I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong, Ed.
Internet-Draft C. Chung
Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: 19 March 2022 T. Ahn
Korea Telecom
R. Kumar
Juniper Networks
S. Hares
Huawei
15 September 2021
I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-15
Abstract
This document describes an information model and a YANG data model
for the Consumer-Facing Interface between an Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) User and Security Controller in an I2NSF
system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. The
information model defines various types of managed objects and the
relationship among them needed to build the interface. The
information model is based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA)
policy model defined by a capability information model for I2NSF, and
the data model is defined for enabling different users of a given
I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor security policies for
specific flows within an administrative domain.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 March 2022.
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Information Model for Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Event Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Condition Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Action Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. User Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Device Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Location Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. URL Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Information Model for Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Threat Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . 19
8. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy
Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices
(Endpoint Group) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours . . . 49
8.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a
Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a
Company Web Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
9. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control for
I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
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13. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Appendix A. Changes from
draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-14 . . . . 62
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1. Introduction
In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
[RFC8329], each vendor can register their NSFs using a Developer's
Management System (DMS). Assuming that vendors also provide the
front-end web applications registered with an I2NSF User, the
Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the web applications
developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying
the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller
communicate using this interface. Therefore, this document specifies
the required information, their data types, and encoding schemes so
that high-level security policies (or configuration information for
security policies) can be transferred to the Security Controller
through the Consumer-Facing Interface. These policies can easily be
translated by the Security Controller into low-level security
policies. The Security Controller delivers the translated policies
to Network Security Functions (NSFs) according to their respective
security capabilities for the required securiy enforcement.
The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects,
with each object capturing a unique set of information from Security
Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User [RFC8329]) needed to express a
Security Policy. An object may have relationship with various other
objects to express a complete set of requirements. An information
model captures the managed objects and relationship among these
objects. The information model proposed in this document is
structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA)
policy model.
An NSF Capability model is proposed in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] as
the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing
Interface security policy model of this document.
[RFC3444] explains differences between an information and data model.
This document uses the guidelines in [RFC3444] to define both the
information and data model for Consumer-Facing Interface. Figure 1
shows a high-level abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface. A data
model, which represents an implementation of the information model in
a specific data representation language, is also defined in this
document.
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+-----------------+
| Consumer-Facing |
| Interface |
+--------+--------+
^
|
+-------------+------------+
| | |
+-----+----+ +-----+----+ +----+---+
| Policy | | Endpoint | | Threat |
| | | groups | | feed |
+-----+----+ +----------+ +--------+
^
|
+------+------+
| Rule |
+------+------+
^
|
+----------------+----------------+
| | |
+------+------+ +------+------+ +------+------+
| Event | | Condition | | Action |
+-------------+ +-------------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: Diagram for High-level Abstraction of Consumer-Facing
Interface
Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide
many details. They provide details about the implementation of a
protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed
objects onto lower-level protocol constructs. Since conceptual
models can be implemented in different ways, multiple data models can
be derived from a single information model.
The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system leads to a rapid
advance in the network industry. As practical applications, Network
Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection
System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack
mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNF)
in the NFV system. By the efficient virtualization technology, these
VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated
based on real-time security requirements. This document presents a
YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV.
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2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common
YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management
Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree
diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].
3. Information Model for Policy
A Policy object represents a mechanism to express a Security Policy
by Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing
Interface toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on
an NSF. Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object. The
Policy object SHALL have the following information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
Resolution-strategy: This field represent how to resolve conflicts
that occur between actions of the same or different policy
rules that are matched and contained in this particular
NSF.
Rules: This field contains a list of rules. These rules are
defined for 1) communication between two Endpoint Groups,
2) for preventing communication with externally or
internally identified threats, and 3) for implementing
business requirement such as controlling access to internal
or external resources for meeting regulatory compliance or
business objectives. An organization may restrict certain
communication between a set of user and applications for
example. The threats may be from threat feeds obtained
from external sources or dynamically identified by using
specialty devices in the network. Rule conflict analysis
should be triggered by the monitoring service to perform an
exhaustive detection of anomalies among the configuration
rules installed into the security functions.
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+--rw i2nsf-cfi-policy* [policy-name]
+--rw policy-name string
+--rw resolution-strategy? identityref
+--rw rules* [rule-name]
| ...
+--rw endpoint-groups
| ...
+--rw threat-preventions
| ...
+--rw url-group* [name]
| ...
Figure 2: Policy YANG Data Tree
A policy is a list of rules. In order to express a Rule, a Rule must
have complete information such as where and when a policy needs to be
applied. This is done by defining a set of managed objects and
relationship among them. A Policy Rule may be related segmentation,
threat mitigation or telemetry data collection from an NSF in the
network, which will be specified as the sub-model of the policy model
in the subsequent sections. Figure 3 shows the YANG data tree of the
Rule object. The rule object SHALL have the following information:
Rule-Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
Priority: This field identifies the priority of the rule.
Event: This field includes the information to determine whether
the Rule Condition can be evaluated or not. See details in
Section 4.1.
Condition: This field contains all the checking conditions to apply
to the objective traffic. See details in Section 4.2.
Action: This field identifies the action taken when a rule is
matched. There is always an implicit action to drop
traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type. See
details in Section 4.3.
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+--rw rules* [rule-name]
| +--rw rule-name string
| +--rw priority? uint8
| +--rw event
| ...
| +--rw condition
| ...
| +--rw actions
...
Figure 3: Rule YANG Data Tree
Note that in the case of policy conflicts, the resolution of the
conflicted policies conforms to the guidelines of "Information Model
of NSFs Capabilities" [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability].
3.1. Event Sub-model
The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule.
The Rule could be activated based on a set time or security event.
Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object. Event object SHALL
have following information:
Security-event: This field identifies for which security event the
policy is enforced. The examples of security events are:
"DDOS", "spyware", "trojan", and "ransomware".
Time-information: This represents the security rule is enforced
based on the period information with the end time for the
event.
Start-date-time: This represents the start time of the event. The
rule will start repeating from the specified time"
End-date-time: This represents the end time of the event. If the
rule time has pass the end-time, the rule will stop
repeating"
Period: This represents the period of time the rule event is
active. It can be configured by the start-time, stop-time,
day, date, and month.
Frequency: This represents how frequent the rule should be enforced.
There are four options: "only-once", "daily", "weekly",
"monthly" or "yearly".
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+--rw event
| +--rw security-event? identityref
| +--rw time
| +--rw start-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--rw end-date-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--rw period
| | +--rw start-time? time
| | +--rw end-time? time
| | +--rw day* identityref
| | +--rw date* int32
| | +--rw month* string
| +--rw frequency? enumeration
Figure 4: Event Sub-model YANG Data Tree
3.2. Condition Sub-model
This object represents Conditions that Security Administrator wants
to apply the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether
the set of actions in the Rule can be executed or not. The Condition
Sub-model consists of three different types of containers each
representing different cases, such as general firewall and DDoS-
mitigation cases, and a case when the condition is based on the
payload strings of packets. Each containers have source and
destination-target to represent the source and destination for each
case. Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object. The
Condition Sub-model SHALL have following information:
Case (firewall-condition): This field represents the general
firewall case, where a security admin can set up firewall
conditions using the information present in this field.
The source and destination is represented as source,
destination, transport layer protocol, port numbers, and
ICMP parameters.
Case (ddos-condition): This field represents the condition for DDoS
mitigation, where a security admin can set up DDoS
mitigation conditions using the information present in this
field. The rate of packet, byte, or flow threshold can be
configured to mitigate the DDoS.
Case (anti-virus-condition): This field represents the condition for
Antivirus, where a security admin can set up Antivirus
conditions using the information present in this field.
The file names or types can be configured to be allowed
without the Antivirus interuption.
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Case (payload-condition): This field contains the payload string
information. This information is useful when security rule
condition is based on the string contents of incoming or
outgoing packets. The name referring to the payload-groups
defined and registered in the endpoint-groups.
Case (url-condition): This field represents the URL to be filtered.
This information can be used to block or allow a certain
URL or website. The url-name is a group of URL or websites
to be matched.
Case (voice-condition): This field contains the call source-id, call
destination-id, and user-agent. This information can be
used to filter a caller id or receiver id to prevent any
VoIP or VoLTE exploits or attack.
Case (context-condition): This field represents a context of a
packet or flow. The context can be extended. This module
provides a context of geography location.
Case (Threat-feed-condition): This field contains the information
obtained from threat-feeds (e.g., Palo-Alto, or RSA-
netwitness). This information is useful when security rule
condition is based on the existing threat reports gathered
by other sources.
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+--rw condition
| +--rw firewall-condition
| | +--rw source* union
| | +--rw destination* union
| | +--rw transport-layer-protocol? identityref
| | +--rw range-port-number
| | | +--rw start-port-number? inet:port-number
| | | +--rw end-port-number? inet:port-number
| | +--rw icmp* [version]
| | +--rw version enumeration
| | +--rw type* uint8
| | +--rw code* uint8
| +--rw ddos-condition
| | +--rw rate-limit
| | +--rw packet-rate-threshold? uint32
| | +--rw byte-rate-threshold? uint32
| | +--rw flow-rate-threshold? uint32
| +--rw anti-virus-condition
| | +--rw exception-files* string
| +--rw payload-condition
| | +--rw content*
-> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name
| +--rw url-condition
| | +--rw url-name?
-> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/url-group/name
| +--rw voice-condition
| | +--rw source-id* string
| | +--rw destination-id* string
| | +--rw user-agent* string
| +--rw context-condition
| +--rw geography-location-condition
| +--rw source*
-> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name
| +--rw destination*
-> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name
| | +--rw threat-feed-condition
| | +--rw name*
-> /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name
Figure 5: Condition Sub-model YANG Data Tree
3.3. Action Sub-model
This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform
based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the
Action object. The Action object SHALL have following information:
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Primary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is
matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "pass",
"drop", "rate-limit", "mirror", "invoke-signaling",
"tunnel-encapsulation", "forwarding", and "transformation".
Secondary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is
matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "rule-log"
and "session-log".
+--rw actions
| +--rw primary-action
| | +--rw action? identityref
| +--rw secondary-action
| +--rw log-action? identityref
Figure 6: Action Sub-model YANG Data Tree
4. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups
The Policy Endpoint Group is a very important part of building User-
Construct based policies. A Security Administrator would create and
use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business
environment, where a Security Policy is to be applied. There are
multiple managed objects that constitute a Policy's Endpoint Group,
as shown in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint-
Groups object. This section lists these objects and relationship
among them.
It is assumed that the information of Endpoint Groups (e.g., User-
group, Device-group, and Location-group) such as the IP address(es)
of each member in a group are stored in the I2NSF database available
to the Security Controller, and that the IP address information of
each group in the I2NSF database is synchronized with other systems
in the networks under the same administration.
+-------------------+
| Endpoint Groups |
+---------+---------+
^
|
+--------------+-------+--------+---------------+
0..n | 0..n | 0..n | 0..n |
+-----+----+ +------+-----+ +-------+------+ +-----+---+
|User-group| |Device-group| |Location-group| |Url-group|
+----------+ +------------+ +--------------+ +---------+
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Figure 7: Endpoint Group Diagram
+--rw endpoint-groups
| +--rw user-group* [name]
| ...
| +--rw device-group* [name]
| ...
| +--rw location-group* [name]
| ...
| +--rw url-group* [name]
| ...
Figure 8: Endpoint Group YANG Data Tree
4.1. User Group
This object represents a User-Group. Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of
the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the
following information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
mac-address: This represents the MAC address of a user in the user
group.
Range-ipv4-address: This represents the IPv4 address range of a user
in the user group.
Range-ipv6-address: This represents the IPv6 address range of a user
in the user group.
+--rw user-group* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw mac-address* yang:mac-address
| +--rw (match-type)
| | +--:(range-match-ipv4)
| | | +--rw range-ipv4-address
| | | +--rw start-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | | +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | +--:(range-match-ipv6)
| | +--rw range-ipv6-address
| | +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
| | +--rw end-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
Figure 9: User Group YANG Data Tree
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4.2. Device Group
This object represents a Device-Group. Figure 10 shows the YANG tree
of the Device-group object. The Device-Group object SHALL have the
following information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
IPv4: This represents the IPv4 address of a device in the device
group.
IPv6: This represents the IPv6 address of a device in the device
group.
Range-ipv4-address: This represents the IPv4 address range of a
device in the device group.
Range-ipv6-address: This represents the IPv6 address range of a
device in the device group.
Application-protocol: This represents the application layer
protocols of devices. If this is not set, it cannot
support the appropriate protocol
+--rw device-group* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw (match-type)
| | +--:(range-match-ipv4)
| | | +--rw range-ipv4-address
| | | +--rw start-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | | +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | +--:(range-match-ipv6)
| | +--rw range-ipv6-address
| | +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
| | +--rw end-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
| +--rw application-protocol* identityref
Figure 10: Device Group YANG Data Tree
4.3. Location Group
This object represents a location group based on either tag or other
information. Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group
object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following
information:
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Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
Geo-ip-ipv4: This field represents the IPv4 Geo-ip address of a
location [RFC8805].
Geo-ip-ipv6: This field represents the IPv6 Geo-ip address of a
location [RFC8805].
Continent: This field represents the continent where the location
group member is located.
+--rw location-group* [name]
| +--rw name string
| +--rw geo-ip-ipv4* [ipv4-address]
| | +--rw ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address-no-zone
| | +--rw ipv4-prefix? inet:ipv4-prefix
| +--rw geo-ip-ipv6* [ipv6-address]
| | +--rw ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address-no-zone
| | +--rw ipv6-prefix? inet:ipv6-prefix
| +--rw continent? identityref
Figure 11: Location Group YANG Data Tree
4.4. URL Group
This object represents a URL group based on a Uniform Resource
Locator (URL) or web address. Figure 12 shows the YANG tree of the
URL-Group object. The URLn-Group object SHALL have the following
information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
url: This field represents the new URL added by a user to the
URL database.
+--rw url-group* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw url* string
Figure 12: URL Group YANG Data Tree
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5. Information Model for Threat Prevention
The threat prevention plays an important part in the overall security
posture by reducing the attack surfaces. This information could come
from various threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat
information). There are multiple managed objects that constitute
this category. This section lists these objects and relationship
among them. Figure 14 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention
object.
+-------------------+
| Threat Prevention |
+---------+---------+
^
|
+---------+---------+
0..n | 0..n |
+------+------+ +--------+--------+
| Threat-feed | | payload-content |
+-------------+ +-----------------+
Figure 13: Threat Prevention Diagram
+--rw threat-prevention
+--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
...
+--rw payload-content* [name]
...
Figure 14: Threat Prevention YANG Data Tree
5.1. Threat Feed
This object represents a threat feed which provides the signatures of
malicious activities. Figure 15 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-
feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following
information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object.
Description: This is the description of the threat feed. The
description should have the clear indication of the
security attack such as attack type (e.g., APT) and file
types used (e.g., executable malware).
Signatures: This field contains the threat signatures of malicious
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programs or activities provided by the threat-feed. The
examples of signature types are "YARA", "SURICATA", and
"SNORT" [YARA][SURICATA][SNORT].
It is assumed that the I2NSF User obtains the threat signatures
(i.e., threat content patterns) from a threat-feed server (i.e., feed
provider), which is a server providing threat signatures. With the
obtained threat signatures, the I2NSF User can deliver them to the
Security Controller. The retrieval of the threat signatures by the
I2NSF User is out of scope in this document.
+--rw threat-prevention
+--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
+--rw name identityref
+--rw description? string
+--rw signatures* identityref
Figure 15: Threat Feed YANG Data Tree
5.2. Payload Content
This object represents a custom list created for the purpose of
defining an exception to threat feeds. Figure 16 shows the YANG tree
of a Payload-content list. The Payload-Content object SHALL have the
following information:
Name: This field identifies the name of this object. For
example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content
is related to a backdoor attack.
Description: This represents the description of how the payload
content is related to a security attack.
Content: This contains the payload contents, which are involed in a
security attack, such as strings.
+--rw payload-content* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw description string
+--rw content* string
Figure 16: Payload Content in YANG Data Tree
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6. Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface
Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) provides a user
group with an access control with the following features [RFC8341]:
* Independent control of action, data, and notification access is
provided.
* A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used.
* Support for YANG security tagging allows default security modes to
automatically exclude sensitive data.
* Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute
permissions are provided.
* Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users.
The data model of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface utilizes the
NACM's mechanisms to manage the access control on the I2NSF Consumer-
Facing Interface. The NACM with the above features can be used to
set up the access control rules of a user group in the I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface.
Figure 17 shows part of the NACM module to enable the access control
of a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. To use the
NACM, a user needs to configure either a NETCONF server [RFC6241] or
a RESTCONF server [RFC8040] to enable the NACM module. Then, the
user can simply use an account of root or admin user for the access
control for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface (i.e.,
ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy). An XML example to configure the access
control a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface can be
seen in Section 9.
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list rule {
key "name";
ordered-by user;
leaf name {
type string {
length "1..max";
}
description
"Arbitrary name assigned to the rule.";
}
leaf module-name {
type union {
type matchall-string-type;
type string;
}
default "*";
description
"Name of the module associated with this rule."
}
leaf access-operations {
type union {
type matchall-string-type;
type access-operations-type;
}
default "*";
description
"Access operations associated with this rule."
}
leaf action {
type action-type;
mandatory true;
description
"The access control action associated with the
rule. If a rule is determined to match a
particular request, then this object is used
to determine whether to permit or deny the
request.";
}
Figure 17: A Part of the NACM YANG Data Model
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7. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface
The main objective of this document is to provide both an information
model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and
management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for
the I2NSF User's high-level security policies.
The semantics of the data model must be aligned with the information
model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. The transformation of the
information model is performed so that this YANG data model can
facilitate the efficient delivery of the control or management
messages.
This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can
be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the
model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific
policies as well as the implementation approach.
With the YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, this
document suggests use cases for security policy rules such as time-
based firewall, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack
mitigation in Section 8.
7.1. YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface
This section describes a YANG module of Consumer-Facing Interface.
This document provides identities in the data model to be used for
configuration of an NSF. Each identity is used for a different type
of configuration. The details are explained in the description of
each identity. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991]. It makes
references to [RFC0768][RFC0792][RFC0793] [RFC0854][RFC0959][RFC1939]
[RFC2818][RFC3022][RFC3261] [RFC3501][RFC4250][RFC4340]
[RFC4443][RFC5321][RFC7230] [RFC7231][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis][IANA-ICMP-Parameters]
[IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters][Encyclopedia-Britannica] [STIX].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2021-09-15.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy";
prefix nsfcfi;
import ietf-inet-types{
prefix inet;
reference "RFC 6991";
}
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import ietf-yang-types{
prefix yang;
reference "RFC 6991";
}
organization
"IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf>
WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
<mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
Editor: Patrick Lingga
<mailto:patricklink@skku.edu>";
description
"This module is a YANG module for Consumer-Facing Interface.
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
revision "2021-09-15" {
description "Initial revision.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model";
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
}
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identity resolution-strategy {
description
"Base identity for resolution strategy";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity fmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for First Matching Rule (FMR)";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity lmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Last Matching Rule (LMR)";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity pmr {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule (PMR)";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity pmre {
base resolution-strategy;
description
"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule
with Errors (PMRE)";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity pmrn {
base resolution-strategy;
description
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"Identity for Prioritized Matching Rule
with No Errors (PMRN)";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution Strategy";
}
identity security-event {
description
"Base identity for security event types.";
}
identity anti-ddos {
base security-event;
description
"Identity for Anti-DDoS event types.";
}
identity ips {
base security-event;
description
"Identity for Intrusion Prevention System event types.";
}
identity url-filtering {
base security-event;
description
"Identity for url-filtering event types.";
}
identity anti-virus {
base security-event;
description
"Identity for Antivirus types.";
}
identity voip-volte-filtering {
base security-event;
description
"Identity for VoIP/VoLTE Filtering event types.";
}
identity protocol {
description
"This identity represents the protocol types.";
}
identity transport-protocol {
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base protocol;
description
"Base identity for the Layer 4 (i.e., Transport Layer)
Protocols";
}
identity tcp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Base identity for TCP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 793: Transmission Control Protocol
draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis: Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) Specification";
}
identity udp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Base identity for UDP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 768: User Datagram Protocol";
}
identity sctp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Identity for SCTP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4960: Stream Control Transmission Protocol";
}
identity dccp {
base transport-protocol;
description
"Identity for DCCP condition capabilities";
reference
"RFC 4340: Datagram Congestion Control Protocol";
}
identity application-protocol {
base protocol;
description
"Base identity for the Layer 7 (i.e., Application Layer)
Protocols";
}
identity ftp {
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base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for ftp protocol.";
reference
"RFC 959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)";
}
identity ssh {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for ssh protocol.";
reference
"RFC 4250: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol";
}
identity telnet {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for telnet.";
reference
"RFC 854: Telnet Protocol";
}
identity smtp {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for smtp.";
reference
"RFC 5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)";
}
identity http {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for http.";
reference
"RFC7230: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message
Syntax and Routing
RFC7231: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics
and Content";
}
identity https {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for https.";
reference
"RFC 2818: HTTP over TLS (HTTPS)";
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}
identity pop3 {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for pop3.";
reference
"RFC 1939: Post Office Protocol - Version 3 (POP3)";
}
identity imap {
base application-protocol;
description
"The identity for Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP).";
reference
"RFC 3501: INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1";
}
identity action {
description
"Base identity for action";
}
identity ingress-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity to represents the ingress actions, such as
pass, drop, rate-limit, and mirror.";
}
identity egress-action {
base action;
description
"Base identity represents the egress actions, such as
pass, drop, rate-limit, mirror, invoke-signaling,
tunnel-encapsulation, forwarding, and transformation.";
}
identity pass {
base ingress-action;
description
"The identity for pass.";
}
identity drop {
base ingress-action;
description
"The identity for drop.";
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}
identity rate-limit {
base ingress-action;
description
"The identity for rate-limit.";
}
identity mirror {
base ingress-action;
description
"The identity for mirroring.";
}
identity invoke-signaling {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for invoke signaling action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Invoke-signaling action";
}
identity tunnel-encapsulation {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for tunnel encapsulation action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Tunnel Encapsulation";
}
identity forwarding {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for forwarding action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Forwarding action";
}
identity transformation {
base egress-action;
description
"Identity for transformation action capability";
reference
"RFC 8329: Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions - Redirection action";
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}
identity log-action {
description
"Base identity for representing log actions, such as rule-log
and session-log action.";
}
identity rule-log {
base log-action;
description
"Identity for rule log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the rule";
}
identity session-log {
base log-action;
description
"Identity for session log-action capability.
Log the received packet based on the session.";
}
identity signature-type {
description
"This represents the base identity for signature types.";
}
identity signature-yara {
base signature-type;
description
"This represents the YARA signatures.";
reference
"YARA: YARA signatures are explained.";
}
identity signature-snort {
base signature-type;
description
"This represents the SNORT signatures.";
reference
"SNORT: SNORT signatures are explained.";
}
identity signature-suricata {
base signature-type;
description
"This represents the SURICATA signatures.";
reference
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"SURICATA: SURICATA signatures are explained.";
}
identity threat-feed-type {
description
"This represents the base identity for threat-feed.";
}
identity day {
description
"This represents the base for days.";
}
identity monday {
base day;
description
"This represents Monday.";
}
identity tuesday {
base day;
description
"This represents Tuesday.";
}
identity wednesday {
base day;
description
"This represents Wednesday.";
}
identity thursday {
base day;
description
"This represents Thursday.";
}
identity friday {
base day;
description
"This represents Friday.";
}
identity saturday {
base day;
description
"This represents Saturday.";
}
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identity sunday {
base day;
description
"This represents Sunday.";
}
identity continent {
description
"Base identity for continent types. The continents are based
on Encyclopedia Britannica";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity africa {
base continent;
description
"Identity for Africa.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity asia {
base continent;
description
"Identity for Asia.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity antarctica {
base continent;
description
"Identity for Antarctica.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity europe {
base continent;
description
"Identity for Europe.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity north-america {
base continent;
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description
"Identity for North America.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity south-america {
base continent;
description
"Identity for South America.";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
identity australia {
base continent;
description
"Identity for Australia";
reference
"Encyclopedia Britannica: Continent";
}
/*
* Typedefs
*/
typedef time {
type string {
pattern '(0[0-9]|1[0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.\d+)?'
+ '(Z|[\+\-]((1[0-3]|0[0-9]):([0-5][0-9])|14:00))?';
}
description
"The time type represents an instance of time of zero-duration
that recurs every day.";
}
/*
* Groupings
*/
grouping ipv4-list {
description
"Grouping for an IPv4 address list.";
leaf-list ipv4 {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
description
"This is the entry for an IPv4 address list.";
}
}
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grouping ipv6-list {
description
"Grouping for an IPv6 address list.";
leaf-list ipv6 {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
description
"This is the entry for an IPv6 address list.";
}
}
grouping ipv4 {
description
"Grouping for an IPv4 address.";
leaf ipv4 {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
description
"This is the entry for an IPv4 address.";
}
}
grouping ipv6 {
description
"Grouping for an IPv6 address.";
leaf ipv6 {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
description
"This is the entry for an IPv6 address.";
}
}
grouping ip-address-info {
description
"There are two types to configure a security policy
for an IP address, such as IPv4 adress and IPv6 address.";
choice match-type {
description
"User can choose between IPv4 and IPv6.";
case range-match-ipv4 {
container range-ipv4-address {
leaf start-ipv4-address {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"A start IPv4 address for a range match.";
}
leaf end-ipv4-address {
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
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description
"An end IPv4 address for a range match.";
}
description
"A range match for IPv4 addresses is provided.
Note that the start IPv4 address must be lower than
the end IPv4 address.";
}
}
case range-match-ipv6 {
container range-ipv6-address {
leaf start-ipv6-address {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"A start IPv6 address for a range match.";
}
leaf end-ipv6-address {
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
mandatory true;
description
"An end IPv6 address for a range match.";
}
description
"A range match for IPv6 addresses is provided.
Note that the start IPv6 address must be lower than
the end IPv6 address.";
}
}
}
}
grouping user-group {
description
"This group represents user group information such as name and
ip-address.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a user-group. A user-group name
is used to map a user-group's name (e.g., employees) to IP
address(es), MAC address(es).
It is dependent on implementation.";
}
leaf-list mac-address {
type yang:mac-address;
description
"Represent the MAC Address of a user-group. A user-group
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can have multiple MAC Addresses.";
}
uses ip-address-info{
description
"This represents the IP addresses of a user-group.";
refine match-type{
mandatory true;
}
}
}
grouping device-group {
description
"This group represents device group information such as
ip-address protocol.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a device-group.";
}
uses ip-address-info{
refine match-type{
mandatory true;
}
}
leaf-list application-protocol {
type identityref {
base application-protocol;
}
description
"This represents the application layer protocols of devices.
If this is not set, it cannot support the appropriate
protocol";
}
}
grouping location-group {
description
"This group represents location-group information such as
geo-ip and continent.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a location.";
}
list geo-ip-ipv4 {
key "ipv4-address";
description
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"This represents the list of IPv4 addresses based on a
location.";
leaf ipv4-address{
type inet:ipv4-address-no-zone;
description
"This represents an IPv4 geo-ip address of a location.";
}
leaf ipv4-prefix{
type inet:ipv4-prefix;
description
"This represents the prefix for the IPv4 addresses.";
}
}
list geo-ip-ipv6 {
key "ipv6-address";
description
"This represents the list of IPv6 addresses based on a
location.";
leaf ipv6-address{
type inet:ipv6-address-no-zone;
description
"This represents an IPv6 geo-ip address of a location.";
}
leaf ipv6-prefix{
type inet:ipv6-prefix;
description
"This represents the prefix for the IPv6 addresses.";
}
}
leaf continent {
type identityref {
base continent;
}
default asia;
description
"location-group has geo-ip addresses of the corresponding
continent.";
}
}
grouping payload-string {
description
"The grouping for payload-string content. It contains
information such as name and string content.";
leaf description {
type string;
description
"This represents the description of a payload. If this is
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not set, it cannot support the description of how the
payload content is related to a security attack.";
}
leaf-list content {
type string;
description
"This represents the string of the payload contents.
This content leaf-list contains the payload of a packet to
analyze a threat. Due to the types of threats, the type of
the content is defined as a string to accommodate any kind
of a payload type such as HTTP, HTTPS, and SIP. If this is
not set, it cannot support the payload contents involved in
a security attack as a string.";
}
}
list i2nsf-cfi-policy {
key "policy-name";
description
"This is a security policy list. Each policy in the list
contains a list of security policy rules, and is a policy
instance to have the information of where and when a policy
needs to be applied.";
leaf policy-name {
type string;
description
"The name which identifies the policy.";
}
leaf resolution-strategy {
type identityref {
base resolution-strategy;
}
default fmr;
description
"The resolution strategies that can be used to
specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between
actions of the same or different policy rules that
are matched and contained in this particular NSF";
reference
"draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-17:
I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model - Resolution strategy";
}
list rules {
key "rule-name";
description
"There can be a single or multiple number of rules.";
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leaf rule-name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name for a rule.";
}
leaf priority {
type uint8 {
range "1..255";
}
description
"The priority keyword comes with a mandatory
numeric value which can range from 1 through 255.
Note that a higher number means a higher priority";
}
container event {
description
"This represents an event (i.e., a security event), for
which a security rule is made.";
leaf security-event {
type identityref {
base security-event;
}
description
"This contains the description of a security event. If
this is not set, it cannot support what security event
will be enforced.";
}
container time {
description
"The time when a security policy rule should be
applied.";
leaf start-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This is the start date and time for a security policy
rule.";
}
leaf end-date-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"This is the end date and time for a policy rule. The
policy rule will stop working after the specified
end-date-time.";
}
container period {
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when
"../frequency!='only-once'";
description
"This represents the repetition time. In the case
where the frequency is weekly, the days can be set.";
leaf start-time {
type time;
description
"This is a period's start time for an event.";
}
leaf end-time {
type time;
description
"This is a period's end time for an event.";
}
leaf-list day {
when
"../../frequency='weekly'";
type identityref{
base day;
}
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated day of every week
(e.g., Monday and Tuesday). More than one day can be
specified.";
}
leaf-list date {
when
"../../frequency='monthly'";
type int32{
range "1..31";
}
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated date of every month.
More than one date can be specified.";
}
leaf-list month {
when
"../../frequency='yearly'";
type string{
pattern '\d{2}-\d{2}';
}
min-elements 1;
description
"This represents the repeated date and month of every
year. More than one can be specified. A pattern
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used here is Month and Date (MM-DD).";
}
}
leaf frequency {
type enumeration {
enum only-once {
description
"This represents that the rule is immediately
enforced only once and not repeated. The policy
will continuously be active from the start-time
to the end-time.";
}
enum daily {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
daily basis. The policy will be repeated daily
until the end-date.";
}
enum weekly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
weekly basis. The policy will be repeated weekly
until the end-date. The repeated days can be
specified.";
}
enum monthly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
monthly basis. The policy will be repeated monthly
until the end-date.";
}
enum yearly {
description
"This represents that the rule is enforced on a
yearly basis. The policy will be repeated yearly
until the end-date.";
}
}
default only-once;
description
"This represents how frequently the rule should be
enforced.";
}
}
}
container condition {
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description
"Conditions for general security policies.";
container firewall-condition {
description
"A general firewall condition based on the packet
header.";
leaf-list source {
type union {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"user-group/name";
}
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"device-group/name";
}
}
description
"This describes the path of the source.";
}
leaf-list destination {
type union {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"user-group/name";
}
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"device-group/name";
}
}
description
"This describes the path to the destinations.";
}
leaf transport-layer-protocol {
type identityref {
base transport-protocol;
}
description
"The transport-layer protocol to be matched.";
}
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container range-port-number {
leaf start-port-number {
type inet:port-number;
description
"A start port number for range match.";
}
leaf end-port-number {
type inet:port-number;
description
"An end port number for range match.";
}
description
"A range match for transport-layer port number. Note
that the start port number value must be lower than
the end port number value";
}
list icmp {
key "version";
description
"Represents the ICMP packet header information to
determine if the set of policy actions in this ECA
policy rule should be executed or not.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces";
leaf version {
type enumeration {
enum icmpv4 {
value "1";
description
"The ICMPv4 Protocol as defined in RFC 792";
}
enum icmpv6 {
value "2";
description
"The ICMPv6 Protocol as defined in RFC 4443";
}
}
description
"The ICMP version to be matched. This value
affected the type and code values.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 4443: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification";
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}
leaf-list type {
type uint8;
description
"The security policy rule according to
ICMP type parameter.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Parameters
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6) Parameters";
}
leaf-list code {
type uint8;
description
"The security policy rule according to
ICMP code parameter.";
reference
"RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol
RFC 8335: PROBE: A Utility for Probing Interfaces
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
Parameters
IANA: Internet Control Message Protocol version 6
(ICMPv6) Parameters";
}
}
}
container ddos-condition {
description
"A condition for a DDoS attack.";
container rate-limit {
description
"This describes the rate-limit.";
leaf packet-rate-threshold {
type uint32;
description
"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of packet
rate for a DDoS-attack mitigation.";
}
leaf byte-rate-threshold {
type uint32;
description
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"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of byte
rate for a DDoS-attack mitigation.";
}
leaf flow-rate-threshold {
type uint32;
description
"This is a trigger value for a rate limit of flow
rate for a DDoS-attack mitigation.";
}
}
}
container anti-virus-condition {
description
"A condition for anti-virus";
leaf-list exception-files {
type string;
description
"The type or name of the files to be excluded by the
anti-virus. This can be used to keep the known
harmless files.";
}
}
container payload-condition {
description
"A condition based on a packet's content.";
leaf-list content {
type leafref {
path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/"
+ "payload-content/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a packet content's";
}
}
container url-condition {
description
"Condition for url category";
leaf url-name {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"url-group/name";
}
description
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"This is description for the condition of a URL's
category such as SNS sites, game sites, ecommerce
sites, company sites, and university sites.";
}
}
container voice-condition {
description
"For the VoIP/VoLTE security system, a VoIP/
VoLTE security system can monitor each
VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE
security rules controlled by a centralized
server for VoIP/VoLTE security service
(called VoIP IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security
system controls each switch for the
VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by
manipulating the rules that can be added,
deleted, or modified dynamically.";
reference
"RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol";
leaf-list source-id {
type string;
description
"The security policy rule according to
a source voice ID for VoIP and VoLTE.";
}
leaf-list destination-id {
type string;
description
"The security policy rule according to
a destination voice ID for VoIP and VoLTE.";
}
leaf-list user-agent {
type string;
description
"The security policy rule according to
an user agent for VoIP and VoLTE.";
}
}
container context-condition {
description
"Condition for matching the context of the packet, such
as geographic location, time, packet direction";
container geography-location-condition {
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description
"A condition for a location-based connection";
leaf-list source {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"location-group/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a location's sources.";
}
leaf-list destination {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/"
+"location-group/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a location's
destinations.";
}
}
}
container threat-feed-condition {
description
"A condition based on the threat-feed information.";
leaf-list name {
type leafref {
path
"/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/"
+"threat-feed-list/name";
}
description
"This describes the paths to a threat-feed's sources.";
}
}
}
container actions {
description
"This is the action container.";
container primary-action {
description
"This represent primary actions (e.g., ingress and egress
action) to be applied to a condition.
If this is not set, it cannot support the primary
actions.";
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leaf action {
type identityref {
base action;
}
description
"Ingress Action: pass, drop, reject, rate-limit,
and mirror.
Egress action: mirror, invoke-signaling,
tunnel-encapsulation, forwarding, and redirection.";
}
}
container secondary-action {
description
"This represents secondary actions (e.g., log and syslog)
to be applied if they are needed. If this is not set,
it cannot support the secondary actions.";
leaf log-action {
type identityref {
base log-action;
}
description
"Log action: rule log and session log";
}
}
}
}
container endpoint-groups {
description
"A logical entity in a business environment, where a security
policy is to be applied.";
list user-group{
uses user-group;
key "name";
description
"This represents a user group.";
}
list device-group {
key "name";
uses device-group;
description
"This represents a device group.";
}
list location-group{
key "name";
uses location-group;
description
"This represents a location group.";
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}
list url-group {
key "name";
description
"This describes the list of URL.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This is the name of URL group, e.g., SNS sites,
gaming sites, ecommerce sites";
}
leaf-list url {
type string;
description
"Specifies the URL to be added into the group.";
}
}
}
container threat-preventions {
description
"This describes the list of threat-preventions.";
list threat-feed-list {
key "name";
description
"There can be a single or multiple number of
threat-feeds.";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of the threat-feed.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"This represents the descriptions of a threat-feed. The
description should include information, such as type,
threat, method, and file type. Structured Threat
Information Expression (STIX) can be used for
description of a threat [STIX].";
}
leaf-list signatures {
type identityref {
base signature-type;
}
description
"This contains a list of signatures or hashes of the
threats.";
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}
}
list payload-content {
key "name";
leaf name {
type string;
description
"This represents the name of a packet's payload-content.
It should give an idea of why a specific payload content
is marked as a threat. For example, the name 'backdoor'
indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor
attack.";
}
description
"This represents a payload-string group.";
uses payload-string;
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
Figure 18: YANG for Consumer-Facing Interface
8. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules
This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security
policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security
Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered use
cases are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web
filtering, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation.
8.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices
(Endpoint Group)
If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to
first register their data to the database. For example, if new
members are newly introduced in either of three different groups
(i.e., user-group, device-group, and url-group), each of them should
be registered with information such as ip-addresses or protocols used
by devices.
Figure 19 shows an example XML representation of the registered
information for the user-group and device-group with IPv4 addresses
[RFC5737].
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<endpoint-groups>
<user-group>
<name>employees</name>
<range-ipv4-address>
<start-ipv4-address>192.0.2.11</start-ipv4-address>
<end-ipv4-address>192.0.2.90</end-ipv4-address>
</range-ipv4-address>
</user-group>
<device-group>
<name>webservers</name>
<range-ipv4-address>
<start-ipv4-address>198.51.100.11</start-ipv4-address>
<end-ipv4-address>198.51.100.20</end-ipv4-address>
</range-ipv4-address>
<protocol>nsfcfi:http</protocol>
<protocol>nsfcfi:https</protocol>
</device-group>
<url-group>
<name>sns-websites</name>
<user-defined>SNS_1</user-defined>
<user-defined>SNS_2</user-defined>
</url-group>
</endpoint-groups>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Figure 19: Registering User-group and Device-group Information
with IPv4 Addresses
Also, Figure 20 shows an example XML representation of the registered
information for the user-group and device-group with IPv6 addresses
[RFC3849].
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<endpoint-groups>
<user-group>
<name>employees</name>
<range-ipv6-address>
<start-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:1::11</start-ipv6-address>
<end-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:1::90</end-ipv6-address>
</range-ipv6-address>
</user-group>
<device-group>
<name>webservers</name>
<range-ipv6-address>
<start-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:2::11</start-ipv6-address>
<end-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:2::20</end-ipv6-address>
</range-ipv6-address>
<protocol>nsfcfi:http</protocol>
<protocol>nsfcfi:https</protocol>
</device-group>
<url-group>
<name>sns-websites</name>
<url>SNS_1</url>
<url>SNS_2</url>
</url-group>
</endpoint-groups>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Figure 20: Registering User-group and Device-group Information
with IPv6 Addresses
8.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours
The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office
hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all
users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to
access Social Networking Services (SNS) during the office hours
(weekdays). The XML instance is described below:
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<policy-name>security_policy_for_blocking_sns123</policy-name>
<rules>
<rule-name>block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours</rule-name>
<event>
<time-information>
<start-date-time>2021-03-11T09:00:00.00Z</start-date-time>
<end-date-time>2021-12-31T18:00:00.00Z</end-date-time>
<period>
<start-time>09:00:00Z</start-time>
<end-time>18:00:00Z</end-time>
<day>nsfcfi:monday</day>
<day>nsfcfi:tuesday</day>
<day>nsfcfi:wednesday</day>
<day>nsfcfi:thursday</day>
<day>nsfcfi:friday</day>
</period>
</time-information>
<frequency>weekly</frequency>
</event>
<condition>
<firewall-condition>
<source>employees</source>
</firewall-condition>
<url-condition>
<url-name>sns-websites</url-name>
</url-condition>
</condition>
<actions>
<primary-action>nsfcfi:drop</primary-action>
</actions>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Figure 21: An XML Example for Time-based Firewall
Time-based-condition Firewall
1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns".
2. The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours".
3. The Source is "employees".
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4. The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the
key which represents the list containing the information, such as
URL, about sns-websites.
5. The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to
websites related to Social networking.
8.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company
The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets
coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the
calls comming from from VOIP and/or VOLTE sources with VOLTE IDs that
are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the
employees and malicious VOIP IDs should be blocked are stored in the
database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and the rest of the
cases assume that the security administrators or someone responsible
for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which
and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements.
Figure 22 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed
in previous sections. Once a high-level seucurity policy is created
by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing
Interface, through RESTCONF server, to the security controller. The
XML instance is described below:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<policy-name>
security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets
</policy-name>
<rules>
<rule-name>Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets</rule-name>
<condition>
<voice-condition>
<source-id>malicious-id</source-id>
</voice-condition>
<firewall-condition>
<destination>employees</destination>
</firewall-condition>
</condition>
<actions>
<primary-action>nsfcfi:drop</primary-action>
</actions>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Figure 22: An XML Example for VoIP Security Service
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Custom-condition Firewall
1. The policy name is
"security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets".
2. The rule name is "Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets".
3. The Source is "malicious-id". This can be a single ID or a list
of IDs, depending on how the ID are stored in the database. The
"malicious-id" is the key so that the security admin can read
every stored malicious VOIP IDs that are named as "malicious-id".
4. The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key
which represents the list containing information about employees,
such as IP addresses.
5. The action required is "drop" when any incoming packets are from
"malicious-id".
8.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web
Server
The third example scenario is to "Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood
attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation
policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service
provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the
packets sent by any sources are more than the set threshold, then the
admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely
maintain the service. In this scenario, the source is set as "any"
to block any sources which send abnormal amount of packets. The
destination is set as "web_server01". Once the rule is set and
delivered and enforced to the nsfs by the securiy controller, the
NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts and the destination to
act according to the rule set. The XML instance is described below:
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<policy-name>security_policy_for_ddos_attacks</policy-name>
<rules>
<rule-name>1000_packets_per_second</rule-name>
<conditions>
<ddos-condition>
<rate-limit>
<packet-rate-threshold>1000</packet-rate-threshold>
</rate-limit>
</ddos-condition>
</conditions>
<actions>
<primary-action>nsfcfi:drop</primary-action>
</actions>
</rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>
Figure 23: An XML Example for DDoS-attack Mitigation
DDoS-condition Firewall
1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks".
2. The rule name is "100_packets_per_second".
3. The rate limit exists to limit the incoming amount of packets per
second. In this case the rate limit is "1000" packets per
second. This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of
the server devices.
4. The Source is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets.
5. The action required is to "drop" packet reception is more than
1000 packets per second.
9. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control for I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface
This is an example for creating privileges for a group of users
(i.e., a user group) to access and use the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface to create security policies via the interface. For the
access control of the Consumer-Facing Interface, the NACM module can
be used. Figure 24 shows an XML example the access control of a user
group (named Example-Group) for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface A
group called Example-Group can be created and configured with NACM
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for the Consumer-Facing Interface. For Example-Group, a rule list
can created with the name of Example-Group-Rules. Example-Group-
Rules has two rules of Example-Group-Rule1 and Example-Group-Rule2 as
follows. For Example-Group-Rule1, the privilege of "Read" is allowed
to Example-Group for the Consumer-Facing Interface. On the other
hand, for Example-Group-Rule2, the privileges of "Create", "Update",
and "Delete" are denied against Example-Group for the Consumer-Facing
Interface.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
<enable-nacm>true</enable-nacm>
<groups>
<group>
<name>Example-Group</name>
<user-name>Alice</user-name>
<user-name>Bob</user-name>
<user-name>Eve</user-name>
</group>
</groups>
<rule-list>
<name>Example-Group-Rules</name>
<group>Example-Group</group>
<rule>
<name>Example-Group-Rule1</name>
<access-operations>read</access-operations>
<module-name>ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy</module-name>
<action>permit</action>
</rule>
<rule>
<name>Example-Group-Rule2</name>
<access-operations>create update delete</access-operations>
<module-name>ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy</module-name>
<action>deny</action>
</rule>
</rule-list>
</nacm>
Figure 24: An XML Example of a User Group's Access Control for
I2NSF Consumer- Facing Interface
The access control for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is as
follows.
1. The NACM is enabled.
2. As a group name, Example-Group is specified.
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3. As members of the group, Alice, Bob, and Eve are specified.
4. As a rule list name, Example-Group-Rules is specified for
managing privileges of Example-Group's members.
5. As the first rule name, Example-Group-Rule1 is specified. This
rule is used to give read privilege to Example-Group's members
for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface.
6. As the second rule name, Example-Group-Rule2 is specified. This
rule is used to deny create, update, and delete privileges
against Example-Group's members for the module of the I2NSF
Consumer-Facing Interface.
10. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
"IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:
name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
prefix: nsfcfi
reference: RFC XXXX
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove
// this note.
11. Security Considerations
The YANG module specified in this document defines a data schema
designed to be accessed through network management protocols such as
NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is
the secure transport layer, and the required secure transport is
Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS,
and the required secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].
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The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides a means of restricting access to specific NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and contents. Thus, NACM SHOULD be used
to restrict the NSF registration from unauthorized users.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable, creatable, and deletable (i.e., config true, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations to these data nodes
could have a negative effect on network and security operations.
These data nodes are collected into a single list node with the
following sensitivity/vulnerability:
* list i2nsf-cfi-policy: Writing to almost any element of this YANG
module would directly impact on the configuration of NSFs, e.g.,
completely turning off security monitoring and mitigation
capabilities; altering the scope of this monitoring and
mitigation; creating an overwhelming logging volume to overwhelm
downstream analytics or storage capacity; creating logging
patterns which are confusing; or rendering useless trained
statistics or artificial intelligence models.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes with their sensitivity/vulnerability:
* list i2nsf-cfi-policy: The leak of this node to an attacker could
reveal the specific configuration of security controls to an
attacker. An attacker can craft an attack path that avoids
observation or mitigations; one may reveal topology information to
inform additional targets or enable lateral movement; one enables
the construction of an attack path that avoids observation or
mitigations; one provides an indication that the operator has
discovered the attack. This node also holds a list of endpoint
data that is considered private to the users.
12. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by
the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based
Network Management Automation Technology).
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13. Contributors
This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group.
Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Mahdi F.
Dachmehchi and Daeyoung Hyun. The authors sincerely appreciate their
contributions.
The following are co-authors of this document:
Patrick Lingga Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419 Republic of Korea EMail: patricklink@skku.edu
Hyoungshick Kim Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do
16419 Republic of Korea EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
Eunsoo Kim Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon,
Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: eskim86@skku.edu
Seungjin Lee Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon,
Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: jine33@skku.edu
Jinyong Tim Kim Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer
Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon,
Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: timkim@skku.edu
Anil Lohiya Juniper Networks 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, CA 94089
US EMail: alohiya@juniper.net
Dave Qi Bloomberg 731 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10022 US EMail:
DQI@bloomberg.net
Nabil Bitar Nokia 755 Ravendale Drive Mountain View, CA 94043 US
EMail: nabil.bitar@nokia.com
Senad Palislamovic Nokia 755 Ravendale Drive Mountain View, CA 94043
US EMail: senad.palislamovic@nokia.com
Liang Xia Huawei 101 Software Avenue Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012 China
EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
14. References
14.1. Normative References
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[RFC0768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
[RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, May
1983, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
[RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.
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[RFC4340] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8407] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8525] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis]
Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25, 7 September 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-
rfc793bis-25.txt>.
14.2. Informative References
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, January 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.
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[RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between
Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3444>.
[RFC3849] Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix
Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3849, July 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3849>.
[RFC5737] Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks
Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
[RFC8805] Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and W.
Kumari, "A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation
Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.
[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]
Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. R. Lopez,
"Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-05,
24 April 2019, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-i2nsf-capability-05.txt>.
[IANA-ICMP-Parameters]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Assigned
Internet Protocol Numbers", February 2021,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
protocol-numbers.xhtml>.
[IANA-ICMPv6-Parameters]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Internet
Control Message Procotol version 6 (ICMPv6) Parameters",
February 2021, <https://www.iana.org/assignments/icmpv6-
parameters/icmpv6-parameters.xhtml>.
[Encyclopedia-Britannica]
Britannica, "Continent", September 2020,
<https://www.britannica.com/science/continent>.
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[YARA] Alvarez, V., Bengen, H., Metz, J., Buehlmann, S., and W.
Shields, "YARA", YARA
Documents https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.5.0/, August
2020.
[SURICATA] Julien, V. and , "SURICATA", SURICATA Documents
https://suricata-ids.org/docs/, August 2020.
[SNORT] Roesch, M., Green, C., and B. Caswell, "SNORT", SNORT
Documents https://www.snort.org/#documents, August 2020.
[STIX] Jordan, B., Piazza, R., and T. Darley, "Structured Threat
Information Expression (STIX)", STIX Version 2.1:
Committee Specification 01 https://docs.oasis-
open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/stix-v2.1.pdf, March 2020.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-
dm-14
The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-
interface-dm-14:
* This version has been updated following Tom Petch's comments.
Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong (editor)
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
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Chaehong Chung
Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon
Gyeonggi-Do
16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Email: darkhong@skku.edu
Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon
305-811
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409
Email: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Rakesh Kumar
Juniper Networks
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States of America
Email: rkkumar@juniper.net
Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
United States of America
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
Email: shares@ndzh.com
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