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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 rfc6472                                  
Network Working Group                                          W. Kumari
Internet-Draft                                              Google, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                                 K. Sriram
Expires: October 24, 2011                                      U.S. NIST
                                                          April 22, 2011


          Deprecation of the use of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.
                  draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-sets-03

Abstract

   This document deprecates the use of the AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET
   types of the AS_PATH in BGPv4.  This is done to simplify the design
   and implementation of the BGP protocol and to make the semantics of
   the originator of a route more clear.  This will also simplify the
   design, implementation and deployment of ongoing work in the Secure
   Inter-Domain Routing Working Group.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 24, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Recommendation to Network Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Appendix A.  Proxy Aggregation without AS_SETs  . . . . . . . . . . 5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7




































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1.  Introduction

   The AS_SET path segment type of the AS_PATH attribute ([RFC4271],
   Section 4.3) is created by a router that is performing route
   aggregation and contains an unordered set of ASs that the update has
   traversed.  The AS_CONFED_SET path type ([RFC5065]) of the AS_PATH
   attribute is created by a router that is performing route aggregation
   and contains an unordered set of Member AS Numbers in the local
   confederation that the update has traversed.  It is very similar to
   AS_SETs but is used within a confederation.

   By performing aggregation, a router is, in essence, combining
   multiple existing routes into a single new route.  This type of
   aggregation blurs the semantics of what it means to originate a route
   which can cause operational issues that include reachability problems
   and traffic engineering issues.

   From analysis of past Internet routing data it is apparent that
   aggregation that involves AS_SETs is very seldom used in practice on
   the public network and, when it is used, it is usually used
   incorrectly -- reserved AS numbers ([RFC1930]) and / or only a single
   AS in the AS_SET are by far the most common case.  The reduction in
   table size provided by the aggregation is outweighed by additional
   complexity in the BGP protocol and confusion regarding what exactly
   is meant by originating a route.

   In the past AS_SET had been used in a few rare cases to allow route
   aggregation where two or more providers could form the same prefix,
   using the exact match of the others prefix in some advertisement and
   configuring the aggregation differently elsewhere.  The key to
   configuring this correctly was to form the aggregate at the border in
   the outbound BGP policy and omit prefixes from the AS that the
   aggregate was being advertised to.  The AS_SET therefore allowed this
   practice without the loss of BGP's AS_PATH loop protection.  This use
   of AS_SET served a purpose which fell in line with the original
   intended use.  Without AS_SET aggregates must always contain only
   less specific prefixes (not less than or equal to), and must never
   aggregate an exact match.  Since this practice is thought to no
   longer be widely used, it is thought to be safe to deprecate the use
   of AS_SET.


2.  Requirements notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].




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3.  Recommendation to Network Operators

   Operators are strongly advised to not generate any new announcements
   containing AS_SETs or AS_CONFED_SETs.  If they have already announced
   routes with AS_SETs or AS_CONFED_SETs in them, then they should
   withdraw and re-announce those prefixes without AS_SETs in the
   updates.  This may require undoing the aggregation that was
   previously performed, and announcing more specifics.  Route
   aggregation is possible under some conditions without the use of
   AS_SETs (please see Appendix A for relevant discussion and
   suggestions).  As with any change, the operator should understand the
   full implications of the change.

   It is worth noting that new technologies (such as those that take
   advantage of the "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
   Identifiers" ([RFC3779]) may not support routes with AS_SETs /
   AS_CONFED_SETs in them, and MAY treat as infeasible routes containing
   them.  Future BGP implementations may also do the same.

   It is expected that, even before the deployment of these
   technologies, operators may begin filtering routes that contain
   AS_SETs or AS_CONFED_SETs.


4.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions.


5.  Security Considerations

   This document discourages the use of aggregation techniques that
   create AS_SETs.  Future work will update the protocol to remove
   support for the AS_SET path segment type of the AS_PATH attribute.
   This will remove complexity and code that is not exercised very
   often, which decreases the attack surface.  This will also simplify
   the design and implementation of the RPKI and systems that will rely
   on it.


6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Tony Li, Randy Bush, John Scudder,
   Curtis Villamizar, Danny McPherson, Chris Morrow, Tom Petch, Ilya
   Varlashkin as well as Douglas Montgomery, Enke Chen, Florian Weimer,
   Jakob Heitz, John Leslie, Keyur Patel, Paul Jakma, Rob Austein, Russ
   Housley, Sandra Murphy, Steve Bellovin, Steve Kent, Steve Padgett,
   Alfred Hones, Alvaro Retana, everyone in IDR and everyone else who



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   provided input.

   Apologies to those who I may have missed, it was not intentional.


7.  Informative References

   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
              BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC5065]  Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
              System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, August 2007.


Appendix A.  Proxy Aggregation without AS_SETs

   Using the illustration in Figure 1 below, we attempt to point out how
   an aggregating AS can perform proxy aggregation without using an
   AS_SET in the aggregate announcement.

   In Figure 1, more specific prefixes p0/24, p1/24, p2/24, and p3/24
   are originated by AS-A, AS-B, AS-C, and AS-D, respectively.  AS-E and
   AS-F choose not to aggregate; they forward the more specifics to
   AS-G.  AS-G aggregates the four more specifics into a single less
   specific prefix p/22, and propagates updates in BGP to its neighbors
   (including AS-E and AS-F) to announce the p/22 prefix.  If G were to
   insert the AS_SET [A,B,C,D,E,F] in the update, then AS-E and AS-F
   will be aware of the looping possibility and not install the route
   for p/22.  The undesirable consequence here would be that AS-E would
   not have reachability to p2/24 and p3/24, and similarly AS-F would
   not have reachability to p0/24 and p1/24.  So there is a hidden
   downside of this nature in proxy aggregation with the use of AS_SET.

   Now consider the case when AS-G performs the same aggregation but
   does not use an AS_SET in the aggregate announcement.  The following
   recommendation is in order:





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   o  An AS should proxy aggregate only prefixes which belong to its
      administrative domain.

   With this recommendation in mind, we attempt to explain here how the
   data-plane looping possibility can still be avoided, and the
   reachability problem identified above is also prevented.

   In Figure 1, please take note of the aggregate announcements (without
   AS_SET) from AS-G to its neighbors.  Absent the AS_SET in the
   aggregate announcement, now AS-E and AS-F would install the route for
   p/22 via AS-G in their routing tables.  So AS-E will have
   reachability to p2/24 and p3/24, and similarly AS-F will have
   reachability to p0/24 and p1/24.  Also, the looping possibility
   between AS-E and AS-G (and likewise between AS-F and AS-G) is avoided
   provided that AS-G observes a slight caution in its aggregation
   decision and packet forwarding.  As already stated, AS-G should
   aggregate only those prefixes which belong in its admin domain, and
   secondly if any of those prefixes are withdrawn then AS-G should drop
   the route for that prefix from its FIB even though it still maintains
   the aggregation and continues to announce p/22 to its neighbors.  If
   AS-E were to withdraw a prefix (say, p1/24) then AS-G will no longer
   forward packets for that prefix to AS-E.  Hence, under said
   circumstance, even though AS-E may forward packets for p1/24 to AS-G,
   those packets will be dropped at AS-G and thus data-plane looping
   would not occur.  The other reason for recommending aggregation of
   prefixes from within the same admin domain is that in that case, the
   aggregating AS (AS-G in the example) can create a ROA (in the RPKI
   repository) for the aggregate (p/22) showing itself (AS-G) as the
   origin.






















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   p0/24--A     Update {E,A, p0/24} -->
            \   Update {E,B, p1/24} -->
             E-------------------------------\
            /   <-- Update {G, p/22}          \
   p1/24--B          (w/o AS_SET)              \
                           or                   \
             <-- Update {G,[A,B,C,D,E,F], p/22}  \
                      (with AS_SET)               \
                                                   \
                                                    \
                                                     \
                                                      \
                                                       G---------H
              <-- Update {G, p/22}                    /   --->
                   (w/o AS_SET)                      /   same aggregate
                       or                           /    update as sent
   p2/24--C   <-- Update {G,[A,B,C,D,E,F], p/22}   /     to E or F
            \      (with AS_SET)                  /
             F-----------------------------------/
            /     Update {F,C, p2/24} -->
   p3/24--D      Update {F,D, p3/24} -->

                                 Note: p0/24+p1/24+p2/24+p3/24 = p/22
                                 BGP speaker G has chosen to Aggregate

     Figure 1: Illustration for discussion of loop possibility in data
      forwarding when AS_SET is not used and how it can be mitigated.


Authors' Addresses

   Warren Kumari
   Google, Inc.
   1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Phone: +1 571 748 4373
   Email: warren@kumari.net












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   Kotikalapudi Sriram
   U.S. NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   US

   Phone: +1 301 975 3973
   Email: ksriram@nist.gov











































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