation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Signing Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Authentication Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Logging in on a New User Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Using HOBA-js . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Key Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. User Join . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. User Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Enrolling a New User Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Signature Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.7. Session Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.8. Multiple Accounts on One User Agent . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.9. Oddities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Additional Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Associating Additional Keys to an Exiting Account . . . . 17
6.3. Logging Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.4. Getting a Fresh Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. localStorage Security for Javascript . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. HOBA Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. .well-known URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.3. Algorithm Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.4. Key Identifier Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.5. Device Identifier Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix A. Problems with Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix B. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix C. Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C.1. WG-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C.2. WG-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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1. Introduction
[[ Commentary is in double-square brackets, like this. As you'll see
there are a bunch of details still to be figured out. Feedback on
those is very welcome. Also note that the authors fully expect that
the description of HOBA-http and HOBA-js to be mostly merged in the
draft; they're both here now so readers can see some alternatives and
maybe support particular proposals. ]]
HTTP Origin-Bound Authentication (HOBA) is an authentication design
that can be used as an HTTP authentication scheme and for Javascript-
based authentication embedded in HTML. The main goal of HOBA is to
offer an easy-to-implement authentication scheme that is not based on
passwords, but that can easily replace HTTP or HTML forms-based
password authentication. If deployment of HOBA reduces the number of
password entries in databases by any appreciable amount, then it
would be worthwhile. As an HTTP authentication scheme, it would work
in the current HTTP 1.0 and HTTP 1.1 authentication framework, and
will very likely work with whatever changes are made to the HTTP
authentication scheme in HTTP 2.0. As a JavaScript design, HOBA
demonstrates a way for clients and servers to interact using the same
credentials that are use by the HTTP authentication scheme.
The HTTP specification defines basic and digest authentication
methods for HTTP that have been in use for many years, but which,
being based on passwords, are susceptible to theft of server-side
databases. (See [RFC2617] for the original specification, and
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth] for clarifications and updates to the
authentication mechanism.) Even though few large web sites use basic
and digest authentication, they still use username/password
authentication and thus have large susceptible server-side databases
of passwords.
Instead of passwords, HOBA uses digital signatures as an
authentication mechanism. HOBA also adds useful features such as
credential management and session logout. In HOBA, the client
creates a new public-private key pair for each host ("web-origin") to
which it authenticates; web-origins are defined in [RFC6454]. These
keys are used in HOBA for HTTP clients to authenticate themselves to
servers in the HTTP protocol or in a Javascript authentication
program.
HOBA keys need not be stored in public key certificates. Because
these are generally "bare keys", there is none of the semantic
overhead of PKIX certificates, particularly with respect to naming
and trust anchors. Thus, client public keys ("CPKs") do not have any
publicly-visible identifier for the user who possesses the
corresponding private key, nor the web-origin with which the client
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is using the CPK. HOBA keys are stored in subjectPublicKeyInfo
structures from PKIX [RFC5280]
HOBA also defines some services that are required for modern HTTP
authentication:
o Servers can bind a CPK with an identifier, such as an account
name. HOBA allows servers to define their own policies for
binding CPKs with accounts during account registration.
o Users are likely to use more than one device or user agent (UA)
for the same HTTP based service, so HOBA gives a way to associate
more than one CPK to the same account, but without having to
register for each separately.
o Users are also likely to lose a private key, or the client's
memory of which key pair is associated with which origin. For
example if a user loses the computer or mobile device in which
state is stored. HOBA allows for clients to tell servers to
delete the association between an existing CPK and an account.
o Logout features can be useful for UAs, so HOBA defines a way to
close a current HTTP "session", and also a way to close all
current sessions, even if more than one session is currently
active from different UAs for the same account.
o Since there are always devices and applications in which state of
the art digital signature mechanism runtimes are significant, and
since HTTP authentication in theory requires that every HTTP
request to a given realm have a signature in an "Authorization"
header field, and since HOBA is a challenge response scheme, we
also define a way in which HTTP servers can indicate the duration
for which they will consider a given challenge value to be valid.
As a consequence we also define a way for UAs to fetch a fresh
challenge.
1.1. Interfacing to Applications (Cookies)
HOBA can be used as a drop-in replacement for password-based user
authentication schemes used in common web applications. The simplest
way in which this can be done is to (re-)direct the UA to a HOBA
"Login" URL and for the response to a successful HTTP request
containing a HOBA signature to set a session cookie [RFC6265].
Further interactions with the web application will then be secured
via the session cookie, as is commonly done today.
While cookies are bearer tokens, and thus weaker than HOBA
signatures, they are currently ubiquitously used. If non-bearer
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token session continuation schemes are developed in future in the
IETF or elsewhere, then those can interface to HOBA as easily as with
any password based authentication scheme.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
A client public key ("CPK") is the public key and associated
cryptographic parameters needed for a server to validate a signature.
The term "account" is (loosely) used to refer to whatever data
structure(s) the server maintains that are associated with an
identity. That will contain of at least one CPK and a web-origin; it
will also optionally include an HTTP "realm" as defined in the HTTP
authentication specification. It might also involve many other non-
standard pieces of data that the server accumulates as part of
account creation processes. An account may have many CPKs that are
considered equivalent in terms of being usable for authentication,
but the meaning of "equivalent" is really up to the server and is not
defined here.
When describing something that is specific to HOBA as an HTTP
authentication mechanism or HOBA as a JavaScript implementation, this
document uses the terms "HOBA-http" and "HOBA-js", respectively.
Web client: the content and javascript code that run within the
context of a single UA instance (such as a tab in a web browser).
User agent (UA): typically, but not always, a web browser.
User: a person who is running a UA. In this document, "user" does
not mean "user name" or "account name".
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation of [RFC5234]
2. The HOBA Authentication Scheme
A UA that implements HOBA maintains a list of web-origins and realms.
The UA also maintains one or more client credentials for each web-
origin/realm combination for which it has created a CPK.
On receipt of a challenge (and optional realm) from a server, the
client marshals an HOBA to-be-signed (TBS) blob that includes a
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client generated nonce, the web-origin, the realm, an identifier for
the CPK and the challenge string; and signs that hashed blob with the
private key corresponding to the CPK for that web-origin. The
formatting chosen for this TBS blob is chosen so as to make server-
side signature verification as simple as possible for a wide-range of
current server tooling.
Figure 1 specifies the ABNF for the signature input.
HOBA-TBS = nonce alg origin realm kid challenge
nonce = unreserved
alg = 1*2DIGIT
origin = scheme authority port
realm = unreserved
kid = unreserved
challenge = unreserved
Figure 1: To-be-signed data for HOBA
The fields above contain the following:
o nonce: is a random value chosen by the UA and MUST be base64url
encoded before being included in the HOBA-TBS value. UAs MUST be
able to use at least 32 bits of randomness in generating a nonce.
UAs SHOULD be able to use up to 64 bits of randomness for nonces.
o alg: specifies the signature algorithm being used encoded as an
ASCII character as defined in Section 9.3. RSA-SHA256 MUST be
supported, RSA-SHA1 MAY be supported. The IANA registered
algorithm values are encoded as ASCII numbers; for example, the
encoding of RSA-SHA256 is 0x30.
o origin: is the web origin expressed as the concatenation of the
scheme, authority and port are from [RFC3986]. These are not
base64 encoded as they will be most readily available to the
server in plain text. For example, if accessing the URL
"https://www.example.com:8080/foo" then the bytes input to the
signature process will be "httpswww.example.com8080"
o realm: is similarly just a string with the syntactic restrictions
defined in [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]. If no realm is specified
for this authentication then this is absent. (A missing field
here is no problem since both sides know when it needs to be
there.)
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o kid: is a key identifier - this MUST be a base64url encoded value
that is presented to the server in the HOBA client result (see
below).
o challenge: MUST be a base64url encoded challenge value that the
server chose to send to the client
The HOBA-TBS string is the input to the client's signing process, but
is not itself sent over the network since some fields are already
inherent in the HTTP exchange. The challenge however is sent over
the network so as to make it simpler for a server to be stateless.
(One form of stateless challenge might be a ciphertext that the
server decrypts and checks, but that is an implementation detail.)
The value that is sent over the network is the HOBA "client result"
which we now define.
The HOBA "client result" is a dot-separated string that includes the
signature and is sent in the HTTP Authorized header field value using
the value syntax defined in Figure 2. The "sig" value is the
base64url encoded version of the binary output of the signing
process. The kid, challenge and nonce are as defined above and are
also base64url encoded. [[Expect more changes here. This is very
like JOSE's compact form and maybe ought be an instance of that.]]
HOBA-RES = kid "." challenge "." nonce "." sig
sig = unreserved
Figure 2: HOBA Client Result value
The HOBA scheme is far from new, for example, the basic idea is
pretty much identical to the first two messages from "Mechanism R" on
page 6 of [MI93] which predates HOBA by 20 years.
3. HOBA HTTP Authentication Mechanism
An HTTP server that supports HOBA authentication includes the "HOBA"
auth-scheme value in a WWW-Authenticate header field when it wants
the client to authenticate with HOBA.
o If the "HOBA" scheme is listed, it MUST be followed by two or more
auth-param values. The auth-param attributes defined by this
specification are below. Other auth-param attributes MAY be used
as well. Unknown auth-param attributes MUST be ignored by
clients, if present.
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o The "challenge" attribute MUST be included. The challenge is the
string made up of the base64url encoded octets that the server
wants the client to sign in its response. The challenge SHOULD be
unique for every HTTP 401 response in order to prevent replay
attacks from passive observers.
o An "expires" attribute MUST be included that specifies the number
of seconds from the time the HTTP response is emitted for which
responses to this challenge can be accepted.
o A "realm" attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of
protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1, Part 7
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]. The "realm" attribute MUST NOT appear
more than once.
When the "client response" is created, the UA encodes the HOBA
client-result (a string matching the HOBA-RES production in Figure 2
as an auth-param with the name "result" and returns that in the
Authorization header.
Note that a HOBA signature is good for however long the expires
attribute allows. This means that replay is potentially possible
within the time window specified by the "expires" value chosen by the
server. Servers SHOULD attempt to detect any such replay and MAY
react to such replays by responding with a second (or subsequent)
401-status HTTP response containing a new challenge.
UAs MAY optimise their use of challenges by pre-fetching a challenge
value, for example after "expires"/2 seconds have elapsed using the
".well-known/hoba/getChal" scheme described below. This also allows
for pre-calculation of HOBA signatures, if that is required in order
to produce a responsive user interface.
4. Using HOBA-http
[[A lot of this is similar to the HOBA-js discussion below. At some
point some nuclear fusion might be nice, but for now it might be best
to keep them separate until we understand better what can be merged,
and what is different.]]
The interaction between an HTTP client and HTTP server using HOBA
happens in three phases: the CPK preparation phase, the signing
phase, and the authentication phase. The first and second phase are
done in a standard fashion; the third is done using site-specific
methods. In addition, we provide a mechanism for pre-fetching
challenges.
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4.1. CPK Preparation Phase
In the CPK preparation phase, the client determines if it already has
a CPK for the web-origin it is going to. If the has a CPK, the
client will use it; if the client does not have a CPK, it generates
one in anticipation of the server asking for one.
4.2. Signing Phase
In the signing phase, the client connects to the server, the server
asks for HOBA-based authentication, and the client authenticates by
signing a blob of information as described in the previous sections.
The UA tries to access a protected resource on the server. The
server sends the HOBA WWW-Authenticate challenge. The UA receives
the challenge and signs the challenge using the CPK it either already
had or just generated. The server validates the signature. If
validation fails, or if the server chooses to do so for other
reasons, then server aborts the transaction via a 403 Unauthorized
HTTP response.
4.3. Authentication Phase
In the authentication phase, the server extracts the CPK from the
signing phase and decides if it recognizes the CPK. If the server
recognizes the CPK, the server may finish the client authentication
process. If this stage of the process involves additional
information for authentication, such as asking the user which account
she wants to use (in the case where a UA is used for multiple
accounts on a site), the server can prompt the user for account
identifying information or the user could choose based on HTML
offered by the server before the 401 is triggered. None of this is
standardized: it all follows the server's security policy and session
flow. At the end of this, the server probably assigns or updates a
session cookie for the client.
If the server does not recognize the CPK the server might send the
client through a either a join or login-new-UA (see below) process.
This process is completely up to the server, and probably entails
using HTML and JavaScript to ask the user some questions in order to
assess whether or not the server wants to give the client an account.
Completion of the joining process might require confirmation by
email, SMS, Captcha, and so on.
Note that there is no necessity for the server to initiate a joining
or login process upon completion of the signing phase. Indeed, the
server may desire to challenge the UA even for unprotected resources
and set a session cookie for later use in a join or login process as
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it becomes necessary. For example, a server might only want to offer
an account to someone who had been to a few pages on the web site; in
such a case, the server could use the CPK from an associated session
cookie as a way of building reputation for the user until the server
wants the user to join.
After the UA is authenticated (if the user had to join, this could be
the last step of joining), the server gives the UA access to the
protected resource that was originally requested at the beginning of
the signing phase. It is quite likely that the server would also
update the UA's session cookie for the web site.
4.4. Logging in on a New User Agent
When a user wants to use a new UA for an existing account, the flows
are similar to logging in with an already-joined UA or joining for
the first time. In fact, the CPK preparation phase (with the UA
knowing that it needs to create a new CPK) and the signing phase are
identical.
During the authentication phase, the server could use HTML and
JavaScript to ask the user if they are really a new user or want to
associate this new CPK with an already-joined CPK. The server can
then use some out-of-band method (such as a confirmation email round
trip, SMS, or an UA that is already enrolled) to verify that the
"new" user is the same as the already-enrolled one.
5. Using HOBA-js
[[ A description of how to use the same HOBA semantics, but doing
everything in Javascript in a web page. This is more of a
demonstration that you could get the similar semantics via JS rather
than a normative section.]]
Web sites using javascript can also perform origin-bound
authentication without needing to involve the http layer, and by
inference not needing HOBA-specific support in browsers. One element
is required: localStorage (see http://www.w3.org/TR/webstorage/), and
one when it is available will be highly desirable: WebCrypto (see
http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI). In lieu of WebCrypto, javascript
crypto libraries can be employed with the known deficiencies of PRNG,
and the general immaturity of those libraries. The following section
outlines a mechanism for Javascript HOBA clients to initially enroll,
subsequent enrollment on new clients, login, and how HOBA-js relates
to web based session management. As with HOBA-http, a pure
Javascript implementation retains the property that only CPKs are
stored on the server, so that server compromise doesn't suffer the
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multiplier affect that the various recent password exposure debacles
have vividly demonstrated.
5.1. Key Storage
We use HTML 5's localStorage feature for key storage. Conceptually
an implementation stores the dictionary account identifier, public
key, private key tuples in the origin's localStorage for subsequent
authentication requests. How this is actually stored in localStorage
is an implementation detail. We rely on the security properties of
the same-origin policy that localStorage enforces. See the security
considerations for discussion about attacks on localStorage.
5.2. User Join
To join a web site, the HOBA-js client generates a public/private key
pair and takes as input the account identifier to which the key pair
should be bound. The key pair and account identifier are stored in
localStorage for later use. The UA then signs the join information
(see below) using the private key, and forms a message with the
public key (CPK) and the signed data. The server receives the
message and verifies the signed data using the supplied key. The
server creates the account and adds the public key to a list of
public keys associated with this account.
5.3. User Login
Each time the user needs to log in to the server, it creates a login
message (see below) and signs the message using the relevant private
key stored in localStorage. The signed login message along with the
associated CPK identifier is sent to the server. The server receives
the message and verifies the signed data. If the supplied public key
is amongst the set of valid public keys for the supplied account,
then the login proceeds. See below for a discussion about replay.
5.4. Enrolling a New User Agent
When a user wants to start using a different UA, the website has two
choices: use a currently enrolled UA to permit the enrollment or use
a trusted out of band mechanism (eg email, sms, etc). To enroll a
new UA using an existing UA, the web site can display a one-time
password on the currently enrolled UA. This password is a one-time
password and expires in a fixed amount of time (say, 30 minutes). It
doesn't need to be an overly fussy password since it's one-time and
times out quickly. The user then inputs the one-time password and
the new UA generates a new asymmetric key pair and includes the one-
time password in the login message to the server (see below).
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Alternatively if an enrolled UA is not available, and the site has an
out of band communication mechanism (eg, sms, email, etc) a user can
request that a one-time password be sent to the user. The server
generates and stores the one-time password as above. The user
receives the one-time password, inputs as above on the new UA, and
the HOBA-js client forms the login message as above.
In both cases, when the server receives a login message with a one-
time password, it checks to see if the password supplied is in a list
of unexpired one-time passwords associated with that account. If the
password matches, the server verifies the signature, expires or
deletes the one-time password and adds the supplied public key to the
list of public keys associated with the user assuming the signature
verified correctly. Subsequent logins proceed as above in User
Login.
5.5. Replay Protection
To guard against replay of a legitimate login/join message, we use
Kerberos-like timestamps in the expectation of synchronization
between the browser's and server's clocks is sufficiently reliable.
This saves an HTTP round trip which is desirable, though a challenge-
response mechanism as in HOBA-http could also be used. The client
puts the current system time into the URL, and the server side vets
it against its system time. Like Kerberos, a replay cache covering a
signature timeout window is required on the server. This can be done
using a database table that is keyed (in the database sense of the
term) using the signature bits. If the signature is in the replay
table, it ought be rejected. If the timestamp in the signature is
outside the current replay cache window then it also gets rejected.
[[ An addition of the ability for the server to reject a client with
potential time skew and give it a nonce (as with HOBA-http) would
allow the size of the replay cache to be set to just a few minutes
rather than a much longer period. Or the HOBA server could always
use a nonce method. This is worthy of more discussion. ]].
5.6. Signature Parameters
Since we only require agreement between the server and the client
where the client is under the control of the server, the actual url
parameter names here are only advisory. For each signed url, the
client forms a url with the necessary login/join information. For
example, suppose example.com has login and join scripts with various
parameters:
o http://example.com/site/login.php?username=Mike
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o http://example.com/site/
join.php?username=Mike&email=mike@example.com&sms=555.1212
The client then appends a signature parameter block to the url:
o curtime: the time in milliseconds since unix epoch (ie, new Date
().getTime ()).
o pubkey: the url encoded public key. See DKIM for the format of
the base64 encoded PEM formated key.
o temppass: an optional url encoded one-time password for subsequent
enrollment.
o keyalg: currently RSA. 2048 bit keys should be use if WebCrypto is
available
o digestalg: currently SHA1. SHA256 should be used if WebCrypto is
available.
o signature: empty for signing canonicalization purposes
[[ Signing the full url is problematic with PHP; we should take a
clue from what OAUTH does here; we almost certainly need to add some
host identifying information...]] To create the signature, the
canonical text includes the path portion, the site-specific url
parameters and appends a signature block onto the end of the url.
The signature block consists of the parameters listed above with an
empty signature parameter (ie, signature=), eg:
o Login: /site/
login.php?username=Mike&curtime=1234567890.1234&keyalg=RSA&
digestalg=SHA1&signature=
o Join: /site/
join.php?username=Mike&email=mike@
example.com&curtime=1234567890.1234&keyalg=RSA&digestalg=SHA1&
signature=
o Login New User Agent: /site/
login.php?username=Mike&curtime=1234567890.1234&temppass=1239678&
keyalg=RSA&digestalg=SHA1&signature=
The canonical signature text is then signed with the private key
associated with the account. The signature is then base64 encoded
and appended to the full url, and sent to the server using
XMLHttpRequest as usual. On receipt of the login request, the server
first extracts the timestamp (curtime) and determines whether the
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timestamp is fresh (see above) rejecting the request if stale. The
server then removes the scheme and domain:port portion of the
incoming url, and removes the signature value only to create the
canonical signature text. The server then extracts the public key
along with the account and verifies the signature. If the signature
verifies, the server then determines whether this is an enrolled
public key for the user. If it is, login/join succeeds. If the key
is not enrolled, the server then checks to see if a one-time password
was supplied. If not, login/join fails. If a one-time password was
supplied, the server checks to see if a one-time password is valid
and fails if not. If valid, the server disables the one-time
password (eg, deletes it from its database) and adds the new public
key to the list of enrolled public keys for this user.
Once verified, the server may start up normal cookie-based session
management (see below). The server should send back status to the
HOBA-js client to determine whether the login/join was successful.
The details are left as an implementation detail.
Note: the client SHOULD use an HTTP POST for the XMLHttpRequest as
both the public key and signature blocks may exhaust the maximum size
for a GET request (typically around 2KB).
5.7. Session Management
Session Management is identical to username/password session
management. That is, the session management tool (such as PHP,
Python CGI, and so on) inserts a session cookie into the output to
the browser, and logging out simply removes the session cookie.
HOBA-js does nothing to help or hurt session cookie hijacking -- TLS
is still our friend.
5.8. Multiple Accounts on One User Agent
A shared UA with multiple accounts is possible if the account
identifier is stored along with the asymmetric key pair binding them
to one another. Multiple entries can be kept, one for each account,
and selected by the current user. This, of course, is fraught with
the possibility for abuse, since you're enrolling the device
potentially long-term. A couple of things can possibly be done to
combat that. First, the user can request that the credential be
erased from keystore. Similarly, in the enrollment phase, a user
could request that the key pair only be kept for a certain amount of
time, or that it not be stored at all. Last, it's probably best to
just not use shared devices at all since that's never especially
safe.
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5.9. Oddities
With the same-origin policy, subdomains do not have access to the
same localStorage as parent domains do. For larger/more complex
sites this could be an issue that requires enrollment into subdomains
with the requisite hassle for users. One way to get around this is
to use session cookies as they can be used across subdomains. That
is, login using a single well-known domain, and then use session
cookies to navigate around a site.
6. Additional Services
HOBA uses a well-known URL [RFC5785] "hoba" as a base URI for
performing many tasks: "https://www.example.com/.well-known/hoba".
These URLs are based on the name of the host that the HTTP client is
accessing. There are many use cases for these URLs to redirect to
other URLs: a site that does registration through a federated site, a
site that only does registration under HTTPS, and so on. Like any
HTTP client, HOBA clients MUST be able to handle redirection of these
URLs. [[There are a bunch of security issues to consider related to
cases where a re-direct brings you off-origin.]]
All additional services MUST be done in TLS-protected sessions
([RFC5246]).
6.1. Registration
Normally, a registration is expected to happen after a UA receives a
WWW-Authenticate for a web-origin and realm for which it has no
associated CPK. The (protocol part of the) process of registration
for a HOBA account on a server is relatively light-weight. The UA
generates a new key pair, and associates it with the web-origin/realm
in question. The UA sets up a TLS-protected session, goes to the
registration URL ".well-known/hoba/register", and submits the CPK
using a POST message as described below. It is up to the server to
decide what kind of user interaction is required before the account
is finally set up.
If the UA has a CPK associated with the web-origin, but not for the
realm concerned, then a new registration is REQUIRED. If the server
did not wish for that outcome, then it ought not use a different
realm.
The POST message sent to the registration URL contains an HTML form
(x-www-form-encoded) with one mandatory field (pub) and some optional
fields that allow the UA to specify the type and value of key and
device identifiers that the UA wishes to use. [[The device stuff is
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just a thought.]]
o pub: is a mandatory field containing the PEM formatted public key
of the client. See Appendix C of [RFC6376] for an example of how
to generate this key format.
o kidtype: contains the type of key identifier, this is a numeric
value intended to contain one of the values from Section 9.4. If
this is not present then the mandatory to implement "DANE-hash"
option MUST be used.
o kid: contains the key identifier as a base64url encoded string
that is of the type indicated in the kidtype. If the kid is a
hash of a public key then the correct (base64url encoded) hash
value MUST be provided and the server SHOULD check that and refuse
the registration if an incorrect value was supplied.
o didtype: specifies a kind of device identifier intended to contain
one of the values from Section 9.5, if absent then the "string"
form of device identifier MUST be used.
o did: A UTF8 string that specifies the device identifier. This can
be used to help a user be confident that authentication has
worked, e.g., following authentication some web content might say
"You last logged in from device 'did' at time T."
6.2. Associating Additional Keys to an Exiting Account
It is common for a user to have multiple UAs, and to want all those
UAs to be able to authenticate to a single account. One method to
allow a user who has an existing account to be able to authenticate
on a second device is to securely transport the private and public
keys and the origin information from the first device to the second.
Previous history with such key transport has been spotty at best. As
an alternative, HOBA allows associating a CPK from the second device
to the account created on the first device.
Instead of registering on the new device, the UA generates a new key
pair, associates it with the web-origin/realm in question, goes to
the URL for starting an association, ".well-known/hoba/
associate-start" in a TLS-protected session, and submits the new CPK
using a POST message. [[ More description is clearly needed here. ]]
The server's response to this request is a nonce with at least 128
bits of entropy. That nonce SHOULD be easy for the user to copy and
type, such as using Base32 encoding (see [RFC4648]). The user then
uses the first UA to log into the origin, goes to the URL for
finishing an association, ".well-known/hoba/associate-finish", and
submits the nonce using a POST message. [[ More description is
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clearly needed here. ]]. The server then knows that the
authenticated user is associated with the second CPK. The server can
choose to associate the two CPKs with one account. Whether to do so
is entirely at the server's discretion however, but the server SHOULD
make the outcome clear to the user.
6.3. Logging Out
When the user wishes to logout, the UA simply goes to ".well-known/
hoba/logout". The UA MAY also delete session cookies associated with
the session. [[Is that right?, maybe a SHOULD- or MUST-delete would
be better]]
The server-side MUST NOT allow TLS session resumption for any logged
out session and SHOULD also revoke or delete any cookies associated
with the session.
6.4. Getting a Fresh Challenge
If the UA would like a "fresh" challenge then it can send a POST or
GET message to ".well-known/hoba/getchal". A successful (200 status)
response MUST include a fresh (base64url encoded) HOBA challenge for
this origin in the body of the response.
7. Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms
RSA-SHA256 MUST be supported. RSA-SHA1 MAY be used. RSA modulus
lengths of at least 2048 bits SHOULD be used.
[[Maybe we should add ECDSA with P256 for shorter signatures.]]
8. Security Considerations
If key binding was server-selected then a bad actor could bind
different accounts belonging to the user from the network with
possible bad consequences, especially if one of the private keys was
compromised somehow.
Binding my CPK with someone else's account would be fun and
profitable so SHOULD be appropriately hard. In particular the string
generated by the server MUST be hard to guess, for whatever level of
difficulty is chosen by the server. The server SHOULD NOT allow a
random guess to reveal whether or not an account exists.
[[The potential impact on privacy of HOBA needs to be addressed. If
a site can use a 401 and a CPK to track users without permission that
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would be not-so-nice so some guidance on how a UA could indicate to a
user that HOBA stuff is going on might be needed.]]
[[lots more TBD, be nice to your private keys etc. etc.]]
8.1. localStorage Security for Javascript
Our use of localStorage will undoubtedly be a cause for concern.
localStorage uses the same-origin model which says that the scheme,
domain and port define a localStorage instance. Beyond that, any
code executing will have access to private keying material. Of
particular concern are XSS attacks which could conceivably take the
keying material and use it to create UAs under the control of an
attacker. But XSS attacks are in reality across the board
devastating since they can and do steal credit card information,
passwords, perform illicit acts, etc, etc. It's not clear that we
introduce unique threats from which clear text passwords don't
already suffer.
Another source of concern is local access to the keys. That is, if
an attacker has access to the UA itself, they could snoop on the key
through a javascript console, or find the file(s) that implement
localStorage on the host computer. Again it's not clear that we are
worse in this regard because the same attacker could get at browser
password files, etc too. One possible mitigation is to encrypt the
keystore with a password/pin the user supplies. This may sound
counter intuitive, but the object here is to keep passwords off of
servers to mitigate the multiplier effect of a large scale compromise
ala LinkedIn because of shared passwords across sites.
It's worth noting that HOBA uses asymmetric keys and not passwords
when evaluating threats. As various password database leaks have
shown, the real threat of a password breach is not just to the site
that was breached, it's all of the sites a user used the same
password on too. That is, the collateral damage is severe because
password reuse is common. Storing a password in localStorage would
also have a similar multiplier effect for an attacker, though perhaps
on a smaller scale than a server-side compromise: one successful
crack gains the attacker potential access to hundreds if not
thousands of sites the user visits. HOBA does not suffer from that
attack multiplier since each asymmetric key pair is unique per site/
UA/user.
9. IANA Considerations
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9.1. HOBA Authentication Scheme
Authentication Scheme Name: HOBA
Pointer to specification text: [[ this document ]]
Notes (optional): The HOBA scheme can be used with either HTTP
servers or proxies. [[But we need to figure out the proxy angle;-)]]
9.2. .well-known URLs
We probably want a new registry for the labels beneath .well-known/
hoba so that other folks can add additional features in a controlled
way, e.g. for CPK/account revocation or whatever.
9.3. Algorithm Names
TBD, hopefully re-use and existing registry
"0" means RSA-SHA256
"1" means RSA-SHA1
9.4. Key Identifier Types
"0" means a hashed public key, as done in DANE. [RFC6698]
"1" means a URI, such as a mailto: or acct: URI, but anything
conforming to [RFC3986] is ok.i
"2" means an unformatted string, at the user's/UA's whim
9.5. Device Identifier Types
"0" means an unformatted nickname, at the user's/UA's whim
10. Implementation Status
[[Note to RFC editor - please delete this section before
publication.]]
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in
[I-D.sheffer-running-code]. The description of implementations in
this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes
in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any
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individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the
IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the
information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors.
This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog
of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised
to note that other implementations may exist.
According to [RFC Editor: replace by a reference to this document],
"this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due
consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, by
considering the running code as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that has made the implemented protocols more mature. It
is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
At the time of writing there are two known implementations. One done
by Stephen Farrell of HOBA-HTTP and a HOBA-JS variant and another by
Michael Thomas of an HOBA-JS variant. More details will be provided
in future drafts as those implementations mature and e.g. open-source
licensing terms and release schedules are figured out.
11. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following for good comments received during the
preparation of this specification: Julian Reschke [[and many more to
be added]. All errors and stupidities are of course the editors'
fault.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-httpbis-p7-auth]
Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Authentication", draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-23
(work in progress), July 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
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[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
April 2010.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
December 2011.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.sheffer-running-code]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: the Implementation Status Section",
draft-sheffer-running-code-06 (work in progress),
June 2013.
[MI93] Mitchell and Thomas, "Standardising Authentication
Protocols Based on Public-Key Techniques.", Journal of
Computer Security 2 (1993): 23-36. , 1993.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
April 2011.
[RFC6376] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376,
July 2013.
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Appendix A. Problems with Passwords
By far the most common mechanism for web authentication is passwords
that can be remembered by the user, called "memorizable passwords".
There is plenty of good research on how users typically use
memorizable passwords ([[ handful of citations goes here ]]), but
some of the highlights are that users typically try hard to reuse
passwords on as many web sites as possible, and that web sites often
use either email addresses or users' names as the identifier that
goes with these passwords.
If an attacker gets access to the database of memorizable passwords,
that attacker can impersonate any of the users. Even if the breach
is discovered, the attacker can still impersonate users until every
password is changed. Even if all the passwords are changed or at
least made unusable, the attacker now possesses a list of likely
username/password pairs that might exist on other sites.
Using memorizable passwords on unencrypted channels also poses risks
to the users. If a web site uses either the HTTP Plain
authentication method, or an HTML form that does no cryptographic
protection of the password in transit, a passive attacker can see the
password and immediately impersonate the user. If a hash-based
authentication scheme such as HTTP Digest authentication is used, a
passive attacker still has a high chance of being able to determine
the password using a dictionary of known passwords.
[[ Say a bit about non-memorizable passwords. Still subject to
database attack, although that doesn't give the attacker knowledge
for other systems. Safe if digest authentication is used, but that's
rare. ]]
Appendix B. Examples
[[Will add more later and probably use example.org.]]
The following values show an example of HOBA-HTTP authentication to
the origin https://hoba-local.ie. Carriage-returns have been added
and need to be removed to validate the example.
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-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Key Identifier: Zhh5vD5ovE0NqTDOufSUFRu5dzZMe-KOrMX2cN3vqWw
Challenge: zzrYL7BaOQtlzOsl4fMY+EYcG4eT2h+JXi+jEGzozQ0=
Nonce: xXSFdZ-7ahM
Tbsorigin: httpshoba-local.ie443
The resulting signature is:
r1ZXAWPXpzkd9iyI9TvwNYb0LT6Nth4WRYL4ciLZD6Wvvsni8AYLduUEPdo5ezfo
K__W_Hi4nyHmtRzPpAW9YSGhsyYOd7GSZH7Kd6ncCPVBQuHQdHI5n6OJslitD7hK
t4bCtP3zGxkg_W71KGU2RXcQDfcTNmFcs2ice8RrrvNh1lzRViHO-scV0VNBk19J
LTUyaisiNKq-sNK14_RIG6AeivAGxLlXnN_RzttNe5d0XrXJ1nRUSFmeN6ZfVHE7
qf6lORqaMeyqsDoJe1MIyISn6sCGzMZmplizNw_eg2QJIJX3Txat9mTfT5UZYyUq
8meaqRXMhoQWHGLweFTNYw
The final HTTP header field sent with a request is then:
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Authorization: result="Zhh5vD5ovE0NqTDOufSUFRu5dzZMe-KOrMX2cN3vq
Ww.zzrYL7BaOQtlzOsl4fMY+EYcG4eT2h+JXi+jEGzozQ0=.xXSFdZ-7ahM.r1ZX
AWPXpzkd9iyI9TvwNYb0LT6Nth4WRYL4ciLZD6Wvvsni8AYLduUEPdo5ezfoK__W
_Hi4nyHmtRzPpAW9YSGhsyYOd7GSZH7Kd6ncCPVBQuHQdHI5n6OJslitD7hKt4bC
tP3zGxkg_W71KGU2RXcQDfcTNmFcs2ice8RrrvNh1lzRViHO-scV0VNBk19JLTUy
aisiNKq-sNK14_RIG6AeivAGxLlXnN_RzttNe5d0XrXJ1nRUSFmeN6ZfVHE7qf6l
ORqaMeyqsDoJe1MIyISn6sCGzMZmplizNw_eg2QJIJX3Txat9mTfT5UZYyUq8mea
qRXMhoQWHGLweFTNYw"
Appendix C. Changes
[[Note to RFC editor - please delete this section before
publication.]]
C.1. WG-01
o A few clarifications/fixes.
o Added getchal interface and expires attribute
o Added Implementation Status section
o Added examples
C.2. WG-00
o First WG draft, replacing draft-farrell-httpbis-hoba-02
o Fleshed out HTTP scheme some more.
o Fleshed out registration form more.
Authors' Addresses
Stephen Farrell
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin, 2
Ireland
Phone: +353-1-896-2354
Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
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Paul Hoffman
VPN Consortium
Email: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org
Michael Thomas
Phresheez
Email: mike@phresheez.com
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