Routing Area Working Group S. Litkowski
Internet-Draft Orange
Intended status: Standards Track A. Simpson
Expires: September 12, 2017 Nokia
K. Patel
Arrcus, Inc
J. Haas
Juniper Networks
L. Yong
Huawei
March 11, 2017
Applying BGP flowspec rules on a specific interface set
draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-interfaceset-03
Abstract
BGP flowspec is an extension to BGP that allows for the dissemination
of traffic flow specification rules. The primary application of this
extension is DDoS mitigation where the flowspec rules are applied in
most cases to all peering routers of the network.
This document will present another use case of BGP flowspec where
flow specifications are used to maintain some access control lists at
network boundary. BGP flowspec is a very efficient distributing
machinery that can help in saving OPEX while deploying/updating ACLs.
This new application requires flow specification rules to be applied
only on a specific subset of interfaces and in a specific direction.
The current specification of BGP flowspec ([RFC5575]) introduces the
notion of flow specification (which describes the matching criterion)
and traffic filtering actions. The flow specification is encoded as
part of the NLRI while the traffic filtering actions are encoded as
extended communities. The combination of a flow specification and
one or more actions is known as a flow specification rule. [RFC5575]
does not detail where the flow specification rules need to be
applied.
Besides the flow specification and traffic filtering actions, this
document introduces the notion of traffic filtering scope in order to
drive where a particular rule must be applied. In particular, this
document introduces the "interface-set" traffic filtering scope that
could be used in parallel of traffic filtering actions (marking,
rate-limiting ...). The purpose of this extension is to inform
remote routers about groups of interfaces where the rule must be
applied.
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This extension can also be used in a DDoS mitigation context where a
provider wants to apply the filtering only on specific peers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Use case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Specific filtering for DDoS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. ACL maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Collaborative filtering and managing filter direction . . . . 5
3. Traffic filtering scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Interface specific filtering using BGP flowspec . . . . . . . 7
5. Interface-set extended community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Handling rules from different sources in the processing pipe 9
6.1. Combining Policy Based Routing with BGP flowspec and
interface-set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Combining flow collection with BGP flowspec and
interface-set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Scaling of per interface rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Deployment considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.1. FlowSpec Transitive Extended Communities . . . . . . . . 13
11.2. FlowSpec Non-Transitive Extended Communities . . . . . . 13
11.3. FlowSpec interface-set Extended Community . . . . . . . 13
11.4. Allocation Advice to IANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Use case
1.1. Specific filtering for DDoS
----------------- --- (ebgp) - Peer3 (BW 10G)
/ \/
| /|
| PE --- (ebgp) - Transit1(BW 4x10G)
Cust1 --- (ebgp) --- PE |
| PE ---- (ebgp) - Peer2 (BW 4*10G)
| \|
Cust2 --- (ebgp) --- PE |----- (ebgp) - Customer3
/| |
Peer1(BW10G)-(ebgp) | PE --- (ebgp) - Transit2(BW 4x10G)
| |
\ /
------------------
Figure 1
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The figure 1 above displays a typical service provider Internet
network owing Customers, Peers and Transit. To protect pro actively
against some attacks (e.g. DNS, NTP ...), the service provider may
want to deploy some rate-limiting of some flows on peers and transit
links. But depending on link bandwidth, the provider may want to
apply different rate-limiting values.
For 4*10G links peer/transit, it may want to apply a rate-limiting of
DNS flows of 1G, while on 10G links, the rate-limiting would be set
to 250Mbps. Customer interfaces must not be rate-limited.
BGP flowspec infrastructure may already be present on the network,
and all PEs may have a BGP session running flowspec address family.
The flowspec infrastructure may be reused by the service provider to
implement such rate-limiting in a very quick manner and being able to
adjust values in future quickly without having to configure each node
one by one. Using the current BGP flowspec specification, it would
not be possible to implement different rate limiter on different
interfaces of a same router. The flowspec rule is applied to all
interfaces in all directions or on some interfaces where flowspec is
activated but flowspec rule set would be the same among all
interfaces.
Section Section 4 will detail a solution to address this use case
using BGP flowspec.
1.2. ACL maintenance
--------------- --- (ebgp) - Cust4_VPN
/ \/
Cust1_INT -- (ebgp) --- PE /|
| PE ------ (ebgp) - Transit1
Cust3_VPN -- (ebgp) --- PE |
| PE ------ (ebgp) - Peer2
| \|
Cust2_INT -- (ebgp) --- PE |----- (ebgp) - Cust4_INT
/| |
Peer1 ------ (ebgp) -- | PE ------ (ebgp) - Transit2
| |
\ /
----------------
Figure 2
The figure 1 above displays a typical service provider multiservice
network owing Customers, Peers and Transit for Internet, as well as
VPN services. The service provider requires to ensure security of
its infrastructure by applying ACLs at network boundary. Maintaining
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and deploying ACLs on hundreds/thousands of routers is really painful
and time consuming and a service provider would be interested to
deploy/updates ACLs using BGP flowspec. In this scenario, depending
on the interface type (Internet customer, VPN customer, Peer, Transit
...) the content of the ACL may be different.
We foresee two main cases :
o Maintaining complete ACLs using flowspec : in this case all the
ingress ACL are maintained and deployed using BGPflowspec. See
section Section 9 for more details on security aspects.
o Requirement of a quick deployment of a new filtering term due to a
security alert : new security alerts often requires a fast
deployment of new ACL terms. Using traditional CLI and hop by hop
provisioning, such deployment takes time and network is
unprotected during this time window. Using BGP flowspec to deploy
such rule, a service provider can protect its network in few
seconds. Then the SP can decide to keep the rule permanently in
BGP flowspec or update its ACL or remove the entry (in case
equipments are not vulnerable anymore).
Section Section 4 will detail a solution to address this use case
using BGP flowspec.
2. Collaborative filtering and managing filter direction
[RFC5575] states in Section 5. : "This mechanism is primarily
designed to allow an upstream autonomous system to perform inbound
filtering in their ingress routers of traffic that a given downstream
AS wishes to drop.".
In case of networks collaborating in filtering, there is a use case
for performing outbound filtering. Outbound filtering allows to
apply traffic action one step before and so may allow to prevent
impact like congestions.
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----------------------
/ \
| Upstream provider |
\ /
-----------------------
| |
|P2 |P1
----------------------
/ \
| MyAS |
\ /
-----------------------
Figure 3
In the figure above, MyAS is connected to an upstream provider. If a
malicious traffic comes in from the upstream provider, it may
congestion P1 or P2 links. If MyAS apply inbound filtering on P1/P2
using BGP flowspec, the congestion issue will not be solved.
Using collaborative filtering, the upstream provider may propose to
MyAS to filter malicious traffic sent to it. We propose to enhance
[RFC5575] to make myAS able to send BGP flowspec updates (on eBGP
sessions) to the upstream provider to request outbound filtering on
peering interfaces towards MyAS. When the upstream provider will
receive the BGP flowspec update from MyAS, the BGP flowspec update
will contain request for outbound filtering on a specific set of
interfaces. The upstream provider will apply automatically the
requested filter and congestion will be prevented.
3. Traffic filtering scope
We see with the use case described above that some BGP flowspec rules
may need to be applied only on specific elements of the network
(interfaces, nodes ...). The basic specification detailed in
[RFC5575] does not address this and does not give any detail on where
the traffic filtering rule need to be applied.
In addition to the flow specification (flow matching criterion) and
traffic filtering actions described in [RFC5575], this document
introduces the notion of traffic filtering scope. The traffic
filtering scope will describe where a particular flow specification
rule must be applied.
Using a traffic filtering scope in a BGP flowspec rule is optional.
When a rule does not contain any traffic filtering scope parameter,
[RFC5575] applies.
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4. Interface specific filtering using BGP flowspec
The use case detailed above requires application of different BGP
flowspec rules on different set of interfaces.
We propose to introduce, within BGP flowspec, a traffic filtering
scope that identifies a group of interfaces where a particular filter
should apply on. Identification of interfaces within BGP flowspec
will be done through group identifiers. A group identifier marks a
set of interfaces sharing a common administrative property. Like a
BGP community, the group identifier itself does not have any
significance. It is up to the network administrator to associate a
particular meaning to a group identifier value (e.g. group ID#1
associated to Internet customer interfaces). The group identifier is
a local interface property. Any interface may be associated with one
or more group identifiers using manual configuration.
When a filtering rule advertised through BGP flowspec must be applied
only to particular sets of interfaces, the BGP flowspec BGP update
will contain the identifiers associated with the relevant sets of
interfaces. In addition to the group identifiers, it will also
contain the direction the filtering rule must be applied in (see
Section 5).
Configuration of group identifiers associated to interfaces may
change over time. An implementation MUST ensure that the filtering
rules (learned from BGP flowspec) applied to a particular interface
are always updated when the group identifier mapping is changing.
Considering figure 2, we can imagine the following design :
o Internet customer interfaces are associated with group-identifier
1.
o VPN customer interfaces are associated with group-identifier 2.
o All customer interfaces are associated with group-identifier 3.
o Peer interfaces are associated with group-identifier 4.
o Transit interfaces are associated with group-identifier 5.
o All external provider interfaces are associated with group-
identifier 6.
o All interfaces are associated with group-identifier 7.
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If the service provider wants to deploy a specific inbound filtering
on external provider interfaces only, the provider can send the BGP
flow specification using group-identifier 6 and including inbound
direction.
There are some cases where nodes are dedicated to specific functions
(Internet peering, Internet Edge, VPN Edge, Service Edge ...), in
this kind of scenario, there is an interest for a constrained
distribution of filtering rules that are using the interface specific
filtering. Without the constrained route distribution, all nodes
will received all the filters even if they are not interested in
those filters. Constrained route distribution of flowspec filters
would allow for a more optimized distribution.
5. Interface-set extended community
This document proposes a new BGP Route Target extended community
called "flowspec interface-set". This document so expands the
definition of the Route Target extended community to allow a new
value of high order octet (Type field) to be TBD (in addition to the
values specified in [RFC4360]).
In order to ease intra-AS and inter-AS use cases, this document
proposes to have a transitive as well as a non transitive version of
this extended community.
This new BGP Route Target extended community is encoded as follows :
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type (TBD) | 0x02 | Autonomous System Number :
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
: AS Number (cont.) |O|I| Group Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The flags are :
o O : if set, the flow specification rule MUST be applied in
outbound direction to the interface set referenced by the
following group-identifier.
o I : if set, the flow specification rule MUST be applied in input
direction to the interface set referenced by the following group-
identifier.
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Both flags can be set at the same time in the interface-set extended
community leading to flow rule to be applied in both directions. An
interface-set extended community with both flags set to zero MUST be
treated as an error and as consequence, the flowspec update MUST be
discarded. As having no direction indicated as no sense, there is no
need to propagate the filter informations in the network.
The Group Identifier is coded as a 14-bit number (values goes from 0
to 16383).
Multiple instances of the interface-set community may be present in a
BGP update. This may appear if the flow rule need to be applied to
multiple set of interfaces.
Multiple instances of the community in a BGP update MUST be
interpreted as a "OR" operation : if a BGP update contains two
interface-set communities with group ID 1 and group ID 2, the filter
would need to be installed on interfaces belonging to Group ID 1 or
Group ID 2.
As using a Route Target, route distribution of flowspec NLRI with
interface-set may be subject to constrained distribution as defined
in [RFC4684]. Constrained route distribution for flowspec routes
using interface-set requires discussion and will be addressed in a
future revision of the document.
6. Handling rules from different sources in the processing pipe
A packet on a router may be processed by multiple rules that are
originated by different sources (e.g. statically configured, I2RS
ephemeral, BGP ephemeral ...). [RFC5575] does not provide any
guidance regarding the precedence of BGP flowspec rules compared to
other sources. A new version of BGP flowspec
[I-D.hares-idr-flowspec-v2] should address these precedence rules
definition in future.
This document only addresses the usage of "interface-set" in the
framework of [RFC5575] and the following generic rules SHOULD be used
by an implementation:
o An inbound flowspec rule using interface-set SHOULD be processed
after all existing inbound traffic processing rules (ACL, PBR,
QoS, flow collection ...) and SHOULD be applied before forwarding
decision is made.
o An outbound flowspec rule using interface-set SHOULD be processed
after all existing outbound traffic processing rules (ACL, PBR,
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QoS, flow collection ...) and SHOULD be applied after forwarding
decision has been made.
Inbound processing Forwarding Outbound processing
ACL->PBR->BGP_FS in -> Lookup -> PBR->QoS->I2RS->BGP_FS out
Example of packet processing pipe
In the example above, any BGP flowspec rule ([RFC5575]) with an
inbound interface-set is processed after all existing features (ACL,
PBR and QoS) but before the lookup is done. The outbound BGP
flowspec rules with interface-set are applied after the lookup and
after all any existing feature.
This section gives two examples of combining existing features with
BGP flowspec+interface-set attribute on an interface.
6.1. Combining Policy Based Routing with BGP flowspec and interface-set
In this example, a router has an already configured inbound policy on
an interface IF1 with the following rules:
o Static policy IN:
* Entry 1: from udp 10/8 to 11/8 port 53 then set dscp af11 and
accept
* Entry 2: from tcp 10/8 to 11/8 port 22 then set dscp af22 and
accept
* Entry 3: from tcp 10/8 to 11/8 port 80 then set dscp af11 and
accept
* Entry 4: from ip 10/8 to 11/8 then drop
In addition to this static inbound ACL, the router receives the
following unordered BGP flowspec version 1 rules with an interface-
set matching IF1.
o flowspec rules IN :
* from udp 10.0.0.1/32 to 11/8 port 53 then drop
* from tcp 10/8 to 11/8 port 80 then set dscp af32 and accept
* from udp 10/8 to 11/8 then accept
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The combination of the static inbound ACL and the inbound "interface-
set" flowspec rules should result in the following packet processing:
o a UDP flow from 10.0.0.1 to 11.0.0.2 on port 53 will be rejected:
firstly, it is allowed by the static ACL and DSCP is set to af11
but then it is dropped by the flowspec filter.
o a UDP flow from 10.0.0.2 to 11.0.0.2 on port 53 will be accepted
and DSCP will be set to af11.
o a TCP flow from 10.0.0.2 to 11.0.0.2 on port 80 will be accepted
and DSCP will be set to af32: firstly, the static PBR rule set the
DSCP to af11 and accepts the packet, then the flowspec filter
rewrites the DSCP to af32 and accepts it also.
6.2. Combining flow collection with BGP flowspec and interface-set
A router may activate flow collection features (used in collaboration
with Netflow export). Flow collection can be done at input side or
output side. When a router is configured to collect flow
informations on an inbound interface, the flow collection happens
before any BGP flowspec rule with interface-set: if a particular
packet flow is denied by a BGP flowspec rule, it will still be
collected.
The same happens if a router is configured to collect flow
informations on an outbound interface, the flow collection happens,
and then the BGP flowspec rule is applied: the flow is collected
whatever the result of the BGP flowspec rule.
7. Scaling of per interface rules
Without "interface-set", all the interfaces are using the same
flowspec filter, while with "interface-set" different interfaces may
have different flowspec filters (with different terms and actions).
Having such flowspec rules that are applied on specific interfaces
may create forwarding instructions that may be harder to share within
the forwarding plane: a particular term may be present or not in the
filter of a particular interface.
An implementation SHOULD take care about trying to keep sharing
forwarding structures as much as possible in order to limit the
scaling impact. How the implementation would do so is out of scope
of the document.
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8. Deployment considerations
There are some cases where a particular BGP flowspec NLRI may be
advertised to different interface groups with a different action.
For example, a service provider may want to discard all ICMP traffic
from customer interfaces to infrastructure addresses and want to
rate-limit the same traffic when it comes from some internal
platforms. These particular cases require ADD-PATH to be deployed in
order to ensure that all paths (NLRI+interface-set group-id+actions)
are propagated within the BGP control plane. Without ADD-PATH, only
a single "NLRI+interface-set group-id+actions" will be propagated, so
some filtering rules will never be applied.
9. Security Considerations
Managing permanent Access Control List by using BGP flowspec as
described in Section 1.2 helps in saving roll out time of such ACL.
However some ACL especially at network boundary are critical for the
network security and loosing the ACL configuration may lead to
network open for attackers.
By design, BGP flowspec rules are ephemeral : the flow rule exists in
the router while the BGP session is UP and the BGP path for the rule
is valid. We can imagine a scenario where a Service Provider is
managing the network boundary ACLs by using only flowspec. In this
scenario, if , for example, an attacker succeed to make the internal
BGP session of a router to be down , it can open all boundary ACLs on
the node, as flowspec rules will disappear due to the BGP session
down.
In reality, the chance for such attack to occur is low, as boundary
ACLs should protect the BGP session from being attacked.
In order to complement the BGP flowspec solution is such deployment
scenario and provides security against such attack, a service
provider may activate Long lived Graceful Restart
[I-D.uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence] on the BGP session owning flowspec
address family. So in case of BGP session to be down, the BGP paths
of flowspec rules would be retained and the flowspec action will be
retained.
10. Acknowledgements
Authors would like to thanks Wim Hendrickx and Robert Raszuk for
their valuable comments.
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11. IANA Considerations
11.1. FlowSpec Transitive Extended Communities
This document requests a new type from the "BGP Transitive Extended
Community Types" extended community registry from the First Come
First Served range. This type name shall be 'FlowSpec Transitive
Extended Communities'.
This document requests creation of a new registry called "FlowSpec
Transitive Extended Community Sub-Types". This registry contains
values of the second octet (the "Sub-Type" field) of an extended
community when the value of the first octet (the "Type" field) is the
value allocated in this document. The registration procedure for
values in this registry shall be First Come First Served.
11.2. FlowSpec Non-Transitive Extended Communities
This document requests a new type from the "BGP Non-Transitive
Extended Community Types" extended community registry from the First
Come First Served range. This type name shall be 'FlowSpec Non-
Transitive Extended Communities'.
This document requests creation of a new registry called "FlowSpec
Non-Transitive Extended Community Sub-Types". This registry contains
values of the second octet (the "Sub-Type" field) of an extended
community when the value of the first octet (the "Type" field) is the
value allocated in this document. The registration procedure for
values in this registry shall be First Come First Served.
11.3. FlowSpec interface-set Extended Community
Within the two new registries above, this document requests a new
subtype (suggested value 0x02). This sub-type shall be named
"interface-set", with a reference to this document.
11.4. Allocation Advice to IANA
IANA is requested to allocate the values of the FlowSpec Transitive
and Non-Transitive Extended Communities such that their values are
identical when ignoring the second high-order bit (Transitive). See
section 2, [RFC4360]. An example allocation would be 0x09/0x49.
It is suggested to IANA that, when possible, allocations from the
FlowSpec Transitive/Non-Transitive Extended Community Sub-Types
registries are made for transitive or non-transitive versions of
features (section 2, [RFC4360]) that their code point in both
registries is identical.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-rtc-no-rt]
Rosen, E., Patel, K., Haas, J., and R. Raszuk, "Route
Target Constrained Distribution of Routes with no Route
Targets", draft-ietf-idr-rtc-no-rt-06 (work in progress),
November 2016.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC4684] Marques, P., Bonica, R., Fang, L., Martini, L., Raszuk,
R., Patel, K., and J. Guichard, "Constrained Route
Distribution for Border Gateway Protocol/MultiProtocol
Label Switching (BGP/MPLS) Internet Protocol (IP) Virtual
Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4684, DOI 10.17487/RFC4684,
November 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4684>.
[RFC5575] Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
Rules", RFC 5575, DOI 10.17487/RFC5575, August 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5575>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.hares-idr-flowspec-v2]
Hares, S., "BGP Flow Specification Version 2", draft-
hares-idr-flowspec-v2-00 (work in progress), June 2016.
[I-D.uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence]
Uttaro, J., Chen, E., Decraene, B., and J. Scudder,
"Support for Long-lived BGP Graceful Restart", draft-
uttaro-idr-bgp-persistence-03 (work in progress), November
2013.
Authors' Addresses
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Stephane Litkowski
Orange
Email: stephane.litkowski@orange.com
Adam Simpson
Nokia
Email: adam.1.simpson@nokia.com
Keyur Patel
Arrcus, Inc
Email: keyur@arrcus.com
Jeff Haas
Juniper Networks
Email: jhaas@juniper.net
Lucy Yong
Huawei
Email: lucy.yong@huawei.com
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