Internet-Draft | NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model | September 2021 |
Jeong, et al. | Expires 19 March 2022 | [Page] |
- Workgroup:
- Network Working Group
- Internet-Draft:
- draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-10
- Published:
- Intended Status:
- Standards Track
- Expires:
I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface YANG Data Model
Abstract
This document proposes an information model and the corresponding YANG data model of an interface for monitoring Network Security Functions (NSFs) in the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) framework. If the monitoring of NSFs is performed with the NSF monitoring interface in a comprehensive way, it is possible to detect the indication of malicious activity, anomalous behavior, the potential sign of denial of service attacks, or system overload in a timely manner. This monitoring functionality is based on the monitoring information that is generated by NSFs. Thus, this document describes not only an information model for the NSF monitoring interface along with a YANG data diagram, but also the corresponding YANG data model.¶
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 March 2022.¶
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.¶
1. Introduction
According to [RFC8329], the interface provided by a Network Security Function (NSF) (e.g., Firewall, IPS, or Anti-DDoS function) to administrative entities (e.g., Security Controller) to enable remote management (i.e., configuring and monitoring) is referred to as an I2NSF Monitoring Interface. This interface enables the sharing of vital data from the NSFs (e.g., alarms, records, and counters) to the Security Controller through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., queries, notifications, and events). The monitoring of NSF plays an important role in an overall security framework, if it is done in a timely and comprehensive way. The monitoring information generated by an NSF can be a good, early indication of anomalous behavior or malicious activity, such as denial of service attacks (DoS).¶
This document defines a comprehensive information model of an NSF monitoring interface that provides visibility into an NSF for the NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller). Note that an NSF data collector is defined as an entity to collect NSF monitoring data from an NSF, such as Security Controller. It specifies the information and illustrates the methods that enable an NSF to provide the information required in order to be monitored in a scalable and efficient way via the NSF Monitoring Interface. The information model for the NSF monitoring interface presented in this document is complementary for the security policy provisioning functionality of the NSF-Facing Interface specified in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm].¶
This document also defines a YANG [RFC7950] data model for the NSF monitoring interface, which is derived from the information model for the NSF monitoring interface.¶
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329].¶
This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].¶
3. Use Cases for NSF Monitoring Data
As mentioned earlier, monitoring plays a critical role in an overall security framework. The monitoring of the NSF provides very valuable information to an NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller) in maintaining the provisioned security posture. Besides this, there are various other reasons to monitor the NSF as listed below:¶
- The security administrator with I2NSF User can configure a policy that is triggered on a specific event occurring in the NSF or the network [RFC8329] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm]. If an NSF data collector detects the specified event, it configures additional security functions as defined by policies.¶
- The events triggered by an NSF as a result of security policy violation can be used by Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) to detect any suspicious activity in a larger correlation context.¶
- The information (i.e., events, records, and counters) from an NSF can be used to build advanced analytics, such as behavior and predictive models to improve security posture in large deployments.¶
- The NSF data collector can use events from the NSF for achieving high availability. It can take corrective actions such as restarting a failed NSF and horizontally scaling up the NSF.¶
- The information (i.e., events, records, and counters) from the NSF can aid in the root cause analysis of an operational issue, so it can improve debugging.¶
- The records from the NSF can be used to build historical data for operation and business reasons.¶
4. Classification of NSF Monitoring Data
In order to maintain a strong security posture, it is not only necessary to configure an NSF's security policies but also to continuously monitor the NSF by consuming acquirable and observable data. This enables security administrators to assess the state of the networks and in a timely fashion. It is not possible to block all the internal and external threats based on static security posture. A more practical approach is supported by enabling dynamic security measures, for which continuous visibility is required. This document defines a set of monitoring elements and their scopes that can be acquired from an NSF and can be used as NSF monitoring data. In essence, these types of monitoring data can be leveraged to support constant visibility on multiple levels of granularity and can be consumed by the corresponding functions.¶
Three basic domains about the monitoring data originating from a system entity [RFC4949], i.e., an NSF, are highlighted in this document.¶
As with I2NSF components, every generic system entity can include a set of capabilities that creates information about some context with monitoring data (i.e., monitoring information), composition, configuration, state or behavior of that system entity. This information is intended to be provided to other consumers of information and in the scope of this document, which deals with NSF monitoring data in an automated fashion.¶
4.1. Retention and Emission
A system entity (e.g., NSF) first retains I2NSF monitoring data inside its own system before emitting the information another I2NSF component (e.g., NSF Data Collector). The I2NSF monitoring information consist of I2NSF Event, I2NSF Record, and I2NSF Counter as follows:¶
- I2NSF Event:
- I2NSF Event is defined as an important occurrence over time, that is, a change in the system being managed or a change in the environment of the system being managed. An I2NSF Event requires immediate attention and should be notified as soon as possible. When used in the context of an (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule, an I2NSF Event is used to determine whether the Condition clause of that Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. The Alarm Management Framework in [RFC3877] defines an event as something that happens which may be of interest. Examples for an event are a fault, a change in status, crossing a threshold, or an external input to the system. In the I2NSF domain, I2NSF events are created following the definition of an event in the Alarm Management Framework.¶
- I2NSF Record:
- A record is defined as an item of information that is kept to be looked at and used in the future. Unlike I2NSF Event, records do not require immediate attention but may be useful for visibility and retroactive cyber forensic. Depending on the record format, there are different qualities in regard to structure and detail. Records are typically stored in log-files or databases on a system entity or NSF. Records in the form of log-files usually include less structures but potentially more detailed information in regard to the changes of a system entity's characteristics. In contrast, databases often use more strict schemas or data models, therefore enforcing a better structure. However, they inhibit storing information that does not match those models ("closed world assumption"). Records can be continuously processed by a system entity as an I2NSF Producer and emitted with a format tailored to a certain type of record. Typically, records are information generated by a system entity (e.g., NSF) that is based on operational and informational data, that is, various changes in system characteristics. The examples of records include as user activities, network/traffic status, and network activity. They are important for debugging, auditing and security forensic of a system entity or the network having the system entity.¶
- I2NSF Counter:
- An I2NSF Counter is defined as a specific representation of continuous value changes of information elements that occur very frequently. Prominent examples are network interface counters for protocol data unit (PDU) amount, byte amount, drop counters, and error counters. Counters are useful in debugging and visibility into operational behavior of a system entity (e.g., NSF). When an NSF data collector asks for the value of a counter to it, a system entity emits¶
For the utilization of the storage space for accumulated NSF monitoring data, all of the information MUST provide the general information (e.g., timestamp) for purging existing records, which is discussed in Section 5. This document provides a YANG data model in Section 9 for the important I2NSF monitoring information that should be retained. All of the information in the data model is considered important and should be kept permanently as the information might be useful in many circumstances in the future. The allowed cases for removing some monitoring information include the following:¶
- When the system storage is full to create a fresh record [RFC4949], the oldest record can be removed.¶
- The administrator deletes existing records manually after analyzing the information in them.¶
The I2NSF monitoring information retained on a system entity (e.g., NSF) may be delivered to a corresponding I2NSF User via an NSF data collector. The information consists of the aggregated records, typically in the form of log-files or databases. For the NSF Monitoring Interface to deliver the information to the NSF data collector, the NSF needs to accommodate standardized delivery protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The NSF data collector can forward the information to the I2NSF User through one of standardized delivery protocols. The interface for this delivery is out of the scope of this document.¶
4.2. Notifications, Events, and Records
A specific task of I2NSF User is to process I2NSF Policy Rules. The rules of a policy are composed of three clauses: Event, Condition, and Action clauses. In consequence, an I2NSF Event is specified to trigger an I2NSF Policy Rule. Such an I2NSF Event is defined as any important occurrence over time in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being managed, which aligns well with the generic definition of Event from [RFC3877].¶
Another role of the I2NSF Event is to trigger a notification for monitoring the status of an NSF. A notification is defined in [RFC3877] as an unsolicited transmission of management information. System alarm (called alarm) is defined as a warning related to service degradation in system hardware in Section 6.1. System event (called alert) is defined as a warning about any changes of configuration, any access violation, the information of sessions and traffic flows in Section 6.2. Both an alarm and an alert are I2NSF Events that can be delivered as a notification. The model illustrated in this document introduces a complementary type of information that can be a conveyed notification.¶
In I2NSF monitoring, a notification is used to deliver either an event and a record via the I2NSF Monitoring Interface. The difference between the event and record is the timing by which the notifications are emitted. An event is emitted as soon as it happens in order to notify an NSF Data Collector of the problem that needs immediate attention. A record is not emitted immediately to the NSF Data Collector, and it can be emitted periodically to the NSF Data Collector every certain time interval.¶
It is important to note that an NSF Data Collector as a consumer (i.e., observer) of a notification assesses the importance of the notification rather than an NSF as a producer. The producer can include metadata in a notification that supports the observer in assessing its importance (e.g., severity).¶
4.3. Unsolicited Poll and Solicited Push
The freshness of the monitored information depends on the acquisition method. Ideally, an I2NSF User is accessing every relevant information about the I2NSF Component and is emitting I2NSF Events to an NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller) in a timely manner. Publication of events via a pubsub/broker model, peer-2-peer meshes, or static defined channels are only a few examples on how a solicited push of I2NSF Events can be facilitated. The actual mechanism implemented by an I2NSF Component is out of the scope of this document.¶
Often, the corresponding management interfaces have to be queried in intervals or on demand if required by an I2NSF Policy rule. In some cases, the collection of information has to be conducted via a login mechanism provided by a system entity. Accessing records of information via this kind of unsolicited polls can introduce a significant latency in regard to the freshness of the monitored information. The actual definition of intervals implemented by an I2NSF Component is also out of scope of this document.¶
5. Basic Information Model for Monitoring Data
As explained in the above section, there is a wealth of data available from the NSF that can be monitored. Firstly, there must be some general information with each monitoring message sent from an NSF that helps a consumer to identify meta data with that message, which are listed as below:¶
- message: The extra detail to give the context of the information.¶
- vendor-name: The name of the NSF vendor.¶
- nsf-name: The name or IP address of the NSF generating the message. If the given nsf-name is not an IP address, the name can be an arbitrary string including FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name). The name MUST be unique for different NSFs to identify the NSF that generates the message.¶
- severity: It indicates the severity level. There are total four levels, i.e., critical, high, middle, and low.¶
- timestamp: Indicates the time when the message is generated. For the notification operations (i.e., System Alarms, System Events, NSF Events, System Logs, and NSF Logs), this is represented by the eventTime of NETCONF event notification [RFC5277] For other operations (i.e., System Counter and NSF Counter), the timestamp MUST be provided separately.¶
6. Extended Information Model for Monitoring Data
This section covers the additional information associated with the system messages. The extended information model is only for the structured data such as events, record, and counters. Any unstructured data is specified with the basic information model only.¶
Each information has characteristics as follows:¶
- Acquisition method: The method to obtain the message. It can be a "query" or a "subscription". A "query" is a request-based method to acquire the solicited information. A "subscription" is a subscribe-based method to acquire the unsolicited information.¶
- Emission type: The cause type for the message to be emitted. It can be "on-change" or "periodic". An "on-change" message is emitted when an important event happens in the NSF. A "periodic" message is emitted at a certain time interval. The time to periodically emit the message is configurable.¶
- Dampening type: The type of message dampening to stop the rapid transmission of messages. The dampening types are "on-repetition" and "no-dampening". The "on-repetition" type limits the transmitted "on-change" message to one message at a certain interval. This interval is defined as dampening-period in [RFC8641]. The dampening-period is configurable. The "no-dampening" type does not limit the transmission for the messages of the same type. In short, "on-repetition" means that the dampening is active and "no-dampening" is inactive. It is recommended to activate the dampening for an "on-change" type of message to reduce the number of messages generated.¶
6.1. System Alarms
System alarms have the following characteristics:¶
6.1.1. Memory Alarm
The memory is the hardware to store information temporarily or for a short period, i.e., Random Access Memory (RAM). The memory-alarm is emitted when the RAM usage exceeds the threshold. The following information should be included in a Memory Alarm:¶
- event-name: memory-alarm.¶
- usage: specifies the size of memory used.¶
- threshold: The threshold triggering the alarm¶
- severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high, medium, and low.¶
- message: Simple information such as "The memory usage exceeded the threshold" or with extra information.¶
6.1.2. CPU Alarm
CPU is the Central Processing Unit that executes basic operations of the system. The cpu-alarm is emitted when the CPU usage exceeds the threshold. The following information should be included in a CPU Alarm:¶
6.1.3. Disk Alarm
Disk is the hardware to store information for a long period, i.e., Hard Disk or Solid-State Drive. The disk-alarm is emitted when the Disk usage exceeds the threshold. The following information should be included in a Disk Alarm:¶
- event-name: disk-alarm.¶
- usage: Specifies the size of disk space used.¶
- threshold: The threshold triggering the event.¶
- severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high, medium, and low.¶
- message: Simple information such as "The disk usage exceeded the threshold" or with extra information.¶
6.1.4. Hardware Alarm
The hardware-alarm is emitted when a hardware, e.g., CPU, memory, disk, or interface, problem is detected. The following information should be included in a Hardware Alarm:¶
- event-name: hardware-alarm.¶
- component-name: It indicates the hardware component responsible for generating this alarm.¶
- severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high, medium, and low.¶
- message: Simple information such as "The hardware component has failed or degraded" or with extra information.¶
6.1.5. Interface Alarm
Interface is the network interface for connecting a device with the network. The interface-alarm is emitted when the state of the interface is changed. The following information should be included in an Interface Alarm:¶
- event-name: interface-alarm.¶
- interface-name: The name of the interface.¶
- interface-state: down, up (not congested), congested (up but congested).¶
- severity: The severity of the alarm such as critical, high, medium, and low.¶
- message: Simple information such as "The interface is 'interface-state'" or with extra information.¶
6.2. System Events
System events (as alerts) have the following characteristics:¶
6.2.1. Access Violation
The access-violation system event is an event when a user tries to access (read or write) any information above their privilege. The following information should be included in this event:¶
- event-name: access-denied.¶
- user: Name of a user.¶
- group: Group(s) to which a user belongs. A user can belong to multiple groups.¶
- ip-address: The IP address of the user that triggered the event.¶
- authentication: The method to verify the valid user, i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.¶
- message: The message to give the context of the event, such as "Access is denied".¶
6.2.2. Configuration Change
A configuration change is a system event when a new configuration is added or an existing configuration is modified. The following information should be included in this event:¶
- event-name: config-change.¶
- user: Name of a user.¶
- group: Group(s) to which a user belongs. A user can belong to multiple groups.¶
- ip-address: The IP address of the user that triggered the event.¶
- authentication: The method to verify the valid user, i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.¶
- message: The message to give the context of the event, such as "Configuration is modified" or "New configuration is added".¶
6.2.3. Session Table Event
The following information should be included in a Session Table Event:¶
- event-name: session-table.¶
- current-session: The number of concurrent sessions.¶
- maximum-session: The maximum number of sessions that the session table can support.¶
- threshold: The threshold triggering the event.¶
- message: The message to give the context of the event, such as "The number of session table exceeded the threshold".¶
6.2.4. Traffic Flows
Traffic flows need to be monitored because they might be used for security attacks to the network. The following information should be included in this event:¶
- src-ip: The source IPv4 or IPv6 address of the traffic flow.¶
- dst-ip: The destination IPv4 or IPv6 address of the traffic flow.¶
- src-port: The source port of the traffic flow.¶
- dst-port: The destination port of the traffic flow.¶
- protocol: The protocol of the traffic flow.¶
- arrival-rate: Arrival rate of packets of the traffic flow.¶
6.3. NSF Events
NSF events have the following characteristics:¶
6.3.1. DDoS Detection
The following information should be included in a DDoS Event:¶
- event-name: detection-ddos.¶
- attack-type: Any one of SYN flood, ACK flood, SYN-ACK flood, FIN/RST flood, TCP Connection flood, UDP flood, ICMP flood, HTTPS flood, HTTP flood, DNS query flood, DNS reply flood, SIP flood, SSL flood, and NTP amplification flood.¶
- attack-src-ip: The IP address of the source of the DDoS attack.¶
- attack-dst-ip: The network prefix with a network mask (for IPv4) or prefix length (for IPv6) of a victim under DDoS attack.¶
- dst-port: The port number that the attack traffic aims at.¶
- start-time: The time stamp indicating when the attack started.¶
- end-time: The time stamp indicating when the attack ended. If the attack is still undergoing when sending out the alarm, this field can be empty.¶
- attack-rate: The packets per second of attack traffic.¶
- attack-speed: the bits per second of attack traffic.¶
- rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered. Note that rule-name is used to match a detected NSF event with a policy rule in [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm], and also that there is no rule-name in a system event.¶
6.3.2. Virus Event
The following information should be included in a Virus Event:¶
- event-name: detection-virus.¶
- virus: Type of the virus. e.g., trojan, worm, macro virus type.¶
- virus-name: Name of the virus.¶
- dst-ip: The destination IP address of the packet where the virus is found.¶
- src-ip: The source IP address of the packet where the virus is found.¶
- src-port: The source port of the packet where the virus is found.¶
- dst-port: The destination port of the packet where the virus is found.¶
- src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the virus.¶
- dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the virus.¶
- file-type: The type of the file where the virus is hided within.¶
- file-name: The name of the file where the virus is hided within.¶
- raw-info: The information describing the packet triggering the event.¶
- rule-name: The name of the rule being triggered.¶
6.3.3. Intrusion Event
The following information should be included in an Intrusion Event:¶
- event-name: The name of the event. e.g., detection-intrusion.¶
- attack-type: Attack type, e.g., brutal force and buffer overflow.¶
- src-ip: The source IP address of the flow.¶
- dst-ip: The destination IP address of the flow.¶
- src-port:The source port number of the flow.¶
- dst-port: The destination port number of the flow¶
- src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the flow.¶
- dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the flow.¶
- protocol: The employed transport layer protocol. e.g., TCP and UDP.¶
- app: The employed application layer protocol. e.g., HTTP and FTP.¶
- rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.¶
- raw-info: The information describing the flow triggering the event.¶
6.3.4. Web Attack Event
The following information should be included in a Web Attack Alarm:¶
- event-name: The name of event. e.g., detection-web-attack.¶
- attack-type: Concrete web attack type. e.g., SQL injection, command injection, XSS, CSRF.¶
- src-ip: The source IP address of the packet.¶
- dst-ip: The destination IP address of the packet.¶
- src-port: The source port number of the packet.¶
- dst-port: The destination port number of the packet.¶
- src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the packet.¶
- dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the packet.¶
- request-method: The method of requirement. For instance, "PUT" and "GET" in HTTP.¶
- req-uri: Requested URI.¶
- response-code: The HTTP Response code.¶
- req-user-agent: The HTTP request user agent header field.¶
- req-cookies: The HTTP Cookie previously sent by the server with Set-Cookie.¶
- req-host: The domain name of the requested host.¶
- uri-category: Matched URI category.¶
- filtering-type: URL filtering type. e.g., deny-list, allow-list, and unknown.¶
- rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.¶
6.3.5. VoIP/VoLTE Event
The following information should be included in a VoIP/VoLTE Event:¶
- source-voice-id: The detected source voice Call ID for VoIP and VoLTE that violates the policy.¶
- destination-voice-id: The destination voice Call ID for VoIP and VoLTE that violates the policy.¶
- user-agent: The user agent for VoIP and VoLTE that violates the policy.¶
- src-ip: The source IP address of the VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- dst-ip: The destination IP address of the VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- src-port: The source port number of the VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- dst-port: The destination port number of VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- src-location: The source geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- dst-location: The destination geographical location (e.g., country and city) of the VoIP/VoLTE.¶
- rule-name: The name of the I2NSF Policy Rule being triggered.¶
6.4. System Logs
System log is a record that is used to monitor the activity of the user on the NSF and the status of the NSF. System logs have the following characteristics:¶
- acquisition-method: subscription¶
- emission-type: on-change or periodic¶
- dampening-type: on-repetition¶
6.4.1. Access Log
Access logs record administrators' login, logout, and operations on a device. By analyzing them, security vulnerabilities can be identified. The following information should be included in an operation report:¶
- username: The username that operates on the device.¶
- login-ip: IP address used by an administrator to log in.¶
- login-mode: Specifies the administrator logs in mode e.g. administrator, user, and guest.¶
- operation-type: The operation type that the administrator execute, e.g., login, logout, configuration, and other.¶
- input: The operation performed by a user after login. The operation is a command given by a user.¶
- output: The result after executing the input.¶
6.4.2. Resource Utilization Log
Running reports record the device system's running status, which is useful for device monitoring. The following information should be included in running report:¶
- system-status: The current system's running status.¶
- cpu-usage: Specifies the aggregated CPU usage.¶
- memory-usage: Specifies the memory usage.¶
- disk-id: Specifies the disk ID to identify the storage disk.¶
- disk-usage: Specifies the disk usage of disk-id.¶
- disk-left: Specifies the available disk space left of disk-id.¶
- session-number: Specifies total concurrent sessions.¶
- process-number: Specifies total number of systems processes.¶
- interface-id: Specifies the interface ID to identify the network interface.¶
- in-traffic-rate: The total inbound traffic rate in packets per second.¶
- out-traffic-rate: The total outbound traffic rate in packets per second.¶
- in-traffic-speed: The total inbound traffic speed in bits per second.¶
- out-traffic-speed: The total outbound traffic speed in bits per second.¶
6.4.3. User Activity Log
User activity logs provide visibility into users' online records (such as login time, online/lockout duration, and login IP addresses) and the actions that users perform. User activity reports are helpful to identify exceptions during a user's login and network access activities.¶
- user: Name of a user.¶
- group: Group to which a user belongs.¶
- login-ip-addr: Login IP address of a user.¶
- authentication: The method to verify the valid user, i.e., pre-configured-key and certificate-authority.¶
- online-duration: The duration of a user's activeness (stays in login) during a session.¶
- logout-duration: The duration of a user's inactiveness (not in login) from the last session.¶
-
additional-info: Additional Information for login:¶
6.5. NSF Logs
NSF logs have the folowing characteristics:¶
6.5.1. Deep Packet Inspection Log
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Logs provide statistics on uploaded and downloaded files and data, sent and received emails, and alert and blocking records on websites. It is helpful to learn risky user behaviors and why access to some URLs is blocked or allowed with an alert record.¶
- attack-type: DPI action types. e.g., File Blocking, Data Filtering, and Application Behavior Control.¶
- src-user: User source who generates the policy.¶
- policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.¶
- action: Action defined in the file blocking rule, data filtering rule, or application behavior control rule that traffic matches.¶
6.6. System Counter
System counter has the following characteristics:¶
6.6.1. Interface Counter
Interface counters provide visibility into traffic into and out of an NSF, and bandwidth usage. The statistics of the interface counters should be computed from the start of the service. When the service is reset, the computation of statistics per counter should restart from 0.¶
- interface-name: Network interface name configured in NSF.¶
- in-total-traffic-pkts: Total inbound packets.¶
- out-total-traffic-pkts: Total outbound packets.¶
- in-total-traffic-bytes: Total inbound bytes.¶
- out-total-traffic-bytes: Total outbound bytes.¶
- in-drop-traffic-pkts: Total inbound drop packets.¶
- out-drop-traffic-pkts: Total outbound drop packets.¶
- in-drop-traffic-bytes: Total inbound drop bytes.¶
- out-drop-traffic-bytes: Total outbound drop bytes.¶
- in-traffic-average-rate: Inbound traffic average rate in packets per second.¶
- in-traffic-peak-rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.¶
- in-traffic-average-speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bits per second.¶
- in-traffic-peak-speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.¶
- out-traffic-average-rate: Outbound traffic average rate in packets per second.¶
- out-traffic-peak-rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.¶
- out-traffic-average-speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bits per second.¶
- out-traffic-peak-speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.¶
6.7. NSF Counters
NSF counters have the following characteristics:¶
6.7.1. Firewall Counter
Firewall counters provide visibility into traffic signatures, bandwidth usage, and how the configured security and bandwidth policies have been applied.¶
- src-ip: Source IP address of traffic.¶
- src-user: User who generates the policy.¶
- dst-ip: Destination IP address of traffic.¶
- src-port: Source port of traffic.¶
- dst-port: Destination port of traffic.¶
- protocol: Protocol type of traffic.¶
- app: Application type of traffic.¶
- policy-id: Security policy id that traffic matches.¶
- policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.¶
- in-interface: Inbound interface of traffic.¶
- out-interface: Outbound interface of traffic.¶
- total-traffic: Total traffic volume.¶
- in-traffic-average-rate: Inbound traffic average rate in packets per second.¶
- in-traffic-peak-rate: Inbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.¶
- in-traffic-average-speed: Inbound traffic average speed in bits per second.¶
- in-traffic-peak-speed: Inbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.¶
- out-traffic-average-rate: Outbound traffic average rate in packets per second.¶
- out-traffic-peak-rate: Outbound traffic peak rate in packets per second.¶
- out-traffic-average-speed: Outbound traffic average speed in bits per second.¶
- out-traffic-peak-speed: Outbound traffic peak speed in bits per second.¶
6.7.2. Policy Hit Counter
Policy Hit Counters record the security policy that traffic matches and its hit count. It can check if policy configurations are correct.¶
- src-ip: Source IP address of traffic.¶
- src-user: User who generates the policy.¶
- dst-ip: Destination IP address of traffic.¶
- src-port: Source port of traffic.¶
- dst-port: Destination port of traffic.¶
- protocol: Protocol type of traffic.¶
- app: Application type of traffic.¶
- policy-id: Security policy id that traffic matches.¶
- policy-name: Security policy name that traffic matches.¶
- hit-times: The hit times that the security policy matches the specified traffic.¶
7. NSF Monitoring Management in I2NSF
A standard model for monitoring data is required for an administrator to check the monitoring data generated by an NSF. The administrator can check the monitoring data through the following process. When the NSF monitoring data that is under the standard format is generated, the NSF forwards it to an NSF data collector via the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface. The NSF data collector delivers it to I2NSF Consumer or Developer's Management System (DMS) so that the administrator can know the state of the I2NSF framework.¶
In order to communicate with other components, an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] requires the interfaces. The three main interfaces in I2NSF framework are used for sending monitoring data as follows:¶
- I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm]: When an I2NSF User makes a security policy and forwards it to the Security Controller via Consumer-Facing Interface, it can specify the threat-feed for threat prevention, the custom list, the malicious code scan group, and the event map group. They can be used as an event to be monitored by an NSF.¶
- I2NSF Registration Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm]: The Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) architecture provides the lifecycle management of a Virtual Network Function (VNF) via the Ve-Vnfm interface. The role of Ve-Vnfm is to request VNF lifecycle management (e.g., the instantiation and de-instantiation of an NSF, and load balancing among NSFs), exchange configuration information, and exchange status information for a network service. In the I2NSF framework, the DMS manages data about resource states and network traffic for the lifecycle management of an NSF. Therefore, the generated monitoring data from NSFs are delivered from the NSF data collector to the DMS via either Registration Interface or a new interface (e.g., NSF Monitoring Interface). These data are delivered from the DMS to the VNF Manager in the Management and Orchestration (MANO) in the NFV system [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-applicability].¶
- I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface [RFC8329]: After a high-level security policy from I2NSF User is translated by security policy translator [I-D.yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation] in the Security Controller, the translated security policy (i.e., low-level policy) is applied to an NSF via NSF-Facing Interface. The monitoring interface data model for an NSF specifies the list of events that can trigger Event-Condition-Action (ECA) policies via NSF Monitoring Interface.¶
8. Tree Structure
The tree structure of the NSF monitoring YANG module is provided below:¶
9. YANG Data Model
This section describes a YANG module of I2NSF NSF Monitoring. The data model provided in this document uses identities to be used to get information of the monitored of an NSF's monitoring data. Every identity used in the document gives information or status about the current situation of an NSF. This YANG module imports from [RFC6991], and makes references to [RFC0768][RFC0791] [RFC0792][RFC0793][RFC0854] [RFC1939][RFC0959] [RFC3501][RFC4340][RFC4443] [RFC4960][RFC5231][RFC7230] [RFC7231][RFC8200][RFC8641] [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis] [IANA-HTTP-Status-Code] [IANA-Media-Types].¶
10. I2NSF Event Stream
This section discusses the NETCONF event stream for I2NSF NSF Monitoring subscription. The YANG module in this document supports "ietf-subscribed-notifications" YANG module [RFC8639] for subscription. The reserved event stream name for this document is "I2NSF-Monitoring". The NETCONF Server (e.g., an NSF) MUST support "I2NSF-Monitoring" event stream for an NSF data collector (e.g., Security Controller). The "I2NSF-Monitoring" event stream contains all I2NSF events described in this document. The following example shows the capabilities of the event streams of an NSF (e.g., "NETCONF" and "I2NSF-Monitoring" event streams) by the subscription of an NSF data collector; note that this example XML file is delivered by an NSF to an NSF data collector. The XML examples in this document follow the line breaks as per [RFC8792].¶
11. XML Examples for I2NSF NSF Monitoring
This section shows the XML examples of I2NSF NSF Monitoring data delivered via Monitoring Interface from an NSF.¶
11.1. I2NSF System Detection Alarm
The following example shows an alarm triggered by Memory Usage of the server; note that this example XML file is delivered by an NSF to an NSF data collector:¶
The XML data above shows:¶
- The NSF that sends the information is named "time_based_firewall".¶
- The memory usage of the NSF triggered the alarm.¶
- The monitoring information is received by subscription method.¶
- The monitoring information is emitted "on-change".¶
- The monitoring information is dampened "on-repetition".¶
- The memory usage of the NSF is 91 percent.¶
- The memory threshold to trigger the alarm is 90 percent.¶
- The severity level of the notification is high.¶
11.2. I2NSF Interface Counters
To get the I2NSF system interface counters information by query, NETCONF Client (e.g., NSF data collector) needs to initiate GET connection with NETCONF Server (e.g., NSF). The following XML file can be used to get the state data and filter the information.¶
The following XML file shows the reply from the NETCONF Server (e.g., NSF):¶
12. IANA Considerations
This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:¶
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.¶
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525]:¶
name: ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring prefix: nsfmi reference: RFC XXXX // RFC Ed.: replace XXXX with an actual RFC number and remove // this note.¶
13. Security Considerations
YANG module described in this document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].¶
The NETCONF access control model [RFC8341] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.¶
All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created, modified and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive as they all could potentially impact security monitoring and mitigation activities. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) applied to these data nodes without proper protection could result in missed alarms or incorrect alarms information being returned to the NSF data collector. There are threats that need to be considered and mitigated:¶
- Compromised NSF with valid credentials:
- It can send falsified information to the NSF data collector to mislead detection or mitigation activities; and/or to hide activity. Currently, there is no in-framework mechanism to mitigate this and an issue for all monitoring infrastructures. It is important to keep the enclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons to mitigate the possibility of compromising the NSF with this information.¶
- Compromised NSF data collector with valid credentials:
- It has visibility to all collected security alarms; entire detection and mitigation infrastructure may be suspect. It is important to keep the enclosure of confidential information to unauthorized persons to mitigate the possibility of compromising the NSF with this information.¶
- Impersonating NSF:
- It is a system trying to send false information while imitating an NSF; client authentication would help the NSF data collector to identify this invalid NSF in the "push" model (NSF-to-collector), while the "pull" model (collector-to-NSF) should already be addressed with the authentication.¶
- Impersonating NSF data collector:
- It is a rogue NSF data collector with which a legitimate NSF is tricked into communicating; for "push" model (NSF-to-collector), it is important to have valid credentials, without it it should not work; for "pull" model (collector-to-NSF), mutual authentication should be used to mitigate the threat.¶
In addition, to defend against the DDoS attack caused by a lot of NSFs sending massive notifications to the NSF data collector, the rate limiting or similar mechanisms should be considered in both an NSF and NSF data collector, whether in advance or just in the process of DDoS attack.¶
All of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered vulnerable in some network environments. Some data also may contain private information that is highly sensitive to the user, such as the IP address of a user in the container "i2nsf-system-user-activity-log" and the container "i2nsf-system-detection-event". It is important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or notification) to the data nodes. If access control is not properly configured, it can expose system internals to those who should not have access to this information.¶
14. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Provisioning). This work was supported in part by the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based Network Management Automation Technology). This work was supported in part by the MSIT under the Information Technology Research Center (ITRC) support program (IITP-2021-2017-0-01633) supervised by the IITP.¶
15. Contributors
This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions.¶
The following are co-authors of this document:¶
Chaehong Chung Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: darkhong@skku.edu¶
Jinyong (Tim) Kim Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: timkim@skku.edu¶
Dongjin Hong Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering Sungkyunkwan University 2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419 Republic of Korea EMail: dong.jin@skku.edu¶
Dacheng Zhang Huawei EMail: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com¶
Yi Wu Aliababa Group EMail: anren.wy@alibaba-inc.com¶
Rakesh Kumar Juniper Networks 1133 Innovation Way Sunnyvale, CA 94089 USA EMail: rkkumar@juniper.net¶
Anil Lohiya Juniper Networks EMail: alohiya@juniper.net¶
16. References
16.1. Normative References
- [RFC0768]
- Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
- [RFC0791]
- Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
- [RFC0792]
- Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5, RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
- [RFC0793]
- Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
- [RFC0854]
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.
- [RFC0959]
- Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.
- [RFC1939]
- Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", STD 53, RFC 1939, DOI 10.17487/RFC1939, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1939>.
- [RFC2119]
- Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
- [RFC3501]
- Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.
- [RFC3688]
- Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
- [RFC3877]
- Chisholm, S. and D. Romascanu, "Alarm Management Information Base (MIB)", RFC 3877, DOI 10.17487/RFC3877, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3877>.
- [RFC4340]
- Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", RFC 4340, DOI 10.17487/RFC4340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4340>.
- [RFC4443]
- Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89, RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
- [RFC4960]
- Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
- [RFC5231]
- Segmuller, W. and B. Leiba, "Sieve Email Filtering: Relational Extension", RFC 5231, DOI 10.17487/RFC5231, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5231>.
- [RFC5277]
- Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event Notifications", RFC 5277, DOI 10.17487/RFC5277, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5277>.
- [RFC6241]
- Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
- [RFC6242]
- Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
- [RFC6991]
- Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
- [RFC7230]
- Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
- [RFC7231]
- Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
- [RFC7950]
- Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
- [RFC8040]
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
- [RFC8174]
- Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
- [RFC8200]
- Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
- [RFC8340]
- Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
- [RFC8341]
- Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
- [RFC8342]
- Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
- [RFC8407]
- Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407, DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.
- [RFC8446]
- Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
- [RFC8525]
- Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525, DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.
- [RFC8639]
- Voit, E., Clemm, A., Gonzalez Prieto, A., Nilsen-Nygaard, E., and A. Tripathy, "Subscription to YANG Notifications", RFC 8639, DOI 10.17487/RFC8639, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8639>.
- [RFC8641]
- Clemm, A. and E. Voit, "Subscription to YANG Notifications for Datastore Updates", RFC 8641, DOI 10.17487/RFC8641, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8641>.
16.2. Informative References
- [RFC4949]
- Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
- [RFC8329]
- Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.
- [RFC8792]
- Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm]
- Jeong, J. (., Chung, C., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-14, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-14.txt>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm]
- Kim, J. (., Jeong, J. (., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-13, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-13.txt>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm]
- Hyun, S., Jeong, J. P., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm-11, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm-11.txt>.
- [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-applicability]
- Jeong, J. P., Hyun, S., Ahn, T., Hares, S., and D. R. Lopez, "Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-Based Security Services", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18.txt>.
- [I-D.yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation]
- Jeong, J. (., Lingga, P., Yang, J., and C. Chung, "Security Policy Translation in Interface to Network Security Functions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation-09, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-yang-i2nsf-security-policy-translation-09.txt>.
- [I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis]
- Eddy, W. M., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis-25.txt>.
- [IANA-HTTP-Status-Code]
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Status Code Registry", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-status-codes/http-status-codes.xhtml>.
- [IANA-Media-Types]
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "Media Types", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types/media-types.xhtml>.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09
The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model-09:¶